1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
29 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
37 use chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, Watch, BestBlock};
38 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
39 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
40 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
41 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
42 // construct one themselves.
43 use ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
44 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
45 use ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
46 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, RouteParameters};
48 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
50 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT, OptionalField};
52 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner, Recipient};
53 use util::config::UserConfig;
54 use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
55 use util::{byte_utils, events};
56 use util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
57 use util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
58 use util::logger::{Level, Logger};
59 use util::errors::APIError;
64 use core::cell::RefCell;
66 use sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
67 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
68 use core::time::Duration;
71 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
72 use std::time::Instant;
73 use util::crypto::sign;
75 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
77 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
78 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
79 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
81 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
82 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
83 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
84 // before we forward it.
86 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
87 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
88 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
89 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
90 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
92 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
93 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
95 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
96 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a "real" SCID, an
97 /// outbound SCID alias, or a phantom node SCID.
98 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
101 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
102 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
103 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
106 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
107 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
111 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
112 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
113 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
114 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
115 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
116 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
117 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
120 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
121 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
122 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
123 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
126 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
127 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
128 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
129 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
130 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
133 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
135 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
137 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
138 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
139 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
142 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
143 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
145 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
149 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
153 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
154 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
155 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
156 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
157 short_channel_id: u64,
159 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
160 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
162 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
163 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
168 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
170 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
171 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
172 _legacy_hop_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
174 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
175 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
178 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
179 struct ClaimableHTLC {
180 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
182 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
184 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
186 /// The sum total of all MPP parts
190 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
191 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
192 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
193 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
195 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
196 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
201 impl Readable for PaymentId {
202 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
203 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
207 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
208 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
209 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
210 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
211 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
214 session_priv: SecretKey,
215 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
216 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
217 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
218 payment_id: PaymentId,
219 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
220 payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters>,
223 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
224 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
225 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
227 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
229 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
231 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payment_params } => {
234 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
235 payment_id.hash(hasher);
236 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
237 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
238 payment_params.hash(hasher);
243 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
246 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
247 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
249 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
250 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
251 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
252 payment_secret: None,
253 payment_params: None,
258 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
259 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
261 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
269 struct ReceiveError {
275 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
276 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
278 MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
283 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
285 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
286 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
287 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
288 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
289 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
291 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
292 err: msgs::LightningError,
293 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u64)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
294 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
296 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
298 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
300 err: LightningError {
302 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
303 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
310 shutdown_finish: None,
314 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
316 err: LightningError {
318 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
321 shutdown_finish: None,
325 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
326 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
329 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u64, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
331 err: LightningError {
333 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
334 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
340 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
341 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
345 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
348 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
350 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
351 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
355 log_level: Level::Warn,
358 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
360 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
362 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
364 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
365 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
371 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
373 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
374 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
382 shutdown_finish: None,
387 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
388 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
389 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
390 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
391 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
393 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
394 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
395 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
396 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
397 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
398 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
399 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
401 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
405 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
406 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
407 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
408 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) to the real channel id. Outbound SCID aliases are added
409 /// here once the channel is available for normal use, with SCIDs being added once the funding
410 /// transaction is confirmed at the channel's required confirmation depth.
411 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
412 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
414 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
415 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
416 /// and via the classic SCID.
418 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
419 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
420 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
421 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
422 /// Map from payment hash to any HTLCs which are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user.
423 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
424 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
426 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
427 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
428 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
429 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
432 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
433 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
434 /// quite some time lag.
435 enum BackgroundEvent {
436 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
437 /// commitment transaction.
438 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
441 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
442 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
444 latest_features: InitFeatures,
447 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
448 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
450 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
453 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
454 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
455 struct PendingInboundPayment {
456 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
457 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
458 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
459 /// this payment being removed.
461 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
462 user_payment_id: u64,
463 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
464 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
465 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
468 /// Stores the session_priv for each part of a payment that is still pending. For versions 0.0.102
469 /// and later, also stores information for retrying the payment.
470 pub(crate) enum PendingOutboundPayment {
472 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
475 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
476 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
477 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
478 pending_amt_msat: u64,
479 /// Used to track the fee paid. Only present if the payment was serialized on 0.0.103+.
480 pending_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
481 /// The total payment amount across all paths, used to verify that a retry is not overpaying.
483 /// Our best known block height at the time this payment was initiated.
484 starting_block_height: u32,
486 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
487 /// been resolved. This ensures we don't look up pending payments in ChannelMonitors on restart
488 /// and add a pending payment that was already fulfilled.
490 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
491 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
493 /// When a payer gives up trying to retry a payment, they inform us, letting us generate a
494 /// `PaymentFailed` event when all HTLCs have irrevocably failed. This avoids a number of race
495 /// conditions in MPP-aware payment retriers (1), where the possibility of multiple
496 /// `PaymentPathFailed` events with `all_paths_failed` can be pending at once, confusing a
497 /// downstream event handler as to when a payment has actually failed.
499 /// (1) https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1164
501 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
502 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
506 impl PendingOutboundPayment {
507 fn is_retryable(&self) -> bool {
509 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { .. } => true,
513 fn is_fulfilled(&self) -> bool {
515 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => true,
519 fn abandoned(&self) -> bool {
521 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => true,
525 fn get_pending_fee_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
527 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { pending_fee_msat, .. } => pending_fee_msat.clone(),
532 fn payment_hash(&self) -> Option<PaymentHash> {
534 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None,
535 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
536 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => *payment_hash,
537 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
541 fn mark_fulfilled(&mut self) {
542 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
543 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
544 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
545 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
546 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
547 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. }
550 let payment_hash = self.payment_hash();
551 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, payment_hash };
554 fn mark_abandoned(&mut self) -> Result<(), ()> {
555 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
556 let our_payment_hash;
557 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
558 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } |
559 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } =>
561 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } |
562 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } => {
563 our_payment_hash = *payment_hash;
567 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash: our_payment_hash };
571 /// panics if path is None and !self.is_fulfilled
572 fn remove(&mut self, session_priv: &[u8; 32], path: Option<&Vec<RouteHop>>) -> bool {
573 let remove_res = match self {
574 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
575 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
576 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
577 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
578 session_privs.remove(session_priv)
582 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
583 let path = path.expect("Fulfilling a payment should always come with a path");
584 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
585 *pending_amt_msat -= path_last_hop.fee_msat;
586 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
587 *fee_msat -= path.get_path_fees();
594 fn insert(&mut self, session_priv: [u8; 32], path: &Vec<RouteHop>) -> bool {
595 let insert_res = match self {
596 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
597 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
598 session_privs.insert(session_priv)
600 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => false,
601 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => false,
604 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
605 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
606 *pending_amt_msat += path_last_hop.fee_msat;
607 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
608 *fee_msat += path.get_path_fees();
615 fn remaining_parts(&self) -> usize {
617 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
618 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
619 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
620 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
627 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
628 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
629 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
630 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
631 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
632 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
633 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
635 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
636 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
638 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
639 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
640 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
641 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
642 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
643 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
644 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
645 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
647 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
648 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
650 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
651 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
653 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
654 /// to individual Channels.
656 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
657 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
658 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
659 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
661 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
662 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
663 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
664 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
665 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
666 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
667 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
669 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
670 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
671 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
672 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
675 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
676 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
677 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
678 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
679 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
681 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
682 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
683 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
684 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
685 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
686 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
687 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
688 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
689 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
690 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
693 default_configuration: UserConfig,
694 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
700 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
702 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
703 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
705 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
706 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
707 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
708 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
710 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
711 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
712 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
713 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
714 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
715 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
717 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
718 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
719 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
720 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
721 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
722 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
723 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
724 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
726 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
728 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
729 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment>>,
731 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
732 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
733 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
734 /// active channel list on load.
735 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
737 our_network_key: SecretKey,
738 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
740 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
742 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
743 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
744 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
746 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
747 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
749 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
750 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
751 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
753 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
754 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
755 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
756 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
758 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
759 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
760 /// are currently open with that peer.
761 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
762 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
765 /// If also holding `channel_state` lock, must lock `channel_state` prior to `per_peer_state`.
766 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
768 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
769 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
770 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
771 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
772 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
773 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
774 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
775 /// PersistenceNotifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
776 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
778 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
785 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
787 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
788 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
789 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
790 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
791 pub struct ChainParameters {
792 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
793 pub network: Network,
795 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
797 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
798 pub best_block: BestBlock,
801 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
807 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
808 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
809 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
810 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
811 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
812 /// updates are ready for persistence).
814 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
815 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
816 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
817 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
818 persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
820 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
821 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
824 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
825 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
826 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
829 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
830 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
832 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
833 persistence_notifier: notifier,
834 should_persist: persist_check,
835 _read_guard: read_guard,
840 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
842 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
843 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
848 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
849 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
851 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
853 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
854 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
855 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
856 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
857 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
859 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
860 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
862 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
864 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
865 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
866 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
867 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
868 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
869 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
870 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
872 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
873 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
875 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
876 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
877 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
878 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
880 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
881 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
882 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
883 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
884 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
885 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
888 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
890 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
891 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
894 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
896 /// The number of blocks before we consider an outbound payment for expiry if it doesn't have any
897 /// pending HTLCs in flight.
898 pub(crate) const PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
900 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
901 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
903 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
904 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
905 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
906 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
907 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
908 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
909 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
910 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
911 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
912 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
913 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
916 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
917 /// to better separate parameters.
