1 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
3 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
4 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
5 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
7 //! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
8 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
9 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
14 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
15 use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
17 use bitcoin_hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
18 use bitcoin_hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
19 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
20 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
21 use bitcoin_hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
23 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
24 use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
25 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
28 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,FeeEstimator};
29 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
30 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
31 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
32 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
33 use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop};
36 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
37 use chain::keysinterface::{ChannelKeys, KeysInterface, InMemoryChannelKeys};
38 use util::config::UserConfig;
39 use util::{byte_utils, events};
40 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
41 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
42 use util::logger::Logger;
43 use util::errors::APIError;
46 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
47 use std::io::{Cursor, Read};
48 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock};
49 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
50 use std::time::Duration;
51 use std::marker::{Sync, Send};
54 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
56 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
57 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
58 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
60 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
61 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
62 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
63 // before we forward it.
65 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
66 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
67 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
68 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
69 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
71 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
72 enum PendingForwardReceiveHTLCInfo {
74 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
75 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually
78 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
82 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
83 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
84 type_data: PendingForwardReceiveHTLCInfo,
85 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
86 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
87 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
88 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
91 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
92 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
93 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
94 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
97 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
98 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
99 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
100 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
101 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
104 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
106 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
108 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
112 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
116 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
117 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
118 pub(super) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
119 short_channel_id: u64,
121 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
124 struct ClaimableHTLC {
125 src: HTLCPreviousHopData,
127 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
130 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
131 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
132 pub(super) enum HTLCSource {
133 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
136 session_priv: SecretKey,
137 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
138 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
139 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
144 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
145 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
147 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
148 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
153 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
154 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
156 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
164 /// payment_hash type, use to cross-lock hop
165 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
166 pub struct PaymentHash(pub [u8;32]);
167 /// payment_preimage type, use to route payment between hop
168 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
169 pub struct PaymentPreimage(pub [u8;32]);
171 type ShutdownResult = (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
173 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
174 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
175 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
176 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
177 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
179 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
180 err: msgs::LightningError,
181 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
183 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
185 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
187 err: LightningError {
189 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
190 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
192 data: err.to_string()
196 shutdown_finish: None,
200 fn ignore_no_close(err: &'static str) -> Self {
202 err: LightningError {
204 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
206 shutdown_finish: None,
210 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
211 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
214 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
216 err: LightningError {
218 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
219 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
221 data: err.to_string()
225 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
229 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
232 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
234 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
236 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
238 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
239 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
241 data: msg.to_string()
245 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { msg, .. } => LightningError {
247 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
248 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
250 data: msg.to_string()
255 shutdown_finish: None,
260 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
261 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
262 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
263 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
264 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
266 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
267 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
268 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
269 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
270 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
271 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
272 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
274 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
278 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
279 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
280 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<ChanSigner>>,
281 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
282 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
283 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
284 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
285 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
286 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
287 /// (payment_hash, payment_secret) -> Vec<HTLCs> for tracking things that
288 /// were to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
289 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
290 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
292 /// TODO: We need to time out HTLCs sitting here which are waiting on other AMP HTLCs to
294 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<(PaymentHash, Option<[u8; 32]>), Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
295 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
296 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
297 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
300 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
301 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
303 latest_features: InitFeatures,
306 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
307 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
309 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
310 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
311 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
312 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
313 /// issues such as overly long function definitions.
314 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M> = Arc<ChannelManager<InMemoryChannelKeys, Arc<M>>>;
316 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
317 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
318 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
319 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
320 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
321 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions.
322 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, M> = ChannelManager<InMemoryChannelKeys, &'a M>;
324 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
325 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
327 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
328 /// to individual Channels.
330 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
331 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
332 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
333 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
335 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
336 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
337 /// returning from ManyChannelMonitor::add_update_monitor, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
338 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
339 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
340 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
341 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
343 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager), which
344 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
345 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
346 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
349 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
350 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
351 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
352 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
353 /// timer_chan_freshness_every_min roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
355 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
356 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
357 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
358 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
359 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
360 pub struct ChannelManager<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref> where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor {
361 default_configuration: UserConfig,
362 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
363 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
365 tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
368 pub(super) latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
370 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
371 last_block_hash: Mutex<Sha256dHash>,
372 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
375 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>,
377 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>,
378 our_network_key: SecretKey,
380 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
382 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
383 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
384 /// are currently open with that peer.
385 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
386 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
388 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
390 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
391 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
392 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
393 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
394 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
396 keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>>,
401 /// The amount of time we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time between when
402 /// we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
403 pub(crate) const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
404 /// The amount of time we're willing to wait to claim money back to us
405 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24 * 7;
407 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
408 /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
409 /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
410 /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
411 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
412 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 12; //TODO?
413 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
415 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
416 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
417 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
418 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
419 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
420 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
423 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
425 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
426 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
429 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
431 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
432 pub struct ChannelDetails {
433 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
434 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
435 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
436 /// lifetime of the channel.
437 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
438 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
439 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
440 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
441 /// The node_id of our counterparty
442 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
443 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
444 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
445 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
446 pub counterparty_features: InitFeatures,
447 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
448 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
449 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
451 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
452 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
453 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
454 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
455 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
456 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
457 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
458 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
459 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
460 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
461 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
462 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
463 /// the peer is connected, and (c) no monitor update failure is pending resolution.
