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[rust-lightning] / lightning / src / ln / channelmanager.rs
1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
2 // history.
3 //
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
8 // licenses.
9
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
11 //!
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
15 //!
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
19
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::{genesis_block, ChainHash};
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
24
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
28
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
32
33 use crate::chain;
34 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 use crate::events;
39 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
40 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
41 // construct one themselves.
42 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
43 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel};
44 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
45 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
46 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
47 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
48 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
49 use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters};
50 use crate::ln::msgs;
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
54 #[cfg(test)]
55 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs};
57 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
58 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
59 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
60 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
61 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
62 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
63 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
64 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
65 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
66
67 use alloc::collections::{btree_map, BTreeMap};
68
69 use crate::io;
70 use crate::prelude::*;
71 use core::{cmp, mem};
72 use core::cell::RefCell;
73 use crate::io::Read;
74 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
75 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
76 use core::time::Duration;
77 use core::ops::Deref;
78
79 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
80 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
81 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
82
83 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
84 //
85 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
86 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
87 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
88 //
89 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
90 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
91 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
92 // before we forward it.
93 //
94 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
95 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
96 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
97 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
98 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
99
100 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
101 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
102         Forward {
103                 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
104                 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
105                 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
106                 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
107         },
108         Receive {
109                 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
110                 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
111                 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
112                 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
113                 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
114                 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
115         },
116         ReceiveKeysend {
117                 /// This was added in 0.0.116 and will break deserialization on downgrades.
118                 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
119                 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
120                 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
121                 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
122                 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
123                 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
124         },
125 }
126
127 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
128 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
129         pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
130         pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
131         payment_hash: PaymentHash,
132         /// Amount received
133         pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
134         /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
135         /// may overshoot this in either case)
136         pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
137         pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
138         /// The fee being skimmed off the top of this HTLC. If this is a forward, it'll be the fee we are
139         /// skimming. If we're receiving this HTLC, it's the fee that our counterparty skimmed.
140         pub(super) skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
141 }
142
143 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
144 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
145         Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
146         Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
147 }
148
149 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
150 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
151 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
152         Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
153         Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
154 }
155
156 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
157         pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
158
159         // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
160         // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
161         // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
162         // HTLCs.
163         //
164         // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
165         prev_short_channel_id: u64,
166         prev_htlc_id: u64,
167         prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
168         prev_user_channel_id: u128,
169 }
170
171 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
172         AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
173         FailHTLC {
174                 htlc_id: u64,
175                 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
176         },
177 }
178
179 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
180 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
181 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
182         // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
183         short_channel_id: u64,
184         user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
185         htlc_id: u64,
186         incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
187         phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
188
189         // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
190         // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
191         outpoint: OutPoint,
192 }
193
194 enum OnionPayload {
195         /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
196         Invoice {
197                 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
198                 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
199                 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
200         },
201         /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
202         Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
203 }
204
205 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
206 struct ClaimableHTLC {
207         prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
208         cltv_expiry: u32,
209         /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
210         value: u64,
211         /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
212         /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
213         sender_intended_value: u64,
214         onion_payload: OnionPayload,
215         timer_ticks: u8,
216         /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
217         /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
218         total_value_received: Option<u64>,
219         /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
220         total_msat: u64,
221         /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
222         counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
223 }
224
225 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
226         fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
227                 events::ClaimedHTLC {
228                         channel_id: val.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
229                         user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
230                         cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
231                         value_msat: val.value,
232                 }
233         }
234 }
235
236 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
237 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
238 ///
239 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
240 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
241 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
242
243 impl PaymentId {
244         /// Number of bytes in the id.
245         pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
246 }
247
248 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
249         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
250                 self.0.write(w)
251         }
252 }
253
254 impl Readable for PaymentId {
255         fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
256                 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
257                 Ok(PaymentId(buf))
258         }
259 }
260
261 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
262         fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
263                 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
264         }
265 }
266
267 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
268 ///
269 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
270 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
271 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
272
273 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
274         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
275                 self.0.write(w)
276         }
277 }
278
279 impl Readable for InterceptId {
280         fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
281                 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
282                 Ok(InterceptId(buf))
283         }
284 }
285
286 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
287 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
288 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
289         PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
290         OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
291 }
292 impl SentHTLCId {
293         pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
294                 match source {
295                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
296                                 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
297                                 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
298                         },
299                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
300                                 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
301                 }
302         }
303 }
304 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
305         (0, PreviousHopData) => {
306                 (0, short_channel_id, required),
307                 (2, htlc_id, required),
308         },
309         (2, OutboundRoute) => {
310                 (0, session_priv, required),
311         };
312 );
313
314
315 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
316 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
317 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
318 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
319         PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
320         OutboundRoute {
321                 path: Path,
322                 session_priv: SecretKey,
323                 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
324                 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
325                 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
326                 payment_id: PaymentId,
327         },
328 }
329 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
330 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
331         fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
332                 match self {
333                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
334                                 0u8.hash(hasher);
335                                 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
336                         },
337                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
338                                 1u8.hash(hasher);
339                                 path.hash(hasher);
340                                 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
341                                 payment_id.hash(hasher);
342                                 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
343                         },
344                 }
345         }
346 }
347 impl HTLCSource {
348         #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
349         #[cfg(test)]
350         pub fn dummy() -> Self {
351                 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
352                         path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
353                         session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
354                         first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
355                         payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
356                 }
357         }
358
359         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
360         /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
361         /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
362         pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
363                 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
364                         *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
365                 } else {
366                         // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
367                         true
368                 }
369         }
370 }
371
372 struct InboundOnionErr {
373         err_code: u16,
374         err_data: Vec<u8>,
375         msg: &'static str,
376 }
377
378 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
379 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
380 ///
381 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
382 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
383 pub enum FailureCode {
384         /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
385         /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
386         TemporaryNodeFailure,
387         /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
388         /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
389         RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
390         /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
391         /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
392         /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
393         /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
394         IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
395         /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
396         /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
397         ///
398         /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
399         /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
400         InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
401 }
402
403 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
404     fn into(self) -> u16 {
405                 match self {
406                         FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
407                         FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
408                         FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
409                         FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
410                 }
411         }
412 }
413
414 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
415 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
416 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
417 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
418 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
419
420 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
421         err: msgs::LightningError,
422         chan_id: Option<(ChannelId, u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
423         shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
424         channel_capacity: Option<u64>,
425 }
426 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
427         #[inline]
428         fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
429                 Self {
430                         err: LightningError {
431                                 err: err.clone(),
432                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
433                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
434                                                 channel_id,
435                                                 data: err
436                                         },
437                                 },
438                         },
439                         chan_id: None,
440                         shutdown_finish: None,
441                         channel_capacity: None,
442                 }
443         }
444         #[inline]
445         fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
446                 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None, channel_capacity: None }
447         }
448         #[inline]
449         fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, channel_capacity: u64) -> Self {
450                 Self {
451                         err: LightningError {
452                                 err: err.clone(),
453                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
454                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
455                                                 channel_id,
456                                                 data: err
457                                         },
458                                 },
459                         },
460                         chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
461                         shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
462                         channel_capacity: Some(channel_capacity)
463                 }
464         }
465         #[inline]
466         fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
467                 Self {
468                         err: match err {
469                                 ChannelError::Warn(msg) =>  LightningError {
470                                         err: msg.clone(),
471                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
472                                                 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
473                                                         channel_id,
474                                                         data: msg
475                                                 },
476                                                 log_level: Level::Warn,
477                                         },
478                                 },
479                                 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
480                                         err: msg,
481                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
482                                 },
483                                 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
484                                         err: msg.clone(),
485                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
486                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
487                                                         channel_id,
488                                                         data: msg
489                                                 },
490                                         },
491                                 },
492                         },
493                         chan_id: None,
494                         shutdown_finish: None,
495                         channel_capacity: None,
496                 }
497         }
498
499         fn closes_channel(&self) -> bool {
500                 self.chan_id.is_some()
501         }
502 }
503
504 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
505 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
506 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
507 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
508 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
509
510 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
511 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
512 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
513 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
514 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
515 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
516         /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
517         CommitmentFirst,
518         /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
519         RevokeAndACKFirst,
520 }
521
522 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
523 struct ClaimingPayment {
524         amount_msat: u64,
525         payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
526         receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
527         htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
528         sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
529 }
530 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
531         (0, amount_msat, required),
532         (2, payment_purpose, required),
533         (4, receiver_node_id, required),
534         (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
535         (7, sender_intended_value, option),
536 });
537
538 struct ClaimablePayment {
539         purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
540         onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
541         htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
542 }
543
544 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
545 struct ClaimablePayments {
546         /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
547         /// failed/claimed by the user.
548         ///
549         /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
550         /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
551         ///
552         /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
553         /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
554         claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
555
556         /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
557         /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
558         /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
559         pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
560 }
561
562 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
563 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
564 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
565 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
566 enum BackgroundEvent {
567         /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
568         /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
569         /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
570         /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
571         ///
572         /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
573         /// are regenerated on startup.
574         ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
575         /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
576         /// channel to continue normal operation.
577         ///
578         /// In general this should be used rather than
579         /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
580         /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
581         /// error the other variant is acceptable.
582         ///
583         /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
584         /// are regenerated on startup.
585         MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
586                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
587                 funding_txo: OutPoint,
588                 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
589         },
590         /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
591         /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
592         /// on a channel.
593         MonitorUpdatesComplete {
594                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
595                 channel_id: ChannelId,
596         },
597 }
598
599 #[derive(Debug)]
600 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
601         /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
602         /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
603         /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
604         /// event can be generated.
605         PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
606         /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
607         /// operation of another channel.
608         ///
609         /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
610         /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
611         /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
612         /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
613         /// outbound edge.
614         EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
615                 event: events::Event,
616                 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
617         },
618         /// Indicates we should immediately resume the operation of another channel, unless there is
619         /// some other reason why the channel is blocked. In practice this simply means immediately
620         /// removing the [`RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction`] provided from the blocking set.
621         ///
622         /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
623         /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
624         /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. However, we use this variant
625         /// instead of [`Self::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel`] when we discover that the claim was in
626         /// fact duplicative and we simply want to resume the outbound edge channel immediately.
627         ///
628         /// This variant should thus never be written to disk, as it is processed inline rather than
629         /// stored for later processing.
630         FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
631                 downstream_counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
632                 downstream_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
633                 blocking_action: RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
634         },
635 }
636
637 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
638         (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
639         // Note that FreeOtherChannelImmediately should never be written - we were supposed to free
640         // *immediately*. However, for simplicity we implement read/write here.
641         (1, FreeOtherChannelImmediately) => {
642                 (0, downstream_counterparty_node_id, required),
643                 (2, downstream_funding_outpoint, required),
644                 (4, blocking_action, required),
645         },
646         (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
647                 (0, event, upgradable_required),
648                 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
649                 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
650                 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
651                 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
652                 // downgrades to prior versions.
653                 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
654         },
655 );
656
657 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
658 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
659         ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
660                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
661                 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
662         },
663 }
664 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
665         (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
666                 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
667                 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
668         };
669 );
670
671 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
672 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
673 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
674 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
675         /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
676         /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
677         /// durably to disk.
678         ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
679                 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
680                 channel_id: ChannelId,
681                 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
682                 htlc_id: u64,
683         },
684 }
685
686 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
687         fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
688                 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
689                         channel_id: prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
690                         htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
691                 }
692         }
693 }
694
695 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
696         (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
697 ;);
698
699
700 /// State we hold per-peer.
701 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
702         /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
703         ///
704         /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
705         pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
706         /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
707         ///
708         /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
709         /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
710         /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
711         /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
712         pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
713         /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
714         latest_features: InitFeatures,
715         /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
716         /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
717         pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
718         /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
719         /// user but which have not yet completed.
720         ///
721         /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
722         /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
723         /// for a missing channel.
724         in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
725         /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
726         /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
727         ///
728         /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
729         /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
730         /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
731         /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
732         ///
733         /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
734         /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
735         /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
736         /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
737         /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
738         /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
739         monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
740         /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
741         /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
742         /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
743         /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
744         actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
745         /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
746         /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
747         /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
748         is_connected: bool,
749 }
750
751 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
752         /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
753         /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
754         /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
755         fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
756                 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
757                         return false
758                 }
759                 self.channel_by_id.iter().filter(|(_, phase)| matches!(phase, ChannelPhase::Funded(_))).count() == 0
760                         && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
761                         && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
762         }
763
764         // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
765         fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
766                 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
767         }
768
769         // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
770         fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
771                 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
772                         self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
773         }
774 }
775
776 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
777 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
778 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
779         /// The original OpenChannel message.
780         pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
781         /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
782         pub ticks_remaining: i32,
783 }
784
785 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
786 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
787 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
788
789 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
790 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
791 ///
792 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
793 /// here.
794 ///
795 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
796 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
797 struct PendingInboundPayment {
798         /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
799         payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
800         /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
801         /// this payment being removed.
802         expiry_time: u64,
803         /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
804         user_payment_id: u64,
805         // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
806         payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
807         min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
808 }
809
810 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
811 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
812 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
813 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
814 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
815 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
816 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
817 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
818 ///
819 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
820 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
821         Arc<M>,
822         Arc<T>,
823         Arc<KeysManager>,
824         Arc<KeysManager>,
825         Arc<KeysManager>,
826         Arc<F>,
827         Arc<DefaultRouter<
828                 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
829                 Arc<L>,
830                 Arc<RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
831                 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
832                 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
833         >>,
834         Arc<L>
835 >;
836
837 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
838 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
839 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
840 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
841 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
842 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
843 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
844 /// or, respectively, [`Router`]  for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
845 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
846 ///
847 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
848 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
849         ChannelManager<
850                 &'a M,
851                 &'b T,
852                 &'c KeysManager,
853                 &'c KeysManager,
854                 &'c KeysManager,
855                 &'d F,
856                 &'e DefaultRouter<
857                         &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
858                         &'g L,
859                         &'h RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
860                         ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
861                         ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
862                 >,
863                 &'g L
864         >;
865
866 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`].
867 ///
868 /// This is not exported to bindings users as general cover traits aren't useful in other
869 /// languages.
870 pub trait AChannelManager {
871         /// A type implementing [`chain::Watch`].
872         type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
873         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Watch`].
874         type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
875         /// A type implementing [`BroadcasterInterface`].
876         type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
877         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Broadcaster`].
878         type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
879         /// A type implementing [`EntropySource`].
880         type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
881         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::EntropySource`].
882         type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
883         /// A type implementing [`NodeSigner`].
884         type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
885         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::NodeSigner`].
886         type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
887         /// A type implementing [`WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner`].
888         type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
889         /// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`].
890         type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<Signer = Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
891         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`].
892         type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
893         /// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`].
894         type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
895         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::FeeEstimator`].
896         type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
897         /// A type implementing [`Router`].
898         type Router: Router + ?Sized;
899         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Router`].
900         type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
901         /// A type implementing [`Logger`].
902         type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
903         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Logger`].
904         type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
905         /// Returns a reference to the actual [`ChannelManager`] object.
906         fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
907 }
908
909 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
910 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
911 where
912         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
913         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
914         ES::Target: EntropySource,
915         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
916         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
917         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
918         R::Target: Router,
919         L::Target: Logger,
920 {
921         type Watch = M::Target;
922         type M = M;
923         type Broadcaster = T::Target;
924         type T = T;
925         type EntropySource = ES::Target;
926         type ES = ES;
927         type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
928         type NS = NS;
929         type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer;
930         type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
931         type SP = SP;
932         type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
933         type F = F;
934         type Router = R::Target;
935         type R = R;
936         type Logger = L::Target;
937         type L = L;
938         fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
939 }
940
941 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
942 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
943 ///
944 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
945 /// to individual Channels.
946 ///
947 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
948 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
949 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
950 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
951 ///
952 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
953 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST durably write each
954 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] before returning from
955 /// [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`] or before completing async writes. With
956 /// `ChannelManager`s, writing updates happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other
957 /// `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during the serialization process). If the
958 /// deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to
959 /// [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds
960 /// will be lost (modulo on-chain transaction fees).
961 ///
962 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
963 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
964 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
965 ///
966 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
967 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
968 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
969 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
970 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
971 ///
972 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
973 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
974 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
975 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
976 ///
977 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
978 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
979 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
980 ///
981 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
982 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
983 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
984 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
985 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
986 ///
987 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
988 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
989 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
990 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
991 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
992 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
993 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
994 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
995 //
996 // Lock order:
997 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
998 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
999 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
1000 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
1001 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
1002 //
1003 // Lock order tree:
1004 //
1005 // `total_consistency_lock`
1006 //  |
1007 //  |__`forward_htlcs`
1008 //  |   |
1009 //  |   |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
1010 //  |
1011 //  |__`per_peer_state`
1012 //  |   |
1013 //  |   |__`pending_inbound_payments`
1014 //  |       |
1015 //  |       |__`claimable_payments`
1016 //  |       |
1017 //  |       |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
1018 //  |           |
1019 //  |           |__`peer_state`
1020 //  |               |
1021 //  |               |__`id_to_peer`
1022 //  |               |
1023 //  |               |__`short_to_chan_info`
1024 //  |               |
1025 //  |               |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
1026 //  |               |
1027 //  |               |__`best_block`
1028 //  |               |
1029 //  |               |__`pending_events`
1030 //  |                   |
1031 //  |                   |__`pending_background_events`
1032 //
1033 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
1034 where
1035         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1036         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1037         ES::Target: EntropySource,
1038         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1039         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1040         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1041         R::Target: Router,
1042         L::Target: Logger,
1043 {
1044         default_configuration: UserConfig,
1045         genesis_hash: BlockHash,
1046         fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1047         chain_monitor: M,
1048         tx_broadcaster: T,
1049         #[allow(unused)]
1050         router: R,
1051
1052         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1053         #[cfg(test)]
1054         pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1055         #[cfg(not(test))]
1056         best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1057         secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1058
1059         /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1060         /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1061         /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1062         /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1063         ///
1064         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1065         pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1066
1067         /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1068         /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1069         /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1070         /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1071         /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1072         /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1073         /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1074         /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1075         ///
1076         /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1077         ///
1078         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1079         pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1080
1081         /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1082         ///
1083         /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1084         /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1085         /// and via the classic SCID.
1086         ///
1087         /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1088         /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1089         ///
1090         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1091         #[cfg(test)]
1092         pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1093         #[cfg(not(test))]
1094         forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1095         /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1096         /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1097         ///
1098         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1099         pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1100
1101         /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1102         /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1103         ///
1104         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1105         claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1106
1107         /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1108         /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1109         /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1110         /// active channel list on load.
1111         ///
1112         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1113         outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1114
1115         /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1116         ///
1117         /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
1118         /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
1119         /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
1120         ///
1121         /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1122         /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1123         /// the handling of the events.
1124         ///
1125         /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1126         /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1127         ///
1128         /// TODO:
1129         /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1130         /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1131         /// would break backwards compatability.
1132         /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1133         /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1134         /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1135         ///
1136         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1137         id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<ChannelId, PublicKey>>,
1138
1139         /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1140         ///
1141         /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1142         /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1143         /// confirmation depth.
1144         ///
1145         /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1146         /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1147         /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1148         ///
1149         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1150         #[cfg(test)]
1151         pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1152         #[cfg(not(test))]
1153         short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1154
1155         our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1156
1157         inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1158
1159         /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1160         /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1161         /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1162         ///
1163         /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1164         fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1165
1166         /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1167         /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1168         /// keeping additional state.
1169         probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1170
1171         /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1172         /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1173         /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1174         highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1175
1176         /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1177         /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1178         ///
1179         /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1180         /// are currently open with that peer.
1181         ///
1182         /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1183         /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1184         /// channels.
1185         ///
1186         /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1187         ///
1188         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1189         #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1190         per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1191         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1192         pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1193
1194         /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1195         /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1196         /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1197         /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1198         /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1199         ///
1200         /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1201         /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1202         ///
1203         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1204         #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1205         pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1206         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1207         pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1208
1209         /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1210         pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1211
1212         /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1213         /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1214         /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1215         /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1216         /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1217         ///
1218         /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1219         ///
1220         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1221         ///
1222         /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1223         pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1224         /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1225         /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1226         /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1227         /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1228         /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1229         /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1230         total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1231         /// Tracks the progress of channels going through batch funding by whether funding_signed was
1232         /// received and the monitor has been persisted.
1233         ///
1234         /// This information does not need to be persisted as funding nodes can forget
1235         /// unfunded channels upon disconnection.
1236         funding_batch_states: Mutex<BTreeMap<Txid, Vec<(ChannelId, PublicKey, bool)>>>,
1237
1238         background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1239
1240         event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
1241         needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool,
1242
1243         entropy_source: ES,
1244         node_signer: NS,
1245         signer_provider: SP,
1246
1247         logger: L,
1248 }
1249
1250 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1251 ///
1252 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1253 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1254 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1255 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1256 pub struct ChainParameters {
1257         /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1258         pub network: Network,
1259
1260         /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1261         ///
1262         /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1263         pub best_block: BestBlock,
1264 }
1265
1266 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1267 #[must_use]
1268 enum NotifyOption {
1269         DoPersist,
1270         SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1271         SkipPersistNoEvents,
1272 }
1273
1274 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1275 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1276 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1277 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1278 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1279 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1280 ///
1281 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1282 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1283 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1284 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1285         event_persist_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1286         needs_persist_flag: &'a AtomicBool,
1287         should_persist: F,
1288         // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1289         _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1290 }
1291
1292 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1293         /// Notifies any waiters and indicates that we need to persist, in addition to possibly having
1294         /// events to handle.
1295         ///
1296         /// This must always be called if the changes included a `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, as well as in
1297         /// other cases where losing the changes on restart may result in a force-close or otherwise
1298         /// isn't ideal.
1299         fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1300                 Self::optionally_notify(cm, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1301         }
1302
1303         fn optionally_notify<F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C, mut persist_check: F)
1304         -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1305                 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1306                 let force_notify = cm.get_cm().process_background_events();
1307
1308                 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1309                         event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1310                         needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1311                         should_persist: move || {
1312                                 // Pick the "most" action between `persist_check` and the background events
1313                                 // processing and return that.
1314                                 let notify = persist_check();
1315                                 match (notify, force_notify) {
1316                                         (NotifyOption::DoPersist, _) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1317                                         (_, NotifyOption::DoPersist) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1318                                         (NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents, _) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1319                                         (_, NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1320                                         _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
1321                                 }
1322                         },
1323                         _read_guard: read_guard,
1324                 }
1325         }
1326
1327         /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1328         /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first (or
1329         /// [`Self::optionally_notify`] used).
1330         fn optionally_notify_skipping_background_events<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>
1331         (cm: &'a C, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1332                 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1333
1334                 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1335                         event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1336                         needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1337                         should_persist: persist_check,
1338                         _read_guard: read_guard,
1339                 }
1340         }
1341 }
1342
1343 impl<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1344         fn drop(&mut self) {
1345                 match (self.should_persist)() {
1346                         NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
1347                                 self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
1348                                 self.event_persist_notifier.notify()
1349                         },
1350                         NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
1351                                 self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
1352                         NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
1353                 }
1354         }
1355 }
1356
1357 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1358 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1359 ///
1360 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1361 ///
1362 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1363 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1364 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1365 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1366 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1367
1368 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1369 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1370 ///
1371 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1372 ///
1373 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1374 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1375 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1376 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1377 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1378 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1379 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1380 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1381 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1382 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1383 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1384 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1385 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1386
1387 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1388 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1389 /// this value.
1390 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1391 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1392 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1393 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1394
1395 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1396 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1397 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1398 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1399 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1400 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1401 #[deny(const_err)]
1402 #[allow(dead_code)]
1403 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1404
1405 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1406 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1407 #[deny(const_err)]
1408 #[allow(dead_code)]
1409 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1410
1411 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1412 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1413
1414 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1415 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1416 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1417
1418 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1419 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1420 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1421
1422 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1423 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1424 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1425 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1426
1427 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1428 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1429 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1430
1431 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1432 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1433 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1434
1435 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1436 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1437 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1438         /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1439         pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1440         /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1441         pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1442         /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1443         /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1444         /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1445         pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1446 }
1447
1448 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1449 /// to better separate parameters.
1450 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1451 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1452         /// The node_id of our counterparty
1453         pub node_id: PublicKey,
1454         /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1455         /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1456         /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1457         pub features: InitFeatures,
1458         /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1459         /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1460         /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1461         ///
1462         /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1463         ///
1464         /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1465         pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1466         /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1467         /// payments to us through this channel.
1468         pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1469         /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1470         /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1471         /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1472         pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1473         /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1474         pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1475 }
1476
1477 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1478 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1479 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1480         /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1481         /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1482         /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1483         /// lifetime of the channel.
1484         pub channel_id: ChannelId,
1485         /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1486         pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1487         /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1488         /// our counterparty already.
1489         ///
1490         /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1491         /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1492         pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1493         /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1494         ///
1495         /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1496         pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1497         /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1498         /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1499         ///
1500         /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1501         /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1502         ///
1503         /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1504         /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1505         ///
1506         /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1507         /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1508         /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1509         /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1510         /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1511         pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1512         /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1513         /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1514         /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1515         /// `Some(0)`).
1516         ///
1517         /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1518         ///
1519         /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1520         /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1521         pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1522         /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1523         /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1524         /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1525         /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1526         ///
1527         /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1528         /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1529         ///
1530         /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1531         pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1532         /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1533         pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1534         /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1535         /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1536         /// this value on chain.
1537         ///
1538         /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1539         ///
1540         /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1541         ///
1542         /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1543         pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1544         /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
1545         /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
1546         /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
1547         /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel.  This may be zero for objects
1548         /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1549         ///
1550         /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
1551         /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
1552         /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
1553         pub user_channel_id: u128,
1554         /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1555         /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1556         ///
1557         /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1558         pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1559         /// Our total balance.  This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1560         /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1561         /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1562         ///
1563         /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1564         /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1565         /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1566         /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1567         ///
1568         /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1569         pub balance_msat: u64,
1570         /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1571         /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1572         /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1573         /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1574         ///
1575         /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1576         ///
1577         /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1578         /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1579         /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1580         pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1581         /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1582         /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1583         /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1584         /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1585         ///
1586         /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
1587         /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1588         pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1589         /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1590         /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1591         /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1592         /// route which is valid.