918 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
919 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
920 /// The node_id of our counterparty
921 pub node_id: PublicKey,
922 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
923 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
924 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
925 pub features: InitFeatures,
926 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
927 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
928 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
930 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
932 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
933 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
934 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
935 /// payments to us through this channel.
936 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
937 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
938 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
939 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
940 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
941 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
942 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
945 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
946 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
947 pub struct ChannelDetails {
948 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
949 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
950 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
951 /// lifetime of the channel.
952 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
953 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
954 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
955 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
956 /// our counterparty already.
958 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
959 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
960 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
961 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
963 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
964 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
965 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
966 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
968 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
969 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
971 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
972 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
973 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
974 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
975 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
976 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
977 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
979 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
980 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
982 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
983 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
984 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
985 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
986 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
987 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
988 /// this value on chain.
990 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
992 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
994 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
995 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
996 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
997 pub user_channel_id: u64,
998 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
999 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1000 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1002 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1003 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1004 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1005 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1007 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1008 pub balance_msat: u64,
1009 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1010 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1011 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1012 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1014 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1016 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1017 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1018 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1019 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1020 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1021 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1022 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1023 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1025 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1026 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1027 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1028 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1029 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1030 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1031 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1033 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1034 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1035 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1036 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1037 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1038 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1039 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1040 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1041 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1043 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1045 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1046 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1047 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1048 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1049 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1050 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1051 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1052 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1053 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1055 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1056 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1057 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1058 pub is_outbound: bool,
1059 /// True if the channel is confirmed, funding_locked messages have been exchanged, and the
1060 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `funding_locked` message exchange implies the
1061 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1062 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1063 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1065 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1066 pub is_funding_locked: bool,
1067 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
1068 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1070 /// This is a strict superset of `is_funding_locked`.
1071 pub is_usable: bool,
1072 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1073 pub is_public: bool,
1074 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1075 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1076 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1077 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1078 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1081 impl ChannelDetails {
1082 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1083 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1084 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1086 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1087 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1088 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1089 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1093 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
1094 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
1095 /// states for more.
1096 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
1097 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
1098 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
1099 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
1100 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
1101 ParameterError(APIError),
1102 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
1103 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
1104 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
1105 /// payment in full.
1107 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1109 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
1110 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
1111 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
1112 /// paths than the ones selected).
1113 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
1114 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
1115 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
1116 /// in over-/re-payment.
1118 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1119 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
1120 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
1122 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
1123 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
1124 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
1125 /// with the latest update_id.
1127 /// The errors themselves, in the same order as the route hops.
1128 results: Vec<Result<(), APIError>>,
1129 /// If some paths failed without irrevocably committing to the new HTLC(s), this will
1130 /// contain a [`RouteParameters`] object which can be used to calculate a new route that
1131 /// will pay all remaining unpaid balance.
1132 failed_paths_retry: Option<RouteParameters>,
1133 /// The payment id for the payment, which is now at least partially pending.
1134 payment_id: PaymentId,
1138 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1140 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1142 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1143 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1144 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1145 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1147 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1148 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1149 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1152 macro_rules! handle_error {
1153 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1156 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1157 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1159 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1160 // entering the macro.
1161 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
1162 assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
1165 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1167 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1168 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1169 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1170 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1174 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1175 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1176 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1177 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1182 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1183 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1185 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1186 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1187 action: err.action.clone()
1191 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1192 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1195 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1202 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1203 ($self: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1204 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1205 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1207 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1208 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1209 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1210 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1211 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1213 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1214 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1216 $short_to_id.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1220 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1221 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1222 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1224 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1225 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1227 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1228 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1230 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1231 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1232 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $short_to_id, $channel);
1233 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1234 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1235 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1237 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => {
1238 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1239 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $short_to_id, $channel);
1240 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(false);
1241 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1242 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1248 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1249 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1253 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1255 $entry.remove_entry();
1263 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1264 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1268 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1270 $entry.remove_entry();
1278 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1279 ($self: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1281 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1282 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel_state.short_to_id, channel);
1288 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
1289 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_funding_locked: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1291 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1292 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1293 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $short_to_id, $chan);
1294 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1295 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1296 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1297 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1298 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1299 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1300 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1301 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1302 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1303 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1304 $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1307 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1308 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1309 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1310 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1311 match $action_type {
1312 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1313 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1315 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1316 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1318 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1319 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1320 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1321 if !$resend_commitment {
1322 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1325 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1327 $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_funding_locked, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1328 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1332 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_funding_locked: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1333 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_funding_locked, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1335 $entry.remove_entry();
1339 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY) => { {
1340 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1341 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1343 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, NO_UPDATE) => {
1344 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1346 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_funding_locked: expr, OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED) => {
1347 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, false, $resend_funding_locked, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1349 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1350 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1352 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1353 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
1357 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
1358 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1359 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
1361 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1362 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
1366 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
1367 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
1368 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1369 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
1370 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
1373 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
1378 macro_rules! send_funding_locked {
1379 ($short_to_id: expr, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $funding_locked_msg: expr) => {
1380 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
1381 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1382 msg: $funding_locked_msg,
1384 // Note that we may send a funding locked multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1385 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1386 let outbound_alias_insert = $short_to_id.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), $channel.channel_id());
1387 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == $channel.channel_id(),
1388 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1389 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1390 let scid_insert = $short_to_id.insert(real_scid, $channel.channel_id());
1391 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == $channel.channel_id(),
1392 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1397 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
1398 ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
1399 $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
1400 $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $funding_locked: expr, $announcement_sigs: expr) => { {
1401 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
1403 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
1404 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
1405 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1407 let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
1408 if !forwards.is_empty() {
1409 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or($channel_entry.get().outbound_scid_alias()),
1410 $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
1413 if chanmon_update.is_some() {
1414 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a funding_locked if there have been
1415 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
1416 // associated with a funding_locked would be the funding_created/funding_signed
1417 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
1418 // funding_locked until it's been updated, so we can't have a funding_locked and a
1419 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
1420 assert!($funding_locked.is_none());
1421 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a funding_locked or a
1422 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a funding_locked, we
1423 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
1424 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1427 if let Some(msg) = $funding_locked {
1428 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the funding_locked fly
1429 // before it should be allowed to.
1430 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
1431 send_funding_locked!($channel_state.short_to_id, $channel_state.pending_msg_events, $channel_entry.get(), msg);
1433 if let Some(msg) = $announcement_sigs {
1434 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1435 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1440 let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
1441 if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
1442 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
1443 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
1444 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
1445 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
1446 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
1447 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
1448 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
1449 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
1450 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
1451 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1452 if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1453 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
1454 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
1455 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
1456 let mut order = $order;
1458 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1460 break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
1464 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1465 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
1466 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1467 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1472 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1473 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
1474 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1475 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1476 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1481 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1485 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1490 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1491 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1492 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1497 if chanmon_update_is_none {
1498 // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
1499 // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
1500 // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
1501 assert!(res.is_ok());
1504 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1508 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1509 ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1510 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1512 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1514 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1515 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1520 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
1521 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
1522 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1523 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1524 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1527 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1529 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1530 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1532 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1534 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1535 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1536 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1537 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1538 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1539 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1540 let inbound_pmt_key_material = keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1541 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1543 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1544 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1545 fee_estimator: fee_est,
1549 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1551 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1552 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1553 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
1554 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1555 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1556 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1558 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1559 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1560 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1562 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1563 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap()),
1566 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1567 fake_scid_rand_bytes: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1569 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1570 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1572 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1574 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1575 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1576 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1577 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
1585 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels, as
1586 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1587 &self.default_configuration
1590 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1591 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1592 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1595 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1596 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1598 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
1600 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1604 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1609 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1611 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1612 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1613 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to 0
1614 /// for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for `user_channel_id` here.
1615 /// `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and otherwise
1618 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1619 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1621 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1622 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1623 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1625 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1626 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1627 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1628 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1629 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1630 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1632 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1633 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1634 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1635 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1636 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1637 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1641 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1642 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1643 Some(peer_state) => {
1644 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1645 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1646 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1647 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1648 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key,
1649 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1650 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1654 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1659 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1662 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1664 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1665 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1666 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1668 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1669 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1670 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1671 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1673 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1675 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1678 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1680 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1681 node_id: their_network_key,
1684 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1687 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1688 let mut res = Vec::new();
1690 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1691 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1692 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1693 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1694 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1695 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1696 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1697 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1698 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1699 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1700 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1701 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1702 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1703 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1704 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1705 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1706 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1707 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1708 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1709 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1710 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1712 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1713 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1714 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1715 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1716 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1717 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1718 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1719 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1720 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1721 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1722 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1723 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1724 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1725 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1726 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1727 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1728 is_funding_locked: channel.is_usable(),
1729 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1730 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1731 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1732 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat()
1736 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1737 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1738 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1739 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1745 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1746 /// more information.
1747 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1748 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1751 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1752 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1754 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1755 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1757 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1758 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1759 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1760 // really wanted anyway.
1761 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1764 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1765 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1766 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1767 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1768 Some(transaction) => {
1769 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1773 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1774 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1775 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1776 reason: closure_reason
1780 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1781 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1783 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1784 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1785 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1786 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1787 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1788 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1789 if *counterparty_node_id != chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id(){
1790 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
1792 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1793 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1794 Some(peer_state) => {
1795 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1796 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1797 chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
1799 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
1801 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1803 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1804 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1805 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1806 let (result, is_permanent) =
1807 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
1809 remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
1815 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1816 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
1820 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1821 let channel = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
1822 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1823 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1827 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1831 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1835 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1836 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1839 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
1843 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1844 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1845 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1847 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1848 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1850 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1851 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1852 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1853 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1855 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1857 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1858 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1859 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1860 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1861 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None)
1864 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1865 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1866 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1868 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1869 /// the channel being closed or not:
1870 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1871 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1872 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1873 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1874 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1875 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1876 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1878 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1880 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1881 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1882 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1883 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1884 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1888 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1889 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1890 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1891 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1892 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1894 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1895 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1896 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1897 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1898 // ignore the result here.