467 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
468 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
471 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
472 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
473 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
474 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
475 ParameterError(APIError),
476 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
477 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
478 /// paths than the ones selected).
479 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
480 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
481 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
482 /// in over-/re-payment.
484 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
485 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
488 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
489 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment.
490 PartialFailure(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
493 macro_rules! handle_error {
494 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr, $locked_channel_state: expr) => {
497 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
498 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
499 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
500 if let Some(update) = update_option {
501 $locked_channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
506 log_error!($self, "{}", err.err);
507 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
508 } else { $locked_channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id: $their_node_id, action: err.action.clone() }); }
509 // Return error in case higher-API need one
516 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
517 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
520 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
521 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
523 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
524 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
525 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
526 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
527 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
529 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
531 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { .. }) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
536 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
537 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
540 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
541 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
543 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
544 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
545 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
546 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
547 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
549 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
551 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { msg, update }) => {
552 log_error!($self, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
553 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
554 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
555 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
557 if let Some(update) = update {
558 if let Err(e) = $self.monitor.add_update_monitor(update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update) {
560 // Upstream channel is dead, but we want at least to fail backward HTLCs to save
561 // downstream channels. In case of PermanentFailure, we are not going to be able
562 // to claim back to_remote output on remote commitment transaction. Doesn't
563 // make a difference here, we are concern about HTLCs circuit, not onchain funds.
564 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {},
565 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {},
569 let mut shutdown_res = chan.force_shutdown();
570 if shutdown_res.0.len() >= 1 {
571 log_error!($self, "You have a toxic local commitment transaction {} avaible in channel monitor, read comment in ChannelMonitor::get_latest_local_commitment_txn to be informed of manual action to take", shutdown_res.0[0].txid());
573 shutdown_res.0.clear();
574 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
580 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
581 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
582 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
584 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
586 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
587 log_error!($self, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]));
588 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
589 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
590 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
592 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
593 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
594 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
595 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
596 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
597 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
598 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
599 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
600 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
601 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()));
604 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
605 log_info!($self, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
606 log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]),
607 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
609 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
610 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
612 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
613 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
615 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
616 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
617 if !$resend_commitment {
618 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
621 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
623 $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
624 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor"), *$entry.key()))
630 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
631 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
632 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
634 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
635 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
639 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
640 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
641 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
642 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
643 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
646 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
651 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref> ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M> where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor {
652 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
654 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
655 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
657 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
659 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
661 /// Users must provide the current blockchain height from which to track onchain channel
662 /// funding outpoints and send payments with reliable timelocks.
664 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
665 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods.
666 /// However, rather than calling these methods directly, the user should register
667 /// the ChannelManager as a listener to the BlockNotifier and call the BlockNotifier's
668 /// `block_(dis)connected` methods, which will notify all registered listeners in one
670 pub fn new(network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>,keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>>, config: UserConfig, current_blockchain_height: usize) -> Result<ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M>, secp256k1::Error> {
671 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
673 let res = ChannelManager {
674 default_configuration: config.clone(),
675 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
676 fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
680 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(current_blockchain_height),
681 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(Default::default()),
684 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
685 by_id: HashMap::new(),
686 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
687 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
688 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
689 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
691 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
693 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
695 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
697 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
698 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
708 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
710 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
711 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
712 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
713 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
715 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
716 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
718 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
719 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
720 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
721 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
722 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "channel_value must be at least 1000 satoshis" });
725 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)?;
726 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator);
728 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
729 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
730 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
731 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
732 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
733 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" });
735 panic!("RNG is bad???");
738 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
740 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
741 node_id: their_network_key,
747 fn list_channels_with_filter<F: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<ChanSigner>)) -> bool>(&self, f: F) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
748 let mut res = Vec::new();
750 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
751 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
752 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
753 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
754 res.push(ChannelDetails {
755 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
756 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
757 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
758 counterparty_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
759 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
760 inbound_capacity_msat,
761 outbound_capacity_msat,
762 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
763 is_live: channel.is_live(),
767 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
768 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
769 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.remote_network_id) {
770 chan.counterparty_features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
776 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
777 /// more information.
778 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
779 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
782 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
783 /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
785 /// These are guaranteed to have their is_live value set to true, see the documentation for
786 /// ChannelDetails::is_live for more info on exactly what the criteria are.
787 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
788 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
789 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
790 // really wanted anyway.
