1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`find_route`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 //! [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
25 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
35 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
38 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
39 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
40 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
41 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
43 // construct one themselves.
44 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
45 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
46 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
47 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
48 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
49 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, RouteParameters};
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
53 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
54 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, Recipient};
55 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
56 use crate::util::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
57 use crate::util::{byte_utils, events};
58 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
59 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
60 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
61 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
62 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
65 use crate::prelude::*;
67 use core::cell::RefCell;
69 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock};
70 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
71 use core::time::Duration;
74 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
76 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
77 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
78 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
80 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
81 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
82 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
83 // before we forward it.
85 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
86 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
87 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
88 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
89 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
91 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
92 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
94 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
95 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a "real" SCID, an
96 /// outbound SCID alias, or a phantom node SCID.
97 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
100 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
101 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
102 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
105 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
106 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
110 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
111 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
112 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
113 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
114 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
115 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
116 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
117 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
120 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
121 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
122 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
123 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
126 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
127 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
128 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
129 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
130 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
133 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
134 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
136 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
137 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
138 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
141 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
142 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
144 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
147 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
148 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
151 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
155 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
156 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
157 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
158 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
159 short_channel_id: u64,
161 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
162 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
164 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
165 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
170 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
172 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
173 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
174 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
176 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
177 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
180 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
181 struct ClaimableHTLC {
182 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
184 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
186 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
188 /// The sum total of all MPP parts
192 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
193 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
194 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
195 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
197 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
198 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
203 impl Readable for PaymentId {
204 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
205 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
209 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
210 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
211 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
212 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
213 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
216 session_priv: SecretKey,
217 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
218 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
219 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
220 payment_id: PaymentId,
221 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
222 payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters>,
225 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
226 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
227 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
229 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
231 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
233 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payment_params } => {
236 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
237 payment_id.hash(hasher);
238 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
239 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
240 payment_params.hash(hasher);
245 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
248 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
249 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
251 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
252 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
253 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
254 payment_secret: None,
255 payment_params: None,
260 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
261 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
263 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
271 struct ReceiveError {
277 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
278 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
280 MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
285 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>);
287 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
288 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
289 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
290 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
291 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
293 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
294 err: msgs::LightningError,
295 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
296 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
298 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
300 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
302 err: LightningError {
304 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
305 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
312 shutdown_finish: None,
316 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
318 err: LightningError {
320 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
323 shutdown_finish: None,
327 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
328 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
331 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
333 err: LightningError {
335 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
336 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
342 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
343 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
347 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
350 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
352 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
353 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
357 log_level: Level::Warn,
360 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
362 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
364 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
366 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
367 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
375 shutdown_finish: None,
380 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
381 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
382 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
383 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
384 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
386 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
387 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
388 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
389 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
390 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
391 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
392 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
394 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
398 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
399 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
400 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
401 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
402 /// failed/claimed by the user.
404 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
405 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
407 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, (events::PaymentPurpose, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>)>,
408 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
409 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
410 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
413 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
414 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
415 /// quite some time lag.
416 enum BackgroundEvent {
417 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
418 /// commitment transaction.
419 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
422 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
423 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
425 latest_features: InitFeatures,
428 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
429 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
431 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
434 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
435 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
436 struct PendingInboundPayment {
437 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
438 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
439 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
440 /// this payment being removed.
442 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
443 user_payment_id: u64,
444 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
445 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
446 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
449 /// Stores the session_priv for each part of a payment that is still pending. For versions 0.0.102
450 /// and later, also stores information for retrying the payment.
451 pub(crate) enum PendingOutboundPayment {
453 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
456 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
457 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
458 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
459 pending_amt_msat: u64,
460 /// Used to track the fee paid. Only present if the payment was serialized on 0.0.103+.
461 pending_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
462 /// The total payment amount across all paths, used to verify that a retry is not overpaying.
464 /// Our best known block height at the time this payment was initiated.
465 starting_block_height: u32,
467 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
468 /// been resolved. This ensures we don't look up pending payments in ChannelMonitors on restart
469 /// and add a pending payment that was already fulfilled.
471 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
472 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
473 timer_ticks_without_htlcs: u8,
475 /// When a payer gives up trying to retry a payment, they inform us, letting us generate a
476 /// `PaymentFailed` event when all HTLCs have irrevocably failed. This avoids a number of race
477 /// conditions in MPP-aware payment retriers (1), where the possibility of multiple
478 /// `PaymentPathFailed` events with `all_paths_failed` can be pending at once, confusing a
479 /// downstream event handler as to when a payment has actually failed.
481 /// (1) https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1164
483 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
484 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
488 impl PendingOutboundPayment {
489 fn is_fulfilled(&self) -> bool {
491 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => true,
495 fn abandoned(&self) -> bool {
497 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => true,
501 fn get_pending_fee_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
503 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { pending_fee_msat, .. } => pending_fee_msat.clone(),
508 fn payment_hash(&self) -> Option<PaymentHash> {
510 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None,
511 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
512 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => *payment_hash,
513 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
517 fn mark_fulfilled(&mut self) {
518 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
519 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
520 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
521 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
522 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
523 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. }
526 let payment_hash = self.payment_hash();
527 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, payment_hash, timer_ticks_without_htlcs: 0 };
530 fn mark_abandoned(&mut self) -> Result<(), ()> {
531 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
532 let our_payment_hash;
533 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
534 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } |
535 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } =>
537 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } |
538 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } => {
539 our_payment_hash = *payment_hash;
543 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash: our_payment_hash };
547 /// panics if path is None and !self.is_fulfilled
548 fn remove(&mut self, session_priv: &[u8; 32], path: Option<&Vec<RouteHop>>) -> bool {
549 let remove_res = match self {
550 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
551 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
552 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
553 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
554 session_privs.remove(session_priv)
558 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
559 let path = path.expect("Fulfilling a payment should always come with a path");
560 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
561 *pending_amt_msat -= path_last_hop.fee_msat;
562 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
563 *fee_msat -= path.get_path_fees();
570 fn insert(&mut self, session_priv: [u8; 32], path: &Vec<RouteHop>) -> bool {
571 let insert_res = match self {
572 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
573 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
574 session_privs.insert(session_priv)
576 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => false,
577 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => false,
580 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
581 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
582 *pending_amt_msat += path_last_hop.fee_msat;
583 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
584 *fee_msat += path.get_path_fees();
591 fn remaining_parts(&self) -> usize {
593 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
594 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
595 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
596 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
603 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
604 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
605 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
606 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
607 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
608 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
609 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
611 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
612 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
614 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
615 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
616 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
617 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
618 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
619 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
620 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
621 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
623 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
624 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
626 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
627 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
629 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
630 /// to individual Channels.
632 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
633 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
634 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
635 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
637 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
638 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
639 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
640 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
641 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
642 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
643 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
645 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
646 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
647 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
648 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
651 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
652 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
653 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
654 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
655 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
657 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
658 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
659 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
660 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
661 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
664 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
665 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
666 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
667 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
668 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
672 // `total_consistency_lock`
674 // |__`forward_htlcs`
676 // |__`channel_state`
680 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
682 // | |__`per_peer_state`
684 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
686 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
688 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments`
692 // | |__`pending_events`
694 // | |__`pending_background_events`
696 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
697 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
698 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
699 K::Target: KeysInterface,
700 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
703 default_configuration: UserConfig,
704 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
705 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
709 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
711 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
713 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
714 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
716 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
717 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
718 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>,
719 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
720 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>,
722 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
723 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
724 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
725 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
727 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
728 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
730 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
731 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
732 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
733 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
734 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
735 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
736 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
737 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
739 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
741 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
742 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment>>,
744 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
746 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
747 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
748 /// and via the classic SCID.
750 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
751 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
753 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
755 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
757 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
759 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
760 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
761 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
762 /// active channel list on load.
764 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
765 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
767 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
769 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
770 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
771 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
773 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
774 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
775 /// the handling of the events.
778 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
779 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
780 /// would break backwards compatability.
781 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
782 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
783 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
785 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
786 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
788 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
790 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
791 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
792 /// confirmation depth.
794 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
795 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
796 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
798 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
800 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
802 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
804 our_network_key: SecretKey,
805 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
807 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
809 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
810 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
811 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
813 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
814 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
816 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
817 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
818 /// keeping additional state.
819 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
821 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
822 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
823 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
824 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
826 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
827 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
828 /// are currently open with that peer.
829 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
830 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
833 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
834 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
836 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
837 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
838 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
839 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
840 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
841 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
842 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
843 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
844 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
845 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
846 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
848 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
855 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
857 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
858 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
859 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
860 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
861 pub struct ChainParameters {
862 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
863 pub network: Network,
865 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
867 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
868 pub best_block: BestBlock,
871 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
877 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
878 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
879 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
880 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
881 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
882 /// updates are ready for persistence).
884 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
885 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
886 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
887 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
888 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
890 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
891 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
894 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
895 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
896 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
899 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
900 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
902 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
903 persistence_notifier: notifier,
904 should_persist: persist_check,
905 _read_guard: read_guard,
910 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
912 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
913 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
918 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
919 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
921 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
923 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
924 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
925 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
926 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
927 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
929 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
930 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
932 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
934 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
935 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
936 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
937 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
938 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
939 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
940 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
941 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
942 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
943 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
944 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
945 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
946 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
948 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
949 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
951 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
952 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
953 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
954 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
956 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
957 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
958 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
959 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
960 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
961 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
964 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
966 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
967 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
970 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
972 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
973 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
975 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
976 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
977 /// [`ChannelManager::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
978 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
980 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
981 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
982 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
983 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
984 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
985 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
986 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
987 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
988 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
989 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
990 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
993 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
994 /// to better separate parameters.
995 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
996 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
997 /// The node_id of our counterparty
998 pub node_id: PublicKey,
999 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1000 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1001 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1002 pub features: InitFeatures,
1003 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1004 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1005 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1007 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1009 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1010 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1011 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1012 /// payments to us through this channel.
1013 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1014 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1015 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1016 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1017 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1018 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1019 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1022 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
1023 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1024 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1025 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1026 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1027 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1028 /// lifetime of the channel.
1029 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1030 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1031 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1032 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1033 /// our counterparty already.
1035 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1036 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1037 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1038 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1040 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1041 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1042 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1043 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1045 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1046 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1048 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1049 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1051 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1052 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1053 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1054 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1055 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1056 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1057 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1058 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1059 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1062 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1064 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1065 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1066 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1067 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1068 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1069 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1070 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1072 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1073 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1075 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1076 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1077 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1078 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1079 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1080 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1081 /// this value on chain.