1899 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1903 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1904 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
1905 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1907 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1908 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1909 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1910 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *peer_node_id {
1911 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1913 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
1914 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
1916 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1918 remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan)
1920 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1923 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1924 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
1925 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1926 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1927 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1932 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1935 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
1936 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
1937 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
1939 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1940 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1941 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None) {
1942 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1943 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1944 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1945 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1946 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1947 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1957 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
1958 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
1959 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
1960 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1961 let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
1965 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
1966 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
1968 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1969 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != cltv_expiry {
1970 return Err(ReceiveError {
1971 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value",
1973 err_data: byte_utils::be32_to_array(cltv_expiry).to_vec()
1976 // final_expiry_too_soon
1977 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
1978 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
1979 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
1980 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
1981 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
1982 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
1983 return Err(ReceiveError {
1985 err_data: Vec::new(),
1986 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
1989 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
1990 return Err(ReceiveError {
1992 err_data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(amt_msat).to_vec(),
1993 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
1997 let routing = match hop_data.format {
1998 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => {
1999 return Err(ReceiveError {
2000 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2001 err_data: Vec::new(),
2002 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2005 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2006 return Err(ReceiveError {
2007 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2008 err_data: Vec::new(),
2009 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2012 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
2013 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2014 return Err(ReceiveError {
2015 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2016 err_data: Vec::new(),
2017 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2019 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2020 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2022 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2023 phantom_shared_secret,
2025 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2026 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2027 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2028 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2029 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2030 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2031 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2032 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2033 return Err(ReceiveError {
2034 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2035 err_data: Vec::new(),
2036 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2040 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2042 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2045 return Err(ReceiveError {
2046 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2047 err_data: Vec::new(),
2048 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2053 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2056 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2057 amt_to_forward: amt_msat,
2058 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2062 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
2063 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2064 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2066 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2067 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2068 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2069 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2070 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2071 failure_code: $err_code,
2072 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2077 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2078 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2081 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key).secret_bytes();
2083 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2084 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2085 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2086 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2087 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2088 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2089 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2090 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2093 let mut channel_state = None;
2094 macro_rules! return_err {
2095 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2097 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2098 if channel_state.is_none() {
2099 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2101 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2102 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2103 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2104 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
2105 })), channel_state.unwrap());
2110 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2112 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2113 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2115 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2116 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2120 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2121 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2123 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2125 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2126 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2127 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2128 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2129 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2131 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2134 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2135 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2137 let blinding_factor = {
2138 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
2139 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
2140 sha.input(&shared_secret);
2141 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
2144 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
2146 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
2148 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2151 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2152 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2155 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2156 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2157 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2158 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2159 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2163 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2164 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2165 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2168 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2169 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2170 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2171 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2176 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2177 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2178 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2179 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2180 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2181 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2182 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
2183 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
2184 let forwarding_id_opt = match id_option {
2185 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2186 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2188 if fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id) {
2191 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2194 Some(id) => Some(id.clone()),
2196 let (chan_update_opt, forwardee_cltv_expiry_delta) = if let Some(forwarding_id) = forwarding_id_opt {
2197 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
2198 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2199 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2200 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2201 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2202 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2204 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2205 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2206 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2207 // we don't have the channel here.
2208 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2210 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2212 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2213 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2214 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2215 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2216 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2217 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2218 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2220 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2221 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2223 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64)
2224 .and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000)
2225 .checked_add(chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat() as u64) });
2226 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
2227 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, chan_update_opt));
2229 (chan_update_opt, chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta())
2230 } else { (None, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA) };
2232 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + forwardee_cltv_expiry_delta as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2233 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, chan_update_opt));
2235 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2236 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2237 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2238 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2239 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2240 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2242 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2243 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2245 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2246 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2247 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2248 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2249 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2250 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2251 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2252 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2253 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2254 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2260 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2261 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2262 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2263 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2265 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2266 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2268 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2269 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
2270 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2272 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2273 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2274 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2276 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2281 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
2284 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2285 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2286 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2288 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2289 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2290 if !chan.should_announce() {
2291 return Err(LightningError {
2292 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2293 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2296 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2297 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2300 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2301 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2302 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2303 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2304 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2305 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2306 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2307 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2308 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2312 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2314 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2315 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2316 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2318 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2319 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2321 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2322 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2323 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2324 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2325 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
2326 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2327 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2328 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2331 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
2332 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
2334 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2340 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2341 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2342 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2343 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2344 let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2345 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2347 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2348 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2349 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2350 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2351 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2353 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2355 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2357 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2358 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2360 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2361 let payment_entry = pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id);
2362 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(payment) = &payment_entry {
2363 if !payment.get().is_retryable() {
2364 return Err(APIError::RouteError {
2365 err: "Payment already completed"
2370 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2371 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2372 Some(id) => id.clone(),
2375 macro_rules! insert_outbound_payment {
2377 let payment = payment_entry.or_insert_with(|| PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2378 session_privs: HashSet::new(),
2379 pending_amt_msat: 0,
2380 pending_fee_msat: Some(0),
2381 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2382 payment_secret: *payment_secret,
2383 starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
2384 total_msat: total_value,
2386 assert!(payment.insert(session_priv_bytes, path));
2390 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2391 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
2393 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
2394 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
2396 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2397 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2399 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2400 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2402 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2403 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2405 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2406 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2407 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2408 channel_state, chan)
2410 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2411 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2412 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
2413 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
2414 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
2415 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
2416 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
2417 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
2418 insert_outbound_payment!(); // Only do this after possibly break'ing on Perm failure above.
2419 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2421 insert_outbound_payment!();
2423 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2424 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2425 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2426 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2427 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2428 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2429 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2430 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2436 None => { insert_outbound_payment!(); },
2438 } else { unreachable!(); }
2442 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2443 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2445 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2450 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2452 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
2453 /// fields for more info.
2455 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
2456 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
2457 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
2458 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
2459 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
2460 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
2462 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
2464 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2465 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2466 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
2468 /// In general, a path may raise:
2469 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2470 /// node public key) is specified.
2471 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2472 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2474 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2475 /// relevant updates.
2477 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2478 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2479 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2481 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
2482 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
2483 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
2484 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
2486 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
2487 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
2488 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2489 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2490 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None, None, None)
2493 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: Option<PaymentId>, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2494 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
2495 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
2497 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
2498 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
2499 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
2500 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
2501 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
2503 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
2504 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
2506 let mut total_value = 0;
2507 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2508 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2509 let payment_id = if let Some(id) = payment_id { id } else { PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()) };
2510 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
2511 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
2512 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
2513 continue 'path_check;
2515 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
2516 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
2517 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
2518 continue 'path_check;
2521 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2522 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
2524 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
2525 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
2527 if let Some(amt_msat) = recv_value_msat {
2528 debug_assert!(amt_msat >= total_value);
2529 total_value = amt_msat;
2532 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2533 let mut results = Vec::new();
2534 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2535 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &route.payment_params, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage));
2537 let mut has_ok = false;
2538 let mut has_err = false;
2539 let mut pending_amt_unsent = 0;
2540 let mut max_unsent_cltv_delta = 0;
2541 for (res, path) in results.iter().zip(route.paths.iter()) {
2542 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
2543 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
2544 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
2545 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
2549 } else if res.is_err() {
2550 pending_amt_unsent += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2551 max_unsent_cltv_delta = cmp::max(max_unsent_cltv_delta, path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta);
2554 if has_err && has_ok {
2555 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure {
2558 failed_paths_retry: if pending_amt_unsent != 0 {
2559 if let Some(payment_params) = &route.payment_params {
2560 Some(RouteParameters {
2561 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2562 final_value_msat: pending_amt_unsent,
2563 final_cltv_expiry_delta: max_unsent_cltv_delta,
2569 // If we failed to send any paths, we shouldn't have inserted the new PaymentId into
2570 // our `pending_outbound_payments` map at all.
2571 debug_assert!(self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().get(&payment_id).is_none());
2572 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
2578 /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2580 /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2581 /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2582 /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, if the payment
2583 /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success), or if
2584 /// further retries have been disabled with [`abandon_payment`].
2586 /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2587 /// [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]
2588 pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2589 const RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE: u64 = 10;
2590 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2591 if path.len() == 0 {
2592 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2593 err: "length-0 path in route".to_string()
2598 let (total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret) = {
2599 let outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2600 if let Some(payment) = outbounds.get(&payment_id) {
2602 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2603 total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret, pending_amt_msat, ..
2605 let retry_amt_msat: u64 = route.paths.iter().map(|path| path.last().unwrap().fee_msat).sum();
2606 if retry_amt_msat + *pending_amt_msat > *total_msat * (100 + RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE) / 100 {
2607 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2608 err: format!("retry_amt_msat of {} will put pending_amt_msat (currently: {}) more than 10% over total_payment_amt_msat of {}", retry_amt_msat, pending_amt_msat, total_msat).to_string()
2611 (*total_msat, *payment_hash, *payment_secret)
2613 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => {
2614 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2615 err: "Unable to retry payments that were initially sent on LDK versions prior to 0.0.102".to_string()
2618 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {
2619 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2620 err: "Payment already completed".to_owned()
2623 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {
2624 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2625 err: "Payment already abandoned (with some HTLCs still pending)".to_owned()
2630 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2631 err: format!("Payment with ID {} not found", log_bytes!(payment_id.0)),
2635 return self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, Some(payment_id), Some(total_msat)).map(|_| ())
2638 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur.
