1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
39 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
40 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
41 // construct one themselves.
42 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
43 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
44 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
45 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
46 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
47 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
48 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, Router};
49 use crate::routing::scoring::ProbabilisticScorer;
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
55 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment};
57 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
58 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, ChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
59 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
60 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
61 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
62 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
63 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
64 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
65 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
67 use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
70 use crate::prelude::*;
72 use core::cell::RefCell;
74 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
75 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
76 use core::time::Duration;
79 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
80 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
81 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
83 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
85 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
86 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
87 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
89 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
90 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
91 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
92 // before we forward it.
94 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
95 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
96 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
97 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
98 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
100 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
101 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
103 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
104 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
105 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
106 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
109 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
110 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
111 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
112 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
115 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
116 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
117 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
121 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
122 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
123 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
124 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
125 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
127 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
128 /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
129 /// may overshoot this in either case)
130 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
131 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
134 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
135 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
136 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
137 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
140 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
141 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
142 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
143 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
144 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
147 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
148 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
150 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
151 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
152 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
155 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
156 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
158 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
159 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
162 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
163 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
166 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
170 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
171 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
172 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
173 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
174 short_channel_id: u64,
176 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
177 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
179 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
180 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
185 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
187 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
188 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
189 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
191 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
192 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
195 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
196 struct ClaimableHTLC {
197 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
199 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
201 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
202 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
203 sender_intended_value: u64,
204 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
206 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
207 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
208 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
209 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
213 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
215 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
216 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
217 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
219 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
220 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
225 impl Readable for PaymentId {
226 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
227 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
232 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
234 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
235 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
236 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
238 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
239 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
244 impl Readable for InterceptId {
245 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
246 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
251 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
252 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
253 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
254 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
255 OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
258 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
260 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
261 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
262 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
264 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
265 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
269 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
270 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
271 (0, short_channel_id, required),
272 (2, htlc_id, required),
274 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
275 (0, session_priv, required),
280 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
281 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
282 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
283 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
284 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
287 session_priv: SecretKey,
288 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
289 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
290 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
291 payment_id: PaymentId,
294 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
295 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
296 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
298 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
300 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
302 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
305 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
306 payment_id.hash(hasher);
307 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
313 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
315 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
316 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
317 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
318 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
319 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
320 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
324 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
325 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
326 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
327 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
328 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
329 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
331 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
337 struct ReceiveError {
343 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
344 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
346 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
347 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
348 pub enum FailureCode {
349 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
350 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
351 TemporaryNodeFailure = 0x2000 | 2,
352 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
353 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
354 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing = 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
355 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
356 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
357 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
358 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
359 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails = 0x4000 | 15,
362 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>);
364 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
365 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
366 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
367 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
368 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
370 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
371 err: msgs::LightningError,
372 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
373 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
375 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
377 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
379 err: LightningError {
381 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
382 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
389 shutdown_finish: None,
393 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
394 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
397 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
399 err: LightningError {
401 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
402 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
408 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
409 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
413 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
416 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
418 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
419 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
423 log_level: Level::Warn,
426 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
428 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
430 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
432 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
433 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
441 shutdown_finish: None,
446 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
447 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
448 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
449 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
450 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
452 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
453 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
454 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
455 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
456 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
457 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
458 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
460 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
464 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
465 struct ClaimingPayment {
467 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
468 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
470 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
471 (0, amount_msat, required),
472 (2, payment_purpose, required),
473 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
476 struct ClaimablePayment {
477 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
478 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
479 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
482 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
483 struct ClaimablePayments {
484 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
485 /// failed/claimed by the user.
487 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
488 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
490 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
491 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
492 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
494 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
495 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
496 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
497 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
500 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
501 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
502 /// quite some time lag.
503 enum BackgroundEvent {
504 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
505 /// commitment transaction.
506 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
510 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
511 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
512 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
513 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
514 /// event can be generated.
515 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
516 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user.
517 EmitEvent { event: events::Event },
520 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
521 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
522 (2, EmitEvent) => { (0, event, upgradable_required) },
525 /// State we hold per-peer.
526 pub(super) struct PeerState<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
527 /// `temporary_channel_id` or `channel_id` -> `channel`.
529 /// Holds all channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once a channel has been assigned a
530 /// `channel_id`, the `temporary_channel_id` key in the map is updated and is replaced by the
532 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
533 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
534 latest_features: InitFeatures,
535 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
536 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
537 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
538 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
539 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
541 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
542 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
543 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
544 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
546 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
547 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
548 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
549 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
550 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
551 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
552 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
553 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
554 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
555 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
559 impl <Signer: ChannelSigner> PeerState<Signer> {
560 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
561 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
562 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
563 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
564 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
567 self.channel_by_id.is_empty() && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
571 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
572 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
574 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
577 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
578 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
579 struct PendingInboundPayment {
580 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
581 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
582 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
583 /// this payment being removed.
585 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
586 user_payment_id: u64,
587 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
588 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
589 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
592 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
593 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
594 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
595 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
596 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
597 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
598 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
599 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
601 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
602 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
610 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
612 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>
617 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
618 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
619 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
620 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
621 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
622 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
623 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
624 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
625 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
627 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
628 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e DefaultRouter<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L, &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>>, &'g L>;
630 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`] used in testing.
631 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
632 pub trait AChannelManager {
633 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer>;
634 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
635 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface;
636 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
637 type EntropySource: EntropySource;
638 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
639 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner;
640 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
641 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner;
642 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<Signer = Self::Signer>;
643 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
644 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator;
645 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
647 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
649 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
650 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
652 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
653 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
654 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
656 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> + Sized,
657 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface + Sized,
658 ES::Target: EntropySource + Sized,
659 NS::Target: NodeSigner + Sized,
660 SP::Target: SignerProvider + Sized,
661 F::Target: FeeEstimator + Sized,
662 R::Target: Router + Sized,
663 L::Target: Logger + Sized,
665 type Watch = M::Target;
667 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
669 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
671 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
673 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer;
674 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
676 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
678 type Router = R::Target;
680 type Logger = L::Target;
682 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
685 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
686 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
688 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
689 /// to individual Channels.
691 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
692 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
693 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
694 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
696 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
697 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
698 /// returning from [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`], with ChannelManagers, writing updates
699 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during
700 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
701 /// [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the
702 /// `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
704 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
705 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
706 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
708 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
709 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
710 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
711 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
712 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
714 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
715 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
716 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
717 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
719 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
720 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
721 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
723 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
724 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
725 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
726 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
727 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
729 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
730 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
731 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
732 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
733 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
734 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
735 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
736 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
739 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
740 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
741 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
742 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
743 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
747 // `total_consistency_lock`
749 // |__`forward_htlcs`
751 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
753 // |__`per_peer_state`
755 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
757 // | |__`claimable_payments`
759 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
765 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
767 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
771 // | |__`pending_events`
773 // | |__`pending_background_events`
775 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
777 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
778 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
779 ES::Target: EntropySource,
780 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
781 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
782 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
786 default_configuration: UserConfig,
787 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
788 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
794 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
796 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
798 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
799 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
801 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
802 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
803 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
804 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
806 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
807 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
809 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
810 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
811 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
812 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
813 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
814 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
815 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
816 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
818 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
820 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
821 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
823 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
825 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
826 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
827 /// and via the classic SCID.
829 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
830 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
832 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
834 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
836 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
837 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
838 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
840 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
841 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
843 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
844 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
846 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
847 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
849 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
850 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
851 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
852 /// active channel list on load.
854 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
855 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
857 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
859 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
860 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
861 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
863 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
864 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
865 /// the handling of the events.
867 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
868 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
871 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
872 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
873 /// would break backwards compatability.
874 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
875 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
876 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
878 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
879 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
881 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
883 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
884 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
885 /// confirmation depth.
887 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
888 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
889 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
891 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
893 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
895 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
897 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
899 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
901 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
902 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
903 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
905 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
906 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
908 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
909 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
910 /// keeping additional state.
911 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
913 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
914 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
915 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
916 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
918 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
919 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
921 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
922 /// are currently open with that peer.
924 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
925 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
928 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
930 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
931 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
932 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
933 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
934 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
936 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
937 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
938 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
939 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
940 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
941 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
942 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
943 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
944 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
945 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
946 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
947 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
948 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
950 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
959 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
961 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
962 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
963 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
964 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
965 pub struct ChainParameters {
966 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
967 pub network: Network,
969 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
971 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
972 pub best_block: BestBlock,
975 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
981 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
982 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
983 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
984 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
985 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
986 /// updates are ready for persistence).
988 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
989 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
990 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
991 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
992 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
994 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
995 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
998 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
999 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1000 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1003 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1004 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
1006 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1007 persistence_notifier: notifier,
1008 should_persist: persist_check,
1009 _read_guard: read_guard,
1014 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1015 fn drop(&mut self) {
1016 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1017 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1022 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1023 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1025 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1027 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1028 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1029 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1030 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1031 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1033 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1034 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1036 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1038 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1039 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1040 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1041 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1042 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1043 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1044 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1045 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1046 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1047 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1048 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1049 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1050 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1052 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1053 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1055 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1056 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1057 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1058 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1060 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1061 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1062 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1063 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1064 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1065 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1068 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1070 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1071 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1074 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1076 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1077 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1079 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
1080 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
1081 /// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
1082 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
1084 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1085 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1086 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1088 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1089 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1090 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1092 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1093 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1094 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1095 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1097 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1098 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1099 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1101 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1102 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1103 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1105 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1106 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1107 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1108 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1109 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1110 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1111 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1112 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1113 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1114 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1115 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1118 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1119 /// to better separate parameters.
1120 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1121 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1122 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1123 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1124 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1125 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1126 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1127 pub features: InitFeatures,
1128 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1129 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1130 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1132 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1134 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1135 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1136 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1137 /// payments to us through this channel.
1138 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1139 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1140 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1141 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1142 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1143 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1144 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1147 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1148 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1149 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1150 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1151 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1152 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1153 /// lifetime of the channel.
1154 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1155 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1156 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1157 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1158 /// our counterparty already.
1160 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1161 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1162 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1163 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1165 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1166 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1167 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1168 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1170 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1171 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1173 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1174 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1176 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1177 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1178 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1179 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1180 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1181 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1182 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1183 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1184 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1187 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1189 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1190 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1191 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1192 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1193 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1194 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1195 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1197 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1198 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1200 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1201 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1202 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1203 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1204 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1205 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1206 /// this value on chain.