1083 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1085 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1087 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1088 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1089 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1090 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1092 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1093 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1094 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1095 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1097 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1098 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1099 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1100 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1102 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1103 pub balance_msat: u64,
1104 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1105 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1106 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1107 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1109 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1111 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1112 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1113 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1114 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1115 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1116 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1117 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1118 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1120 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1121 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1122 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1123 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1124 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1125 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1126 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1128 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1129 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1130 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1131 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1132 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1133 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1134 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1135 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1136 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1138 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1140 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1141 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1142 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1143 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1144 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1145 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1146 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1147 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1148 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1150 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1151 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1152 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1153 pub is_outbound: bool,
1154 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1155 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1156 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1157 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1158 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1160 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1161 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1162 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1163 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1165 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1166 pub is_usable: bool,
1167 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1168 pub is_public: bool,
1169 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1170 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1171 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1172 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1173 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1174 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1176 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1177 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1180 impl ChannelDetails {
1181 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1182 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1183 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1185 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1186 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1187 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1188 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1191 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1192 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1193 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1195 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1196 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1197 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1198 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1202 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
1203 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
1204 /// states for more.
1205 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
1206 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
1207 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
1208 /// send the payment at all.
1210 /// You can freely resend the payment in full (with the parameter error fixed).
1212 /// Because the payment failed outright, no payment tracking is done, you do not need to call
1213 /// [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] and [`ChannelManager::retry_payment`] will *not* work
1214 /// for this payment.
1215 ParameterError(APIError),
1216 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
1217 /// from attempting to send the payment at all.
1219 /// You can freely resend the payment in full (with the parameter error fixed).
1221 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1224 /// Because the payment failed outright, no payment tracking is done, you do not need to call
1225 /// [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] and [`ChannelManager::retry_payment`] will *not* work
1226 /// for this payment.
1227 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
1228 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
1229 /// You can freely resend the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
1230 /// paths than the ones selected).
1232 /// Because the payment failed outright, no payment tracking is done, you do not need to call
1233 /// [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] and [`ChannelManager::retry_payment`] will *not* work
1234 /// for this payment.
1235 AllFailedResendSafe(Vec<APIError>),
1236 /// Indicates that a payment for the provided [`PaymentId`] is already in-flight and has not
1237 /// yet completed (i.e. generated an [`Event::PaymentSent`]) or been abandoned (via
1238 /// [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]).
1240 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
1242 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
1243 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
1244 /// in over-/re-payment.
1246 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1247 /// send_payment, and any `Err`s which are not [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] can be
1248 /// safely retried via [`ChannelManager::retry_payment`].
1250 /// Any entries which contain `Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInprogress)` or `Ok(())` MUST NOT be
1251 /// retried as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent
1252 /// (in the case of `Ok(())`) or will send once a [`MonitorEvent::Completed`] is provided for
1253 /// the next-hop channel with the latest update_id.
1255 /// The errors themselves, in the same order as the route hops.
1256 results: Vec<Result<(), APIError>>,
1257 /// If some paths failed without irrevocably committing to the new HTLC(s), this will
1258 /// contain a [`RouteParameters`] object which can be used to calculate a new route that
1259 /// will pay all remaining unpaid balance.
1260 failed_paths_retry: Option<RouteParameters>,
1261 /// The payment id for the payment, which is now at least partially pending.
1262 payment_id: PaymentId,
1266 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1268 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1270 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1271 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1272 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1273 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1275 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1276 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1277 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1280 macro_rules! handle_error {
1281 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1284 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1285 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1287 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1288 // entering the macro.
1289 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
1290 assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
1293 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1295 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1296 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1297 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1298 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1302 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1303 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1304 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1305 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1310 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1311 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1313 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1314 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1315 action: err.action.clone()
1319 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1320 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1323 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1330 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1331 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {{
1332 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
1333 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1334 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1335 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1337 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1338 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1339 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1340 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1341 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1343 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1344 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1346 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1350 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1351 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1352 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1354 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1355 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1357 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1358 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1360 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1361 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1362 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel);
1363 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1364 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1365 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1371 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1372 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1376 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1378 $entry.remove_entry();
1386 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1387 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1391 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1393 $entry.remove_entry();
1401 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1402 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1404 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1405 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, channel);
1411 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_res {
1412 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1414 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1415 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1416 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan);
1417 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1418 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1419 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1420 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1421 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1422 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1423 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1424 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1425 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1426 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1427 $chan.force_shutdown(false), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1430 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1431 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update in progress. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1432 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1433 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1434 match $action_type {
1435 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1436 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1438 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1439 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1441 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1442 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1443 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1444 if !$resend_commitment {
1445 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1448 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1450 $chan.monitor_updating_paused($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1451 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1453 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1458 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1459 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1461 $entry.remove_entry();
1465 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY) => { {
1466 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1467 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1469 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, NO_UPDATE) => {
1470 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1472 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_channel_ready: expr, OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED) => {
1473 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, false, $resend_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1475 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1476 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1478 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1479 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
1483 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1484 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1485 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1486 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1487 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1489 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1490 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1491 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1492 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1493 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1494 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1495 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1496 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1497 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1498 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1503 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1504 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1505 if $channel.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1507 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1508 pending_events.push(events::Event::ChannelReady {
1509 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1510 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1511 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1512 channel_type: $channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
1515 $channel.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1520 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
1521 ($self: ident, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
1522 $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr,
1523 $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $channel_ready: expr, $announcement_sigs: expr) => { {
1524 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
1526 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1528 let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
1529 if !forwards.is_empty() {
1530 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or($channel_entry.get().outbound_scid_alias()),
1531 $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
1534 if let Some(msg) = $channel_ready {
1535 send_channel_ready!($self, $channel_state.pending_msg_events, $channel_entry.get(), msg);
1537 if let Some(msg) = $announcement_sigs {
1538 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1539 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1544 emit_channel_ready_event!($self, $channel_entry.get_mut());
1546 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1547 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
1548 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1549 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1554 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1555 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
1556 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1557 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1558 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1563 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1567 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1573 let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
1574 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1575 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1576 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1581 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1585 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1586 ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1587 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1589 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1591 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1592 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1597 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
1598 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
1599 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1600 K::Target: KeysInterface,
1601 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1604 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1606 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1607 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1609 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1611 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1612 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1613 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1614 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1615 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1616 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1617 let inbound_pmt_key_material = keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1618 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1620 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1621 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1622 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1626 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1628 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1629 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1630 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1631 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1633 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1634 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1635 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1636 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1637 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1638 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1640 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1641 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap()),
1644 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1645 fake_scid_rand_bytes: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1647 probing_cookie_secret: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1649 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1651 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1653 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1654 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1655 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1656 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
1664 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1665 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1666 &self.default_configuration
1669 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1670 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1671 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1674 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1675 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1677 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
1679 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1683 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1688 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1690 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1691 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1692 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
1693 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
1694 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
1696 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1697 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1699 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1700 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1701 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1703 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1704 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1705 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1706 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1707 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1708 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1710 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1711 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1712 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1713 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1714 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1715 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1719 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1720 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1721 Some(peer_state) => {
1722 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1723 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1724 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1725 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1726 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key,
1727 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1728 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1732 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1737 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1740 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1742 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1743 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1744 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1746 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1747 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1748 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1749 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1751 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1753 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1756 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1758 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1759 node_id: their_network_key,
1762 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1765 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1766 let mut res = Vec::new();
1768 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1769 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1770 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1771 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1772 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1773 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1774 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1775 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1776 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1777 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1778 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1779 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1780 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1781 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1782 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1783 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1784 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1785 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1786 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1787 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1788 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1790 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1791 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1792 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1793 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1794 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1795 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1796 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1797 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1798 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1799 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1800 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1801 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1802 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1803 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1804 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1805 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1806 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1807 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1808 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1809 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1810 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1811 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1812 config: Some(channel.config()),
1816 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1817 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1818 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1819 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1825 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1826 /// more information.
1827 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1828 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1831 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to [`find_route`]
1832 /// to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1834 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1835 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1838 /// [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
1839 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1840 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1841 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1842 // really wanted anyway.
1843 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1846 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1847 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1848 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1849 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1850 Some(transaction) => {
1851 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1855 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1856 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1857 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1858 reason: closure_reason
1862 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1863 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1865 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1866 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1867 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1868 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1869 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1870 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1871 if *counterparty_node_id != chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id(){
1872 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
1874 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1875 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1876 Some(peer_state) => {
1877 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1878 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1879 chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
1881 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
1883 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1885 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1886 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1887 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
1888 let (result, is_permanent) =
1889 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
1891 remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1896 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1897 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
1901 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1902 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1903 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1904 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1908 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1912 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1916 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1917 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
1918 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
1921 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
1925 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1926 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1927 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1929 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1930 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1932 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1933 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1934 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1935 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1937 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1939 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1940 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1941 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1942 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1943 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None)
1946 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1947 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1948 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1950 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1951 /// the channel being closed or not:
1952 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1953 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1954 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1955 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1956 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1957 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1958 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1960 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1962 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1963 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1964 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1965 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1966 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1970 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1971 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1972 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1973 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1974 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
1975 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1976 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
1978 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1979 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1980 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1981 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1982 // ignore the result here.
1983 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1987 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1988 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
1989 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
1990 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1992 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1993 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1994 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1995 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *peer_node_id {
1996 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1998 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
1999 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
2001 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2003 remove_channel!(self, chan)
2005 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
2008 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2009 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2010 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2011 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2012 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2017 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
2020 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2021 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2022 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2023 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2024 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
2025 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2026 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2027 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2028 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2038 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2039 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2040 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2042 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2043 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2044 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2047 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2048 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2049 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2051 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2052 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2053 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2054 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2055 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2058 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2059 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2060 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2061 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2062 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2066 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2067 /// local transaction(s).