791 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
794 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
795 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
796 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
798 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
799 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
800 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
802 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
803 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
804 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
805 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
806 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
807 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
808 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
809 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(),
812 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
813 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
814 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
816 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
817 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
819 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel"})
822 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
823 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
825 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
826 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
831 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
832 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
833 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
842 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
843 let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
844 log_trace!(self, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} transactions to broadcast and {} HTLCs to fail", local_txn.len(), failed_htlcs.len());
845 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
846 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
848 for tx in local_txn {
849 log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(tx));
850 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
854 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
855 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
856 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
857 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
860 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
861 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
862 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
863 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
864 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
871 log_trace!(self, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
872 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
873 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
874 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
875 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
881 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
882 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
883 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
884 for chan in self.list_channels() {
885 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
889 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>) {
890 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
891 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
893 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
894 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
895 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
896 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
897 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
898 failure_code: $err_code,
899 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
904 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
905 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
908 let shared_secret = {
909 let mut arr = [0; 32];
910 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
913 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
915 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
916 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
917 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
918 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
919 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
920 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
921 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
922 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
925 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
926 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
927 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
928 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
929 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
932 let mut channel_state = None;
933 macro_rules! return_err {
934 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
936 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
937 if channel_state.is_none() {
938 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
940 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
941 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
942 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
943 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
944 })), channel_state.unwrap());
949 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
950 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
951 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac) = {
952 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
954 let error_code = match err {
955 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
956 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
957 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
958 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
959 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
961 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
964 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
965 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
966 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
973 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
976 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
977 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
978 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
979 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
980 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
981 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
982 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
983 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
984 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
985 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
986 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
987 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
991 // final_expiry_too_soon
992 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + (CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
993 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
995 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
996 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
997 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
999 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1000 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1001 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1004 let payment_data = match next_hop_data.format {
1005 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => None,
1006 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]),
1007 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data } => payment_data,
1010 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1011 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1012 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1013 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1015 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1016 type_data: PendingForwardReceiveHTLCInfo::Receive { payment_data },
1017 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1018 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1019 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1020 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1023 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1024 let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
1025 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1027 // Check two things:
1028 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
1029 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
1030 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
1032 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
1034 // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
1035 // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
1036 chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
1038 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1040 let blinding_factor = {
1041 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1042 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1043 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1044 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
1047 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
1049 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1051 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1054 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1055 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
1058 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
1059 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1060 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1061 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
1062 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1066 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1067 type_data: PendingForwardReceiveHTLCInfo::Forward {
1068 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
1069 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1071 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1072 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1073 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1074 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1078 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1079 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref type_data, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1080 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here (which is
1081 // important as various things later assume we are a ::Receive if short_channel_id is
1083 if let &PendingForwardReceiveHTLCInfo::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = type_data {
1084 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1085 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1086 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1087 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1089 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1091 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1092 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1094 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1095 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1096 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1097 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1098 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1099 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1100 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1102 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1103 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1105 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
1106 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1107 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1109 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1110 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1112 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1113 // We want to have at least LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS to fail prior to going on chain CLAIM_BUFFER blocks before expiration
1114 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1115 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1117 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1118 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1123 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1124 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1125 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1126 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1128 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1129 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1131 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1132 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(chan_update.contents.flags));
1134 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1136 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1141 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1144 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1145 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1146 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel<ChanSigner>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1147 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1148 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1152 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
1154 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1155 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1156 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1157 timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
1158 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
1159 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
1160 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1161 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
1162 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1163 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1166 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1167 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
1169 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1175 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1177 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1178 /// fields for more info.
1180 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1181 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1182 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1183 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1184 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1185 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1187 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
1189 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
1190 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths.
1192 /// In general, a path may raise:
1193 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
1194 /// node public key) is specified.
1195 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1196 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
1198 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1199 /// relevant updates.
1201 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
1202 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
1203 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1205 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
1206 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
1207 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
1208 /// must not contain multiple paths as otherwise the multipath data cannot be sent.
1209 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the basic_mpp feature bit
1210 /// set (either as required or as available).
1211 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: Option<&[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
1212 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
1213 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
1215 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
1216 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
1218 let mut total_value = 0;
1219 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1220 for path in route.paths.iter() {
1221 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
1222 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
1224 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
1225 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1226 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
1229 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
1231 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1232 let mut results = Vec::new();
1233 'path_loop: for path in route.paths.iter() {
1234 macro_rules! check_res_push {
1235 ($res: expr) => { match $res {
1238 results.push(Err(e));
1239 continue 'path_loop;
1245 log_trace!(self, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
1246 let (session_priv, prng_seed) = self.keys_manager.get_onion_rand();
1248 let onion_keys = check_res_push!(onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
1249 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"}));
1250 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = check_res_push!(onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height));
1251 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
1252 check_res_push!(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route had too large size once"}));
1254 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, &payment_hash);
1256 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1258 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1259 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1260 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1261 None => check_res_push!(Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!"})),
1262 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1265 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1266 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1268 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1269 check_res_push!(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"}));
1271 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1272 check_res_push!(Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!"}));
1274 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1276 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1277 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1278 }, onion_packet), channel_state, chan)
1280 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) => {
1281 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1282 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
1283 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1284 // that we will resent the commitment update once we unfree monitor
1285 // updating, so we have to take special care that we don't return
1286 // something else in case we will resend later!
1287 check_res_push!(Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed));
1290 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1291 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1292 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1293 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1294 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1295 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1296 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1304 } else { unreachable!(); }
1305 results.push(Ok(()));
1306 continue 'path_loop;
1309 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey, channel_lock) {
1310 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1312 check_res_push!(Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err }));
1316 let mut has_ok = false;
1317 let mut has_err = false;
1318 for res in results.iter() {
1319 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
1320 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
1321 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
1322 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
1329 if has_err && has_ok {
1330 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure(results))
1332 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
1338 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1340 /// Note that ALL inputs in the transaction pointed to by funding_txo MUST spend SegWit outputs
1341 /// or your counterparty can steal your funds!
