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[rust-lightning] / lightning / src / ln / channelmanager.rs
1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
2 // history.
3 //
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
8 // licenses.
9
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
11 //!
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
15 //!
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
19
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
24
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
28
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
32
33 use crate::blinded_path::BlindedPath;
34 use crate::blinded_path::payment::{PaymentConstraints, ReceiveTlvs};
35 use crate::chain;
36 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
37 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
38 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
39 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
40 use crate::events;
41 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
42 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
43 // construct one themselves.
44 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
45 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel};
46 use crate::ln::features::{Bolt12InvoiceFeatures, ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
47 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
48 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
49 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
50 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
51 use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters};
52 use crate::ln::msgs;
53 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
54 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
55 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
56 #[cfg(test)]
57 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
58 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{Bolt12PaymentError, OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs, StaleExpiration};
59 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
60 use crate::offers::invoice::{BlindedPayInfo, Bolt12Invoice, DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY, DerivedSigningPubkey, InvoiceBuilder};
61 use crate::offers::invoice_error::InvoiceError;
62 use crate::offers::merkle::SignError;
63 use crate::offers::offer::{DerivedMetadata, Offer, OfferBuilder};
64 use crate::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
65 use crate::offers::refund::{Refund, RefundBuilder};
66 use crate::onion_message::{Destination, OffersMessage, OffersMessageHandler, PendingOnionMessage, new_pending_onion_message};
67 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
68 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
69 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
70 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
71 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
72 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
73 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
74 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
75
76 use alloc::collections::{btree_map, BTreeMap};
77
78 use crate::io;
79 use crate::prelude::*;
80 use core::{cmp, mem};
81 use core::cell::RefCell;
82 use crate::io::Read;
83 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
84 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
85 use core::time::Duration;
86 use core::ops::Deref;
87
88 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
89 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
90 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
91
92 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
93 //
94 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
95 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
96 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
97 //
98 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
99 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
100 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
101 // before we forward it.
102 //
103 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
104 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
105 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
106 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
107 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
108
109 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
110 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
111         Forward {
112                 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
113                 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
114                 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
115                 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
116         },
117         Receive {
118                 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
119                 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
120                 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
121                 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
122                 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
123                 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
124         },
125         ReceiveKeysend {
126                 /// This was added in 0.0.116 and will break deserialization on downgrades.
127                 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
128                 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
129                 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
130                 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
131                 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
132                 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
133         },
134 }
135
136 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
137 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
138         pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
139         pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
140         payment_hash: PaymentHash,
141         /// Amount received
142         pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
143         /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
144         /// may overshoot this in either case)
145         pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
146         pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
147         /// The fee being skimmed off the top of this HTLC. If this is a forward, it'll be the fee we are
148         /// skimming. If we're receiving this HTLC, it's the fee that our counterparty skimmed.
149         pub(super) skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
150 }
151
152 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
153 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
154         Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
155         Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
156 }
157
158 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
159 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
160 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
161         Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
162         Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
163 }
164
165 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
166         pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
167
168         // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
169         // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
170         // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
171         // HTLCs.
172         //
173         // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
174         prev_short_channel_id: u64,
175         prev_htlc_id: u64,
176         prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
177         prev_user_channel_id: u128,
178 }
179
180 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
181         AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
182         FailHTLC {
183                 htlc_id: u64,
184                 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
185         },
186 }
187
188 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
189 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
190 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
191         // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
192         short_channel_id: u64,
193         user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
194         htlc_id: u64,
195         incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
196         phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
197
198         // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
199         // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
200         outpoint: OutPoint,
201 }
202
203 enum OnionPayload {
204         /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
205         Invoice {
206                 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
207                 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
208                 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
209         },
210         /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
211         Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
212 }
213
214 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
215 struct ClaimableHTLC {
216         prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
217         cltv_expiry: u32,
218         /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
219         value: u64,
220         /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
221         /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
222         sender_intended_value: u64,
223         onion_payload: OnionPayload,
224         timer_ticks: u8,
225         /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
226         /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
227         total_value_received: Option<u64>,
228         /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
229         total_msat: u64,
230         /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
231         counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
232 }
233
234 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
235         fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
236                 events::ClaimedHTLC {
237                         channel_id: val.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
238                         user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
239                         cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
240                         value_msat: val.value,
241                         counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: val.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0),
242                 }
243         }
244 }
245
246 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
247 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
248 ///
249 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
250 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
251 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
252
253 impl PaymentId {
254         /// Number of bytes in the id.
255         pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
256 }
257
258 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
259         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
260                 self.0.write(w)
261         }
262 }
263
264 impl Readable for PaymentId {
265         fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
266                 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
267                 Ok(PaymentId(buf))
268         }
269 }
270
271 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
272         fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
273                 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
274         }
275 }
276
277 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
278 ///
279 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
280 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
281 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
282
283 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
284         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
285                 self.0.write(w)
286         }
287 }
288
289 impl Readable for InterceptId {
290         fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
291                 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
292                 Ok(InterceptId(buf))
293         }
294 }
295
296 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
297 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
298 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
299         PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
300         OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
301 }
302 impl SentHTLCId {
303         pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
304                 match source {
305                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
306                                 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
307                                 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
308                         },
309                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
310                                 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
311                 }
312         }
313 }
314 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
315         (0, PreviousHopData) => {
316                 (0, short_channel_id, required),
317                 (2, htlc_id, required),
318         },
319         (2, OutboundRoute) => {
320                 (0, session_priv, required),
321         };
322 );
323
324
325 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
326 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
327 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
328 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
329         PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
330         OutboundRoute {
331                 path: Path,
332                 session_priv: SecretKey,
333                 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
334                 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
335                 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
336                 payment_id: PaymentId,
337         },
338 }
339 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
340 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
341         fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
342                 match self {
343                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
344                                 0u8.hash(hasher);
345                                 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
346                         },
347                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
348                                 1u8.hash(hasher);
349                                 path.hash(hasher);
350                                 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
351                                 payment_id.hash(hasher);
352                                 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
353                         },
354                 }
355         }
356 }
357 impl HTLCSource {
358         #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
359         #[cfg(test)]
360         pub fn dummy() -> Self {
361                 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
362                         path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
363                         session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
364                         first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
365                         payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
366                 }
367         }
368
369         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
370         /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
371         /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
372         pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
373                 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
374                         *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
375                 } else {
376                         // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
377                         true
378                 }
379         }
380 }
381
382 struct InboundOnionErr {
383         err_code: u16,
384         err_data: Vec<u8>,
385         msg: &'static str,
386 }
387
388 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
389 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
390 ///
391 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
392 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
393 pub enum FailureCode {
394         /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
395         /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
396         TemporaryNodeFailure,
397         /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
398         /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
399         RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
400         /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
401         /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
402         /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
403         /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
404         IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
405         /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
406         /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
407         ///
408         /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
409         /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
410         InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
411 }
412
413 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
414     fn into(self) -> u16 {
415                 match self {
416                         FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
417                         FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
418                         FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
419                         FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
420                 }
421         }
422 }
423
424 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
425 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
426 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
427 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
428 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
429
430 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
431         err: msgs::LightningError,
432         chan_id: Option<(ChannelId, u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
433         shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
434         channel_capacity: Option<u64>,
435 }
436 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
437         #[inline]
438         fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
439                 Self {
440                         err: LightningError {
441                                 err: err.clone(),
442                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
443                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
444                                                 channel_id,
445                                                 data: err
446                                         },
447                                 },
448                         },
449                         chan_id: None,
450                         shutdown_finish: None,
451                         channel_capacity: None,
452                 }
453         }
454         #[inline]
455         fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
456                 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None, channel_capacity: None }
457         }
458         #[inline]
459         fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, channel_capacity: u64) -> Self {
460                 let err_msg = msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: err.clone() };
461                 let action = if shutdown_res.monitor_update.is_some() {
462                         // We have a closing `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, which means the channel was funded and we
463                         // should disconnect our peer such that we force them to broadcast their latest
464                         // commitment upon reconnecting.
465                         msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(err_msg) }
466                 } else {
467                         msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: err_msg }
468                 };
469                 Self {
470                         err: LightningError { err, action },
471                         chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
472                         shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
473                         channel_capacity: Some(channel_capacity)
474                 }
475         }
476         #[inline]
477         fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
478                 Self {
479                         err: match err {
480                                 ChannelError::Warn(msg) =>  LightningError {
481                                         err: msg.clone(),
482                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
483                                                 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
484                                                         channel_id,
485                                                         data: msg
486                                                 },
487                                                 log_level: Level::Warn,
488                                         },
489                                 },
490                                 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
491                                         err: msg,
492                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
493                                 },
494                                 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
495                                         err: msg.clone(),
496                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
497                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
498                                                         channel_id,
499                                                         data: msg
500                                                 },
501                                         },
502                                 },
503                         },
504                         chan_id: None,
505                         shutdown_finish: None,
506                         channel_capacity: None,
507                 }
508         }
509
510         fn closes_channel(&self) -> bool {
511                 self.chan_id.is_some()
512         }
513 }
514
515 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
516 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
517 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
518 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
519 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
520
521 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
522 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
523 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
524 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
525 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
526 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
527         /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
528         CommitmentFirst,
529         /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
530         RevokeAndACKFirst,
531 }
532
533 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
534 struct ClaimingPayment {
535         amount_msat: u64,
536         payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
537         receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
538         htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
539         sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
540 }
541 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
542         (0, amount_msat, required),
543         (2, payment_purpose, required),
544         (4, receiver_node_id, required),
545         (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
546         (7, sender_intended_value, option),
547 });
548
549 struct ClaimablePayment {
550         purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
551         onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
552         htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
553 }
554
555 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
556 struct ClaimablePayments {
557         /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
558         /// failed/claimed by the user.
559         ///
560         /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
561         /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
562         ///
563         /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
564         /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
565         claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
566
567         /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
568         /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
569         /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
570         pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
571 }
572
573 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
574 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
575 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
576 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
577 #[derive(Debug)]
578 enum BackgroundEvent {
579         /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
580         /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
581         /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
582         /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
583         ///
584         /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
585         /// are regenerated on startup.
586         ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
587         /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
588         /// channel to continue normal operation.
589         ///
590         /// In general this should be used rather than
591         /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
592         /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
593         /// error the other variant is acceptable.
594         ///
595         /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
596         /// are regenerated on startup.
597         MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
598                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
599                 funding_txo: OutPoint,
600                 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
601         },
602         /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
603         /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
604         /// on a channel.
605         MonitorUpdatesComplete {
606                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
607                 channel_id: ChannelId,
608         },
609 }
610
611 #[derive(Debug)]
612 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
613         /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
614         /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
615         /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
616         /// event can be generated.
617         PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
618         /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
619         /// operation of another channel.
620         ///
621         /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
622         /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
623         /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
624         /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
625         /// outbound edge.
626         EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
627                 event: events::Event,
628                 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
629         },
630         /// Indicates we should immediately resume the operation of another channel, unless there is
631         /// some other reason why the channel is blocked. In practice this simply means immediately
632         /// removing the [`RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction`] provided from the blocking set.
633         ///
634         /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
635         /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
636         /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. However, we use this variant
637         /// instead of [`Self::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel`] when we discover that the claim was in
638         /// fact duplicative and we simply want to resume the outbound edge channel immediately.
639         ///
640         /// This variant should thus never be written to disk, as it is processed inline rather than
641         /// stored for later processing.
642         FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
643                 downstream_counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
644                 downstream_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
645                 blocking_action: RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
646         },
647 }
648
649 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
650         (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
651         // Note that FreeOtherChannelImmediately should never be written - we were supposed to free
652         // *immediately*. However, for simplicity we implement read/write here.
653         (1, FreeOtherChannelImmediately) => {
654                 (0, downstream_counterparty_node_id, required),
655                 (2, downstream_funding_outpoint, required),
656                 (4, blocking_action, required),
657         },
658         (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
659                 (0, event, upgradable_required),
660                 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
661                 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
662                 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
663                 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
664                 // downgrades to prior versions.
665                 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
666         },
667 );
668
669 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
670 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
671         ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
672                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
673                 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
674         },
675 }
676 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
677         (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
678                 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
679                 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
680         };
681 );
682
683 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
684 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
685 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
686 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
687         /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
688         /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
689         /// durably to disk.
690         ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
691                 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
692                 channel_id: ChannelId,
693                 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
694                 htlc_id: u64,
695         },
696 }
697
698 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
699         fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
700                 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
701                         channel_id: prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
702                         htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
703                 }
704         }
705 }
706
707 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
708         (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
709 ;);
710
711
712 /// State we hold per-peer.
713 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
714         /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
715         ///
716         /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
717         pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
718         /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
719         ///
720         /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
721         /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
722         /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
723         /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
724         pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
725         /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
726         latest_features: InitFeatures,
727         /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
728         /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
729         pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
730         /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
731         /// user but which have not yet completed.
732         ///
733         /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
734         /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
735         /// for a missing channel.
736         in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
737         /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
738         /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
739         ///
740         /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
741         /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
742         /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
743         /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
744         ///
745         /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
746         /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
747         /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
748         /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
749         /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
750         /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
751         monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
752         /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
753         /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
754         /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
755         /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
756         actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
757         /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
758         /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
759         /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
760         is_connected: bool,
761 }
762
763 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
764         /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
765         /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
766         /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
767         fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
768                 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
769                         return false
770                 }
771                 self.channel_by_id.iter().filter(|(_, phase)| matches!(phase, ChannelPhase::Funded(_))).count() == 0
772                         && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
773                         && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
774         }
775
776         // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
777         fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
778                 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
779         }
780
781         // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
782         fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
783                 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
784                         self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
785         }
786 }
787
788 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
789 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
790 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
791         /// The original OpenChannel message.
792         pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
793         /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
794         pub ticks_remaining: i32,
795 }
796
797 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
798 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
799 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
800
801 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
802 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
803 ///
804 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
805 /// here.
806 ///
807 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
808 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
809 struct PendingInboundPayment {
810         /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
811         payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
812         /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
813         /// this payment being removed.
814         expiry_time: u64,
815         /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
816         user_payment_id: u64,
817         // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
818         payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
819         min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
820 }
821
822 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
823 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
824 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
825 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
826 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
827 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
828 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
829 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
830 ///
831 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
832 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
833 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
834         Arc<M>,
835         Arc<T>,
836         Arc<KeysManager>,
837         Arc<KeysManager>,
838         Arc<KeysManager>,
839         Arc<F>,
840         Arc<DefaultRouter<
841                 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
842                 Arc<L>,
843                 Arc<RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
844                 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
845                 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
846         >>,
847         Arc<L>
848 >;
849
850 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
851 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
852 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
853 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
854 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
855 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
856 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
857 /// or, respectively, [`Router`]  for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
858 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
859 ///
860 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
861 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
862 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
863         ChannelManager<
864                 &'a M,
865                 &'b T,
866                 &'c KeysManager,
867                 &'c KeysManager,
868                 &'c KeysManager,
869                 &'d F,
870                 &'e DefaultRouter<
871                         &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
872                         &'g L,
873                         &'h RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
874                         ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
875                         ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
876                 >,
877                 &'g L
878         >;
879
880 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`].
881 ///
882 /// This is not exported to bindings users as general cover traits aren't useful in other
883 /// languages.
884 pub trait AChannelManager {
885         /// A type implementing [`chain::Watch`].
886         type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
887         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Watch`].
888         type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
889         /// A type implementing [`BroadcasterInterface`].
890         type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
891         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Broadcaster`].
892         type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
893         /// A type implementing [`EntropySource`].
894         type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
895         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::EntropySource`].
896         type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
897         /// A type implementing [`NodeSigner`].
898         type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
899         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::NodeSigner`].
900         type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
901         /// A type implementing [`WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner`].
902         type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
903         /// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`].
904         type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<Signer = Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
905         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`].
906         type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
907         /// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`].
908         type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
909         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::FeeEstimator`].
910         type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
911         /// A type implementing [`Router`].
912         type Router: Router + ?Sized;
913         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Router`].
914         type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
915         /// A type implementing [`Logger`].
916         type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
917         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Logger`].
918         type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
919         /// Returns a reference to the actual [`ChannelManager`] object.
920         fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
921 }
922
923 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
924 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
925 where
926         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
927         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
928         ES::Target: EntropySource,
929         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
930         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
931         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
932         R::Target: Router,
933         L::Target: Logger,
934 {
935         type Watch = M::Target;
936         type M = M;
937         type Broadcaster = T::Target;
938         type T = T;
939         type EntropySource = ES::Target;
940         type ES = ES;
941         type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
942         type NS = NS;
943         type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer;
944         type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
945         type SP = SP;
946         type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
947         type F = F;
948         type Router = R::Target;
949         type R = R;
950         type Logger = L::Target;
951         type L = L;
952         fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
953 }
954
955 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
956 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
957 ///
958 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
959 /// to individual Channels.
960 ///
961 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
962 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
963 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
964 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
965 ///
966 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
967 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST durably write each
968 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] before returning from
969 /// [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`] or before completing async writes. With
970 /// `ChannelManager`s, writing updates happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other
971 /// `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during the serialization process). If the
972 /// deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to
973 /// [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds
974 /// will be lost (modulo on-chain transaction fees).
975 ///
976 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
977 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
978 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
979 ///
980 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
981 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
982 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
983 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
984 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
985 ///
986 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
987 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
988 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
989 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
990 ///
991 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
992 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
993 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
994 ///
995 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
996 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
997 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
998 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
999 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
1000 ///
1001 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
1002 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
1003 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
1004 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
1005 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
1006 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
1007 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
1008 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
1009 //
1010 // Lock order:
1011 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
1012 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
1013 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
1014 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
1015 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
1016 //
1017 // Lock order tree:
1018 //
1019 // `pending_offers_messages`
1020 //
1021 // `total_consistency_lock`
1022 //  |
1023 //  |__`forward_htlcs`
1024 //  |   |
1025 //  |   |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
1026 //  |
1027 //  |__`per_peer_state`
1028 //      |
1029 //      |__`pending_inbound_payments`
1030 //          |
1031 //          |__`claimable_payments`
1032 //          |
1033 //          |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
1034 //              |
1035 //              |__`peer_state`
1036 //                  |
1037 //                  |__`id_to_peer`
1038 //                  |
1039 //                  |__`short_to_chan_info`
1040 //                  |
1041 //                  |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
1042 //                  |
1043 //                  |__`best_block`
1044 //                  |
1045 //                  |__`pending_events`
1046 //                      |
1047 //                      |__`pending_background_events`
1048 //
1049 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
1050 where
1051         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1052         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1053         ES::Target: EntropySource,
1054         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1055         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1056         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1057         R::Target: Router,
1058         L::Target: Logger,
1059 {
1060         default_configuration: UserConfig,
1061         chain_hash: ChainHash,
1062         fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1063         chain_monitor: M,
1064         tx_broadcaster: T,
1065         #[allow(unused)]
1066         router: R,
1067
1068         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1069         #[cfg(test)]
1070         pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1071         #[cfg(not(test))]
1072         best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1073         secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1074
1075         /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1076         /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1077         /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1078         /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1079         ///
1080         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1081         pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1082
1083         /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1084         /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1085         /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1086         /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1087         /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1088         /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1089         /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1090         /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1091         ///
1092         /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1093         ///
1094         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1095         pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1096
1097         /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1098         ///
1099         /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1100         /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1101         /// and via the classic SCID.