2068 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2069 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2070 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2074 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2075 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2077 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2078 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != cltv_expiry {
2079 return Err(ReceiveError {
2080 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value",
2082 err_data: byte_utils::be32_to_array(cltv_expiry).to_vec()
2085 // final_expiry_too_soon
2086 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2087 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2088 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2089 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2090 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2091 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2092 return Err(ReceiveError {
2094 err_data: Vec::new(),
2095 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2098 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2099 return Err(ReceiveError {
2101 err_data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(amt_msat).to_vec(),
2102 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2106 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2107 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2108 return Err(ReceiveError {
2109 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2110 err_data: Vec::new(),
2111 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2114 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
2115 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2116 return Err(ReceiveError {
2117 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2118 err_data: Vec::new(),
2119 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2121 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2122 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2124 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2125 phantom_shared_secret,
2127 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2128 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2129 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2130 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2131 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2132 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2133 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2134 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2135 return Err(ReceiveError {
2136 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2137 err_data: Vec::new(),
2138 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2142 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2144 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2147 return Err(ReceiveError {
2148 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2149 err_data: Vec::new(),
2150 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2155 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2158 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2159 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2160 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_msat,
2161 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2165 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2166 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2167 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2169 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2170 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2171 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2172 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2173 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2174 failure_code: $err_code,
2180 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2181 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2184 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key).secret_bytes();
2186 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2187 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2188 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2189 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2190 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2191 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2192 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2193 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2195 macro_rules! return_err {
2196 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2198 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2199 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2200 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2201 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2202 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
2208 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2210 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2211 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2213 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2214 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2218 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2219 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2221 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2223 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2224 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2225 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2226 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2227 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2229 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2232 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2233 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2234 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2236 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2237 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2238 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2241 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2242 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2243 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2244 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2248 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2249 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2250 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2253 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2254 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2255 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2256 outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2257 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2262 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref outgoing_amt_msat, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2263 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2264 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2265 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2266 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2267 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
2268 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
2269 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2270 let forwarding_id_opt = match id_option {
2271 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2272 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2274 if fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
2277 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2280 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => Some(chan_id.clone()),
2282 let chan_update_opt = if let Some(forwarding_id) = forwarding_id_opt {
2283 let chan = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2285 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and by_id maps have
2286 // no consistency guarantees.
2287 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2291 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2292 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2293 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2294 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2295 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2297 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2298 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2299 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2300 // we don't have the channel here.
2301 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2303 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2305 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2306 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2307 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2308 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2309 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2310 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2311 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2313 if *outgoing_amt_msat < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2314 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2316 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *outgoing_amt_msat, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2317 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2321 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2323 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2330 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2331 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2332 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2333 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2334 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2335 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2337 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2338 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2340 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2341 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2342 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2343 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2344 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2345 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2346 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2347 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2348 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2349 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2355 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2356 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2357 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2358 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2360 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2361 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2363 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2364 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2365 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2367 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2368 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2369 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2371 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2376 pending_forward_info
2379 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2380 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2381 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2383 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2384 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2385 if !chan.should_announce() {
2386 return Err(LightningError {
2387 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2388 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2391 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2392 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2394 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2395 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2398 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2399 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2400 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2401 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2402 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2403 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2404 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2405 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2406 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2410 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2412 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2413 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2414 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2416 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2417 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2419 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2420 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2421 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2422 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2423 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2424 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2425 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2426 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2429 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
2430 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
2432 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2438 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2439 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2440 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2441 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2442 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2444 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2445 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2446 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2447 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2448 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2450 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2452 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2454 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2455 let id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2456 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2457 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
2460 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2461 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2462 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
2464 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
2465 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
2467 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2468 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2470 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2471 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2473 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2474 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2476 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2477 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2478 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2481 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2482 let update_err = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
2483 let chan_id = chan.get().channel_id();
2485 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_err, chan,
2486 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true))
2488 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure, Err(e)) => break Err(e),
2489 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed, Ok(())) => {},
2490 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress, Err(_)) => {
2491 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
2492 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
2493 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
2494 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
2495 // which we do in the send_payment check for
2496 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
2497 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
2499 _ => unreachable!(),
2502 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan_id));
2503 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2504 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2505 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2506 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2507 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2508 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2509 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2518 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
2519 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the `by_id` map.
2520 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
2521 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
2526 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2527 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2529 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2534 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2536 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
2537 /// fields for more info.
2539 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
2540 /// method will error with an [`APIError::RouteError`]. Note, however, that once a payment
2541 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
2542 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a second payment with the same
2545 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
2546 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
2547 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
2548 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
2549 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
2551 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
2552 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
2554 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2555 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2556 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
2558 /// In general, a path may raise:
2559 /// * [`APIError::RouteError`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2560 /// node public key) is specified.
2561 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2562 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2564 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2565 /// relevant updates.
2567 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2568 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2569 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2571 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
2572 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
2573 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
2574 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
2577 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
2578 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
2579 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2581 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2582 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
2583 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2584 let onion_session_privs = self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, *payment_secret, payment_id, route)?;
2585 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None, payment_id, None, onion_session_privs)
2589 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2590 self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, route)
2593 fn add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2594 let mut onion_session_privs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2595 for _ in 0..route.paths.len() {
2596 onion_session_privs.push(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
2599 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2600 match pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
2601 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => Err(PaymentSendFailure::DuplicatePayment),
2602 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2603 let payment = entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2604 session_privs: HashSet::new(),
2605 pending_amt_msat: 0,
2606 pending_fee_msat: Some(0),
2609 starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
2610 total_msat: route.get_total_amount(),
2613 for (path, session_priv_bytes) in route.paths.iter().zip(onion_session_privs.iter()) {
2614 assert!(payment.insert(*session_priv_bytes, path));
2617 Ok(onion_session_privs)
2622 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2623 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
2624 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
2626 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
2627 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
2629 let mut total_value = 0;
2630 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2631 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2632 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
2633 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
2634 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
2635 continue 'path_check;
2637 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
2638 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
2639 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
2640 continue 'path_check;
2643 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2644 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
2646 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
2647 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
2649 if let Some(amt_msat) = recv_value_msat {
2650 debug_assert!(amt_msat >= total_value);
2651 total_value = amt_msat;
2654 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2655 let mut results = Vec::new();
2656 debug_assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), onion_session_privs.len());
2657 for (path, session_priv) in route.paths.iter().zip(onion_session_privs.into_iter()) {
2658 let mut path_res = self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &route.payment_params, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage, session_priv);
2661 Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress) => {
2662 // While a MonitorUpdateInProgress is an Err(_), the payment is still
2663 // considered "in flight" and we shouldn't remove it from the
2664 // PendingOutboundPayment set.
2667 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2668 if let Some(payment) = pending_outbounds.get_mut(&payment_id) {
2669 let removed = payment.remove(&session_priv, Some(path));
2670 debug_assert!(removed, "This can't happen as the payment has an entry for this path added by callers");
2672 debug_assert!(false, "This can't happen as the payment was added by callers");
2673 path_res = Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Internal error: payment disappeared during processing. Please report this bug!".to_owned() });
2677 results.push(path_res);
2679 let mut has_ok = false;
2680 let mut has_err = false;
2681 let mut pending_amt_unsent = 0;
2682 let mut max_unsent_cltv_delta = 0;
2683 for (res, path) in results.iter().zip(route.paths.iter()) {
2684 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
2685 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
2686 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress) = res {
2687 // MonitorUpdateInProgress is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
2691 } else if res.is_err() {
2692 pending_amt_unsent += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2693 max_unsent_cltv_delta = cmp::max(max_unsent_cltv_delta, path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta);
2696 if has_err && has_ok {
2697 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure {
2700 failed_paths_retry: if pending_amt_unsent != 0 {
2701 if let Some(payment_params) = &route.payment_params {
2702 Some(RouteParameters {
2703 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2704 final_value_msat: pending_amt_unsent,
2705 final_cltv_expiry_delta: max_unsent_cltv_delta,
2711 // If we failed to send any paths, we should remove the new PaymentId from the
2712 // `pending_outbound_payments` map, as the user isn't expected to `abandon_payment`.
2713 let removed = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&payment_id).is_some();
2714 debug_assert!(removed, "We should always have a pending payment to remove here");
2715 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedResendSafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
2721 /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2723 /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2724 /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2725 /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, if the payment
2726 /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success), or if
2727 /// further retries have been disabled with [`abandon_payment`].
2729 /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2730 /// [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]
2731 pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2732 const RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE: u64 = 10;
2733 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2734 if path.len() == 0 {
2735 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2736 err: "length-0 path in route".to_string()
2741 let mut onion_session_privs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2742 for _ in 0..route.paths.len() {
2743 onion_session_privs.push(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
2746 let (total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret) = {
2747 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2748 match outbounds.get_mut(&payment_id) {
2750 let res = match payment {
2751 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2752 total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret, pending_amt_msat, ..
2754 let retry_amt_msat: u64 = route.paths.iter().map(|path| path.last().unwrap().fee_msat).sum();
2755 if retry_amt_msat + *pending_amt_msat > *total_msat * (100 + RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE) / 100 {
2756 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2757 err: format!("retry_amt_msat of {} will put pending_amt_msat (currently: {}) more than 10% over total_payment_amt_msat of {}", retry_amt_msat, pending_amt_msat, total_msat).to_string()
2760 (*total_msat, *payment_hash, *payment_secret)
2762 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => {
2763 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2764 err: "Unable to retry payments that were initially sent on LDK versions prior to 0.0.102".to_string()
2767 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {
2768 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2769 err: "Payment already completed".to_owned()
2772 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {
2773 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2774 err: "Payment already abandoned (with some HTLCs still pending)".to_owned()
2778 for (path, session_priv_bytes) in route.paths.iter().zip(onion_session_privs.iter()) {
2779 assert!(payment.insert(*session_priv_bytes, path));
2784 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2785 err: format!("Payment with ID {} not found", log_bytes!(payment_id.0)),
2789 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, payment_id, Some(total_msat), onion_session_privs)
2792 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur.
2794 /// After this method returns, any future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id`
2795 /// will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`]. If no such event has been generated,
2796 /// an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event will be generated as soon as there are no remaining
2797 /// pending HTLCs for this payment.
2799 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2800 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2801 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2803 /// [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment
2804 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2805 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2806 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2807 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2809 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2810 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
2811 if let Ok(()) = payment.get_mut().mark_abandoned() {
2812 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
2813 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2815 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
2823 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2824 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2825 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2826 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2827 /// never reach the recipient.
2829 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
2830 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
2832 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2833 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2835 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2837 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2838 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2839 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
2841 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
2843 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
2844 let onion_session_privs = self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, None, payment_id, &route)?;
2846 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage), payment_id, None, onion_session_privs) {
2847 Ok(()) => Ok(payment_hash),
2852 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
2853 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
2854 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
2855 pub fn send_probe(&self, hops: Vec<RouteHop>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2856 let payment_id = PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
2858 let payment_hash = self.probing_cookie_from_id(&payment_id);
2861 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2862 err: "No need probing a path with less than two hops".to_string()
2866 let route = Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None };
2867 let onion_session_privs = self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, None, payment_id, &route)?;
2869 match self.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &None, None, payment_id, None, onion_session_privs) {
2870 Ok(()) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2875 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
2877 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
2878 let target_payment_hash = self.probing_cookie_from_id(payment_id);
2879 target_payment_hash == *payment_hash
2882 /// Returns the 'probing cookie' for the given [`PaymentId`].