1208 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1210 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1212 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1213 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1214 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1215 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1217 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1218 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1219 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1221 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1222 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1223 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1224 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1225 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1227 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1228 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1229 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1230 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1232 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1233 pub balance_msat: u64,
1234 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1235 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1236 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1237 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1239 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1241 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1242 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1243 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1244 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1245 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1246 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1247 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1248 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1250 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1251 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1252 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1253 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1254 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1255 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1256 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1258 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1259 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1260 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1261 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1262 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1263 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1264 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1265 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1266 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1268 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1270 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1271 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1272 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1273 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1274 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1276 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1277 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1278 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1279 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1280 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1281 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1282 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1284 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1285 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1286 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1287 pub is_outbound: bool,
1288 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1289 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1290 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1291 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1292 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1294 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1295 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1296 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1297 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1299 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1300 pub is_usable: bool,
1301 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1302 pub is_public: bool,
1303 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1304 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1305 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1306 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1307 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1308 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1310 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1311 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1314 impl ChannelDetails {
1315 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1316 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1317 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1319 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1320 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1321 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1322 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1325 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1326 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1327 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1329 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1330 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1331 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1332 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1335 fn from_channel<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner>(channel: &Channel<Signer>,
1336 best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures) -> Self {
1338 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1339 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1340 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1342 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1343 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1344 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1345 features: latest_features,
1346 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1347 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1348 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1349 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1350 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1351 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1352 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1353 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1354 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1355 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1357 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1358 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1359 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1360 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1361 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1362 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1363 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1364 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1365 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(channel.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1366 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1367 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1368 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1369 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1370 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1371 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1372 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1373 confirmations: Some(channel.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1374 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1375 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1376 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1377 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1378 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1379 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1380 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1381 config: Some(channel.config()),
1386 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1387 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1388 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1389 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1390 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1392 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1394 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1395 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1396 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1399 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1400 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1401 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1403 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1404 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1405 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1407 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1408 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1409 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1411 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1412 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1416 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1418 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1420 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1421 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1422 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1423 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1425 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1426 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1427 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1430 macro_rules! handle_error {
1431 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1432 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1433 // entering the macro.
1434 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1435 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1439 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1440 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1442 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1443 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1444 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1445 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1449 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1450 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1451 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1452 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1457 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1458 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1460 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1461 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1462 action: err.action.clone()
1466 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1467 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1468 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1469 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1470 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1474 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1481 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1482 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {{
1483 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
1484 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1485 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1486 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1488 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1489 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1490 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1491 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1492 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1494 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1495 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1497 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1501 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1502 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1503 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1505 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1506 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1508 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1509 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1511 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1512 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1513 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel);
1514 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1515 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1516 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1522 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1523 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1527 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1529 $entry.remove_entry();
1537 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1538 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1542 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1544 $entry.remove_entry();
1552 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1553 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1555 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1556 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, channel);
1562 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1563 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1564 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1565 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1566 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1568 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1569 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1570 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1571 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1572 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1573 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1574 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1575 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1576 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1577 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1582 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
1583 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1584 if $channel.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
1585 $locked_events.push(events::Event::ChannelPending {
1586 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1587 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.temporary_channel_id(),
1588 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1589 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1590 funding_txo: $channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1592 $channel.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
1597 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1598 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1599 if $channel.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1600 debug_assert!($channel.channel_pending_event_emitted());
1601 $locked_events.push(events::Event::ChannelReady {
1602 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1603 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1604 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1605 channel_type: $channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
1607 $channel.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1612 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
1613 ($self: ident, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
1614 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
1615 &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
1616 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
1617 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1618 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.is_usable() {
1619 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
1620 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
1621 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
1622 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
1624 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
1625 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
1626 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1632 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
1633 .remove(&$chan.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
1635 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
1636 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
1637 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
1638 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
1639 updates.announcement_sigs);
1640 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
1641 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
1644 let channel_id = $chan.channel_id();
1645 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
1646 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
1648 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
1650 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1651 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1653 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
1654 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1655 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1656 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
1661 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
1662 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING, $remove: expr) => { {
1663 // update_maps_on_chan_removal needs to be able to take id_to_peer, so make sure we can in
1664 // any case so that it won't deadlock.
1665 debug_assert_ne!($self.id_to_peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1667 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1668 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
1669 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1672 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1673 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure",
1674 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1675 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan);
1676 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(
1677 "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.channel_id(),
1678 $chan.get_user_id(), $chan.force_shutdown(false),
1679 $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok()));
1683 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1684 if ($update_id == 0 || $chan.get_next_monitor_update()
1685 .expect("We can't be processing a monitor update if it isn't queued")
1686 .update_id == $update_id) &&
1687 $chan.get_latest_monitor_update_id() == $update_id
1689 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
1695 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr) => {
1696 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
1700 macro_rules! process_events_body {
1701 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
1702 let mut processed_all_events = false;
1703 while !processed_all_events {
1704 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
1708 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
1711 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
1712 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
1713 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1715 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
1716 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
1717 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
1718 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
1722 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
1723 let num_events = pending_events.len();
1724 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
1725 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
1728 for event in pending_events {
1729 $event_to_handle = event;
1734 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1735 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
1736 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
1737 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
1740 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1741 $self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1747 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1749 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1750 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1751 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1752 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1753 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1754 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1758 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
1760 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1761 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
1763 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1765 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
1766 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
1767 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
1770 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
1771 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
1772 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
1773 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1774 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1775 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1776 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1777 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1779 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1780 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1781 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1786 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1788 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1789 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1790 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
1791 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1792 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
1793 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1794 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1795 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1797 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1800 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1801 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1803 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1805 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1807 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1809 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1810 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
1811 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1812 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1813 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
1823 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1824 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1825 &self.default_configuration
1828 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1829 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1830 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1833 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1834 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1836 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
1838 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1842 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1847 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1849 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1850 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1851 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
1852 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
1853 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
1855 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1856 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1858 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
1859 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
1860 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
1862 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1863 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1864 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1866 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1867 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1868 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1869 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1870 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1871 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1873 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1874 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1875 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1876 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1877 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1878 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1881 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1882 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1883 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1885 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1887 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
1888 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
1890 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1892 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1893 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1894 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1895 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
1896 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1897 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1901 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1906 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1908 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1909 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1910 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1912 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1914 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1917 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1920 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1921 node_id: their_network_key,
1924 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1927 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1928 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
1929 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
1930 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
1931 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
1932 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
1933 // the same channel.
1934 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
1936 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1937 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1938 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
1939 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1940 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1941 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1942 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel(channel, best_block_height,
1943 peer_state.latest_features.clone());
1951 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
1952 /// more information.
1953 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1954 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1957 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1958 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1960 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1961 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1963 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1964 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1965 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1966 // really wanted anyway.
1967 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1970 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
1971 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1972 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1973 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1975 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
1976 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1977 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1978 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1979 return peer_state.channel_by_id
1982 ChannelDetails::from_channel(channel, best_block_height, features.clone()))
1988 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
1989 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1991 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
1992 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
1993 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
1995 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
1996 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
1997 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
1998 .filter_map(|(_, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
1999 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2000 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2001 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2002 total_msat: *total_msat,
2005 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2006 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2008 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2009 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2011 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2016 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
2017 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
2018 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2019 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
2020 Some(transaction) => {
2021 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
2025 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2026 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
2027 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
2028 reason: closure_reason
2032 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2033 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2035 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
2036 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
2037 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2039 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2040 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2042 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2043 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2044 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2045 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2046 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
2047 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2048 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut()
2049 .get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2050 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2052 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2053 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2054 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2055 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2056 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2060 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2061 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2062 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2063 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
2064 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
2067 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2068 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
2069 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
2070 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2074 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2078 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id) })
2082 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2083 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2084 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2085 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2088 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
2092 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2093 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2094 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2096 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
2097 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2099 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2100 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
2101 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2102 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2104 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2106 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2107 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2108 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2111 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2112 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2113 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2114 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2115 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2116 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2119 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2120 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2121 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2123 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2124 /// the channel being closed or not:
2125 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2126 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2127 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2128 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2129 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2130 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2131 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2133 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2134 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2135 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2136 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2138 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2140 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2141 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2142 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2145 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2146 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2147 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2148 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2149 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2150 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2154 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2155 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
2156 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2157 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2158 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2159 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2160 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2161 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2163 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2164 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2165 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2166 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2167 // ignore the result here.
2168 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2172 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2173 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2174 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2175 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2176 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2177 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2178 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2180 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2181 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2182 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2183 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2184 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) });
2186 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2188 remove_channel!(self, chan)
2190 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) });
2193 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2194 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2195 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2196 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2197 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2202 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
2205 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2206 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2207 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2208 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2209 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2210 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2211 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2212 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2213 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2214 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2215 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2216 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2227 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2228 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2229 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2231 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2232 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2233 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2236 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2237 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2238 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2240 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2241 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2242 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2243 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2244 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2247 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2248 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2249 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2250 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2251 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2255 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2256 /// local transaction(s).
2257 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2258 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2259 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2263 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2264 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2266 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2267 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
2268 return Err(ReceiveError {
2269 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
2271 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2274 // final_expiry_too_soon
2275 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2276 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2278 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2279 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2280 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2281 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2282 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2283 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2284 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2285 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2286 return Err(ReceiveError {
2287 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2288 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2291 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2292 return Err(ReceiveError {
2294 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2295 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2299 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2300 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2301 return Err(ReceiveError {
2302 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2303 err_data: Vec::new(),
2304 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2307 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage, payment_metadata } => {
2308 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2309 return Err(ReceiveError {
2310 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2311 err_data: Vec::new(),
2312 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2314 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2315 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2318 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2319 phantom_shared_secret,
2321 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2322 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2323 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2324 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2325 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2326 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2327 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2328 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2329 return Err(ReceiveError {
2330 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2331 err_data: Vec::new(),
2332 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2336 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2339 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2342 return Err(ReceiveError {
2343 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2344 err_data: Vec::new(),
2345 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2350 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2353 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2354 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2355 outgoing_amt_msat: hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2356 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2360 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2361 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2362 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2364 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2365 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2366 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2367 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2368 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2369 failure_code: $err_code,
2375 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2376 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2379 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
2380 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
2381 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2383 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2384 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2385 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2386 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2387 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2388 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2389 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2390 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2392 macro_rules! return_err {
2393 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2395 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2396 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2397 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2398 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2399 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2400 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2406 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2408 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2409 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2411 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2412 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2416 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2417 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2419 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2421 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2422 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2423 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2424 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2425 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2427 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2430 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2431 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2432 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2434 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2435 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2436 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2439 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2440 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2441 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2442 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2446 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2447 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2448 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2451 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2452 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2453 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2454 outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2455 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2460 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref outgoing_amt_msat, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2461 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2462 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2463 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2464 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2465 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2466 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(short_channel_id).cloned();
2467 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2468 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2469 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2470 // phantom or an intercept.