1102         ///
1103         /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1104         /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1105         ///
1106         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1107         #[cfg(test)]
1108         pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1109         #[cfg(not(test))]
1110         forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1111         /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1112         /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1113         ///
1114         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1115         pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1116
1117         /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1118         /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1119         ///
1120         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1121         claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1122
1123         /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1124         /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1125         /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1126         /// active channel list on load.
1127         ///
1128         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1129         outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1130
1131         /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1132         ///
1133         /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
1134         /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
1135         /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
1136         ///
1137         /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1138         /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1139         /// the handling of the events.
1140         ///
1141         /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1142         /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1143         ///
1144         /// TODO:
1145         /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1146         /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1147         /// would break backwards compatability.
1148         /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1149         /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1150         /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1151         ///
1152         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1153         id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<ChannelId, PublicKey>>,
1154
1155         /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1156         ///
1157         /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1158         /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1159         /// confirmation depth.
1160         ///
1161         /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1162         /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1163         /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1164         ///
1165         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1166         #[cfg(test)]
1167         pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1168         #[cfg(not(test))]
1169         short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1170
1171         our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1172
1173         inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1174
1175         /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1176         /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1177         /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1178         ///
1179         /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1180         fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1181
1182         /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1183         /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1184         /// keeping additional state.
1185         probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1186
1187         /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1188         /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1189         /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1190         highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1191
1192         /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1193         /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1194         ///
1195         /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1196         /// are currently open with that peer.
1197         ///
1198         /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1199         /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1200         /// channels.
1201         ///
1202         /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1203         ///
1204         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1205         #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1206         per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1207         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1208         pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1209
1210         /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1211         /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1212         /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1213         /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1214         /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1215         ///
1216         /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1217         /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1218         ///
1219         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1220         #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1221         pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1222         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1223         pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1224
1225         /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1226         pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1227
1228         /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1229         /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1230         /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1231         /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1232         /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1233         ///
1234         /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1235         ///
1236         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1237         ///
1238         /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1239         pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1240         /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1241         /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1242         /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1243         /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1244         /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1245         /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1246         total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1247         /// Tracks the progress of channels going through batch funding by whether funding_signed was
1248         /// received and the monitor has been persisted.
1249         ///
1250         /// This information does not need to be persisted as funding nodes can forget
1251         /// unfunded channels upon disconnection.
1252         funding_batch_states: Mutex<BTreeMap<Txid, Vec<(ChannelId, PublicKey, bool)>>>,
1253
1254         background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1255
1256         event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
1257         needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool,
1258
1259         pending_offers_messages: Mutex<Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>>>,
1260
1261         entropy_source: ES,
1262         node_signer: NS,
1263         signer_provider: SP,
1264
1265         logger: L,
1266 }
1267
1268 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1269 ///
1270 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1271 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1272 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1273 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1274 pub struct ChainParameters {
1275         /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1276         pub network: Network,
1277
1278         /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1279         ///
1280         /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1281         pub best_block: BestBlock,
1282 }
1283
1284 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1285 #[must_use]
1286 enum NotifyOption {
1287         DoPersist,
1288         SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1289         SkipPersistNoEvents,
1290 }
1291
1292 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1293 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1294 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1295 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1296 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1297 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1298 ///
1299 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1300 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1301 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1302 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1303         event_persist_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1304         needs_persist_flag: &'a AtomicBool,
1305         should_persist: F,
1306         // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1307         _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1308 }
1309
1310 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1311         /// Notifies any waiters and indicates that we need to persist, in addition to possibly having
1312         /// events to handle.
1313         ///
1314         /// This must always be called if the changes included a `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, as well as in
1315         /// other cases where losing the changes on restart may result in a force-close or otherwise
1316         /// isn't ideal.
1317         fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1318                 Self::optionally_notify(cm, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1319         }
1320
1321         fn optionally_notify<F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C, mut persist_check: F)
1322         -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1323                 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1324                 let force_notify = cm.get_cm().process_background_events();
1325
1326                 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1327                         event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1328                         needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1329                         should_persist: move || {
1330                                 // Pick the "most" action between `persist_check` and the background events
1331                                 // processing and return that.
1332                                 let notify = persist_check();
1333                                 match (notify, force_notify) {
1334                                         (NotifyOption::DoPersist, _) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1335                                         (_, NotifyOption::DoPersist) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1336                                         (NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents, _) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1337                                         (_, NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1338                                         _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
1339                                 }
1340                         },
1341                         _read_guard: read_guard,
1342                 }
1343         }
1344
1345         /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1346         /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first (or
1347         /// [`Self::optionally_notify`] used).
1348         fn optionally_notify_skipping_background_events<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>
1349         (cm: &'a C, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1350                 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1351
1352                 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1353                         event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1354                         needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1355                         should_persist: persist_check,
1356                         _read_guard: read_guard,
1357                 }
1358         }
1359 }
1360
1361 impl<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1362         fn drop(&mut self) {
1363                 match (self.should_persist)() {
1364                         NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
1365                                 self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
1366                                 self.event_persist_notifier.notify()
1367                         },
1368                         NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
1369                                 self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
1370                         NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
1371                 }
1372         }
1373 }
1374
1375 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1376 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1377 ///
1378 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1379 ///
1380 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1381 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1382 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1383 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1384 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1385
1386 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1387 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1388 ///
1389 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1390 ///
1391 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1392 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1393 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1394 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1395 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1396 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1397 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1398 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1399 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1400 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1401 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1402 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1403 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1404
1405 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1406 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1407 /// this value.
1408 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1409 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1410 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1411 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1412
1413 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1414 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1415 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1416 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1417 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1418 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1419 #[deny(const_err)]
1420 #[allow(dead_code)]
1421 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1422
1423 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1424 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1425 #[deny(const_err)]
1426 #[allow(dead_code)]
1427 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1428
1429 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1430 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1431
1432 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1433 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1434 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1435
1436 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1437 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1438 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1439
1440 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1441 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1442 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1443 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1444
1445 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1446 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1447 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1448
1449 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1450 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1451 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1452
1453 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1454 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1455 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1456         /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1457         pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1458         /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1459         pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1460         /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1461         /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1462         /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1463         pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1464 }
1465
1466 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1467 /// to better separate parameters.
1468 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1469 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1470         /// The node_id of our counterparty
1471         pub node_id: PublicKey,
1472         /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1473         /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1474         /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1475         pub features: InitFeatures,
1476         /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1477         /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1478         /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1479         ///
1480         /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1481         ///
1482         /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1483         pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1484         /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1485         /// payments to us through this channel.
1486         pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1487         /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1488         /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1489         /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1490         pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1491         /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1492         pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1493 }
1494
1495 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1496 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1497 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1498         /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1499         /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1500         /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1501         /// lifetime of the channel.
1502         pub channel_id: ChannelId,
1503         /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1504         pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1505         /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1506         /// our counterparty already.
1507         ///
1508         /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1509         /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1510         pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1511         /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1512         ///
1513         /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1514         pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1515         /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1516         /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1517         ///
1518         /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1519         /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1520         ///
1521         /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1522         /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1523         ///
1524         /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1525         /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1526         /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1527         /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1528         /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1529         pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1530         /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1531         /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1532         /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1533         /// `Some(0)`).
1534         ///
1535         /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1536         ///
1537         /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1538         /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1539         pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1540         /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1541         /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1542         /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1543         /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1544         ///
1545         /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1546         /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1547         ///
1548         /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1549         pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1550         /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1551         pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1552         /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1553         /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1554         /// this value on chain.
1555         ///
1556         /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1557         ///
1558         /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1559         ///
1560         /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1561         pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1562         /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
1563         /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
1564         /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
1565         /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel.  This may be zero for objects
1566         /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1567         ///
1568         /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
1569         /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
1570         /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
1571         pub user_channel_id: u128,
1572         /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1573         /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1574         ///
1575         /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1576         pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1577         /// Our total balance.  This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1578         /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1579         /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1580         ///
1581         /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1582         /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1583         /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1584         /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1585         ///
1586         /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1587         pub balance_msat: u64,
1588         /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1589         /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1590         /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1591         /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1592         ///
1593         /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1594         ///
1595         /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1596         /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1597         /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1598         pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1599         /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1600         /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1601         /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1602         /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1603         ///
1604         /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
1605         /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1606         pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1607         /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1608         /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1609         /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1610         /// route which is valid.
1611         pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1612         /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1613         /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1614         /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1615         /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1616         /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1617         ///
1618         /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1619         /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1620         /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1621         pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1622         /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1623         /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1624         /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1625         /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1626         /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1627         ///
1628         /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1629         ///
1630         /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1631         /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1632         /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1633         pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1634         /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1635         ///
1636         /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1637         pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1638         /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1639         /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1640         /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1641         /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1642         /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1643         ///
1644         /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1645         pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1646         /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1647         pub is_outbound: bool,
1648         /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1649         /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1650         /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1651         /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1652         /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1653         ///
1654         /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1655         pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1656         /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
1657         /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
1658         pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
1659         /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1660         /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1661         ///
1662         /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1663         pub is_usable: bool,
1664         /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1665         pub is_public: bool,
1666         /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1667         /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1668         pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1669         /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1670         pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1671         /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1672         ///
1673         /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1674         pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1675 }
1676
1677 impl ChannelDetails {
1678         /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1679         /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1680         /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1681         ///
1682         /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1683         /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1684         pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1685                 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1686         }
1687
1688         /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1689         /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1690         /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1691         ///
1692         /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1693         /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1694         pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1695                 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1696         }
1697
1698         fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
1699                 context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
1700                 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
1701         ) -> Self
1702         where
1703                 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1704                 F::Target: FeeEstimator
1705         {
1706                 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
1707                 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1708                         context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1709                 ChannelDetails {
1710                         channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1711                         counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1712                                 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1713                                 features: latest_features,
1714                                 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1715                                 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1716                                 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1717                                 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1718                                 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1719                                 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1720                                 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1721                                 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1722                                         Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1723                                 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1724                         },
1725                         funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1726                         // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1727                         // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1728                         channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1729                         short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1730                         outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1731                         inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1732                         channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1733                         feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1734                         unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1735                         balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1736                         inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1737                         outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1738                         next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1739                         next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1740                         user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1741                         confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1742                         confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1743                         force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1744                         is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1745                         is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1746                         is_usable: context.is_live(),
1747                         is_public: context.should_announce(),
1748                         inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1749                         inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1750                         config: Some(context.config()),
1751                         channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
1752                 }
1753         }
1754 }
1755
1756 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1757 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
1758 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
1759 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
1760 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
1761 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
1762 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
1763 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
1764         /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
1765         NotShuttingDown,
1766         /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
1767         ShutdownInitiated,
1768         /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
1769         /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
1770         ResolvingHTLCs,
1771         /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
1772         NegotiatingClosingFee,
1773         /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
1774         /// to drop the channel.
1775         ShutdownComplete,
1776 }
1777
1778 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1779 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1780 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1781 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1782         /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
1783         AwaitingInvoice {
1784                 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1785                 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1786                 payment_id: PaymentId,
1787         },
1788         /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1789         Pending {
1790                 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1791                 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1792                 payment_id: PaymentId,
1793                 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1794                 /// abandoned.
1795                 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1796                 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1797                 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1798                 total_msat: u64,
1799         },
1800         /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1801         /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1802         /// payment is removed from tracking.
1803         Fulfilled {
1804                 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1805                 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1806                 payment_id: PaymentId,
1807                 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1808                 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1809                 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1810         },
1811         /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1812         /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1813         /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1814         Abandoned {
1815                 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1816                 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1817                 payment_id: PaymentId,
1818                 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1819                 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1820         },
1821 }
1822
1823 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1824 ///
1825 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1826 #[derive(Clone)]
1827 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1828         /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1829         pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1830         /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1831         /// route hints.
1832         pub phantom_scid: u64,
1833         /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1834         pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1835 }
1836
1837 macro_rules! handle_error {
1838         ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1839                 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1840                 // entering the macro.
1841                 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1842                 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1843
1844                 match $internal {
1845                         Ok(msg) => Ok(msg),
1846                         Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish, channel_capacity }) => {
1847                                 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1848
1849                                 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1850                                         $self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1851                                         if let Some(update) = update_option {
1852                                                 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1853                                                         msg: update
1854                                                 });
1855                                         }
1856                                         if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1857                                                 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1858                                                         channel_id, user_channel_id,
1859                                                         reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() },
1860                                                         counterparty_node_id: Some($counterparty_node_id),
1861                                                         channel_capacity_sats: channel_capacity,
1862                                                 }, None));
1863                                         }
1864                                 }
1865
1866                                 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1867                                 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1868                                 } else {
1869                                         msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1870                                                 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1871                                                 action: err.action.clone()
1872                                         });
1873                                 }
1874
1875                                 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1876                                         let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1877                                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1878                                                 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1879                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1880                                         }
1881                                 }
1882
1883                                 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1884                                 Err(err)
1885                         },
1886                 }
1887         } };
1888         ($self: ident, $internal: expr) => {
1889                 match $internal {
1890                         Ok(res) => Ok(res),
1891                         Err((chan, msg_handle_err)) => {
1892                                 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1893                                 handle_error!($self, Err(msg_handle_err), counterparty_node_id).map_err(|err| (chan, err))
1894                         },
1895                 }
1896         };
1897 }
1898
1899 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1900         ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
1901                 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.channel_id());
1902                 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1903                 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
1904                         short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1905                 } else {
1906                         // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1907                         // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1908                         // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1909                         // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1910                         // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1911                         // stage.
1912                         let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1913                         debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1914                 }
1915                 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1916         }}
1917 }
1918
1919 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1920 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
1921         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
1922                 match $err {
1923                         ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1924                                 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
1925                         },
1926                         ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1927                                 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
1928                         },
1929                         ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1930                                 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
1931                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
1932                                 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
1933                                 let user_id = $channel.context.get_user_id();
1934                                 let channel_capacity_satoshis = $channel.context.get_value_satoshis();
1935
1936                                 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, user_id,
1937                                         shutdown_res, $channel_update, channel_capacity_satoshis))
1938                         },
1939                 }
1940         };
1941         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
1942                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
1943         };
1944         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
1945                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
1946         };
1947         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1948                 match $channel_phase {
1949                         ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
1950                                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
1951                         },
1952                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
1953                                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
1954                         },
1955                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
1956                                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
1957                         },
1958                 }
1959         };
1960 }
1961
1962 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
1963         ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1964                 match $res {
1965                         Ok(res) => res,
1966                         Err(e) => {
1967                                 let key = *$entry.key();
1968                                 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
1969                                 if drop {
1970                                         $entry.remove_entry();
1971                                 }
1972                                 break Err(res);
1973                         }
1974                 }
1975         }
1976 }
1977
1978 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
1979         ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1980                 match $res {
1981                         Ok(res) => res,
1982                         Err(e) => {
1983                                 let key = *$entry.key();
1984                                 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
1985                                 if drop {
1986                                         $entry.remove_entry();
1987                                 }
1988                                 return Err(res);
1989                         }
1990                 }
1991         }
1992 }
1993
1994 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
1995         ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1996                 {
1997                         let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1998                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
1999                         channel
2000                 }
2001         }
2002 }
2003
2004 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
2005         ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
2006                 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
2007                         node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2008                         msg: $channel_ready_msg,
2009                 });
2010                 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
2011                 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
2012                 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2013                 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2014                 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2015                         "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2016                 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
2017                         let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2018                         assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2019                                 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2020                 }
2021         }}
2022 }
2023
2024 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
2025         ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2026                 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
2027                         $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
2028                                 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2029                                 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
2030                                 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2031                                 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2032                                 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
2033                         }, None));
2034                         $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
2035                 }
2036         }
2037 }
2038
2039 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
2040         ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2041                 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
2042                         debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
2043                         $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
2044                                 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2045                                 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2046                                 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2047                                 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
2048                         }, None));
2049                         $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
2050                 }
2051         }
2052 }
2053
2054 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
2055         ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2056                 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
2057                         &$self.node_signer, $self.chain_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
2058                         $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
2059                 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
2060                 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
2061                         // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2062                         // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
2063                         // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
2064                         // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
2065                         // now.
2066                         if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
2067                                 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2068                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2069                                         msg,
2070                                 })
2071                         } else { None }
2072                 } else { None };
2073
2074                 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
2075                         .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
2076
2077                 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
2078                         &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
2079                         updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
2080                         updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
2081                         updates.announcement_sigs);
2082                 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2083                         $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2084                 }
2085
2086                 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
2087                 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = $chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2088                 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
2089                 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
2090
2091                 // If the channel belongs to a batch funding transaction, the progress of the batch
2092                 // should be updated as we have received funding_signed and persisted the monitor.
2093                 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2094                         let mut funding_batch_states = $self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2095                         let mut batch_completed = false;
2096                         if let Some(batch_state) = funding_batch_states.get_mut(&txid) {
2097                                 let channel_state = batch_state.iter_mut().find(|(chan_id, pubkey, _)| (
2098                                         *chan_id == channel_id &&
2099                                         *pubkey == counterparty_node_id
2100                                 ));
2101                                 if let Some(channel_state) = channel_state {
2102                                         channel_state.2 = true;
2103                                 } else {
2104                                         debug_assert!(false, "Missing channel batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2105                                 }
2106                                 batch_completed = batch_state.iter().all(|(_, _, completed)| *completed);
2107                         } else {
2108                                 debug_assert!(false, "Missing batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2109                         }
2110
2111                         // When all channels in a batched funding transaction have become ready, it is not necessary
2112                         // to track the progress of the batch anymore and the state of the channels can be updated.
2113                         if batch_completed {
2114                                 let removed_batch_state = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2115                                 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2116                                 let mut batch_funding_tx = None;
2117                                 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, _) in removed_batch_state {
2118                                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2119                                                 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2120                                                 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2121                                                         batch_funding_tx = batch_funding_tx.or_else(|| chan.context.unbroadcasted_funding());
2122                                                         chan.set_batch_ready();
2123                                                         let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2124                                                         emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, chan);
2125                                                 }
2126                                         }
2127                                 }
2128                                 if let Some(tx) = batch_funding_tx {
2129                                         log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting batch funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
2130                                         $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
2131                                 }
2132                         }
2133                 }
2134
2135                 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
2136
2137                 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
2138                         $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
2139                 }
2140                 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
2141                 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2142                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2143                         $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2144                 }
2145         } }
2146 }
2147
2148 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2149         ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $completed: expr) => { {
2150                 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
2151                 match $update_res {
2152                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => {
2153                                 let err_str = "ChannelMonitor[Update] persistence failed unrecoverably. This indicates we cannot continue normal operation and must shut down.";
2154                                 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err_str);
2155                                 panic!("{}", err_str);
2156                         },
2157                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
2158                                 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
2159                                         &$chan.context.channel_id());
2160                                 false
2161                         },
2162                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
2163                                 $completed;
2164                                 true
2165                         },
2166                 }
2167         } };
2168         ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2169                 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $chan, _internal,
2170                         handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2171         };
2172         ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2173                 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2174                         .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2175                 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2176                 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2177                 // filter for uniqueness here.