2640 /// After this method returns, any future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id`
2641 /// will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`]. If no such event has been generated,
2642 /// an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event will be generated as soon as there are no remaining
2643 /// pending HTLCs for this payment.
2645 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2646 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2647 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2649 /// [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment
2650 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2651 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2652 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2653 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2655 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2656 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
2657 if let Ok(()) = payment.get_mut().mark_abandoned() {
2658 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
2659 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2661 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
2669 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2670 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2671 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2672 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2673 /// never reach the recipient.
2675 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function.
2677 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2678 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2680 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2682 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2683 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2684 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
2686 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
2688 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
2689 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage), None, None) {
2690 Ok(payment_id) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2695 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2696 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2697 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2698 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], _counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2699 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2701 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2703 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2705 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2706 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2707 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2708 } else { unreachable!(); })
2711 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2713 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2714 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2717 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2718 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2723 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2724 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2725 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2728 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2729 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2730 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2732 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2740 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2741 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2742 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2746 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2748 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2749 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2751 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2752 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2754 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2755 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2756 /// keys per-channel).
2758 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2759 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2760 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2762 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2763 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2764 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2766 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2767 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2768 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2769 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2771 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2772 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2773 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2774 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2778 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2779 let mut output_index = None;
2780 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2781 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2782 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2783 if output_index.is_some() {
2784 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2785 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2788 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2789 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2790 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2793 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2796 if output_index.is_none() {
2797 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2798 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2801 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2806 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
2807 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
2808 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
2810 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::core::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
2813 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
2814 // smaller than 500:
2815 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
2817 /// Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given
2818 /// arguments, providing them in corresponding events via
2819 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed
2820 /// on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node
2821 /// announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and
2822 /// our network addresses.
2824 /// `rgb` is a node "color" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this
2825 /// node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
2827 /// `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node
2828 /// accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly
2829 /// tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy,
2830 /// addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses.
2832 /// Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 500).
2834 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
2835 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
2836 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2838 if addresses.len() > 500 {
2839 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
2842 // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that
2843 // addresses be sorted for future compatibility.
2844 addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id());
2846 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2847 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
2848 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
2849 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
2850 rgb, alias, addresses,
2851 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2852 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2854 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2855 let node_announce_sig = sign(&self.secp_ctx, &msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2857 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2858 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2860 let mut announced_chans = false;
2861 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2862 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()) {
2863 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2865 update_msg: match self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
2870 announced_chans = true;
2872 // If the channel is not public or has not yet reached funding_locked, check the
2873 // next channel. If we don't yet have any public channels, we'll skip the broadcast
2874 // below as peers may not accept it without channels on chain first.
2878 if announced_chans {
2879 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
2880 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
2881 signature: node_announce_sig,
2882 contents: announcement
2888 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
2890 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
2891 /// Will likely generate further events.
2892 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
2893 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2895 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2896 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
2897 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
2898 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2900 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2901 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2903 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
2904 if short_chan_id != 0 {
2905 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
2906 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2908 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2909 match forward_info {
2910 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2911 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
2912 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2913 macro_rules! fail_forward {
2914 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
2916 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2917 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2918 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2919 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2920 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2921 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2922 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
2924 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
2925 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: $err_code, data: $err_data }
2931 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
2932 let phantom_secret_res = self.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::PhantomNode);
2933 if phantom_secret_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id) {
2934 let phantom_shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &phantom_secret_res.unwrap()).secret_bytes();
2935 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
2937 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2938 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
2939 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
2940 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
2941 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
2943 fail_forward!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
2945 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2946 fail_forward!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
2950 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
2951 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
2952 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
2953 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => fail_forward!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
2959 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
2962 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
2965 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2966 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
2967 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
2968 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
2969 // problem, not ours.
2976 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
2977 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2978 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2979 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2980 match forward_info {
2981 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2982 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2984 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
2985 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2986 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
2987 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2988 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2989 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2990 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2991 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2992 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
2993 phantom_shared_secret: None,
2995 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet, &self.logger) {
2997 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2998 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3000 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3002 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3003 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3004 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data }
3010 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3012 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3013 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
3014 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
3015 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
3016 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
3017 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
3018 // this channel currently :/.
3024 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3025 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3027 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3028 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3029 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
3031 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3032 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3034 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
3036 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3037 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3038 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3041 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3043 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3044 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
3045 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
3046 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
3047 // messages when we can.
3048 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
3049 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
3050 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
3057 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
3058 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
3061 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
3062 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
3063 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3064 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
3065 ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
3066 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
3068 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
3069 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
3070 let mut channel = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan);
3071 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
3072 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel.channel_id(), channel.get_user_id(), channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
3074 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
3076 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
3080 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3081 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
3084 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
3085 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3086 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3087 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3088 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3089 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
3090 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3091 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
3092 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3094 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
3102 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3103 match forward_info {
3104 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3105 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
3106 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3107 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3108 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3109 let _legacy_hop_data = payment_data.clone();
3110 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data }, Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret)
3112 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3113 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None, None),
3115 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3118 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3119 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3120 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3121 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3122 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3123 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3124 phantom_shared_secret,
3126 value: amt_to_forward,
3128 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { amt_to_forward },
3133 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3135 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
3136 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3137 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
3139 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3140 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3141 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3142 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3143 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3144 phantom_shared_secret,
3146 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
3151 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3152 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3153 let mut payment_received_generated = false;
3154 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3155 .or_insert(Vec::new());
3156 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3157 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3158 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3159 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3163 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.value;
3164 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3165 total_value += htlc.value;
3166 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3167 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3168 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3169 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3170 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3171 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3173 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3175 _ => unreachable!(),
3178 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data.total_msat {
3179 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3180 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data.total_msat);
3181 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3182 } else if total_value == $payment_data.total_msat {
3183 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3184 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3186 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3187 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3188 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3192 payment_received_generated = true;
3194 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3195 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3197 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3199 payment_received_generated
3203 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3204 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3205 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3206 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3207 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3208 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3209 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3210 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3211 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3212 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3213 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3214 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3215 let payment_preimage = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3216 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
3218 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3222 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3224 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3225 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
3226 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3227 e.insert(vec![claimable_htlc]);
3228 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3230 amt: amt_to_forward,
3231 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage),
3234 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3235 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3236 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3242 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3243 if payment_data.is_none() {
3244 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3245 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3248 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3249 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3250 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3251 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3252 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3253 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3254 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3255 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3257 let payment_received_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3258 if payment_received_generated {
3259 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3265 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3266 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3274 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3275 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
3277 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3279 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3280 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3283 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3284 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3285 events.append(&mut new_events);
3288 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3290 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3291 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3293 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3294 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3295 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3296 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3297 if background_events.is_empty() {
3301 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3303 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3304 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3305 // monitor updating completing.
3306 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
3313 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3314 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3315 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3316 self.process_background_events();
3319 fn update_channel_fee(&self, short_to_id: &mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
3320 if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
3321 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3322 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3323 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3324 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3325 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3327 if !chan.is_live() {
3328 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3329 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3330 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3332 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3333 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3335 let mut retain_channel = true;
3336 let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
3339 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
3340 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3344 let ret_err = match res {
3345 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
3346 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3347 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
3348 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3351 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3352 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3353 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3354 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3355 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3356 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3357 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3358 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3368 (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
3372 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3373 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3374 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3375 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3376 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3377 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3378 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3380 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3382 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3384 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3385 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3386 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3387 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3388 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3389 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3390 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3392 handle_errors.push(err);
3402 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3404 /// This currently includes:
3405 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3406 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3407 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3410 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3411 /// estimate fetches.
3412 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3413 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3414 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3415 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3417 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3419 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3420 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3422 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3423 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3424 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3425 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3426 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3427 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
3428 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3429 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3431 handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
3433 if !retain_channel { return false; }
3435 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3436 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
3437 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
3438 if needs_close { return false; }
3441 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3442 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3443 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3444 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3445 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3446 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3447 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3448 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3452 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3453 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3455 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3456 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3457 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3461 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3462 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3470 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, htlcs| {
3471 if htlcs.is_empty() {
3472 // This should be unreachable
3473 debug_assert!(false);
3476 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3477 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3478 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3479 if htlcs[0].total_msat == htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.value) {
3481 } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| {
3482 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3483 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3485 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.into_iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.prev_hop.clone(), payment_hash.clone())));
3493 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3494 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0), &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 23, data: Vec::new() });
3497 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3498 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3504 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3505 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3506 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3507 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
3508 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
3509 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
3510 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3512 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3513 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3514 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3515 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3516 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3517 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3518 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3519 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3520 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3521 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
3522 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3528 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3529 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3531 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3533 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3534 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3535 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3536 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3537 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3538 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3539 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3541 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3543 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3544 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3546 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3551 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3552 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3553 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3554 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
3555 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
3556 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
3557 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3558 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3559 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3561 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3562 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3563 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3564 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
3566 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
3567 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
3568 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
3569 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
3570 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3574 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3575 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3576 // be surfaced to the user.