1343 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1345 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1346 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1347 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1348 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1350 let (mut chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1351 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1352 let (res, chan) = match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1354 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo)
1355 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1356 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(), None)
1357 } else { unreachable!(); })
1362 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_their_node_id(), channel_state) {
1363 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1364 (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1366 Err(_) => { return; }
1369 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1370 // lock before add_update_monitor
1371 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1373 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1375 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1376 match handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", *temporary_channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), None)), chan.get_their_node_id(), channel_state) {
1377 Err(_) => { return; },
1378 Ok(()) => unreachable!(),
1382 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1383 // Its completely fine to continue with a FundingCreated until the monitor
1384 // update is persisted, as long as we don't generate the FundingBroadcastSafe
1385 // until the monitor has been safely persisted (as funding broadcast is not,
1387 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
1392 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1393 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1394 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1397 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1398 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1399 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1401 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1407 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<ChanSigner>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1408 if !chan.should_announce() { return None }
1410 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1412 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1414 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1415 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1417 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1418 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1419 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1420 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1421 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1425 /// Generates a signed node_announcement from the given arguments and creates a
1426 /// BroadcastNodeAnnouncement event.
1428 /// RGB is a node "color" and alias a printable human-readable string to describe this node to
1429 /// humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
1431 /// addresses represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node accepts
1432 /// incoming connections.
1433 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], addresses: msgs::NetAddressSet) {
1434 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1436 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1437 features: NodeFeatures::supported(),
1438 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
1439 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
1441 addresses: addresses.to_vec(),
1442 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
1443 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1445 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1447 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1448 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
1449 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
1450 signature: self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key),
1451 contents: announcement
1456 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1458 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1459 /// Will likely generate further events.
1460 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1461 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1463 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1464 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1465 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
1467 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1468 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1470 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1471 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1472 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1473 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1475 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1476 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1477 match forward_info {
1478 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1479 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1480 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1481 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1482 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1484 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
1485 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: Vec::new() }
1488 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1489 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
1490 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
1491 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
1492 // problem, not ours.
1499 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
1500 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1501 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1502 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1503 match forward_info {
1504 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
1505 type_data: PendingForwardReceiveHTLCInfo::Forward {
1507 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value }, } => {
1508 log_trace!(self, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), prev_short_channel_id, short_chan_id);
1509 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1510 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1511 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1512 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
1514 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet) {
1516 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1517 log_trace!(self, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
1519 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
1521 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap();
1522 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
1523 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
1529 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1531 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1532 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1533 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1534 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1535 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1536 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1537 // this channel currently :/.
1543 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
1544 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
1546 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
1547 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} after delay", short_chan_id);
1548 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1550 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1551 log_trace!(self, "Failed to fail backwards to short_id {}: {}", short_chan_id, msg);
1553 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
1555 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
1556 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
1557 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
1560 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1562 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1563 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
1564 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
1565 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
1566 // messages when we can.
1567 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
1568 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
1569 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
1576 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1577 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment() {
1580 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
1581 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
1582 let their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id();
1583 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
1584 ChannelError::Ignore(_) => {
1585 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1587 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1588 log_trace!(self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
1589 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
1590 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1591 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1593 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.force_shutdown(), self.get_channel_update(&channel).ok()))
1595 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { .. } => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
1597 match handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id, channel_state) {
1598 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1599 Err(_) => { continue; },
1603 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1604 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_their_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
1607 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1608 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
1609 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1610 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1611 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1612 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
1613 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1615 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1623 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1624 match forward_info {
1625 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
1626 type_data: PendingForwardReceiveHTLCInfo::Receive { payment_data },
1627 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. }, } => {
1628 let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1629 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1630 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1631 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
1634 let mut total_value = 0;
1635 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry((payment_hash, if let &Some(ref data) = &payment_data {
1636 Some(data.payment_secret.clone()) } else { None }))
1637 .or_insert(Vec::new());
1638 htlcs.push(ClaimableHTLC {
1640 value: amt_to_forward,
1641 payment_data: payment_data.clone(),
1643 if let &Some(ref data) = &payment_data {
1644 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
1645 total_value += htlc.value;
1646 if htlc.payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat != data.total_msat {
1647 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
1649 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
1651 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
1652 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
1653 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1654 short_channel_id: htlc.src.short_channel_id,
1655 htlc_id: htlc.src.htlc_id,
1656 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.src.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
1658 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec() }
1661 } else if total_value >= data.total_msat {
1662 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1663 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1664 payment_secret: Some(data.payment_secret),
1669 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1670 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1671 payment_secret: None,
1672 amt: amt_to_forward,
1676 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
1677 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
1679 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1680 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
1688 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1689 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
1692 if handle_errors.len() > 0 {
1693 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1694 for (their_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
1695 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
1699 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1700 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1701 events.append(&mut new_events);
1704 /// If a peer is disconnected we mark any channels with that peer as 'disabled'.
1705 /// After some time, if channels are still disabled we need to broadcast a ChannelUpdate
1706 /// to inform the network about the uselessness of these channels.
1708 /// This method handles all the details, and must be called roughly once per minute.