2471 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2472 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2473 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)
2477 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2480 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2482 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2483 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2484 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2485 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
2486 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2488 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2489 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2490 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2492 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
2493 // have no consistency guarantees.
2494 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2498 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2499 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2500 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2501 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2502 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2504 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2505 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2506 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2507 // we don't have the channel here.
2508 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2510 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2512 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2513 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2514 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2515 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2516 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2517 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2518 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
2519 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
2520 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
2521 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
2522 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2524 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
2527 if *outgoing_amt_msat < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2528 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2530 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *outgoing_amt_msat, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2531 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2535 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
2536 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
2537 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
2538 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
2540 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2547 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2548 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2549 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2550 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2551 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2552 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2554 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2555 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2557 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2558 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2559 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2560 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2561 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2562 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2563 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2564 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2565 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2566 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2572 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2573 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2574 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2575 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2577 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2578 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2580 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2581 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2582 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2584 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2585 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2586 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2587 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
2588 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
2589 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
2590 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
2594 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2599 pending_forward_info
2602 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2603 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2604 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2606 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
2607 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
2608 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2610 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2611 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
2612 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2613 if !chan.should_announce() {
2614 return Err(LightningError {
2615 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2616 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2619 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2620 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2622 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2623 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2626 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2627 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
2628 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2629 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2631 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
2632 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
2633 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2635 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2636 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
2637 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2638 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2639 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2640 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2644 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2646 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2647 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2648 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2650 let enabled = chan.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
2651 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
2652 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
2653 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
2654 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
2657 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2658 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2660 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2661 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
2662 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2663 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2664 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2665 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2666 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2667 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2669 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
2670 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
2671 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
2673 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
2675 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2682 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2683 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2684 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv_bytes)
2687 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2688 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
2689 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2691 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2692 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
2693 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2695 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2696 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
2697 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2698 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2699 return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()});
2701 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2703 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2704 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2705 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2706 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
2709 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2710 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
2711 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
2712 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2713 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2714 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
2715 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2716 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
2718 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2719 let send_res = chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
2720 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2722 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2723 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2725 }, onion_packet, &self.logger);
2726 match break_chan_entry!(self, send_res, chan) {
2727 Some(monitor_update) => {
2728 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2729 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
2730 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
2733 if update_res == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress {
2734 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
2735 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
2736 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
2737 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
2738 // which we do in the send_payment check for
2739 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
2740 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
2746 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
2747 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
2748 // `channel_by_id` map.
2749 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
2750 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
2755 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2756 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2758 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2763 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2765 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
2766 /// fields for more info.
2768 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
2769 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
2771 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
2773 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
2774 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
2775 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
2776 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
2777 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
2779 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
2780 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
2781 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
2782 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
2783 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
2785 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
2786 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
2787 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
2788 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
2790 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
2792 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
2793 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2794 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
2796 /// In general, a path may raise:
2797 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2798 /// node public key) is specified.
2799 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2800 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2802 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2803 /// relevant updates.
2805 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
2806 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2807 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2809 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2810 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2811 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
2812 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
2813 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
2814 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2815 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2816 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2817 self.pending_outbound_payments
2818 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2819 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2820 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2823 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment`], but will automatically find a route based on
2824 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2825 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
2826 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2827 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2828 self.pending_outbound_payments
2829 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
2830 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
2831 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
2832 &self.pending_events,
2833 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2834 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2838 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2839 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2840 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2841 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2842 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2843 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2847 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2848 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2849 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
2853 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
2854 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
2858 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
2859 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
2860 /// retries are exhausted.
2862 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
2863 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
2865 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2866 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2867 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2869 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
2870 /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
2872 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2873 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2874 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2875 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2876 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
2879 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2880 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2881 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2882 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2883 /// never reach the recipient.
2885 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
2886 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
2888 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2889 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2891 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2893 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2894 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2895 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2896 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2897 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
2898 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
2899 &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2900 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2901 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2904 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
2905 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2907 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
2910 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
2911 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
2912 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2913 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2914 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
2915 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
2916 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2917 &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
2918 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2919 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2922 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
2923 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
2924 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
2925 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2926 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2927 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2928 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2929 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2930 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2933 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
2936 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
2937 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
2940 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2941 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2942 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2943 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2944 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2945 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2946 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2947 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2949 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2950 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2951 let (msg, chan) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2953 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2955 let funding_res = chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2956 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2957 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2958 } else { unreachable!(); });
2960 Ok(funding_msg) => (funding_msg, chan),
2962 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
2963 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2965 let _ = handle_error!(self, funding_res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
2966 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2967 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
2973 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2975 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
2976 log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
2981 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2982 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2985 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2986 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2987 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2989 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2990 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
2991 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
2992 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
3001 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3002 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
3003 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3007 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3009 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3010 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3012 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3013 /// across the p2p network.
3015 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3016 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3018 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3019 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3020 /// keys per-channel).
3022 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3023 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3024 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3026 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3027 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3028 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3030 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3031 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3032 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3033 /// for more details.
3035 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3036 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3037 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3038 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3040 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3041 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3042 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3043 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3048 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3049 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3050 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3051 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3052 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3053 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 1 {
3054 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3055 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3059 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
3060 let mut output_index = None;
3061 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3062 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3063 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
3064 if output_index.is_some() {
3065 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3066 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3069 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
3070 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3071 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3074 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3077 if output_index.is_none() {
3078 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3079 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3082 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
3086 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
3088 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3089 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3090 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3091 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3093 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3094 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3096 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3097 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3099 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3101 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3102 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3103 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3104 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3105 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3106 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3107 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3108 pub fn update_channel_config(
3109 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
3110 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3111 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
3112 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3113 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3117 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
3118 &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
3120 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3121 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3122 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3123 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3124 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3125 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3126 if !peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) {
3127 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3128 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3132 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3133 let channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
3134 if !channel.update_config(config) {
3137 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3138 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3139 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3140 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3141 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3149 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
3150 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
3152 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
3153 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
3155 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
3156 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
3157 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
3158 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
3159 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
3161 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
3162 /// you from forwarding more than you received.
3164 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3167 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
3168 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3169 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
3170 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
3171 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3172 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3174 let next_hop_scid = {
3175 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3176 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
3177 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
3178 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3179 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3180 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
3182 if !chan.is_usable() {
3183 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3184 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
3187 chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.outbound_scid_alias())
3189 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3190 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id)
3195 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3196 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3197 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3200 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
3201 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
3202 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
3204 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3206 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
3207 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
3210 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
3211 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3212 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3213 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
3214 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
3216 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
3220 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
3221 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
3223 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3226 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3227 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3228 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3230 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3231 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3232 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3235 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
3236 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3237 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3238 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3239 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
3240 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3241 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3244 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
3245 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
3246 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3247 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3252 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3254 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3255 /// Will likely generate further events.
3256 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3257 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3259 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
3260 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3261 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3263 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3264 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3266 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3267 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3268 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3270 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3271 match forward_info {
3272 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3273 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3274 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3275 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3276 outgoing_cltv_value, incoming_amt_msat: _
3279 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3280 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3281 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3283 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3284 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3285 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3286 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3287 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3288 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3291 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3292 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3294 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3297 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3298 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3304 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3305 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3307 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3311 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3312 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3314 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3318 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3319 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3320 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3321 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3322 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3324 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3325 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3326 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3327 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3328 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3330 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3332 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3333 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3337 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3338 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3339 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3340 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3346 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3349 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3352 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3353 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3354 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3355 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3356 // problem, not ours.
3362 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3363 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3365 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3369 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3370 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3371 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3372 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3375 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3376 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3377 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3378 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3379 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3382 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3383 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3384 match forward_info {
3385 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3386 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
3387 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3388 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3389 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, incoming_amt_msat: _,
3392 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3393 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3394 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3395 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3396 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3397 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3398 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3399 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3401 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
3402 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
3403 onion_packet, &self.logger)
3405 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3406 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3408 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3410 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3411 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3412 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3413 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3418 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3419 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3421 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3422 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3423 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
3424 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
3426 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3427 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3429 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
3431 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3432 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3433 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3442 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3443 match forward_info {
3444 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3445 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3446 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3447 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat, ..