3577 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
3578 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3580 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
3581 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
3582 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3583 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3584 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
3586 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3588 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3589 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
3590 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
3592 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, payment_params, .. } => {
3593 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3594 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3595 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3596 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3597 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) && !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3598 let retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
3599 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3600 Some(RouteParameters {
3601 payment_params: payment_params_data,
3602 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3603 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3606 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3607 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3608 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3610 rejected_by_dest: false,
3611 network_update: None,
3612 all_paths_failed: payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0,
3614 short_channel_id: None,
3621 if payment.get().abandoned() && payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3622 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3624 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3630 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3637 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3638 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
3639 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
3640 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
3641 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
3642 /// still-available channels.
3643 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
3644 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3645 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3646 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3649 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3650 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3651 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3653 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => {
3654 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3655 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3656 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3657 let mut all_paths_failed = false;
3658 let mut full_failure_ev = None;
3659 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3660 if !payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
3661 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3664 if payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3665 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received failure of HTLC with payment_hash {} after payment completion", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3668 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3669 all_paths_failed = true;
3670 if payment.get().abandoned() {
3671 full_failure_ev = Some(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3673 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3679 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3682 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3683 let retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
3684 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3685 Some(RouteParameters {
3686 payment_params: payment_params_data.clone(),
3687 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3688 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3691 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3693 let path_failure = match &onion_error {
3694 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3696 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3698 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3699 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
3700 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
3701 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
3702 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3703 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3704 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3705 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
3712 error_code: onion_error_code,
3714 error_data: onion_error_data
3717 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3723 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
3724 // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
3725 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
3726 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
3728 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
3729 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
3730 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3731 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3732 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3733 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
3734 network_update: None,
3737 short_channel_id: Some(path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id),
3740 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
3742 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
3746 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3747 pending_events.push(path_failure);
3748 if let Some(ev) = full_failure_ev { pending_events.push(ev); }
3750 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3751 let err_packet = match onion_error {
3752 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
3753 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
3754 if let Some(phantom_ss) = phantom_shared_secret {
3755 let phantom_packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
3756 let encrypted_phantom_packet = onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, &phantom_packet);
3757 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &encrypted_phantom_packet.data[..])
3759 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
3760 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
3763 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
3764 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3765 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
3769 let mut forward_event = None;
3770 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3771 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
3773 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
3774 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3775 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
3777 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3778 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
3781 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3782 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
3783 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3784 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3785 time_forwardable: time
3792 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentReceived`], generating any
3793 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
3795 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3796 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
3797 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3798 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3800 /// Returns whether any HTLCs were claimed, and thus if any new [`MessageSendEvent`]s are now
3801 /// pending for processing via [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`].
3803 /// [`Event::PaymentReceived`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentReceived
3804 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3805 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3806 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
3807 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
3808 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3810 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3812 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3813 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
3814 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3815 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3817 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
3818 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
3819 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
3820 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
3822 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3823 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3824 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3825 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3826 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3828 let mut valid_mpp = true;
3829 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3830 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3836 let mut errs = Vec::new();
3837 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
3838 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3840 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3841 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3842 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3843 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3844 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3845 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
3846 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3848 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
3849 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
3850 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
3851 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
3852 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
3853 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
3854 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
3855 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
3857 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
3858 ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
3859 // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
3860 // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
3861 // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
3862 // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
3864 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
3869 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
3870 // which were generated.
3871 channel_state.take();
3873 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
3874 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3875 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
3882 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
3883 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
3884 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
3885 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3886 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3888 return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed
3892 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3893 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
3894 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
3895 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
3896 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3897 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
3898 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3899 payment_preimage, e);
3900 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
3901 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3902 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
3903 Some(htlc_value_msat)
3906 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
3907 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
3908 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3909 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3910 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3911 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3912 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3913 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
3914 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3915 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3921 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
3923 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
3926 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
3927 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3928 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
3929 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
3930 payment_preimage, e);
3932 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3933 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
3935 chan.remove_entry();
3937 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
3940 } else { unreachable!(); }
3943 fn finalize_claims(&self, mut sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
3944 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3945 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3946 for source in sources.drain(..) {
3947 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } = source {
3948 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3949 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3950 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3951 assert!(payment.get().is_fulfilled());
3952 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, None) {
3953 pending_events.push(
3954 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
3956 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash(),
3961 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3969 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
3971 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
3972 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3973 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3974 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3975 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3976 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3977 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3978 if !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3979 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3980 let fee_paid_msat = payment.get().get_pending_fee_msat();
3981 pending_events.push(
3982 events::Event::PaymentSent {
3983 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3989 payment.get_mut().mark_fulfilled();
3993 // We currently immediately remove HTLCs which were fulfilled on-chain.
3994 // This could potentially lead to removing a pending payment too early,
3995 // with a reorg of one block causing us to re-add the fulfilled payment on
3997 // TODO: We should have a second monitor event that informs us of payments
3998 // irrevocably fulfilled.
3999 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
4000 let payment_hash = Some(PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()));
4001 pending_events.push(
4002 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4010 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
4015 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
4018 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4019 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4020 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
4021 let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
4022 let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
4023 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
4024 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
4027 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
4028 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4029 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4030 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4031 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4034 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4035 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
4036 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
4037 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
4038 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4039 payment_preimage, e);
4041 // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
4042 // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
4043 // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
4044 // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
4047 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4048 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
4049 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4050 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4054 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4055 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4056 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4059 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4060 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4061 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
4063 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4065 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4075 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4076 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4077 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4080 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
4081 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4083 let chan_restoration_res;
4084 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims) = {
4085 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4086 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4087 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4088 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4089 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4091 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4095 let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
4096 let channel_update = if updates.funding_locked.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() {
4097 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
4098 // funding_locked and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
4099 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
4100 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
4102 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()) {
4103 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4104 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4109 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, None, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.funding_locked, updates.announcement_sigs);
4110 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4111 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4113 (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs)
4115 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
4116 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
4117 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4118 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
4122 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4124 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4125 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4128 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4129 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4130 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4132 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4133 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4134 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4135 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4138 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4139 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4141 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4142 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4143 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4145 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4146 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4148 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4149 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4151 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4152 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4154 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4155 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4156 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4157 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4160 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4161 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4163 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4164 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4165 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4166 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4167 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4168 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4170 if *counterparty_node_id != channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id() {
4171 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
4173 if accept_0conf { channel.get_mut().set_0conf(); }
4174 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4175 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4176 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4179 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4180 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist".to_owned() });
4186 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4187 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4188 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4191 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4192 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4195 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4196 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager,
4197 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration,
4198 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4201 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4202 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4206 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4207 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4208 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4209 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4210 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4211 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4213 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4214 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4215 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4216 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4217 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(0),
4220 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4221 pending_events.push(
4222 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4223 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4224 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4225 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4226 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4227 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4232 entry.insert(channel);
4238 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4239 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4240 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4241 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4242 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4243 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4244 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4245 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4247 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.peer_channel_config_limits, &their_features), channel_state, chan);
4248 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4250 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4253 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4254 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4255 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4256 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4257 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4259 user_channel_id: user_id,
4264 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4265 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
4266 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4267 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4268 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4269 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4270 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4271 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4272 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4274 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
4276 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4279 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
4280 // lock before watch_channel
4281 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
4283 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
4284 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4285 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4286 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4287 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4288 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
4289 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
4290 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4291 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
4292 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4293 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
4295 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
4296 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4297 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4298 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
4299 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4300 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4304 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4305 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4306 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4307 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4308 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4310 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4311 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4312 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4321 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4323 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4324 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4325 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4326 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4327 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4328 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4329 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4331 let (monitor, funding_tx, funding_locked) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
4332 Ok(update) => update,
4333 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4335 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
4336 let mut res = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, funding_locked.is_some(), OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED);
4337 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4338 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4339 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4340 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4341 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4342 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4347 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
4348 send_funding_locked!(channel_state.short_to_id, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get(), msg);
4352 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4355 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
4356 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
4360 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4361 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4362 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4363 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4364 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4365 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4366 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4368 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg, self.get_our_node_id(),
4369 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4370 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4371 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4372 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4373 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4374 msg: announcement_sigs,
4376 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4377 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4378 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4379 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4380 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4381 // announcement_signatures.