1709 pub fn timer_chan_freshness_every_min(&self) {
1710 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1711 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1712 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1713 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter_mut() {
1714 if chan.is_disabled_staged() && !chan.is_live() {
1715 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1716 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1721 } else if chan.is_disabled_staged() && chan.is_live() {
1723 } else if chan.is_disabled_marked() {
1724 chan.to_disabled_staged();
1729 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
1730 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
1731 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
1732 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
1733 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
1734 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<[u8; 32]>) -> bool {
1735 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1737 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1738 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&(*payment_hash, *payment_secret));
1739 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1740 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
1741 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1742 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
1743 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.src), payment_hash,
1744 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec() });
1750 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1751 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1752 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1753 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1754 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1755 /// still-available channels.
1756 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1757 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
1758 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
1759 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
1762 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, .. } => {
1763 log_trace!(self, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1764 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1765 match &onion_error {
1766 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
1768 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1770 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1771 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
1772 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
1773 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
1774 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
1775 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1776 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
1781 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1782 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1783 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1784 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
1786 error_code: onion_error_code
1790 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
1794 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
1795 // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
1796 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as Router::get_route
1797 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
1799 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
1800 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
1801 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1802 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1803 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1804 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
1806 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
1812 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1813 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1814 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1815 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
1816 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1817 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1819 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
1820 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1821 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1825 let mut forward_event = None;
1826 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
1827 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
1829 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
1830 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1831 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
1833 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1834 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
1837 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1838 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
1839 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1840 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
1841 time_forwardable: time
1848 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1849 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1850 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1852 /// You must specify the expected amounts for this HTLC, and we will only claim HTLCs
1853 /// available within a few percent of the expected amount. This is critical for several
1854 /// reasons : a) it avoids providing senders with `proof-of-payment` (in the form of the
1855 /// payment_preimage without having provided the full value and b) it avoids certain
1856 /// privacy-breaking recipient-probing attacks which may reveal payment activity to
1857 /// motivated attackers.
1859 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1860 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, payment_secret: &Option<[u8; 32]>, expected_amount: u64) -> bool {
1861 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1863 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1865 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1866 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&(payment_hash, *payment_secret));
1867 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1868 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
1869 let passes_value = if let &Some(ref data) = &sources[0].payment_data {
1870 assert!(payment_secret.is_some());
1871 if data.total_msat == expected_amount { true } else { false }
1873 assert!(payment_secret.is_none());
1877 let mut one_claimed = false;
1878 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
1879 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1880 if !passes_value && (htlc.value < expected_amount || htlc.value > expected_amount * 2) {
1881 let mut htlc_msat_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
1882 let mut height_data = byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).to_vec();
1883 htlc_msat_data.append(&mut height_data);
1884 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
1885 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.src), &payment_hash,
1886 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_data });
1888 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.src), payment_preimage);
1895 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
1896 let (their_node_id, err) = loop {
1898 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1899 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1900 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1901 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1905 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
1906 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1907 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1909 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1910 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1912 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1913 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1914 // why it's missing.
1919 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
1920 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
1921 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1922 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
1923 if let Some(chan_monitor) = monitor_option {
1924 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1925 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
1926 assert!(msgs.is_none());
1928 break (chan.get().get_their_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()));
1932 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
1933 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1934 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
1935 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1936 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1937 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1938 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1939 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1947 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1948 // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1949 //TODO: Do something with e?
1953 } else { unreachable!(); }
1959 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
1962 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1963 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1964 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1967 /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1968 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1970 pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1971 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
1972 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
1973 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
1974 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
1975 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1978 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1979 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1980 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
1981 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
1982 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
1983 if channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
1984 let chan_monitor = channel.channel_monitor().clone();
1985 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1987 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1988 // TODO: There may be some pending HTLCs that we intended to fail
1989 // backwards when a monitor update failed. We should make sure
1990 // knowledge of those gets moved into the appropriate in-memory
1991 // ChannelMonitor and they get failed backwards once we get
1992 // on-chain confirmations.
1993 // Note I think #198 addresses this, so once it's merged a test
1994 // should be written.
1995 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1996 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1998 close_results.push(channel.force_shutdown());
1999 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2000 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2006 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => true,
2009 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked) = channel.monitor_updating_restored();
2010 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2011 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), pending_forwards));
2013 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
2015 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
2016 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
2017 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2018 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2023 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
2024 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
2025 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2026 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2027 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2032 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2036 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2041 if needs_broadcast_safe {
2042 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
2043 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
2044 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
2047 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2048 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2049 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2052 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2053 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2054 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2055 msg: announcement_sigs,
2058 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2066 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().append(&mut pending_events);
2068 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
2069 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2071 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
2073 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
2074 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
2078 fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2079 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
2080 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
2083 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_node_id.clone(), their_features, msg, 0, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)
2084 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
2085 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2086 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2087 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
2088 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
2089 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2090 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
2091 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2092 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
2094 entry.insert(channel);
2100 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2101 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
2102 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2103 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2104 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
2105 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2106 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2107 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
2109 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, their_features), channel_state, chan);
2110 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
2112 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
2115 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2116 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
2117 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
2118 channel_value_satoshis: value,
2119 output_script: output_script,
2120 user_channel_id: user_id,
2125 fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2126 let ((funding_msg, monitor_update), mut chan) = {
2127 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2128 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2129 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
2130 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2131 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2132 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
2134 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
2136 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
2139 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
2140 // lock before add_update_monitor
2141 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2143 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
2144 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
2145 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
2146 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
2147 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
2148 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", funding_msg.channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), None));
2150 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
2151 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
2152 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
2153 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
2154 // until we have persisted our monitor.