3450 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
3451 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3452 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3454 RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret), payment_metadata };
3455 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
3456 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
3458 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry } => {
3459 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: None, payment_metadata };
3460 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
3461 None, None, onion_fields)
3464 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3467 let mut claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3468 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3469 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3470 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3471 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3472 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3473 phantom_shared_secret,
3475 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
3476 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
3477 // if routing nodes overpay
3478 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
3479 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3481 total_value_received: None,
3482 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3487 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
3489 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3490 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3491 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
3492 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3493 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3494 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
3496 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3497 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3498 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3499 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3500 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3501 phantom_shared_secret,
3503 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
3504 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3506 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
3509 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
3510 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3511 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3512 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3513 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3516 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3517 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3518 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
3520 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3521 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3522 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3525 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3526 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3527 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3529 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
3530 .entry(payment_hash)
3531 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
3532 .or_insert_with(|| {
3533 committed_to_claimable = true;
3535 purpose: purpose(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
3538 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
3539 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
3540 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3543 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
3545 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
3546 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3547 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3548 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3549 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3552 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
3553 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
3554 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3555 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
3556 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
3557 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3558 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3559 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3560 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3561 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3562 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3564 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3566 _ => unreachable!(),
3569 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
3570 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
3571 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
3572 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3573 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= $payment_data.total_msat {
3574 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
3575 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3576 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3577 } else if total_value >= $payment_data.total_msat {
3578 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
3579 committed_to_claimable = true;
3581 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3582 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3583 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
3584 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
3585 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3586 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3590 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3591 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3592 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
3593 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
3595 payment_claimable_generated = true;
3597 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3598 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3600 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3601 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
3602 committed_to_claimable = true;
3605 payment_claimable_generated
3609 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3610 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3611 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3612 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3613 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3614 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3615 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3616 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3617 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3618 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3619 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3620 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3621 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3622 Ok(result) => result,
3624 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3625 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3628 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
3629 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
3630 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
3631 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
3632 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
3633 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3636 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3638 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3639 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3640 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3641 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3643 match claimable_payments.claimable_payments.entry(payment_hash) {
3644 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3645 let amount_msat = claimable_htlc.value;
3646 claimable_htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat);
3647 let claim_deadline = Some(claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER);
3648 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3649 e.insert(ClaimablePayment {
3650 purpose: purpose.clone(),
3651 onion_fields: Some(onion_fields.clone()),
3652 htlcs: vec![claimable_htlc],
3654 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3655 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3656 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3660 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3661 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3663 onion_fields: Some(onion_fields),
3666 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3667 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3668 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3674 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3675 if payment_data.is_none() {
3676 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3677 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3679 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3680 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3681 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3682 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3683 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3684 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3685 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3686 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3688 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3689 if payment_claimable_generated {
3690 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3696 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3697 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3705 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3706 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
3707 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3708 &self.pending_events, &self.logger,
3709 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3710 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv));
3712 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3713 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3715 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3717 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
3718 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
3719 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
3721 self.check_free_holding_cells();
3723 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3724 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3725 events.append(&mut new_events);
3728 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3730 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3731 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3733 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3734 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3735 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3736 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3737 if background_events.is_empty() {
3741 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3743 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3744 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3745 // monitor updating completing.
3746 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
3753 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3754 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3755 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3756 self.process_background_events();
3759 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
3760 if !chan.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
3761 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3762 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
3763 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3764 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3765 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3767 if !chan.is_live() {
3768 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3769 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3770 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3772 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3773 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3775 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.logger);
3776 NotifyOption::DoPersist
3780 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3781 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3782 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3783 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3784 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3785 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3786 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3788 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3790 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3791 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3792 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3793 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3794 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
3795 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3796 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3804 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3806 /// This currently includes:
3807 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3808 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3809 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3811 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3812 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
3813 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
3815 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
3816 /// estimate fetches.
3818 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3819 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
3820 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3821 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3822 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3823 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3825 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3827 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
3828 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3829 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
3831 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3832 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3833 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3834 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3835 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
3836 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
3837 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3838 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3839 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3841 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3842 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3843 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
3844 if needs_close { return false; }
3847 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3848 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
3849 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
3850 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.is_live()
3851 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3852 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.is_live()
3853 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3854 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.is_live() => {
3856 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
3857 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3858 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3859 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3863 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3865 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
3868 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.is_live() => {
3870 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
3871 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3872 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3873 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3877 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3879 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
3885 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
3889 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
3890 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
3895 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
3896 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
3897 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
3898 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
3899 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
3900 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
3901 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
3902 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
3903 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3904 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
3905 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
3906 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
3907 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
3908 // have no channels to the peer.
3909 let remove_entry = {
3910 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
3911 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
3914 entry.remove_entry();
3917 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
3922 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
3923 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
3924 // This should be unreachable
3925 debug_assert!(false);
3928 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3929 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3930 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3931 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
3932 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
3933 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
3934 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
3937 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
3938 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3939 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3941 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
3942 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
3949 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3950 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
3951 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
3952 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
3953 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
3956 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3957 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3960 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self.pending_events);
3962 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
3963 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
3964 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
3965 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
3966 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3973 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3974 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3975 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3977 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
3978 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
3979 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
3980 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
3982 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
3983 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
3984 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
3985 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
3986 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
3987 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
3990 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
3991 /// reason for the failure.
3993 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
3994 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
3995 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3997 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
3998 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
3999 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
4000 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
4001 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4002 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
4003 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4008 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
4009 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
4010 match failure_code {
4011 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
4012 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
4013 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
4014 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4015 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4016 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code as u16, htlc_msat_height_data)
4021 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4022 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4024 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
4026 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4027 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
4028 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
4029 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
4030 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
4031 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
4032 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
4034 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
4036 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
4037 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
4039 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4044 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4045 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4046 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4047 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
4048 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
4049 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
4050 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
4051 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
4052 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
4053 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4055 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4056 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4057 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4058 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
4060 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
4061 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
4062 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
4063 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
4064 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4068 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
4069 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
4070 // be surfaced to the user.
4071 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
4072 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
4073 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
4075 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
4076 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4077 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
4078 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4079 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4080 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
4081 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
4082 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
4084 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4086 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
4089 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
4090 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
4091 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
4092 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4096 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
4097 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
4098 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
4099 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
4100 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
4101 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
4102 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
4103 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
4104 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
4107 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
4108 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
4109 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
4112 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4113 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
4114 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4116 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
4117 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
4118 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
4119 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
4120 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4122 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
4123 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
4124 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
4126 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
4127 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4128 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4129 push_forward_ev = true;
4131 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
4132 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4133 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
4135 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4136 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
4139 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
4140 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4141 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4142 pending_events.push(events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
4143 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
4144 failed_next_destination: destination,
4150 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
4151 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
4153 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
4154 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
4155 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
4156 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
4158 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
4159 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
4160 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
4161 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
4163 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
4164 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
4165 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
4166 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
4167 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4168 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4169 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4170 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4172 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4175 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4176 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
4177 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4178 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
4179 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4180 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4181 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4182 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
4187 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
4188 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
4189 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id,
4191 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
4192 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
4193 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
4194 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4199 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
4201 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
4202 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
4203 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
4204 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
4205 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
4206 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
4207 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
4208 let mut valid_mpp = true;
4209 let mut errs = Vec::new();
4210 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4211 for htlc in sources.iter() {
4212 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
4213 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4214 debug_assert!(false);
4218 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
4220 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
4221 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4222 debug_assert!(false);
4226 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
4228 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
4229 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
4230 // that there's one payment here and move on.
4231 if sources.len() != 1 {
4232 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
4233 debug_assert!(false);
4239 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
4241 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4242 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4243 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4244 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4247 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4248 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4249 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4250 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4254 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4255 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
4256 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
4257 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
4259 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4260 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4261 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4262 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4263 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4268 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4269 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4270 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4271 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4272 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
4273 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
4274 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4276 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4279 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
4280 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4281 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4282 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4286 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
4287 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
4288 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
4289 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4292 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4293 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
4294 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4295 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
4299 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
4300 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4301 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
4304 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
4305 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
4306 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4307 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4308 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4309 let fulfill_res = chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
4311 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
4312 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
4313 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
4314 log_bytes!(chan_id), action);
4315 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
4317 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4318 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update);
4319 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
4320 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4321 if let Err(e) = res {
4322 // TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge
4323 // of the HTLC's monitor with a preimage. We should retry this monitor
4324 // update over and over again until morale improves.
4325 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}", payment_preimage);
4326 return Err((counterparty_node_id, e));
4333 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4334 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4335 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4339 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4340 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
4341 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
4342 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4343 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4344 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4345 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
4346 // again on restart.
4347 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4348 payment_preimage, update_res);
4350 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
4351 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
4352 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
4353 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
4354 // `PaymentForwarded`).
4355 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
4359 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4360 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
4363 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4365 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4366 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage, session_priv, path, from_onchain, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
4368 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4369 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4370 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
4371 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
4372 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4373 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4374 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4377 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4378 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
4380 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4382 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4385 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
4389 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
4390 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4391 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4397 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4398 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4399 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4402 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
4403 for action in actions.into_iter() {
4405 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
4406 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4407 if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
4408 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4409 payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4413 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event } => {
4414 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(event);
4420 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
4421 /// update completion.
4422 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4423 channel: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
4424 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
4425 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
4426 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
4427 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
4428 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
4429 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()),
4430 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
4431 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
4432 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
4433 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
4434 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
4436 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
4438 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get_counterparty_node_id();
4439 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4440 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.outbound_scid_alias()),
4441 channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
4444 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4445 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
4447 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
4448 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4449 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4454 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
4455 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
4456 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4457 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4462 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
4463 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
4464 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4465 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4466 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4471 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
4475 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
4481 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
4482 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
4483 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
4487 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4488 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
4489 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
4495 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
4496 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
4498 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
4499 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4501 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
4502 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
4503 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4504 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4505 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4510 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4511 let mut peer_state_lock;
4512 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4513 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
4514 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4515 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4517 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()){
4518 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4519 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4522 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}",
4523 highest_applied_update_id, channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id());
4524 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4527 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, highest_applied_update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel.get_mut());
4530 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4532 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4533 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4536 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4537 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4538 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4540 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4541 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4542 /// used to accept such channels.
4544 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4545 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4546 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4547 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4550 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4551 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4553 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4554 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4555 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4557 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4558 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4560 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4561 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4563 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4564 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4566 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4567 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4568 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4569 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4572 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4573 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4575 let peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| !peer.channel_by_id.is_empty());
4576 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4577 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4578 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4579 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4580 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4581 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.len() == 1;
4582 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4583 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4584 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4585 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4588 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4589 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4590 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4591 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4592 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4593 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4596 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4597 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4598 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4600 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4601 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4602 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4603 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
4604 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4605 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4606 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4607 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
4610 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4611 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4612 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
4616 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4617 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4618 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4621 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4622 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) });
4628 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
4629 /// or 0-conf channels.