1593         pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1594         /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1595         /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1596         /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1597         /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1598         /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1599         ///
1600         /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1601         /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1602         /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1603         pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1604         /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1605         /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1606         /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1607         /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1608         /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1609         ///
1610         /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1611         ///
1612         /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1613         /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1614         /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1615         pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1616         /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1617         ///
1618         /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1619         pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1620         /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1621         /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1622         /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1623         /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1624         /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1625         ///
1626         /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1627         pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1628         /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1629         pub is_outbound: bool,
1630         /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1631         /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1632         /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1633         /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1634         /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1635         ///
1636         /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1637         pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1638         /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
1639         /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
1640         pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
1641         /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1642         /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1643         ///
1644         /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1645         pub is_usable: bool,
1646         /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1647         pub is_public: bool,
1648         /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1649         /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1650         pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1651         /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1652         pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1653         /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1654         ///
1655         /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1656         pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1657 }
1658
1659 impl ChannelDetails {
1660         /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1661         /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1662         /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1663         ///
1664         /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1665         /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1666         pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1667                 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1668         }
1669
1670         /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1671         /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1672         /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1673         ///
1674         /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1675         /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1676         pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1677                 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1678         }
1679
1680         fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
1681                 context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
1682                 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
1683         ) -> Self
1684         where
1685                 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1686                 F::Target: FeeEstimator
1687         {
1688                 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
1689                 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1690                         context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1691                 ChannelDetails {
1692                         channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1693                         counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1694                                 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1695                                 features: latest_features,
1696                                 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1697                                 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1698                                 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1699                                 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1700                                 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1701                                 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1702                                 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1703                                 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1704                                         Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1705                                 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1706                         },
1707                         funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1708                         // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1709                         // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1710                         channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1711                         short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1712                         outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1713                         inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1714                         channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1715                         feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1716                         unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1717                         balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1718                         inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1719                         outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1720                         next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1721                         next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1722                         user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1723                         confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1724                         confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1725                         force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1726                         is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1727                         is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1728                         is_usable: context.is_live(),
1729                         is_public: context.should_announce(),
1730                         inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1731                         inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1732                         config: Some(context.config()),
1733                         channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
1734                 }
1735         }
1736 }
1737
1738 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1739 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
1740 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
1741 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
1742 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
1743 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
1744 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
1745 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
1746         /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
1747         NotShuttingDown,
1748         /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
1749         ShutdownInitiated,
1750         /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
1751         /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
1752         ResolvingHTLCs,
1753         /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
1754         NegotiatingClosingFee,
1755         /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
1756         /// to drop the channel.
1757         ShutdownComplete,
1758 }
1759
1760 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1761 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1762 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1763 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1764         /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
1765         AwaitingInvoice {
1766                 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1767                 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1768                 payment_id: PaymentId,
1769         },
1770         /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1771         Pending {
1772                 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1773                 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1774                 payment_id: PaymentId,
1775                 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1776                 /// abandoned.
1777                 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1778                 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1779                 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1780                 total_msat: u64,
1781         },
1782         /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1783         /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1784         /// payment is removed from tracking.
1785         Fulfilled {
1786                 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1787                 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1788                 payment_id: PaymentId,
1789                 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1790                 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1791                 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1792         },
1793         /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1794         /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1795         /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1796         Abandoned {
1797                 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1798                 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1799                 payment_id: PaymentId,
1800                 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1801                 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1802         },
1803 }
1804
1805 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1806 ///
1807 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1808 #[derive(Clone)]
1809 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1810         /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1811         pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1812         /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1813         /// route hints.
1814         pub phantom_scid: u64,
1815         /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1816         pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1817 }
1818
1819 macro_rules! handle_error {
1820         ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1821                 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1822                 // entering the macro.
1823                 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1824                 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1825
1826                 match $internal {
1827                         Ok(msg) => Ok(msg),
1828                         Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish, channel_capacity }) => {
1829                                 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1830
1831                                 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1832                                         $self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1833                                         if let Some(update) = update_option {
1834                                                 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1835                                                         msg: update
1836                                                 });
1837                                         }
1838                                         if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1839                                                 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1840                                                         channel_id, user_channel_id,
1841                                                         reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() },
1842                                                         counterparty_node_id: Some($counterparty_node_id),
1843                                                         channel_capacity_sats: channel_capacity,
1844                                                 }, None));
1845                                         }
1846                                 }
1847
1848                                 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1849                                 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1850                                 } else {
1851                                         msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1852                                                 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1853                                                 action: err.action.clone()
1854                                         });
1855                                 }
1856
1857                                 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1858                                         let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1859                                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1860                                                 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1861                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1862                                         }
1863                                 }
1864
1865                                 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1866                                 Err(err)
1867                         },
1868                 }
1869         } };
1870         ($self: ident, $internal: expr) => {
1871                 match $internal {
1872                         Ok(res) => Ok(res),
1873                         Err((chan, msg_handle_err)) => {
1874                                 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1875                                 handle_error!($self, Err(msg_handle_err), counterparty_node_id).map_err(|err| (chan, err))
1876                         },
1877                 }
1878         };
1879 }
1880
1881 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1882         ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
1883                 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.channel_id());
1884                 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1885                 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
1886                         short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1887                 } else {
1888                         // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1889                         // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1890                         // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1891                         // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1892                         // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1893                         // stage.
1894                         let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1895                         debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1896                 }
1897                 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1898         }}
1899 }
1900
1901 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1902 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
1903         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
1904                 match $err {
1905                         ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1906                                 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
1907                         },
1908                         ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1909                                 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
1910                         },
1911                         ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1912                                 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
1913                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
1914                                 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
1915                                 let user_id = $channel.context.get_user_id();
1916                                 let channel_capacity_satoshis = $channel.context.get_value_satoshis();
1917
1918                                 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, user_id,
1919                                         shutdown_res, $channel_update, channel_capacity_satoshis))
1920                         },
1921                 }
1922         };
1923         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
1924                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
1925         };
1926         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
1927                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
1928         };
1929         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1930                 match $channel_phase {
1931                         ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
1932                                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
1933                         },
1934                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
1935                                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
1936                         },
1937                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
1938                                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
1939                         },
1940                 }
1941         };
1942 }
1943
1944 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
1945         ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1946                 match $res {
1947                         Ok(res) => res,
1948                         Err(e) => {
1949                                 let key = *$entry.key();
1950                                 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
1951                                 if drop {
1952                                         $entry.remove_entry();
1953                                 }
1954                                 break Err(res);
1955                         }
1956                 }
1957         }
1958 }
1959
1960 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
1961         ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1962                 match $res {
1963                         Ok(res) => res,
1964                         Err(e) => {
1965                                 let key = *$entry.key();
1966                                 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
1967                                 if drop {
1968                                         $entry.remove_entry();
1969                                 }
1970                                 return Err(res);
1971                         }
1972                 }
1973         }
1974 }
1975
1976 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
1977         ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1978                 {
1979                         let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1980                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
1981                         channel
1982                 }
1983         }
1984 }
1985
1986 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1987         ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1988                 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1989                         node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1990                         msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1991                 });
1992                 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1993                 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1994                 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1995                 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
1996                 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
1997                         "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1998                 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
1999                         let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2000                         assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2001                                 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2002                 }
2003         }}
2004 }
2005
2006 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
2007         ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2008                 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
2009                         $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
2010                                 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2011                                 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
2012                                 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2013                                 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2014                                 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
2015                         }, None));
2016                         $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
2017                 }
2018         }
2019 }
2020
2021 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
2022         ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2023                 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
2024                         debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
2025                         $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
2026                                 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2027                                 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2028                                 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2029                                 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
2030                         }, None));
2031                         $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
2032                 }
2033         }
2034 }
2035
2036 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
2037         ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2038                 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
2039                         &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
2040                         $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
2041                 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
2042                 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
2043                         // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2044                         // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
2045                         // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
2046                         // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
2047                         // now.
2048                         if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
2049                                 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2050                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2051                                         msg,
2052                                 })
2053                         } else { None }
2054                 } else { None };
2055
2056                 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
2057                         .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
2058
2059                 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
2060                         &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
2061                         updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
2062                         updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
2063                         updates.announcement_sigs);
2064                 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2065                         $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2066                 }
2067
2068                 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
2069                 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = $chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2070                 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
2071                 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
2072
2073                 // If the channel belongs to a batch funding transaction, the progress of the batch
2074                 // should be updated as we have received funding_signed and persisted the monitor.
2075                 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2076                         let mut funding_batch_states = $self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2077                         let mut batch_completed = false;
2078                         if let Some(batch_state) = funding_batch_states.get_mut(&txid) {
2079                                 let channel_state = batch_state.iter_mut().find(|(chan_id, pubkey, _)| (
2080                                         *chan_id == channel_id &&
2081                                         *pubkey == counterparty_node_id
2082                                 ));
2083                                 if let Some(channel_state) = channel_state {
2084                                         channel_state.2 = true;
2085                                 } else {
2086                                         debug_assert!(false, "Missing channel batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2087                                 }
2088                                 batch_completed = batch_state.iter().all(|(_, _, completed)| *completed);
2089                         } else {
2090                                 debug_assert!(false, "Missing batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2091                         }
2092
2093                         // When all channels in a batched funding transaction have become ready, it is not necessary
2094                         // to track the progress of the batch anymore and the state of the channels can be updated.
2095                         if batch_completed {
2096                                 let removed_batch_state = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2097                                 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2098                                 let mut batch_funding_tx = None;
2099                                 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, _) in removed_batch_state {
2100                                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2101                                                 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2102                                                 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2103                                                         batch_funding_tx = batch_funding_tx.or_else(|| chan.context.unbroadcasted_funding());
2104                                                         chan.set_batch_ready();
2105                                                         let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2106                                                         emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, chan);
2107                                                 }
2108                                         }
2109                                 }
2110                                 if let Some(tx) = batch_funding_tx {
2111                                         log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting batch funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
2112                                         $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
2113                                 }
2114                         }
2115                 }
2116
2117                 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
2118
2119                 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
2120                         $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
2121                 }
2122                 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
2123                 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2124                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2125                         $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2126                 }
2127         } }
2128 }
2129
2130 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2131         ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $completed: expr) => { {
2132                 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
2133                 match $update_res {
2134                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => {
2135                                 let err_str = "ChannelMonitor[Update] persistence failed unrecoverably. This indicates we cannot continue normal operation and must shut down.";
2136                                 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err_str);
2137                                 panic!("{}", err_str);
2138                         },
2139                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
2140                                 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
2141                                         &$chan.context.channel_id());
2142                                 false
2143                         },
2144                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
2145                                 $completed;
2146                                 true
2147                         },
2148                 }
2149         } };
2150         ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2151                 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $chan, _internal,
2152                         handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2153         };
2154         ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2155                 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2156                         .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2157                 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2158                 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2159                 // filter for uniqueness here.
2160                 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2161                         .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2162                                 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2163                                 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2164                         });
2165                 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2166                 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $chan, _internal,
2167                         {
2168                                 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2169                                 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2170                                         handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2171                                 }
2172                         })
2173         } };
2174 }
2175
2176 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2177         ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2178                 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2179                 while !processed_all_events {
2180                         if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2181                                 return;
2182                         }
2183
2184                         let mut result;
2185
2186                         {
2187                                 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2188                                 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2189                                 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2190
2191                                 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2192                                 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2193                                 result = $self.process_background_events();
2194
2195                                 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2196                                 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2197                                 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2198                                         result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2199                                 }
2200                         }
2201
2202                         let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2203                         let num_events = pending_events.len();
2204                         if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2205                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2206                         }
2207
2208                         let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2209
2210                         for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2211                                 $event_to_handle = event;
2212                                 $handle_event;
2213                                 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2214                                         post_event_actions.push(action);
2215                                 }
2216                         }
2217
2218                         {
2219                                 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2220                                 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2221                                 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2222                                 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2223                                 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2224                                 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2225                         }
2226
2227                         if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2228                                 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2229                                 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2230                                 processed_all_events = false;
2231                         }
2232
2233                         match result {
2234                                 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2235                                         $self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2236                                         $self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
2237                                 },
2238                                 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2239                                         $self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2240                                 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2241                         }
2242                 }
2243         }
2244 }
2245
2246 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2247 where
2248         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
2249         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2250         ES::Target: EntropySource,
2251         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2252         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2253         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2254         R::Target: Router,
2255         L::Target: Logger,
2256 {
2257         /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2258         ///
2259         /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2260         ///
2261         /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2262         /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2263         ///
2264         /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2265         ///
2266         /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2267         /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2268         /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2269         /// more details.
2270         ///
2271         /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2272         /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2273         /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2274         pub fn new(
2275                 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2276                 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2277                 current_timestamp: u32,
2278         ) -> Self {
2279                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2280                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2281                 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2282                 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2283                 ChannelManager {
2284                         default_configuration: config.clone(),
2285                         genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
2286                         fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2287                         chain_monitor,
2288                         tx_broadcaster,
2289                         router,
2290
2291                         best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2292
2293                         outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
2294                         pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2295                         pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2296                         forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2297                         claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
2298                         pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2299                         id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2300                         short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2301
2302                         our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2303                         secp_ctx,
2304
2305                         inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2306                         fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2307
2308                         probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2309
2310                         highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2311
2312                         per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2313
2314                         pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2315                         pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2316                         pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2317                         total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2318                         background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2319                         event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2320                         needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
2321                         funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
2322
2323                         entropy_source,
2324                         node_signer,
2325                         signer_provider,
2326
2327                         logger,
2328                 }
2329         }
2330
2331         /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2332         pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2333                 &self.default_configuration
2334         }
2335
2336         fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2337                 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2338                 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2339                 let mut i = 0;
2340                 loop {
2341                         if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2342                                 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2343                         } else {
2344                                 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2345                         }
2346                         if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2347                                 break;
2348                         }
2349                         i += 1;
2350                         if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2351                 }
2352                 outbound_scid_alias
2353         }
2354
2355         /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2356         ///
2357         /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2358         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2359         /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2360         /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2361         /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2362         ///
2363         /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2364         /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2365         ///
2366         /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2367         /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2368         /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2369         ///
2370         /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2371         /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2372         /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2373         ///
2374         /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2375         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2376         /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2377         /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2378         /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2379         /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2380         ///
2381         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2382         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2383         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2384         pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
2385                 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2386                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2387                 }
2388
2389                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2390                 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2391                 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2392
2393                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2394
2395                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2396                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2397
2398                 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2399                 let channel = {
2400                         let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2401                         let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2402                         let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2403                         match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2404                                 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2405                                 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
2406                         {
2407                                 Ok(res) => res,
2408                                 Err(e) => {
2409                                         self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2410                                         return Err(e);
2411                                 },
2412                         }
2413                 };
2414                 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
2415
2416                 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2417                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2418                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2419                                 if cfg!(fuzzing) {
2420                                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2421                                 } else {
2422                                         panic!("RNG is bad???");
2423                                 }
2424                         },
2425                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
2426                 }
2427
2428                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2429                         node_id: their_network_key,
2430                         msg: res,
2431                 });
2432                 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2433         }
2434
2435         fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2436                 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2437                 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2438                 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2439                 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2440                 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2441                 // the same channel.
2442                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2443                 {
2444                         let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2445                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2446                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2447                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2448                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2449                                 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
2450                                         .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
2451                                                 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
2452                                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
2453                                                 _ => None,
2454                                         })
2455                                         .filter(f)
2456                                         .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
2457                                                 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2458                                                         peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2459                                         })
2460                                 );
2461                         }
2462                 }
2463                 res
2464         }
2465
2466         /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2467         /// more information.
2468         pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2469                 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2470                 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2471                 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2472                 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2473                 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2474                 // the same channel.
2475                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2476                 {
2477                         let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2478                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2479                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2480                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2481                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2482                                 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
2483                                         let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
2484                                                 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2485                                         res.push(details);
2486                                 }
2487                         }
2488                 }
2489                 res
2490         }
2491
2492         /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2493         /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2494         ///
2495         /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2496         /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2497         /// are.
2498         pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2499                 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2500                 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2501                 // really wanted anyway.
2502                 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2503         }
2504
2505         /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2506         pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2507                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2508                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2509
2510                 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2511                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2512                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2513                         let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2514                         let context_to_details = |context| {
2515                                 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2516                         };
2517                         return peer_state.channel_by_id
2518                                 .iter()
2519                                 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
2520                                 .map(context_to_details)
2521                                 .collect();
2522                 }
2523                 vec![]
2524         }
2525
2526         /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2527         /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2528         ///
2529         /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2530         /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2531         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2532         ///
2533         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2534         pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2535                 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2536                         .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2537                                 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
2538                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2539                                 },
2540                                 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
2541                                 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
2542                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2543                                 },
2544                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2545                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2546                                                 payment_id: *payment_id,
2547                                                 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2548                                                 total_msat: *total_msat,
2549                                         })
2550                                 },
2551                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2552                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2553                                 },
2554                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2555                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2556                                 },
2557                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2558                         })
2559                         .collect()
2560         }
2561
2562         /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
2563         fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, context: &ChannelContext<SP>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
2564                 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2565                 match context.unbroadcasted_funding() {
2566                         Some(transaction) => {
2567                                 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2568                                         channel_id: context.channel_id(), transaction
2569                                 }, None));
2570                         },
2571                         None => {},
2572                 }
2573                 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2574                         channel_id: context.channel_id(),
2575                         user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
2576                         reason: closure_reason,
2577                         counterparty_node_id: Some(context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
2578                         channel_capacity_sats: Some(context.get_value_satoshis()),
2579                 }, None));
2580         }
2581
2582         fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2583                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2584
2585                 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
2586                 let mut shutdown_result = None;
2587                 loop {
2588                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2589
2590                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2591                                 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2592
2593                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2594                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2595
2596                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2597                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
2598                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
2599                                                 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
2600                                                 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2601                                                 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2602                                                 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) =
2603                                                         chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2604                                                 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2605
2606                                                 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2607                                                 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2608                                                 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2609                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2610                                                         node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2611                                                         msg: shutdown_msg,
2612                                                 });
2613
2614                                                 debug_assert!(monitor_update_opt.is_none() || !chan.is_shutdown(),
2615                                                         "We can't both complete shutdown and generate a monitor update");
2616
2617                                                 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2618                                                 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2619                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2620                                                                 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
2621                                                         break;
2622                                                 }
2623
2624                                                 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2625                                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
2626                                                                 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2627                                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2628                                                                                 msg: channel_update
2629                                                                         });
2630                                                                 }
2631                                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2632                                                                 shutdown_result = Some((None, Vec::new(), unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid));
2633                                                         }
2634                                                 }
2635                                                 break;
2636                                         }
2637                                 },
2638                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2639                                         // If we reach this point, it means that the channel_id either refers to an unfunded channel or
2640                                         // it does not exist for this peer. Either way, we can attempt to force-close it.
2641                                         //
2642                                         // An appropriate error will be returned for non-existence of the channel if that's the case.
2643                                         mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
2644                                         mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2645                                         return self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, false).map(|_| ())
2646                                 },
2647                         }
2648                 }
2649
2650                 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2651                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2652                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2653                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2654                 }
2655
2656                 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
2657                         self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2658                 }
2659
2660                 Ok(())
2661         }
2662
2663         /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2664         /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2665         /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2666         ///
2667         ///  * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
2668         ///    [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2669         ///    estimate.
2670         ///  * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2671         ///    transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
2672         ///    would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2673         ///    counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2674         ///
2675         /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2676         ///
2677         /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2678         /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2679         /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2680         /// channel.
2681         ///
2682         /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2683         /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2684         /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2685         /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2686         pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2687                 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2688         }
2689
2690         /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2691         /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2692         /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2693         ///
2694         /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2695         /// the channel being closed or not:
2696         ///  * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2697         ///    transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2698         ///    [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2699         ///    estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2700         ///  * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2701         ///    transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2702         ///    will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2703         ///
2704         /// The `shutdown_script` provided  will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2705         /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2706         /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2707         /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2708         ///
2709         /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2710         ///
2711         /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2712         /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2713         /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2714         /// channel.
2715         ///
2716         /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2717         /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2718         /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2719         /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2720         pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2721                 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2722         }
2723
2724         fn finish_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2725                 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2726                 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2727                 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
2728                         debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2729                 }
2730
2731                 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs, unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid) = shutdown_res;
2732                 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2733                 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2734                         let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2735                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2736                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2737                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2738                 }
2739                 if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2740                         // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2741                         // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2742                         // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2743                         // ignore the result here.
2744                         let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2745                 }
2746                 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
2747                 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2748                         let mut funding_batch_states = self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2749                         let affected_channels = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2750                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2751                         let mut has_uncompleted_channel = None;
2752                         for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, state) in affected_channels {
2753                                 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2754                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2755                                         if let Some(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id) {
2756                                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
2757                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context(), ClosureReason::FundingBatchClosure);
2758                                                 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
2759                                         }
2760                                 }
2761                                 has_uncompleted_channel = Some(has_uncompleted_channel.map_or(!state, |v| v || !state));
2762                         }
2763                         debug_assert!(
2764                                 has_uncompleted_channel.unwrap_or(true),
2765                                 "Closing a batch where all channels have completed initial monitor update",
2766                         );
2767                 }
2768                 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
2769                         self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2770                 }
2771         }
2772
2773         /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2774         /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2775         fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2776         -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2777                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2778                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2779                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2780                 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2781                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2782                         let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2783                                 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2784                         } else {
2785                                 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2786                         };
2787                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2788                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
2789                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_phase_entry.get().context(), closure_reason);
2790                                 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2791                                 mem::drop(peer_state);
2792                                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2793                                 match chan_phase {
2794                                         ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
2795                                                 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2796                                                 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2797                                         },
2798                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
2799                                                 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
2800                                                 // Unfunded channel has no update
2801                                                 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
2802                                         },
2803                                 }
2804                         } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
2805                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
2806                                 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
2807                                 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
2808                                 // events anyway.
2809                                 (None, *peer_node_id)
2810                         } else {
2811                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
2812                         }
2813                 };
2814                 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
2815                         // Try to send the `BroadcastChannelUpdate` to the peer we just force-closed on, but if
2816                         // not try to broadcast it via whatever peer we have.
2817                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2818                         let a_peer_state_opt = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2819                                 .ok_or(per_peer_state.values().next());
2820                         if let Ok(a_peer_state_mutex) = a_peer_state_opt {
2821                                 let mut a_peer_state = a_peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2822                                 a_peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2823                                         msg: update
2824                                 });
2825                         }
2826                 }
2827
2828                 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
2829         }
2830
2831         fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2832                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2833                 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2834                         Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2835                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2836                                 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2837                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2838                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2839                                                 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2840                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2841                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2842                                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2843                                                         },
2844                                                 }
2845                                         );
2846                                 }
2847                                 Ok(())
2848                         },
2849                         Err(e) => Err(e)
2850                 }
2851         }
2852
2853         /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2854         /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2855         /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2856         /// channel.
2857         pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2858         -> Result<(), APIError> {
2859                 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2860         }
2861
2862         /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2863         /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2864         /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2865         ///
2866         /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2867         /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2868         pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2869         -> Result<(), APIError> {
2870                 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2871         }
2872
2873         /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2874         /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2875         pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2876                 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2877                         let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2878                 }
2879         }
2880
2881         /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2882         /// local transaction(s).
2883         pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2884                 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2885                         let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2886                 }
2887         }
2888
2889         fn construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(
2890                 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, hop_hmac: [u8; 32],
2891                 new_packet_bytes: [u8; onion_utils::ONION_DATA_LEN], shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2892                 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
2893         ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
2894                 debug_assert!(next_packet_pubkey_opt.is_some());
2895                 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2896                         version: 0,
2897                         public_key: next_packet_pubkey_opt.unwrap_or(Err(secp256k1::Error::InvalidPublicKey)),
2898                         hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2899                         hmac: hop_hmac,
2900                 };
2901
2902                 let (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value) = match hop_data {
2903                         msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value } =>
2904                                 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value),
2905                         msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. } | msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive { .. } =>
2906                                 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2907                                         msg: "Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node",
2908                                         err_code: 0x4000 | 22,
2909                                         err_data: Vec::new(),
2910                                 }),
2911                 };
2912
2913                 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2914                         routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2915                                 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2916                                 short_channel_id,
2917                         },
2918                         payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2919                         incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2920                         incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2921                         outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward,
2922                         outgoing_cltv_value,
2923                         skimmed_fee_msat: None,
2924                 })
2925         }
2926
2927         fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(
2928                 &self, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, shared_secret: [u8; 32], payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2929                 amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>, allow_underpay: bool,
2930                 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
2931         ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
2932                 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, onion_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata) = match hop_data {
2933                         msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
2934                                 payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata, ..
2935                         } =>
2936                                 (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata),
2937                         msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive {
2938                                 amt_msat, total_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_secret, ..