2155 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2159 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2160 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2161 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
2162 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2163 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
2165 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2166 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
2167 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2176 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2177 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
2178 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2179 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2180 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2181 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2182 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2183 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2185 let chan_monitor = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg), channel_state, chan);
2186 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2187 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
2189 (chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get().get_user_id())
2191 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2194 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2195 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
2196 funding_txo: funding_txo,
2197 user_channel_id: user_id,
2202 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2203 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2204 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2205 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2206 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2207 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2208 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2210 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan);
2211 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
2212 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
2213 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
2214 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
2215 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
2216 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
2217 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
2218 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
2219 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
2220 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
2221 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2222 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2223 msg: announcement_sigs,
2228 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2232 fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2233 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
2234 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2235 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2237 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2238 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2239 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2240 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2242 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2243 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2244 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2245 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2249 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2250 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2251 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2255 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2256 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2257 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2259 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2260 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
2262 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2265 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
2266 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2268 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2269 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2270 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2271 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2279 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2280 let (tx, chan_option) = {
2281 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2282 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2283 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2284 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2285 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2286 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2288 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2289 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2290 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2291 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2296 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
2297 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
2298 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
2299 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
2300 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
2301 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2302 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2304 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2305 } else { (tx, None) }
2307 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2310 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
2311 log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
2312 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
2314 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2315 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2316 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2317 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2325 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2326 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
2327 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
2328 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
2330 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
2331 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
2332 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
2333 //but we should prevent it anyway.
2335 let (mut pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
2336 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2338 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2339 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2340 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2341 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2343 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2344 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
2345 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
2346 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
2347 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { incoming_shared_secret, .. }) = pending_forward_info {
2348 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get());
2349 pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2350 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2351 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2352 reason: if let Ok(update) = chan_update {
2353 // TODO: Note that |20 is defined as "channel FROM the processing
2354 // node has been disabled" (emphasis mine), which seems to imply
2355 // that we can't return |20 for an inbound channel being disabled.
2356 // This probably needs a spec update but should definitely be
2358 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x1000|20, &{
2359 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
2360 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(update.contents.flags));
2361 res.extend_from_slice(&update.encode_with_len()[..]);
2365 // This can only happen if the channel isn't in the fully-funded
2366 // state yet, implying our counterparty is trying to route payments
2367 // over the channel back to themselves (cause no one else should
2368 // know the short_id is a lightning channel yet). We should have no
2369 // problem just calling this unknown_next_peer
2370 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
2375 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info), channel_state, chan);
2377 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2382 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2383 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2385 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2386 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2387 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2388 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2389 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2391 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
2393 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2396 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
2400 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2401 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2402 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2403 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2404 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2405 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2406 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2408 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
2410 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2415 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2416 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2417 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2418 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2419 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2420 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2421 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2423 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
2424 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set")), channel_state, chan);
2426 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
2429 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2433 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2434 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2435 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2436 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2437 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2438 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2439 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2441 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
2442 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2443 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2444 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
2445 //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
2447 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2448 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2449 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2451 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
2452 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2453 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2454 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2455 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2456 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2457 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2458 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2460 commitment_signed: msg,
2464 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2465 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2466 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2472 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2477 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2478 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2479 let mut forward_event = None;
2480 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2481 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2482 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2483 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
2485 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2486 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.type_data {
2487 PendingForwardReceiveHTLCInfo::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
2488 PendingForwardReceiveHTLCInfo::Receive { .. } => 0,
2490 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2491 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2493 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2494 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2499 match forward_event {
2501 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2502 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2503 time_forwardable: time
2511 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2512 let (pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id) = {
2513 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2514 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2515 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2516 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2517 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2518 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2520 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
2521 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
2522 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2523 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2524 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
2525 assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && closing_signed.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
2526 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA"));
2528 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures);
2531 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2532 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2533 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2537 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2538 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2539 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2543 (pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
2545 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2548 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2549 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2551 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
2556 fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2557 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2558 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2559 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2560 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2561 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2562 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2564 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
2566 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2571 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2572 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2573 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2575 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2576 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2577 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2578 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2580 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2581 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
2584 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2585 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) =
2586 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone()), channel_state, chan);
2588 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
2589 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2590 if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }).is_err() ||
2591 self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }).is_err() {
2592 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature")), channel_state, chan);
2595 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2597 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2598 msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2599 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
2600 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
2601 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
2602 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
2603 contents: announcement,
2605 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
2608 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2613 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2614 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2615 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2617 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2618 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2619 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2620 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2622 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor, mut order, shutdown) =
2623 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg), channel_state, chan);
2624 if let Some(monitor) = channel_monitor {
2625 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2626 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
2627 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
2628 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
2629 if revoke_and_ack.is_none() {
2630 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2632 if commitment_update.is_none() {
2633 order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
2635 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, order, revoke_and_ack.is_some(), commitment_update.is_some());