4631 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
4632 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
4633 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
4634 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> bool {
4635 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
4636 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4638 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4639 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
4640 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4641 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
4642 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
4643 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.channel_by_id.len() {
4644 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
4648 return peers_without_funded_channels;
4651 fn unfunded_channel_count(
4652 peer: &PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, best_block_height: u32
4654 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
4655 for (_, chan) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
4656 if !chan.is_outbound() && chan.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
4657 chan.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
4659 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
4662 num_unfunded_channels
4665 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4666 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4667 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4670 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4671 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4674 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
4675 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
4676 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
4677 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4679 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
4680 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
4681 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
4682 let channeled_peers_without_funding = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| !node.channel_by_id.is_empty());
4684 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4685 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4687 debug_assert!(false);
4688 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
4690 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4691 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4693 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4694 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4695 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4696 if peer_state.channel_by_id.is_empty() &&
4697 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
4698 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
4700 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4701 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
4702 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4705 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4706 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
4707 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4708 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
4709 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4712 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
4713 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
4714 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4717 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4718 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4722 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4723 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4724 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4725 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4727 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4728 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4729 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4730 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4732 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4733 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4734 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4737 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4738 pending_events.push(
4739 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4740 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4741 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4742 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4743 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4744 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4749 entry.insert(channel);
4755 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4756 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4757 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4758 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4760 debug_assert!(false);
4761 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4763 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4764 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4765 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4766 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4767 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan);
4768 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4770 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4773 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4774 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4775 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4776 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4777 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4779 user_channel_id: user_id,
4784 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4785 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4787 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4788 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4790 debug_assert!(false);
4791 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4794 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4795 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4796 let ((funding_msg, monitor), chan) =
4797 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4798 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4799 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
4801 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4804 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4805 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4806 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4808 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4809 match self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().entry(chan.channel_id()) {
4810 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4811 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4812 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
4813 funding_msg.channel_id))
4815 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
4816 i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
4820 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4821 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4822 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4823 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4824 let new_channel_id = funding_msg.channel_id;
4825 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4826 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4830 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
4832 let chan = e.insert(chan);
4833 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, monitor_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
4834 per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING, { peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&new_channel_id) });
4836 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4837 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4838 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4839 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4840 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
4841 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
4842 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4843 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { shutdown_finish: Some((res, _)), .. }) = &mut res {
4851 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4852 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4853 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4854 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4856 debug_assert!(false);
4857 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4860 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4861 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4862 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4863 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4864 let monitor = try_chan_entry!(self,
4865 chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan);
4866 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor);
4867 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4868 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4869 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4870 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4871 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4872 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4873 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4878 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4882 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4883 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4884 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4886 debug_assert!(false);
4887 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4889 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4890 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4891 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4892 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4893 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
4894 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
4895 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4896 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4897 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4898 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4899 msg: announcement_sigs,
4901 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4902 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4903 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4904 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4905 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4906 // announcement_signatures.
4907 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4908 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4909 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4910 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4917 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4918 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan.get_mut());
4923 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4927 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4928 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4929 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4930 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4931 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4933 debug_assert!(false);
4934 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4936 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4937 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4938 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4939 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4941 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4942 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4943 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4944 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4947 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
4948 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self,
4949 chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
4950 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4952 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4953 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
4954 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
4955 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
4956 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4957 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4962 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4963 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
4964 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4965 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
4966 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
4970 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4973 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4974 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
4975 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
4976 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4982 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4983 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4984 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4986 debug_assert!(false);
4987 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4989 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4990 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4991 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4992 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4993 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4994 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
4995 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4996 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4997 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5002 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
5003 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
5004 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
5005 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
5006 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
5007 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
5008 } else { (tx, None) }
5010 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5013 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
5014 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
5015 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
5017 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
5018 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5019 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5020 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5021 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5025 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5030 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5031 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
5032 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
5033 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
5035 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
5036 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
5037 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
5038 //but we should prevent it anyway.
5040 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
5041 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5042 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5044 debug_assert!(false);
5045 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5047 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5048 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5049 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5050 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5052 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
5053 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
5054 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
5055 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
5056 match pending_forward_info {
5057 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
5058 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
5059 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
5060 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
5062 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
5063 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
5064 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5065 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
5066 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
5069 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
5071 _ => pending_forward_info
5074 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
5076 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5081 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5082 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
5083 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5084 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5086 debug_assert!(false);
5087 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5089 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5090 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5091 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5092 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5093 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
5095 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5098 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
5102 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5103 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5104 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5106 debug_assert!(false);
5107 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5109 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5110 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5111 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5112 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5113 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
5115 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5120 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5121 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5122 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5124 debug_assert!(false);
5125 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5127 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5128 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5129 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5130 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5131 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
5132 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
5133 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
5135 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
5138 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5142 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5143 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5144 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5146 debug_assert!(false);
5147 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5149 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5150 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5151 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5152 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5153 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
5154 let monitor_update = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5155 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
5156 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5157 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
5158 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
5160 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5165 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
5166 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
5167 let mut push_forward_event = false;
5168 let mut new_intercept_events = Vec::new();
5169 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
5170 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5171 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5172 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
5173 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
5174 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
5175 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
5177 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
5178 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
5180 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5181 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
5182 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
5183 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5184 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5185 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
5187 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5188 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
5189 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
5191 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
5192 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5193 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
5194 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5195 new_intercept_events.push(events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
5196 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
5197 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
5198 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
5199 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
5202 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5203 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
5205 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5206 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
5207 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5208 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5209 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5210 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5211 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
5212 phantom_shared_secret: None,
5215 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
5216 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
5217 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
5222 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
5223 // payments are being processed.
5224 if forward_htlcs_empty {
5225 push_forward_event = true;
5227 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5228 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
5235 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
5236 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
5239 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
5240 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5241 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
5243 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
5247 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued.
5248 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
5249 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5250 let forward_ev_exists = pending_events.iter()
5251 .find(|ev| if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false })
5253 if !forward_ev_exists {
5254 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5256 Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
5261 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5262 let (htlcs_to_fail, res) = {
5263 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5264 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5266 debug_assert!(false);
5267 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5268 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
5269 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5270 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5271 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5272 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
5273 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5274 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
5275 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5276 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5277 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5278 (htlcs_to_fail, res)
5280 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5283 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5287 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5288 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5289 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5291 debug_assert!(false);
5292 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5294 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5295 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5296 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5297 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5298 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
5300 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5305 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5306 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5307 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5309 debug_assert!(false);
5310 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5312 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5313 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5314 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5315 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5316 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
5317 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
5320 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5321 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5322 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
5323 msg, &self.default_configuration
5325 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5326 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5327 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap()),
5330 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5335 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5336 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5337 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5338 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
5340 // It's not a local channel
5341 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5344 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5345 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
5346 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
5347 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5349 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5350 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5351 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5352 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5353 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5354 if chan.get().should_announce() {
5355 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5356 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5357 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5358 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5360 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5362 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5363 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5364 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5365 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5367 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5368 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
5371 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5373 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5376 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5378 let need_lnd_workaround = {
5379 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5381 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5383 debug_assert!(false);
5384 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5386 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5387 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5388 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5389 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5390 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5391 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5392 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5393 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5394 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5395 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
5396 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
5397 let mut channel_update = None;
5398 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5399 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5400 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5403 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5404 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5405 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5406 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5407 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5408 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5409 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5414 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5415 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
5416 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5417 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5418 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5419 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5423 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5427 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
5428 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
5431 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5432 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5437 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
5438 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5439 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5441 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5442 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5443 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5444 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5445 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5446 match monitor_event {
5447 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5448 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5449 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5450 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5452 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5453 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5454 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5455 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5458 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5459 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5460 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
5461 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
5463 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5464 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5465 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5466 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
5469 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
5470 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5471 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5472 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5473 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5474 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5475 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5476 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5477 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5478 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5479 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5483 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5484 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5486 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5488 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5489 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5490 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5491 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5492 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5499 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5500 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
5506 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5507 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5510 has_pending_monitor_events
5513 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5514 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5515 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5517 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5518 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5519 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5520 NotifyOption::DoPersist
5522 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
5527 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5528 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5529 /// update was applied.
5530 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5531 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5532 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5533 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5535 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
5536 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
5537 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
5538 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
5540 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5541 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5543 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5544 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5545 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
5546 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
5547 let funding_txo = chan.get_funding_txo();
5548 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
5549 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger);
5550 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5551 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
5553 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
5554 has_monitor_update = true;
5556 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(
5557 funding_txo.expect("channel is live"), monitor_update);
5558 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5559 let channel_id: [u8; 32] = *channel_id;
5560 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5561 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING,
5562 peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id));
5564 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, res));
5566 continue 'peer_loop;
5575 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5576 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5577 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5580 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5581 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5587 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5588 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5589 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5590 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5591 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5592 let mut has_update = false;
5594 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5596 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5597 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5598 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5599 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5600 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5601 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5602 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5603 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5605 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5606 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5609 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5610 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5611 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5612 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5613 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5618 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5620 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5621 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
5622 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
5628 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5629 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5637 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5638 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5644 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5645 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5647 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5648 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5649 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5650 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5651 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5652 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5653 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5654 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5655 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5656 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5657 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5658 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5659 assert!(should_broadcast);
5660 } else { unreachable!(); }
5661 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5663 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5667 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5668 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5670 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5671 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5674 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5676 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5677 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5678 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5679 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5680 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5681 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5682 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5683 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5684 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5685 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5686 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5687 // never fail a payment too early.
5688 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5690 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5693 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5698 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5701 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5702 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5704 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
5705 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
5706 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5707 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5709 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5711 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5712 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5716 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5717 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5719 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5721 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5722 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5724 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5725 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5726 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
5727 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
5728 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
5729 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5730 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
5731 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5732 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
5733 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5734 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
5737 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5738 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5740 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5743 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5745 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5747 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5748 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5749 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5750 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5751 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5754 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5755 /// stored external to LDK.
5757 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5758 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5759 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5761 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5762 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5765 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5766 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5767 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5768 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5770 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5771 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5772 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5773 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5774 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5776 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5777 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5778 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
5779 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5780 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
5782 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
5783 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
5785 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5786 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5790 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5791 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5793 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5795 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5796 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5798 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5799 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5800 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
5801 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5802 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
5803 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5804 min_final_cltv_expiry)
5807 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5808 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5810 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5813 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5815 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5817 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5818 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5821 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5822 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5824 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5825 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5826 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5829 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5830 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5832 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
5833 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5834 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5835 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5837 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5838 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5839 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
5840 Some(_) => continue,
5841 None => return scid_candidate
5846 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5848 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
5849 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5851 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5852 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5853 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5857 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
5858 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
5859 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
5861 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
5862 /// times to get a unique scid.
5863 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5864 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5865 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5867 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5868 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5869 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
5870 return scid_candidate
5874 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
5875 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
5876 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
5877 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
5879 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5880 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5881 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5882 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5883 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5884 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
5885 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
5886 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
5895 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5896 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5897 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5898 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
5899 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5903 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
5904 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
5905 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5910 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
5911 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5912 if events.is_empty() { None } else { Some(events.remove(0)) }
5916 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5917 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
5921 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5922 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
5925 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
5926 /// using the given event handler.