2883 fn probing_cookie_from_id(&self, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> PaymentHash {
2884 let mut preimage = [0u8; 64];
2885 preimage[..32].copy_from_slice(&self.probing_cookie_secret);
2886 preimage[32..].copy_from_slice(&payment_id.0);
2887 PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage).into_inner())
2890 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2891 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2892 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2893 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], _counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2894 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2896 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2898 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2900 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2901 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2902 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2903 } else { unreachable!(); })
2906 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2908 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2909 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2912 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2913 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2918 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2919 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2920 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2923 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2924 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2925 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2927 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2928 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
2929 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
2930 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
2939 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2940 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2941 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2945 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2947 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2948 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2950 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
2951 /// across the p2p network.
2953 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2954 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2956 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2957 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2958 /// keys per-channel).
2960 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2961 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2962 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2964 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2965 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2966 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2968 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
2969 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
2970 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
2971 /// for more details.
2973 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2974 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2975 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2976 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2978 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2979 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2980 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2981 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2986 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2987 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools at the next block. However, the modules
2988 // constituting our Lightning node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if
2989 // the wallet module is in advance on the LDK view, allow one more block of headroom.
2990 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 2 {
2991 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2992 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
2996 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2997 let mut output_index = None;
2998 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2999 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3000 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
3001 if output_index.is_some() {
3002 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3003 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3006 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
3007 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3008 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3011 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3014 if output_index.is_none() {
3015 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3016 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3019 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
3023 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
3025 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3026 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3027 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3028 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3030 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3031 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3033 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3034 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3036 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3038 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3039 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3040 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3041 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3042 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3043 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3044 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3045 pub fn update_channel_config(
3046 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
3047 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3048 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
3049 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3050 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3054 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
3055 &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
3058 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3059 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3060 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3061 let channel_counterparty_node_id = channel_state.by_id.get(channel_id)
3062 .ok_or(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3063 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found", log_bytes!(*channel_id)),
3065 .get_counterparty_node_id();
3066 if channel_counterparty_node_id != *counterparty_node_id {
3067 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3068 err: "counterparty node id mismatch".to_owned(),
3072 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3073 let channel = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
3074 if !channel.update_config(config) {
3077 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3078 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3079 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3080 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3081 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3090 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3092 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3093 /// Will likely generate further events.
3094 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3095 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3097 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
3098 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3099 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3100 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3102 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3103 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3105 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3106 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3107 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3108 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3109 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3111 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3112 match forward_info {
3113 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3114 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
3115 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3116 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3117 outgoing_cltv_value, incoming_amt_msat: _
3120 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3121 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3122 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3124 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3125 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3126 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3127 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3128 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3129 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3132 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3133 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3135 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3138 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3139 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: $err_code, data: $err_data },
3145 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3146 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3148 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3152 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3153 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3155 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3159 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3160 let phantom_secret_res = self.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3161 if phantom_secret_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3162 let phantom_shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &phantom_secret_res.unwrap()).secret_bytes();
3163 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3165 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3166 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3167 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3168 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3169 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3171 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3173 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3174 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3178 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3179 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3180 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3181 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3187 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3190 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3193 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3194 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3195 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3196 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3197 // problem, not ours.
3203 let forward_chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3204 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
3206 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3210 match channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3211 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3212 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3215 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3216 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3217 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3218 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3219 match forward_info {
3220 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3221 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint ,
3222 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3223 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3224 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, incoming_amt_msat: _,
3227 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3228 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3229 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3230 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3231 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3232 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3233 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3234 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3236 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet, &self.logger) {
3238 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3239 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3241 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3243 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3244 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3245 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data },
3246 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3252 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3254 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3255 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
3256 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
3257 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
3258 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
3259 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
3260 // this channel currently :/.
3266 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3267 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3269 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3270 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3271 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
3273 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3274 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3276 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
3278 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3279 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3280 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3283 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3285 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3286 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
3287 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
3288 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
3289 // messages when we can.
3290 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
3291 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
3292 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
3299 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
3300 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
3303 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
3304 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
3305 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3306 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
3307 ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
3308 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
3310 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
3311 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
3312 let mut channel = remove_channel!(self, chan);
3313 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
3314 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel.channel_id(), channel.get_user_id(), channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
3317 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
3321 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3322 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
3324 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
3328 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
3329 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3330 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3331 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3332 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3333 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
3334 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3335 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
3336 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3338 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
3345 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3346 match forward_info {
3347 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3348 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
3349 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3350 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, ..
3353 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3354 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3355 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3356 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data }, Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret)
3358 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3359 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None, None),
3361 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3364 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3365 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3366 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3367 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3368 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3369 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3370 phantom_shared_secret,
3372 value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3374 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3379 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3380 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3381 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
3382 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3383 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
3385 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3386 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3387 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3388 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3389 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3390 phantom_shared_secret,
3392 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data },
3393 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3398 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3399 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3400 let mut payment_received_generated = false;
3402 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3403 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3404 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3407 let (_, htlcs) = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3408 .or_insert_with(|| (purpose(), Vec::new()));
3409 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3410 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3411 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3412 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3416 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.value;
3417 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3418 total_value += htlc.value;
3419 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3420 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3421 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3422 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3423 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3424 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3426 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3428 _ => unreachable!(),
3431 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data.total_msat {
3432 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3433 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data.total_msat);
3434 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3435 } else if total_value == $payment_data.total_msat {
3436 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3437 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3440 amount_msat: total_value,
3442 payment_received_generated = true;
3444 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3445 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3447 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3449 payment_received_generated
3453 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3454 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3455 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3456 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3457 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3458 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3459 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3460 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3461 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3462 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3463 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3464 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3465 let payment_preimage = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3466 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
3468 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3472 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3474 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3475 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
3476 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3477 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3478 e.insert((purpose.clone(), vec![claimable_htlc]));
3479 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3481 amount_msat: outgoing_amt_msat,
3485 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3486 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3487 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3493 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3494 if payment_data.is_none() {
3495 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3496 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3499 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3500 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3501 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3502 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3503 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3504 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3505 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3506 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3508 let payment_received_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3509 if payment_received_generated {
3510 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3516 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3517 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3525 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3526 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason, destination);
3528 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3530 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3531 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3534 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3535 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3536 events.append(&mut new_events);
3539 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3541 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3542 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3544 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3545 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3546 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3547 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3548 if background_events.is_empty() {
3552 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3554 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3555 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3556 // monitor updating completing.
3557 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
3564 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3565 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3566 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3567 self.process_background_events();
3570 fn update_channel_fee(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
3571 if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
3572 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3573 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3574 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3575 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3576 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3578 if !chan.is_live() {
3579 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3580 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3581 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3583 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3584 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3586 let mut retain_channel = true;
3587 let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
3590 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3591 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3595 let ret_err = match res {
3596 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
3597 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3598 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
3599 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3600 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3601 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3602 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3603 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3604 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3605 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3606 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3613 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
3614 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3622 (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
3626 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3627 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3628 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3629 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3630 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3631 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3632 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3634 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3636 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3638 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3639 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3640 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3641 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3642 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3643 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3645 handle_errors.push(err);
3655 fn remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self) {
3656 // If an outbound payment was completed, and no pending HTLCs remain, we should remove it
3657 // from the map. However, if we did that immediately when the last payment HTLC is claimed,
3658 // this could race the user making a duplicate send_payment call and our idempotency
3659 // guarantees would be violated. Instead, we wait a few timer ticks to do the actual
3660 // removal. This should be more than sufficient to ensure the idempotency of any
3661 // `send_payment` calls that were made at the same time the `PaymentSent` event was being
3663 let mut pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3664 let pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3665 pending_outbound_payments.retain(|payment_id, payment| {
3666 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, timer_ticks_without_htlcs, .. } = payment {
3667 let mut no_remaining_entries = session_privs.is_empty();
3668 if no_remaining_entries {
3669 for ev in pending_events.iter() {
3671 events::Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: Some(ev_payment_id), .. } |
3672 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ev_payment_id, .. } |
3673 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_id: Some(ev_payment_id), .. } => {
3674 if payment_id == ev_payment_id {
3675 no_remaining_entries = false;
3683 if no_remaining_entries {
3684 *timer_ticks_without_htlcs += 1;
3685 *timer_ticks_without_htlcs <= IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3687 *timer_ticks_without_htlcs = 0;
3694 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3696 /// This currently includes:
3697 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3698 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3699 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3701 /// * Expiring a channel's previous `ChannelConfig` if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3702 /// with the current `ChannelConfig`.
3704 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3705 /// estimate fetches.
3706 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3707 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3708 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3709 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3711 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3713 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3714 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3716 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3717 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3718 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3719 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3720 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
3721 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3722 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3724 handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
3726 if !retain_channel { return false; }
3728 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3729 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3730 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
3731 if needs_close { return false; }
3734 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3735 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3736 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3737 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3738 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3739 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3740 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3741 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3745 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3746 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3748 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3749 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3750 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3754 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3755 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3760 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
3765 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
3766 if htlcs.is_empty() {
3767 // This should be unreachable
3768 debug_assert!(false);
3771 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3772 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3773 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3774 if htlcs[0].total_msat == htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.value) {
3776 } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| {
3777 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3778 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3780 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.into_iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.prev_hop.clone(), payment_hash.clone())));
3788 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3789 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
3790 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone()), &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 23, data: Vec::new() }, receiver );
3793 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3794 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3797 self.remove_stale_resolved_payments();
3803 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3804 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3805 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3807 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
3808 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
3809 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentReceived`] event. Alternatively, the payment
3810 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
3812 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
3813 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
3814 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
3815 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
3816 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
3817 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3819 let removed_source = {
3820 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3821 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash)
3823 if let Some((_, mut sources)) = removed_source {
3824 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3825 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3826 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3827 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3828 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(
3829 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
3830 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data },
3831 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash });
3836 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3837 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3839 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3841 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3842 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3843 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3844 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3845 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3846 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3847 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3849 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3851 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3852 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3854 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3859 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3860 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3861 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3862 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
3863 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
3864 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
3865 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3866 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
3867 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
3868 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3870 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3871 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3872 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3873 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
3875 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
3876 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
3877 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
3878 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
3879 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3883 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3884 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3885 // be surfaced to the user.
3886 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
3887 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
3888 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
3890 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3891 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
3892 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3893 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3894 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
3896 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3899 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
3900 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data }, receiver);
3904 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3905 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
3906 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason,destination: HTLCDestination) {
3907 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3909 // Ensure that the `channel_state` lock is not held when calling this function.
3910 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock_order requirement for
3911 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `channel_state` lock, which calling this
3912 // function with the `channel_state` locked would.