2939                         } => {
2940                                 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData { payment_secret, total_msat };
2941                                 (Some(payment_data), None, Vec::new(), amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, None)
2942                         }
2943                         msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { .. } => {
2944                                 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2945                                         err_code: 0x4000|22,
2946                                         err_data: Vec::new(),
2947                                         msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2948                                 })
2949                         },
2950                 };
2951                 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2952                 if outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
2953                         return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2954                                 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
2955                                 err_code: 18,
2956                                 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2957                         })
2958                 }
2959                 // final_expiry_too_soon
2960                 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2961                 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2962                 //
2963                 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2964                 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2965                 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2966                 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2967                 if (outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2968                         let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2969                         err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2970                         err_data.extend_from_slice(&current_height.to_be_bytes());
2971                         return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2972                                 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2973                                 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2974                         });
2975                 }
2976                 if (!allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat > amt_msat) ||
2977                         (allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat >
2978                          amt_msat.saturating_add(counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)))
2979                 {
2980                         return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2981                                 err_code: 19,
2982                                 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2983                                 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2984                         });
2985                 }
2986
2987                 let routing = if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2988                         // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2989                         // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2990                         // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2991                         // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2992                         // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2993                         let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2994                         if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2995                                 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2996                                         err_code: 0x4000|22,
2997                                         err_data: Vec::new(),
2998                                         msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2999                                 });
3000                         }
3001                         if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && payment_data.is_some() {
3002                                 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
3003                                         err_code: 0x4000|22,
3004                                         err_data: Vec::new(),
3005                                         msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
3006                                 });
3007                         }
3008                         PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
3009                                 payment_data,
3010                                 payment_preimage,
3011                                 payment_metadata,
3012                                 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
3013                                 custom_tlvs,
3014                         }
3015                 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
3016                         PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
3017                                 payment_data: data,
3018                                 payment_metadata,
3019                                 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
3020                                 phantom_shared_secret,
3021                                 custom_tlvs,
3022                         }
3023                 } else {
3024                         return Err(InboundOnionErr {
3025                                 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
3026                                 err_data: Vec::new(),
3027                                 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
3028                         });
3029                 };
3030                 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
3031                         routing,
3032                         payment_hash,
3033                         incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
3034                         incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
3035                         outgoing_amt_msat: onion_amt_msat,
3036                         outgoing_cltv_value,
3037                         skimmed_fee_msat: counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
3038                 })
3039         }
3040
3041         fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
3042                 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC
3043         ) -> Result<(onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg> {
3044                 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
3045                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
3046                                 {
3047                                         log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3048                                         return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3049                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3050                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3051                                                 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
3052                                                 failure_code: $err_code,
3053                                         }));
3054                                 }
3055                         }
3056                 }
3057
3058                 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
3059                         return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
3060                 }
3061
3062                 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
3063                         Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
3064                 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3065
3066                 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
3067                         //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
3068                         //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
3069                         //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
3070                         //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
3071                         //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
3072                         //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
3073                         return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
3074                 }
3075                 macro_rules! return_err {
3076                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3077                                 {
3078                                         log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3079                                         return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3080                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3081                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3082                                                 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3083                                                         .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3084                                         }));
3085                                 }
3086                         }
3087                 }
3088
3089                 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
3090                         shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac,
3091                         msg.payment_hash, &self.node_signer
3092                 ) {
3093                         Ok(res) => res,
3094                         Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3095                                 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
3096                         },
3097                         Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3098                                 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
3099                         },
3100                 };
3101                 let (outgoing_scid, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, next_packet_pk_opt) = match next_hop {
3102                         onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
3103                                 next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward {
3104                                         short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value
3105                                 }, ..
3106                         } => {
3107                                 let next_packet_pk = onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx,
3108                                         msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &shared_secret);
3109                                 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(next_packet_pk))
3110                         },
3111                         // We'll do receive checks in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] so we have access to the
3112                         // inbound channel's state.
3113                         onion_utils::Hop::Receive { .. } => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
3114                         onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. }, .. } |
3115                                 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive { .. }, .. } =>
3116                         {
3117                                 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0; 0]);
3118                         }
3119                 };
3120
3121                 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
3122                 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
3123                 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
3124                         let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
3125                         let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
3126                                 None => { // unknown_next_peer
3127                                         // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
3128                                         // phantom or an intercept.
3129                                         if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
3130                                                 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
3131                                                 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.genesis_hash)
3132                                         {
3133                                                 None
3134                                         } else {
3135                                                 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3136                                         }
3137                                 },
3138                                 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
3139                         };
3140                         let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
3141                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3142                                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3143                                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3144                                         break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3145                                 }
3146                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3147                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3148                                 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).map(
3149                                         |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
3150                                 ).flatten() {
3151                                         None => {
3152                                                 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
3153                                                 // have no consistency guarantees.
3154                                                 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3155                                         },
3156                                         Some(chan) => chan
3157                                 };
3158                                 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
3159                                         // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
3160                                         // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
3161                                         // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
3162                                         break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3163                                 }
3164                                 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
3165                                         // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
3166                                         // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3167                                         // we don't have the channel here.
3168                                         break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3169                                 }
3170                                 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3171
3172                                 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3173                                 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3174                                 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3175                                 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3176                                 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3177                                 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3178                                         // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3179                                         // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3180                                         // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3181                                         if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3182                                                 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3183                                         } else {
3184                                                 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3185                                         }
3186                                 }
3187                                 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3188                                         break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3189                                 }
3190                                 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
3191                                         break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3192                                 }
3193                                 chan_update_opt
3194                         } else {
3195                                 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
3196                                         // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
3197                                         // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
3198                                         // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
3199                                         break Some((
3200                                                         "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
3201                                                         0x2000 | 2, None,
3202                                         ));
3203                                 }
3204                                 None
3205                         };
3206
3207                         let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3208                         // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
3209                         // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
3210                         // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
3211                         if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
3212                                 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
3213                         }
3214                         if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
3215                                 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
3216                         }
3217                         // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
3218                         // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
3219                         // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
3220                         // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
3221                         // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
3222                         // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
3223                         // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
3224                         // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
3225                         if (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
3226                                 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
3227                         }
3228
3229                         break None;
3230                 }
3231                 {
3232                         let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3233                         if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
3234                                 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3235                                         msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3236                                 }
3237                                 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3238                                         msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3239                                 }
3240                                 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3241                                         // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3242                                         0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3243                                 }
3244                                 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3245                                 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3246                                 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3247                         } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3248                                 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3249                                 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3250                                 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3251                                 // instead.
3252                                 code = 0x2000 | 2;
3253                         }
3254                         return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
3255                 }
3256                 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt))
3257         }
3258
3259         fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3260                 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, shared_secret: [u8; 32], decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop,
3261                 allow_underpay: bool, next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
3262         ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3263                 macro_rules! return_err {
3264                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3265                                 {
3266                                         log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3267                                         return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3268                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3269                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3270                                                 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3271                                                         .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3272                                         }));
3273                                 }
3274                         }
3275                 }
3276                 match decoded_hop {
3277                         onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3278                                 // OUR PAYMENT!
3279                                 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3280                                         msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat)
3281                                 {
3282                                         Ok(info) => {
3283                                                 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3284                                                 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3285                                                 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3286                                                 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3287                                                 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3288                                         },
3289                                         Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3290                                 }
3291                         },
3292                         onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3293                                 match self.construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3294                                         new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3295                                         Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3296                                         Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3297                                 }
3298                         }
3299                 }
3300         }
3301
3302         /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3303         /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3304         /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3305         ///
3306         /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3307         /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3308         /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3309         ///
3310         /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3311         /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3312         fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3313                 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3314                         return Err(LightningError {
3315                                 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3316                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3317                         });
3318                 }
3319                 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3320                         return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3321                 }
3322                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3323                 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3324         }
3325
3326         /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3327         /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3328         /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3329         /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3330         ///
3331         /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3332         /// `peer_state`  corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3333         /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3334         ///
3335         /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3336         /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3337         fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3338                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3339                 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3340                         None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3341                         Some(id) => id,
3342                 };
3343
3344                 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3345         }
3346
3347         fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3348                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3349                 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3350
3351                 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3352                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3353                         ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3354                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3355                         ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3356                 };
3357
3358                 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3359                         chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
3360                         short_channel_id,
3361                         timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3362                         flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3363                         cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3364                         htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3365                         htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3366                         fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3367                         fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3368                         excess_data: Vec::new(),
3369                 };
3370                 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3371                 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3372                 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3373                 // channel.
3374                 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3375
3376                 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3377                         signature: sig,
3378                         contents: unsigned
3379                 })
3380         }
3381
3382         #[cfg(test)]
3383         pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3384                 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3385                 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3386                         path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3387                         session_priv_bytes
3388                 })
3389         }
3390
3391         fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3392                 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3393                         path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3394                         session_priv_bytes
3395                 } = args;
3396                 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3397                 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3398
3399                 log_trace!(self.logger,
3400                         "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
3401                         payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3402                 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3403                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3404
3405                 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
3406                         .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
3407                 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
3408
3409                 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash)
3410                         .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute { err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()})?;
3411
3412                 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3413                         let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3414                                 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
3415                                 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3416                         };
3417
3418                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3419                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3420                                 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3421                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3422                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3423                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3424                                 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3425                                         ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
3426                                                 if !chan.context.is_live() {
3427                                                         return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3428                                                 }
3429                                                 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3430                                                 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3431                                                         htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3432                                                                 path: path.clone(),
3433                                                                 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3434                                                                 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3435                                                                 payment_id,
3436                                                         }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
3437                                                 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
3438                                                         Some(monitor_update) => {
3439                                                                 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3440                                                                         false => {
3441                                                                                 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3442                                                                                 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3443                                                                                 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3444                                                                                 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3445                                                                                 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3446                                                                                 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3447                                                                                 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3448                                                                         },
3449                                                                         true => {},
3450                                                                 }
3451                                                         },
3452                                                         None => {},
3453                                                 }
3454                                         },
3455                                         _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
3456                                 };
3457                         } else {
3458                                 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3459                                 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3460                                 // `channel_by_id` map.
3461                                 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3462                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3463                         }
3464                         return Ok(());
3465                 };
3466
3467                 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3468                         Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3469                         Err(e) => {
3470                                 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3471                         },
3472                 }
3473         }
3474
3475         /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3476         ///
3477         /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3478         /// fields for more info.
3479         ///
3480         /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3481         /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3482         ///
3483         /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3484         ///
3485         /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3486         /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3487         /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3488         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3489         /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3490         ///
3491         /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3492         /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3493         /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3494         /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3495         /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3496         ///
3497         /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3498         /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3499         /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3500         /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3501         ///
3502         /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3503         ///
3504         /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3505         /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3506         /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3507         ///
3508         /// In general, a path may raise:
3509         ///  * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3510         ///    node public key) is specified.
3511         ///  * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available as it has been
3512         ///    closed, doesn't exist, or the peer is currently disconnected.
3513         ///  * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3514         ///    relevant updates.
3515         ///
3516         /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3517         /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3518         /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3519         ///
3520         /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3521         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3522         /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3523         /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3524         /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3525         /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3526         pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3527                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3528                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3529                 self.pending_outbound_payments
3530                         .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3531                                 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3532                                 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3533         }
3534
3535         /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3536         /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3537         pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3538                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3539                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3540                 self.pending_outbound_payments
3541                         .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3542                                 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3543                                 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3544                                 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3545         }
3546
3547         #[cfg(test)]
3548         pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3549                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3550                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3551                 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3552                         keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3553                         best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3554         }
3555
3556         #[cfg(test)]
3557         pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3558                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3559                 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3560         }
3561
3562         #[cfg(test)]
3563         pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3564                 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3565         }
3566
3567
3568         /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3569         /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3570         /// retries are exhausted.
3571         ///
3572         /// # Event Generation
3573         ///
3574         /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3575         /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3576         ///
3577         /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3578         /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3579         /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3580         ///
3581         /// # Restart Behavior
3582         ///
3583         /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
3584         /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
3585         pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3586                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3587                 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3588         }
3589
3590         /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3591         /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3592         /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3593         /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3594         /// never reach the recipient.
3595         ///
3596         /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3597         /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3598         ///
3599         /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3600         /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3601         ///
3602         /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3603         pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3604                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3605                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3606                 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3607                         route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3608                         &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3609         }
3610
3611         /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3612         /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3613         ///
3614         /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3615         /// payments.
3616         ///
3617         /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3618         pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3619                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3620                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3621                 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3622                         payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3623                         || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),  &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3624                         &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3625         }
3626
3627         /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3628         /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3629         /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3630         pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3631                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3632                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3633                 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
3634                         &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3635                         |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3636         }
3637
3638         /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3639         /// payment probe.
3640         #[cfg(test)]
3641         pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3642                 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3643         }
3644
3645         /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
3646         /// amount to the given `node_id`.
3647         ///
3648         /// See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
3649         pub fn send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(
3650                 &self, node_id: PublicKey, amount_msat: u64, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
3651                 liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3652         ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3653                 let payment_params =
3654                         PaymentParameters::from_node_id(node_id, final_cltv_expiry_delta);
3655
3656                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, amount_msat);
3657
3658                 self.send_preflight_probes(route_params, liquidity_limit_multiplier)
3659         }
3660
3661         /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
3662         /// according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
3663         ///
3664         /// This may be used to send "pre-flight" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
3665         /// the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
3666         /// probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
3667         /// confirmation in a wallet UI.
3668         ///
3669         /// Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
3670         /// actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
3671         /// liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
3672         /// payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
3673         /// amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
3674         /// probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
3675         pub fn send_preflight_probes(
3676                 &self, route_params: RouteParameters, liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3677         ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3678                 let liquidity_limit_multiplier = liquidity_limit_multiplier.unwrap_or(3);
3679
3680                 let payer = self.get_our_node_id();
3681                 let usable_channels = self.list_usable_channels();
3682                 let first_hops = usable_channels.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
3683                 let inflight_htlcs = self.compute_inflight_htlcs();
3684
3685                 let route = self
3686                         .router
3687                         .find_route(&payer, &route_params, Some(&first_hops), inflight_htlcs)
3688                         .map_err(|e| {
3689                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to find path for payment probe: {:?}", e);
3690                                 ProbeSendFailure::RouteNotFound
3691                         })?;
3692
3693                 let mut used_liquidity_map = HashMap::with_capacity(first_hops.len());
3694
3695                 let mut res = Vec::new();
3696
3697                 for mut path in route.paths {
3698                         // If the last hop is probably an unannounced channel we refrain from probing all the
3699                         // way through to the end and instead probe up to the second-to-last channel.
3700                         while let Some(last_path_hop) = path.hops.last() {
3701                                 if last_path_hop.maybe_announced_channel {
3702                                         // We found a potentially announced last hop.
3703                                         break;
3704                                 } else {
3705                                         // Drop the last hop, as it's likely unannounced.
3706                                         log_debug!(
3707                                                 self.logger,
3708                                                 "Avoided sending payment probe all the way to last hop {} as it is likely unannounced.",
3709                                                 last_path_hop.short_channel_id
3710                                         );
3711                                         let final_value_msat = path.final_value_msat();
3712                                         path.hops.pop();
3713                                         if let Some(new_last) = path.hops.last_mut() {
3714                                                 new_last.fee_msat += final_value_msat;
3715                                         }
3716                                 }
3717                         }
3718
3719                         if path.hops.len() < 2 {
3720                                 log_debug!(
3721                                         self.logger,
3722                                         "Skipped sending payment probe over path with less than two hops."
3723                                 );
3724                                 continue;
3725                         }
3726
3727                         if let Some(first_path_hop) = path.hops.first() {
3728                                 if let Some(first_hop) = first_hops.iter().find(|h| {
3729                                         h.get_outbound_payment_scid() == Some(first_path_hop.short_channel_id)
3730                                 }) {
3731                                         let path_value = path.final_value_msat() + path.fee_msat();
3732                                         let used_liquidity =
3733                                                 used_liquidity_map.entry(first_path_hop.short_channel_id).or_insert(0);
3734
3735                                         if first_hop.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
3736                                                 < (*used_liquidity + path_value) * liquidity_limit_multiplier
3737                                         {
3738                                                 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipped sending payment probe to avoid putting channel {} under the liquidity limit.", first_path_hop.short_channel_id);
3739                                                 continue;
3740                                         } else {
3741                                                 *used_liquidity += path_value;
3742                                         }
3743                                 }
3744                         }
3745
3746                         res.push(self.send_probe(path).map_err(|e| {
3747                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to send pre-flight probe: {:?}", e);
3748                                 ProbeSendFailure::SendingFailed(e)
3749                         })?);
3750                 }
3751
3752                 Ok(res)
3753         }
3754
3755         /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3756         /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3757         fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: FnMut(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3758                 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, is_batch_funding: bool,
3759                 mut find_funding_output: FundingOutput,
3760         ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3761                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3762                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3763                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3764
3765                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3766                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3767                 let (chan, msg) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3768                         Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) => {
3769                                 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3770
3771                                 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, is_batch_funding, &self.logger)
3772                                         .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3773                                                 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3774                                                 let user_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
3775                                                 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
3776                                                 let channel_capacity = chan.context.get_value_satoshis();
3777                                                 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, channel_capacity))
3778                                         } else { unreachable!(); });
3779                                 match funding_res {
3780                                         Ok((chan, funding_msg)) => (chan, funding_msg),
3781                                         Err((chan, err)) => {
3782                                                 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3783                                                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3784
3785                                                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3786                                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3787                                                         err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3788                                                 });
3789                                         },
3790                                 }
3791                         },
3792                         Some(phase) => {
3793                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
3794                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3795                                         err: format!(
3796                                                 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
3797                                                 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3798                                 })
3799                         },
3800                         None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
3801                                 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3802                                 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3803                                 }),
3804                 };
3805
3806                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3807                         node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3808                         msg,
3809                 });
3810                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3811                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3812                                 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3813                         },
3814                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3815                                 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3816                                 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.context.channel_id(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
3817                                         panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
3818                                 }
3819                                 e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
3820                         }
3821                 }
3822                 Ok(())
3823         }
3824
3825         #[cfg(test)]
3826         pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3827                 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, false, |_, tx| {
3828                         Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3829                 })
3830         }
3831
3832         /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3833         ///
3834         /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3835         /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3836         ///
3837         /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3838         /// across the p2p network.
3839         ///
3840         /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3841         /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3842         ///
3843         /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3844         /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3845         /// keys per-channel).
3846         ///
3847         /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3848         /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3849         /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3850         ///
3851         /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3852         /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3853         /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3854         ///
3855         /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3856         /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3857         /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3858         /// for more details.
3859         ///
3860         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3861         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3862         pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3863                 self.batch_funding_transaction_generated(&[(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id)], funding_transaction)
3864         }
3865
3866         /// Call this upon creation of a batch funding transaction for the given channels.
3867         ///
3868         /// Return values are identical to [`Self::funding_transaction_generated`], respective to
3869         /// each individual channel and transaction output.
3870         ///
3871         /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. This batch funding transcaction
3872         /// will only be broadcast when we have safely received and persisted the counterparty's
3873         /// signature for each channel.
3874         ///
3875         /// If there is an error, all channels in the batch are to be considered closed.
3876         pub fn batch_funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channels: &[(&ChannelId, &PublicKey)], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3877                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3878                 let mut result = Ok(());
3879
3880                 if !funding_transaction.is_coin_base() {
3881                         for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3882                                 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3883                                         result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3884                                                 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3885                                         }));
3886                                 }
3887                         }
3888                 }
3889                 if funding_transaction.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3890                         result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3891                                 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3892                         }));
3893                 }
3894                 {
3895                         let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3896                         // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3897                         // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3898                         // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3899                         // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3900                         if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 1 {
3901                                 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3902                                         err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3903                                 }));
3904                         }
3905                 }
3906
3907                 let txid = funding_transaction.txid();
3908                 let is_batch_funding = temporary_channels.len() > 1;
3909                 let mut funding_batch_states = if is_batch_funding {
3910                         Some(self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap())
3911                 } else {
3912                         None
3913                 };
3914                 let mut funding_batch_state = funding_batch_states.as_mut().and_then(|states| {
3915                         match states.entry(txid) {
3916                                 btree_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3917                                         result = result.clone().and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3918                                                 err: "Batch funding transaction with the same txid already exists".to_owned()
3919                                         }));
3920                                         None
3921                                 },
3922                                 btree_map::Entry::Vacant(vacant) => Some(vacant.insert(Vec::new())),
3923                         }
3924                 });
3925                 for &(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in temporary_channels.iter() {
3926                         result = result.and_then(|_| self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(
3927                                 temporary_channel_id,
3928                                 counterparty_node_id,
3929                                 funding_transaction.clone(),
3930                                 is_batch_funding,
3931                                 |chan, tx| {
3932                                         let mut output_index = None;
3933                                         let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3934                                         for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3935                                                 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
3936                                                         if output_index.is_some() {
3937                                                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3938                                                                         err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3939                                                                 });
3940                                                         }
3941                                                         output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3942                                                 }
3943                                         }
3944                                         if output_index.is_none() {
3945                                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3946                                                         err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3947                                                 });
3948                                         }
3949                                         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() };
3950                                         if let Some(funding_batch_state) = funding_batch_state.as_mut() {
3951                                                 funding_batch_state.push((outpoint.to_channel_id(), *counterparty_node_id, false));
3952                                         }
3953                                         Ok(outpoint)
3954                                 })
3955                         );
3956                 }
3957                 if let Err(ref e) = result {
3958                         // Remaining channels need to be removed on any error.
3959                         let e = format!("Error in transaction funding: {:?}", e);
3960                         let mut channels_to_remove = Vec::new();
3961                         channels_to_remove.extend(funding_batch_states.as_mut()
3962                                 .and_then(|states| states.remove(&txid))
3963                                 .into_iter().flatten()
3964                                 .map(|(chan_id, node_id, _state)| (chan_id, node_id))
3965                         );
3966                         channels_to_remove.extend(temporary_channels.iter()
3967                                 .map(|(&chan_id, &node_id)| (chan_id, node_id))
3968                         );
3969                         let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
3970                         {
3971                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3972                                 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in channels_to_remove {
3973                                         per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3974                                                 .map(|peer_state_mutex| peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap())
3975                                                 .and_then(|mut peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id))
3976                                                 .map(|mut chan| {
3977                                                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
3978                                                         self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context(), ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: e.clone() });
3979                                                         shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
3980                                                 });
3981                                 }
3982                         }
3983                         for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
3984                                 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
3985                         }
3986                 }
3987                 result
3988         }
3989
3990         /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
3991         ///
3992         /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3993         /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3994         /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3995         /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3996         ///
3997         /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3998         /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3999         ///
4000         /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4001         /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4002         ///
4003         /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4004         ///
4005         /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4006         /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4007         /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4008         /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4009         /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4010         /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4011         /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4012         pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
4013                 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
4014         ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4015                 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
4016                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4017                                 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
4018                         });
4019                 }
4020
4021                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4022                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4023                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4024                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4025                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4026                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4027                 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4028                         if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
4029                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4030                                         err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4031                                 });
4032                         };
4033                 }
4034                 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4035                         if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
4036                                 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
4037                                 config.apply(config_update);
4038                                 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
4039                                         continue;
4040                                 }
4041                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
4042                                         if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
4043                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
4044                                         } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
4045                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4046                                                         node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4047                                                         msg,
4048                                                 });
4049                                         }
4050                                 }
4051                                 continue;
4052                         } else {
4053                                 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
4054                                 debug_assert!(false);
4055                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4056                                         err: format!(
4057                                                 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
4058                                                 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4059                                 });
4060                         };
4061                 }
4062                 Ok(())
4063         }
4064
4065         /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
4066         ///
4067         /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4068         /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4069         /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4070         /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4071         ///
4072         /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4073         /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4074         ///
4075         /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4076         /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4077         ///
4078         /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4079         ///
4080         /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4081         /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4082         /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4083         /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4084         /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4085         /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4086         /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4087         pub fn update_channel_config(
4088                 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
4089         ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4090                 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
4091         }
4092
4093         /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
4094         /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
4095         ///
4096         /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
4097         /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
4098         ///
4099         /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
4100         /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
4101         /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
4102         /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
4103         /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
4104         ///
4105         /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
4106         /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
4107         /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
4108         /// than expected.
4109         ///
4110         /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4111         /// backwards.
4112         ///
4113         /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
4114         /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4115         /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
4116         // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
4117         // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
4118         pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4119                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4120
4121                 let next_hop_scid = {
4122                         let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4123                         let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
4124                                 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
4125                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4126                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4127                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
4128                                 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
4129                                         if !chan.context.is_usable() {
4130                                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4131                                                         err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
4132                                                 })
4133                                         }
4134                                         chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
4135                                 },
4136                                 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4137                                         err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
4138                                                 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4139                                 }),
4140                                 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4141                                         err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4142                                                 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4143                                 })
4144                         }
4145                 };
4146
4147                 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4148                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4149                                 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4150                         })?;
4151
4152                 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
4153                         PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
4154                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
4155                         },
4156                         _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4157                 };
4158                 let skimmed_fee_msat =
4159                         payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
4160                 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
4161                         skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
4162                         outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
4163                 };
4164
4165                 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
4166                         payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4167                         payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4168                         payment.prev_user_channel_id,
4169                         vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
4170                 )];
4171                 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
4172                 Ok(())
4173         }
4174
4175         /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
4176         /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
4177         ///
4178         /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4179         /// backwards.
4180         ///
4181         /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4182         pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4183                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4184
4185                 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4186                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4187                                 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4188                         })?;
4189
4190                 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
4191                         let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4192                                 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4193                                 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
4194                                 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4195                                 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
4196                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4197                                 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4198                         });
4199
4200                         let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
4201                         let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
4202                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4203                 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4204
4205                 Ok(())
4206         }
4207
4208         /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
4209         ///
4210         /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
4211         /// Will likely generate further events.
4212         pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
4213                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4214
4215                 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
4216                 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
4217                 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
4218                 {
4219                         let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
4220                         mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4221
4222                         for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
4223                                 if short_chan_id != 0 {
4224                                         macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
4225                                                 () => {
4226                                                         for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4227                                                                 match forward_info {
4228                                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4229                                                                                 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4230                                                                                 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4231                                                                                         routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4232                                                                                         outgoing_cltv_value, ..