2178                 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2179                         .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2180                                 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2181                                 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2182                         });
2183                 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2184                 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $chan, _internal,
2185                         {
2186                                 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2187                                 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2188                                         handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2189                                 }
2190                         })
2191         } };
2192 }
2193
2194 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2195         ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2196                 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2197                 while !processed_all_events {
2198                         if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2199                                 return;
2200                         }
2201
2202                         let mut result;
2203
2204                         {
2205                                 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2206                                 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2207                                 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2208
2209                                 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2210                                 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2211                                 result = $self.process_background_events();
2212
2213                                 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2214                                 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2215                                 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2216                                         result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2217                                 }
2218                         }
2219
2220                         let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2221                         let num_events = pending_events.len();
2222                         if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2223                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2224                         }
2225
2226                         let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2227
2228                         for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2229                                 $event_to_handle = event;
2230                                 $handle_event;
2231                                 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2232                                         post_event_actions.push(action);
2233                                 }
2234                         }
2235
2236                         {
2237                                 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2238                                 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2239                                 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2240                                 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2241                                 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2242                                 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2243                         }
2244
2245                         if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2246                                 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2247                                 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2248                                 processed_all_events = false;
2249                         }
2250
2251                         match result {
2252                                 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2253                                         $self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2254                                         $self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
2255                                 },
2256                                 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2257                                         $self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2258                                 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2259                         }
2260                 }
2261         }
2262 }
2263
2264 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2265 where
2266         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
2267         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2268         ES::Target: EntropySource,
2269         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2270         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2271         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2272         R::Target: Router,
2273         L::Target: Logger,
2274 {
2275         /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2276         ///
2277         /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2278         ///
2279         /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2280         /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2281         ///
2282         /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2283         ///
2284         /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2285         /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2286         /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2287         /// more details.
2288         ///
2289         /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2290         /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2291         /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2292         pub fn new(
2293                 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2294                 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2295                 current_timestamp: u32,
2296         ) -> Self {
2297                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2298                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2299                 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2300                 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2301                 ChannelManager {
2302                         default_configuration: config.clone(),
2303                         chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(params.network),
2304                         fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2305                         chain_monitor,
2306                         tx_broadcaster,
2307                         router,
2308
2309                         best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2310
2311                         outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
2312                         pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2313                         pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2314                         forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2315                         claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
2316                         pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2317                         id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2318                         short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2319
2320                         our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2321                         secp_ctx,
2322
2323                         inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2324                         fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2325
2326                         probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2327
2328                         highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2329
2330                         per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2331
2332                         pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2333                         pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2334                         pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2335                         total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2336                         background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2337                         event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2338                         needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
2339                         funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
2340
2341                         pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2342
2343                         entropy_source,
2344                         node_signer,
2345                         signer_provider,
2346
2347                         logger,
2348                 }
2349         }
2350
2351         /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2352         pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2353                 &self.default_configuration
2354         }
2355
2356         fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2357                 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2358                 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2359                 let mut i = 0;
2360                 loop {
2361                         if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2362                                 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2363                         } else {
2364                                 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2365                         }
2366                         if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2367                                 break;
2368                         }
2369                         i += 1;
2370                         if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2371                 }
2372                 outbound_scid_alias
2373         }
2374
2375         /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2376         ///
2377         /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2378         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2379         /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2380         /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2381         /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2382         ///
2383         /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2384         /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2385         ///
2386         /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2387         /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2388         /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2389         ///
2390         /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2391         /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2392         /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2393         ///
2394         /// If `temporary_channel_id` is specified, it will be used as the temporary channel ID of the
2395         /// channel. Otherwise, a random one will be generated for you.
2396         ///
2397         /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2398         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2399         /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2400         /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2401         /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2402         /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2403         ///
2404         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2405         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2406         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2407         pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
2408                 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2409                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2410                 }
2411
2412                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2413                 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2414                 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2415
2416                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2417
2418                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2419                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2420
2421                 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2422
2423                 if let Some(temporary_channel_id) = temporary_channel_id {
2424                         if peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(&temporary_channel_id) {
2425                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Channel with temporary channel ID {} already exists!", temporary_channel_id)});
2426                         }
2427                 }
2428
2429                 let channel = {
2430                         let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2431                         let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2432                         let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2433                         match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2434                                 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2435                                 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias, temporary_channel_id)
2436                         {
2437                                 Ok(res) => res,
2438                                 Err(e) => {
2439                                         self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2440                                         return Err(e);
2441                                 },
2442                         }
2443                 };
2444                 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash);
2445
2446                 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2447                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2448                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2449                                 if cfg!(fuzzing) {
2450                                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2451                                 } else {
2452                                         panic!("RNG is bad???");
2453                                 }
2454                         },
2455                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
2456                 }
2457
2458                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2459                         node_id: their_network_key,
2460                         msg: res,
2461                 });
2462                 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2463         }
2464
2465         fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2466                 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2467                 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2468                 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2469                 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2470                 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2471                 // the same channel.
2472                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2473                 {
2474                         let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2475                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2476                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2477                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2478                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2479                                 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
2480                                         .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
2481                                                 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
2482                                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
2483                                                 _ => None,
2484                                         })
2485                                         .filter(f)
2486                                         .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
2487                                                 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2488                                                         peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2489                                         })
2490                                 );
2491                         }
2492                 }
2493                 res
2494         }
2495
2496         /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2497         /// more information.
2498         pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2499                 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2500                 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2501                 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2502                 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2503                 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2504                 // the same channel.
2505                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2506                 {
2507                         let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2508                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2509                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2510                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2511                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2512                                 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
2513                                         let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
2514                                                 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2515                                         res.push(details);
2516                                 }
2517                         }
2518                 }
2519                 res
2520         }
2521
2522         /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2523         /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2524         ///
2525         /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2526         /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2527         /// are.
2528         pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2529                 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2530                 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2531                 // really wanted anyway.
2532                 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2533         }
2534
2535         /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2536         pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2537                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2538                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2539
2540                 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2541                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2542                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2543                         let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2544                         let context_to_details = |context| {
2545                                 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2546                         };
2547                         return peer_state.channel_by_id
2548                                 .iter()
2549                                 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
2550                                 .map(context_to_details)
2551                                 .collect();
2552                 }
2553                 vec![]
2554         }
2555
2556         /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2557         /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2558         ///
2559         /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2560         /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2561         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2562         ///
2563         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2564         pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2565                 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2566                         .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2567                                 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
2568                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2569                                 },
2570                                 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
2571                                 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
2572                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2573                                 },
2574                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2575                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2576                                                 payment_id: *payment_id,
2577                                                 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2578                                                 total_msat: *total_msat,
2579                                         })
2580                                 },
2581                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2582                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2583                                 },
2584                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2585                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2586                                 },
2587                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2588                         })
2589                         .collect()
2590         }
2591
2592         /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
2593         fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, context: &ChannelContext<SP>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
2594                 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2595                 match context.unbroadcasted_funding() {
2596                         Some(transaction) => {
2597                                 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2598                                         channel_id: context.channel_id(), transaction
2599                                 }, None));
2600                         },
2601                         None => {},
2602                 }
2603                 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2604                         channel_id: context.channel_id(),
2605                         user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
2606                         reason: closure_reason,
2607                         counterparty_node_id: Some(context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
2608                         channel_capacity_sats: Some(context.get_value_satoshis()),
2609                 }, None));
2610         }
2611
2612         fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2613                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2614
2615                 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
2616                 let shutdown_result;
2617                 loop {
2618                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2619
2620                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2621                                 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2622
2623                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2624                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2625
2626                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2627                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
2628                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
2629                                                 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
2630                                                 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2631                                                 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs, local_shutdown_result) =
2632                                                         chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2633                                                 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2634                                                 shutdown_result = local_shutdown_result;
2635                                                 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
2636
2637                                                 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2638                                                 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2639                                                 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2640                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2641                                                         node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2642                                                         msg: shutdown_msg,
2643                                                 });
2644
2645                                                 debug_assert!(monitor_update_opt.is_none() || !chan.is_shutdown(),
2646                                                         "We can't both complete shutdown and generate a monitor update");
2647
2648                                                 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2649                                                 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2650                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2651                                                                 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
2652                                                         break;
2653                                                 }
2654
2655                                                 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2656                                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
2657                                                                 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2658                                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2659                                                                                 msg: channel_update
2660                                                                         });
2661                                                                 }
2662                                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2663                                                         }
2664                                                 }
2665                                                 break;
2666                                         }
2667                                 },
2668                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2669                                         // If we reach this point, it means that the channel_id either refers to an unfunded channel or
2670                                         // it does not exist for this peer. Either way, we can attempt to force-close it.
2671                                         //
2672                                         // An appropriate error will be returned for non-existence of the channel if that's the case.
2673                                         mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
2674                                         mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2675                                         return self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, false).map(|_| ())
2676                                 },
2677                         }
2678                 }
2679
2680                 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2681                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2682                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2683                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2684                 }
2685
2686                 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
2687                         self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2688                 }
2689
2690                 Ok(())
2691         }
2692
2693         /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2694         /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2695         /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2696         ///
2697         ///  * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and
2698         ///    [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2699         ///    fee estimate.
2700         ///  * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2701         ///    transaction feerate of at least our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] feerate or the feerate which
2702         ///    would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2703         ///    counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2704         ///
2705         /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2706         ///
2707         /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2708         /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2709         /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2710         /// channel.
2711         ///
2712         /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2713         /// [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum
2714         /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2715         /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2716         pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2717                 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2718         }
2719
2720         /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2721         /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2722         /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2723         ///
2724         /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2725         /// the channel being closed or not:
2726         ///  * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2727         ///    transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2728         ///    [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2729         ///    fee estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2730         ///  * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2731         ///    transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2732         ///    will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2733         ///
2734         /// The `shutdown_script` provided  will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2735         /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2736         /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2737         /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2738         ///
2739         /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2740         ///
2741         /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2742         /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2743         /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2744         /// channel.
2745         ///
2746         /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2747         /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2748         /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2749         pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2750                 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2751         }
2752
2753         fn finish_close_channel(&self, mut shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2754                 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2755                 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2756                 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
2757                         debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2758                 }
2759
2760                 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.len());
2761                 for htlc_source in shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) {
2762                         let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2763                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2764                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2765                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2766                 }
2767                 if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = shutdown_res.monitor_update {
2768                         // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2769                         // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2770                         // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2771                         // ignore the result here.
2772                         let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2773                 }
2774                 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
2775                 if let Some(txid) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2776                         let mut funding_batch_states = self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2777                         let affected_channels = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2778                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2779                         let mut has_uncompleted_channel = None;
2780                         for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, state) in affected_channels {
2781                                 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2782                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2783                                         if let Some(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id) {
2784                                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
2785                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context(), ClosureReason::FundingBatchClosure);
2786                                                 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
2787                                         }
2788                                 }
2789                                 has_uncompleted_channel = Some(has_uncompleted_channel.map_or(!state, |v| v || !state));
2790                         }
2791                         debug_assert!(
2792                                 has_uncompleted_channel.unwrap_or(true),
2793                                 "Closing a batch where all channels have completed initial monitor update",
2794                         );
2795                 }
2796                 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
2797                         self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2798                 }
2799         }
2800
2801         /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2802         /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2803         fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2804         -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2805                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2806                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2807                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2808                 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2809                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2810                         let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2811                                 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2812                         } else {
2813                                 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2814                         };
2815                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2816                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
2817                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_phase_entry.get().context(), closure_reason);
2818                                 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2819                                 mem::drop(peer_state);
2820                                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2821                                 match chan_phase {
2822                                         ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
2823                                                 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2824                                                 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2825                                         },
2826                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
2827                                                 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
2828                                                 // Unfunded channel has no update
2829                                                 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
2830                                         },
2831                                 }
2832                         } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
2833                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
2834                                 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
2835                                 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
2836                                 // events anyway.
2837                                 (None, *peer_node_id)
2838                         } else {
2839                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
2840                         }
2841                 };
2842                 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
2843                         // Try to send the `BroadcastChannelUpdate` to the peer we just force-closed on, but if
2844                         // not try to broadcast it via whatever peer we have.
2845                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2846                         let a_peer_state_opt = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2847                                 .ok_or(per_peer_state.values().next());
2848                         if let Ok(a_peer_state_mutex) = a_peer_state_opt {
2849                                 let mut a_peer_state = a_peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2850                                 a_peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2851                                         msg: update
2852                                 });
2853                         }
2854                 }
2855
2856                 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
2857         }
2858
2859         fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2860                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2861                 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2862                         Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2863                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2864                                 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2865                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2866                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2867                                                 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2868                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2869                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
2870                                                                 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
2871                                                         },
2872                                                 }
2873                                         );
2874                                 }
2875                                 Ok(())
2876                         },
2877                         Err(e) => Err(e)
2878                 }
2879         }
2880
2881         /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2882         /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2883         /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2884         /// channel.
2885         pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2886         -> Result<(), APIError> {
2887                 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2888         }
2889
2890         /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2891         /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2892         /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2893         ///
2894         /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2895         /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2896         pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2897         -> Result<(), APIError> {
2898                 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2899         }
2900
2901         /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2902         /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2903         pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2904                 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2905                         let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2906                 }
2907         }
2908
2909         /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2910         /// local transaction(s).
2911         pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2912                 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2913                         let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2914                 }
2915         }
2916
2917         fn construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(
2918                 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, hop_hmac: [u8; 32],
2919                 new_packet_bytes: [u8; onion_utils::ONION_DATA_LEN], shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2920                 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
2921         ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
2922                 debug_assert!(next_packet_pubkey_opt.is_some());
2923                 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2924                         version: 0,
2925                         public_key: next_packet_pubkey_opt.unwrap_or(Err(secp256k1::Error::InvalidPublicKey)),
2926                         hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2927                         hmac: hop_hmac,
2928                 };
2929
2930                 let (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value) = match hop_data {
2931                         msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value } =>
2932                                 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value),
2933                         msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. } | msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive { .. } =>
2934                                 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2935                                         msg: "Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node",
2936                                         err_code: 0x4000 | 22,
2937                                         err_data: Vec::new(),
2938                                 }),
2939                 };
2940
2941                 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2942                         routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2943                                 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2944                                 short_channel_id,
2945                         },
2946                         payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2947                         incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2948                         incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2949                         outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward,
2950                         outgoing_cltv_value,
2951                         skimmed_fee_msat: None,
2952                 })
2953         }
2954
2955         fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(
2956                 &self, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, shared_secret: [u8; 32], payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2957                 amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>, allow_underpay: bool,
2958                 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
2959         ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
2960                 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, onion_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata) = match hop_data {
2961                         msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
2962                                 payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata, ..
2963                         } =>
2964                                 (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata),
2965                         msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive {
2966                                 amt_msat, total_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_secret, ..
2967                         } => {
2968                                 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData { payment_secret, total_msat };
2969                                 (Some(payment_data), None, Vec::new(), amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, None)
2970                         }
2971                         msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { .. } => {
2972                                 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2973                                         err_code: 0x4000|22,
2974                                         err_data: Vec::new(),
2975                                         msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2976                                 })
2977                         },
2978                 };
2979                 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2980                 if outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
2981                         return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2982                                 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
2983                                 err_code: 18,
2984                                 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2985                         })
2986                 }
2987                 // final_expiry_too_soon
2988                 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2989                 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2990                 //
2991                 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2992                 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2993                 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2994                 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2995                 if cltv_expiry <= current_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 {
2996                         let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2997                         err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2998                         err_data.extend_from_slice(&current_height.to_be_bytes());
2999                         return Err(InboundOnionErr {
3000                                 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
3001                                 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
3002                         });
3003                 }
3004                 if (!allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat > amt_msat) ||
3005                         (allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat >
3006                          amt_msat.saturating_add(counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)))
3007                 {
3008                         return Err(InboundOnionErr {
3009                                 err_code: 19,
3010                                 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
3011                                 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
3012                         });
3013                 }
3014
3015                 let routing = if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
3016                         // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
3017                         // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
3018                         // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
3019                         // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
3020                         // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
3021                         let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3022                         if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
3023                                 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
3024                                         err_code: 0x4000|22,
3025                                         err_data: Vec::new(),
3026                                         msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
3027                                 });
3028                         }
3029                         if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && payment_data.is_some() {
3030                                 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
3031                                         err_code: 0x4000|22,
3032                                         err_data: Vec::new(),
3033                                         msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
3034                                 });
3035                         }
3036                         PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
3037                                 payment_data,
3038                                 payment_preimage,
3039                                 payment_metadata,
3040                                 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
3041                                 custom_tlvs,
3042                         }
3043                 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
3044                         PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
3045                                 payment_data: data,
3046                                 payment_metadata,
3047                                 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
3048                                 phantom_shared_secret,
3049                                 custom_tlvs,
3050                         }
3051                 } else {
3052                         return Err(InboundOnionErr {
3053                                 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
3054                                 err_data: Vec::new(),
3055                                 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
3056                         });
3057                 };
3058                 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
3059                         routing,
3060                         payment_hash,
3061                         incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
3062                         incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
3063                         outgoing_amt_msat: onion_amt_msat,
3064                         outgoing_cltv_value,
3065                         skimmed_fee_msat: counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
3066                 })
3067         }
3068
3069         fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
3070                 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC
3071         ) -> Result<(onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg> {
3072                 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
3073                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
3074                                 {
3075                                         log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3076                                         return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3077                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3078                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3079                                                 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
3080                                                 failure_code: $err_code,
3081                                         }));
3082                                 }
3083                         }
3084                 }
3085
3086                 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
3087                         return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
3088                 }
3089
3090                 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
3091                         Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
3092                 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3093
3094                 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
3095                         //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
3096                         //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
3097                         //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
3098                         //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
3099                         //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
3100                         //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
3101                         return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
3102                 }
3103                 macro_rules! return_err {
3104                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3105                                 {
3106                                         log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3107                                         return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3108                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3109                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3110                                                 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3111                                                         .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3112                                         }));
3113                                 }
3114                         }
3115                 }
3116
3117                 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
3118                         shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac,
3119                         msg.payment_hash, &self.node_signer
3120                 ) {
3121                         Ok(res) => res,
3122                         Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3123                                 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
3124                         },
3125                         Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3126                                 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
3127                         },
3128                 };
3129                 let (outgoing_scid, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, next_packet_pk_opt) = match next_hop {
3130                         onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
3131                                 next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward {
3132                                         short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value
3133                                 }, ..
3134                         } => {
3135                                 let next_packet_pk = onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx,
3136                                         msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &shared_secret);
3137                                 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(next_packet_pk))
3138                         },
3139                         // We'll do receive checks in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] so we have access to the
3140                         // inbound channel's state.
3141                         onion_utils::Hop::Receive { .. } => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
3142                         onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. }, .. } |
3143                                 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive { .. }, .. } =>
3144                         {
3145                                 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0; 0]);
3146                         }
3147                 };
3148
3149                 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
3150                 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
3151                 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
3152                         let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
3153                         let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
3154                                 None => { // unknown_next_peer
3155                                         // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
3156                                         // phantom or an intercept.
3157                                         if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
3158                                                 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)) ||
3159                                                 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)
3160                                         {
3161                                                 None
3162                                         } else {
3163                                                 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3164                                         }
3165                                 },
3166                                 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
3167                         };
3168                         let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
3169                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3170                                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3171                                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3172                                         break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3173                                 }
3174                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3175                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3176                                 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).map(
3177                                         |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
3178                                 ).flatten() {
3179                                         None => {
3180                                                 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
3181                                                 // have no consistency guarantees.
3182                                                 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3183                                         },
3184                                         Some(chan) => chan
3185                                 };
3186                                 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
3187                                         // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
3188                                         // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
3189                                         // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
3190                                         break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3191                                 }
3192                                 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
3193                                         // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
3194                                         // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3195                                         // we don't have the channel here.