4382 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4383 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4384 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4385 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4392 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4396 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4397 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4398 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4399 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4400 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4402 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4403 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4404 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4405 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4408 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4409 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4410 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4411 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4414 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
4415 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4417 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4418 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
4419 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4420 let (result, is_permanent) =
4421 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
4423 remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
4429 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4430 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4431 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4438 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4441 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4442 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4445 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
4449 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4450 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4451 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4452 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4453 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4454 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4455 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4456 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4458 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
4459 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4460 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4461 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4466 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4467 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4468 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4469 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4470 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4471 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry)))
4472 } else { (tx, None) }
4474 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4477 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4478 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4479 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4481 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4482 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4483 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4484 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4488 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4493 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4494 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4495 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4496 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4498 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4499 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4500 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4501 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4503 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4504 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4506 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4507 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4508 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4509 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4512 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4513 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4514 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4515 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4516 match pending_forward_info {
4517 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4518 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4519 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
4520 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, real_code, &error_data)
4522 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[])
4524 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4525 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4526 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4529 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4531 _ => pending_forward_info
4534 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4536 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4541 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4542 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4543 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4544 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4545 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4546 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4547 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4548 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4550 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
4552 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4555 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
4559 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4560 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4561 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4562 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4563 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4564 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4565 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4567 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
4569 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4574 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4575 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4576 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4577 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4578 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4579 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4580 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4582 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4583 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4584 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
4586 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
4589 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4593 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4594 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4595 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4596 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4597 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4598 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4599 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4601 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
4602 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
4603 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4604 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
4605 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
4606 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
4607 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
4612 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4613 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
4615 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4616 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4617 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4619 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
4620 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4621 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4622 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4623 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4624 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4625 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4626 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4628 commitment_signed: msg,
4634 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4639 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4640 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4641 let mut forward_event = None;
4642 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4643 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4644 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4645 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
4647 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4648 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
4649 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4650 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4651 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4653 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4654 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4655 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
4657 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4658 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4659 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
4664 match forward_event {
4666 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4667 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4668 time_forwardable: time
4676 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4677 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
4679 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4680 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4681 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4682 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4683 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4684 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4686 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
4687 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
4688 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4689 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
4690 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update) {
4691 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
4692 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
4693 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
4694 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4695 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
4696 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
4698 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan,
4699 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
4700 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(), false,
4701 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4702 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
4704 } else { unreachable!(); }
4707 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
4708 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4709 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4713 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4714 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
4715 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
4716 .unwrap_or(chan.get().outbound_scid_alias()),
4717 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
4719 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4722 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
4724 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
4725 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) =>
4727 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4728 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
4730 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
4731 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
4738 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4739 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4740 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4741 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4742 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4743 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4744 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4746 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
4748 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4753 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4754 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4755 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4757 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4758 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4759 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4760 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4762 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
4763 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
4766 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
4767 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
4768 self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), msg), channel_state, chan),
4769 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
4770 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
4771 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4774 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4779 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
4780 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4781 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4782 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4783 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
4784 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
4786 // It's not a local channel
4787 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
4790 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4791 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4792 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4793 if chan.get().should_announce() {
4794 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
4795 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
4796 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
4797 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4799 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
4801 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
4802 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
4803 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
4804 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4806 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
4809 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
4811 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
4814 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4815 let chan_restoration_res;
4816 let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround) = {
4817 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4818 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4820 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4821 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4822 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4823 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4825 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
4826 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
4827 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
4828 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
4829 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
4830 msg, &self.logger, self.our_network_pubkey.clone(), self.genesis_hash,
4831 &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), channel_state, chan);
4832 let mut channel_update = None;
4833 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
4834 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4835 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4838 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4839 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
4840 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
4841 // they have the latest channel parameters.
4842 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4843 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4844 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4849 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
4850 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(
4851 self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
4852 responses.mon_update, Vec::new(), None, responses.funding_locked, responses.announcement_sigs);
4853 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4854 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4856 (responses.holding_cell_failed_htlcs, need_lnd_workaround)
4858 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4861 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
4862 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id);
4864 if let Some(funding_locked_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
4865 self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, &funding_locked_msg)?;
4870 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
4871 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
4872 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4873 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
4874 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
4875 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
4876 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
4877 match monitor_event {
4878 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
4879 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
4880 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
4881 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.onchain_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4883 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
4884 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4887 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
4888 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
4889 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4890 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4891 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4892 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4893 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
4894 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
4895 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
4896 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4897 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4901 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
4902 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
4904 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
4906 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
4907 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4908 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4909 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4910 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
4915 MonitorEvent::UpdateCompleted { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
4916 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
4922 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4923 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4926 has_pending_monitor_events
4929 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
4930 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
4931 /// update events as a separate process method here.
4933 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
4934 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
4937 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
4938 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
4939 /// update was applied.
4941 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
4942 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
4943 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
4944 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
4945 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
4946 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
4947 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4948 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
4950 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4951 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4952 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4953 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4954 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4956 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4957 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
4958 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
4959 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
4960 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id));
4962 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
4963 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4964 has_monitor_update = true;
4965 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, channel_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
4966 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
4967 if close_channel { return false; }
4969 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4970 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4971 updates: commitment_update,
4978 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
4979 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
4980 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
4987 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
4988 for (failures, channel_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
4989 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id);
4992 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4993 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4999 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5000 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5001 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5002 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5003 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5004 let mut has_update = false;
5006 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5007 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5008 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5009 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5010 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5012 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5013 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5014 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5015 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5017 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5018 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5021 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5022 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5023 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5024 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5025 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5030 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5032 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5033 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5034 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_id, chan);
5040 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
5041 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5048 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5049 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5055 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5056 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5058 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5059 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5060 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5061 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5062 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5063 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5064 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5065 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5066 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5067 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5068 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5069 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5070 assert!(should_broadcast);
5071 } else { unreachable!(); }
5072 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5074 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5078 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5079 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5081 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5082 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5085 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5087 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5088 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5089 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5090 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5091 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5092 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5093 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5094 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5095 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5096 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5097 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5098 // never fail a payment too early.
5099 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5101 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5104 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5109 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5112 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5113 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5115 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
5116 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5117 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5119 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5121 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5122 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5126 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5127 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5129 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5131 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5132 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5133 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
5134 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5135 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5136 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, &self.keys_manager, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5139 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5140 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5142 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5145 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5147 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5149 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5150 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5151 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5152 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5153 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5156 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5157 /// stored external to LDK.
5159 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5160 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5161 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5163 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5164 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5167 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5168 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5169 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5170 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5172 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5173 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5174 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5175 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5176 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5178 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5179 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5180 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
5181 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5182 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
5184 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
5185 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
5187 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5188 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5192 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5193 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5195 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5197 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5198 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5199 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5200 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5203 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5204 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5206 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5209 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5211 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5213 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5214 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5217 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5218 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5220 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5221 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5222 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5225 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5226 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5228 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5229 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5230 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5231 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5233 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block.height(), &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
5234 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5235 match channel_state.short_to_id.entry(scid_candidate) {
5236 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => continue,
5237 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return scid_candidate
5242 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5244 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5245 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5247 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5248 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5249 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5253 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5254 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5255 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5256 let event_handler = |event: &events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event.clone());
5257 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5262 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5263 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().is_empty()
5267 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5268 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().clear()
5272 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5273 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5274 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5275 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5276 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5279 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5280 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5281 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5282 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5284 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5285 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5286 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5287 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5290 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5291 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5293 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5294 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5297 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5298 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5299 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
5301 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5302 events.replace(pending_events);
5311 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5313 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5314 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5315 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5316 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5319 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5321 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5322 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5324 /// Pending events are persisted as part of [`ChannelManager`]. While these events are cleared
5325 /// when processed, an [`EventHandler`] must be able to handle previously seen events when
5326 /// restarting from an old state.
5327 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5328 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5329 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5331 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5332 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5333 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5334 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5337 let mut pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5338 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5339 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5342 for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
5343 handler.handle_event(&event);
5351 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5353 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5354 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5355 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5356 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5359 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5361 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5362 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
5363 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5364 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5365 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5368 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
5369 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
5372 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5373 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5374 let new_height = height - 1;
5376 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5377 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5378 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5379 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5380 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5381 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5384 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5388 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5390 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5391 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5392 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5393 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5396 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5397 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5398 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5399 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5401 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5402 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5404 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5405 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger)
5406 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5408 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5409 if height < last_best_block_height {
5410 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5411 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5415 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5416 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5417 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5418 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5420 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5421 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5423 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5425 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5427 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5429 macro_rules! max_time {
5430 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5432 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5433 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5434 // having an explicit local time source.
5435 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5436 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5437 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5438 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5439 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5445 max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
5446 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5447 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5448 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5449 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5452 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5453 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5454 outbounds.retain(|payment_id, payment| {
5455 if payment.remaining_parts() != 0 { return true }
5456 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { starting_block_height, payment_hash, .. } = payment {
5457 if *starting_block_height + PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS <= height {
5458 log_info!(self.logger, "Timing out payment with id {} and hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_id.0), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
5459 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
5460 payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash,
5468 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
5469 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5470 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_id.len());
5471 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
5472 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
5473 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
5479 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5480 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5481 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5482 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5483 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
5484 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
5485 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5486 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5491 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5493 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5494 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5495 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5496 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5499 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
5500 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
5502 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
5503 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
5504 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5505 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5506 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5508 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5509 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5511 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5512 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5513 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5514 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5515 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
5516 let res = f(channel);
5517 if let Ok((funding_locked_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
5518 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
5519 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
5520 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5524 if let Some(funding_locked) = funding_locked_opt {
5525 send_funding_locked!(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, channel, funding_locked);
5526 if channel.is_usable() {
5527 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5528 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
5529 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5530 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5535 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5538 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
5539 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5540 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5541 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5542 msg: announcement_sigs,
5544 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5545 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, height) {
5546 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5548 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5549 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5550 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap(),
5555 if channel.is_our_funding_locked() {
5556 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5557 // If we sent a 0conf funding_locked, and now have an SCID, we add it
5558 // to the short_to_id map here. Note that we check whether we can relay
5559 // using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e. enforce option_scid_alias
5560 // then), and if the funding tx is ever un-confirmed we force-close the
5561 // channel, ensuring short_to_id is always consistent.