4233                                                                                 }
4234                                                                         }) => {
4235                                                                                 macro_rules! failure_handler {
4236                                                                                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
4237                                                                                                 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
4238
4239                                                                                                 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4240                                                                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4241                                                                                                         user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4242                                                                                                         outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4243                                                                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4244                                                                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4245                                                                                                         phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
4246                                                                                                 });
4247
4248                                                                                                 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
4249                                                                                                         HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
4250                                                                                                 } else {
4251                                                                                                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
4252                                                                                                 };
4253
4254                                                                                                 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4255                                                                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
4256                                                                                                         reason
4257                                                                                                 ));
4258                                                                                                 continue;
4259                                                                                         }
4260                                                                                 }
4261                                                                                 macro_rules! fail_forward {
4262                                                                                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4263                                                                                                 {
4264                                                                                                         failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
4265                                                                                                 }
4266                                                                                         }
4267                                                                                 }
4268                                                                                 macro_rules! failed_payment {
4269                                                                                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4270                                                                                                 {
4271                                                                                                         failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
4272                                                                                                 }
4273                                                                                         }
4274                                                                                 }
4275                                                                                 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
4276                                                                                         let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
4277                                                                                         if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
4278                                                                                                 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4279                                                                                                 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
4280                                                                                                         phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac,
4281                                                                                                         payment_hash, &self.node_signer
4282                                                                                                 ) {
4283                                                                                                         Ok(res) => res,
4284                                                                                                         Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4285                                                                                                                 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
4286                                                                                                                 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
4287                                                                                                                 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
4288                                                                                                                 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
4289                                                                                                                 // of the onion.
4290                                                                                                                 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
4291                                                                                                         },
4292                                                                                                         Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4293                                                                                                                 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
4294                                                                                                         },
4295                                                                                                 };
4296                                                                                                 match next_hop {
4297                                                                                                         onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
4298                                                                                                                 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
4299                                                                                                                         incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4300                                                                                                                         outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None)
4301                                                                                                                 {
4302                                                                                                                         Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
4303                                                                                                                         Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
4304                                                                                                                 }
4305                                                                                                         },
4306                                                                                                         _ => panic!(),
4307                                                                                                 }
4308                                                                                         } else {
4309                                                                                                 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4310                                                                                         }
4311                                                                                 } else {
4312                                                                                         fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4313                                                                                 }
4314                                                                         },
4315                                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4316                                                                                 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
4317                                                                                 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
4318                                                                                 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
4319                                                                                 // problem, not ours.
4320                                                                         }
4321                                                                 }
4322                                                         }
4323                                                 }
4324                                         }
4325                                         let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
4326                                                 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
4327                                                 None => {
4328                                                         forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4329                                                         continue;
4330                                                 }
4331                                         };
4332                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4333                                         let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4334                                         if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
4335                                                 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4336                                                 continue;
4337                                         }
4338                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4339                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4340                                         if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
4341                                                 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4342                                                         match forward_info {
4343                                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4344                                                                         prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4345                                                                         forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4346                                                                                 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
4347                                                                                 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4348                                                                         },
4349                                                                 }) => {
4350                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
4351                                                                         let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4352                                                                                 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4353                                                                                 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4354                                                                                 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4355                                                                                 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4356                                                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4357                                                                                 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
4358                                                                                 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4359                                                                         });
4360                                                                         if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
4361                                                                                 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
4362                                                                                 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, &self.fee_estimator,
4363                                                                                 &self.logger)
4364                                                                         {
4365                                                                                 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4366                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
4367                                                                                 } else {
4368                                                                                         panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
4369                                                                                 }
4370                                                                                 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
4371                                                                                 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4372                                                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
4373                                                                                         HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
4374                                                                                 ));
4375                                                                                 continue;
4376                                                                         }
4377                                                                 },
4378                                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
4379                                                                         panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
4380                                                                 },
4381                                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
4382                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4383                                                                         if let Err(e) = chan.queue_fail_htlc(
4384                                                                                 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
4385                                                                         ) {
4386                                                                                 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4387                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
4388                                                                                 } else {
4389                                                                                         panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
4390                                                                                 }
4391                                                                                 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
4392                                                                                 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
4393                                                                                 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
4394                                                                                 continue;
4395                                                                         }
4396                                                                 },
4397                                                         }
4398                                                 }
4399                                         } else {
4400                                                 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4401                                                 continue;
4402                                         }
4403                                 } else {
4404                                         'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4405                                                 match forward_info {
4406                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4407                                                                 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4408                                                                 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4409                                                                         routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
4410                                                                         skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4411                                                                 }
4412                                                         }) => {
4413                                                                 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
4414                                                                         PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret, custom_tlvs } => {
4415                                                                                 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
4416                                                                                 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
4417                                                                                                 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
4418                                                                                 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
4419                                                                                         Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
4420                                                                         },
4421                                                                         PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs } => {
4422                                                                                 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
4423                                                                                         payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
4424                                                                                         payment_metadata,
4425                                                                                         custom_tlvs,
4426                                                                                 };
4427                                                                                 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
4428                                                                                         payment_data, None, onion_fields)
4429                                                                         },
4430                                                                         _ => {
4431                                                                                 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
4432                                                                         }
4433                                                                 };
4434                                                                 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
4435                                                                         prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
4436                                                                                 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4437                                                                                 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4438                                                                                 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4439                                                                                 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4440                                                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4441                                                                                 phantom_shared_secret,
4442                                                                         },
4443                                                                         // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
4444                                                                         // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
4445                                                                         // if routing nodes overpay
4446                                                                         value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
4447                                                                         sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
4448                                                                         timer_ticks: 0,
4449                                                                         total_value_received: None,
4450                                                                         total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
4451                                                                         cltv_expiry,
4452                                                                         onion_payload,
4453                                                                         counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
4454                                                                 };
4455
4456                                                                 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
4457
4458                                                                 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
4459                                                                         ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
4460                                                                                 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
4461                                                                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4462                                                                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
4463                                                                                         &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
4464                                                                                 );
4465                                                                                 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4466                                                                                                 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
4467                                                                                                 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
4468                                                                                                 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4469                                                                                                 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
4470                                                                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
4471                                                                                                 phantom_shared_secret,
4472                                                                                         }), payment_hash,
4473                                                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
4474                                                                                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
4475                                                                                 ));
4476                                                                                 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
4477                                                                         }
4478                                                                 }
4479                                                                 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4480                                                                 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4481                                                                 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4482                                                                         receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4483                                                                                 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4484                                                                 }
4485
4486                                                                 macro_rules! check_total_value {
4487                                                                         ($purpose: expr) => {{
4488                                                                                 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
4489                                                                                 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
4490                                                                                         events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
4491                                                                                         events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
4492                                                                                 };
4493                                                                                 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4494                                                                                 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
4495                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4496                                                                                 }
4497                                                                                 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
4498                                                                                         .entry(payment_hash)
4499                                                                                         // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
4500                                                                                         .or_insert_with(|| {
4501                                                                                                 committed_to_claimable = true;
4502                                                                                                 ClaimablePayment {
4503                                                                                                         purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
4504                                                                                                 }
4505                                                                                         });
4506                                                                                 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
4507                                                                                         let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
4508                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
4509                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4510                                                                                 }
4511                                                                                 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4512                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
4513                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4514                                                                                 }
4515                                                                                 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
4516                                                                                         if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
4517                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4518                                                                                         }
4519                                                                                 } else {
4520                                                                                         claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
4521                                                                                 }
4522                                                                                 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
4523                                                                                 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
4524                                                                                 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
4525                                                                                 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
4526                                                                                         total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
4527                                                                                         earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4528                                                                                         if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4529                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
4530                                                                                                         &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
4531                                                                                                 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
4532                                                                                         }
4533                                                                                         if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
4534                                                                                 }
4535                                                                                 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
4536                                                                                 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
4537                                                                                 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4538                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4539                                                                                 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4540                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
4541                                                                                                 &payment_hash);
4542                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4543                                                                                 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4544                                                                                         #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4545                                                                                                 committed_to_claimable = true;
4546                                                                                         }
4547                                                                                         let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
4548                                                                                         htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4549                                                                                         let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
4550                                                                                         htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
4551                                                                                         let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
4552                                                                                                 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
4553                                                                                         debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
4554                                                                                                 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
4555                                                                                         new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
4556                                                                                                 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4557                                                                                                 payment_hash,
4558                                                                                                 purpose: $purpose,
4559                                                                                                 amount_msat,
4560                                                                                                 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4561                                                                                                 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4562                                                                                                 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4563                                                                                                 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4564                                                                                                 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4565                                                                                         }, None));
4566                                                                                         payment_claimable_generated = true;
4567                                                                                 } else {
4568                                                                                         // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
4569                                                                                         // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
4570                                                                                         // MPP parts.
4571                                                                                         htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4572                                                                                         #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4573                                                                                                 committed_to_claimable = true;
4574                                                                                         }
4575                                                                                 }
4576                                                                                 payment_claimable_generated
4577                                                                         }}
4578                                                                 }
4579
4580                                                                 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
4581                                                                 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
4582                                                                 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4583                                                                 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4584                                                                 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4585                                                                 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4586                                                                 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4587                                                                 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4588                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4589                                                                                 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4590                                                                                         OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4591                                                                                                 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4592                                                                                                 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4593                                                                                                         Ok(result) => result,
4594                                                                                                         Err(()) => {
4595                                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
4596                                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4597                                                                                                         }
4598                                                                                                 };
4599                                                                                                 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4600                                                                                                         let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4601                                                                                                         if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4602                                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4603                                                                                                                         &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4604                                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4605                                                                                                         }
4606                                                                                                 }
4607                                                                                                 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4608                                                                                                         payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4609                                                                                                         payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4610                                                                                                 };
4611                                                                                                 check_total_value!(purpose);
4612                                                                                         },
4613                                                                                         OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4614                                                                                                 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4615                                                                                                 check_total_value!(purpose);
4616                                                                                         }
4617                                                                                 }
4618                                                                         },
4619                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4620                                                                                 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4621                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
4622                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4623                                                                                 }
4624                                                                                 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4625                                                                                 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4626                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
4627                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4628                                                                                 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4629                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4630                                                                                                 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4631                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4632                                                                                 } else {
4633                                                                                         let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4634                                                                                                 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4635                                                                                                 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4636                                                                                         };
4637                                                                                         let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4638                                                                                         if payment_claimable_generated {
4639                                                                                                 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4640                                                                                         }
4641                                                                                 }
4642                                                                         },
4643                                                                 };
4644                                                         },
4645                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4646                                                                 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4647                                                         }
4648                                                 }
4649                                         }
4650                                 }
4651                         }
4652                 }
4653
4654                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4655                 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4656                         || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4657                         &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
4658
4659                 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4660                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4661                 }
4662                 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4663
4664                 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4665                 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4666                 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4667                 // network stack.
4668                 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4669
4670                 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4671                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4672                 events.append(&mut new_events);
4673         }
4674
4675         /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4676         ///
4677         /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4678         fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4679                 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4680
4681                 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4682
4683                 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4684                 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4685                 if background_events.is_empty() {
4686                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4687                 }
4688
4689                 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4690                         match event {
4691                                 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
4692                                         // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4693                                         // monitor updating completing.
4694                                         let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4695                                 },
4696                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update } => {
4697                                         let mut updated_chan = false;
4698                                         {
4699                                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4700                                                 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4701                                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4702                                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4703                                                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4704                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
4705                                                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase.get_mut() {
4706                                                                                 updated_chan = true;
4707                                                                                 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4708                                                                                         peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4709                                                                         } else {
4710                                                                                 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't have an update for a non-funded channel");
4711                                                                         }
4712                                                                 },
4713                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {},
4714                                                         }
4715                                                 }
4716                                         }
4717                                         if !updated_chan {
4718                                                 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
4719                                                 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4720                                         }
4721                                 },
4722                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
4723                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4724                                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4725                                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4726                                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4727                                                 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
4728                                                         handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4729                                                 } else {
4730                                                         let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
4731                                                                 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
4732                                                         mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4733                                                         mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4734                                                         self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
4735                                                 }
4736                                         }
4737                                 },
4738                         }
4739                 }
4740                 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4741         }
4742
4743         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4744         /// Process background events, for functional testing
4745         pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4746                 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4747                 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4748         }
4749
4750         fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4751                 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
4752                 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4753                 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4754                         if new_feerate != chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4755                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4756                                 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4757                         }
4758                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4759                 }
4760                 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4761                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4762                                 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4763                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4764                 }
4765                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4766                         &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4767
4768                 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
4769                 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4770         }
4771
4772         #[cfg(fuzzing)]
4773         /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4774         /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4775         /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4776         /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4777         pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4778                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4779                         let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4780
4781                         let normal_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4782                         let min_mempool_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum);
4783
4784                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4785                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4786                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4787                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4788                                 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
4789                                         |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
4790                                 ) {
4791                                         let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4792                                                 min_mempool_feerate
4793                                         } else {
4794                                                 normal_feerate
4795                                         };
4796                                         let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4797                                         if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4798                                 }
4799                         }
4800
4801                         should_persist
4802                 });
4803         }
4804
4805         /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4806         ///
4807         /// This currently includes:
4808         ///  * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4809         ///  * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4810         ///    than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4811         ///    the channel.
4812         ///  * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4813         ///    with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4814         ///  * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4815         ///  * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
4816         ///
4817         /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4818         /// estimate fetches.
4819         ///
4820         /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4821         /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4822         pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4823                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4824                         let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4825
4826                         let normal_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4827                         let min_mempool_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum);
4828
4829                         let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4830                         let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4831                         let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4832                         let mut shutdown_channels = Vec::new();
4833
4834                         let mut process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
4835                                 chan_id: &ChannelId,
4836                                 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
4837                                 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
4838                                 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4839                                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
4840                         | {
4841                                 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4842                                 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
4843                                         log_error!(self.logger,
4844                                                 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
4845                                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
4846                                         self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4847                                         shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false));
4848                                         pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4849                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4850                                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4851                                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4852                                                                 channel_id: *chan_id,
4853                                                                 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
4854                                                         },
4855                                                 },
4856                                         });
4857                                         false
4858                                 } else {
4859                                         true
4860                                 }
4861                         };
4862
4863                         {
4864                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4865                                 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4866                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4867                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4868                                         let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4869                                         let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4870                                         peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
4871                                                 match phase {
4872                                                         ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
4873                                                                 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4874                                                                         min_mempool_feerate
4875                                                                 } else {
4876                                                                         normal_feerate
4877                                                                 };
4878                                                                 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4879                                                                 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4880
4881                                                                 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4882                                                                         let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
4883                                                                         handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
4884                                                                         if needs_close { return false; }
4885                                                                 }
4886
4887                                                                 match chan.channel_update_status() {
4888                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
4889                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
4890                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
4891                                                                                 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
4892                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
4893                                                                                 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
4894                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
4895                                                                                 n += 1;
4896                                                                                 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4897                                                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
4898                                                                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4899                                                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4900                                                                                                         msg: update
4901                                                                                                 });
4902                                                                                         }
4903                                                                                         should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4904                                                                                 } else {
4905                                                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
4906                                                                                 }
4907                                                                         },
4908                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
4909                                                                                 n += 1;
4910                                                                                 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4911                                                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
4912                                                                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4913                                                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4914                                                                                                         msg: update
4915                                                                                                 });
4916                                                                                         }
4917                                                                                         should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4918                                                                                 } else {
4919                                                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
4920                                                                                 }
4921                                                                         },
4922                                                                         _ => {},
4923                                                                 }
4924
4925                                                                 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4926
4927                                                                 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
4928                                                                         log_debug!(self.logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
4929                                                                                         counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
4930                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4931                                                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4932                                                                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
4933                                                                                         msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
4934                                                                                                 channel_id: *chan_id,
4935                                                                                                 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
4936                                                                                         },
4937                                                                                 },
4938                                                                         });
4939                                                                 }
4940
4941                                                                 true
4942                                                         },
4943                                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
4944                                                                 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4945                                                                         pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4946                                                         },
4947                                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
4948                                                                 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4949                                                                         pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4950                                                         },
4951                                                 }
4952                                         });
4953
4954                                         for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
4955                                                 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
4956                                                         log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
4957                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
4958                                                                 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4959                                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4960                                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4961                                                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
4962                                                                         },
4963                                                                 }
4964                                                         );
4965                                                 }
4966                                         }
4967                                         peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
4968
4969                                         if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
4970                                                 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
4971                                         }
4972                                 }
4973                         }
4974
4975                         // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
4976                         // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
4977                         // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
4978                         // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
4979                         // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
4980                         // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
4981                         // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
4982                         if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
4983                                 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4984                                 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
4985                                         match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
4986                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
4987                                                         // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
4988                                                         // have no channels to the peer.
4989                                                         let remove_entry = {
4990                                                                 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
4991                                                                 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
4992                                                         };
4993                                                         if remove_entry {
4994                                                                 entry.remove_entry();
4995                                                         }
4996                                                 },
4997                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
4998                                         }
4999                                 }
5000                         }
5001
5002                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
5003                                 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
5004                                         // This should be unreachable
5005                                         debug_assert!(false);
5006                                         return false;
5007                                 }
5008                                 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
5009                                         // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
5010                                         // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
5011                                         // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
5012                                         // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
5013                                         if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
5014                                                 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
5015                                         {
5016                                                 return true;
5017                                         } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
5018                                                 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
5019                                                 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
5020                                         }) {
5021                                                 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
5022                                                         .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
5023                                                 return false;
5024                                         }
5025                                 }
5026                                 true
5027                         });
5028
5029                         for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
5030                                 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
5031                                 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
5032                                 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
5033                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5034                         }
5035
5036                         for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5037                                 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5038                         }
5039
5040                         for shutdown_res in shutdown_channels {
5041                                 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
5042                         }
5043
5044                         self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(&self.pending_events);
5045
5046                         // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
5047                         // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
5048                         // than block the message queueing pipeline.
5049                         if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5050                                 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5051                         }
5052
5053                         should_persist
5054                 });
5055         }
5056
5057         /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
5058         /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
5059         /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
5060         ///
5061         /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
5062         /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
5063         /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
5064         /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
5065         ///
5066         /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
5067         /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
5068         /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
5069         /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
5070         pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
5071                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
5072         }
5073
5074         /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
5075         /// reason for the failure.
5076         ///
5077         /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
5078         pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
5079                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5080
5081                 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
5082                 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
5083                         for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5084                                 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
5085                                 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5086                                 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
5087                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5088                         }
5089                 }
5090         }
5091
5092         /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
5093         fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
5094                 match failure_code {
5095                         FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5096                         FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5097                         FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
5098                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5099                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5100                                 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
5101                         },
5102                         FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
5103                                 let fail_data = match data {
5104                                         Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
5105                                         None => Vec::new(),
5106                                 };
5107                                 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
5108                         }
5109                 }
5110         }
5111
5112         /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5113         /// that we want to return and a channel.
5114         ///
5115         /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
5116         /// forwarding
5117         fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5118                 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
5119                 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
5120                 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
5121                 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
5122                 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
5123                         chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
5124                 } else {
5125                         chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
5126                 };
5127                 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
5128                         self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
5129                 } else {
5130                         (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5131                 }
5132         }
5133
5134
5135         /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5136         /// that we want to return and a channel.
5137         fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5138                 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
5139                 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
5140                         let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
5141                         if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
5142                                 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
5143                                 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
5144                                 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5145                         }
5146                         (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5147                         msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5148                         upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5149                         (desired_err_code, enc.0)
5150                 } else {
5151                         // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
5152                         // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
5153                         // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
5154                         // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
5155                         (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5156                 }
5157         }
5158
5159         // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
5160         // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
5161         // be surfaced to the user.
5162         fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
5163                 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
5164                 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
5165         ) {
5166                 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
5167                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5168                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
5169                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5170                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5171                                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5172                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
5173                                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
5174                                                         self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
5175                                                 } else {
5176                                                         // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
5177                                                         debug_assert!(false);
5178                                                         (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5179                                                 }
5180                                         },
5181                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5182                                 }
5183                         } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
5184                 };
5185
5186                 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
5187                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
5188                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
5189                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5190                 }
5191         }
5192
5193         /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
5194         /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
5195         fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
5196                 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
5197                 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
5198                 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
5199                 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
5200                 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5201                 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5202                         debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5203                 }
5204
5205                 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
5206                 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
5207                 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
5208                 //timer handling.
5209
5210                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5211                 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
5212                 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5213                 match source {
5214                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
5215                                 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
5216                                         session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
5217                                         &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
5218                                 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5219                         },
5220                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint, .. }) => {
5221                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", &payment_hash, onion_error);
5222                                 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
5223
5224                                 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
5225                                 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5226                                 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
5227                                         push_forward_ev = true;
5228                                 }
5229                                 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
5230                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5231                                                 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
5232                                         },
5233                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5234                                                 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
5235                                         }
5236                                 }
5237                                 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
5238                                 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5239                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5240                                 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
5241                                         prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
5242                                         failed_next_destination: destination,
5243                                 }, None));
5244                         },
5245                 }
5246         }
5247
5248         /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
5249         /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
5250         ///
5251         /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
5252         /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
5253         /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
5254         /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
5255         ///
5256         /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
5257         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
5258         /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
5259         /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
5260         ///
5261         /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
5262         /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
5263         /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
5264         ///
5265         /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5266         /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
5267         /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
5268         /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
5269         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5270         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5271         /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
5272         pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5273                 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
5274         }
5275
5276         /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
5277         /// even type numbers.
5278         ///
5279         /// # Note
5280         ///
5281         /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
5282         /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
5283         ///
5284         /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5285         pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5286                 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
5287         }
5288
5289         fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
5290                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5291
5292                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5293
5294                 let mut sources = {
5295                         let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
5296                         if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
5297                                 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
5298                                 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
5299                                         if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
5300                                                 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
5301                                                         .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5302                                                 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
5303                                                 break;
5304                                         }
5305                                 }
5306
5307                                 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
5308                                 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
5309                                 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
5310                                         ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
5311                                         payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
5312                                 });
5313                                 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
5314                                         debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
5315                                         log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
5316                                                 &payment_hash);
5317                                 }
5318
5319                                 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
5320                                         if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
5321                                                 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
5322                                                         &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
5323                                                 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5324                                                 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
5325                                                 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5326                                                         let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
5327                                                         let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5328                                                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5329                                                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5330                                                 }
5331                                                 return;
5332                                         }
5333                                 }
5334
5335                                 payment.htlcs
5336                         } else { return; }
5337                 };
5338                 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
5339
5340                 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
5341                 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
5342                 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
5343                 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
5344                 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
5345                 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
5346                 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
5347                 let mut valid_mpp = true;
5348                 let mut errs = Vec::new();
5349                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5350                 for htlc in sources.iter() {
5351                         if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
5352                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5353                                 debug_assert!(false);
5354                                 valid_mpp = false;
5355                                 break;
5356                         }
5357                         prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
5358
5359                         if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
5360                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5361                                 debug_assert!(false);
5362                                 valid_mpp = false;
5363                                 break;
5364                         }
5365                         expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
5366                         claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
5367                 }
5368                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5369                 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
5370                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5371                         log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
5372                         return;
5373                 }
5374                 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
5375                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5376                         log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
5377                                 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
5378                         return;
5379                 }
5380                 if valid_mpp {
5381                         for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5382                                 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
5383                                         htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
5384                                         |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
5385                                 {
5386                                         if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
5387                                                 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
5388                                                 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
5389                                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
5390                                         } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
5391                                 }
5392                         }
5393                 }
5394                 if !valid_mpp {
5395                         for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5396                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5397                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5398                                 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5399                                 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
5400                                 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5401                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5402                         }
5403                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5404                 }
5405
5406                 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
5407                 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
5408                         let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5409                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
5410                 }
5411         }
5412
5413         fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
5414                 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
5415         -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
5416                 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
5417
5418                 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
5419                 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
5420                 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
5421                 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5422
5423                 {
5424                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5425                         let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
5426                         let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
5427                                 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
5428                                 None => None
5429                         };
5430
5431                         let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
5432                                 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5433                                         .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
5434                         ).unwrap_or(None);
5435
5436                         if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
5437                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
5438                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5439                                 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5440                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5441                                                 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5442                                                 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
5443
5444                                                 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
5445                                                         if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
5446                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
5447                                                                         chan_id, action);
5448                                                                 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
5449                                                         }
5450                                                         if !during_init {
5451                                                                 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5452                                                                         peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5453                                                         } else {
5454                                                                 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
5455                                                                 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
5456                                                                 // monitor update as a background event.
5457                                                                 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5458                                                                         BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5459                                                                                 counterparty_node_id,
5460                                                                                 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
5461                                                                                 update: monitor_update.clone(),
5462                                                                         });
5463                                                         }
5464                                                 }
5465                                         }
5466                                         return Ok(());
5467                                 }
5468                         }
5469                 }
5470                 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5471                         update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
5472                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5473                                 payment_preimage,
5474                         }],
5475                 };
5476
5477                 if !during_init {
5478                         // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
5479                         // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
5480                         let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
5481                         if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5482                                 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
5483                                 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
5484                                 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
5485                                 // again on restart.
5486                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
5487                                         payment_preimage, update_res);
5488                         }
5489                 } else {
5490                         // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
5491                         // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
5492                         // event.
5493                         // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
5494                         // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
5495                         // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
5496                         // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
5497                         // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
5498                         // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
5499                         // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
5500                         self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5501                                 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
5502                                         prev_hop.outpoint, preimage_update,
5503                                 )));
5504                 }
5505                 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
5506                 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
5507                 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
5508                 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
5509                 // `PaymentForwarded`).
5510                 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
5511                 Ok(())
5512         }
5513
5514         fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
5515                 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
5516         }
5517
5518         fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
5519                 forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, startup_replay: bool,
5520                 next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>, next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint
5521         ) {
5522                 match source {
5523                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
5524                                 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
5525                                         "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
5526                                 if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5527                                         debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey);
5528                                 }
5529                                 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5530                                         channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint,
5531                                         counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
5532                                 };
5533                                 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
5534                                         session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
5535                                         &self.logger);
5536                         },
5537                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
5538                                 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5539                                 let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
5540                                 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
5541                                         |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
5542                                                 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
5543                                                         let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
5544                                                                 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
5545                                                         } else { None };
5546
5547                                                         Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5548                                                                 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
5549                                                                         fee_earned_msat,
5550                                                                         claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
5551                                                                         prev_channel_id: Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5552                                                                         next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5553                                                                         outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
5554                                                                 },
5555                                                                 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
5556                                                                         if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5557                                                                                 Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, completed_blocker))
5558                                                                         } else {
5559                                                                                 // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
5560                                                                                 // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
5561                                                                                 // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
5562                                                                                 // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
5563                                                                                 // closed.