3196                                         break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3197                                 }
3198                                 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3199
3200                                 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3201                                 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3202                                 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3203                                 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3204                                 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3205                                 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3206                                         // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3207                                         // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3208                                         // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3209                                         if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3210                                                 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3211                                         } else {
3212                                                 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3213                                         }
3214                                 }
3215                                 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3216                                         break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3217                                 }
3218                                 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
3219                                         break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3220                                 }
3221                                 chan_update_opt
3222                         } else {
3223                                 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
3224                                         // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
3225                                         // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
3226                                         // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
3227                                         break Some((
3228                                                         "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
3229                                                         0x2000 | 2, None,
3230                                         ));
3231                                 }
3232                                 None
3233                         };
3234
3235                         let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3236                         // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
3237                         // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
3238                         // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
3239                         if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
3240                                 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
3241                         }
3242                         if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
3243                                 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
3244                         }
3245                         // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
3246                         // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
3247                         // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
3248                         // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
3249                         // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
3250                         // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
3251                         // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
3252                         // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
3253                         if (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
3254                                 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
3255                         }
3256
3257                         break None;
3258                 }
3259                 {
3260                         let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3261                         if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
3262                                 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3263                                         msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3264                                 }
3265                                 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3266                                         msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3267                                 }
3268                                 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3269                                         // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3270                                         0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3271                                 }
3272                                 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3273                                 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3274                                 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3275                         } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3276                                 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3277                                 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3278                                 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3279                                 // instead.
3280                                 code = 0x2000 | 2;
3281                         }
3282                         return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
3283                 }
3284                 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt))
3285         }
3286
3287         fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3288                 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, shared_secret: [u8; 32], decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop,
3289                 allow_underpay: bool, next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
3290         ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3291                 macro_rules! return_err {
3292                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3293                                 {
3294                                         log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3295                                         return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3296                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3297                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3298                                                 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3299                                                         .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3300                                         }));
3301                                 }
3302                         }
3303                 }
3304                 match decoded_hop {
3305                         onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3306                                 // OUR PAYMENT!
3307                                 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3308                                         msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat)
3309                                 {
3310                                         Ok(info) => {
3311                                                 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3312                                                 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3313                                                 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3314                                                 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3315                                                 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3316                                         },
3317                                         Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3318                                 }
3319                         },
3320                         onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3321                                 match self.construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3322                                         new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3323                                         Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3324                                         Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3325                                 }
3326                         }
3327                 }
3328         }
3329
3330         /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3331         /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3332         /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3333         ///
3334         /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3335         /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3336         /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3337         ///
3338         /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3339         /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3340         fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3341                 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3342                         return Err(LightningError {
3343                                 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3344                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3345                         });
3346                 }
3347                 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3348                         return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3349                 }
3350                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3351                 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3352         }
3353
3354         /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3355         /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3356         /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3357         /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3358         ///
3359         /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3360         /// `peer_state`  corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3361         /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3362         ///
3363         /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3364         /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3365         fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3366                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3367                 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3368                         None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3369                         Some(id) => id,
3370                 };
3371
3372                 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3373         }
3374
3375         fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3376                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3377                 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3378
3379                 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3380                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3381                         ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3382                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3383                         ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3384                 };
3385
3386                 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3387                         chain_hash: self.chain_hash,
3388                         short_channel_id,
3389                         timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3390                         flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3391                         cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3392                         htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3393                         htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3394                         fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3395                         fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3396                         excess_data: Vec::new(),
3397                 };
3398                 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3399                 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3400                 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3401                 // channel.
3402                 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3403
3404                 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3405                         signature: sig,
3406                         contents: unsigned
3407                 })
3408         }
3409
3410         #[cfg(test)]
3411         pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3412                 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3413                 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3414                         path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3415                         session_priv_bytes
3416                 })
3417         }
3418
3419         fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3420                 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3421                         path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3422                         session_priv_bytes
3423                 } = args;
3424                 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3425                 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3426
3427                 log_trace!(self.logger,
3428                         "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
3429                         payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3430                 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3431                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3432
3433                 let (onion_packet, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::create_payment_onion(
3434                         &self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height,
3435                         payment_hash, keysend_preimage, prng_seed
3436                 )?;
3437
3438                 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3439                         let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3440                                 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
3441                                 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3442                         };
3443
3444                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3445                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3446                                 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3447                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3448                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3449                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3450                                 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3451                                         ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
3452                                                 if !chan.context.is_live() {
3453                                                         return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3454                                                 }
3455                                                 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3456                                                 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3457                                                         htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3458                                                                 path: path.clone(),
3459                                                                 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3460                                                                 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3461                                                                 payment_id,
3462                                                         }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
3463                                                 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
3464                                                         Some(monitor_update) => {
3465                                                                 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3466                                                                         false => {
3467                                                                                 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3468                                                                                 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3469                                                                                 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3470                                                                                 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3471                                                                                 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3472                                                                                 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3473                                                                                 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3474                                                                         },
3475                                                                         true => {},
3476                                                                 }
3477                                                         },
3478                                                         None => {},
3479                                                 }
3480                                         },
3481                                         _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
3482                                 };
3483                         } else {
3484                                 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3485                                 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3486                                 // `channel_by_id` map.
3487                                 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3488                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3489                         }
3490                         return Ok(());
3491                 };
3492
3493                 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3494                         Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3495                         Err(e) => {
3496                                 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3497                         },
3498                 }
3499         }
3500
3501         /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3502         ///
3503         /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3504         /// fields for more info.
3505         ///
3506         /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3507         /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3508         ///
3509         /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3510         ///
3511         /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3512         /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3513         /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3514         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3515         /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3516         ///
3517         /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3518         /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3519         /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3520         /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3521         /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3522         ///
3523         /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3524         /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3525         /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3526         /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3527         ///
3528         /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3529         ///
3530         /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3531         /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3532         /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3533         ///
3534         /// In general, a path may raise:
3535         ///  * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3536         ///    node public key) is specified.
3537         ///  * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available as it has been
3538         ///    closed, doesn't exist, or the peer is currently disconnected.
3539         ///  * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3540         ///    relevant updates.
3541         ///
3542         /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3543         /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3544         /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3545         ///
3546         /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3547         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3548         /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3549         /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3550         /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3551         /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3552         pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3553                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3554                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3555                 self.pending_outbound_payments
3556                         .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3557                                 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3558                                 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3559         }
3560
3561         /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3562         /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3563         pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3564                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3565                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3566                 self.pending_outbound_payments
3567                         .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3568                                 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3569                                 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3570                                 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3571         }
3572
3573         #[cfg(test)]
3574         pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3575                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3576                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3577                 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3578                         keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3579                         best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3580         }
3581
3582         #[cfg(test)]
3583         pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3584                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3585                 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3586         }
3587
3588         #[cfg(test)]
3589         pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3590                 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3591         }
3592
3593         pub(super) fn send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&self, invoice: &Bolt12Invoice, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), Bolt12PaymentError> {
3594                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3595                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3596                 self.pending_outbound_payments
3597                         .send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(
3598                                 invoice, payment_id, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3599                                 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
3600                                 best_block_height, &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
3601                                 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args)
3602                         )
3603         }
3604
3605         /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3606         /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3607         /// retries are exhausted.
3608         ///
3609         /// # Event Generation
3610         ///
3611         /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3612         /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3613         ///
3614         /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3615         /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3616         /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3617         ///
3618         /// # Requested Invoices
3619         ///
3620         /// In the case of paying a [`Bolt12Invoice`] via [`ChannelManager::pay_for_offer`], abandoning
3621         /// the payment prior to receiving the invoice will result in an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`]
3622         /// and prevent any attempts at paying it once received. The other events may only be generated
3623         /// once the invoice has been received.
3624         ///
3625         /// # Restart Behavior
3626         ///
3627         /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
3628         /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated; likewise for
3629         /// [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
3630         ///
3631         /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
3632         pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3633                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3634                 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3635         }
3636
3637         /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3638         /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3639         /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3640         /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3641         /// never reach the recipient.
3642         ///
3643         /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3644         /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3645         ///
3646         /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3647         /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3648         ///
3649         /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3650         pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3651                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3652                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3653                 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3654                         route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3655                         &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3656         }
3657
3658         /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3659         /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3660         ///
3661         /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3662         /// payments.
3663         ///
3664         /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3665         pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3666                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3667                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3668                 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3669                         payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3670                         || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),  &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3671                         &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3672         }
3673
3674         /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3675         /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3676         /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3677         pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3678                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3679                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3680                 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
3681                         &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3682                         |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3683         }
3684
3685         /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3686         /// payment probe.
3687         #[cfg(test)]
3688         pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3689                 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3690         }
3691
3692         /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
3693         /// amount to the given `node_id`.
3694         ///
3695         /// See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
3696         pub fn send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(
3697                 &self, node_id: PublicKey, amount_msat: u64, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
3698                 liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3699         ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3700                 let payment_params =
3701                         PaymentParameters::from_node_id(node_id, final_cltv_expiry_delta);
3702
3703                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, amount_msat);
3704
3705                 self.send_preflight_probes(route_params, liquidity_limit_multiplier)
3706         }
3707
3708         /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
3709         /// according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
3710         ///
3711         /// This may be used to send "pre-flight" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
3712         /// the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
3713         /// probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
3714         /// confirmation in a wallet UI.
3715         ///
3716         /// Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
3717         /// actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
3718         /// liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
3719         /// payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
3720         /// amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
3721         /// probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
3722         pub fn send_preflight_probes(
3723                 &self, route_params: RouteParameters, liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3724         ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3725                 let liquidity_limit_multiplier = liquidity_limit_multiplier.unwrap_or(3);
3726
3727                 let payer = self.get_our_node_id();
3728                 let usable_channels = self.list_usable_channels();
3729                 let first_hops = usable_channels.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
3730                 let inflight_htlcs = self.compute_inflight_htlcs();
3731
3732                 let route = self
3733                         .router
3734                         .find_route(&payer, &route_params, Some(&first_hops), inflight_htlcs)
3735                         .map_err(|e| {
3736                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to find path for payment probe: {:?}", e);
3737                                 ProbeSendFailure::RouteNotFound
3738                         })?;
3739
3740                 let mut used_liquidity_map = HashMap::with_capacity(first_hops.len());
3741
3742                 let mut res = Vec::new();
3743
3744                 for mut path in route.paths {
3745                         // If the last hop is probably an unannounced channel we refrain from probing all the
3746                         // way through to the end and instead probe up to the second-to-last channel.
3747                         while let Some(last_path_hop) = path.hops.last() {
3748                                 if last_path_hop.maybe_announced_channel {
3749                                         // We found a potentially announced last hop.
3750                                         break;
3751                                 } else {
3752                                         // Drop the last hop, as it's likely unannounced.
3753                                         log_debug!(
3754                                                 self.logger,
3755                                                 "Avoided sending payment probe all the way to last hop {} as it is likely unannounced.",
3756                                                 last_path_hop.short_channel_id
3757                                         );
3758                                         let final_value_msat = path.final_value_msat();
3759                                         path.hops.pop();
3760                                         if let Some(new_last) = path.hops.last_mut() {
3761                                                 new_last.fee_msat += final_value_msat;
3762                                         }
3763                                 }
3764                         }
3765
3766                         if path.hops.len() < 2 {
3767                                 log_debug!(
3768                                         self.logger,
3769                                         "Skipped sending payment probe over path with less than two hops."
3770                                 );
3771                                 continue;
3772                         }
3773
3774                         if let Some(first_path_hop) = path.hops.first() {
3775                                 if let Some(first_hop) = first_hops.iter().find(|h| {
3776                                         h.get_outbound_payment_scid() == Some(first_path_hop.short_channel_id)
3777                                 }) {
3778                                         let path_value = path.final_value_msat() + path.fee_msat();
3779                                         let used_liquidity =
3780                                                 used_liquidity_map.entry(first_path_hop.short_channel_id).or_insert(0);
3781
3782                                         if first_hop.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
3783                                                 < (*used_liquidity + path_value) * liquidity_limit_multiplier
3784                                         {
3785                                                 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipped sending payment probe to avoid putting channel {} under the liquidity limit.", first_path_hop.short_channel_id);
3786                                                 continue;
3787                                         } else {
3788                                                 *used_liquidity += path_value;
3789                                         }
3790                                 }
3791                         }
3792
3793                         res.push(self.send_probe(path).map_err(|e| {
3794                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to send pre-flight probe: {:?}", e);
3795                                 ProbeSendFailure::SendingFailed(e)
3796                         })?);
3797                 }
3798
3799                 Ok(res)
3800         }
3801
3802         /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3803         /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3804         fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: FnMut(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3805                 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, is_batch_funding: bool,
3806                 mut find_funding_output: FundingOutput,
3807         ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3808                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3809                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3810                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3811
3812                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3813                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3814                 let (chan, msg_opt) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3815                         Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) => {
3816                                 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3817
3818                                 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, is_batch_funding, &self.logger)
3819                                         .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3820                                                 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3821                                                 let user_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
3822                                                 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
3823                                                 let channel_capacity = chan.context.get_value_satoshis();
3824                                                 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, channel_capacity))
3825                                         } else { unreachable!(); });
3826                                 match funding_res {
3827                                         Ok((chan, funding_msg)) => (chan, funding_msg),
3828                                         Err((chan, err)) => {
3829                                                 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3830                                                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3831
3832                                                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3833                                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3834                                                         err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3835                                                 });
3836                                         },
3837                                 }
3838                         },
3839                         Some(phase) => {
3840                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
3841                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3842                                         err: format!(
3843                                                 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
3844                                                 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3845                                 })
3846                         },
3847                         None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
3848                                 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3849                                 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3850                                 }),
3851                 };
3852
3853                 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
3854                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3855                                 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3856                                 msg,
3857                         });
3858                 }
3859                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3860                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3861                                 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3862                         },
3863                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3864                                 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3865                                 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.context.channel_id(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
3866                                         panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
3867                                 }
3868                                 e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
3869                         }
3870                 }
3871                 Ok(())
3872         }
3873
3874         #[cfg(test)]
3875         pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3876                 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, false, |_, tx| {
3877                         Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3878                 })
3879         }
3880
3881         /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3882         ///
3883         /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3884         /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3885         ///
3886         /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3887         /// across the p2p network.
3888         ///
3889         /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3890         /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3891         ///
3892         /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3893         /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3894         /// keys per-channel).
3895         ///
3896         /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3897         /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3898         /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3899         ///
3900         /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3901         /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3902         /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3903         ///
3904         /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3905         /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3906         /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3907         /// for more details.
3908         ///
3909         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3910         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3911         pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3912                 self.batch_funding_transaction_generated(&[(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id)], funding_transaction)
3913         }
3914
3915         /// Call this upon creation of a batch funding transaction for the given channels.
3916         ///
3917         /// Return values are identical to [`Self::funding_transaction_generated`], respective to
3918         /// each individual channel and transaction output.
3919         ///
3920         /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. This batch funding transaction
3921         /// will only be broadcast when we have safely received and persisted the counterparty's
3922         /// signature for each channel.
3923         ///
3924         /// If there is an error, all channels in the batch are to be considered closed.
3925         pub fn batch_funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channels: &[(&ChannelId, &PublicKey)], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3926                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3927                 let mut result = Ok(());
3928
3929                 if !funding_transaction.is_coin_base() {
3930                         for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3931                                 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3932                                         result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3933                                                 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3934                                         }));
3935                                 }
3936                         }
3937                 }
3938                 if funding_transaction.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3939                         result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3940                                 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3941                         }));
3942                 }
3943                 {
3944                         let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3945                         // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3946                         // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3947                         // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3948                         // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3949                         if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 1 {
3950                                 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3951                                         err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3952                                 }));
3953                         }
3954                 }
3955
3956                 let txid = funding_transaction.txid();
3957                 let is_batch_funding = temporary_channels.len() > 1;
3958                 let mut funding_batch_states = if is_batch_funding {
3959                         Some(self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap())
3960                 } else {
3961                         None
3962                 };
3963                 let mut funding_batch_state = funding_batch_states.as_mut().and_then(|states| {
3964                         match states.entry(txid) {
3965                                 btree_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3966                                         result = result.clone().and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3967                                                 err: "Batch funding transaction with the same txid already exists".to_owned()
3968                                         }));
3969                                         None
3970                                 },
3971                                 btree_map::Entry::Vacant(vacant) => Some(vacant.insert(Vec::new())),
3972                         }
3973                 });
3974                 for &(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in temporary_channels {
3975                         result = result.and_then(|_| self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(
3976                                 temporary_channel_id,
3977                                 counterparty_node_id,
3978                                 funding_transaction.clone(),
3979                                 is_batch_funding,
3980                                 |chan, tx| {
3981                                         let mut output_index = None;
3982                                         let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3983                                         for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3984                                                 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
3985                                                         if output_index.is_some() {
3986                                                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3987                                                                         err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3988                                                                 });
3989                                                         }
3990                                                         output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3991                                                 }
3992                                         }
3993                                         if output_index.is_none() {
3994                                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3995                                                         err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3996                                                 });
3997                                         }
3998                                         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() };
3999                                         if let Some(funding_batch_state) = funding_batch_state.as_mut() {
4000                                                 funding_batch_state.push((outpoint.to_channel_id(), *counterparty_node_id, false));
4001                                         }
4002                                         Ok(outpoint)
4003                                 })
4004                         );
4005                 }
4006                 if let Err(ref e) = result {
4007                         // Remaining channels need to be removed on any error.
4008                         let e = format!("Error in transaction funding: {:?}", e);
4009                         let mut channels_to_remove = Vec::new();
4010                         channels_to_remove.extend(funding_batch_states.as_mut()
4011                                 .and_then(|states| states.remove(&txid))
4012                                 .into_iter().flatten()
4013                                 .map(|(chan_id, node_id, _state)| (chan_id, node_id))
4014                         );
4015                         channels_to_remove.extend(temporary_channels.iter()
4016                                 .map(|(&chan_id, &node_id)| (chan_id, node_id))
4017                         );
4018                         let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
4019                         {
4020                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4021                                 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in channels_to_remove {
4022                                         per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
4023                                                 .map(|peer_state_mutex| peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap())
4024                                                 .and_then(|mut peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id))
4025                                                 .map(|mut chan| {
4026                                                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
4027                                                         self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context(), ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: e.clone() });
4028                                                         shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
4029                                                 });
4030                                 }
4031                         }
4032                         for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
4033                                 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
4034                         }
4035                 }
4036                 result
4037         }
4038
4039         /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
4040         ///
4041         /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4042         /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4043         /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4044         /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4045         ///
4046         /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4047         /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4048         ///
4049         /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4050         /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4051         ///
4052         /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4053         ///
4054         /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4055         /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4056         /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4057         /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4058         /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4059         /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4060         /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4061         pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
4062                 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
4063         ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4064                 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
4065                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4066                                 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
4067                         });
4068                 }
4069
4070                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4071                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4072                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4073                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4074                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4075                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4076                 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4077                         if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
4078                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4079                                         err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4080                                 });
4081                         };
4082                 }
4083                 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4084                         if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
4085                                 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
4086                                 config.apply(config_update);
4087                                 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
4088                                         continue;
4089                                 }
4090                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
4091                                         if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
4092                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
4093                                         } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
4094                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4095                                                         node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4096                                                         msg,
4097                                                 });
4098                                         }
4099                                 }
4100                                 continue;
4101                         } else {
4102                                 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
4103                                 debug_assert!(false);
4104                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4105                                         err: format!(
4106                                                 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
4107                                                 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4108                                 });
4109                         };
4110                 }
4111                 Ok(())
4112         }
4113
4114         /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
4115         ///
4116         /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4117         /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4118         /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4119         /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4120         ///
4121         /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4122         /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4123         ///
4124         /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4125         /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4126         ///
4127         /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4128         ///
4129         /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4130         /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4131         /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4132         /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4133         /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4134         /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4135         /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4136         pub fn update_channel_config(
4137                 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
4138         ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4139                 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
4140         }
4141
4142         /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
4143         /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
4144         ///
4145         /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
4146         /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
4147         ///
4148         /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
4149         /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
4150         /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
4151         /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
4152         /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
4153         ///
4154         /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
4155         /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
4156         /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
4157         /// than expected.