5562 let scid_insert = short_to_id.insert(real_scid, channel.channel_id());
5563 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == channel.channel_id(),
5564 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
5565 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
5568 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
5569 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_id, channel);
5570 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
5571 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
5572 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
5573 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
5574 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5578 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
5579 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
5580 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5581 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5582 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
5583 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
5584 data: reason_message,
5592 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5593 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, htlcs| {
5594 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
5595 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
5596 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
5597 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
5598 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
5599 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
5600 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
5601 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
5602 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5603 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
5604 data: htlc_msat_height_data
5609 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
5614 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
5616 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
5617 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
5621 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
5622 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
5623 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5626 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
5627 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
5628 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5629 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
5632 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
5633 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5635 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
5636 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
5639 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5640 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
5641 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
5642 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
5643 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5647 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
5648 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
5649 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
5650 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
5654 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
5655 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5656 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5657 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5658 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5659 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5662 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
5663 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5664 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5667 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
5668 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5669 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5672 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
5673 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5674 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5677 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
5678 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5679 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5682 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
5683 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5684 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5687 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
5688 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5689 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5692 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
5693 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5694 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5697 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
5698 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5699 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5702 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
5703 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5704 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5707 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
5708 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5709 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5712 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
5713 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5714 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5717 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
5718 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5719 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5722 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
5723 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5724 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5727 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
5728 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5729 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5732 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
5733 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5734 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5737 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
5738 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5739 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
5742 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
5747 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
5748 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5749 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5752 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
5753 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5754 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5755 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
5757 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5758 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5759 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5760 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5761 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates. We believe we {} make future connections to this peer.",
5762 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id), if no_connection_possible { "cannot" } else { "can" });
5763 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5764 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5765 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
5766 if chan.is_shutdown() {
5767 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_id, chan);
5768 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5771 no_channels_remain = false;
5776 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
5778 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5779 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5780 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5781 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5782 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5783 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5784 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5785 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5786 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5787 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5788 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5789 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5790 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5791 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
5792 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5793 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5794 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
5795 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
5796 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
5797 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
5801 if no_channels_remain {
5802 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
5805 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5806 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5810 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
5811 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5813 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5816 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5817 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
5818 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5819 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
5820 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
5823 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
5824 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
5829 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5830 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5831 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5832 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5833 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5834 if !chan.have_received_message() {
5835 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
5836 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
5837 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
5841 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
5842 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5843 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
5849 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
5852 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
5853 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5855 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
5856 for chan in self.list_channels() {
5857 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
5858 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
5859 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data));
5864 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
5865 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5866 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
5867 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5870 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
5871 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
5872 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5880 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
5881 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data));
5886 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
5887 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
5888 struct PersistenceNotifier {
5889 /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
5890 /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
5891 persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
5894 impl PersistenceNotifier {
5897 persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
5903 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
5904 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5909 guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
5910 let result = *guard;
5918 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
5919 fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5920 let current_time = Instant::now();
5922 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
5923 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5928 guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
5929 // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
5930 // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
5931 // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
5932 // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
5934 let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
5935 let result = *guard;
5936 if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
5940 match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
5941 None => return result,
5947 // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
5949 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
5950 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5951 *persistence_lock = true;
5952 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
5957 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
5958 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
5960 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
5961 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
5962 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
5963 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
5966 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
5967 (2, node_id, required),
5968 (4, features, required),
5969 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
5970 (8, forwarding_info, option),
5971 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
5972 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
5975 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelDetails, {
5976 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
5977 (2, channel_id, required),
5978 (3, channel_type, option),
5979 (4, counterparty, required),
5980 (6, funding_txo, option),
5981 (8, short_channel_id, option),
5982 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
5983 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
5984 (14, user_channel_id, required),
5985 (16, balance_msat, required),
5986 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
5987 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
5988 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
5989 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap())),
5990 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
5991 (22, confirmations_required, option),
5992 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
5993 (26, is_outbound, required),
5994 (28, is_funding_locked, required),
5995 (30, is_usable, required),
5996 (32, is_public, required),
5997 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
5998 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6001 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6002 (2, channels, vec_type),
6003 (4, phantom_scid, required),
6004 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6007 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6009 (0, onion_packet, required),
6010 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6013 (0, payment_data, required),
6014 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6015 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6017 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6018 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6019 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6023 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6024 (0, routing, required),
6025 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6026 (4, payment_hash, required),
6027 (6, amt_to_forward, required),
6028 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required)
6032 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6033 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6035 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6037 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6038 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6039 reason.write(writer)?;
6041 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6042 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6045 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6046 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6047 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6048 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6055 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6056 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6057 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6060 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6061 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6062 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6063 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6067 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6068 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6069 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6070 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6071 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6074 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6075 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6076 // messages contained in the variants.
6077 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6078 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6079 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6081 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6082 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6083 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6084 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6085 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6088 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6089 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6090 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6091 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6092 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6094 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6099 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6104 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6105 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6106 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6107 (2, outpoint, required),
6108 (4, htlc_id, required),
6109 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6112 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6113 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6114 let payment_data = match &self.onion_payload {
6115 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => Some(_legacy_hop_data),
6118 let keysend_preimage = match self.onion_payload {
6119 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => None,
6120 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => Some(preimage.clone()),
6122 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6123 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
6124 (1, self.total_msat, required),
6125 (2, self.value, required),
6126 (4, payment_data, option),
6127 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6128 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6134 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6135 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6136 let mut prev_hop = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6138 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6139 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6140 let mut total_msat = None;
6141 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6142 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6143 (0, prev_hop, required),
6144 (1, total_msat, option),
6145 (2, value, required),
6146 (4, payment_data, option),
6147 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6148 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6150 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6152 if payment_data.is_some() {
6153 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6155 if total_msat.is_none() {
6156 total_msat = Some(value);
6158 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6161 if payment_data.is_none() {
6162 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6164 if total_msat.is_none() {
6165 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
6167 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data.unwrap() }
6171 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6174 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
6181 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6182 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6183 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6186 let mut session_priv: ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6187 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6188 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
6189 let mut payment_id = None;
6190 let mut payment_secret = None;
6191 let mut payment_params = None;
6192 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6193 (0, session_priv, required),
6194 (1, payment_id, option),
6195 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6196 (3, payment_secret, option),
6197 (4, path, vec_type),
6198 (5, payment_params, option),
6200 if payment_id.is_none() {
6201 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6203 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6205 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6206 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6207 first_hop_htlc_msat: first_hop_htlc_msat,
6208 path: path.unwrap(),
6209 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6214 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6215 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6220 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6221 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::io::Error> {
6223 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payment_params } => {
6225 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6226 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6227 (0, session_priv, required),
6228 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6229 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6230 (3, payment_secret, option),
6231 (4, path, vec_type),
6232 (5, payment_params, option),
6235 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6237 field.write(writer)?;
6244 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
6245 (0, LightningError) => {
6249 (0, failure_code, required),
6250 (2, data, vec_type),
6254 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6256 (0, forward_info, required),
6257 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6258 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6259 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6262 (0, htlc_id, required),
6263 (2, err_packet, required),
6267 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6268 (0, payment_secret, required),
6269 (2, expiry_time, required),
6270 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6271 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6272 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6275 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(PendingOutboundPayment,
6277 (0, session_privs, required),
6280 (0, session_privs, required),
6281 (1, payment_hash, option),
6284 (0, session_privs, required),
6285 (1, pending_fee_msat, option),
6286 (2, payment_hash, required),
6287 (4, payment_secret, option),
6288 (6, total_msat, required),
6289 (8, pending_amt_msat, required),
6290 (10, starting_block_height, required),
6293 (0, session_privs, required),
6294 (2, payment_hash, required),
6298 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
6299 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6300 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6301 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6302 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6305 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6306 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6308 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6310 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
6312 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6313 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
6314 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
6317 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6318 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
6319 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6320 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6321 unfunded_channels += 1;
6324 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
6325 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6326 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6327 channel.write(writer)?;
6331 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6332 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
6333 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6334 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6335 for forward in pending_forwards {
6336 forward.write(writer)?;
6340 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6341 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
6342 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6343 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6344 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
6345 htlc.write(writer)?;
6349 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6350 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6351 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6352 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
6353 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6354 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
6357 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6358 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6359 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6360 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6361 for event in events.iter() {
6362 event.write(writer)?;
6365 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
6366 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6367 for event in background_events.iter() {
6369 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
6371 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
6372 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
6377 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6378 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6380 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6381 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
6382 hash.write(writer)?;
6383 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
6386 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
6387 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
6388 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6389 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
6390 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
6393 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
6394 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6396 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6397 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6398 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
6399 session_priv.write(writer)?;
6402 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
6403 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
6407 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
6408 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
6409 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6411 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6412 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6413 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
6418 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6419 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
6420 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
6421 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
6422 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
6429 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
6431 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
6433 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6434 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
6435 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
6436 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
6437 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
6438 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
6439 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
6440 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
6441 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6442 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
6443 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
6444 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
6445 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
6447 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
6448 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
6450 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
6451 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
6453 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
6454 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
6455 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
6456 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
6457 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
6458 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
6460 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
6461 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6462 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6463 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6464 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6465 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6468 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
6469 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
6471 pub keys_manager: K,
6473 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6475 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
6476 pub fee_estimator: F,
6477 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6479 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
6480 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
6481 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
6482 pub chain_monitor: M,
6484 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
6485 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
6486 /// force-closed during deserialization.
6487 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
6488 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
6489 /// deserialization.