5564                                                                                 None
5565                                                                         },
5566                                                         })
5567                                                 } else { None }
5568                                         });
5569                                 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
5570                                         let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5571                                         let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
5572                                 }
5573                         },
5574                 }
5575         }
5576
5577         /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
5578         pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
5579                 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
5580         }
5581
5582         fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
5583                 for action in actions.into_iter() {
5584                         match action {
5585                                 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
5586                                         let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5587                                         if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
5588                                                 amount_msat,
5589                                                 payment_purpose: purpose,
5590                                                 receiver_node_id,
5591                                                 htlcs,
5592                                                 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
5593                                         }) = payment {
5594                                                 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
5595                                                         payment_hash,
5596                                                         purpose,
5597                                                         amount_msat,
5598                                                         receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5599                                                         htlcs,
5600                                                         sender_intended_total_msat,
5601                                                 }, None));
5602                                         }
5603                                 },
5604                                 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5605                                         event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
5606                                 } => {
5607                                         self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
5608                                         if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
5609                                                 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker));
5610                                         }
5611                                 },
5612                                 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5613                                         downstream_counterparty_node_id, downstream_funding_outpoint, blocking_action,
5614                                 } => {
5615                                         self.handle_monitor_update_release(
5616                                                 downstream_counterparty_node_id,
5617                                                 downstream_funding_outpoint,
5618                                                 Some(blocking_action),
5619                                         );
5620                                 },
5621                         }
5622                 }
5623         }
5624
5625         /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
5626         /// update completion.
5627         fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5628                 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
5629                 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
5630                 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
5631                 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
5632         -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
5633                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
5634                         &channel.context.channel_id(),
5635                         if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5636                         if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
5637                         if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
5638                         if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
5639                         if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
5640
5641                 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
5642
5643                 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5644                 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5645                         htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
5646                                 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
5647                 }
5648
5649                 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
5650                         send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
5651                 }
5652                 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
5653                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5654                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5655                                 msg,
5656                         });
5657                 }
5658
5659                 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
5660                         if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
5661                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5662                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5663                                         updates: update,
5664                                 });
5665                         }
5666                 } }
5667                 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
5668                         if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
5669                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5670                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5671                                         msg: revoke_and_ack,
5672                                 });
5673                         }
5674                 } }
5675                 match order {
5676                         RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
5677                                 handle_cs!();
5678                                 handle_raa!();
5679                         },
5680                         RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
5681                                 handle_raa!();
5682                                 handle_cs!();
5683                         },
5684                 }
5685
5686                 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
5687                         log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
5688                         self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
5689                 }
5690
5691                 {
5692                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5693                         emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
5694                         emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
5695                 }
5696
5697                 htlc_forwards
5698         }
5699
5700         fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
5701                 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5702
5703                 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
5704                         Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5705                         None => {
5706                                 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5707                                 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5708                                 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5709                                 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5710                                         Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5711                                         None => return,
5712                                 }
5713                         }
5714                 };
5715                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5716                 let mut peer_state_lock;
5717                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
5718                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
5719                 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5720                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5721                 let channel =
5722                         if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5723                                 chan
5724                         } else {
5725                                 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5726                                         .remove(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5727                                 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5728                                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5729                                 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5730                                 return;
5731                         };
5732                 let remaining_in_flight =
5733                         if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
5734                                 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
5735                                 pending.len()
5736                         } else { 0 };
5737                 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
5738                         highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
5739                         remaining_in_flight);
5740                 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
5741                         return;
5742                 }
5743                 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
5744         }
5745
5746         /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
5747         ///
5748         /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
5749         /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
5750         /// the channel.
5751         ///
5752         /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5753         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5754         /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5755         ///
5756         /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
5757         /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
5758         /// used to accept such channels.
5759         ///
5760         /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5761         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5762         pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5763                 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
5764         }
5765
5766         /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
5767         /// it as confirmed immediately.
5768         ///
5769         /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5770         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5771         /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5772         ///
5773         /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
5774         /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
5775         ///
5776         /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
5777         /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
5778         ///
5779         /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
5780         /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
5781         ///
5782         /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5783         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5784         pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5785                 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
5786         }
5787
5788         fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5789                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5790
5791                 let peers_without_funded_channels =
5792                         self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
5793                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5794                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5795                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
5796                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5797                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5798                 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
5799
5800                 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
5801                 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
5802                 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
5803                 // succeed.
5804                 let mut channel = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
5805                         Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
5806                                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5807                                 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5808                                         counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
5809                                         &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
5810                                         &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|e| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.to_string() })
5811                         }
5812                         _ => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() })
5813                 }?;
5814
5815                 if accept_0conf {
5816                         // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
5817                         debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
5818                 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
5819                         let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5820                                 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5821                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5822                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
5823                                 }
5824                         };
5825                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5826                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
5827                 } else {
5828                         // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5829                         // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5830                         // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5831                         if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
5832                                 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5833                                         node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5834                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5835                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
5836                                         }
5837                                 };
5838                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5839                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
5840                         }
5841                 }
5842
5843                 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
5844                 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
5845                 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
5846
5847                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5848                         node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5849                         msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
5850                 });
5851
5852                 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
5853
5854                 Ok(())
5855         }
5856
5857         /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
5858         /// or 0-conf channels.
5859         ///
5860         /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
5861         /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
5862         fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
5863         where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
5864                 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
5865                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5866                 {
5867                         let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5868                         for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
5869                                 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5870                                 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
5871                                 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
5872                                 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
5873                                         peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
5874                                 }
5875                         }
5876                 }
5877                 return peers_without_funded_channels;
5878         }
5879
5880         fn unfunded_channel_count(
5881                 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
5882         ) -> usize {
5883                 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
5884                 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
5885                         match phase {
5886                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
5887                                         // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
5888                                         // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
5889                                         if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
5890                                                 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
5891                                         {
5892                                                 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5893                                         }
5894                                 },
5895                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
5896                                         if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
5897                                                 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5898                                         }
5899                                 },
5900                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
5901                                         // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
5902                                         continue;
5903                                 }
5904                         }
5905                 }
5906                 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
5907         }
5908
5909         fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5910                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
5911                 // likely to be lost on restart!
5912                 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
5913                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5914                 }
5915
5916                 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
5917                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5918                 }
5919
5920                 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
5921                 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
5922                 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
5923                 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
5924                         self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
5925
5926                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5927                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5928                     .ok_or_else(|| {
5929                                 debug_assert!(false);
5930                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
5931                         })?;
5932                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5933                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5934
5935                 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5936                 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5937                 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5938                 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
5939                         channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
5940                         !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
5941                 {
5942                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5943                                 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
5944                                 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5945                 }
5946
5947                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5948                 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
5949                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5950                                 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
5951                                 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5952                 }
5953
5954                 let channel_id = msg.temporary_channel_id;
5955                 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
5956                 if channel_exists {
5957                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5958                 }
5959
5960                 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
5961                 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
5962                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5963                         pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
5964                                 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
5965                                 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5966                                 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
5967                                 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
5968                                 channel_type: msg.channel_type.clone().unwrap(),
5969                         }, None));
5970                         peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
5971                                 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
5972                                 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
5973                         });
5974                         return Ok(());
5975                 }
5976
5977                 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
5978                 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
5979                 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
5980                 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
5981                 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5982                         counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
5983                         &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
5984                 {
5985                         Err(e) => {
5986                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
5987                         },
5988                         Ok(res) => res
5989                 };
5990
5991                 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
5992                 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
5993                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5994                 }
5995                 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5996                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5997                 }
5998
5999                 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6000                 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6001
6002                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6003                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6004                         msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6005                 });
6006                 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6007                 Ok(())
6008         }
6009
6010         fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6011                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6012                 // likely to be lost on restart!
6013                 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
6014                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6015                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6016                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
6017                                         debug_assert!(false);
6018                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6019                                 })?;
6020                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6021                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6022                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6023                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
6024                                         match phase.get_mut() {
6025                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
6026                                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
6027                                                         (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
6028                                                 },
6029                                                 _ => {
6030                                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
6031                                                 }
6032                                         }
6033                                 },
6034                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6035                         }
6036                 };
6037                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6038                 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
6039                         temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6040                         counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6041                         channel_value_satoshis: value,
6042                         output_script,
6043                         user_channel_id: user_id,
6044                 }, None));
6045                 Ok(())
6046         }
6047
6048         fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6049                 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6050
6051                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6052                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6053                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6054                                 debug_assert!(false);
6055                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6056                         })?;
6057
6058                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6059                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6060                 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor) =
6061                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6062                                 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
6063                                         match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger) {
6064                                                 Ok(res) => res,
6065                                                 Err((mut inbound_chan, err)) => {
6066                                                         // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
6067                                                         // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
6068                                                         // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6069                                                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &inbound_chan.context);
6070                                                         let user_id = inbound_chan.context.get_user_id();
6071                                                         let shutdown_res = inbound_chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
6072                                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(format!("{}", err),
6073                                                                 msg.temporary_channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, inbound_chan.context.get_value_satoshis()));
6074                                                 },
6075                                         }
6076                                 },
6077                                 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(_)) | Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) => {
6078                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
6079                                 },
6080                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6081                         };
6082
6083                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
6084                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6085                                 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
6086                         },
6087                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6088                                 let mut id_to_peer_lock = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6089                                 match id_to_peer_lock.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
6090                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6091                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6092                                                         "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
6093                                                         funding_msg.channel_id))
6094                                         },
6095                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
6096                                                 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
6097                                                 if let Ok(persist_state) = monitor_res {
6098                                                         i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
6099                                                         mem::drop(id_to_peer_lock);
6100
6101                                                         // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
6102                                                         // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
6103                                                         // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
6104                                                         // until we have persisted our monitor.
6105                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
6106                                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6107                                                                 msg: funding_msg,
6108                                                         });
6109
6110                                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
6111                                                                 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
6112                                                                         per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6113                                                         } else {
6114                                                                 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
6115                                                         }
6116                                                         Ok(())
6117                                                 } else {
6118                                                         log_error!(self.logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
6119                                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6120                                                                 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
6121                                                                 funding_msg.channel_id));
6122                                                 }
6123                                         }
6124                                 }
6125                         }
6126                 }
6127         }
6128
6129         fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6130                 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6131                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6132                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6133                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6134                                 debug_assert!(false);
6135                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6136                         })?;
6137
6138                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6139                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6140                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6141                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6142                                 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6143                                         ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => {
6144                                                 let monitor = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6145                                                         chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6146                                                 if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
6147                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6148                                                         Ok(())
6149                                                 } else {
6150                                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned())), chan_phase_entry)
6151                                                 }
6152                                         },
6153                                         _ => {
6154                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
6155                                         },
6156                                 }
6157                         },
6158                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
6159                 }
6160         }
6161
6162         fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6163                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6164                 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6165                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6166                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6167                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6168                                 debug_assert!(false);
6169                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6170                         })?;
6171                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6172                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6173                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6174                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6175                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6176                                         let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
6177                                                 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6178                                         if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
6179                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6180                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6181                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6182                                                         msg: announcement_sigs,
6183                                                 });
6184                                         } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6185                                                 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
6186                                                 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
6187                                                 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
6188                                                 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
6189                                                 // announcement_signatures.
6190                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6191                                                 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6192                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6193                                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6194                                                                 msg,
6195                                                         });
6196                                                 }
6197                                         }
6198
6199                                         {
6200                                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6201                                                 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
6202                                         }
6203
6204                                         Ok(())
6205                                 } else {
6206                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6207                                                 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
6208                                 }
6209                         },
6210                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
6211                                 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6212                         }
6213                 }
6214         }
6215
6216         fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6217                 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
6218                 let mut finish_shutdown = None;
6219                 {
6220                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6221                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6222                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
6223                                         debug_assert!(false);
6224                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6225                                 })?;
6226                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6227                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6228                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6229                                 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
6230                                 match phase {
6231                                         ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6232                                                 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
6233                                                         log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
6234                                                                 msg.channel_id,
6235                                                                 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
6236                                                 }
6237
6238                                                 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6239                                                 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6240                                                         chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6241                                                 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
6242
6243                                                 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
6244                                                         // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
6245                                                         // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
6246                                                         // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
6247                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6248                                                                 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6249                                                                 msg,
6250                                                         });
6251                                                 }
6252                                                 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
6253                                                 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6254                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6255                                                                 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6256                                                 }
6257                                         },
6258                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6259                                                 let context = phase.context_mut();
6260                                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
6261                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel);
6262                                                 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
6263                                                 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
6264                                         },
6265                                 }
6266                         } else {
6267                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6268                         }
6269                 }
6270                 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
6271                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
6272                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6273                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
6274                 }
6275                 if let Some(shutdown_res) = finish_shutdown {
6276                         self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
6277                 }
6278
6279                 Ok(())
6280         }
6281
6282         fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6283                 let mut shutdown_result = None;
6284                 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid;
6285                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6286                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6287                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6288                                 debug_assert!(false);
6289                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6290                         })?;
6291                 let (tx, chan_option) = {
6292                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6293                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6294                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6295                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6296                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6297                                                 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
6298                                                 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6299                                                 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
6300                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6301                                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6302                                                                 msg,
6303                                                         });
6304                                                 }
6305                                                 if tx.is_some() {
6306                                                         // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
6307                                                         // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
6308                                                         // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
6309                                                         // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
6310                                                         // watch for old state broadcasts)!
6311                                                         (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)))
6312                                                 } else { (tx, None) }
6313                                         } else {
6314                                                 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6315                                                         "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6316                                         }
6317                                 },
6318                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6319                         }
6320                 };
6321                 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
6322                         log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
6323                         self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
6324                 }
6325                 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
6326                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6327                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6328                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6329                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6330                                         msg: update
6331                                 });
6332                         }
6333                         self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
6334                         shutdown_result = Some((None, Vec::new(), unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid));
6335                 }
6336                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6337                 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
6338                         self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
6339                 }
6340                 Ok(())
6341         }
6342
6343         fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6344                 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
6345                 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
6346                 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
6347                 //
6348                 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
6349                 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
6350                 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
6351                 //but we should prevent it anyway.
6352
6353                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6354                 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6355
6356                 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
6357                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6358                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6359                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6360                                 debug_assert!(false);
6361                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6362                         })?;
6363                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6364                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6365                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6366                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6367                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6368                                         let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
6369                                                 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
6370                                                         self.construct_pending_htlc_status(msg, shared_secret, next_hop,
6371                                                                 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt),
6372                                                 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
6373                                         };
6374                                         let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<SP>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
6375                                                 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
6376                                                 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
6377                                                 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
6378                                                 match pending_forward_info {
6379                                                         PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
6380                                                                 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
6381                                                                         let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
6382                                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
6383                                                                 } else {
6384                                                                         HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
6385                                                                 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
6386                                                                 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6387                                                                         channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6388                                                                         htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6389                                                                         reason
6390                                                                 };
6391                                                                 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
6392                                                         },
6393                                                         _ => pending_forward_info
6394                                                 }
6395                                         };
6396                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6397                                 } else {
6398                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6399                                                 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6400                                 }
6401                         },
6402                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6403                 }
6404                 Ok(())
6405         }
6406
6407         fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6408                 let funding_txo;
6409                 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
6410                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6411                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6412                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
6413                                         debug_assert!(false);
6414                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6415                                 })?;
6416                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6417                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6418                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6419                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6420                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6421                                                 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6422                                                 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
6423                                                         log_trace!(self.logger,
6424                                                                 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
6425                                                                 msg.channel_id);
6426                                                         peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
6427                                                                 .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
6428                                                                 .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
6429                                                 }
6430                                                 // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates`
6431                                                 // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update.
6432                                                 // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a
6433                                                 // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the
6434                                                 // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we
6435                                                 // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially.
6436                                                 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
6437                                                 res
6438                                         } else {
6439                                                 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6440                                                         "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6441                                         }
6442                                 },
6443                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6444                         }
6445                 };
6446                 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, false, Some(*counterparty_node_id), funding_txo);
6447                 Ok(())
6448         }
6449
6450         fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6451                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6452                 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6453                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6454                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6455                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6456                                 debug_assert!(false);
6457                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6458                         })?;
6459                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6460                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6461                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6462                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6463                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6464                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
6465                                 } else {
6466                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6467                                                 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6468                                 }
6469                         },
6470                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6471                 }
6472                 Ok(())
6473         }
6474
6475         fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6476                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6477                 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6478                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6479                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6480                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6481                                 debug_assert!(false);
6482                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6483                         })?;
6484                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6485                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6486                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6487                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6488                                 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
6489                                         let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
6490                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
6491                                 }
6492                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6493                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
6494                                 } else {
6495                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6496                                                 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6497                                 }
6498                                 Ok(())
6499                         },
6500                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6501                 }
6502         }
6503
6504         fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6505                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6506                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6507                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6508                                 debug_assert!(false);
6509                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6510                         })?;
6511                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6512                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6513                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6514                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6515                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6516                                         let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6517                                         let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6518                                         if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6519                                                 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6520                                                         peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6521                                         }
6522                                         Ok(())
6523                                 } else {
6524                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6525                                                 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6526                                 }
6527                         },
6528                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6529                 }
6530         }
6531
6532         #[inline]
6533         fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
6534                 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
6535                         let mut push_forward_event = false;
6536                         let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
6537                         let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
6538                         if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6539                                 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
6540                                         let scid = match forward_info.routing {
6541                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6542                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
6543                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
6544                                         };
6545                                         // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
6546                                         let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
6547
6548                                         let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6549                                         let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
6550                                         match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
6551                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6552                                                         entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6553                                                                 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
6554                                                 },
6555                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6556                                                         if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
6557                                                            fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
6558                                                         {
6559                                                                 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
6560                                                                 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6561                                                                 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
6562                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6563                                                                                 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
6564                                                                                         requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
6565                                                                                         payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
6566                                                                                         inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
6567                                                                                         expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
6568                                                                                         intercept_id
6569                                                                                 }, None));
6570                                                                                 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6571                                                                                         prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
6572                                                                         },
6573                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6574                                                                                 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
6575                                                                                 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6576                                                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
6577                                                                                         user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
6578                                                                                         outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
6579                                                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
6580                                                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6581                                                                                         phantom_shared_secret: None,
6582                                                                                 });
6583
6584                                                                                 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
6585                                                                                                 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
6586                                                                                                 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
6587                                                                                 ));
6588                                                                         }
6589                                                                 }
6590                                                         } else {
6591                                                                 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
6592                                                                 // payments are being processed.
6593                                                                 if forward_htlcs_empty {
6594                                                                         push_forward_event = true;
6595                                                                 }
6596                                                                 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6597                                                                         prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
6598                                                         }
6599                                                 }
6600                                         }
6601                                 }
6602                         }
6603
6604                         for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
6605                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
6606                         }
6607
6608                         if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
6609                                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6610                                 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
6611                         }
6612                         if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
6613                 }
6614         }
6615
6616         fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
6617                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6618                 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6619                 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
6620                         if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
6621                 ).count();
6622                 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
6623                 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
6624                 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
6625                 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
6626                 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
6627                 // real by taking more time.
6628                 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
6629                         pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6630                                 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
6631                         }, None));
6632                 }
6633         }
6634
6635         /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
6636         /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
6637         /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
6638         /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
6639         fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6640                 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
6641                 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
6642         ) -> bool {
6643                 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6644                         .get(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
6645                 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
6646                         action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6647                                 channel_funding_outpoint,
6648                                 counterparty_node_id,
6649                         })
6650                 })
6651         }
6652
6653         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6654         pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6655                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId
6656         ) -> bool {
6657                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6658                 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6659                         let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6660                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
6661
6662                         if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) {
6663                                 return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
6664                                         chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), counterparty_node_id);
6665                         }
6666                 }
6667                 false
6668         }
6669
6670         fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6671                 let htlcs_to_fail = {
6672                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6673                         let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6674                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
6675                                         debug_assert!(false);
6676                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6677                                 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
6678                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6679                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6680                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6681                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6682                                                 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6683                                                 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
6684                                                         self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
6685                                                                 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo,
6686                                                                 *counterparty_node_id)
6687                                                 } else { false };
6688                                                 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6689                                                         chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
6690                                                 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6691                                                         let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
6692                                                                 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
6693                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
6694                                                                 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6695                                                 }
6696                                                 htlcs_to_fail
6697                                         } else {
6698                                                 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6699                                                         "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6700                                         }
6701                                 },
6702                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6703                         }
6704                 };
6705                 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
6706                 Ok(())
6707         }
6708
6709         fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6710                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6711                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6712                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6713                                 debug_assert!(false);
6714                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6715                         })?;
6716                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6717                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6718                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6719                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6720                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6721                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6722                                 } else {
6723                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6724                                                 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6725                                 }
6726                         },
6727                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6728                 }
6729                 Ok(())
6730         }
6731
6732         fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6733                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6734                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6735                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6736                                 debug_assert!(false);
6737                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6738                         })?;
6739                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6740                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6741                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6742                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6743                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6744                                         if !chan.context.is_usable() {
6745                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
6746                                         }
6747
6748                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6749                                                 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
6750                                                         &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
6751                                                         msg, &self.default_configuration
6752                                                 ), chan_phase_entry),
6753                                                 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6754                                                 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6755                                                 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
6756                                         });
6757                                 } else {
6758                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6759                                                 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6760                                 }
6761                         },
6762                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6763                 }
6764                 Ok(())
6765         }
6766
6767         /// Returns DoPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersistNoEvents or an Err.
6768         fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6769                 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
6770                         Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
6771                         None => {
6772                                 // It's not a local channel
6773                                 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6774                         }
6775                 };
6776                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6777                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
6778                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
6779                         return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6780                 }
6781                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6782                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6783                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
6784                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6785                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6786                                         if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6787                                                 if chan.context.should_announce() {
6788                                                         // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
6789                                                         // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
6790                                                         // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
6791                                                         return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6792                                                 }
6793                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
6794                                         }
6795                                         let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
6796                                         let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
6797                                         if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
6798                                                 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6799                                         } else {
6800                                                 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update {:?} for channel {}.", msg, chan_id);
6801                                                 let did_change = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6802                                                 // If nothing changed after applying their update, we don't need to bother
6803                                                 // persisting.
6804                                                 if !did_change {
6805                                                         return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6806                                                 }
6807                                         }
6808                                 } else {
6809                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6810                                                 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6811                                 }
6812                         },
6813                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6814                 }
6815                 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
6816         }
6817
6818         fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6819                 let htlc_forwards;
6820                 let need_lnd_workaround = {
6821                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6822
6823                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6824                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
6825                                         debug_assert!(false);
6826                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6827                                 })?;
6828                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6829                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6830                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6831                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6832                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6833                                                 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
6834                                                 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
6835                                                 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
6836                                                 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
6837                                                 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
6838                                                         msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
6839                                                         &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
6840                                                 let mut channel_update = None;
6841                                                 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
6842                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6843                                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6844                                                                 msg,
6845                                                         });
6846                                                 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6847                                                         // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
6848                                                         // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
6849                                                         // they have the latest channel parameters.
6850                                                         if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6851                                                                 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6852                                                                         node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6853                                                                         msg,
6854                                                                 });
6855                                                         }
6856                                                 }
6857                                                 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
6858                                                 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
6859                                                         &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
6860                                                         Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
6861                                                 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
6862                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
6863                                                 }
6864                                                 need_lnd_workaround
6865                                         } else {
6866                                                 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6867                                                         "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6868                                         }
6869                                 },
6870                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6871                         }
6872                 };
6873
6874                 let mut persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
6875                 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
6876                         self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
6877                         persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6878                 }
6879
6880                 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
6881                         self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
6882                 }
6883                 Ok(persist)
6884         }
6885
6886         /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
6887         fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
6888                 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
6889
6890                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6891                 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
6892                 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
6893                 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
6894                         for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
6895                                 match monitor_event {
6896                                         MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
6897                                                 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
6898                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
6899                                                         self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, false, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint);
6900                                                 } else {
6901                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
6902                                                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
6903                                                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6904                                                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6905                                                 }
6906                                         },
6907                                         MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(funding_outpoint) => {
6908                                                 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
6909                                                         Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
6910                                                         None => {
6911                                                                 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
6912                                                                 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
6913                                                                 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6914                                                                 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
6915                                                         }
6916                                                 };
6917                                                 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
6918                                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6919                                                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6920                                                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6921                                                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6922                                                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6923                                                                 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
6924                                                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
6925                                                                                 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
6926                                                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6927                                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6928                                                                                                 msg: update
6929                                                                                         });
6930                                                                                 }
6931                                                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
6932                                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6933                                                                                         node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6934                                                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
6935                                                                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
6936                                                                                         },
6937                                                                                 });
6938                                                                         }
6939                                                                 }
6940                                                         }
6941                                                 }
6942                                         },
6943                                         MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
6944                                                 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
6945                                         },
6946                                 }
6947                         }
6948                 }
6949
6950                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6951                         self.finish_close_channel(failure);
6952                 }
6953
6954                 has_pending_monitor_events
6955         }
6956
6957         /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
6958         /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
6959         /// update events as a separate process method here.
6960         #[cfg(fuzzing)]
6961         pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
6962                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6963                 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
6964         }
6965
6966         /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
6967         /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
6968         /// update was applied.