4158         ///
4159         /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4160         /// backwards.
4161         ///
4162         /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
4163         /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4164         /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
4165         // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
4166         // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
4167         pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4168                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4169
4170                 let next_hop_scid = {
4171                         let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4172                         let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
4173                                 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
4174                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4175                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4176                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
4177                                 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
4178                                         if !chan.context.is_usable() {
4179                                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4180                                                         err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
4181                                                 })
4182                                         }
4183                                         chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
4184                                 },
4185                                 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4186                                         err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
4187                                                 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4188                                 }),
4189                                 None => {
4190                                         let error = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4191                                                 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id);
4192                                         log_error!(self.logger, "{} when attempting to forward intercepted HTLC", error);
4193                                         return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4194                                                 err: error
4195                                         })
4196                                 }
4197                         }
4198                 };
4199
4200                 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4201                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4202                                 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4203                         })?;
4204
4205                 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
4206                         PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
4207                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
4208                         },
4209                         _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4210                 };
4211                 let skimmed_fee_msat =
4212                         payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
4213                 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
4214                         skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
4215                         outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
4216                 };
4217
4218                 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
4219                         payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4220                         payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4221                         payment.prev_user_channel_id,
4222                         vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
4223                 )];
4224                 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
4225                 Ok(())
4226         }
4227
4228         /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
4229         /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
4230         ///
4231         /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4232         /// backwards.
4233         ///
4234         /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4235         pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4236                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4237
4238                 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4239                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4240                                 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4241                         })?;
4242
4243                 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
4244                         let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4245                                 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4246                                 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
4247                                 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4248                                 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
4249                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4250                                 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4251                         });
4252
4253                         let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
4254                         let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
4255                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4256                 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4257
4258                 Ok(())
4259         }
4260
4261         /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
4262         ///
4263         /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
4264         /// Will likely generate further events.
4265         pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
4266                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4267
4268                 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
4269                 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
4270                 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
4271                 {
4272                         let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
4273                         mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4274
4275                         for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
4276                                 if short_chan_id != 0 {
4277                                         macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
4278                                                 () => {
4279                                                         for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4280                                                                 match forward_info {
4281                                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4282                                                                                 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4283                                                                                 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4284                                                                                         routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4285                                                                                         outgoing_cltv_value, ..
4286                                                                                 }
4287                                                                         }) => {
4288                                                                                 macro_rules! failure_handler {
4289                                                                                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
4290                                                                                                 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
4291
4292                                                                                                 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4293                                                                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4294                                                                                                         user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4295                                                                                                         outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4296                                                                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4297                                                                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4298                                                                                                         phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
4299                                                                                                 });
4300
4301                                                                                                 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
4302                                                                                                         HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
4303                                                                                                 } else {
4304                                                                                                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
4305                                                                                                 };
4306
4307                                                                                                 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4308                                                                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
4309                                                                                                         reason
4310                                                                                                 ));
4311                                                                                                 continue;
4312                                                                                         }
4313                                                                                 }
4314                                                                                 macro_rules! fail_forward {
4315                                                                                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4316                                                                                                 {
4317                                                                                                         failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
4318                                                                                                 }
4319                                                                                         }
4320                                                                                 }
4321                                                                                 macro_rules! failed_payment {
4322                                                                                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4323                                                                                                 {
4324                                                                                                         failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
4325                                                                                                 }
4326                                                                                         }
4327                                                                                 }
4328                                                                                 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
4329                                                                                         let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
4330                                                                                         if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.chain_hash) {
4331                                                                                                 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4332                                                                                                 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
4333                                                                                                         phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac,
4334                                                                                                         payment_hash, &self.node_signer
4335                                                                                                 ) {
4336                                                                                                         Ok(res) => res,
4337                                                                                                         Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4338                                                                                                                 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
4339                                                                                                                 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
4340                                                                                                                 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
4341                                                                                                                 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
4342                                                                                                                 // of the onion.
4343                                                                                                                 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
4344                                                                                                         },
4345                                                                                                         Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4346                                                                                                                 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
4347                                                                                                         },
4348                                                                                                 };
4349                                                                                                 match next_hop {
4350                                                                                                         onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
4351                                                                                                                 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
4352                                                                                                                         incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4353                                                                                                                         outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None)
4354                                                                                                                 {
4355                                                                                                                         Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
4356                                                                                                                         Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
4357                                                                                                                 }
4358                                                                                                         },
4359                                                                                                         _ => panic!(),
4360                                                                                                 }
4361                                                                                         } else {
4362                                                                                                 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4363                                                                                         }
4364                                                                                 } else {
4365                                                                                         fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4366                                                                                 }
4367                                                                         },
4368                                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4369                                                                                 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
4370                                                                                 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
4371                                                                                 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
4372                                                                                 // problem, not ours.
4373                                                                         }
4374                                                                 }
4375                                                         }
4376                                                 }
4377                                         }
4378                                         let chan_info_opt = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id).cloned();
4379                                         let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match chan_info_opt {
4380                                                 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id, chan_id),
4381                                                 None => {
4382                                                         forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4383                                                         continue;
4384                                                 }
4385                                         };
4386                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4387                                         let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4388                                         if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
4389                                                 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4390                                                 continue;
4391                                         }
4392                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4393                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4394                                         if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
4395                                                 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4396                                                         match forward_info {
4397                                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4398                                                                         prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4399                                                                         forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4400                                                                                 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
4401                                                                                 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4402                                                                         },
4403                                                                 }) => {
4404                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
4405                                                                         let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4406                                                                                 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4407                                                                                 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4408                                                                                 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4409                                                                                 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4410                                                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4411                                                                                 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
4412                                                                                 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4413                                                                         });
4414                                                                         if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
4415                                                                                 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
4416                                                                                 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, &self.fee_estimator,
4417                                                                                 &self.logger)
4418                                                                         {
4419                                                                                 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4420                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
4421                                                                                 } else {
4422                                                                                         panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
4423                                                                                 }
4424                                                                                 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
4425                                                                                 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4426                                                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
4427                                                                                         HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
4428                                                                                 ));
4429                                                                                 continue;
4430                                                                         }
4431                                                                 },
4432                                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
4433                                                                         panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
4434                                                                 },
4435                                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
4436                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4437                                                                         if let Err(e) = chan.queue_fail_htlc(
4438                                                                                 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
4439                                                                         ) {
4440                                                                                 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4441                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
4442                                                                                 } else {
4443                                                                                         panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
4444                                                                                 }
4445                                                                                 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
4446                                                                                 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
4447                                                                                 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
4448                                                                                 continue;
4449                                                                         }
4450                                                                 },
4451                                                         }
4452                                                 }
4453                                         } else {
4454                                                 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4455                                                 continue;
4456                                         }
4457                                 } else {
4458                                         'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4459                                                 match forward_info {
4460                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4461                                                                 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4462                                                                 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4463                                                                         routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
4464                                                                         skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4465                                                                 }
4466                                                         }) => {
4467                                                                 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
4468                                                                         PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret, custom_tlvs } => {
4469                                                                                 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
4470                                                                                 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
4471                                                                                                 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
4472                                                                                 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
4473                                                                                         Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
4474                                                                         },
4475                                                                         PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs } => {
4476                                                                                 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
4477                                                                                         payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
4478                                                                                         payment_metadata,
4479                                                                                         custom_tlvs,
4480                                                                                 };
4481                                                                                 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
4482                                                                                         payment_data, None, onion_fields)
4483                                                                         },
4484                                                                         _ => {
4485                                                                                 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
4486                                                                         }
4487                                                                 };
4488                                                                 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
4489                                                                         prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
4490                                                                                 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4491                                                                                 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4492                                                                                 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4493                                                                                 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4494                                                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4495                                                                                 phantom_shared_secret,
4496                                                                         },
4497                                                                         // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
4498                                                                         // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
4499                                                                         // if routing nodes overpay
4500                                                                         value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
4501                                                                         sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
4502                                                                         timer_ticks: 0,
4503                                                                         total_value_received: None,
4504                                                                         total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
4505                                                                         cltv_expiry,
4506                                                                         onion_payload,
4507                                                                         counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
4508                                                                 };
4509
4510                                                                 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
4511
4512                                                                 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
4513                                                                         ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
4514                                                                                 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
4515                                                                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4516                                                                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
4517                                                                                         &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
4518                                                                                 );
4519                                                                                 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4520                                                                                                 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
4521                                                                                                 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
4522                                                                                                 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4523                                                                                                 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
4524                                                                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
4525                                                                                                 phantom_shared_secret,
4526                                                                                         }), payment_hash,
4527                                                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
4528                                                                                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
4529                                                                                 ));
4530                                                                                 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
4531                                                                         }
4532                                                                 }
4533                                                                 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4534                                                                 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4535                                                                 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4536                                                                         receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4537                                                                                 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4538                                                                 }
4539
4540                                                                 macro_rules! check_total_value {
4541                                                                         ($purpose: expr) => {{
4542                                                                                 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
4543                                                                                 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
4544                                                                                         events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
4545                                                                                         events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
4546                                                                                 };
4547                                                                                 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4548                                                                                 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
4549                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4550                                                                                 }
4551                                                                                 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
4552                                                                                         .entry(payment_hash)
4553                                                                                         // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
4554                                                                                         .or_insert_with(|| {
4555                                                                                                 committed_to_claimable = true;
4556                                                                                                 ClaimablePayment {
4557                                                                                                         purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
4558                                                                                                 }
4559                                                                                         });
4560                                                                                 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
4561                                                                                         let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
4562                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
4563                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4564                                                                                 }
4565                                                                                 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4566                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
4567                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4568                                                                                 }
4569                                                                                 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
4570                                                                                         if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
4571                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4572                                                                                         }
4573                                                                                 } else {
4574                                                                                         claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
4575                                                                                 }
4576                                                                                 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
4577                                                                                 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
4578                                                                                 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
4579                                                                                 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
4580                                                                                         total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
4581                                                                                         earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4582                                                                                         if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4583                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
4584                                                                                                         &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
4585                                                                                                 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
4586                                                                                         }
4587                                                                                         if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
4588                                                                                 }
4589                                                                                 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
4590                                                                                 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
4591                                                                                 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4592                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4593                                                                                 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4594                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
4595                                                                                                 &payment_hash);
4596                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4597                                                                                 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4598                                                                                         #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4599                                                                                                 committed_to_claimable = true;
4600                                                                                         }
4601                                                                                         let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
4602                                                                                         htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4603                                                                                         let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
4604                                                                                         htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
4605                                                                                         let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
4606                                                                                                 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
4607                                                                                         debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
4608                                                                                                 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
4609                                                                                         new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
4610                                                                                                 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4611                                                                                                 payment_hash,
4612                                                                                                 purpose: $purpose,
4613                                                                                                 amount_msat,
4614                                                                                                 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4615                                                                                                 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4616                                                                                                 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4617                                                                                                 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4618                                                                                                 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4619                                                                                         }, None));
4620                                                                                         payment_claimable_generated = true;
4621                                                                                 } else {
4622                                                                                         // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
4623                                                                                         // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
4624                                                                                         // MPP parts.
4625                                                                                         htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4626                                                                                         #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4627                                                                                                 committed_to_claimable = true;
4628                                                                                         }
4629                                                                                 }
4630                                                                                 payment_claimable_generated
4631                                                                         }}
4632                                                                 }
4633
4634                                                                 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
4635                                                                 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
4636                                                                 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4637                                                                 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4638                                                                 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4639                                                                 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4640                                                                 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4641                                                                 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4642                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4643                                                                                 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4644                                                                                         OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4645                                                                                                 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4646                                                                                                 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4647                                                                                                         Ok(result) => result,
4648                                                                                                         Err(()) => {
4649                                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
4650                                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4651                                                                                                         }
4652                                                                                                 };
4653                                                                                                 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4654                                                                                                         let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4655                                                                                                         if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4656                                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4657                                                                                                                         &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4658                                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4659                                                                                                         }
4660                                                                                                 }
4661                                                                                                 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4662                                                                                                         payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4663                                                                                                         payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4664                                                                                                 };
4665                                                                                                 check_total_value!(purpose);
4666                                                                                         },
4667                                                                                         OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4668                                                                                                 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4669                                                                                                 check_total_value!(purpose);
4670                                                                                         }
4671                                                                                 }
4672                                                                         },
4673                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4674                                                                                 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4675                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
4676                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4677                                                                                 }
4678                                                                                 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4679                                                                                 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4680                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
4681                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4682                                                                                 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4683                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4684                                                                                                 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4685                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4686                                                                                 } else {
4687                                                                                         let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4688                                                                                                 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4689                                                                                                 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4690                                                                                         };
4691                                                                                         let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4692                                                                                         if payment_claimable_generated {
4693                                                                                                 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4694                                                                                         }
4695                                                                                 }
4696                                                                         },
4697                                                                 };
4698                                                         },
4699                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4700                                                                 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4701                                                         }
4702                                                 }
4703                                         }
4704                                 }
4705                         }
4706                 }
4707
4708                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4709                 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4710                         || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4711                         &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
4712
4713                 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4714                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4715                 }
4716                 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4717
4718                 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4719                 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4720                 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4721                 // network stack.
4722                 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4723
4724                 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4725                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4726                 events.append(&mut new_events);
4727         }
4728
4729         /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4730         ///
4731         /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4732         fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4733                 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4734
4735                 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4736
4737                 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4738                 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4739                 if background_events.is_empty() {
4740                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4741                 }
4742
4743                 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4744                         match event {
4745                                 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
4746                                         // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4747                                         // monitor updating completing.
4748                                         let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4749                                 },
4750                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update } => {
4751                                         let mut updated_chan = false;
4752                                         {
4753                                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4754                                                 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4755                                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4756                                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4757                                                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4758                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
4759                                                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase.get_mut() {
4760                                                                                 updated_chan = true;
4761                                                                                 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4762                                                                                         peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4763                                                                         } else {
4764                                                                                 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't have an update for a non-funded channel");
4765                                                                         }
4766                                                                 },
4767                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {},
4768                                                         }
4769                                                 }
4770                                         }
4771                                         if !updated_chan {
4772                                                 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
4773                                                 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4774                                         }
4775                                 },
4776                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
4777                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4778                                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4779                                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4780                                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4781                                                 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
4782                                                         handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4783                                                 } else {
4784                                                         let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
4785                                                                 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
4786                                                         mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4787                                                         mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4788                                                         self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
4789                                                 }
4790                                         }
4791                                 },
4792                         }
4793                 }
4794                 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4795         }
4796
4797         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4798         /// Process background events, for functional testing
4799         pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4800                 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4801                 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4802         }
4803
4804         fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4805                 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
4806                 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4807                 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4808                         if new_feerate != chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4809                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4810                                 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4811                         }
4812                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4813                 }
4814                 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4815                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4816                                 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4817                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4818                 }
4819                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4820                         &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4821
4822                 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
4823                 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4824         }
4825
4826         #[cfg(fuzzing)]
4827         /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4828         /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4829         /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4830         /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4831         pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4832                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4833                         let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4834
4835                         let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4836                         let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4837
4838                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4839                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4840                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4841                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4842                                 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
4843                                         |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
4844                                 ) {
4845                                         let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4846                                                 anchor_feerate
4847                                         } else {
4848                                                 non_anchor_feerate
4849                                         };
4850                                         let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4851                                         if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4852                                 }
4853                         }
4854
4855                         should_persist
4856                 });
4857         }
4858
4859         /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4860         ///
4861         /// This currently includes:
4862         ///  * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4863         ///  * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4864         ///    than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4865         ///    the channel.
4866         ///  * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4867         ///    with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4868         ///  * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4869         ///  * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
4870         ///  * Forgetting about stale outbound payments, either those that have already been fulfilled
4871         ///    or those awaiting an invoice that hasn't been delivered in the necessary amount of time.
4872         ///    The latter is determined using the system clock in `std` and the highest seen block time
4873         ///    minus two hours in `no-std`.
4874         ///
4875         /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4876         /// estimate fetches.
4877         ///
4878         /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4879         /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4880         pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4881                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4882                         let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4883
4884                         let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4885                         let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4886
4887                         let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4888                         let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4889                         let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4890                         let mut shutdown_channels = Vec::new();
4891
4892                         let mut process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
4893                                 chan_id: &ChannelId,
4894                                 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
4895                                 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
4896                                 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4897                                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
4898                         | {
4899                                 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4900                                 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
4901                                         log_error!(self.logger,
4902                                                 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
4903                                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
4904                                         self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4905                                         shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false));
4906                                         pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4907                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4908                                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4909                                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4910                                                                 channel_id: *chan_id,
4911                                                                 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
4912                                                         },
4913                                                 },
4914                                         });
4915                                         false
4916                                 } else {
4917                                         true
4918                                 }
4919                         };
4920
4921                         {
4922                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4923                                 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4924                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4925                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4926                                         let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4927                                         let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4928                                         peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
4929                                                 match phase {
4930                                                         ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
4931                                                                 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4932                                                                         anchor_feerate
4933                                                                 } else {
4934                                                                         non_anchor_feerate
4935                                                                 };
4936                                                                 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4937                                                                 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4938
4939                                                                 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4940                                                                         let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
4941                                                                         handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
4942                                                                         if needs_close { return false; }
4943                                                                 }
4944
4945                                                                 match chan.channel_update_status() {
4946                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
4947                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
4948                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
4949                                                                                 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
4950                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
4951                                                                                 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
4952                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
4953                                                                                 n += 1;
4954                                                                                 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4955                                                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
4956                                                                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4957                                                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4958                                                                                                         msg: update
4959                                                                                                 });
4960                                                                                         }
4961                                                                                         should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4962                                                                                 } else {
4963                                                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
4964                                                                                 }
4965                                                                         },
4966                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
4967                                                                                 n += 1;
4968                                                                                 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4969                                                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
4970                                                                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4971                                                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4972                                                                                                         msg: update
4973                                                                                                 });
4974                                                                                         }
4975                                                                                         should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4976                                                                                 } else {
4977                                                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
4978                                                                                 }
4979                                                                         },
4980                                                                         _ => {},
4981                                                                 }
4982
4983                                                                 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4984
4985                                                                 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
4986                                                                         log_debug!(self.logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
4987                                                                                         counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
4988                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4989                                                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4990                                                                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
4991                                                                                         msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
4992                                                                                                 channel_id: *chan_id,
4993                                                                                                 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
4994                                                                                         },
4995                                                                                 },
4996                                                                         });
4997                                                                 }
4998
4999                                                                 true
5000                                                         },
5001                                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
5002                                                                 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5003                                                                         pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5004                                                         },
5005                                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
5006                                                                 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5007                                                                         pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5008                                                         },
5009                                                 }
5010                                         });
5011
5012                                         for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
5013                                                 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
5014                                                         log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
5015                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
5016                                                                 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5017                                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5018                                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5019                                                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5020                                                                         },
5021                                                                 }
5022                                                         );
5023                                                 }
5024                                         }
5025                                         peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
5026
5027                                         if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
5028                                                 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
5029                                         }
5030                                 }
5031                         }
5032
5033                         // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
5034                         // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
5035                         // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
5036                         // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
5037                         // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
5038                         // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
5039                         // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
5040                         if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
5041                                 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5042                                 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
5043                                         match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
5044                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
5045                                                         // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
5046                                                         // have no channels to the peer.