2636 //TODO: Resend the funding_locked if needed once we get the monitor running again
2639 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2640 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2641 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2645 macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
2646 if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
2647 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2648 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2653 macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
2654 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2655 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2656 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2662 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2666 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2671 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2672 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2673 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2679 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2683 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
2684 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
2685 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
2686 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
2688 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2689 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2690 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2692 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2693 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2695 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2696 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
2697 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2698 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
2699 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
2701 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
2702 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2704 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2705 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected"});
2707 their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id();
2708 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) =
2709 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw), channel_state, chan)
2711 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2714 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2715 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
2716 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2717 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2718 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2719 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2720 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2721 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2731 match handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id, channel_state_lock) {
2732 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2733 Err(e) => { Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })}
2738 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref> events::MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M> where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor {
2739 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<events::MessageSendEvent> {
2740 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a
2741 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2742 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2744 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2745 for htlc_update in self.monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated() {
2746 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2747 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2748 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2750 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2751 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2756 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2757 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2758 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
2763 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref> events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M> where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor {
2764 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
2765 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a
2766 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2767 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2769 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2770 for htlc_update in self.monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated() {
2771 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2772 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2773 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2775 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2776 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2781 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2782 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2783 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
2788 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref + Sync + Send> ChainListener for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M> where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor {
2789 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
2790 let header_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
2791 log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", header_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
2792 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2793 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2795 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2796 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2797 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2798 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2799 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
2800 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
2801 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
2802 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2803 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2804 msg: funding_locked,
2806 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2807 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2808 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2809 msg: announcement_sigs,
2812 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2813 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
2814 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2815 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2816 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
2820 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
2821 for tx in txn_matched {
2822 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
2823 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
2824 log_trace!(self, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
2825 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2826 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2828 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
2829 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
2830 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
2831 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2832 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2833 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2842 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
2843 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2844 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2846 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2847 // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
2848 // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
2849 // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
2850 failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
2851 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2852 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2861 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2862 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2864 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
2865 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header_hash;
2868 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
2869 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, _: u32) {
2870 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2871 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2873 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2874 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2875 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2876 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2877 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
2878 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
2879 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
2880 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2882 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
2883 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
2884 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2894 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2895 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2897 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
2898 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.bitcoin_hash();
2902 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref + Sync + Send> ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M> where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor {
2903 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
2904 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2905 let res = self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, their_features, msg);
2907 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2908 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2912 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
2913 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2914 let res = self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, their_features, msg);
2916 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2917 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2921 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
2922 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2923 let res = self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg);
2925 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2926 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2930 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
2931 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2932 let res = self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg);
2934 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2935 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2939 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
2940 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2941 let res = self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg);
2943 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2944 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2948 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
2949 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2950 let res = self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg);
2952 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2953 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2957 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
2958 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2959 let res = self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg);
2961 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2962 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2966 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
2967 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2968 let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg);
2970 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2971 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2975 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
2976 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2977 let res = self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg);
2979 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2980 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2984 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
2985 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2986 let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg);
2988 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2989 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2993 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
2994 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2995 let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg);
2997 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2998 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
3002 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
3003 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3004 let res = self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg);
3006 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3007 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
3011 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
3012 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3013 let res = self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg);
3015 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3016 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
3020 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
3021 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3022 let res = self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg);
3024 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3025 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
3029 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
3030 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3031 let res = self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg);
3033 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3034 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
3038 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
3039 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3040 let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg);
3042 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3043 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
3047 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
3048 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3049 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3050 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
3051 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
3053 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3054 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3055 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3056 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3057 if no_connection_possible {
3058 log_debug!(self, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
3059 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3060 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
3061 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3062 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3064 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
3065 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
3066 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3076 log_debug!(self, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
3077 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3078 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
3079 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
3080 chan.to_disabled_marked();
3081 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
3082 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
3083 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
3085 if chan.is_shutdown() {
3086 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3087 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3091 no_channels_remain = false;
3097 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
3099 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3100 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3101 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3102 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3103 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3104 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3105 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3106 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3107 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3108 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3109 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3110 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
3111 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
3112 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
3113 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3114 &events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => true,
3118 if no_channels_remain {
3119 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(their_node_id);
3122 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3123 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3125 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
3126 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
3127 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
3132 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