3913 assert!(self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
3916 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3917 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3918 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3921 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3922 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3923 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3925 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => {
3926 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3927 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3928 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3929 let mut all_paths_failed = false;
3930 let mut full_failure_ev = None;
3931 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3932 if !payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
3933 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3936 if payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3937 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received failure of HTLC with payment_hash {} after payment completion", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3940 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3941 all_paths_failed = true;
3942 if payment.get().abandoned() {
3943 full_failure_ev = Some(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3945 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3951 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3954 let mut retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
3955 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3956 Some(RouteParameters {
3957 payment_params: payment_params_data.clone(),
3958 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3959 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3962 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3964 let path_failure = match &onion_error {
3965 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3967 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3969 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3971 if self.payment_is_probe(payment_hash, &payment_id) {
3972 if !payment_retryable {
3973 events::Event::ProbeSuccessful {
3975 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3979 events::Event::ProbeFailed {
3981 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3987 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
3988 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
3989 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
3990 if let Some(scid) = short_channel_id {
3991 retry.as_mut().map(|r| r.payment_params.previously_failed_channels.push(scid));
3993 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3994 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3995 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3996 payment_failed_permanently: !payment_retryable,
4003 error_code: onion_error_code,
4005 error_data: onion_error_data
4009 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4015 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
4016 // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
4017 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as find_route
4018 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
4020 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
4021 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
4022 let scid = path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id;
4023 retry.as_mut().map(|r| r.payment_params.previously_failed_channels.push(scid));
4025 if self.payment_is_probe(payment_hash, &payment_id) {
4026 events::Event::ProbeFailed {
4028 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
4030 short_channel_id: Some(scid),
4033 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
4034 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
4035 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
4036 payment_failed_permanently: false,
4037 network_update: None,
4040 short_channel_id: Some(scid),
4043 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
4045 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
4050 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4051 pending_events.push(path_failure);
4052 if let Some(ev) = full_failure_ev { pending_events.push(ev); }
4054 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret, outpoint }) => {
4055 let err_packet = match onion_error {
4056 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
4057 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
4058 if let Some(phantom_ss) = phantom_shared_secret {
4059 let phantom_packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
4060 let encrypted_phantom_packet = onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, &phantom_packet);
4061 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &encrypted_phantom_packet.data[..])
4063 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
4064 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
4067 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
4068 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4069 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
4073 let mut forward_event = None;
4074 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4075 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4076 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
4078 match forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
4079 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4080 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
4082 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4083 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
4086 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
4087 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4088 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
4089 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4090 time_forwardable: time
4093 pending_events.push(events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
4094 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
4095 failed_next_destination: destination
4101 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentReceived`], generating any
4102 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
4104 /// Note that calling this method does *not* guarantee that the payment has been claimed. You
4105 /// *must* wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] event which upon a successful claim will be
4106 /// provided to your [`EventHandler`] when [`process_pending_events`] is next called.
4108 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
4109 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
4110 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
4111 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
4113 /// [`Event::PaymentReceived`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentReceived
4114 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
4115 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
4116 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4117 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4118 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
4119 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4120 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4122 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4124 let removed_source = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
4125 if let Some((payment_purpose, mut sources)) = removed_source {
4126 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
4128 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
4129 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
4130 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
4131 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
4133 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
4134 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
4135 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
4136 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
4137 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
4139 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
4140 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
4141 let mut valid_mpp = true;
4142 let mut errs = Vec::new();
4143 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
4144 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4145 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4146 for htlc in sources.iter() {
4147 let chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4148 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
4155 if let None = channel_state.by_id.get(&chan_id) {
4160 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
4161 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4162 debug_assert!(false);
4166 expected_amt_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
4167 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
4168 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
4169 // that there's one payment here and move on.
4170 if sources.len() != 1 {
4171 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
4172 debug_assert!(false);
4178 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
4180 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4181 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4184 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4185 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4186 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4190 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4191 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
4192 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
4193 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4194 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4195 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4196 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4197 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
4198 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4200 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
4201 ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
4202 // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
4203 // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
4204 // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
4205 // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
4207 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
4211 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4213 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4214 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
4215 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
4216 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
4217 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(
4218 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
4219 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data },
4220 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash } );
4224 if claimed_any_htlcs {
4225 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4227 purpose: payment_purpose,
4228 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
4232 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
4233 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4234 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4235 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4240 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
4241 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4242 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
4243 let chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4244 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
4246 return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed
4250 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4251 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
4252 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
4253 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
4254 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4255 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4257 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
4258 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4259 payment_preimage, e);
4260 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
4261 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4262 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
4263 Some(htlc_value_msat)
4267 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
4268 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
4269 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4270 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4271 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4272 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4273 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4274 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
4275 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4276 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4282 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
4284 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
4287 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
4288 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4289 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4291 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
4292 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
4293 payment_preimage, e);
4296 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4297 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
4299 chan.remove_entry();
4301 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
4304 } else { return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed }
4307 fn finalize_claims(&self, mut sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4308 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4309 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4310 for source in sources.drain(..) {
4311 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } = source {
4312 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4313 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4314 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4315 assert!(payment.get().is_fulfilled());
4316 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, None) {
4317 pending_events.push(
4318 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4320 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash(),
4330 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4332 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4333 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4334 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4335 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4336 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4337 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4338 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4339 if !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
4340 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4341 let fee_paid_msat = payment.get().get_pending_fee_msat();
4342 pending_events.push(
4343 events::Event::PaymentSent {
4344 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
4350 payment.get_mut().mark_fulfilled();
4354 // We currently immediately remove HTLCs which were fulfilled on-chain.
4355 // This could potentially lead to removing a pending payment too early,
4356 // with a reorg of one block causing us to re-add the fulfilled payment on
4358 // TODO: We should have a second monitor event that informs us of payments
4359 // irrevocably fulfilled.
4360 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
4361 let payment_hash = Some(PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()));
4362 pending_events.push(
4363 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4372 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
4375 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4376 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4377 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
4378 let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
4379 let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
4380 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
4381 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
4384 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
4385 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4386 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4387 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4388 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4391 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4392 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
4393 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
4394 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update);
4395 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4396 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4397 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4398 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
4399 // again on restart.
4400 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4401 payment_preimage, update_res);
4403 // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
4404 // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
4405 // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
4406 // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
4409 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4410 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
4411 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4412 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4416 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4417 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4418 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4421 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4422 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4423 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
4425 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4427 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4437 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4438 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4439 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4442 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
4443 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4445 let chan_restoration_res;
4446 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims, counterparty_node_id) = {
4447 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4448 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4449 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4450 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4451 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4453 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4457 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4458 let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
4459 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() {
4460 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
4461 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
4462 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
4463 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
4465 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()) {
4466 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4467 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4472 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_state, channel, updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready, updates.announcement_sigs);
4473 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4474 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4477 (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs, counterparty_node_id)
4479 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
4480 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
4481 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4482 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id: funding_txo.to_channel_id() };
4483 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2, receiver);
4487 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4489 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4490 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4493 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4494 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4495 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4497 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4498 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4499 /// used to accept such channels.
4501 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4502 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4503 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4504 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4507 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4508 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4510 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4511 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4512 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4514 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4515 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4517 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4518 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4520 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4521 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4523 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4524 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4525 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4526 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4529 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4530 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4532 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4533 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4534 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4535 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4536 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4537 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4539 if *counterparty_node_id != channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id() {
4540 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
4543 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4544 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4545 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4546 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4547 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4548 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4551 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4552 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4553 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4556 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4557 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4558 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4561 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4562 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist".to_owned() });
4568 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4569 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4570 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4573 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4574 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4577 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
4578 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
4579 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
4581 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4582 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager,
4583 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &their_features, msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration,
4584 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4587 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4588 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4592 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4593 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4594 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4595 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4596 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4597 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4599 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4600 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4601 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4602 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4604 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4605 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4606 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4609 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4610 pending_events.push(
4611 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4612 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4613 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4614 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4615 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4616 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4621 entry.insert(channel);
4627 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4628 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4629 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4630 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4631 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4632 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4633 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4634 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4636 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &their_features), chan);
4637 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4639 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4642 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4643 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4644 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4645 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4646 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4648 user_channel_id: user_id,
4653 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4654 let ((funding_msg, monitor, mut channel_ready), mut chan) = {
4655 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4656 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4657 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4658 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4659 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4660 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4661 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4663 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
4665 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4668 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
4669 // lock before watch_channel
4670 match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
4671 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4672 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
4673 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4674 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4675 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4676 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4677 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
4678 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
4679 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4680 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(false);
4681 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4682 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
4684 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
4685 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4686 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4687 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4688 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4689 chan.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, channel_ready.is_some(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4690 channel_ready = None; // Don't send the channel_ready now
4693 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4694 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4695 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4696 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4697 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4699 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4700 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4701 match id_to_peer.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
4702 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4703 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4704 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
4705 funding_msg.channel_id))
4707 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
4708 i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
4711 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4712 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4715 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4716 send_channel_ready!(self, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
4724 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4726 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4727 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4728 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4729 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4730 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4731 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4732 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4734 let (monitor, funding_tx, channel_ready) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
4735 Ok(update) => update,
4736 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan),
4738 match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
4739 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4741 let mut res = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, channel_ready.is_some(), OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED);
4742 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4743 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4744 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4745 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4746 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4747 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4753 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4754 send_channel_ready!(self, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get(), msg);
4758 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4761 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
4762 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
4766 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4767 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4768 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4769 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4770 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4771 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4772 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4774 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, self.get_our_node_id(),
4775 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
4776 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4777 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4778 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4779 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4780 msg: announcement_sigs,
4782 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4783 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4784 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4785 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4786 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4787 // announcement_signatures.