5047                                                         let remove_entry = {
5048                                                                 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
5049                                                                 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
5050                                                         };
5051                                                         if remove_entry {
5052                                                                 entry.remove_entry();
5053                                                         }
5054                                                 },
5055                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
5056                                         }
5057                                 }
5058                         }
5059
5060                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
5061                                 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
5062                                         // This should be unreachable
5063                                         debug_assert!(false);
5064                                         return false;
5065                                 }
5066                                 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
5067                                         // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
5068                                         // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
5069                                         // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
5070                                         // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
5071                                         if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
5072                                                 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
5073                                         {
5074                                                 return true;
5075                                         } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
5076                                                 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
5077                                                 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
5078                                         }) {
5079                                                 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
5080                                                         .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
5081                                                 return false;
5082                                         }
5083                                 }
5084                                 true
5085                         });
5086
5087                         for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
5088                                 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
5089                                 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
5090                                 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
5091                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5092                         }
5093
5094                         for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5095                                 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5096                         }
5097
5098                         for shutdown_res in shutdown_channels {
5099                                 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
5100                         }
5101
5102                         #[cfg(feature = "std")]
5103                         let duration_since_epoch = std::time::SystemTime::now()
5104                                 .duration_since(std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
5105                                 .expect("SystemTime::now() should come after SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH");
5106                         #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
5107                         let duration_since_epoch = Duration::from_secs(
5108                                 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire).saturating_sub(7200) as u64
5109                         );
5110
5111                         self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(
5112                                 duration_since_epoch, &self.pending_events
5113                         );
5114
5115                         // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
5116                         // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
5117                         // than block the message queueing pipeline.
5118                         if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5119                                 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5120                         }
5121
5122                         should_persist
5123                 });
5124         }
5125
5126         /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
5127         /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
5128         /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
5129         ///
5130         /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
5131         /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
5132         /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
5133         /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
5134         ///
5135         /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
5136         /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
5137         /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
5138         /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
5139         pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
5140                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
5141         }
5142
5143         /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
5144         /// reason for the failure.
5145         ///
5146         /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
5147         pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
5148                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5149
5150                 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
5151                 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
5152                         for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5153                                 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
5154                                 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5155                                 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
5156                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5157                         }
5158                 }
5159         }
5160
5161         /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
5162         fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
5163                 match failure_code {
5164                         FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5165                         FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5166                         FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
5167                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5168                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5169                                 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
5170                         },
5171                         FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
5172                                 let fail_data = match data {
5173                                         Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
5174                                         None => Vec::new(),
5175                                 };
5176                                 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
5177                         }
5178                 }
5179         }
5180
5181         /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5182         /// that we want to return and a channel.
5183         ///
5184         /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
5185         /// forwarding
5186         fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5187                 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
5188                 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
5189                 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
5190                 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
5191                 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
5192                         chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
5193                 } else {
5194                         chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
5195                 };
5196                 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
5197                         self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
5198                 } else {
5199                         (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5200                 }
5201         }
5202
5203
5204         /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5205         /// that we want to return and a channel.
5206         fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5207                 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
5208                 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
5209                         let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
5210                         if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
5211                                 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
5212                                 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
5213                                 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5214                         }
5215                         (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5216                         msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5217                         upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5218                         (desired_err_code, enc.0)
5219                 } else {
5220                         // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
5221                         // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
5222                         // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
5223                         // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
5224                         (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5225                 }
5226         }
5227
5228         // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
5229         // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
5230         // be surfaced to the user.
5231         fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
5232                 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
5233                 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
5234         ) {
5235                 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
5236                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5237                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
5238                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5239                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5240                                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5241                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
5242                                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
5243                                                         self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
5244                                                 } else {
5245                                                         // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
5246                                                         debug_assert!(false);
5247                                                         (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5248                                                 }
5249                                         },
5250                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5251                                 }
5252                         } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
5253                 };
5254
5255                 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
5256                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
5257                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
5258                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5259                 }
5260         }
5261
5262         /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
5263         /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
5264         fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
5265                 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
5266                 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
5267                 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
5268                 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
5269                 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5270                 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5271                         debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5272                 }
5273
5274                 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
5275                 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
5276                 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
5277                 //timer handling.
5278
5279                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5280                 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
5281                 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5282                 match source {
5283                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
5284                                 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
5285                                         session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
5286                                         &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
5287                                 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5288                         },
5289                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint, .. }) => {
5290                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", &payment_hash, onion_error);
5291                                 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
5292
5293                                 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
5294                                 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5295                                 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
5296                                         push_forward_ev = true;
5297                                 }
5298                                 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
5299                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5300                                                 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
5301                                         },
5302                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5303                                                 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
5304                                         }
5305                                 }
5306                                 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
5307                                 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5308                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5309                                 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
5310                                         prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
5311                                         failed_next_destination: destination,
5312                                 }, None));
5313                         },
5314                 }
5315         }
5316
5317         /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
5318         /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
5319         ///
5320         /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
5321         /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
5322         /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
5323         /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
5324         ///
5325         /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
5326         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
5327         /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
5328         /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
5329         ///
5330         /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
5331         /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
5332         /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
5333         ///
5334         /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5335         /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
5336         /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
5337         /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
5338         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5339         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5340         /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
5341         pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5342                 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
5343         }
5344
5345         /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
5346         /// even type numbers.
5347         ///
5348         /// # Note
5349         ///
5350         /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
5351         /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
5352         ///
5353         /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5354         pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5355                 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
5356         }
5357
5358         fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
5359                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5360
5361                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5362
5363                 let mut sources = {
5364                         let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
5365                         if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
5366                                 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
5367                                 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
5368                                         if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
5369                                                 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
5370                                                         .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5371                                                 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
5372                                                 break;
5373                                         }
5374                                 }
5375
5376                                 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
5377                                 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
5378                                 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
5379                                         ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
5380                                         payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
5381                                 });
5382                                 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
5383                                         debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
5384                                         log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
5385                                                 &payment_hash);
5386                                 }
5387
5388                                 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
5389                                         if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
5390                                                 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
5391                                                         &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
5392                                                 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5393                                                 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
5394                                                 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5395                                                         let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
5396                                                         let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5397                                                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5398                                                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5399                                                 }
5400                                                 return;
5401                                         }
5402                                 }
5403
5404                                 payment.htlcs
5405                         } else { return; }
5406                 };
5407                 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
5408
5409                 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
5410                 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
5411                 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
5412                 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
5413                 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
5414                 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
5415                 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
5416                 let mut valid_mpp = true;
5417                 let mut errs = Vec::new();
5418                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5419                 for htlc in sources.iter() {
5420                         if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
5421                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5422                                 debug_assert!(false);
5423                                 valid_mpp = false;
5424                                 break;
5425                         }
5426                         prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
5427
5428                         if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
5429                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5430                                 debug_assert!(false);
5431                                 valid_mpp = false;
5432                                 break;
5433                         }
5434                         expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
5435                         claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
5436                 }
5437                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5438                 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
5439                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5440                         log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
5441                         return;
5442                 }
5443                 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
5444                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5445                         log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
5446                                 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
5447                         return;
5448                 }
5449                 if valid_mpp {
5450                         for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5451                                 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
5452                                         htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
5453                                         |_, definitely_duplicate| {
5454                                                 debug_assert!(!definitely_duplicate, "We shouldn't claim duplicatively from a payment");
5455                                                 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash })
5456                                         }
5457                                 ) {
5458                                         if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
5459                                                 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
5460                                                 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
5461                                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
5462                                         } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
5463                                 }
5464                         }
5465                 }
5466                 if !valid_mpp {
5467                         for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5468                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5469                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5470                                 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5471                                 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
5472                                 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5473                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5474                         }
5475                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5476                 }
5477
5478                 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
5479                 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
5480                         let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5481                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
5482                 }
5483         }
5484
5485         fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>, bool) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
5486                 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
5487         -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
5488                 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
5489
5490                 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
5491                 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
5492                 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
5493                 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5494
5495                 // As we may call handle_monitor_update_completion_actions in rather rare cases, check that
5496                 // the required mutexes are not held before we start.
5497                 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5498                 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5499
5500                 {
5501                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5502                         let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
5503                         let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
5504                                 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
5505                                 None => None
5506                         };
5507
5508                         let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
5509                                 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5510                                         .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
5511                         ).unwrap_or(None);
5512
5513                         if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
5514                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
5515                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5516                                 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5517                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5518                                                 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5519                                                 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
5520
5521                                                 match fulfill_res {
5522                                                         UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } => {
5523                                                                 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat), false) {
5524                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
5525                                                                                 chan_id, action);
5526                                                                         peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
5527                                                                 }
5528                                                                 if !during_init {
5529                                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5530                                                                                 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5531                                                                 } else {
5532                                                                         // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
5533                                                                         // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
5534                                                                         // monitor update as a background event.
5535                                                                         self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5536                                                                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5537                                                                                         counterparty_node_id,
5538                                                                                         funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
5539                                                                                         update: monitor_update.clone(),
5540                                                                                 });
5541                                                                 }
5542                                                         }
5543                                                         UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => {
5544                                                                 let action = if let Some(action) = completion_action(None, true) {
5545                                                                         action
5546                                                                 } else {
5547                                                                         return Ok(());
5548                                                                 };
5549                                                                 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5550
5551                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Completing monitor update completion action for channel {} as claim was redundant: {:?}",
5552                                                                         chan_id, action);
5553                                                                 let (node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker) =
5554                                                                 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5555                                                                         downstream_counterparty_node_id: node_id,
5556                                                                         downstream_funding_outpoint: funding_outpoint,
5557                                                                         blocking_action: blocker,
5558                                                                 } = action {
5559                                                                         (node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)
5560                                                                 } else {
5561                                                                         debug_assert!(false,
5562                                                                                 "Duplicate claims should always free another channel immediately");
5563                                                                         return Ok(());
5564                                                                 };
5565                                                                 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
5566                                                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5567                                                                         if let Some(blockers) = peer_state
5568                                                                                 .actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
5569                                                                                 .get_mut(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
5570                                                                         {
5571                                                                                 let mut found_blocker = false;
5572                                                                                 blockers.retain(|iter| {
5573                                                                                         // Note that we could actually be blocked, in
5574                                                                                         // which case we need to only remove the one
5575                                                                                         // blocker which was added duplicatively.
5576                                                                                         let first_blocker = !found_blocker;
5577                                                                                         if *iter == blocker { found_blocker = true; }
5578                                                                                         *iter != blocker || !first_blocker
5579                                                                                 });
5580                                                                                 debug_assert!(found_blocker);
5581                                                                         }
5582                                                                 } else {
5583                                                                         debug_assert!(false);
5584                                                                 }
5585                                                         }
5586                                                 }
5587                                         }
5588                                         return Ok(());
5589                                 }
5590                         }
5591                 }
5592                 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5593                         update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
5594                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5595                                 payment_preimage,
5596                         }],
5597                 };
5598
5599                 if !during_init {
5600                         // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
5601                         // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
5602                         let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
5603                         if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5604                                 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
5605                                 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
5606                                 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
5607                                 // again on restart.
5608                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
5609                                         payment_preimage, update_res);
5610                         }
5611                 } else {
5612                         // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
5613                         // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
5614                         // event.
5615                         // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
5616                         // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
5617                         // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
5618                         // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
5619                         // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
5620                         // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
5621                         // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
5622                         self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5623                                 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
5624                                         prev_hop.outpoint, preimage_update,
5625                                 )));
5626                 }
5627                 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
5628                 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
5629                 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
5630                 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
5631                 // `PaymentForwarded`).
5632                 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None, false));
5633                 Ok(())
5634         }
5635
5636         fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
5637                 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
5638         }
5639
5640         fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
5641                 forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, startup_replay: bool,
5642                 next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>, next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint
5643         ) {
5644                 match source {
5645                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
5646                                 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
5647                                         "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
5648                                 if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5649                                         debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey);
5650                                 }
5651                                 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5652                                         channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint,
5653                                         counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
5654                                 };
5655                                 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
5656                                         session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
5657                                         &self.logger);
5658                         },
5659                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
5660                                 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5661                                 let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
5662                                 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5663                                 let claiming_chan_funding_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5664                                 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
5665                                         |htlc_claim_value_msat, definitely_duplicate| {
5666                                                 let chan_to_release =
5667                                                         if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5668                                                                 Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, completed_blocker))
5669                                                         } else {
5670                                                                 // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
5671                                                                 // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
5672                                                                 // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
5673                                                                 // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
5674                                                                 // closed.
5675                                                                 None
5676                                                         };
5677
5678                                                 if definitely_duplicate && startup_replay {
5679                                                         // On startup we may get redundant claims which are related to
5680                                                         // monitor updates still in flight. In that case, we shouldn't
5681                                                         // immediately free, but instead let that monitor update complete
5682                                                         // in the background.
5683                                                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
5684                                                                 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
5685                                                                 // There should be a `BackgroundEvent` pending...
5686                                                                 assert!(background_events.iter().any(|ev| {
5687                                                                         match ev {
5688                                                                                 // to apply a monitor update that blocked the claiming channel,
5689                                                                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5690                                                                                         funding_txo, update, ..
5691                                                                                 } => {
5692                                                                                         if *funding_txo == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint {
5693                                                                                                 assert!(update.updates.iter().any(|upd|
5694                                                                                                         if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5695                                                                                                                 payment_preimage: update_preimage
5696                                                                                                         } = upd {
5697                                                                                                                 payment_preimage == *update_preimage
5698                                                                                                         } else { false }
5699                                                                                                 ), "{:?}", update);
5700                                                                                                 true
5701                                                                                         } else { false }
5702                                                                                 },
5703                                                                                 // or the channel we'd unblock is already closed,
5704                                                                                 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup(
5705                                                                                         (funding_txo, monitor_update)
5706                                                                                 ) => {
5707                                                                                         if *funding_txo == next_channel_outpoint {
5708                                                                                                 assert_eq!(monitor_update.updates.len(), 1);
5709                                                                                                 assert!(matches!(
5710                                                                                                         monitor_update.updates[0],
5711                                                                                                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. }
5712                                                                                                 ));
5713                                                                                                 true
5714                                                                                         } else { false }
5715                                                                                 },
5716                                                                                 // or the monitor update has completed and will unblock
5717                                                                                 // immediately once we get going.
5718                                                                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
5719                                                                                         channel_id, ..
5720                                                                                 } =>
5721                                                                                         *channel_id == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(),
5722                                                                         }
5723                                                                 }), "{:?}", *background_events);
5724                                                         }
5725                                                         None
5726                                                 } else if definitely_duplicate {
5727                                                         if let Some(other_chan) = chan_to_release {
5728                                                                 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5729                                                                         downstream_counterparty_node_id: other_chan.0,
5730                                                                         downstream_funding_outpoint: other_chan.1,
5731                                                                         blocking_action: other_chan.2,
5732                                                                 })
5733                                                         } else { None }
5734                                                 } else {
5735                                                         let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
5736                                                                 if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
5737                                                                         Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
5738                                                                 } else { None }
5739                                                         } else { None };
5740                                                         Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5741                                                                 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
5742                                                                         fee_earned_msat,
5743                                                                         claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
5744                                                                         prev_channel_id: Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5745                                                                         next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5746                                                                         outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
5747                                                                 },
5748                                                                 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: chan_to_release,
5749                                                         })
5750                                                 }
5751                                         });
5752                                 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
5753                                         let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5754                                         let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
5755                                 }
5756                         },
5757                 }
5758         }
5759
5760         /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
5761         pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
5762                 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
5763         }
5764
5765         fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
5766                 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5767                 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5768                 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5769
5770                 for action in actions.into_iter() {
5771                         match action {
5772                                 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
5773                                         let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5774                                         if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
5775                                                 amount_msat,
5776                                                 payment_purpose: purpose,
5777                                                 receiver_node_id,
5778                                                 htlcs,
5779                                                 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
5780                                         }) = payment {
5781                                                 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
5782                                                         payment_hash,
5783                                                         purpose,
5784                                                         amount_msat,
5785                                                         receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5786                                                         htlcs,
5787                                                         sender_intended_total_msat,
5788                                                 }, None));
5789                                         }
5790                                 },
5791                                 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5792                                         event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
5793                                 } => {
5794                                         self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
5795                                         if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
5796                                                 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker));
5797                                         }
5798                                 },
5799                                 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5800                                         downstream_counterparty_node_id, downstream_funding_outpoint, blocking_action,
5801                                 } => {
5802                                         self.handle_monitor_update_release(
5803                                                 downstream_counterparty_node_id,
5804                                                 downstream_funding_outpoint,
5805                                                 Some(blocking_action),
5806                                         );
5807                                 },
5808                         }
5809                 }
5810         }
5811
5812         /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
5813         /// update completion.
5814         fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5815                 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
5816                 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
5817                 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
5818                 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
5819         -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
5820                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
5821                         &channel.context.channel_id(),
5822                         if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5823                         if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
5824                         if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
5825                         if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
5826                         if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
5827
5828                 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
5829
5830                 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5831                 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5832                         htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
5833                                 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
5834                 }
5835
5836                 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
5837                         send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
5838                 }
5839                 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
5840                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5841                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5842                                 msg,
5843                         });
5844                 }
5845
5846                 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
5847                         if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
5848                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5849                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5850                                         updates: update,
5851                                 });
5852                         }
5853                 } }
5854                 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
5855                         if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
5856                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5857                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5858                                         msg: revoke_and_ack,
5859                                 });
5860                         }
5861                 } }
5862                 match order {
5863                         RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
5864                                 handle_cs!();
5865                                 handle_raa!();
5866                         },
5867                         RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
5868                                 handle_raa!();
5869                                 handle_cs!();
5870                         },
5871                 }
5872
5873                 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
5874                         log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
5875                         self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
5876                 }
5877
5878                 {
5879                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5880                         emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
5881                         emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
5882                 }
5883
5884                 htlc_forwards
5885         }
5886
5887         fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
5888                 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5889
5890                 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
5891                         Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5892                         None => {
5893                                 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5894                                 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5895                                 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5896                                 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5897                                         Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5898                                         None => return,
5899                                 }
5900                         }
5901                 };
5902                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5903                 let mut peer_state_lock;
5904                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
5905                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
5906                 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5907                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5908                 let channel =
5909                         if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5910                                 chan
5911                         } else {
5912                                 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5913                                         .remove(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5914                                 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5915                                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5916                                 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5917                                 return;
5918                         };
5919                 let remaining_in_flight =
5920                         if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
5921                                 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
5922                                 pending.len()
5923                         } else { 0 };
5924                 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
5925                         highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
5926                         remaining_in_flight);
5927                 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
5928                         return;
5929                 }
5930                 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
5931         }
5932
5933         /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
5934         ///
5935         /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
5936         /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
5937         /// the channel.
5938         ///
5939         /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5940         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5941         /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5942         ///
5943         /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
5944         /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
5945         /// used to accept such channels.
5946         ///
5947         /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5948         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5949         pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5950                 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
5951         }
5952
5953         /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
5954         /// it as confirmed immediately.
5955         ///
5956         /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5957         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5958         /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5959         ///
5960         /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
5961         /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
5962         ///
5963         /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
5964         /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
5965         ///
5966         /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
5967         /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
5968         ///
5969         /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5970         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5971         pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5972                 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
5973         }
5974
5975         fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5976                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5977
5978                 let peers_without_funded_channels =
5979                         self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
5980                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5981                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5982                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
5983                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5984                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5985                 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
5986
5987                 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
5988                 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
5989                 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
5990                 // succeed.