6969         fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
6970                 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
6971                 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
6972
6973                 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
6974                 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
6975                 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
6976                 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
6977                 'peer_loop: loop {
6978                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6979                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6980                                 'chan_loop: loop {
6981                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6982                                         let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6983                                         for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
6984                                                 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
6985                                         ) {
6986                                                 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
6987                                                 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6988                                                 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
6989                                                         chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
6990                                                 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
6991                                                         failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
6992                                                 }
6993                                                 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
6994                                                         has_monitor_update = true;
6995
6996                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6997                                                                 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6998                                                         continue 'peer_loop;
6999                                                 }
7000                                         }
7001                                         break 'chan_loop;
7002                                 }
7003                         }
7004                         break 'peer_loop;
7005                 }
7006
7007                 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
7008                 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7009                         self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
7010                 }
7011
7012                 has_update
7013         }
7014
7015         /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
7016         /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
7017         /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
7018         fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
7019                 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
7020                 let mut has_update = false;
7021                 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
7022                 {
7023                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7024
7025                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7026                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7027                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7028                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7029                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
7030                                         match phase {
7031                                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7032                                                         let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
7033                                                         match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
7034                                                                 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
7035                                                                         if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
7036                                                                                 has_update = true;
7037                                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
7038                                                                                         node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
7039                                                                                 });
7040                                                                         }
7041                                                                         if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
7042                                                                                 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
7043                                                                                 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
7044                                                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7045                                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7046                                                                                                 msg: update
7047                                                                                         });
7048                                                                                 }
7049
7050                                                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
7051
7052                                                                                 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
7053                                                                                 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
7054                                                                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7055                                                                                 shutdown_results.push((None, Vec::new(), unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid));
7056                                                                                 false
7057                                                                         } else { true }
7058                                                                 },
7059                                                                 Err(e) => {
7060                                                                         has_update = true;
7061                                                                         let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
7062                                                                         handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
7063                                                                         !close_channel
7064                                                                 }
7065                                                         }
7066                                                 },
7067                                                 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
7068                                         }
7069                                 });
7070                         }
7071                 }
7072
7073                 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
7074                         let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
7075                 }
7076
7077                 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
7078                         self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
7079                 }
7080
7081                 has_update
7082         }
7083
7084         /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
7085         /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
7086         /// Channel object.
7087         fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
7088                 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7089                         // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
7090                         // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
7091                         // reorganized out of the main chain.
7092                         // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
7093                         // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
7094                         // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
7095                         // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
7096                         if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
7097                                 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
7098                                 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
7099                                         assert!(should_broadcast);
7100                                 } else { unreachable!(); }
7101                                 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
7102                                         BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
7103                                                 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
7104                                         });
7105                         }
7106                         self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7107                 }
7108         }
7109
7110         /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
7111         /// to pay us.
7112         ///
7113         /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
7114         /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
7115         ///
7116         /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
7117         /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
7118         /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
7119         /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
7120         ///
7121         /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
7122         ///
7123         /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7124         /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7125         ///
7126         /// # Note
7127         ///
7128         /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7129         /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7130         ///
7131         /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7132         ///
7133         /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7134         /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7135         ///
7136         /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
7137         /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7138         /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
7139         /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
7140         /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
7141         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
7142         pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
7143                 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
7144                 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
7145                         &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7146                         min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
7147         }
7148
7149         /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
7150         /// stored external to LDK.
7151         ///
7152         /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
7153         /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
7154         /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
7155         ///
7156         /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
7157         /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
7158         /// payments.
7159         ///
7160         /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
7161         /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
7162         /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
7163         /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
7164         ///
7165         /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
7166         /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
7167         /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
7168         /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
7169         /// invoices when no timeout is set.
7170         ///
7171         /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
7172         /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
7173         /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
7174         /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
7175         /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
7176         ///
7177         /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
7178         /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
7179         ///
7180         /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7181         /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7182         ///
7183         /// # Note
7184         ///
7185         /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7186         /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7187         ///
7188         /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7189         ///
7190         /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7191         /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7192         ///
7193         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7194         /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7195         pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
7196                 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
7197                 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
7198                         invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7199                         min_final_cltv_expiry)
7200         }
7201
7202         /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
7203         /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
7204         ///
7205         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7206         pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
7207                 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
7208         }
7209
7210         /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
7211         /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
7212         ///
7213         /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
7214         pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
7215                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7216                 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
7217                 loop {
7218                         let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
7219                         // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
7220                         match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
7221                                 Some(_) => continue,
7222                                 None => return scid_candidate
7223                         }
7224                 }
7225         }
7226
7227         /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
7228         ///
7229         /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
7230         pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
7231                 PhantomRouteHints {
7232                         channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
7233                         phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
7234                         real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
7235                 }
7236         }
7237
7238         /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
7239         /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
7240         /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
7241         ///
7242         /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
7243         /// times to get a unique scid.
7244         pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
7245                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7246                 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
7247                 loop {
7248                         let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
7249                         // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
7250                         if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
7251                         return scid_candidate
7252                 }
7253         }
7254
7255         /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
7256         /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
7257         pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
7258                 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
7259
7260                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7261                 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7262                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7263                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7264                         for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
7265                                 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
7266                         ) {
7267                                 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7268                                         if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
7269                                                 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
7270                                         }
7271                                 }
7272                         }
7273                 }
7274
7275                 inflight_htlcs
7276         }
7277
7278         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7279         pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
7280                 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
7281                 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
7282                 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
7283                 events.into_inner()
7284         }
7285
7286         #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
7287         pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
7288                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7289                 events.push_back((event, None));
7290         }
7291
7292         #[cfg(test)]
7293         pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
7294                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7295                 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
7296         }
7297
7298         #[cfg(test)]
7299         pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
7300                 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
7301         }
7302
7303         #[cfg(test)]
7304         pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
7305                 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
7306         }
7307
7308         /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
7309         /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
7310         /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
7311         /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
7312         fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
7313                 loop {
7314                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7315                         if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7316                                 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7317                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
7318
7319                                 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
7320                                         // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
7321                                         if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
7322                                                 .get_mut(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
7323                                         {
7324                                                 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
7325                                         }
7326                                 }
7327
7328                                 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
7329                                         channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id) {
7330                                         // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
7331                                         // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
7332                                         // update(s) when those blockers complete.
7333                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
7334                                                 &channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7335                                         break;
7336                                 }
7337
7338                                 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
7339                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7340                                                 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
7341                                                 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
7342                                                         log_debug!(self.logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
7343                                                                 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7344                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
7345                                                                 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7346                                                         if further_update_exists {
7347                                                                 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
7348                                                                 // top of the loop.
7349                                                                 continue;
7350                                                         }
7351                                                 } else {
7352                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
7353                                                                 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7354                                                 }
7355                                         }
7356                                 }
7357                         } else {
7358                                 log_debug!(self.logger,
7359                                         "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
7360                                         log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7361                         }
7362                         break;
7363                 }
7364         }
7365
7366         fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
7367                 for action in actions {
7368                         match action {
7369                                 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
7370                                         channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
7371                                 } => {
7372                                         self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, None);
7373                                 }
7374                         }
7375                 }
7376         }
7377
7378         /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
7379         /// using the given event handler.
7380         ///
7381         /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
7382         pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
7383                 &self, handler: H
7384         ) {
7385                 let mut ev;
7386                 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
7387         }
7388 }
7389
7390 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7391 where
7392         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7393         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7394         ES::Target: EntropySource,
7395         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7396         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7397         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7398         R::Target: Router,
7399         L::Target: Logger,
7400 {
7401         /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
7402         /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
7403         /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
7404         /// is always placed next to each other.
7405         ///
7406         /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
7407         /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
7408         /// `MessageSendEvent`s  for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
7409         /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
7410         ///
7411         /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
7412         /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
7413         /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
7414         fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
7415                 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
7416                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7417                         let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
7418
7419                         // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
7420                         // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
7421                         if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
7422                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7423                         }
7424
7425                         if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
7426                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7427                         }
7428                         if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
7429                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7430                         }
7431
7432                         let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
7433                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7434                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7435                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7436                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7437                                 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
7438                                         pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7439                                 }
7440                         }
7441
7442                         if !pending_events.is_empty() {
7443                                 events.replace(pending_events);
7444                         }
7445
7446                         result
7447                 });
7448                 events.into_inner()
7449         }
7450 }
7451
7452 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7453 where
7454         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7455         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7456         ES::Target: EntropySource,
7457         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7458         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7459         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7460         R::Target: Router,
7461         L::Target: Logger,
7462 {
7463         /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
7464         ///
7465         /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
7466         /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
7467         fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
7468                 let mut ev;
7469                 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
7470         }
7471 }
7472
7473 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7474 where
7475         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7476         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7477         ES::Target: EntropySource,
7478         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7479         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7480         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7481         R::Target: Router,
7482         L::Target: Logger,
7483 {
7484         fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
7485                 {
7486                         let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7487                         assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
7488                                 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
7489                         assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
7490                                 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
7491                 }
7492
7493                 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
7494                 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
7495         }
7496
7497         fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
7498                 let _persistence_guard =
7499                         PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
7500                                 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7501                 let new_height = height - 1;
7502                 {
7503                         let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
7504                         assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
7505                                 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
7506                         assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
7507                                 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
7508                         *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
7509                 }
7510
7511                 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
7512         }
7513 }
7514
7515 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7516 where
7517         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7518         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7519         ES::Target: EntropySource,
7520         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7521         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7522         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7523         R::Target: Router,
7524         L::Target: Logger,
7525 {
7526         fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
7527                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
7528                 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
7529                 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
7530
7531                 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
7532                 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
7533
7534                 let _persistence_guard =
7535                         PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
7536                                 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7537                 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
7538                         .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
7539
7540                 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7541                 if height < last_best_block_height {
7542                         let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
7543                         self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
7544                 }
7545         }
7546
7547         fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
7548                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
7549                 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
7550                 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
7551
7552                 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
7553                 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
7554
7555                 let _persistence_guard =
7556                         PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
7557                                 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7558                 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
7559
7560                 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
7561
7562                 macro_rules! max_time {
7563                         ($timestamp: expr) => {
7564                                 loop {
7565                                         // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
7566                                         // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
7567                                         // having an explicit local time source.
7568                                         // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
7569                                         // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
7570                                         let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
7571                                         if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
7572                                         if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
7573                                                 break;
7574                                         }
7575                                 }
7576                         }
7577                 }
7578                 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
7579                 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7580                 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
7581                         inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
7582                 });
7583         }
7584
7585         fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
7586                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
7587                 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
7588                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7589                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7590                         for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
7591                                 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.context.get_funding_txo(), chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
7592                                         res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
7593                                 }
7594                         }
7595                 }
7596                 res
7597         }
7598
7599         fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
7600                 let _persistence_guard =
7601                         PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
7602                                 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7603                 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
7604                         if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
7605                                 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
7606                                         channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
7607                                 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
7608                         } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
7609                 });
7610         }
7611 }
7612
7613 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7614 where
7615         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7616         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7617         ES::Target: EntropySource,
7618         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7619         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7620         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7621         R::Target: Router,
7622         L::Target: Logger,
7623 {
7624         /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
7625         /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
7626         /// the function.
7627         fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
7628                         (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
7629                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
7630                 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
7631                 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
7632
7633                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7634                 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
7635                 {
7636                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7637                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7638                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7639                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7640                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7641                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
7642                                         match phase {
7643                                                 // Retain unfunded channels.
7644                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
7645                                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
7646                                                         let res = f(channel);
7647                                                         if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
7648                                                                 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
7649                                                                         let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
7650                                                                         timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
7651                                                                                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
7652                                                                 }
7653                                                                 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
7654                                                                         send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
7655                                                                         if channel.context.is_usable() {
7656                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
7657                                                                                 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
7658                                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7659                                                                                                 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7660                                                                                                 msg,
7661                                                                                         });
7662                                                                                 }
7663                                                                         } else {
7664                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
7665                                                                         }
7666                                                                 }
7667
7668                                                                 {
7669                                                                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7670                                                                         emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
7671                                                                 }
7672
7673                                                                 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
7674                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
7675                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
7676                                                                                 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7677                                                                                 msg: announcement_sigs,
7678                                                                         });
7679                                                                         if let Some(height) = height_opt {
7680                                                                                 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
7681                                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
7682                                                                                                 msg: announcement,
7683                                                                                                 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
7684                                                                                                 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
7685                                                                                                 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
7686                                                                                         });
7687                                                                                 }
7688                                                                         }
7689                                                                 }
7690                                                                 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
7691                                                                         if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
7692                                                                                 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
7693                                                                                 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
7694                                                                                 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
7695                                                                                 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
7696                                                                                 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
7697                                                                                 // is always consistent.
7698                                                                                 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
7699                                                                                 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
7700                                                                                 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
7701                                                                                         "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
7702                                                                                         fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
7703                                                                         }
7704                                                                 }
7705                                                         } else if let Err(reason) = res {
7706                                                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
7707                                                                 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
7708                                                                 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
7709                                                                 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true));
7710                                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
7711                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7712                                                                                 msg: update
7713                                                                         });
7714                                                                 }
7715                                                                 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
7716                                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, reason);
7717                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7718                                                                         node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7719                                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
7720                                                                                 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
7721                                                                                 data: reason_message,
7722                                                                         } },
7723                                                                 });
7724                                                                 return false;
7725                                                         }
7726                                                         true
7727                                                 }
7728                                         }
7729                                 });
7730                         }
7731                 }
7732
7733                 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
7734                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
7735                                 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
7736                                         // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
7737                                         // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
7738                                         // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
7739                                         // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
7740                                         if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
7741                                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
7742                                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
7743
7744                                                 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
7745                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
7746                                                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
7747                                                 false
7748                                         } else { true }
7749                                 });
7750                                 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
7751                         });
7752
7753                         let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7754                         intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
7755                                 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
7756                                         let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
7757                                                 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
7758                                                 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
7759                                                 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
7760                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
7761                                                 phantom_shared_secret: None,
7762                                                 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
7763                                         });
7764
7765                                         let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
7766                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
7767                                                 _ => unreachable!(),
7768                                         };
7769                                         timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
7770                                                         HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
7771                                                         HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
7772                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
7773                                         false
7774                                 } else { true }
7775                         });
7776                 }
7777
7778                 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
7779
7780                 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
7781                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
7782                 }
7783         }
7784
7785         /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or
7786         /// may have events that need processing.
7787         ///
7788         /// In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call
7789         /// [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`].
7790         ///
7791         /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
7792         /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
7793         pub fn get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(&self) -> Future {
7794                 self.event_persist_notifier.get_future()
7795         }
7796
7797         /// Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
7798         pub fn get_and_clear_needs_persistence(&self) -> bool {
7799                 self.needs_persist_flag.swap(false, Ordering::AcqRel)
7800         }
7801
7802         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7803         pub fn get_event_or_persist_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
7804                 self.event_persist_notifier.notify_pending()
7805         }
7806
7807         /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
7808         /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
7809         pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
7810                 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
7811         }
7812
7813         /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7814         /// [`ChannelManager`].
7815         pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
7816                 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
7817         }
7818
7819         /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7820         /// [`ChannelManager`].
7821         ///
7822         /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
7823         /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
7824         #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
7825         pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
7826                 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
7827         }
7828
7829         /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7830         /// [`ChannelManager`].
7831         pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
7832                 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
7833         }
7834
7835         /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7836         /// [`ChannelManager`].
7837         pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
7838                 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
7839         }
7840
7841         /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7842         /// [`ChannelManager`].
7843         pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
7844                 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
7845         }
7846 }
7847
7848 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7849         ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7850 where
7851         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7852         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7853         ES::Target: EntropySource,
7854         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7855         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7856         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7857         R::Target: Router,
7858         L::Target: Logger,
7859 {
7860         fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
7861                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
7862                 // open_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
7863                 // change to the contents.
7864                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7865                         let res = self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg);
7866                         let persist = match &res {
7867                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => {
7868                                         debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't close a new channel");
7869                                         NotifyOption::DoPersist
7870                                 },
7871                                 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
7872                         };
7873                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
7874                         persist
7875                 });
7876         }
7877
7878         fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
7879                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7880                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7881                          msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7882         }
7883
7884         fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
7885                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
7886                 // accept_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
7887                 // change to the contents.
7888                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7889                         let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7890                         NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents
7891                 });
7892         }
7893
7894         fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
7895                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7896                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7897                          msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7898         }
7899
7900         fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
7901                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7902                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7903         }
7904
7905         fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
7906                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7907                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7908         }
7909
7910         fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
7911                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
7912                 // channel_ready message - while the channel's state will change, any channel_ready message
7913                 // will ultimately be re-sent on startup and the `ChannelMonitor` won't be updated so we
7914                 // will not force-close the channel on startup.
7915                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7916                         let res = self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg);
7917                         let persist = match &res {
7918                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
7919                                 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
7920                         };
7921                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
7922                         persist
7923                 });
7924         }
7925
7926         fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
7927                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7928                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7929         }
7930
7931         fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
7932                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7933                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7934         }
7935
7936         fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
7937                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
7938                 // update_add_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
7939                 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
7940                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7941                         let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
7942                         let persist = match &res {
7943                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
7944                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
7945                                 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
7946                         };
7947                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
7948                         persist
7949                 });
7950         }
7951
7952         fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
7953                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7954                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7955         }
7956
7957         fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
7958                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
7959                 // update_fail_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
7960                 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
7961                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7962                         let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
7963                         let persist = match &res {
7964                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
7965                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
7966                                 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
7967                         };
7968                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
7969                         persist
7970                 });
7971         }
7972
7973         fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
7974                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
7975                 // update_fail_malformed_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state
7976                 // only the `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
7977                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7978                         let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
7979                         let persist = match &res {
7980                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
7981                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
7982                                 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
7983                         };
7984                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
7985                         persist
7986                 });
7987         }
7988
7989         fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
7990                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7991                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7992         }
7993
7994         fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
7995                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7996                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7997         }
7998
7999         fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
8000                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8001                 // update_fee message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8002                 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8003                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8004                         let res = self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8005                         let persist = match &res {
8006                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8007                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8008                                 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8009                         };
8010                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8011                         persist
8012                 });
8013         }
8014
8015         fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
8016                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8017                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8018         }
8019
8020         fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
8021                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8022                         if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
8023                                 persist
8024                         } else {
8025                                 NotifyOption::DoPersist
8026                         }
8027                 });
8028         }
8029
8030         fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
8031                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8032                         let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8033                         let persist = match &res {
8034                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8035                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8036                                 Ok(persist) => *persist,
8037                         };
8038                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8039                         persist
8040                 });
8041         }
8042
8043         fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
8044                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
8045                         self, || NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents);
8046                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8047                 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8048                 let remove_peer = {
8049                         log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
8050                                 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8051                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
8052                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8053                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8054                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8055                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8056                                         let context = match phase {
8057                                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
8058                                                         if chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger).is_ok() {
8059                                                                 // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
8060                                                                 return true;
8061                                                         }
8062                                                         &mut chan.context
8063                                                 },
8064                                                 // Unfunded channels will always be removed.
8065                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
8066                                                         &mut chan.context
8067                                                 },
8068                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
8069                                                         &mut chan.context
8070                                                 },
8071                                         };
8072                                         // Clean up for removal.
8073                                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
8074                                         self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
8075                                         failed_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false));
8076                                         false
8077                                 });
8078                                 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
8079                                 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
8080                                 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
8081                                 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
8082                                         match msg {
8083                                                 // V1 Channel Establishment
8084                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
8085                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
8086                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
8087                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
8088                                                 // V2 Channel Establishment
8089                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8090                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8091                                                 // Common Channel Establishment
8092                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
8093                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
8094                                                 // Interactive Transaction Construction
8095                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
8096                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
8097                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
8098                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
8099                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
8100                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
8101                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
8102                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
8103                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
8104                                                 // Channel Operations
8105                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
8106                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
8107                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
8108                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
8109                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
8110                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
8111                                                 // Gossip
8112                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
8113                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8114                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
8115                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8116                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
8117                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
8118                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
8119                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
8120                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
8121                                         }
8122                                 });
8123                                 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
8124                                 peer_state.is_connected = false;
8125                                 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
8126                         } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
8127                 };
8128                 if remove_peer {
8129                         per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
8130                 }
8131                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
8132
8133                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
8134                         self.finish_close_channel(failure);
8135                 }
8136         }
8137
8138         fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
8139                 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
8140                         log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8141                         return Err(());
8142                 }
8143
8144                 let mut res = Ok(());
8145
8146                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8147                         // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
8148                         // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
8149                         // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
8150                         // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
8151                         let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
8152                         let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
8153
8154                         {
8155                                 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8156                                 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
8157                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
8158                                                 if inbound_peer_limited {
8159                                                         res = Err(());
8160                                                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8161                                                 }
8162                                                 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
8163                                                         channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8164                                                         inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8165                                                         latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
8166                                                         pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
8167                                                         in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8168                                                         monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
8169                                                         actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8170                                                         is_connected: true,
8171                                                 }));
8172                                         },
8173                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
8174                                                 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
8175                                                 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
8176
8177                                                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8178                                                 if inbound_peer_limited &&
8179                                                         Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
8180                                                         peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
8181                                                 {
8182                                                         res = Err(());
8183                                                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8184                                                 }
8185
8186                                                 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
8187                                                 peer_state.is_connected = true;
8188                                         },
8189                                 }
8190                         }
8191
8192                         log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8193
8194                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8195                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
8196                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8197                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8198                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8199
8200                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(|(_, phase)|
8201                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else {
8202                                                 // Since unfunded channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer, and they're not persisted
8203                                                 // (so won't be recovered after a crash), they shouldn't exist here and we would never need to
8204                                                 // worry about closing and removing them.
8205                                                 debug_assert!(false);
8206                                                 None
8207                                         }
8208                                 ).for_each(|chan| {
8209                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
8210                                                 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8211                                                 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
8212                                         });
8213                                 });
8214                         }
8215
8216                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
8217                         //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
8218                 });
8219                 res
8220         }
8221
8222         fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
8223                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8224
8225                 match &msg.data as &str {
8226                         "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
8227                         "link failed to shutdown" =>
8228                         {
8229                                 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
8230                                 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
8231                                 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
8232                                 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
8233                                 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
8234                                 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
8235                                 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
8236                                 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
8237                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8238                                         let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8239                                         if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8240                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8241                                         if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
8242                                                 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
8243                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
8244                                                                 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8245                                                                 msg,
8246                                                         });
8247                                                 }
8248                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8249                                                         node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8250                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
8251                                                                 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
8252                                                                         channel_id: msg.channel_id,
8253                                                                         data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
8254                                                                 },
8255                                                                 log_level: Level::Trace,
8256                                                         }
8257                                                 });
8258                                         }
8259                                 }
8260                                 return;
8261                         }
8262                         _ => {}
8263                 }
8264
8265                 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
8266                         let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
8267                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8268                                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8269                                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8270                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8271                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8272                                 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
8273                                 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
8274                                 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
8275                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
8276                         };
8277                         for channel_id in channel_ids {
8278                                 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
8279                                 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
8280                         }
8281                 } else {
8282                         {
8283                                 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
8284                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8285                                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8286                                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8287                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8288                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8289                                 if let Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
8290                                         if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
8291                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
8292                                                         node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8293                                                         msg,
8294                                                 });
8295                                                 return;
8296                                         }
8297                                 }
8298                         }
8299
8300                         // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
8301                         let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
8302                 }
8303         }
8304
8305         fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
8306                 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
8307         }
8308
8309         fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
8310                 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
8311         }
8312
8313         fn get_genesis_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
8314                 Some(vec![ChainHash::from(&self.genesis_hash[..])])
8315         }
8316
8317         fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
8318                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8319                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8320                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8321         }
8322
8323         fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
8324                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8325                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8326                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8327         }
8328
8329         fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
8330                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8331                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8332                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8333         }
8334
8335         fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
8336                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8337                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8338                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8339         }
8340
8341         fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
8342                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8343                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8344                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8345         }
8346
8347         fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
8348                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8349                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8350                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8351         }
8352
8353         fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
8354                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8355                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8356                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8357         }
8358
8359         fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
8360                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8361                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8362                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8363         }
8364
8365         fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
8366                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8367                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8368                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8369         }
8370 }
8371
8372 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8373 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8374 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
8375         let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
8376         node_features.set_keysend_optional();
8377         node_features
8378 }
8379
8380 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8381 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8382 ///
8383 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
8384 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
8385 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
8386 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
8387         provided_init_features(config).to_context()
8388 }
8389
8390 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8391 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8392 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
8393         provided_init_features(config).to_context()
8394 }
8395
8396 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8397 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8398 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
8399         ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
8400 }
8401
8402 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8403 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8404 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
8405         // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
8406         // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
8407         // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
8408         let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
8409         features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
8410         features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
8411         features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
8412         features.set_static_remote_key_required();
8413         features.set_payment_secret_required();
8414         features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
8415         features.set_wumbo_optional();
8416         features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
8417         features.set_channel_type_optional();
8418         features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
8419         features.set_zero_conf_optional();
8420         if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
8421                 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
8422         }
8423         features
8424 }
8425
8426 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
8427 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
8428
8429 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
8430         (2, fee_base_msat, required),
8431         (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
8432         (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
8433 });
8434
8435 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
8436         (2, node_id, required),
8437         (4, features, required),
8438         (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
8439         (8, forwarding_info, option),
8440         (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
8441         (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
8442 });
8443
8444 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
8445         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8446                 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8447                 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
8448                 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
8449                 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
8450                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8451                         (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
8452                         (2, self.channel_id, required),
8453                         (3, self.channel_type, option),
8454                         (4, self.counterparty, required),
8455                         (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
8456                         (6, self.funding_txo, option),
8457                         (7, self.config, option),
8458                         (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
8459                         (9, self.confirmations, option),
8460                         (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
8461                         (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
8462                         (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
8463                         (16, self.balance_msat, required),
8464                         (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
8465                         (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
8466                         (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
8467                         (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
8468                         (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
8469                         (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
8470                         (26, self.is_outbound, required),
8471                         (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
8472                         (30, self.is_usable, required),
8473                         (32, self.is_public, required),
8474                         (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
8475                         (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
8476                         (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
8477                         (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
8478                         (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
8479                 });
8480                 Ok(())
8481         }
8482 }
8483
8484 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
8485         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8486                 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8487                         (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
8488                         (2, channel_id, required),
8489                         (3, channel_type, option),
8490                         (4, counterparty, required),
8491                         (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
8492                         (6, funding_txo, option),
8493                         (7, config, option),
8494                         (8, short_channel_id, option),
8495                         (9, confirmations, option),
8496                         (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
8497                         (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
8498                         (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
8499                         (16, balance_msat, required),
8500                         (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
8501                         // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
8502                         // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
8503                         (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
8504                         (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
8505                         (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
8506                         (22, confirmations_required, option),
8507                         (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
8508                         (26, is_outbound, required),
8509                         (28, is_channel_ready, required),
8510                         (30, is_usable, required),
8511                         (32, is_public, required),
8512                         (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
8513                         (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
8514                         (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
8515                         (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
8516                         (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
8517                 });
8518
8519                 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8520                 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
8521                 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
8522                 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
8523                         ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
8524
8525                 Ok(Self {
8526                         inbound_scid_alias,
8527                         channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
8528                         channel_type,
8529                         counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
8530                         outbound_scid_alias,
8531                         funding_txo,
8532                         config,
8533                         short_channel_id,
8534                         channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
8535                         unspendable_punishment_reserve,
8536                         user_channel_id,
8537                         balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
8538                         outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
8539                         next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
8540                         next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
8541                         inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
8542                         confirmations_required,
8543                         confirmations,
8544                         force_close_spend_delay,
8545                         is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
8546                         is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
8547                         is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
8548                         is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
8549                         inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
8550                         inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
8551                         feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
8552                         channel_shutdown_state,
8553                 })
8554         }
8555 }
8556
8557 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
8558         (2, channels, required_vec),
8559         (4, phantom_scid, required),
8560         (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
8561 });
8562
8563 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
8564         (0, Forward) => {
8565                 (0, onion_packet, required),
8566                 (2, short_channel_id, required),
8567         },
8568         (1, Receive) => {
8569                 (0, payment_data, required),
8570                 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
8571                 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
8572                 (3, payment_metadata, option),
8573                 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
8574         },
8575         (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
8576                 (0, payment_preimage, required),
8577                 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
8578                 (3, payment_metadata, option),
8579                 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
8580                 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
8581         },
8582 ;);
8583
8584 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
8585         (0, routing, required),
8586         (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
8587         (4, payment_hash, required),
8588         (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
8589         (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
8590         (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
8591         (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
8592 });
8593
8594
8595 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
8596         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8597                 match self {
8598                         HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
8599                                 0u8.write(writer)?;
8600                                 channel_id.write(writer)?;
8601                                 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8602                                 reason.write(writer)?;
8603                         },
8604                         HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
8605                                 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
8606                         }) => {
8607                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
8608                                 channel_id.write(writer)?;
8609                                 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8610                                 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
8611                                 failure_code.write(writer)?;
8612                         },
8613                 }
8614                 Ok(())
8615         }
8616 }
8617
8618 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
8619         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8620                 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8621                 match id {
8622                         0 => {
8623                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
8624                                         channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8625                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8626                                         reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
8627                                 }))
8628                         },
8629                         1 => {
8630                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
8631                                         channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8632                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8633                                         sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
8634                                         failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
8635                                 }))
8636                         },
8637                         // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
8638                         // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
8639                         // messages contained in the variants.