5928 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
5929 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
5933 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
5937 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5939 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5940 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5941 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5942 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5943 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5944 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5948 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
5949 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
5950 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
5951 /// is always placed next to each other.
5953 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
5954 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
5955 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
5956 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
5958 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
5959 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
5960 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
5961 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5962 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5963 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5964 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5966 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5967 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5968 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5969 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5972 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5973 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5975 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5976 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5979 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5980 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5981 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5982 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5983 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5984 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
5985 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
5989 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5990 events.replace(pending_events);
5999 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6001 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6002 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6003 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6004 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6005 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6006 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6010 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
6012 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
6013 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
6014 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
6016 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
6020 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6022 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6023 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6024 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6025 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6026 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6027 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6031 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6033 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6034 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
6035 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
6036 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
6037 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
6040 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
6041 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
6044 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6045 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6046 let new_height = height - 1;
6048 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
6049 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
6050 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
6051 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
6052 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
6053 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
6056 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6060 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6062 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6063 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6064 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6065 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6066 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6067 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6071 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6072 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6073 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6074 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6076 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6077 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
6079 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6080 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
6081 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
6083 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6084 if height < last_best_block_height {
6085 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6086 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6090 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6091 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6092 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6093 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6095 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6096 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
6098 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6100 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
6102 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6104 macro_rules! max_time {
6105 ($timestamp: expr) => {
6107 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
6108 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
6109 // having an explicit local time source.
6110 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
6111 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
6112 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6113 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
6114 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
6120 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
6121 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6122 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
6123 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
6127 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
6128 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
6129 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
6130 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6131 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6132 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
6133 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.get_funding_txo(), chan.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
6134 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
6141 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
6142 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6143 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
6144 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
6145 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
6146 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
6147 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6148 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6153 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6155 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6156 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6157 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6158 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6159 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6160 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6164 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
6165 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
6167 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
6168 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
6169 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6170 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6171 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6173 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6174 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
6176 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6177 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6178 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6179 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6180 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6181 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
6182 let res = f(channel);
6183 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
6184 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
6185 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
6186 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
6187 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
6189 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
6190 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
6191 if channel.is_usable() {
6192 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6193 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
6194 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6195 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6200 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6205 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6206 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
6209 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
6210 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6211 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6212 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6213 msg: announcement_sigs,
6215 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6216 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
6217 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6219 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6220 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6221 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
6226 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
6227 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6228 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
6229 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
6230 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
6231 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
6232 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
6233 // is always consistent.
6234 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
6235 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
6236 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
6237 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
6238 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
6241 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
6242 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel);
6243 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
6244 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
6245 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
6246 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
6247 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6251 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
6252 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
6253 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6254 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6255 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
6256 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6257 data: reason_message,
6267 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6268 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
6269 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
6270 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
6271 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
6272 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
6273 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
6274 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6275 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6276 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
6278 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
6279 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
6280 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
6284 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
6287 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6288 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
6289 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6290 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6291 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
6292 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
6293 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6294 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6295 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
6298 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
6299 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6300 _ => unreachable!(),
6302 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
6303 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
6304 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
6305 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
6311 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
6313 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
6314 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
6318 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
6320 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
6321 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
6323 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
6324 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
6327 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6328 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
6329 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
6332 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
6333 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
6334 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
6335 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
6338 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6339 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6340 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6341 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6344 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6345 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6347 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6348 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6349 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6350 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6351 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
6354 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6355 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6356 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
6357 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
6360 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6361 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6362 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6363 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
6366 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6367 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6368 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
6369 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6373 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
6374 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6376 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6377 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6378 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6379 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6380 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6381 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6385 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
6386 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6387 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6390 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
6391 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6392 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6395 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6396 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6397 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6400 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6401 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6402 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6405 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6406 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6407 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6410 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6411 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6412 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6415 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6416 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6417 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6420 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6421 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6422 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6425 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6426 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6427 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6430 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6431 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6432 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6435 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6436 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6437 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6440 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6441 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6442 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6445 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6446 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6447 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6450 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6451 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6452 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6455 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6456 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6457 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6460 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6461 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6462 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6465 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6470 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6471 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6472 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6475 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
6476 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6477 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6478 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6480 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
6481 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6482 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
6483 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6484 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6485 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6486 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6487 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6488 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6489 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
6490 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6495 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6497 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
6498 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
6499 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
6500 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
6501 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
6502 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
6503 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
6504 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
6505 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
6506 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
6507 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
6508 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
6509 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6510 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6511 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6512 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
6513 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
6514 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6515 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6516 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6517 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6520 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
6521 peer_state.is_connected = false;
6522 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
6523 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
6526 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
6528 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6530 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6531 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6535 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
6536 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
6537 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6541 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6543 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
6544 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
6545 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
6546 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
6547 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
6548 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
6551 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6552 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6553 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6554 if inbound_peer_limited {
6557 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6558 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
6559 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6560 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6561 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
6565 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6566 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
6567 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6569 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6570 if inbound_peer_limited &&
6571 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
6572 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
6577 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
6578 peer_state.is_connected = true;
6583 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6585 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6586 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6587 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6588 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6589 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6590 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6591 let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6592 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6593 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6594 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6595 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6599 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6600 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6601 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6606 if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6607 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.default_configuration) {
6608 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
6609 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
6610 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6619 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6623 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6624 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6626 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6627 let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = {
6628 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6629 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6630 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6631 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6632 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6633 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
6635 for channel_id in channel_ids {
6636 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6637 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6641 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6642 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6643 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6644 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6645 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6646 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6647 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6648 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6649 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6650 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6658 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6659 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6663 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6664 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6667 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
6668 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6672 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6673 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6674 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
6675 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6678 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6679 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6681 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6682 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6683 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6684 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6685 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6688 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6689 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6690 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
6691 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6694 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6695 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6696 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6697 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
6700 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6701 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6702 pub fn provided_init_features(_config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
6703 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
6704 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
6705 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
6706 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
6707 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
6708 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
6709 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
6710 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
6711 features.set_payment_secret_required();
6712 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
6713 features.set_wumbo_optional();
6714 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
6715 features.set_channel_type_optional();
6716 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
6717 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
6719 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
6720 if _config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
6721 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
6727 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6728 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6730 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6731 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6732 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6733 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6736 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6737 (2, node_id, required),
6738 (4, features, required),
6739 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6740 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6741 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6742 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6745 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
6746 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6747 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6748 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6749 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
6750 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
6751 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6752 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
6753 (2, self.channel_id, required),
6754 (3, self.channel_type, option),
6755 (4, self.counterparty, required),
6756 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
6757 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
6758 (7, self.config, option),
6759 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
6760 (9, self.confirmations, option),
6761 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
6762 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6763 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6764 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
6765 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6766 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6767 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6768 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6769 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6770 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
6771 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
6772 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
6773 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
6774 (30, self.is_usable, required),
6775 (32, self.is_public, required),
6776 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6777 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6778 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6779 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
6785 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
6786 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6787 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6788 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6789 (2, channel_id, required),
6790 (3, channel_type, option),
6791 (4, counterparty, required),
6792 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6793 (6, funding_txo, option),
6794 (7, config, option),
6795 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6796 (9, confirmations, option),
6797 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6798 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6799 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6800 (16, balance_msat, required),
6801 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6802 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6803 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6804 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6805 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6806 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6807 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6808 (26, is_outbound, required),
6809 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
6810 (30, is_usable, required),
6811 (32, is_public, required),
6812 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6813 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6814 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6815 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
6818 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6819 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6820 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
6821 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
6822 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
6826 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
6828 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
6829 outbound_scid_alias,
6833 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
6834 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
6836 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
6837 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6838 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
6839 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6840 confirmations_required,
6842 force_close_spend_delay,
6843 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
6844 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
6845 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
6846 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
6847 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
6848 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
6849 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
6854 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6855 (2, channels, vec_type),
6856 (4, phantom_scid, required),
6857 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6860 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6862 (0, onion_packet, required),
6863 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6866 (0, payment_data, required),
6867 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6868 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6869 (3, payment_metadata, option),
6871 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6872 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6873 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6874 (3, payment_metadata, option),
6878 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6879 (0, routing, required),
6880 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6881 (4, payment_hash, required),
6882 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
6883 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
6884 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
6888 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6889 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6891 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6893 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6894 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6895 reason.write(writer)?;
6897 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6898 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6901 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6902 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6903 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6904 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6911 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6912 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6913 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6916 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6917 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6918 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6919 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6923 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6924 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6925 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6926 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6927 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6930 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6931 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6932 // messages contained in the variants.