5991                 let mut channel = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
5992                         Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
5993                                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5994                                 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5995                                         counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
5996                                         &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
5997                                         &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|e| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.to_string() })
5998                         }
5999                         _ => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() })
6000                 }?;
6001
6002                 if accept_0conf {
6003                         // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
6004                         debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
6005                 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
6006                         let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6007                                 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6008                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6009                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
6010                                 }
6011                         };
6012                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6013                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
6014                 } else {
6015                         // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6016                         // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6017                         // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6018                         if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
6019                                 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6020                                         node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6021                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6022                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
6023                                         }
6024                                 };
6025                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6026                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
6027                         }
6028                 }
6029
6030                 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
6031                 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6032                 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6033
6034                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6035                         node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6036                         msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6037                 });
6038
6039                 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6040
6041                 Ok(())
6042         }
6043
6044         /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
6045         /// or 0-conf channels.
6046         ///
6047         /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
6048         /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
6049         fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
6050         where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
6051                 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
6052                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6053                 {
6054                         let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6055                         for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
6056                                 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6057                                 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
6058                                 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
6059                                 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
6060                                         peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
6061                                 }
6062                         }
6063                 }
6064                 return peers_without_funded_channels;
6065         }
6066
6067         fn unfunded_channel_count(
6068                 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
6069         ) -> usize {
6070                 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
6071                 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
6072                         match phase {
6073                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6074                                         // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
6075                                         // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
6076                                         if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
6077                                                 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
6078                                         {
6079                                                 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6080                                         }
6081                                 },
6082                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
6083                                         if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
6084                                                 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6085                                         }
6086                                 },
6087                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6088                                         // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
6089                                         continue;
6090                                 }
6091                         }
6092                 }
6093                 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
6094         }
6095
6096         fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6097                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6098                 // likely to be lost on restart!
6099                 if msg.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
6100                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6101                 }
6102
6103                 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
6104                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6105                 }
6106
6107                 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
6108                 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
6109                 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
6110                 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
6111                         self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
6112
6113                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6114                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6115                     .ok_or_else(|| {
6116                                 debug_assert!(false);
6117                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
6118                         })?;
6119                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6120                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6121
6122                 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6123                 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6124                 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6125                 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
6126                         channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
6127                         !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
6128                 {
6129                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6130                                 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
6131                                 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6132                 }
6133
6134                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6135                 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
6136                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6137                                 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
6138                                 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6139                 }
6140
6141                 let channel_id = msg.temporary_channel_id;
6142                 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
6143                 if channel_exists {
6144                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6145                 }
6146
6147                 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
6148                 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
6149                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6150                         pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
6151                                 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
6152                                 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6153                                 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6154                                 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
6155                                 channel_type: msg.channel_type.clone().unwrap(),
6156                         }, None));
6157                         peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
6158                                 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
6159                                 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
6160                         });
6161                         return Ok(());
6162                 }
6163
6164                 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
6165                 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
6166                 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
6167                 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
6168                 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6169                         counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
6170                         &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
6171                 {
6172                         Err(e) => {
6173                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
6174                         },
6175                         Ok(res) => res
6176                 };
6177
6178                 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
6179                 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
6180                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6181                 }
6182                 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6183                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6184                 }
6185
6186                 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6187                 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6188
6189                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6190                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6191                         msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6192                 });
6193                 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6194                 Ok(())
6195         }
6196
6197         fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6198                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6199                 // likely to be lost on restart!
6200                 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
6201                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6202                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6203                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
6204                                         debug_assert!(false);
6205                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6206                                 })?;
6207                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6208                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6209                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6210                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
6211                                         match phase.get_mut() {
6212                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
6213                                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
6214                                                         (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
6215                                                 },
6216                                                 _ => {
6217                                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
6218                                                 }
6219                                         }
6220                                 },
6221                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6222                         }
6223                 };
6224                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6225                 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
6226                         temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6227                         counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6228                         channel_value_satoshis: value,
6229                         output_script,
6230                         user_channel_id: user_id,
6231                 }, None));
6232                 Ok(())
6233         }
6234
6235         fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6236                 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6237
6238                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6239                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6240                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6241                                 debug_assert!(false);
6242                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6243                         })?;
6244
6245                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6246                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6247                 let (chan, funding_msg_opt, monitor) =
6248                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6249                                 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
6250                                         match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger) {
6251                                                 Ok(res) => res,
6252                                                 Err((mut inbound_chan, err)) => {
6253                                                         // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
6254                                                         // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
6255                                                         // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6256                                                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &inbound_chan.context);
6257                                                         let user_id = inbound_chan.context.get_user_id();
6258                                                         let shutdown_res = inbound_chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
6259                                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(format!("{}", err),
6260                                                                 msg.temporary_channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, inbound_chan.context.get_value_satoshis()));
6261                                                 },
6262                                         }
6263                                 },
6264                                 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(_)) | Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) => {
6265                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
6266                                 },
6267                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6268                         };
6269
6270                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
6271                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6272                                 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6273                                         "Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(),
6274                                         chan.context.channel_id()
6275                                 ))
6276                         },
6277                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6278                                 let mut id_to_peer_lock = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6279                                 match id_to_peer_lock.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
6280                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6281                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6282                                                         "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
6283                                                         chan.context.channel_id()))
6284                                         },
6285                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
6286                                                 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
6287                                                 if let Ok(persist_state) = monitor_res {
6288                                                         i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
6289                                                         mem::drop(id_to_peer_lock);
6290
6291                                                         // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
6292                                                         // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
6293                                                         // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
6294                                                         // until we have persisted our monitor.
6295                                                         if let Some(msg) = funding_msg_opt {
6296                                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
6297                                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6298                                                                         msg,
6299                                                                 });
6300                                                         }
6301
6302                                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
6303                                                                 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
6304                                                                         per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6305                                                         } else {
6306                                                                 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
6307                                                         }
6308                                                         Ok(())
6309                                                 } else {
6310                                                         log_error!(self.logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
6311                                                         let channel_id = match funding_msg_opt {
6312                                                                 Some(msg) => msg.channel_id,
6313                                                                 None => chan.context.channel_id(),
6314                                                         };
6315                                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6316                                                                 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
6317                                                                 channel_id));
6318                                                 }
6319                                         }
6320                                 }
6321                         }
6322                 }
6323         }
6324
6325         fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6326                 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6327                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6328                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6329                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6330                                 debug_assert!(false);
6331                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6332                         })?;
6333
6334                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6335                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6336                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6337                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6338                                 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6339                                         ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => {
6340                                                 let monitor = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6341                                                         chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6342                                                 if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
6343                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6344                                                         Ok(())
6345                                                 } else {
6346                                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned())), chan_phase_entry)
6347                                                 }
6348                                         },
6349                                         _ => {
6350                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
6351                                         },
6352                                 }
6353                         },
6354                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
6355                 }
6356         }
6357
6358         fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6359                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6360                 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6361                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6362                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6363                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6364                                 debug_assert!(false);
6365                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6366                         })?;
6367                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6368                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6369                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6370                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6371                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6372                                         let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
6373                                                 self.chain_hash, &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6374                                         if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
6375                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6376                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6377                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6378                                                         msg: announcement_sigs,
6379                                                 });
6380                                         } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6381                                                 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
6382                                                 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
6383                                                 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
6384                                                 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
6385                                                 // announcement_signatures.
6386                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6387                                                 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6388                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6389                                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6390                                                                 msg,
6391                                                         });
6392                                                 }
6393                                         }
6394
6395                                         {
6396                                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6397                                                 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
6398                                         }
6399
6400                                         Ok(())
6401                                 } else {
6402                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6403                                                 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
6404                                 }
6405                         },
6406                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
6407                                 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6408                         }
6409                 }
6410         }
6411
6412         fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6413                 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
6414                 let mut finish_shutdown = None;
6415                 {
6416                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6417                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6418                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
6419                                         debug_assert!(false);
6420                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6421                                 })?;
6422                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6423                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6424                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6425                                 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
6426                                 match phase {
6427                                         ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6428                                                 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
6429                                                         log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
6430                                                                 msg.channel_id,
6431                                                                 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
6432                                                 }
6433
6434                                                 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6435                                                 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6436                                                         chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6437                                                 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
6438
6439                                                 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
6440                                                         // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
6441                                                         // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
6442                                                         // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
6443                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6444                                                                 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6445                                                                 msg,
6446                                                         });
6447                                                 }
6448                                                 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
6449                                                 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6450                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6451                                                                 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6452                                                 }
6453                                         },
6454                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6455                                                 let context = phase.context_mut();
6456                                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
6457                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel);
6458                                                 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
6459                                                 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
6460                                         },
6461                                 }
6462                         } else {
6463                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6464                         }
6465                 }
6466                 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
6467                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
6468                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6469                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
6470                 }
6471                 if let Some(shutdown_res) = finish_shutdown {
6472                         self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
6473                 }
6474
6475                 Ok(())
6476         }
6477
6478         fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6479                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6480                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6481                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6482                                 debug_assert!(false);
6483                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6484                         })?;
6485                 let (tx, chan_option, shutdown_result) = {
6486                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6487                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6488                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6489                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6490                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6491                                                 let (closing_signed, tx, shutdown_result) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6492                                                 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
6493                                                 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
6494                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6495                                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6496                                                                 msg,
6497                                                         });
6498                                                 }
6499                                                 if tx.is_some() {
6500                                                         // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
6501                                                         // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
6502                                                         // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
6503                                                         // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
6504                                                         // watch for old state broadcasts)!
6505                                                         (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)), shutdown_result)
6506                                                 } else { (tx, None, shutdown_result) }
6507                                         } else {
6508                                                 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6509                                                         "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6510                                         }
6511                                 },
6512                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6513                         }
6514                 };
6515                 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
6516                         log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
6517                         self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
6518                 }
6519                 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
6520                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6521                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6522                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6523                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6524                                         msg: update
6525                                 });
6526                         }
6527                         self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
6528                 }
6529                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6530                 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
6531                         self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
6532                 }
6533                 Ok(())
6534         }
6535
6536         fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6537                 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
6538                 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
6539                 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
6540                 //
6541                 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
6542                 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
6543                 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
6544                 //but we should prevent it anyway.
6545
6546                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6547                 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6548
6549                 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
6550                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6551                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6552                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6553                                 debug_assert!(false);
6554                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6555                         })?;
6556                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6557                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6558                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6559                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6560                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6561                                         let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
6562                                                 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
6563                                                         self.construct_pending_htlc_status(msg, shared_secret, next_hop,
6564                                                                 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt),
6565                                                 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
6566                                         };
6567                                         let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<SP>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
6568                                                 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
6569                                                 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
6570                                                 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
6571                                                 match pending_forward_info {
6572                                                         PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
6573                                                                 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
6574                                                                         let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
6575                                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
6576                                                                 } else {
6577                                                                         HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
6578                                                                 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
6579                                                                 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6580                                                                         channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6581                                                                         htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6582                                                                         reason
6583                                                                 };
6584                                                                 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
6585                                                         },
6586                                                         _ => pending_forward_info
6587                                                 }
6588                                         };
6589                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6590                                 } else {
6591                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6592                                                 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6593                                 }
6594                         },
6595                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6596                 }
6597                 Ok(())
6598         }
6599
6600         fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6601                 let funding_txo;
6602                 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
6603                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6604                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6605                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
6606                                         debug_assert!(false);
6607                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6608                                 })?;
6609                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6610                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6611                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6612                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6613                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6614                                                 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6615                                                 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
6616                                                         log_trace!(self.logger,
6617                                                                 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
6618                                                                 msg.channel_id);
6619                                                         peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
6620                                                                 .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
6621                                                                 .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
6622                                                 }
6623                                                 // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates`
6624                                                 // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update.
6625                                                 // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a
6626                                                 // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the
6627                                                 // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we
6628                                                 // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially.
6629                                                 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
6630                                                 res
6631                                         } else {
6632                                                 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6633                                                         "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6634                                         }
6635                                 },
6636                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6637                         }
6638                 };
6639                 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, false, Some(*counterparty_node_id), funding_txo);
6640                 Ok(())
6641         }
6642
6643         fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6644                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6645                 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6646                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6647                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6648                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6649                                 debug_assert!(false);
6650                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6651                         })?;
6652                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6653                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6654                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6655                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6656                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6657                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
6658                                 } else {
6659                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6660                                                 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6661                                 }
6662                         },
6663                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6664                 }
6665                 Ok(())
6666         }
6667
6668         fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6669                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6670                 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6671                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6672                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6673                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6674                                 debug_assert!(false);
6675                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6676                         })?;
6677                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6678                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6679                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6680                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6681                                 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
6682                                         let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
6683                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
6684                                 }
6685                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6686                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
6687                                 } else {
6688                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6689                                                 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6690                                 }
6691                                 Ok(())
6692                         },
6693                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6694                 }
6695         }
6696
6697         fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6698                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6699                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6700                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6701                                 debug_assert!(false);
6702                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6703                         })?;
6704                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6705                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6706                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6707                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6708                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6709                                         let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6710                                         let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6711                                         if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6712                                                 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6713                                                         peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6714                                         }
6715                                         Ok(())
6716                                 } else {
6717                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6718                                                 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6719                                 }
6720                         },
6721                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6722                 }
6723         }
6724
6725         #[inline]
6726         fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
6727                 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
6728                         let mut push_forward_event = false;
6729                         let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
6730                         let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
6731                         if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6732                                 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
6733                                         let scid = match forward_info.routing {
6734                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6735                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
6736                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
6737                                         };
6738                                         // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
6739                                         let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
6740
6741                                         let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6742                                         let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
6743                                         match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
6744                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6745                                                         entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6746                                                                 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
6747                                                 },
6748                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6749                                                         if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
6750                                                            fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.chain_hash)
6751                                                         {
6752                                                                 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
6753                                                                 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6754                                                                 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
6755                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6756                                                                                 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
6757                                                                                         requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
6758                                                                                         payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
6759                                                                                         inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
6760                                                                                         expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
6761                                                                                         intercept_id
6762                                                                                 }, None));
6763                                                                                 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6764                                                                                         prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
6765                                                                         },
6766                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6767                                                                                 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
6768                                                                                 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6769                                                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
6770                                                                                         user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
6771                                                                                         outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
6772                                                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
6773                                                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6774                                                                                         phantom_shared_secret: None,
6775                                                                                 });
6776
6777                                                                                 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
6778                                                                                                 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
6779                                                                                                 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
6780                                                                                 ));
6781                                                                         }
6782                                                                 }
6783                                                         } else {
6784                                                                 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
6785                                                                 // payments are being processed.
6786                                                                 if forward_htlcs_empty {
6787                                                                         push_forward_event = true;
6788                                                                 }
6789                                                                 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6790                                                                         prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
6791                                                         }
6792                                                 }
6793                                         }
6794                                 }
6795                         }
6796
6797                         for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
6798                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
6799                         }
6800
6801                         if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
6802                                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6803                                 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
6804                         }
6805                         if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
6806                 }
6807         }
6808
6809         fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
6810                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6811                 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6812                 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
6813                         if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
6814                 ).count();
6815                 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
6816                 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
6817                 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
6818                 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
6819                 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
6820                 // real by taking more time.
6821                 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
6822                         pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6823                                 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
6824                         }, None));
6825                 }
6826         }
6827
6828         /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
6829         /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
6830         /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
6831         /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
6832         fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6833                 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
6834                 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
6835         ) -> bool {
6836                 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6837                         .get(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
6838                 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
6839                         action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6840                                 channel_funding_outpoint,
6841                                 counterparty_node_id,
6842                         })
6843                 })
6844         }
6845
6846         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6847         pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6848                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId
6849         ) -> bool {
6850                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6851                 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6852                         let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6853                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
6854
6855                         if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) {
6856                                 return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
6857                                         chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), counterparty_node_id);
6858                         }
6859                 }
6860                 false
6861         }
6862
6863         fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6864                 let htlcs_to_fail = {
6865                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6866                         let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6867                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
6868                                         debug_assert!(false);
6869                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6870                                 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
6871                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6872                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6873                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6874                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6875                                                 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6876                                                 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
6877                                                         self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
6878                                                                 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo,
6879                                                                 *counterparty_node_id)
6880                                                 } else { false };
6881                                                 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6882                                                         chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
6883                                                 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6884                                                         let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
6885                                                                 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
6886                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
6887                                                                 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6888                                                 }
6889                                                 htlcs_to_fail
6890                                         } else {
6891                                                 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6892                                                         "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6893                                         }
6894                                 },
6895                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6896                         }
6897                 };
6898                 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
6899                 Ok(())
6900         }
6901
6902         fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6903                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6904                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6905                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6906                                 debug_assert!(false);
6907                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6908                         })?;
6909                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6910                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6911                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6912                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6913                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6914                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6915                                 } else {
6916                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6917                                                 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6918                                 }
6919                         },
6920                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6921                 }
6922                 Ok(())
6923         }
6924
6925         fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6926                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6927                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6928                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6929                                 debug_assert!(false);
6930                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6931                         })?;
6932                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6933                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6934                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6935                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6936                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6937                                         if !chan.context.is_usable() {
6938                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
6939                                         }
6940
6941                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6942                                                 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
6943                                                         &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
6944                                                         msg, &self.default_configuration
6945                                                 ), chan_phase_entry),
6946                                                 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6947                                                 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6948                                                 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
6949                                         });
6950                                 } else {
6951                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6952                                                 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6953                                 }
6954                         },
6955                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6956                 }
6957                 Ok(())
6958         }
6959
6960         /// Returns DoPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersistNoEvents or an Err.
6961         fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6962                 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
6963                         Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
6964                         None => {
6965                                 // It's not a local channel
6966                                 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6967                         }
6968                 };
6969                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6970                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
6971                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
6972                         return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6973                 }
6974                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6975                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6976                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
6977                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6978                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6979                                         if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6980                                                 if chan.context.should_announce() {
6981                                                         // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
6982                                                         // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
6983                                                         // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
6984                                                         return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6985                                                 }
6986                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
6987                                         }
6988                                         let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
6989                                         let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
6990                                         if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
6991                                                 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6992                                         } else {
6993                                                 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update {:?} for channel {}.", msg, chan_id);
6994                                                 let did_change = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6995                                                 // If nothing changed after applying their update, we don't need to bother
6996                                                 // persisting.
6997                                                 if !did_change {
6998                                                         return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6999                                                 }
7000                                         }
7001                                 } else {
7002                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7003                                                 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7004                                 }
7005                         },
7006                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7007                 }
7008                 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
7009         }
7010
7011         fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7012                 let htlc_forwards;
7013                 let need_lnd_workaround = {
7014                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7015
7016                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7017                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
7018                                         debug_assert!(false);
7019                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7020                                                 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
7021                                                 msg.channel_id
7022                                         )
7023                                 })?;
7024                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7025                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7026                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7027                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7028                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7029                                                 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
7030                                                 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
7031                                                 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
7032                                                 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
7033                                                 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
7034                                                         msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash,
7035                                                         &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
7036                                                 let mut channel_update = None;
7037                                                 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
7038                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
7039                                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7040                                                                 msg,
7041                                                         });
7042                                                 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
7043                                                         // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
7044                                                         // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
7045                                                         // they have the latest channel parameters.