8640                         // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
8641                         // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
8642                         // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
8643                         2 => {
8644                                 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
8645                                 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
8646                                 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
8647                                 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
8648                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
8649                         },
8650                         3 => {
8651                                 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
8652                                 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
8653                                 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
8654                                 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
8655                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
8656                         },
8657                         _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
8658                 }
8659         }
8660 }
8661
8662 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
8663         (0, Forward),
8664         (1, Fail),
8665 );
8666
8667 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
8668         (0, short_channel_id, required),
8669         (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
8670         (2, outpoint, required),
8671         (4, htlc_id, required),
8672         (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
8673         (7, user_channel_id, option),
8674 });
8675
8676 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
8677         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8678                 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
8679                         OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
8680                         OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
8681                 };
8682                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8683                         (0, self.prev_hop, required),
8684                         (1, self.total_msat, required),
8685                         (2, self.value, required),
8686                         (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
8687                         (4, payment_data, option),
8688                         (5, self.total_value_received, option),
8689                         (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
8690                         (8, keysend_preimage, option),
8691                         (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
8692                 });
8693                 Ok(())
8694         }
8695 }
8696
8697 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
8698         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8699                 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8700                         (0, prev_hop, required),
8701                         (1, total_msat, option),
8702                         (2, value_ser, required),
8703                         (3, sender_intended_value, option),
8704                         (4, payment_data_opt, option),
8705                         (5, total_value_received, option),
8706                         (6, cltv_expiry, required),
8707                         (8, keysend_preimage, option),
8708                         (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
8709                 });
8710                 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
8711                 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
8712                 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
8713                         Some(p) => {
8714                                 if payment_data.is_some() {
8715                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8716                                 }
8717                                 if total_msat.is_none() {
8718                                         total_msat = Some(value);
8719                                 }
8720                                 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
8721                         },
8722                         None => {
8723                                 if total_msat.is_none() {
8724                                         if payment_data.is_none() {
8725                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8726                                         }
8727                                         total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
8728                                 }
8729                                 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
8730                         },
8731                 };
8732                 Ok(Self {
8733                         prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
8734                         timer_ticks: 0,
8735                         value,
8736                         sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
8737                         total_value_received,
8738                         total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
8739                         onion_payload,
8740                         cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
8741                         counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
8742                 })
8743         }
8744 }
8745
8746 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
8747         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8748                 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8749                 match id {
8750                         0 => {
8751                                 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
8752                                 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
8753                                 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
8754                                 let mut payment_id = None;
8755                                 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
8756                                 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
8757                                 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8758                                         (0, session_priv, required),
8759                                         (1, payment_id, option),
8760                                         (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
8761                                         (4, path_hops, required_vec),
8762                                         (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
8763                                         (6, blinded_tail, option),
8764                                 });
8765                                 if payment_id.is_none() {
8766                                         // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
8767                                         // instead.
8768                                         payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
8769                                 }
8770                                 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
8771                                 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
8772                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8773                                 }
8774                                 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
8775                                         if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
8776                                                 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
8777                                                         *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8778                                                 }
8779                                         }
8780                                 }
8781                                 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
8782                                         session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
8783                                         first_hop_htlc_msat,
8784                                         path,
8785                                         payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
8786                                 })
8787                         }
8788                         1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
8789                         _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
8790                 }
8791         }
8792 }
8793
8794 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
8795         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
8796                 match self {
8797                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
8798                                 0u8.write(writer)?;
8799                                 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
8800                                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8801                                         (0, session_priv, required),
8802                                         (1, payment_id_opt, option),
8803                                         (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
8804                                         // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
8805                                         (4, path.hops, required_vec),
8806                                         (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
8807                                         (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
8808                                  });
8809                         }
8810                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
8811                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
8812                                 field.write(writer)?;
8813                         }
8814                 }
8815                 Ok(())
8816         }
8817 }
8818
8819 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
8820         (0, forward_info, required),
8821         (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
8822         (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
8823         (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
8824         (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
8825 });
8826
8827 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
8828         (1, FailHTLC) => {
8829                 (0, htlc_id, required),
8830                 (2, err_packet, required),
8831         };
8832         (0, AddHTLC)
8833 );
8834
8835 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
8836         (0, payment_secret, required),
8837         (2, expiry_time, required),
8838         (4, user_payment_id, required),
8839         (6, payment_preimage, required),
8840         (8, min_value_msat, required),
8841 });
8842
8843 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8844 where
8845         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8846         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8847         ES::Target: EntropySource,
8848         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8849         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8850         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8851         R::Target: Router,
8852         L::Target: Logger,
8853 {
8854         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8855                 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
8856
8857                 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8858
8859                 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
8860                 {
8861                         let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
8862                         best_block.height().write(writer)?;
8863                         best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
8864                 }
8865
8866                 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
8867                 {
8868                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8869                         let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
8870                         for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8871                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8872                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8873                                 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
8874                                         serializable_peer_count += 1;
8875                                 }
8876
8877                                 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
8878                                         |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_broadcast() } else { false }
8879                                 ).count();
8880                         }
8881
8882                         (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
8883
8884                         for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8885                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8886                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8887                                 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
8888                                         |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
8889                                                 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() { Some(channel) } else { None }
8890                                         } else { None }
8891                                 ) {
8892                                         channel.write(writer)?;
8893                                 }
8894                         }
8895                 }
8896
8897                 {
8898                         let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8899                         (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8900                         for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
8901                                 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
8902                                 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8903                                 for forward in pending_forwards {
8904                                         forward.write(writer)?;
8905                                 }
8906                         }
8907                 }
8908
8909                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8910
8911                 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8912                 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
8913                 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8914
8915                 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
8916                 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
8917                 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8918                 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
8919                         payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8920                         (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8921                         for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
8922                                 htlc.write(writer)?;
8923                         }
8924                         htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
8925                         htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
8926                 }
8927
8928                 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
8929                 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
8930                 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8931                         // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
8932                         // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
8933                         // per_peer_state lock at all.
8934                         peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
8935                 }
8936
8937                 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
8938                 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
8939                         // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
8940                         // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
8941                         // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
8942                         // no channels.
8943                         if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
8944                                 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
8945                                 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
8946                                 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
8947                                         monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
8948                                                 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
8949                                                 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
8950                                 }
8951                         }
8952                 }
8953
8954                 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8955                 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
8956                 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
8957                 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
8958                 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
8959                 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
8960                         // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
8961                         // well save the space and not write any events here.
8962                         0u64.write(writer)?;
8963                 } else {
8964                         (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8965                         for (event, _) in events.iter() {
8966                                 event.write(writer)?;
8967                         }
8968                 }
8969
8970                 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
8971                 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
8972                 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
8973                 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
8974                 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
8975                 0u64.write(writer)?;
8976
8977                 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
8978                 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
8979                 // likely to be identical.
8980                 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
8981                 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
8982
8983                 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8984                 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
8985                         hash.write(writer)?;
8986                         pending_payment.write(writer)?;
8987                 }
8988
8989                 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
8990                 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
8991                 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
8992                         if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
8993                                 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
8994                         }
8995                 }
8996                 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
8997                 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
8998                         match outbound {
8999                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
9000                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
9001                                         for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
9002                                                 session_priv.write(writer)?;
9003                                         }
9004                                 }
9005                                 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
9006                                 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
9007                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
9008                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
9009                         }
9010                 }
9011
9012                 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
9013                 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
9014                 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9015                         match outbound {
9016                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
9017                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
9018                                         pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
9019                                 },
9020                                 _ => {},
9021                         }
9022                 }
9023
9024                 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
9025                 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9026                 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
9027                         pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
9028                 }
9029
9030                 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
9031                 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
9032                         // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
9033                         // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
9034                         pending_claiming_payments = None;
9035                 }
9036
9037                 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
9038                 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
9039                         for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
9040                                 if !updates.is_empty() {
9041                                         if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(HashMap::new()); }
9042                                         in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
9043                                 }
9044                         }
9045                 }
9046
9047                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9048                         (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
9049                         (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
9050                         (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
9051                         (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
9052                         (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
9053                         (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
9054                         (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
9055                         (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
9056                         (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
9057                         (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
9058                         (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
9059                         (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
9060                 });
9061
9062                 Ok(())
9063         }
9064 }
9065
9066 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
9067         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9068                 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
9069                 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
9070                         event.write(w)?;
9071                         action.write(w)?;
9072                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
9073                                 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
9074                                 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
9075                                 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
9076                                 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
9077                                 // check that the event is sane here.
9078                                 let event_encoded = event.encode();
9079                                 let event_read: Option<Event> =
9080                                         MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
9081                                 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
9082                         }
9083                 }
9084                 Ok(())
9085         }
9086 }
9087 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
9088         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9089                 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9090                 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
9091                 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
9092                         MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
9093                         len) as usize);
9094                 for _ in 0..len {
9095                         let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
9096                         let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
9097                         if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
9098                                 events.push_back((ev, action));
9099                         } else if action.is_some() {
9100                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9101                         }
9102                 }
9103                 Ok(events)
9104         }
9105 }
9106
9107 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
9108         (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
9109         (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
9110         (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
9111         (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
9112         (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
9113 );
9114
9115 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
9116 ///
9117 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
9118 /// is:
9119 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
9120 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
9121 ///    `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
9122 ///    This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
9123 ///    [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
9124 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
9125 ///    same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
9126 ///    [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
9127 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
9128 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
9129 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
9130 ///    Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
9131 ///    will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
9132 ///    the next step.
9133 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
9134 ///    [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
9135 ///
9136 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
9137 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
9138 ///
9139 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
9140 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
9141 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
9142 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
9143 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
9144 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
9145 ///
9146 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
9147 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9148 where
9149         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9150         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9151         ES::Target: EntropySource,
9152         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9153         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9154         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9155         R::Target: Router,
9156         L::Target: Logger,
9157 {
9158         /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
9159         pub entropy_source: ES,
9160
9161         /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
9162         pub node_signer: NS,
9163
9164         /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
9165         /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
9166         /// signing data.
9167         pub signer_provider: SP,
9168
9169         /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
9170         ///
9171         /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
9172         pub fee_estimator: F,
9173         /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
9174         ///
9175         /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
9176         /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
9177         /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
9178         pub chain_monitor: M,
9179
9180         /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
9181         /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
9182         /// force-closed during deserialization.
9183         pub tx_broadcaster: T,
9184         /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
9185         /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
9186         ///
9187         /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
9188         pub router: R,
9189         /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
9190         /// deserialization.
9191         pub logger: L,
9192         /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
9193         /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
9194         pub default_config: UserConfig,
9195
9196         /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
9197         /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
9198         ///
9199         /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
9200         /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
9201         /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
9202         /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
9203         ///
9204         /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
9205         /// this struct.
9206         ///
9207         /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
9208         pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
9209 }
9210
9211 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9212                 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9213 where
9214         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9215         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9216         ES::Target: EntropySource,
9217         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9218         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9219         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9220         R::Target: Router,
9221         L::Target: Logger,
9222 {
9223         /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
9224         /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
9225         /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
9226         pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
9227                         mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
9228                 Self {
9229                         entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
9230                         channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
9231                 }
9232         }
9233 }
9234
9235 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
9236 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
9237 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9238         ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
9239 where
9240         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9241         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9242         ES::Target: EntropySource,
9243         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9244         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9245         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9246         R::Target: Router,
9247         L::Target: Logger,
9248 {
9249         fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9250                 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
9251                 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
9252         }
9253 }
9254
9255 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9256         ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
9257 where
9258         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9259         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9260         ES::Target: EntropySource,
9261         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9262         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9263         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9264         R::Target: Router,
9265         L::Target: Logger,
9266 {
9267         fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9268                 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
9269
9270                 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
9271                 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9272                 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
9273
9274                 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
9275
9276                 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9277                 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
9278                 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
9279                 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
9280                 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
9281                 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
9282                 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
9283                 for _ in 0..channel_count {
9284                         let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
9285                                 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
9286                         ))?;
9287                         let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9288                         funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
9289                         if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
9290                                 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
9291                                                 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
9292                                                 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
9293                                                 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
9294                                         // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
9295                                         log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
9296                                         log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
9297                                         if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
9298                                                 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
9299                                                         &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
9300                                         }
9301                                         if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
9302                                                 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
9303                                                         &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
9304                                         }
9305                                         if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
9306                                                 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
9307                                                         &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
9308                                         }
9309                                         if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
9310                                                 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
9311                                                         &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
9312                                         }
9313                                         let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs, batch_funding_txid) = channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
9314                                         if batch_funding_txid.is_some() {
9315                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9316                                         }
9317                                         if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = monitor_update {
9318                                                 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
9319                                                         counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
9320                                                 });
9321                                         }
9322                                         failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
9323                                         channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
9324                                                 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
9325                                                 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
9326                                                 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
9327                                                 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
9328                                                 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
9329                                         }, None));
9330                                         for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
9331                                                 let mut found_htlc = false;
9332                                                 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
9333                                                         if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
9334                                                 }
9335                                                 if !found_htlc {
9336                                                         // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
9337                                                         // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
9338                                                         // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
9339                                                         // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
9340                                                         // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
9341                                                         // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
9342                                                         // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
9343                                                         log_info!(args.logger,
9344                                                                 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
9345                                                                 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
9346                                                         failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
9347                                                 }
9348                                         }
9349                                 } else {
9350                                         log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
9351                                                 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
9352                                                 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
9353                                         if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
9354                                                 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
9355                                         }
9356                                         if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() {
9357                                                 id_to_peer.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
9358                                         }
9359                                         match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
9360                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
9361                                                         let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
9362                                                         by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
9363                                                 },
9364                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
9365                                                         let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
9366                                                         by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
9367                                                         entry.insert(by_id_map);
9368                                                 }
9369                                         }
9370                                 }
9371                         } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
9372                                 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
9373                                 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
9374                                 // safely discard the channel.
9375                                 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false);
9376                                 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
9377                                         channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
9378                                         user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
9379                                         reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
9380                                         counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
9381                                         channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
9382                                 }, None));
9383                         } else {
9384                                 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
9385                                 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
9386                                 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
9387                                 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
9388                                 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
9389                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9390                         }
9391                 }
9392
9393                 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
9394                         if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
9395                                 log_info!(args.logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
9396                                         &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
9397                                 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
9398                                         update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
9399                                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
9400                                 };
9401                                 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
9402                         }
9403                 }
9404
9405                 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
9406                 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9407                 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
9408                 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
9409                         let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
9410                         let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9411                         let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
9412                         for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
9413                                 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
9414                         }
9415                         forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
9416                 }
9417
9418                 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9419                 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
9420                 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
9421                         let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
9422                         let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9423                         let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
9424                         for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
9425                                 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
9426                         }
9427                         claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
9428                 }
9429
9430                 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
9431                         PeerState {
9432                                 channel_by_id,
9433                                 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
9434                                 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
9435                                 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
9436                                 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9437                                 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
9438                                 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9439                                 is_connected: false,
9440                         }
9441                 };
9442
9443                 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9444                 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
9445                 for _ in 0..peer_count {
9446                         let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
9447                         let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new());
9448                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
9449                         peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
9450                         per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
9451                 }
9452
9453                 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9454                 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
9455                         VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
9456                 for _ in 0..event_count {
9457                         match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
9458                                 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
9459                                 None => continue,
9460                         }
9461                 }
9462
9463                 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9464                 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
9465                         match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
9466                                 0 => {
9467                                         // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
9468                                         // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
9469                                         // on-startup monitor updates.
9470                                         let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
9471                                         let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
9472                                 }
9473                                 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
9474                         }
9475                 }
9476
9477                 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
9478                 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9479
9480                 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9481                 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
9482                 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
9483                         if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
9484                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9485                         }
9486                 }
9487
9488                 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9489                 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
9490                         HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
9491                 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
9492                         let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
9493                         let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
9494                                 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
9495                         };
9496                         if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
9497                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9498                         };
9499                 }
9500
9501                 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
9502                 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
9503                 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
9504                 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
9505                 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
9506                 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
9507                 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
9508                 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
9509                 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
9510                 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
9511                 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
9512                 let mut events_override = None;
9513                 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
9514                 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9515                         (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
9516                         (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
9517                         (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
9518                         (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
9519                         (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
9520                         (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
9521                         (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
9522                         (8, events_override, option),
9523                         (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
9524                         (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
9525                         (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
9526                         (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
9527                 });
9528                 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
9529                         fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
9530                 }
9531
9532                 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
9533                         probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
9534                 }
9535
9536                 if let Some(events) = events_override {
9537                         pending_events_read = events;
9538                 }
9539
9540                 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
9541                         pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
9542                 }
9543
9544                 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
9545                         pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
9546                 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
9547                         let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
9548                         for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
9549                                 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
9550                         }
9551                         pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
9552                 }
9553                 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
9554                         pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
9555                         retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
9556                 };
9557
9558                 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
9559                 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
9560                 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
9561                 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
9562                 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
9563                 //
9564                 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
9565                 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
9566                 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
9567                 //
9568                 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
9569                 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
9570                 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
9571                         ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
9572                          $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
9573                         ) => { {
9574                                 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
9575                                 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
9576                                 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
9577                                         log_trace!(args.logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
9578                                                 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$funding_txo.to_channel_id());
9579                                         max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
9580                                         pending_background_events.push(
9581                                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
9582                                                         counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
9583                                                         funding_txo: $funding_txo,
9584                                                         update: update.clone(),
9585                                                 });
9586                                 }
9587                                 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
9588                                         // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
9589                                         // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
9590                                         // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
9591                                         pending_background_events.push(
9592                                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
9593                                                         counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
9594                                                         channel_id: $funding_txo.to_channel_id(),
9595                                                 });
9596                                 }
9597                                 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
9598                                         log_error!(args.logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
9599                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9600                                 }
9601                                 max_in_flight_update_id
9602                         } }
9603                 }
9604
9605                 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
9606                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
9607                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9608                         for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
9609                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
9610                                         // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
9611                                         // discarded.
9612                                         let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9613                                         let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
9614                                                 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
9615                                         let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
9616                                         if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
9617                                                 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
9618                                                         max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
9619                                                                 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
9620                                                                         funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, ""));
9621                                                 }
9622                                         }
9623                                         if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
9624                                                 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
9625                                                 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
9626                                                 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
9627                                                         chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
9628                                                 log_error!(args.logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
9629                                                 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
9630                                                 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
9631                                                 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
9632                                                 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
9633                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9634                                         }
9635                                 } else {
9636                                         // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
9637                                         // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
9638                                         debug_assert!(false);
9639                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9640                                 }
9641                         }
9642                 }
9643
9644                 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
9645                         for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
9646                                 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
9647                                         // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
9648                                         // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
9649                                         // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
9650                                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
9651                                                 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(HashMap::new()))
9652                                         });
9653                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9654                                         handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
9655                                                 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, "closed ");
9656                                 } else {
9657                                         log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
9658                                         log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.",
9659                                                 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
9660                                         log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
9661                                         log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
9662                                         log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
9663                                         log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
9664                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9665                                 }
9666                         }
9667                 }
9668
9669                 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
9670                 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
9671
9672                 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
9673                 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
9674                 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
9675                 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
9676
9677                 {
9678                         // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
9679                         // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
9680                         // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
9681                         // corresponding `Channel` at all).
9682                         // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
9683                         // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
9684                         // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
9685                         // 0.0.102+
9686                         for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
9687                                 let counterparty_opt = id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
9688                                 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
9689                                         for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
9690                                                 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
9691                                                         if path.hops.is_empty() {
9692                                                                 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
9693                                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9694                                                         }
9695
9696                                                         let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
9697                                                         let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
9698                                                         session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
9699                                                         match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
9700                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
9701                                                                         let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
9702                                                                         log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
9703                                                                                 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), &htlc.payment_hash);
9704                                                                 },
9705                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
9706                                                                         let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
9707                                                                         entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
9708                                                                                 retry_strategy: None,
9709                                                                                 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
9710                                                                                 payment_params: None,
9711                                                                                 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
9712                                                                                 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
9713                                                                                 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9714                                                                                 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9715                                                                                 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9716                                                                                 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9717                                                                                 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
9718                                                                                 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
9719                                                                                 total_msat: path_amt,
9720                                                                                 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
9721                                                                                 remaining_max_total_routing_fee_msat: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9722                                                                         });
9723                                                                         log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
9724                                                                                 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash,  log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
9725                                                                 }
9726                                                         }
9727                                                 }
9728                                         }
9729                                         for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
9730                                                 match htlc_source {
9731                                                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
9732                                                                 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
9733                                                                         info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
9734                                                                                 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
9735                                                                 };
9736                                                                 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
9737                                                                 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
9738                                                                 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
9739                                                                 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
9740                                                                 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
9741                                                                 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
9742                                                                         forwards.retain(|forward| {
9743                                                                                 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
9744                                                                                         if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
9745                                                                                                 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
9746                                                                                                         &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
9747                                                                                                 false
9748                                                                                         } else { true }
9749                                                                                 } else { true }
9750                                                                         });
9751                                                                         !forwards.is_empty()
9752                                                                 });
9753                                                                 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
9754                                                                         if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
9755                                                                                 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
9756                                                                                         &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
9757                                                                                 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
9758                                                                                         if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
9759                                                                                                 intercepted_id != ev_id
9760                                                                                         } else { true }
9761                                                                                 });
9762                                                                                 false
9763                                                                         } else { true }
9764                                                                 });
9765                                                         },
9766                                                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
9767                                                                 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
9768                                                                         let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
9769                                                                         // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
9770                                                                         // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
9771                                                                         // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
9772                                                                         // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
9773                                                                         // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
9774                                                                         // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
9775                                                                         // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
9776                                                                         // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
9777                                                                         let compl_action =
9778                                                                                 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
9779                                                                                         channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
9780                                                                                         counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
9781                                                                                 };
9782                                                                         pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
9783                                                                                 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &args.logger);
9784                                                                         pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
9785                                                                 }
9786                                                         },
9787                                                 }
9788                                         }
9789                                 }
9790
9791                                 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
9792                                 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
9793                                 // payments.
9794                                 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
9795                                         .into_iter()
9796                                         .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
9797                                                 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
9798                                                         if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
9799                                                                 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
9800                                                                         // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
9801                                                                         // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
9802                                                                         // channel_id -> peer map entry).
9803                                                                         counterparty_opt.is_none(),
9804                                                                         counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
9805                                                                         monitor.get_funding_txo().0))
9806                                                         } else { None }
9807                                                 } else {
9808                                                         // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
9809                                                         // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
9810                                                         // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
9811                                                         // channel still live case here.