6491 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
6492 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
6493 pub default_config: UserConfig,
6495 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
6496 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
6498 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
6499 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
6500 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
6501 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
6503 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
6506 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
6507 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
6510 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6511 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
6512 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6513 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6514 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6515 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6518 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
6519 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
6520 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
6521 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
6522 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
6524 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
6525 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
6530 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
6531 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
6532 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6533 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
6534 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6535 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6536 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6537 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6540 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6541 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
6542 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
6546 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6547 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
6548 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6549 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6550 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6551 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6554 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6555 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6557 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6558 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6559 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6561 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
6563 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6564 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6565 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6566 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6567 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
6568 for _ in 0..channel_count {
6569 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (&args.keys_manager, best_block_height))?;
6570 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
6571 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
6572 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
6573 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6574 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6575 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6576 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6577 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
6578 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
6579 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6580 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6581 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6582 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6583 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6584 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
6585 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6586 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6587 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6588 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6589 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6590 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
6591 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
6592 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
6593 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6594 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6595 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
6596 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
6597 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6598 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
6599 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6600 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
6601 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
6604 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6605 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6606 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
6608 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
6611 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6612 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6613 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6614 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6615 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
6616 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6620 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
6621 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
6622 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
6623 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6627 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
6628 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6629 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6630 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
6631 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6632 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6633 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
6634 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
6635 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
6637 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
6640 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6641 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6642 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
6643 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6644 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6645 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
6646 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
6647 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
6649 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
6652 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6653 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
6654 for _ in 0..peer_count {
6655 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6656 let peer_state = PeerState {
6657 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
6659 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
6662 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6663 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
6664 for _ in 0..event_count {
6665 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
6666 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
6670 if forward_htlcs_count > 0 {
6671 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
6672 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
6673 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
6674 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
6675 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
6676 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6677 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
6681 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6682 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
6683 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
6684 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6685 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
6686 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6690 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6691 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6693 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6694 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
6695 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
6696 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
6697 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6701 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6702 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
6703 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
6704 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
6705 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
6706 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
6707 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
6709 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
6710 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6714 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
6715 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
6716 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
6717 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
6718 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
6719 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6720 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
6721 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
6722 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
6723 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
6725 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
6726 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
6729 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
6730 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
6731 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
6732 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
6733 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
6734 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
6736 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
6738 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
6739 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
6740 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
6741 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
6742 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
6743 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
6744 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
6746 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors {
6747 if by_id.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
6748 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
6749 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
6750 if path.is_empty() {
6751 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
6752 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6754 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
6755 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
6756 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
6757 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
6758 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6759 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
6760 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
6761 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
6763 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6764 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
6765 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
6766 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
6767 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
6769 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
6770 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
6771 total_msat: path_amt,
6772 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
6774 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
6775 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
6784 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6785 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
6787 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
6788 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
6791 let our_network_key = match args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node) {
6793 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6795 let our_network_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &our_network_key);
6796 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
6797 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
6798 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
6799 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6803 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
6804 for (chan_id, chan) in by_id.iter_mut() {
6805 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
6806 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
6808 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
6809 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.keys_manager);
6810 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
6812 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6813 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
6814 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
6815 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
6816 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
6817 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6819 if chan.is_usable() {
6820 if short_to_id.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), *chan_id).is_some() {
6821 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
6822 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
6823 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
6824 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6829 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
6830 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
6831 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
6833 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
6834 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
6835 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
6837 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
6839 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
6844 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6846 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
6847 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
6848 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
6850 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
6851 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
6857 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
6858 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
6860 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
6862 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
6863 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
6864 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
6865 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
6867 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
6868 logger: args.logger,
6869 default_configuration: args.default_config,
6872 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
6873 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
6876 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
6877 //connection or two.
6879 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
6885 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6886 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6887 use core::time::Duration;
6888 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
6889 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
6890 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
6891 use ln::channelmanager::inbound_payment;
6892 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
6893 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
6895 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
6896 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
6897 use util::errors::APIError;
6898 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
6899 use util::test_utils;
6900 use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
6902 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
6904 fn test_wait_timeout() {
6905 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
6907 use core::sync::atomic::AtomicBool;
6910 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
6911 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
6913 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
6914 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
6915 thread::spawn(move || {
6917 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
6918 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6919 *persistence_lock = true;
6922 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
6928 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
6929 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
6931 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
6934 if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
6939 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
6941 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
6944 if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
6951 fn test_notify_limits() {
6952 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
6953 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
6954 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6955 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6956 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6957 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6959 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
6960 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
6961 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6962 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6963 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6965 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6967 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
6968 // to connect messages with new values
6969 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
6970 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
6971 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
6972 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
6974 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
6975 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6976 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6977 // ... but the last node should not.
6978 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6979 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
6980 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6981 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6983 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
6984 // about the channel.
6985 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6986 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6987 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6989 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
6991 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6992 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6993 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6994 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6995 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6996 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6998 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
6999 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7000 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7002 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
7003 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
7004 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
7005 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
7006 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
7007 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
7009 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
7010 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
7011 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7012 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7013 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7014 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7015 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7016 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7018 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
7019 // the channel info has updated.
7020 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7021 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7022 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7023 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7024 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7025 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7029 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
7030 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
7032 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7033 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7034 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7035 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7036 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7038 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
7039 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7040 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
7041 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
7042 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
7043 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
7044 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
7045 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7046 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7047 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7048 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
7050 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
7051 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7052 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7053 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7054 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7055 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7056 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7057 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7058 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7059 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7060 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7061 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7062 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7063 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7064 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7065 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7066 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7067 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7068 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7069 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7070 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7071 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
7073 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
7074 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
7075 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7076 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7077 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7078 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
7080 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
7081 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
7082 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
7083 // lightning messages manually.
7084 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
7085 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7086 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7087 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7088 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
7089 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7090 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7091 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
7092 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7093 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7094 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
7095 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7096 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7097 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7098 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7099 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7100 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7101 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
7102 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7103 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7104 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
7105 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7106 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7107 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7108 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7109 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
7110 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7112 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
7113 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
7114 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7115 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
7117 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
7118 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
7119 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
7120 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
7122 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7125 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7126 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7127 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7128 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7130 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7133 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7134 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7135 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7136 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7138 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7143 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
7144 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
7145 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
7146 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
7147 // fails as expected.
7148 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7149 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7150 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7151 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7152 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7153 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7154 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7156 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
7157 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
7158 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
7160 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
7161 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7162 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id()),
7163 final_value_msat: 100_000,
7164 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
7166 let route = find_route(
7167 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, nodes[0].network_graph, None,
7168 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7170 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7171 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7172 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7173 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7174 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7175 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7176 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7177 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7178 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7179 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7180 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7181 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7182 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7183 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7184 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7185 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7186 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7187 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7188 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7189 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7190 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7192 // Finally, claim the original payment.
7193 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7195 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
7196 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7197 let route = find_route(
7198 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, nodes[0].network_graph, None,
7199 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7201 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7202 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7203 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7204 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7205 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
7206 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
7207 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
7209 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
7210 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7211 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
7212 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7213 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7214 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7215 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7216 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7217 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7218 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7219 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7220 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7221 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7222 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7223 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7224 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7225 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7226 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7227 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7228 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7229 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7230 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7231 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7233 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
7234 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7238 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
7239 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
7240 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
7241 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7242 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7243 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7244 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7246 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7247 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7248 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7249 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7251 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7252 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7253 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7254 final_value_msat: 10000,
7255 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7257 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7258 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7259 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7260 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7261 let route = find_route(
7262 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7263 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7266 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7267 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
7268 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
7269 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7271 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7272 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7273 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7274 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7275 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7276 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7277 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7279 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
7283 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
7284 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
7285 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7286 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7287 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7288 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7290 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7291 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7292 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7293 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7295 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7296 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7297 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7298 final_value_msat: 10000,
7299 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7301 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7302 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7303 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7304 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7305 let route = find_route(
7306 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7307 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7310 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7311 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7312 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
7313 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
7314 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7316 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7317 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7318 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7319 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7320 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7321 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7322 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7324 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
7328 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
7329 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7330 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7331 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
7332 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7334 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7335 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7336 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7337 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7339 // Marshall an MPP route.
7340 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
7341 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
7342 route.paths.push(path);
7343 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7344 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
7345 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
7346 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
7347 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
7348 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
7350 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None).unwrap_err() {
7351 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
7352 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
7353 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
7358 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
7359 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
7360 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7361 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7362 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7363 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7365 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
7366 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
7368 total_msat: 100_000,
7371 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
7372 // payment verification fails as expected.
7373 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
7374 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
7375 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
7376 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
7378 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
7382 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
7383 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
7387 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
7390 use chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
7391 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, KeysInterface, InMemorySigner};
7392 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
7393 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
7394 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7395 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
7396 use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
7397 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
7398 use util::test_utils;
7399 use util::config::UserConfig;
7400 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
7402 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7403 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7404 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
7406 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
7410 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
7411 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
7412 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
7413 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
7414 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
7415 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
7416 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
7421 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
7422 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
7425 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
7426 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
7427 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
7429 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
7430 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7432 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
7433 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7435 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
7436 config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
7438 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
7439 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
7440 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
7441 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
7442 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
7444 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
7446 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
7448 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
7449 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
7450 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
7451 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
7452 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
7454 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
7456 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
7458 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7459 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7460 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
7461 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7462 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7465 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
7466 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7467 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
7469 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
7470 } else { panic!(); }
7472 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7473 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7475 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
7478 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
7481 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
7482 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
7484 node_a.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7485 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7486 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
7487 match msg_events[0] {
7488 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref msg, .. } => {
7489 node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
7490 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
7494 match msg_events[1] {
7495 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7499 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
7501 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
7502 macro_rules! send_payment {
7503 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
7504 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
7505 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id())
7506 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7507 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7508 let seed = [3u8; 32];
7509 let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42);
7510 let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7511 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph.read_only(),
7512 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7514 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
7515 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
7517 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
7518 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
7520 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
7521 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
7522 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7523 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
7524 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
7525 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
7526 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
7527 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7529 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
7530 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
7531 assert!($node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
7533 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
7534 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
7535 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
7536 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7537 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
7539 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
7542 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
7543 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
7544 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
7545 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7547 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
7552 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
7553 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);