4788 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4789 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4790 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4791 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4797 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, chan.get_mut());
4801 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4805 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4806 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4807 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4808 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4809 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4811 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4812 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4813 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4814 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4817 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4818 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4819 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4820 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4823 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), chan_entry);
4824 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4826 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4827 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
4828 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
4829 let (result, is_permanent) =
4830 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
4832 remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
4837 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4838 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4839 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4846 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4849 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4850 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
4851 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
4854 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
4858 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4859 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4860 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4861 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4862 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4863 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4864 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4865 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4867 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
4868 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4869 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4870 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4875 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4876 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4877 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4878 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4879 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4880 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
4881 } else { (tx, None) }
4883 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4886 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4887 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4888 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4890 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4891 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4892 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4893 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4897 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4902 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4903 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4904 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4905 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4907 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4908 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4909 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4910 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4912 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4913 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4914 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4916 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4917 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4918 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4919 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4922 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4923 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4924 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4925 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4926 match pending_forward_info {
4927 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4928 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4929 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
4930 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, real_code, &error_data)
4932 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[])
4934 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4935 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4936 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4939 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4941 _ => pending_forward_info
4944 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
4946 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4951 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4952 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4953 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4954 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4955 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4956 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4957 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4958 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4960 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
4962 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4965 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
4969 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4970 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4971 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4972 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4973 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4974 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4975 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4977 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), chan);
4979 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4984 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4985 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4986 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4987 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4988 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4989 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4990 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4992 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4993 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4994 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
4996 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), chan);
4999 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5003 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5004 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5005 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5006 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5007 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5008 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5009 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5011 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
5012 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
5013 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan),
5014 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
5015 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
5016 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
5017 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan);
5022 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
5023 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some()) {
5027 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5028 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5029 msg: revoke_and_ack,
5031 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
5032 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5033 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5034 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
5035 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5036 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5037 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5038 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5040 commitment_signed: msg,
5046 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5051 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
5052 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
5053 let mut forward_event = None;
5054 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5055 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5056 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
5057 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
5059 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5060 match forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
5061 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
5062 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
5063 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
5065 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5066 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5067 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
5069 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5070 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5071 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, forward_info })));
5076 match forward_event {
5078 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5079 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5080 time_forwardable: time
5088 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5089 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
5091 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5092 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5093 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5094 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5095 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5096 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5098 let was_paused_for_mon_update = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
5099 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
5100 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5101 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
5102 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update);
5103 if was_paused_for_mon_update {
5104 assert!(update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
5105 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
5106 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
5107 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
5108 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
5109 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Existing pending monitor update prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
5111 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5112 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan,
5113 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
5114 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(), false,
5115 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
5116 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
5118 } else { unreachable!(); }
5120 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
5121 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5122 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5126 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
5127 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
5128 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
5129 .unwrap_or(chan.get().outbound_scid_alias()),
5130 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
5132 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5135 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5137 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
5138 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) =>
5140 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
5141 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: channel_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5142 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2, receiver);
5144 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
5145 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
5152 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5153 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5154 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5155 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5156 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5157 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5158 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5160 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan);
5162 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5167 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5168 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5169 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5171 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5172 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5173 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5174 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5176 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
5177 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
5180 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5181 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5182 self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), msg), chan),
5183 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5184 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5185 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
5188 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5193 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5194 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5195 let chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5196 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
5198 // It's not a local channel
5199 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5202 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5203 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5204 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5205 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5206 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5207 if chan.get().should_announce() {
5208 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5209 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5210 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5211 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5213 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5215 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5216 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5217 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5218 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5220 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5221 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
5224 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5226 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5229 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5230 let chan_restoration_res;
5231 let need_lnd_workaround = {
5232 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5233 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5235 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5236 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5237 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5238 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5240 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5241 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5242 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5243 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5244 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5245 msg, &self.logger, self.our_network_pubkey.clone(), self.genesis_hash,
5246 &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
5247 let mut channel_update = None;
5248 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5249 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5250 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5253 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5254 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5255 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5256 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5257 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5258 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5259 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5264 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5265 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(
5266 self, channel_state, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5267 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5268 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5269 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5273 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5276 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
5278 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5279 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5284 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
5285 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5286 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5287 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5288 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5289 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5290 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5291 match monitor_event {
5292 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5293 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5294 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5295 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5297 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5298 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5299 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
5302 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5303 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5304 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5305 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5306 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5307 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5308 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5309 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5310 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5311 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5312 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5316 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5317 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5319 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5321 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5322 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5323 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5324 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5325 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5330 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5331 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
5337 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5338 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5341 has_pending_monitor_events
5344 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5345 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5346 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5348 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5349 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
5352 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5353 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5354 /// update was applied.
5356 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
5357 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
5358 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
5359 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
5360 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5361 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5362 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5363 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5365 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5366 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5367 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5368 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5370 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5371 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
5372 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
5373 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5375 holding_cell_failed_htlcs,
5377 chan.get_counterparty_node_id()
5380 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
5381 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
5382 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
5383 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5384 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5385 updates: commitment_update,
5389 has_monitor_update = true;
5390 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, channel_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
5391 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
5392 if close_channel { return false; }
5399 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5400 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5401 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
5408 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5409 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5410 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5413 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5414 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5420 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5421 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5422 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5423 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5424 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5425 let mut has_update = false;
5427 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5428 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5429 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5430 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5432 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5433 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5434 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5435 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5437 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5438 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5441 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5442 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5443 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5444 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5445 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5450 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5452 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5453 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5454 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
5460 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5461 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5468 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5469 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5475 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5476 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5478 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5479 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5480 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5481 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5482 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5483 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5484 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5485 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5486 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5487 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5488 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5489 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5490 assert!(should_broadcast);
5491 } else { unreachable!(); }
5492 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5494 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5498 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5499 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5501 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5502 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5505 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5507 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5508 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5509 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5510 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5511 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5512 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5513 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5514 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5515 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5516 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5517 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5518 // never fail a payment too early.
5519 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5521 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5524 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5529 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5532 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5533 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5535 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
5536 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5537 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5539 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5541 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5542 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5546 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5547 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5549 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5551 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5552 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5553 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
5554 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5555 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5556 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, &self.keys_manager, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5559 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5560 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5562 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5565 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5567 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5569 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5570 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5571 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5572 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5573 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5576 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5577 /// stored external to LDK.
5579 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5580 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5581 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5583 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5584 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5587 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5588 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5589 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5590 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5592 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5593 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5594 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5595 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5596 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5598 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5599 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5600 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
5601 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5602 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
5604 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
5605 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
5607 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5608 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5612 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5613 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5615 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5617 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5618 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5619 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5620 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5623 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5624 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5626 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5629 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5631 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5633 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5634 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5637 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5638 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5640 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5641 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5642 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5645 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5646 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5648 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5649 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5650 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5651 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5653 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
5654 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5655 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
5656 Some(_) => continue,
5657 None => return scid_candidate
5662 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5664 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5665 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5667 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5668 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5669 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5673 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5674 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5675 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5676 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
5677 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5682 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5683 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().is_empty()
5687 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5688 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().clear()
5691 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
5692 /// using the given event handler.
5694 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
5695 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
5698 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock until the returned future completes so that
5699 // we can be sure no other persists happen while processing events.
5700 let _read_guard = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
5702 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5704 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5705 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5706 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5707 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5710 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5711 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5712 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5715 for event in pending_events {
5716 handler(event).await;
5719 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
5720 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
5725 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
5726 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
5727 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5728 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5729 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5732 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5733 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5734 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5735 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5737 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5738 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5739 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5740 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5743 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5744 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5746 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5747 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5750 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5751 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5752 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
5754 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5755 events.replace(pending_events);
5764 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
5766 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
5767 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5768 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5769 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5772 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5774 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5775 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5776 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5777 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5778 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5780 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5781 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5782 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5783 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5786 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5787 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5788 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5791 for event in pending_events {
5792 handler.handle_event(event);
5800 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
5802 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
5803 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5804 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5805 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5808 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5810 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5811 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
5812 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5813 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5814 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5817 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
5818 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
5821 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5822 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5823 let new_height = height - 1;
5825 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5826 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5827 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5828 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5829 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5830 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5833 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5837 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
5839 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
5840 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5841 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5842 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5845 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5846 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5847 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5848 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5850 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5851 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5853 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5854 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger)
5855 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5857 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5858 if height < last_best_block_height {
5859 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5860 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5864 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5865 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5866 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5867 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5869 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5870 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5872 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5874 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5876 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5878 macro_rules! max_time {
5879 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5881 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5882 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5883 // having an explicit local time source.
5884 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5885 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5886 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5887 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5888 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5894 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5895 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5896 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5897 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5901 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
5902 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5903 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
5904 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
5905 if let (Some(funding_txo), block_hash) = (chan.get_funding_txo(), chan.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
5906 res.push((funding_txo.txid, block_hash));
5912 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5913 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5914 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5915 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5916 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
5917 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
5918 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5919 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5924 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
5926 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
5927 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5928 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5929 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5932 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
5933 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
5935 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
5936 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
5937 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5938 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5939 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5941 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5942 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5944 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5945 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5946 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5947 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
5948 let res = f(channel);
5949 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
5950 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
5951 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
5952 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5954 }, HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
5956 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
5957 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
5958 if channel.is_usable() {
5959 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5960 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
5961 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5962 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5967 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5971 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
5973 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
5974 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5975 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5976 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5977 msg: announcement_sigs,
5979 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5980 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, height) {
5981 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5983 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5984 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5985 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap(),
5990 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
5991 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5992 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
5993 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
5994 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
5995 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
5996 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
5997 // is always consistent.
5998 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
5999 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
6000 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
6001 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
6002 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
6005 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
6006 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel);
6007 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
6008 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
6009 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
6010 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
6011 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6015 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
6016 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
6017 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6018 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6019 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
6020 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6021 data: reason_message,
6029 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6030 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
6031 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
6032 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
6033 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
6034 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
6035 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
6036 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6037 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
6038 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
6040 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
6041 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
6042 data: htlc_msat_height_data
6043 }, HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
6047 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
6052 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
6054 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
6055 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(source, &payment_hash, reason, destination);
6059 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
6060 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
6061 /// [`await_persistable_update`], [`await_persistable_update_timeout`], or a future returned by
6062 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
6064 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
6066 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
6067 /// [`await_persistable_update_timeout`]: Self::await_persistable_update_timeout
6068 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
6069 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
6070 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
6071 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
6074 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
6075 /// [`await_persistable_update`], `await_persistable_update_timeout`, or a future returned by
6076 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
6078 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
6079 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
6080 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
6081 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
6084 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when a persistable update is available. Note that
6085 /// callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this [`ChannelManager`] and
6086 /// should instead register actions to be taken later.