3133 log_debug!(self, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
3135 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3138 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3139 match peer_state_lock.entry(their_node_id.clone()) {
3140 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3141 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
3142 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
3145 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
3146 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
3151 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3152 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3153 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3154 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3155 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
3156 if !chan.have_received_message() {
3157 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
3158 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
3159 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
3163 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
3164 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
3165 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(),
3171 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
3174 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
3175 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3177 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
3178 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3179 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
3180 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
3184 self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
3189 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3190 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3192 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCInfo {
3193 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3194 match &self.type_data {
3195 &PendingForwardReceiveHTLCInfo::Forward { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id } => {
3197 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
3198 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3200 &PendingForwardReceiveHTLCInfo::Receive { ref payment_data } => {
3202 payment_data.write(writer)?;
3205 self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
3206 self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3207 self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
3208 self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
3213 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingHTLCInfo {
3214 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
3215 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
3216 type_data: match Readable::read(reader)? {
3217 0u8 => PendingForwardReceiveHTLCInfo::Forward {
3218 onion_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
3219 short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3221 1u8 => PendingForwardReceiveHTLCInfo::Receive {
3222 payment_data: Readable::read(reader)?,
3224 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3226 incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
3227 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
3228 amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
3229 outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
3234 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
3235 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3237 &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => {
3239 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3241 &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => {
3243 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3250 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailureMsg {
3251 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
3252 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3253 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3254 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3255 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3260 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus {
3261 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3263 &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => {
3265 forward_info.write(writer)?;
3267 &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => {
3269 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3276 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingHTLCStatus {
3277 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
3278 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3279 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3280 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3281 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3286 impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, {
3289 incoming_packet_shared_secret
3292 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
3293 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3295 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => {
3297 hop_data.write(writer)?;
3299 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
3301 path.write(writer)?;
3302 session_priv.write(writer)?;
3303 first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
3310 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCSource {
3311 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
3312 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3313 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3314 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3315 path: Readable::read(reader)?,
3316 session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
3317 first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
3319 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3324 impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
3325 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3327 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3331 &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
3333 failure_code.write(writer)?;
3334 data.write(writer)?;
3341 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailReason {
3342 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
3343 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3344 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
3345 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3346 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
3347 data: Readable::read(reader)?,
3349 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3354 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
3355 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3357 &HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { ref prev_short_channel_id, ref prev_htlc_id, ref forward_info } => {
3359 prev_short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3360 prev_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3361 forward_info.write(writer)?;
3363 &HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3365 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3366 err_packet.write(writer)?;
3373 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCForwardInfo {
3374 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCForwardInfo, DecodeError> {
3375 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3376 0 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC {
3377 prev_short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3378 prev_htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3379 forward_info: Readable::read(reader)?,
3381 1 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC {
3382 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3383 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
3385 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3390 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Writeable, M: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M> where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor {
3391 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3392 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
3394 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3395 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3397 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
3398 (self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
3399 self.last_block_hash.lock().unwrap().write(writer)?;
3401 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3402 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
3403 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3404 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3405 unfunded_channels += 1;
3408 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
3409 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3410 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3411 channel.write(writer)?;
3415 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3416 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
3417 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3418 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3419 for forward in pending_forwards {
3420 forward.write(writer)?;
3424 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3425 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
3426 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3427 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3428 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
3429 htlc.src.write(writer)?;
3430 htlc.value.write(writer)?;
3431 htlc.payment_data.write(writer)?;
3435 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3436 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3437 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3438 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
3439 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3440 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
3443 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
3449 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
3451 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
3453 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
3454 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling <(Sha256dHash,
3455 /// ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args).
3456 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
3457 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
3458 /// 3) Register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints with your chain watch mechanism using
3459 /// ChannelMonitor::get_monitored_outpoints and ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
3460 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
3461 /// 5) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local ManyChannelMonitor.
3462 /// 6) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
3463 /// 7) Register the new ChannelManager with your ChainWatchInterface.
3464 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref> where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor {
3465 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
3466 /// deserialization.
3467 pub keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>>,
3469 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3471 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
3472 pub fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
3473 /// The ManyChannelMonitor for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3475 /// No calls to the ManyChannelMonitor will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
3476 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
3477 /// ManyChannelMonitor after deserializing this ChannelManager.
3480 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
3481 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
3482 /// force-closed during deserialization.
3483 pub tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
3484 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
3485 /// deserialization.
3486 pub logger: Arc<Logger>,
3487 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
3488 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
3489 pub default_config: UserConfig,
3491 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
3492 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
3494 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
3495 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
3496 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
3497 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
3499 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
3501 pub channel_monitors: &'a mut HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor>,
3504 impl<'a, R : ::std::io::Read, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable<R>, M: Deref> ReadableArgs<R, ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M>) where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor {
3505 fn read(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3506 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3507 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3508 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
3509 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
3512 let genesis_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3513 let latest_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3514 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3516 let mut closed_channels = Vec::new();
3518 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3519 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3520 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3521 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3522 for _ in 0..channel_count {
3523 let mut channel: Channel<ChanSigner> = ReadableArgs::read(reader, args.logger.clone())?;
3524 if channel.last_block_connected != last_block_hash {
3525 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3528 let funding_txo = channel.channel_monitor().get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
3529 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
3530 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
3531 if channel.get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_local_commitment_number() ||
3532 channel.get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
3533 channel.get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_remote_commitment_number() {
3534 let mut force_close_res = channel.force_shutdown();
3535 force_close_res.0 = monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn();
3536 closed_channels.push(force_close_res);
3538 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3539 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
3541 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
3544 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3548 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
3549 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
3550 closed_channels.push((monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn(), Vec::new()));
3554 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3555 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3556 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
3557 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3558 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3559 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, 128));
3560 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
3561 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3563 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
3566 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3567 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3568 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
3569 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3570 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3571 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, 2));
3572 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
3573 previous_hops.push(ClaimableHTLC {
3574 src: Readable::read(reader)?,
3575 value: Readable::read(reader)?,
3576 payment_data: Readable::read(reader)?,
3579 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
3582 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3583 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, 128));
3584 for _ in 0..peer_count {
3585 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
3586 let peer_state = PeerState {
3587 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
3589 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
3592 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3594 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
3596 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
3597 monitor: args.monitor,
3598 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
3600 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(latest_block_height as usize),
3601 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(last_block_hash),
3602 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
3604 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
3609 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
3611 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
3613 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
3615 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
3617 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3618 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
3619 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
3620 logger: args.logger,
3621 default_configuration: args.default_config,
3624 for close_res in closed_channels.drain(..) {
3625 channel_manager.finish_force_close_channel(close_res);
3626 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
3627 //connection or two.
3630 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))