6933 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6934 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6935 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6937 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6938 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6939 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6940 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6941 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6944 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6945 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6946 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6947 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6948 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6950 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6955 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6960 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6961 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6962 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6963 (2, outpoint, required),
6964 (4, htlc_id, required),
6965 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6968 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6969 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6970 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
6971 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
6972 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
6974 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6975 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
6976 (1, self.total_msat, required),
6977 (2, self.value, required),
6978 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
6979 (4, payment_data, option),
6980 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
6981 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6982 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6988 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6989 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6990 let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
6992 let mut sender_intended_value = None;
6993 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6994 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6995 let mut total_value_received = None;
6996 let mut total_msat = None;
6997 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6998 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6999 (0, prev_hop, required),
7000 (1, total_msat, option),
7001 (2, value, required),
7002 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
7003 (4, payment_data, option),
7004 (5, total_value_received, option),
7005 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
7006 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
7008 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
7010 if payment_data.is_some() {
7011 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7013 if total_msat.is_none() {
7014 total_msat = Some(value);
7016 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
7019 if total_msat.is_none() {
7020 if payment_data.is_none() {
7021 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7023 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
7025 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
7029 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
7032 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
7033 total_value_received,
7034 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
7041 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
7042 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7043 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7046 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
7047 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
7048 let mut path_hops: Option<Vec<RouteHop>> = Some(Vec::new());
7049 let mut payment_id = None;
7050 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
7051 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
7052 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7053 (0, session_priv, required),
7054 (1, payment_id, option),
7055 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
7056 (4, path_hops, vec_type),
7057 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
7058 (6, blinded_tail, option),
7060 if payment_id.is_none() {
7061 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
7063 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
7065 let path = Path { hops: path_hops.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?, blinded_tail };
7066 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
7067 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7069 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
7070 if params.final_cltv_expiry_delta == 0 {
7071 params.final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7074 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7075 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
7076 first_hop_htlc_msat,
7078 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
7081 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7082 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
7087 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
7088 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
7090 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
7092 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
7093 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7094 (0, session_priv, required),
7095 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
7096 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
7097 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
7098 (4, path.hops, vec_type),
7099 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
7100 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
7103 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
7105 field.write(writer)?;
7112 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
7113 (0, forward_info, required),
7114 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
7115 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
7116 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
7117 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
7120 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
7122 (0, htlc_id, required),
7123 (2, err_packet, required),
7128 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
7129 (0, payment_secret, required),
7130 (2, expiry_time, required),
7131 (4, user_payment_id, required),
7132 (6, payment_preimage, required),
7133 (8, min_value_msat, required),
7136 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7138 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7139 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7140 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7141 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7142 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7143 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7147 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7148 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
7150 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7152 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
7154 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7155 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
7156 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
7159 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
7161 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7162 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
7163 let mut number_of_channels = 0;
7164 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7165 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7166 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7167 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7168 serializable_peer_count += 1;
7170 number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len();
7171 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
7172 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7173 unfunded_channels += 1;
7178 ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
7180 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7181 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7182 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7183 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
7184 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7185 channel.write(writer)?;
7192 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7193 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7194 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
7195 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7196 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7197 for forward in pending_forwards {
7198 forward.write(writer)?;
7203 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7205 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7206 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
7207 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7209 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
7210 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
7211 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7212 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
7213 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7214 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7215 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
7216 htlc.write(writer)?;
7218 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
7219 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
7222 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
7223 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
7224 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7225 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
7226 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
7227 // per_peer_state lock at all.
7228 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
7231 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
7232 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
7233 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
7234 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
7235 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
7237 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7238 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
7239 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
7240 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
7241 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
7242 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
7243 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
7248 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7249 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7250 for event in events.iter() {
7251 event.write(writer)?;
7254 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
7255 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7256 for event in background_events.iter() {
7258 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
7260 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
7261 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
7266 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
7267 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
7268 // likely to be identical.
7269 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7270 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7272 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7273 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
7274 hash.write(writer)?;
7275 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
7278 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
7279 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
7280 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7281 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
7282 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
7285 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
7286 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7288 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7289 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7290 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
7291 session_priv.write(writer)?;
7294 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
7295 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
7299 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
7300 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
7301 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7303 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7304 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7305 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
7311 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
7312 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7313 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
7314 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
7317 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
7318 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
7319 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
7320 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
7321 pending_claiming_payments = None;
7324 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7325 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
7326 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7327 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
7328 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7329 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
7330 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7331 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
7332 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7333 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
7334 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
7341 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
7343 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
7345 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7346 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
7347 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
7348 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
7349 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
7350 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
7351 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
7352 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
7353 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7354 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
7355 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
7356 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
7357 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
7359 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
7360 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
7362 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
7363 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
7365 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
7366 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
7367 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
7368 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
7369 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
7370 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
7372 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
7373 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7375 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7376 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7377 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7378 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7379 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7380 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7384 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
7385 pub entropy_source: ES,
7387 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
7388 pub node_signer: NS,
7390 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
7391 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
7393 pub signer_provider: SP,
7395 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7397 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
7398 pub fee_estimator: F,
7399 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7401 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
7402 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
7403 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
7404 pub chain_monitor: M,
7406 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
7407 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
7408 /// force-closed during deserialization.
7409 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
7410 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
7411 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
7413 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
7415 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
7416 /// deserialization.
7418 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
7419 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
7420 pub default_config: UserConfig,
7422 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
7423 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
7425 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
7426 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
7427 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
7428 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
7430 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
7433 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
7434 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
7437 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7438 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7440 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7441 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7442 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7443 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7444 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7445 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7449 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
7450 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
7451 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
7452 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
7453 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
7455 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
7456 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
7461 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
7462 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
7463 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7464 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
7466 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7467 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7468 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7469 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7470 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7471 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7475 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7476 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
7477 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
7481 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7482 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
7484 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7485 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7486 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7487 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7488 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7489 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7493 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7494 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7496 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7497 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7498 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7500 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7502 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7503 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7504 let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7505 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7506 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7507 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
7508 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
7509 for _ in 0..channel_count {
7510 let mut channel: Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (
7511 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
7513 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7514 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
7515 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
7516 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7517 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7518 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7519 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7520 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
7521 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
7522 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7523 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7524 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7525 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7526 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7527 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7528 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7529 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7530 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7531 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7532 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7533 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
7534 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
7535 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
7536 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7537 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7538 let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
7539 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
7540 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate(monitor_update));
7542 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
7543 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7544 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7545 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7546 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
7548 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7549 let mut found_htlc = false;
7550 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7551 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
7554 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
7555 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
7556 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
7557 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
7558 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
7559 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
7560 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
7561 log_info!(args.logger,
7562 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
7563 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7564 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7568 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7569 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
7570 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7572 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7573 id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
7575 match peer_channels.entry(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
7576 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7577 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
7578 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7580 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7581 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
7582 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7583 entry.insert(by_id_map);
7587 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
7588 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
7589 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
7590 // safely discard the channel.
7591 let _ = channel.force_shutdown(false);
7592 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7593 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7594 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7595 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
7598 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7599 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7600 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7601 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7602 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7603 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7607 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7608 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
7609 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
7610 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
7611 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
7613 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
7617 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
7618 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7619 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7620 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
7621 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7622 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7623 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
7624 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
7625 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
7627 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
7630 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7631 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7632 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
7633 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7634 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7635 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
7636 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
7637 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
7639 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
7642 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7643 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>)>()));
7644 for _ in 0..peer_count {
7645 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7646 let peer_state = PeerState {
7647 channel_by_id: peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new()),
7648 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
7649 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7650 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
7651 is_connected: false,
7653 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
7656 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7657 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
7658 for _ in 0..event_count {
7659 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
7660 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
7665 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7666 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
7667 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7669 let (funding_txo, monitor_update): (OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate) = (Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?);
7670 if pending_background_events.iter().find(|e| {
7671 let BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((pending_funding_txo, pending_monitor_update)) = e;
7672 *pending_funding_txo == funding_txo && *pending_monitor_update == monitor_update
7674 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)));
7677 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7681 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
7682 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7684 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7685 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
7686 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
7687 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
7688 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7692 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7693 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
7694 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
7695 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
7696 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
7697 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
7698 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
7700 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
7701 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7705 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
7706 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
7707 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
7708 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
7709 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
7710 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7711 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7712 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
7713 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
7714 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
7715 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = Some(Vec::new());
7716 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7717 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
7718 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7719 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
7720 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7721 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
7722 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7723 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
7724 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7725 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
7726 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
7728 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
7729 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7732 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
7733 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7736 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
7737 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
7740 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
7741 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
7742 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
7743 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
7744 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
7745 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
7747 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
7749 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
7750 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
7751 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
7755 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
7756 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
7757 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
7758 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
7759 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
7760 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
7761 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
7763 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7764 if id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
7765 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
7766 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
7767 if path.hops.is_empty() {
7768 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
7769 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7772 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
7773 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
7774 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
7775 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
7776 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7777 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
7778 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
7779 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
7781 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7782 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
7783 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
7784 retry_strategy: None,
7785 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
7786 payment_params: None,
7787 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
7788 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
7789 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
7790 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
7791 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
7792 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
7793 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
7794 total_msat: path_amt,
7795 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
7797 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
7798 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
7803 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7805 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
7806 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
7807 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
7808 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
7810 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
7811 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
7812 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
7813 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
7814 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
7815 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
7816 forwards.retain(|forward| {
7817 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
7818 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7819 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7820 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7825 !forwards.is_empty()
7827 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
7828 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7829 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7830 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7831 pending_events_read.retain(|event| {
7832 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
7833 intercepted_id != ev_id
7840 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
7841 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
7842 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
7843 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
7844 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
7845 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
7846 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
7847 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
7848 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
7849 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
7850 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
7851 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv, path, false, &pending_events, &args.logger);
7852 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
7861 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
7862 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
7863 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
7864 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
7865 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
7866 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
7867 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7868 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
7872 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
7873 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
7875 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
7876 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
7877 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
7878 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7880 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
7881 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
7882 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7884 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
7885 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
7887 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
7888 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
7890 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7893 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
7894 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
7895 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
7897 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7901 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
7902 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
7903 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
7904 if htlcs.is_empty() {
7905 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7907 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
7908 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
7909 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
7910 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
7911 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
7912 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
7913 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
7914 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
7916 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7917 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7921 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
7923 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7925 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
7926 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
7928 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
7929 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
7934 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7935 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7937 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
7939 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7941 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
7942 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
7943 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
7944 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7948 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
7949 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
7950 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7951 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7952 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7953 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
7954 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
7956 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
7957 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
7958 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
7960 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7961 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
7962 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7963 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7964 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7965 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7967 if chan.is_usable() {
7968 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
7969 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7970 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7971 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7972 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7978 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
7980 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7981 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
7982 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
7983 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7984 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
7985 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
7986 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
7987 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
7988 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
7989 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
7990 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
7992 for claimable_htlc in payment.htlcs {
7993 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
7995 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
7996 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
7997 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
7998 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
8000 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
8001 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
8002 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
8003 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
8005 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
8006 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
8007 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
8008 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
8010 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
8011 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
8012 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
8013 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8014 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8015 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
8016 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
8019 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
8020 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
8023 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
8026 purpose: payment.purpose,
8027 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
8033 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
8034 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get_mut(&node_id) {
8035 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
8037 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
8038 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8042 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
8044 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
8045 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
8046 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
8047 router: args.router,
8049 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
8051 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
8052 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
8053 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
8054 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
8056 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
8057 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
8058 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
8059 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
8060 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
8061 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
8063 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
8068 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
8070 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
8072 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
8073 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
8074 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
8075 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
8076 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
8078 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
8079 node_signer: args.node_signer,
8080 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
8082 logger: args.logger,
8083 default_configuration: args.default_config,
8086 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
8087 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
8088 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
8089 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
8090 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
8093 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
8094 //connection or two.