6087 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
6088 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
6091 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6092 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
6093 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
6096 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
6097 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
6098 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
6099 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
6103 impl<M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
6104 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
6105 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
6106 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6107 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6108 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6111 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
6112 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6113 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6116 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
6117 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6118 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6121 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6122 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6123 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6126 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6127 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6128 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6131 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6132 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6133 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6136 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6137 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6138 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6141 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6142 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6143 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6146 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6147 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6148 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6151 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6152 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6153 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6156 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6157 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6158 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6161 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6162 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6163 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6166 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6167 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6168 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6171 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6172 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6173 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6176 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6177 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6178 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6181 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6182 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6183 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6186 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6187 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6188 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6191 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6196 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6197 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6198 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6201 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
6202 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6203 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6204 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
6206 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6207 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
6208 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
6209 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates. We believe we {} make future connections to this peer.",
6210 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id), if no_connection_possible { "cannot" } else { "can" });
6211 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6212 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6213 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6214 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6215 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
6216 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6219 no_channels_remain = false;
6224 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6226 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6227 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6228 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6229 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6230 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6231 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6232 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6233 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6234 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6235 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6236 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6237 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6238 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6239 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6240 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6241 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6242 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6243 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6244 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6245 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6249 if no_channels_remain {
6250 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
6253 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6254 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6258 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) -> Result<(), ()> {
6259 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
6260 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting with no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6264 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6266 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6269 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6270 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6271 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6272 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6273 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6276 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6277 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6282 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6283 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
6284 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
6285 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6286 let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6287 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6288 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6289 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6290 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6294 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6295 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6296 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6301 if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6302 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()) {
6303 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
6304 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
6305 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6313 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6317 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6318 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6320 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6321 for chan in self.list_channels() {
6322 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
6323 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6324 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6329 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6330 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6331 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6332 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6335 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6336 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6337 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6345 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6346 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6350 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6351 provided_node_features()
6354 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
6355 provided_init_features()
6359 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6360 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6361 pub fn provided_node_features() -> NodeFeatures {
6362 provided_init_features().to_context()
6365 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6366 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6368 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6369 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6370 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6371 pub fn provided_invoice_features() -> InvoiceFeatures {
6372 provided_init_features().to_context()
6375 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6376 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6377 pub fn provided_channel_features() -> ChannelFeatures {
6378 provided_init_features().to_context()
6381 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6382 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6383 pub fn provided_init_features() -> InitFeatures {
6384 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
6385 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the ChannelMessageHandler impl for
6386 // ErroringMessageHandler.
6387 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
6388 features.set_data_loss_protect_optional();
6389 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
6390 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
6391 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
6392 features.set_payment_secret_required();
6393 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
6394 features.set_wumbo_optional();
6395 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
6396 features.set_channel_type_optional();
6397 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
6398 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
6402 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6403 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6405 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6406 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6407 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6408 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6411 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6412 (2, node_id, required),
6413 (4, features, required),
6414 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6415 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6416 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6417 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6420 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
6421 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6422 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6423 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6424 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
6425 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
6426 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6427 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
6428 (2, self.channel_id, required),
6429 (3, self.channel_type, option),
6430 (4, self.counterparty, required),
6431 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
6432 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
6433 (7, self.config, option),
6434 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
6435 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
6436 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6437 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6438 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
6439 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6440 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6441 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6442 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6443 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6444 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
6445 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
6446 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
6447 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
6448 (30, self.is_usable, required),
6449 (32, self.is_public, required),
6450 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6451 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6452 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6458 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
6459 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6460 init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6461 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6462 (2, channel_id, required),
6463 (3, channel_type, option),
6464 (4, counterparty, required),
6465 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6466 (6, funding_txo, option),
6467 (7, config, option),
6468 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6469 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6470 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6471 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6472 (16, balance_msat, required),
6473 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6474 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6475 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6476 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6477 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6478 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6479 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6480 (26, is_outbound, required),
6481 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
6482 (30, is_usable, required),
6483 (32, is_public, required),
6484 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6485 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6486 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6489 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6490 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6491 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
6492 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
6493 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
6497 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
6499 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
6500 outbound_scid_alias,
6504 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
6505 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
6507 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
6508 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6509 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
6510 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6511 confirmations_required,
6512 force_close_spend_delay,
6513 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
6514 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
6515 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
6516 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
6517 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
6518 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
6523 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6524 (2, channels, vec_type),
6525 (4, phantom_scid, required),
6526 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6529 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6531 (0, onion_packet, required),
6532 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6535 (0, payment_data, required),
6536 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6537 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6539 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6540 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6541 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6545 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6546 (0, routing, required),
6547 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6548 (4, payment_hash, required),
6549 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
6550 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
6551 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
6555 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6556 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6558 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6560 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6561 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6562 reason.write(writer)?;
6564 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6565 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6568 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6569 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6570 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6571 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6578 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6579 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6580 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6583 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6584 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6585 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6586 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6590 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6591 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6592 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6593 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6594 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6597 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6598 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6599 // messages contained in the variants.
6600 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6601 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6602 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6604 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6605 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6606 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6607 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6608 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6611 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6612 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6613 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6614 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6615 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6617 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6622 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6627 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6628 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6629 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6630 (2, outpoint, required),
6631 (4, htlc_id, required),
6632 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6635 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6636 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6637 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
6638 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
6639 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
6641 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6642 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
6643 (1, self.total_msat, required),
6644 (2, self.value, required),
6645 (4, payment_data, option),
6646 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6647 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6653 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6654 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6655 let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6657 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6658 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6659 let mut total_msat = None;
6660 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6661 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6662 (0, prev_hop, required),
6663 (1, total_msat, option),
6664 (2, value, required),
6665 (4, payment_data, option),
6666 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6667 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6669 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6671 if payment_data.is_some() {
6672 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6674 if total_msat.is_none() {
6675 total_msat = Some(value);
6677 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6680 if total_msat.is_none() {
6681 if payment_data.is_none() {
6682 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6684 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
6686 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
6690 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6693 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
6700 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6701 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6702 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6705 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6706 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6707 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
6708 let mut payment_id = None;
6709 let mut payment_secret = None;
6710 let mut payment_params = None;
6711 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6712 (0, session_priv, required),
6713 (1, payment_id, option),
6714 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6715 (3, payment_secret, option),
6716 (4, path, vec_type),
6717 (5, payment_params, option),
6719 if payment_id.is_none() {
6720 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6722 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6724 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6725 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6726 first_hop_htlc_msat,
6727 path: path.unwrap(),
6728 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6733 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6734 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6739 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6740 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
6742 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payment_params } => {
6744 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6745 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6746 (0, session_priv, required),
6747 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6748 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6749 (3, payment_secret, option),
6750 (4, *path, vec_type),
6751 (5, payment_params, option),
6754 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6756 field.write(writer)?;
6763 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
6764 (0, LightningError) => {
6768 (0, failure_code, required),
6769 (2, data, vec_type),
6773 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
6774 (0, forward_info, required),
6775 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6776 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6777 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6780 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6782 (0, htlc_id, required),
6783 (2, err_packet, required),
6788 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6789 (0, payment_secret, required),
6790 (2, expiry_time, required),
6791 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6792 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6793 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6796 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(PendingOutboundPayment,
6798 (0, session_privs, required),
6801 (0, session_privs, required),
6802 (1, payment_hash, option),
6803 (3, timer_ticks_without_htlcs, (default_value, 0)),
6806 (0, session_privs, required),
6807 (1, pending_fee_msat, option),
6808 (2, payment_hash, required),
6809 (4, payment_secret, option),
6810 (6, total_msat, required),
6811 (8, pending_amt_msat, required),
6812 (10, starting_block_height, required),
6815 (0, session_privs, required),
6816 (2, payment_hash, required),
6820 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
6821 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
6822 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6823 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6824 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6827 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6828 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6830 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6832 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
6834 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6835 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
6836 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
6840 // Take `channel_state` lock temporarily to avoid creating a lock order that requires
6841 // that the `forward_htlcs` lock is taken after `channel_state`
6842 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6843 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
6844 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6845 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6846 unfunded_channels += 1;
6849 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
6850 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6851 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6852 channel.write(writer)?;
6858 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6859 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6860 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
6861 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6862 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6863 for forward in pending_forwards {
6864 forward.write(writer)?;
6869 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6870 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
6871 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6872 for (payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops)) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
6873 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6874 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6875 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
6876 htlc.write(writer)?;
6878 htlc_purposes.push(purpose);
6881 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6882 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6883 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6884 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
6885 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6886 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
6889 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6890 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6891 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6892 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6893 for event in events.iter() {
6894 event.write(writer)?;
6897 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
6898 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6899 for event in background_events.iter() {
6901 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
6903 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
6904 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
6909 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
6910 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
6911 // likely to be identical.
6912 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6913 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6915 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6916 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
6917 hash.write(writer)?;
6918 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
6921 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
6922 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
6923 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6924 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
6925 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
6928 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
6929 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6931 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6932 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6933 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
6934 session_priv.write(writer)?;
6937 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
6938 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
6942 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
6943 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
6944 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6946 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6947 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6948 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
6953 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6954 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
6955 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
6956 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
6957 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
6958 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
6959 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
6966 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
6968 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
6970 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6971 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
6972 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
6973 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
6974 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
6975 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
6976 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
6977 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
6978 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6979 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
6980 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
6981 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
6982 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
6984 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
6985 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
6987 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
6988 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
6990 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
6991 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
6992 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
6993 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
6994 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
6995 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
6997 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
6998 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6999 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
7000 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7001 K::Target: KeysInterface,
7002 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7005 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
7006 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
7008 pub keys_manager: K,
7010 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7012 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
7013 pub fee_estimator: F,
7014 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7016 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
7017 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
7018 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
7019 pub chain_monitor: M,
7021 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
7022 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
7023 /// force-closed during deserialization.
7024 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
7025 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
7026 /// deserialization.
7028 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
7029 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
7030 pub default_config: UserConfig,
7032 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
7033 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
7035 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
7036 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
7037 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
7038 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
7040 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
7043 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
7044 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>,
7047 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
7048 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>
7049 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
7050 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7051 K::Target: KeysInterface,
7052 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7055 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
7056 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
7057 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
7058 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
7059 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>) -> Self {
7061 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
7062 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
7067 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
7068 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
7069 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
7070 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>>)
7071 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
7072 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7073 K::Target: KeysInterface,
7074 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7077 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7078 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
7079 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
7083 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
7084 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>)
7085 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
7086 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7087 K::Target: KeysInterface,
7088 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7091 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7092 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7094 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7095 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7096 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7098 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7100 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7101 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7102 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7103 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7104 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7105 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
7106 for _ in 0..channel_count {
7107 let mut channel: Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (&args.keys_manager, best_block_height))?;
7108 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7109 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
7110 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
7111 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7112 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7113 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7114 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7115 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
7116 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
7117 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7118 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7119 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7120 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7121 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7122 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7123 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7124 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7125 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7126 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7127 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7128 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
7129 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
7130 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
7131 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7132 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7133 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
7134 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
7135 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7136 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7137 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7138 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7139 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
7142 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7143 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
7144 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7146 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7147 id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
7149 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7151 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
7152 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
7153 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
7154 // safely discard the channel.