9812                                                         None
9813                                                 }
9814                                         });
9815                                 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
9816                                         pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
9817                                 }
9818                         }
9819                 }
9820
9821                 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
9822                         // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
9823                         // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
9824                         // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
9825                         // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
9826                         // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
9827                         pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
9828                                 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
9829                         }, None));
9830                 }
9831
9832                 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
9833                 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
9834
9835                 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
9836                 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
9837                         if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
9838                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9839                         }
9840                         if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
9841                                 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
9842                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9843                                 }
9844                                 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
9845                                         purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
9846                                 {
9847                                         let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
9848                                                 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
9849                                         });
9850                                         if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
9851                                 }
9852                         } else {
9853                                 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
9854                                         let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
9855                                                 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
9856                                         });
9857                                         if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
9858                                 }
9859                         }
9860                 } else {
9861                         // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
9862                         // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
9863                         for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
9864                                 if htlcs.is_empty() {
9865                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9866                                 }
9867                                 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
9868                                         OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
9869                                                 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
9870                                                         events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
9871                                                                 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
9872                                                                         Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
9873                                                                         None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
9874                                                                                 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
9875                                                                                 Err(()) => {
9876                                                                                         log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
9877                                                                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9878                                                                                 }
9879                                                                         }
9880                                                                 },
9881                                                                 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
9882                                                         }
9883                                                 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
9884                                         },
9885                                         OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
9886                                                 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
9887                                 };
9888                                 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
9889                                         purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
9890                                 });
9891                         }
9892                 }
9893
9894                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9895                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
9896
9897                 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
9898                         Ok(key) => key,
9899                         Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9900                 };
9901                 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
9902                         if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
9903                                 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
9904                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9905                         }
9906                 }
9907
9908                 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
9909                 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
9910                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9911                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9912                         for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
9913                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
9914                                         if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
9915                                                 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
9916                                                 loop {
9917                                                         outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
9918                                                                 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
9919                                                         if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
9920                                                 }
9921                                                 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
9922                                         } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
9923                                                 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
9924                                                 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
9925                                                 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
9926                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9927                                         }
9928                                         if chan.context.is_usable() {
9929                                                 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
9930                                                         // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
9931                                                         // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
9932                                                         log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
9933                                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9934                                                 }
9935                                         }
9936                                 } else {
9937                                         // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
9938                                         // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
9939                                         debug_assert!(false);
9940                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9941                                 }
9942                         }
9943                 }
9944
9945                 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
9946
9947                 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
9948                         for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
9949                                 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
9950                                         log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
9951                                         let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
9952                                         let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
9953                                         let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
9954                                         if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
9955                                                 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
9956                                                         .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
9957                                                 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
9958                                         }
9959                                         for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
9960                                                 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
9961
9962                                                 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
9963                                                 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
9964                                                 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
9965                                                 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
9966                                                 //
9967                                                 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
9968                                                 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
9969                                                 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
9970                                                 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
9971                                                 // reason to.
9972                                                 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
9973                                                 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
9974                                                 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
9975                                                 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
9976                                                 // restart.
9977                                                 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
9978                                                 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
9979                                                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
9980                                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9981                                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9982                                                         if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
9983                                                                 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
9984                                                         }
9985                                                 }
9986                                                 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
9987                                                         previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
9988                                                 }
9989                                         }
9990                                         pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
9991                                                 receiver_node_id,
9992                                                 payment_hash,
9993                                                 purpose: payment.purpose,
9994                                                 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
9995                                                 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
9996                                                 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
9997                                         }, None));
9998                                 }
9999                         }
10000                 }
10001
10002                 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
10003                         if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
10004                                 for (_, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
10005                                         for action in actions.iter() {
10006                                                 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
10007                                                         downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
10008                                                                 Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), ..
10009                                                 } = action {
10010                                                         if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
10011                                                                 log_trace!(args.logger,
10012                                                                         "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
10013                                                                         blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id());
10014                                                                 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
10015                                                                         .entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
10016                                                                         .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
10017                                                         } else {
10018                                                                 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
10019                                                                 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
10020                                                                 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
10021                                                                 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
10022                                                                 // anymore.
10023                                                         }
10024                                                 }
10025                                                 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately { .. } = action {
10026                                                         debug_assert!(false, "Non-event-generating channel freeing should not appear in our queue");
10027                                                 }
10028                                         }
10029                                 }
10030                                 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
10031                         } else {
10032                                 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
10033                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10034                         }
10035                 }
10036
10037                 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
10038                         genesis_hash,
10039                         fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
10040                         chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
10041                         tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
10042                         router: args.router,
10043
10044                         best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
10045
10046                         inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
10047                         pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
10048                         pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
10049                         pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
10050
10051                         forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
10052                         claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
10053                         outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
10054                         id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
10055                         short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
10056                         fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
10057
10058                         probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
10059
10060                         our_network_pubkey,
10061                         secp_ctx,
10062
10063                         highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
10064
10065                         per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
10066
10067                         pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
10068                         pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
10069                         pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
10070                         total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
10071                         background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
10072
10073                         event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
10074                         needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
10075
10076                         funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
10077
10078                         entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
10079                         node_signer: args.node_signer,
10080                         signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
10081
10082                         logger: args.logger,
10083                         default_configuration: args.default_config,
10084                 };
10085
10086                 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
10087                         let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
10088                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
10089                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
10090                         channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
10091                 }
10092
10093                 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding) in pending_claims_to_replay {
10094                         // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
10095                         // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
10096                         // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
10097                         channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value),
10098                                 downstream_closed, true, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding);
10099                 }
10100
10101                 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
10102                 //connection or two.
10103
10104                 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
10105         }
10106 }
10107
10108 #[cfg(test)]
10109 mod tests {
10110         use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
10111         use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
10112         use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
10113         use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
10114         use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
10115         use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
10116         use crate::ln::ChannelId;
10117         use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
10118         use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
10119         use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
10120         use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
10121         use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
10122         use crate::util::errors::APIError;
10123         use crate::util::test_utils;
10124         use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
10125         use crate::sign::EntropySource;
10126
10127         #[test]
10128         fn test_notify_limits() {
10129                 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
10130                 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
10131                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10132                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10133                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
10134                 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10135
10136                 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
10137                 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
10138                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10139                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10140                 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10141
10142                 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10143
10144                 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
10145                 // to connect messages with new values
10146                 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
10147                 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
10148                 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
10149                         &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
10150                 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
10151                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
10152
10153                 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
10154                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10155                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10156                 // ... but the last node should not.
10157                 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10158                 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
10159                 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10160                 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10161
10162                 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
10163                 // about the channel.
10164                 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10165                 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10166                 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10167
10168                 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
10169                 // parties.
10170                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10171                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10172                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10173                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10174                 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10175                 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10176
10177                 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
10178                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
10179                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
10180
10181                 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
10182                 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
10183                 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
10184                 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
10185                 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
10186                 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
10187
10188                 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
10189                 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
10190                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
10191                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
10192                 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10193                 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10194                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
10195                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
10196
10197                 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
10198                 // the channel info has updated.
10199                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
10200                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
10201                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10202                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10203                 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
10204                 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
10205         }
10206
10207         #[test]
10208         fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
10209                 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
10210                 // expected.
10211                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10212                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10213                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10214                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10215                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10216
10217                 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
10218                 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
10219                 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
10220                 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
10221
10222                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
10223                 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
10224                 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
10225                 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
10226                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
10227                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
10228                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
10229                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
10230                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10231                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10232                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10233                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
10234
10235                 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
10236                 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10237                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
10238                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10239                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10240                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10241                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
10242                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
10243                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10244                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
10245                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
10246                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
10247                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
10248                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10249                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10250                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
10251                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10252                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
10253                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10254                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10255                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10256                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
10257                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
10258
10259                 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
10260                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
10261                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
10262                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10263                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10264                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10265                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
10266
10267                 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
10268                 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
10269                 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
10270                 // lightning messages manually.
10271                 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
10272                 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
10273                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
10274
10275                 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10276                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10277                 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
10278                 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
10279                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10280                 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10281                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
10282                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10283                 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10284                 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
10285                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10286                 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10287                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10288                 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
10289                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10290                 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10291                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
10292                 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10293                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10294                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
10295                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10296                 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
10297                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10298                 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10299                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
10300                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10301
10302                 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
10303                 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
10304                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10305                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
10306                 match events[0] {
10307                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
10308                                 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
10309                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
10310                                 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
10311                         },
10312                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10313                 }
10314                 match events[1] {
10315                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
10316                                 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
10317                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
10318                                 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
10319                         },
10320                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10321                 }
10322         }
10323
10324         #[test]
10325         fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
10326                 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
10327                 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
10328         }
10329
10330         fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
10331                 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
10332                 //      outbound regular payment fails as expected.
10333                 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
10334                 //      fails as expected.
10335                 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
10336                 //      payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
10337                 //      reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
10338                 //      secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
10339                 //      `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
10340                 //      payment secrets and reject otherwise.
10341                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10342                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10343                 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
10344                 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
10345                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
10346                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10347                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10348                 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
10349                 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10350
10351                 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
10352                 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
10353                 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
10354
10355                 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
10356                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
10357                         PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
10358                         TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
10359                 let route = find_route(
10360                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
10361                         None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
10362                 ).unwrap();
10363                 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10364                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
10365                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10366                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10367                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10368                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
10369                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
10370                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10371                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
10372                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
10373                 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
10374                 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
10375                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
10376                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
10377                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10378                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10379                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
10380                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10381                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
10382                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10383                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10384                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10385                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
10386                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
10387
10388                 // Finally, claim the original payment.
10389                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
10390
10391                 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
10392                 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
10393                 let route = find_route(
10394                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
10395                         None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
10396                 ).unwrap();
10397                 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10398                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
10399                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10400                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10401                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10402                 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
10403                 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
10404                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
10405
10406                 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
10407                 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
10408                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
10409                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
10410                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10411                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10412                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10413                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
10414                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
10415                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10416                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
10417                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
10418                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
10419                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
10420                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10421                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10422                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
10423                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10424                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
10425                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10426                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10427                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10428                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
10429                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
10430
10431                 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
10432                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
10433
10434                 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
10435                 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
10436                 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10437                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
10438                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10439                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10440                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10441                 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
10442                 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
10443                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
10444
10445                 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
10446                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
10447                         PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
10448                         100_000
10449                 );
10450                 let route = find_route(
10451                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
10452                         None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
10453                 ).unwrap();
10454                 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
10455                 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10456                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
10457                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10458                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10459                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10460                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
10461                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
10462                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10463                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
10464                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
10465                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
10466                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
10467                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10468                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10469                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
10470                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10471                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
10472                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10473                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10474                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10475                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
10476                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
10477
10478                 // Finally, claim the original payment.
10479                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
10480         }
10481
10482         #[test]
10483         fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
10484                 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
10485                 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
10486                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10487                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10488                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10489                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10490
10491                 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
10492                 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
10493
10494                 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
10495                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
10496                         PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
10497                 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
10498                 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
10499                 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
10500                 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10501                 let route = find_route(
10502                         &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
10503                         nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
10504                 ).unwrap();
10505
10506                 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
10507                 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
10508                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
10509                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
10510                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
10511                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
10512                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10513
10514                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10515                 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
10516                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10517                 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
10518                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10519                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10520                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
10521
10522                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
10523         }
10524
10525         #[test]
10526         fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
10527                 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
10528                 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
10529                 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
10530                 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
10531                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10532                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10533                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
10534                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10535
10536                 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
10537                 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
10538
10539                 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
10540                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
10541                         PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
10542                 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
10543                 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
10544                 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
10545                 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10546                 let route = find_route(
10547                         &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
10548                         nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
10549                 ).unwrap();
10550
10551                 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
10552                 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
10553                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
10554                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
10555                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
10556                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
10557                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
10558                         PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
10559                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10560
10561                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10562                 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
10563                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10564                 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
10565                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10566                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10567                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
10568
10569                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
10570         }
10571
10572         #[test]
10573         fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
10574                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
10575                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
10576                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
10577                 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10578
10579                 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
10580                 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
10581                 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
10582                 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
10583
10584                 // Marshall an MPP route.
10585                 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
10586                 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
10587                 route.paths.push(path);
10588                 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
10589                 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
10590                 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
10591                 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
10592                 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
10593                 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
10594
10595                 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
10596                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
10597                 .unwrap_err() {
10598                         PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
10599                                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
10600                         },
10601                         _ => panic!("unexpected error")
10602                 }
10603         }
10604
10605         #[test]
10606         fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
10607                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10608                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10609                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10610                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10611
10612                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10613
10614                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10615                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10616
10617                 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
10618                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
10619                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10620                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
10621
10622                 {
10623                         // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
10624                         // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
10625                         let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10626                         // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
10627                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
10628                         assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
10629                 }
10630
10631                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10632
10633                 {
10634                         // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
10635                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
10636                 }
10637         }
10638
10639         #[test]
10640         fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
10641                 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
10642                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10643                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10644                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10645                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10646
10647                 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
10648                 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
10649                         payment_secret,
10650                         total_msat: 100_000,
10651                 };
10652
10653                 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
10654                 // payment verification fails as expected.
10655                 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
10656                 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
10657                 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
10658                         Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
10659                         Err(()) => {
10660                                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
10661                         }
10662                 }
10663
10664                 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
10665                 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
10666         }
10667
10668         #[test]
10669         fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
10670                 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
10671                 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
10672                 // the channel is successfully closed.
10673                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10674                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10675                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10676                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10677
10678                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
10679                 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10680                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
10681                 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10682                 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
10683
10684                 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
10685                 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().into_inner());
10686                 {
10687                         // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
10688                         // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
10689                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10690                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10691                 }
10692
10693                 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
10694                 {
10695                         // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
10696                         // as it has the funding transaction.
10697                         let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10698                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
10699                         assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10700                 }
10701
10702                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10703
10704                 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10705
10706                 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
10707                 {
10708                         let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10709                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
10710                         assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10711                 }
10712                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10713
10714                 {
10715                         // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
10716                         // as it has the funding transaction.
10717                         let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10718                         assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
10719                         assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10720                 }
10721                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10722                 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10723                 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
10724                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10725                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10726                 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
10727                 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
10728                 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
10729
10730                 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
10731                 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
10732                 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10733                 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
10734
10735                 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10736                 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
10737                 {
10738                         // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
10739                         // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
10740                         // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
10741                         // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
10742                         let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10743                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
10744                         assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10745                 }
10746
10747                 {
10748                         // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
10749                         // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
10750                         // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
10751                         // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
10752                         let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10753                         assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
10754                         assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10755                 }
10756
10757                 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
10758                 {
10759                         // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
10760                         // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
10761                         // closing transaction).
10762                         // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
10763                         // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
10764                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10765
10766                         // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s  `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
10767                         // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
10768                         let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10769                         assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
10770                         assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10771                 }
10772
10773                 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10774
10775                 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
10776                 {
10777                         // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
10778                         // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
10779                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10780                 }
10781                 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10782
10783                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
10784                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
10785         }
10786
10787         fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
10788                 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
10789                 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
10790         }
10791
10792         fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
10793                 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
10794                 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
10795         }
10796
10797         fn check_channel_unavailable_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_channel_id: ChannelId, peer_node_id: PublicKey) {
10798                 let expected_message = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_channel_id, peer_node_id);
10799                 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
10800         }
10801
10802         fn check_api_misuse_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
10803                 let expected_message = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_string();
10804                 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
10805         }
10806
10807         fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
10808                 match res_err {
10809                         Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
10810                                 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
10811                         },
10812                         Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
10813                                 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
10814                         },
10815                         Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
10816                         Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
10817                 }
10818         }
10819
10820         #[test]
10821         fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
10822                 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
10823                 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
10824                 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
10825                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10826                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
10827                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
10828                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
10829
10830                 // Dummy values
10831                 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
10832                 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
10833                 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
10834
10835                 // Test the API functions.
10836                 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
10837
10838                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
10839
10840                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
10841
10842                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
10843
10844                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
10845
10846                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
10847
10848                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
10849         }
10850
10851         #[test]
10852         fn test_api_calls_with_unavailable_channel() {
10853                 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` and a `channel_id`
10854                 // as input, behaves as expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is a known peer in the
10855                 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map, but the peer state doesn't contain a channel with
10856                 // the given `channel_id`.
10857                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10858                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
10859                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
10860                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
10861
10862                 let counterparty_node_id = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
10863
10864                 // Dummy values
10865                 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
10866
10867                 // Test the API functions.
10868                 check_api_misuse_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, 42));
10869
10870                 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
10871
10872                 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
10873
10874                 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
10875
10876                 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(InterceptId([0; 32]), &channel_id, counterparty_node_id, 1_000_000), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
10877
10878                 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&counterparty_node_id, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
10879         }
10880
10881         #[test]
10882         fn test_connection_limiting() {
10883                 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
10884                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10885                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10886                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10887                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10888
10889                 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
10890
10891                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10892                 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10893
10894                 let mut funding_tx = None;
10895                 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
10896                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10897                         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10898
10899                         if idx == 0 {
10900                                 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
10901                                 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
10902                                 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
10903                                 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
10904                                 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10905
10906                                 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
10907                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10908                                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10909
10910                                 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10911
10912                                 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
10913                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10914                                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10915                         }
10916                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
10917                 }
10918
10919                 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
10920                 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
10921                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10922                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
10923                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10924
10925                 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
10926                 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
10927                 // limit.
10928                 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
10929                 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
10930                         let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10931                                 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10932                         peer_pks.push(random_pk);
10933                         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10934                                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10935                         }, true).unwrap();
10936                 }
10937                 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10938                         &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10939                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10940                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10941                 }, true).unwrap_err();
10942
10943                 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
10944                 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
10945                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10946                 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10947                 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
10948                 for ev in chan_closed_events {
10949                         if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
10950                 }
10951                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10952                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10953                 }, true).unwrap();
10954                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
10955                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10956                 }, true).unwrap_err();
10957
10958                 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
10959                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
10960                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10961                 }, false).unwrap();
10962                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10963
10964                 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
10965                 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
10966                 // open channels.
10967                 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
10968                 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
10969                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
10970                         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
10971                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
10972                 }
10973                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10974                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
10975                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10976
10977                 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
10978                 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10979                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
10980
10981                 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
10982                 // "protected" and can connect again.
10983                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
10984                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
10985                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10986                 }, true).unwrap();
10987                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10988
10989                 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
10990                 // last_random_pk.
10991                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10992                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
10993         }
10994
10995         #[test]
10996         fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
10997                 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
10998                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10999                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11000                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11001                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11002
11003                 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11004
11005                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
11006                 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11007
11008                 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
11009                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11010                         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11011                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11012                 }
11013
11014                 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
11015                 // rejected.
11016                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11017                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11018                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11019
11020                 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
11021                 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
11022                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11023
11024                 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
11025                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11026                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11027                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11028         }
11029
11030         #[test]
11031         fn test_0conf_limiting() {
11032                 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
11033                 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
11034                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11035                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11036                 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
11037                 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11038                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
11039                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11040
11041                 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11042
11043                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
11044                 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11045
11046                 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
11047                 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
11048                         let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11049                                 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11050                         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11051                                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11052                         }, true).unwrap();
11053
11054                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11055                         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11056                         match events[0] {
11057                                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11058                                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
11059                                 }
11060                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11061                         }
11062                         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
11063                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11064                 }
11065
11066                 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
11067                 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11068                         &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11069                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11070                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11071                 }, true).unwrap();
11072                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11073                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11074                 match events[0] {
11075                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11076                                 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
11077                                         Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
11078                                                 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
11079                                         _ => panic!(),
11080                                 }
11081                         }
11082                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11083                 }
11084                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
11085                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11086
11087                 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
11088                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11089                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11090                 match events[0] {
11091                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11092                                 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
11093                         }
11094                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11095                 }
11096                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
11097         }
11098
11099         #[test]
11100         fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
11101                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
11102                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
11103                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
11104                 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11105                 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
11106                 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
11107                 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
11108                         amt_msat: 100,
11109                         outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
11110                         payment_metadata: None,
11111                         keysend_preimage: None,
11112                         payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11113                                 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
11114                         }),
11115                         custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11116                 };
11117                 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
11118                 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
11119                 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundOnionErr { err_code, .. }) =
11120                         node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
11121                                 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat))
11122                 {
11123                         assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
11124                 } else { panic!(); }
11125
11126                 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
11127                 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
11128                         amt_msat: 100,
11129                         outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
11130                         payment_metadata: None,
11131                         keysend_preimage: None,
11132                         payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11133                                 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
11134                         }),
11135                         custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11136                 };
11137                 assert!(node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
11138                         sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat)).is_ok());
11139         }
11140
11141         #[test]
11142         fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
11143                 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
11144                 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
11145                 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11146                 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
11147
11148                 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
11149                 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11150
11151                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
11152                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
11153                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
11154                         &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
11155                 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11156
11157                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
11158                 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11159
11160                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11161                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
11162                 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11163                 match &msg_events[0] {
11164                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
11165                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11166                                 match action {
11167                                         ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
11168                                                 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
11169                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
11170                                 }
11171                         }
11172                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11173                 }
11174
11175                 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11176                 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11177                 match events[0] {
11178                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
11179                                 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
11180                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11181                 }
11182                 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11183         }
11184
11185         #[test]
11186         fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
11187                 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
11188                 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
11189                 // the channel without the anchors feature.
11190                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11191                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11192                 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
11193                 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
11194                 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11195                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
11196                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11197
11198                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
11199                 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11200                 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
11201
11202                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11203                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11204                 match events[0] {
11205                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11206                                 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11207                         }
11208                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11209                 }
11210
11211                 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11212                 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
11213
11214                 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11215                 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
11216
11217                 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
11218                 // not have generated any events.
11219                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
11220         }
11221
11222         #[test]
11223         fn test_update_channel_config() {
11224                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11225                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11226                 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
11227                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
11228                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11229                 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11230                 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
11231
11232                 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
11233                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11234                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
11235
11236                 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
11237                 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
11238                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
11239                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11240                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11241                 match &events[0] {
11242                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
11243                         _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
11244                 }
11245
11246                 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
11247                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11248                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
11249
11250                 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
11251                 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
11252                         cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
11253                         ..Default::default()
11254                 }).unwrap();
11255                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
11256                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11257                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11258                 match &events[0] {
11259                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
11260                         _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
11261                 }
11262
11263                 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
11264                 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
11265                         forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
11266                         ..Default::default()
11267                 }).unwrap();
11268                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
11269                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
11270                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11271                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11272                 match &events[0] {
11273                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
11274                         _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
11275                 }
11276
11277                 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
11278                 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
11279                 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
11280                 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
11281                 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
11282                 assert!(
11283                         matches!(
11284                                 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
11285                                         forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
11286                                         ..Default::default()
11287                                 }),
11288                                 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
11289                         )
11290                 );
11291                 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
11292                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
11293                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11294                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
11295         }
11296
11297         #[test]
11298         fn test_payment_display() {
11299                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
11300                 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
11301                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
11302                 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
11303                 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11304                 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
11305         }
11306 }
11307
11308 #[cfg(ldk_bench)]
11309 pub mod bench {
11310         use crate::chain::Listen;
11311         use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
11312         use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
11313         use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
11314         use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
11315         use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
11316         use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
11317         use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
11318         use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
11319         use crate::util::test_utils;
11320         use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
11321
11322         use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
11323         use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
11324         use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
11325
11326         use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
11327
11328         use criterion::Criterion;
11329
11330         type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
11331                 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
11332                         &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
11333                         &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
11334                 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
11335                 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
11336                 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
11337
11338         struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
11339                 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
11340         }
11341         impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
11342                 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
11343                 #[inline]
11344                 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
11345                 #[inline]
11346                 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
11347         }
11348
11349         pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
11350                 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
11351         }
11352
11353         pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
11354                 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
11355                 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
11356                 // calls per node.
11357                 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
11358                 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
11359
11360                 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
11361                 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
11362                 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
11363                 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
11364                 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
11365
11366                 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
11367                 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
11368                 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
11369
11370                 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
11371                 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
11372                 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
11373                 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
11374                         network,
11375                         best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
11376                 }, genesis_block.header.time);
11377                 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
11378
11379                 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
11380                 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
11381                 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
11382                 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
11383                 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
11384                         network,
11385                         best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
11386                 }, genesis_block.header.time);
11387                 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
11388
11389                 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
11390                         features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11391                 }, true).unwrap();
11392                 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
11393                         features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11394                 }, false).unwrap();
11395                 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
11396                 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
11397                 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
11398
11399                 let tx;
11400                 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
11401                         tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
11402                                 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
11403                         }]};
11404                         node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
11405                 } else { panic!(); }
11406
11407                 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
11408                 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11409                 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
11410                 match events_b[0] {
11411                         Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
11412                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
11413                         },
11414                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11415                 }
11416
11417                 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
11418                 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11419                 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
11420                 match events_a[0] {
11421                         Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
11422                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
11423                         },
11424                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11425                 }
11426
11427                 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
11428
11429                 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), 42, vec![tx]);
11430                 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
11431                 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
11432
11433                 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
11434                 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11435                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
11436                 match msg_events[0] {
11437                         MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
11438                                 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
11439                                 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
11440                         },
11441                         _ => panic!(),
11442                 }
11443                 match msg_events[1] {
11444                         MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
11445                         _ => panic!(),
11446                 }
11447
11448                 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11449                 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
11450                 match events_a[0] {
11451                         Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
11452                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
11453                         },
11454                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11455                 }
11456
11457                 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11458                 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
11459                 match events_b[0] {
11460                         Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
11461                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
11462                         },
11463                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11464                 }
11465
11466                 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
11467                 macro_rules! send_payment {
11468                         ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
11469                                 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
11470                                         .with_bolt11_features($node_b.invoice_features()).unwrap();
11471                                 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
11472                                 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
11473                                 payment_count += 1;
11474                                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
11475                                 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
11476
11477                                 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
11478                                         PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
11479                                         RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
11480                                         Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
11481                                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
11482                                 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11483                                 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
11484                                 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
11485                                 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
11486                                 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
11487                                 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
11488
11489                                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
11490                                 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
11491                                 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
11492                                 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
11493
11494                                 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
11495                                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
11496                                                 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
11497                                                 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11498                                                 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
11499                                         },
11500                                         _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
11501                                 }
11502
11503                                 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
11504                                 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
11505                                 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
11506                                 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
11507
11508                                 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
11509                         }
11510                 }
11511
11512                 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
11513                         send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
11514                         send_payment!(node_b, node_a);
11515                 }));
11516         }
11517 }