8096 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
8102 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8103 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8104 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
8105 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
8106 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
8107 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
8108 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
8109 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
8110 use crate::ln::msgs;
8111 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
8112 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
8113 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
8114 use crate::util::test_utils;
8115 use crate::util::config::ChannelConfig;
8116 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
8119 fn test_notify_limits() {
8120 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
8121 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
8122 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8123 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8124 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8125 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8127 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
8128 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
8129 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8130 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8131 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8133 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8135 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
8136 // to connect messages with new values
8137 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
8138 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
8139 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
8140 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
8141 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
8142 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
8144 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
8145 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8146 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8147 // ... but the last node should not.
8148 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8149 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
8150 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8151 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8153 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
8154 // about the channel.
8155 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8156 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8157 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8159 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
8161 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8162 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8163 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8164 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8165 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8166 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8168 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
8169 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8170 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8172 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
8173 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
8174 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
8175 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
8176 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
8177 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
8179 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
8180 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
8181 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
8182 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
8183 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8184 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8185 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8186 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8188 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
8189 // the channel info has updated.
8190 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
8191 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
8192 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8193 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8194 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8195 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8199 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
8200 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
8202 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8203 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8204 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8205 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8206 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8208 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
8209 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8210 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
8211 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
8213 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
8214 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
8215 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
8216 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
8217 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
8218 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
8219 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
8220 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
8221 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8222 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8223 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8224 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
8226 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
8227 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8228 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8229 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8230 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8231 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8232 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8233 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8234 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8235 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8236 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8237 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8238 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
8239 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8240 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8241 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8242 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8243 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8244 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8245 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8246 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8247 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8248 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8250 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
8251 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
8252 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
8253 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8254 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8255 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8256 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
8258 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
8259 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
8260 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
8261 // lightning messages manually.
8262 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8263 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
8264 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8266 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8267 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8268 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
8269 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8270 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8271 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
8272 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8273 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8274 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
8275 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8276 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8277 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8278 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8279 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8280 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8281 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
8282 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8283 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8284 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
8285 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8286 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8287 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8288 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8289 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
8290 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8292 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
8293 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
8294 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8295 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
8297 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
8298 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
8299 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
8300 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
8302 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8305 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8306 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8307 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8308 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8310 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8313 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8314 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8315 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8316 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8318 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8323 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
8324 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
8325 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
8326 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
8327 // fails as expected.
8328 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8329 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8330 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8331 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8332 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8333 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8334 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8336 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
8337 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
8338 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
8340 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
8341 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8342 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV),
8343 final_value_msat: 100_000,
8345 let route = find_route(
8346 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8347 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8349 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8350 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8351 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8352 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8353 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8354 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8355 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8356 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8357 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8358 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8359 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
8360 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
8361 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8362 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8363 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8364 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8365 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8366 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8367 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8368 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8369 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8370 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8371 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8372 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8374 // Finally, claim the original payment.
8375 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8377 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
8378 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8379 let route = find_route(
8380 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8381 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8383 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8384 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8385 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8386 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8387 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8388 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
8389 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
8390 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
8392 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
8393 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8394 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8395 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8396 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8397 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8398 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8399 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8400 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8401 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8402 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8403 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8404 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8405 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8406 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8407 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8408 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8409 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8410 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8411 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8412 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8413 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8414 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8415 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8417 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
8418 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8422 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
8423 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
8424 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
8425 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8426 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8427 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8428 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8430 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8431 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8433 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8434 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8435 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8436 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8438 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8439 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8440 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8441 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8442 let route = find_route(
8443 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8444 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8447 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8448 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
8449 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
8450 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8451 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
8452 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8453 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8455 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8456 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8457 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8458 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8459 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8460 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8461 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8463 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
8467 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
8468 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
8469 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8470 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8471 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8472 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8474 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8475 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8477 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8478 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8479 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8480 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8482 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8483 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8484 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8485 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8486 let route = find_route(
8487 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8488 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8491 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8492 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8493 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
8494 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
8495 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8496 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
8497 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
8498 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8499 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8501 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8502 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8503 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8504 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8505 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8506 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8507 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8509 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
8513 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
8514 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8515 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8516 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8517 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8519 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8520 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8521 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8522 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8524 // Marshall an MPP route.
8525 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8526 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8527 route.paths.push(path);
8528 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8529 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8530 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8531 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8532 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8533 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8535 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8536 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
8538 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
8539 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
8541 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
8546 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
8547 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8548 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8549 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8550 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8552 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8554 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8555 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8557 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8558 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8559 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8560 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8563 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
8564 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
8565 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8566 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
8567 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
8568 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
8571 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
8574 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
8575 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
8580 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
8581 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
8582 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8583 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8584 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8585 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8587 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
8588 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
8590 total_msat: 100_000,
8593 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
8594 // payment verification fails as expected.
8595 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
8596 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
8597 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
8598 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
8600 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
8604 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
8605 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
8609 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
8610 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
8611 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
8612 // the channel is successfully closed.
8613 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8614 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8615 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8616 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8618 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8619 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8620 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
8621 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8622 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
8624 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
8625 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
8627 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
8628 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
8629 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8630 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8633 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8635 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8636 // as it has the funding transaction.
8637 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8638 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8639 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8642 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8644 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8646 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8648 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8649 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8650 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8652 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8655 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8656 // as it has the funding transaction.
8657 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8658 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8659 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8661 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8662 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8663 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8664 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8665 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8666 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8667 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8668 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
8670 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8671 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8672 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8673 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
8675 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8676 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
8678 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
8679 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
8680 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
8681 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
8682 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8683 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8684 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8688 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
8689 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
8690 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
8691 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
8692 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8693 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8694 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8697 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8699 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
8700 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
8701 // closing transaction).
8702 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
8703 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
8704 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8706 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
8707 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
8708 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8709 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8710 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8713 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8715 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
8717 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
8718 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
8719 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8721 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8723 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8724 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8727 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8728 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
8729 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8732 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8733 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
8734 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8737 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
8739 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8740 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8742 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
8743 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8745 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
8746 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8751 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
8752 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
8753 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
8754 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
8755 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8756 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
8757 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
8758 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
8761 let channel_id = [4; 32];
8762 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8763 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
8765 // Test the API functions.
8766 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
8768 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
8770 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8772 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8774 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8776 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
8778 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
8782 fn test_connection_limiting() {
8783 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
8784 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8785 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8786 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8787 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8789 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8791 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8792 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8794 let mut funding_tx = None;
8795 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
8796 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8797 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8800 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
8801 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
8802 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
8803 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
8804 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8806 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8807 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8808 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8810 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8812 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8813 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8814 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8816 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8819 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
8820 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8821 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8822 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8823 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8825 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
8826 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
8828 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
8829 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
8830 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8831 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8832 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
8833 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8834 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8836 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8837 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8838 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8839 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err();
8841 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
8842 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
8843 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8844 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8845 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
8846 for ev in chan_closed_events {
8847 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
8849 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8850 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8851 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8852 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err();
8854 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
8855 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8856 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
8857 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8859 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
8860 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
8862 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
8863 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
8864 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
8865 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
8866 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8868 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8869 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
8870 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8872 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
8873 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8874 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
8876 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
8877 // "protected" and can connect again.
8878 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
8879 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8880 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8881 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8883 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
8885 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8886 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
8890 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
8891 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
8892 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8893 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8894 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8895 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8897 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8899 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8900 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8902 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
8903 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8904 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8905 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8908 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
8910 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8911 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8912 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8914 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
8915 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8916 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8918 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
8919 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8920 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8921 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8925 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
8926 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
8927 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
8928 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8929 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8930 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
8931 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8932 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
8933 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8935 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8937 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8938 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8940 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
8941 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
8942 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8943 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8944 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8945 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8947 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8948 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8950 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8951 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
8953 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8955 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
8956 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8959 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
8960 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8961 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8962 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8963 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8964 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8965 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8967 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8968 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
8969 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
8970 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
8974 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8976 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
8977 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8979 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
8980 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8981 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8983 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8984 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
8986 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8988 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
8993 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
8994 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
8995 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
8996 // the channel without the anchors feature.
8997 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8998 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8999 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
9000 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
9001 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
9002 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
9003 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9005 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
9006 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9007 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
9009 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9010 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9012 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9013 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9015 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9018 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9019 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
9021 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9022 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
9024 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9028 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
9030 use crate::chain::Listen;
9031 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
9032 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
9033 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
9034 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
9035 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
9036 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
9037 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
9038 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
9039 use crate::util::test_utils;
9040 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
9042 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
9043 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
9044 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
9046 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
9050 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
9051 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
9052 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
9053 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
9054 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
9055 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
9056 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
9058 struct ANodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
9059 node: &'a Manager<'a, P>,
9061 impl<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'a, P> {
9062 type CM = Manager<'a, P>;
9064 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'a, P> { self.node }
9066 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
9071 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
9072 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
9075 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
9076 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
9077 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
9079 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
9081 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
9082 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
9083 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
9084 let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
9085 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
9087 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
9088 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
9090 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
9091 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
9092 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
9093 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
9095 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
9097 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
9099 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
9100 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
9101 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
9102 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
9103 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
9105 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
9107 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
9109 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_b.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
9110 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_a.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
9111 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9112 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
9113 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9116 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
9117 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9118 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
9120 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9121 } else { panic!(); }
9123 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
9124 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9125 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
9127 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9128 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
9130 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9133 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9134 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9135 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
9137 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9138 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
9140 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9143 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
9146 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
9149 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
9150 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
9152 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9153 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9154 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
9155 match msg_events[0] {
9156 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
9157 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
9158 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
9162 match msg_events[1] {
9163 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9167 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9168 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
9170 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9171 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
9173 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9176 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9177 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
9179 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9180 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
9182 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9185 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
9186 macro_rules! send_payment {
9187 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
9188 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
9189 .with_features($node_b.invoice_features());
9190 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
9191 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
9193 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
9194 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
9196 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
9197 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), RouteParameters {
9198 payment_params, final_value_msat: 10_000,
9199 }, Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
9200 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
9201 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9202 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
9203 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
9204 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
9205 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
9206 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
9208 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
9209 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
9210 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9211 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
9213 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
9214 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
9215 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
9216 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9217 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
9219 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
9222 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
9223 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
9224 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
9225 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9227 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
9232 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
9233 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);