7155 let _ = channel.force_shutdown(false);
7156 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7157 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7158 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7159 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
7162 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7163 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7164 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7165 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7166 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7167 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7171 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
7172 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
7173 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
7174 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7178 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
7179 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7180 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7181 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
7182 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7183 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7184 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
7185 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
7186 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
7188 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
7191 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7192 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7193 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
7194 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7195 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7196 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
7197 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
7198 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
7200 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
7203 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7204 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
7205 for _ in 0..peer_count {
7206 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7207 let peer_state = PeerState {
7208 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
7210 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
7213 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7214 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
7215 for _ in 0..event_count {
7216 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
7217 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
7221 if forward_htlcs_count > 0 {
7222 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
7223 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
7224 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
7225 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
7226 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
7227 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7228 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
7232 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7233 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
7234 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
7235 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7236 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
7237 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7241 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
7242 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7244 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7245 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
7246 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
7247 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
7248 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7252 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7253 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
7254 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
7255 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
7256 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
7257 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
7258 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
7260 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
7261 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7265 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
7266 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
7267 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
7268 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
7269 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7270 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7271 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
7272 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7273 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
7274 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
7275 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
7276 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
7277 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7278 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
7280 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
7281 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7284 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
7285 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7288 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
7289 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
7290 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
7291 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
7292 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
7293 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
7295 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
7297 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
7298 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
7299 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
7300 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
7301 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
7302 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
7303 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
7305 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7306 if by_id.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
7307 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
7308 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
7309 if path.is_empty() {
7310 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
7311 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7313 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
7314 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
7315 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
7316 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
7317 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7318 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
7319 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
7320 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
7322 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7323 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
7324 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
7325 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
7326 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
7328 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
7329 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
7330 total_msat: path_amt,
7331 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
7333 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
7334 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
7343 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
7344 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
7346 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
7347 if let Some(mut purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
7348 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
7349 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7351 for (purpose, (payment_hash, previous_hops)) in purposes.drain(..).zip(claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..)) {
7352 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7355 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
7356 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
7357 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
7358 if previous_hops.is_empty() {
7359 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7361 let purpose = match &previous_hops[0].onion_payload {
7362 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
7363 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
7364 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
7365 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
7366 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
7367 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
7368 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
7370 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7371 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7375 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
7377 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7379 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
7380 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
7382 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7386 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7387 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7389 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
7390 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
7393 let our_network_key = match args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node) {
7395 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7397 let our_network_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &our_network_key);
7398 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
7399 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
7400 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
7401 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7405 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
7406 for (chan_id, chan) in by_id.iter_mut() {
7407 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
7408 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
7410 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
7411 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.keys_manager);
7412 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
7414 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7415 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
7416 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7417 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7418 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7419 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7421 if chan.is_usable() {
7422 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
7423 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7424 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7425 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7426 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7431 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
7433 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7434 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
7435 if let Some((payment_purpose, claimable_htlcs)) = claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
7436 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7437 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
7438 for claimable_htlc in claimable_htlcs {
7439 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
7441 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
7442 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
7443 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
7444 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
7446 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
7447 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
7448 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
7449 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
7451 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
7452 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
7453 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
7454 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
7456 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
7457 if let Some(channel) = by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
7458 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
7460 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
7461 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
7464 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
7466 purpose: payment_purpose,
7467 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
7473 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
7475 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
7476 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
7477 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
7479 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
7481 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
7484 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7486 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
7487 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
7488 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
7490 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
7491 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
7492 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
7493 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
7494 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
7496 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
7502 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
7504 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
7506 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
7507 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
7508 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
7509 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
7511 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
7512 logger: args.logger,
7513 default_configuration: args.default_config,
7516 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7517 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
7518 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
7519 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
7522 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
7523 //connection or two.
7525 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
7531 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7532 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7533 use core::time::Duration;
7534 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
7535 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
7536 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
7537 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7538 use crate::ln::msgs;
7539 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
7540 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
7541 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7542 use crate::util::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
7543 use crate::util::test_utils;
7544 use crate::chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
7547 fn test_notify_limits() {
7548 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
7549 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
7550 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7551 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7552 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7553 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7555 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
7556 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
7557 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7558 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7559 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7561 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7563 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
7564 // to connect messages with new values
7565 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7566 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7567 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7568 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7570 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
7571 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7572 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7573 // ... but the last node should not.
7574 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7575 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
7576 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7577 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7579 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
7580 // about the channel.
7581 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7582 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7583 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7585 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
7587 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7588 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7589 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7590 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7591 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7592 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7594 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
7595 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7596 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7598 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
7599 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
7600 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
7601 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
7602 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
7603 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
7605 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
7606 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
7607 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7608 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7609 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7610 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7611 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7612 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7614 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
7615 // the channel info has updated.
7616 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7617 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7618 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7619 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7620 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7621 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7625 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
7626 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
7628 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7629 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7630 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7631 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7632 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7634 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
7635 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7636 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
7637 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
7639 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
7640 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
7641 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
7642 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
7643 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
7644 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
7645 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7646 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7647 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7648 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
7650 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
7651 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7652 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7653 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7654 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7655 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7656 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7657 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7658 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7659 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7660 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7661 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
7662 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7663 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7664 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7665 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7666 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7667 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7668 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7669 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7670 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7671 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
7673 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
7674 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
7675 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7676 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7677 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7678 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
7680 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
7681 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
7682 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
7683 // lightning messages manually.
7684 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7685 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
7686 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7688 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7689 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7690 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
7691 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7692 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7693 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
7694 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7695 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7696 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
7697 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7698 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7699 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7700 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7701 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7702 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7703 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
7704 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7705 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7706 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
7707 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7708 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7709 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7710 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7711 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
7712 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7714 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
7715 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
7716 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7717 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
7719 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
7720 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
7721 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
7722 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
7724 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7727 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7728 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7729 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7730 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7732 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7735 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7736 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7737 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7738 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7740 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7745 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
7746 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
7747 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
7748 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
7749 // fails as expected.
7750 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7751 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7752 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7753 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7754 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7755 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7756 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7758 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
7759 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
7760 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
7762 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
7763 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7764 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id()),
7765 final_value_msat: 100_000,
7766 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
7768 let route = find_route(
7769 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
7770 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7772 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7773 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7774 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7775 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7776 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7777 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7778 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7779 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7780 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7781 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
7782 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
7783 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7784 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
7785 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7786 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7787 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7788 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7789 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7790 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7791 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7792 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7793 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7794 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7796 // Finally, claim the original payment.
7797 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7799 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
7800 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7801 let route = find_route(
7802 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
7803 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7805 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7806 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7807 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7808 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7809 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
7810 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
7811 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
7813 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
7814 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7815 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
7816 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7817 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7818 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7819 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7820 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7821 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7822 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7823 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7824 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7825 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
7826 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7827 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7828 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7829 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7830 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7831 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7832 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7833 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7834 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7835 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7837 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
7838 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7842 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
7843 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
7844 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
7845 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7846 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7847 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7848 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7850 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7851 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7852 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7853 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7855 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7856 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7857 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7858 final_value_msat: 10_000,
7859 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7861 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7862 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7863 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7864 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7865 let route = find_route(
7866 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7867 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7870 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7871 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
7872 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash, None, PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
7873 nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
7874 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7876 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7877 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7878 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7879 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7880 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7881 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7882 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7884 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
7888 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
7889 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
7890 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7891 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7892 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7893 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7895 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7896 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7897 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7898 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7900 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7901 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7902 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7903 final_value_msat: 10_000,
7904 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7906 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7907 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7908 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7909 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7910 let route = find_route(
7911 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7912 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7915 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7916 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7917 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
7918 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, Some(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
7919 nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
7920 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7922 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7923 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7924 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7925 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7926 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7927 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7928 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7930 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
7934 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
7935 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7936 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7937 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
7938 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7940 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7941 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7942 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7943 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7945 // Marshall an MPP route.
7946 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
7947 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
7948 route.paths.push(path);
7949 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7950 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
7951 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
7952 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
7953 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
7954 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
7956 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None, PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap_err() {
7957 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
7958 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
7959 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
7964 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
7965 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
7966 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7967 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7968 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7969 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7971 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
7972 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
7974 total_msat: 100_000,
7977 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
7978 // payment verification fails as expected.
7979 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
7980 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
7981 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
7982 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
7984 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
7988 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
7989 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
7993 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
7994 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
7995 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
7996 // the channel is successfully closed.
7997 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7998 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7999 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8000 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8002 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8003 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8004 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel);
8005 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8006 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
8008 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
8009 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
8011 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
8012 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
8013 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8014 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8017 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8019 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8020 // as it has the funding transaction.
8021 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8022 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8023 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8025 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8028 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8030 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8032 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8033 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8034 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8036 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8037 // as it has the funding transaction.
8038 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8039 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8040 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8042 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8043 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8044 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8045 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8046 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8047 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8048 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
8050 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8051 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8052 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8053 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
8055 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8056 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
8058 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
8059 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
8060 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
8061 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
8062 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8063 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8064 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8066 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
8067 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
8068 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
8069 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
8070 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8071 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8072 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8075 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8077 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
8078 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
8079 // closing transaction).
8080 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
8081 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
8082 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8084 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
8085 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
8086 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8087 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8088 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8091 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8093 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
8095 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
8096 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
8097 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8099 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8101 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8102 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8106 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
8108 use crate::chain::Listen;
8109 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
8110 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, KeysInterface, InMemorySigner};
8111 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId};
8112 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
8113 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
8114 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
8115 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
8116 use crate::util::test_utils;
8117 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
8118 use crate::util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
8120 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8121 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8122 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
8124 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
8128 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
8129 node: &'a ChannelManager<
8130 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
8131 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
8132 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
8133 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
8134 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>,
8139 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
8140 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
8143 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
8144 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
8145 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
8147 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
8148 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
8150 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
8151 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
8153 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
8154 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
8156 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8157 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
8158 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
8159 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
8160 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8162 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
8164 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
8166 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8167 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
8168 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
8169 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
8170 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8172 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
8174 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
8176 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8177 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8178 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8179 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8180 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8183 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
8184 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8185 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
8187 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8188 } else { panic!(); }
8190 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8191 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8193 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
8196 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8199 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
8200 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
8202 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8203 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8204 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
8205 match msg_events[0] {
8206 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
8207 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
8208 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8212 match msg_events[1] {
8213 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8217 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8218 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
8220 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8221 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
8223 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8226 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8227 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
8229 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8230 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8232 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8235 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger_a);
8237 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
8238 macro_rules! send_payment {
8239 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
8240 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
8241 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id())
8242 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
8243 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
8244 let seed = [3u8; 32];
8245 let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42);
8246 let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8247 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph.read_only(),
8248 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
8250 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
8251 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
8253 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
8254 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
8256 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8257 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
8258 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8259 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
8260 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8261 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8262 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8263 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8265 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
8266 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
8267 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8268 expect_payment_claimed!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
8270 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
8271 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
8272 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8273 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8274 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
8276 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
8279 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
8280 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8281 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8282 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8284 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
8289 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
8290 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);