7046                                                         if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
7047                                                                 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7048                                                                         node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7049                                                                         msg,
7050                                                                 });
7051                                                         }
7052                                                 }
7053                                                 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
7054                                                 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
7055                                                         &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
7056                                                         Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
7057                                                 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
7058                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
7059                                                 }
7060                                                 need_lnd_workaround
7061                                         } else {
7062                                                 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7063                                                         "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7064                                         }
7065                                 },
7066                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
7067                                         log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending bogus ChannelReestablish for unknown channel {} to force channel closure",
7068                                                 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id.0));
7069                                         // Unfortunately, lnd doesn't force close on errors
7070                                         // (https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/blob/abb1e3463f3a83bbb843d5c399869dbe930ad94f/htlcswitch/link.go#L2119).
7071                                         // One of the few ways to get an lnd counterparty to force close is by
7072                                         // replicating what they do when restoring static channel backups (SCBs). They
7073                                         // send an invalid `ChannelReestablish` with `0` commitment numbers and an
7074                                         // invalid `your_last_per_commitment_secret`.
7075                                         //
7076                                         // Since we received a `ChannelReestablish` for a channel that doesn't exist, we
7077                                         // can assume it's likely the channel closed from our point of view, but it
7078                                         // remains open on the counterparty's side. By sending this bogus
7079                                         // `ChannelReestablish` message now as a response to theirs, we trigger them to
7080                                         // force close broadcasting their latest state. If the closing transaction from
7081                                         // our point of view remains unconfirmed, it'll enter a race with the
7082                                         // counterparty's to-be-broadcast latest commitment transaction.
7083                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
7084                                                 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7085                                                 msg: msgs::ChannelReestablish {
7086                                                         channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7087                                                         next_local_commitment_number: 0,
7088                                                         next_remote_commitment_number: 0,
7089                                                         your_last_per_commitment_secret: [1u8; 32],
7090                                                         my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_slice(&[2u8; 33]).unwrap(),
7091                                                         next_funding_txid: None,
7092                                                 },
7093                                         });
7094                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7095                                                 format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}",
7096                                                         counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7097                                         )
7098                                 }
7099                         }
7100                 };
7101
7102                 let mut persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
7103                 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
7104                         self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
7105                         persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7106                 }
7107
7108                 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
7109                         self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
7110                 }
7111                 Ok(persist)
7112         }
7113
7114         /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
7115         fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
7116                 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
7117
7118                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7119                 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
7120                 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
7121                 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
7122                         for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
7123                                 match monitor_event {
7124                                         MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
7125                                                 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
7126                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
7127                                                         self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, false, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint);
7128                                                 } else {
7129                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
7130                                                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
7131                                                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7132                                                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7133                                                 }
7134                                         },
7135                                         MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(funding_outpoint) => {
7136                                                 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
7137                                                         Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
7138                                                         None => {
7139                                                                 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
7140                                                                 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
7141                                                                 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7142                                                                 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
7143                                                         }
7144                                                 };
7145                                                 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
7146                                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7147                                                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7148                                                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7149                                                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7150                                                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7151                                                                 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
7152                                                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
7153                                                                                 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
7154                                                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7155                                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7156                                                                                                 msg: update
7157                                                                                         });
7158                                                                                 }
7159                                                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
7160                                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7161                                                                                         node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7162                                                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
7163                                                                                                 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
7164                                                                                         },
7165                                                                                 });
7166                                                                         }
7167                                                                 }
7168                                                         }
7169                                                 }
7170                                         },
7171                                         MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
7172                                                 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
7173                                         },
7174                                 }
7175                         }
7176                 }
7177
7178                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7179                         self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7180                 }
7181
7182                 has_pending_monitor_events
7183         }
7184
7185         /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
7186         /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
7187         /// update events as a separate process method here.
7188         #[cfg(fuzzing)]
7189         pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
7190                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7191                 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
7192         }
7193
7194         /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
7195         /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
7196         /// update was applied.
7197         fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
7198                 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
7199                 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7200
7201                 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
7202                 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
7203                 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
7204                 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
7205                 'peer_loop: loop {
7206                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7207                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7208                                 'chan_loop: loop {
7209                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7210                                         let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7211                                         for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
7212                                                 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
7213                                         ) {
7214                                                 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
7215                                                 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7216                                                 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
7217                                                         chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
7218                                                 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
7219                                                         failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
7220                                                 }
7221                                                 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
7222                                                         has_monitor_update = true;
7223
7224                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
7225                                                                 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7226                                                         continue 'peer_loop;
7227                                                 }
7228                                         }
7229                                         break 'chan_loop;
7230                                 }
7231                         }
7232                         break 'peer_loop;
7233                 }
7234
7235                 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
7236                 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7237                         self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
7238                 }
7239
7240                 has_update
7241         }
7242
7243         /// When a call to a [`ChannelSigner`] method returns an error, this indicates that the signer
7244         /// is (temporarily) unavailable, and the operation should be retried later.
7245         ///
7246         /// This method allows for that retry - either checking for any signer-pending messages to be
7247         /// attempted in every channel, or in the specifically provided channel.
7248         ///
7249         /// [`ChannelSigner`]: crate::sign::ChannelSigner
7250         #[cfg(test)] // This is only implemented for one signer method, and should be private until we
7251                      // actually finish implementing it fully.
7252         pub fn signer_unblocked(&self, channel_opt: Option<(PublicKey, ChannelId)>) {
7253                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7254
7255                 let unblock_chan = |phase: &mut ChannelPhase<SP>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>| {
7256                         let node_id = phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id();
7257                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
7258                                 let msgs = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger);
7259                                 if let Some(updates) = msgs.commitment_update {
7260                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
7261                                                 node_id,
7262                                                 updates,
7263                                         });
7264                                 }
7265                                 if let Some(msg) = msgs.funding_signed {
7266                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
7267                                                 node_id,
7268                                                 msg,
7269                                         });
7270                                 }
7271                                 if let Some(msg) = msgs.funding_created {
7272                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
7273                                                 node_id,
7274                                                 msg,
7275                                         });
7276                                 }
7277                                 if let Some(msg) = msgs.channel_ready {
7278                                         send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
7279                                 }
7280                         }
7281                 };
7282
7283                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7284                 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, channel_id)) = channel_opt {
7285                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7286                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7287                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7288                                 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
7289                                         unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7290                                 }
7291                         }
7292                 } else {
7293                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7294                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7295                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7296                                 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7297                                         unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7298                                 }
7299                         }
7300                 }
7301         }
7302
7303         /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
7304         /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
7305         /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
7306         fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
7307                 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
7308                 let mut has_update = false;
7309                 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
7310                 {
7311                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7312
7313                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7314                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7315                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7316                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7317                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
7318                                         match phase {
7319                                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7320                                                         match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
7321                                                                 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt, shutdown_result_opt)) => {
7322                                                                         if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
7323                                                                                 has_update = true;
7324                                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
7325                                                                                         node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
7326                                                                                 });
7327                                                                         }
7328                                                                         debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result_opt.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
7329                                                                         if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result_opt {
7330                                                                                 shutdown_results.push(shutdown_result);
7331                                                                         }
7332                                                                         if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
7333                                                                                 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
7334                                                                                 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
7335                                                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7336                                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7337                                                                                                 msg: update
7338                                                                                         });
7339                                                                                 }
7340
7341                                                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
7342
7343                                                                                 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
7344                                                                                 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
7345                                                                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7346                                                                                 false
7347                                                                         } else { true }
7348                                                                 },
7349                                                                 Err(e) => {
7350                                                                         has_update = true;
7351                                                                         let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
7352                                                                         handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
7353                                                                         !close_channel
7354                                                                 }
7355                                                         }
7356                                                 },
7357                                                 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
7358                                         }
7359                                 });
7360                         }
7361                 }
7362
7363                 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
7364                         let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
7365                 }
7366
7367                 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
7368                         self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
7369                 }
7370
7371                 has_update
7372         }
7373
7374         /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
7375         /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
7376         /// Channel object.
7377         fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
7378                 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7379                         // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
7380                         // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
7381                         // reorganized out of the main chain.
7382                         // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
7383                         // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
7384                         // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
7385                         // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
7386                         if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.monitor_update.take() {
7387                                 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
7388                                 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
7389                                         assert!(should_broadcast);
7390                                 } else { unreachable!(); }
7391                                 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
7392                                         BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
7393                                                 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
7394                                         });
7395                         }
7396                         self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7397                 }
7398         }
7399
7400         /// Creates an [`OfferBuilder`] such that the [`Offer`] it builds is recognized by the
7401         /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`InvoiceRequest`] messages for the offer. The offer will
7402         /// not have an expiration unless otherwise set on the builder.
7403         ///
7404         /// # Privacy
7405         ///
7406         /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the offer with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the
7407         /// introduction node and a derived signing pubkey for recipient privacy. As such, currently,
7408         /// the node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction
7409         /// node in order to send the [`InvoiceRequest`].
7410         ///
7411         /// # Limitations
7412         ///
7413         /// Requires a direct connection to the introduction node in the responding [`InvoiceRequest`]'s
7414         /// reply path.
7415         ///
7416         /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7417         ///
7418         /// [`Offer`]: crate::offers::offer::Offer
7419         /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7420         pub fn create_offer_builder(
7421                 &self, description: String
7422         ) -> OfferBuilder<DerivedMetadata, secp256k1::All> {
7423                 let node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7424                 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7425                 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7426                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7427                 let path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7428
7429                 OfferBuilder::deriving_signing_pubkey(description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx)
7430                         .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)
7431                         .path(path)
7432         }
7433
7434         /// Creates a [`RefundBuilder`] such that the [`Refund`] it builds is recognized by the
7435         /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`Bolt12Invoice`] messages for the refund.
7436         ///
7437         /// # Payment
7438         ///
7439         /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the refund.
7440         /// See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has been sent.
7441         ///
7442         /// The builder will have the provided expiration set. Any changes to the expiration on the
7443         /// returned builder will not be honored by [`ChannelManager`]. For `no-std`, the highest seen
7444         /// block time minus two hours is used for the current time when determining if the refund has
7445         /// expired.
7446         ///
7447         /// To revoke the refund, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7448         /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received before expiration, the payment will fail
7449         /// with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7450         ///
7451         /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7452         /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7453         ///
7454         /// # Privacy
7455         ///
7456         /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the refund with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as
7457         /// the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
7458         /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
7459         /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7460         ///
7461         /// # Limitations
7462         ///
7463         /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in the responding
7464         /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7465         ///
7466         /// # Errors
7467         ///
7468         /// Errors if a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link
7469         /// or if `amount_msats` is invalid.
7470         ///
7471         /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7472         ///
7473         /// [`Refund`]: crate::offers::refund::Refund
7474         /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7475         /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7476         pub fn create_refund_builder(
7477                 &self, description: String, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration,
7478                 payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7479         ) -> Result<RefundBuilder<secp256k1::All>, Bolt12SemanticError> {
7480                 let node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7481                 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7482                 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7483                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7484                 let path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7485
7486                 let builder = RefundBuilder::deriving_payer_id(
7487                         description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, amount_msats, payment_id
7488                 )?
7489                         .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)
7490                         .absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry)
7491                         .path(path);
7492
7493                 let expiration = StaleExpiration::AbsoluteTimeout(absolute_expiry);
7494                 self.pending_outbound_payments
7495                         .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7496                                 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat,
7497                         )
7498                         .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7499
7500                 Ok(builder)
7501         }
7502
7503         /// Pays for an [`Offer`] using the given parameters by creating an [`InvoiceRequest`] and
7504         /// enqueuing it to be sent via an onion message. [`ChannelManager`] will pay the actual
7505         /// [`Bolt12Invoice`] once it is received.
7506         ///
7507         /// Uses [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`] such that the [`InvoiceRequest`] it builds is recognized by
7508         /// the [`ChannelManager`] when handling a [`Bolt12Invoice`] message in response to the request.
7509         /// The optional parameters are used in the builder, if `Some`:
7510         /// - `quantity` for [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`] which must be set if
7511         ///   [`Offer::expects_quantity`] is `true`.
7512         /// - `amount_msats` if overpaying what is required for the given `quantity` is desired, and
7513         /// - `payer_note` for [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`].
7514         ///
7515         /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7516         /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7517         ///
7518         /// # Payment
7519         ///
7520         /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the request
7521         /// when received. See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has
7522         /// been sent.
7523         ///
7524         /// To revoke the request, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7525         /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received in a reasonable amount of time, the
7526         /// payment will fail with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7527         ///
7528         /// # Privacy
7529         ///
7530         /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the reply path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`]
7531         /// as the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
7532         /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
7533         /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7534         ///
7535         /// # Limitations
7536         ///
7537         /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Offer::paths`] or to
7538         /// [`Offer::signing_pubkey`], if empty. A similar restriction applies to the responding
7539         /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7540         ///
7541         /// # Errors
7542         ///
7543         /// Errors if a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link
7544         /// or if the provided parameters are invalid for the offer.
7545         ///
7546         /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7547         /// [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::quantity
7548         /// [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::payer_note
7549         /// [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequestBuilder
7550         /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7551         /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7552         /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
7553         pub fn pay_for_offer(
7554                 &self, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
7555                 payer_note: Option<String>, payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry,
7556                 max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7557         ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7558                 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7559                 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7560                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7561
7562                 let builder = offer
7563                         .request_invoice_deriving_payer_id(expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, payment_id)?
7564                         .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)?;
7565                 let builder = match quantity {
7566                         None => builder,
7567                         Some(quantity) => builder.quantity(quantity)?,
7568                 };
7569                 let builder = match amount_msats {
7570                         None => builder,
7571                         Some(amount_msats) => builder.amount_msats(amount_msats)?,
7572                 };
7573                 let builder = match payer_note {
7574                         None => builder,
7575                         Some(payer_note) => builder.payer_note(payer_note),
7576                 };
7577
7578                 let invoice_request = builder.build_and_sign()?;
7579                 let reply_path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7580
7581                 let expiration = StaleExpiration::TimerTicks(1);
7582                 self.pending_outbound_payments
7583                         .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7584                                 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat
7585                         )
7586                         .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7587
7588                 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7589                 if offer.paths().is_empty() {
7590                         let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7591                                 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request),
7592                                 Destination::Node(offer.signing_pubkey()),
7593                                 Some(reply_path),
7594                         );
7595                         pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7596                 } else {
7597                         // Send as many invoice requests as there are paths in the offer (with an upper bound).
7598                         // Using only one path could result in a failure if the path no longer exists. But only
7599                         // one invoice for a given payment id will be paid, even if more than one is received.
7600                         const REQUEST_LIMIT: usize = 10;
7601                         for path in offer.paths().into_iter().take(REQUEST_LIMIT) {
7602                                 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7603                                         OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request.clone()),
7604                                         Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
7605                                         Some(reply_path.clone()),
7606                                 );
7607                                 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7608                         }
7609                 }
7610
7611                 Ok(())
7612         }
7613
7614         /// Creates a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for a [`Refund`] and enqueues it to be sent via an onion
7615         /// message.
7616         ///
7617         /// The resulting invoice uses a [`PaymentHash`] recognized by the [`ChannelManager`] and a
7618         /// [`BlindedPath`] containing the [`PaymentSecret`] needed to reconstruct the corresponding
7619         /// [`PaymentPreimage`].
7620         ///
7621         /// # Limitations
7622         ///
7623         /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Refund::paths`] or to
7624         /// [`Refund::payer_id`], if empty. This request is best effort; an invoice will be sent to each
7625         /// node meeting the aforementioned criteria, but there's no guarantee that they will be
7626         /// received and no retries will be made.
7627         ///
7628         /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7629         pub fn request_refund_payment(&self, refund: &Refund) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7630                 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7631                 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7632                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7633
7634                 let amount_msats = refund.amount_msats();
7635                 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
7636
7637                 match self.create_inbound_payment(Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None) {
7638                         Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
7639                                 let payment_paths = vec![
7640                                         self.create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(payment_secret),
7641                                 ];
7642                                 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
7643                                 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys(
7644                                         payment_paths, payment_hash, expanded_key, entropy
7645                                 )?;
7646                                 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
7647                                 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
7648                                         self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
7649                                 );
7650                                 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
7651                                 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
7652                                         payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at, expanded_key, entropy
7653                                 )?;
7654                                 let invoice = builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)?;
7655                                 let reply_path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7656
7657                                 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7658                                 if refund.paths().is_empty() {
7659                                         let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7660                                                 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice),
7661                                                 Destination::Node(refund.payer_id()),
7662                                                 Some(reply_path),
7663                                         );
7664                                         pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7665                                 } else {
7666                                         for path in refund.paths() {
7667                                                 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7668                                                         OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
7669                                                         Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
7670                                                         Some(reply_path.clone()),
7671                                                 );
7672                                                 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7673                                         }
7674                                 }
7675
7676                                 Ok(())
7677                         },
7678                         Err(()) => Err(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount),
7679                 }
7680         }
7681
7682         /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
7683         /// to pay us.
7684         ///
7685         /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
7686         /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
7687         ///
7688         /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
7689         /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
7690         /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
7691         /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
7692         ///
7693         /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
7694         ///
7695         /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7696         /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7697         ///
7698         /// # Note
7699         ///
7700         /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7701         /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7702         ///
7703         /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7704         ///
7705         /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7706         /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7707         ///
7708         /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
7709         /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7710         /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
7711         /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
7712         /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
7713         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
7714         pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
7715                 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
7716                 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
7717                         &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7718                         min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
7719         }
7720
7721         /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
7722         /// stored external to LDK.
7723         ///
7724         /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
7725         /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
7726         /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
7727         ///
7728         /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
7729         /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
7730         /// payments.
7731         ///
7732         /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
7733         /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
7734         /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
7735         /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
7736         ///
7737         /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
7738         /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
7739         /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
7740         /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
7741         /// invoices when no timeout is set.
7742         ///
7743         /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
7744         /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
7745         /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
7746         /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
7747         /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
7748         ///
7749         /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
7750         /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
7751         ///
7752         /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7753         /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7754         ///
7755         /// # Note
7756         ///
7757         /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7758         /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7759         ///
7760         /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7761         ///
7762         /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7763         /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7764         ///
7765         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7766         /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7767         pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
7768                 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
7769                 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
7770                         invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7771                         min_final_cltv_expiry)
7772         }
7773
7774         /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
7775         /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
7776         ///
7777         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7778         pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
7779                 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
7780         }
7781
7782         /// Creates a one-hop blinded path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction
7783         /// node.
7784         fn create_one_hop_blinded_path(&self) -> BlindedPath {
7785                 let entropy_source = self.entropy_source.deref();
7786                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7787                 BlindedPath::one_hop_for_message(self.get_our_node_id(), entropy_source, secp_ctx).unwrap()
7788         }
7789
7790         /// Creates a one-hop blinded path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction
7791         /// node.
7792         fn create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(
7793                 &self, payment_secret: PaymentSecret
7794         ) -> (BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath) {
7795                 let entropy_source = self.entropy_source.deref();
7796                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7797
7798                 let payee_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7799                 let max_cltv_expiry = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
7800                 let payee_tlvs = ReceiveTlvs {
7801                         payment_secret,
7802                         payment_constraints: PaymentConstraints {
7803                                 max_cltv_expiry,
7804                                 htlc_minimum_msat: 1,
7805                         },
7806                 };
7807                 // TODO: Err for overflow?
7808                 BlindedPath::one_hop_for_payment(
7809                         payee_node_id, payee_tlvs, entropy_source, secp_ctx
7810                 ).unwrap()
7811         }
7812
7813         /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
7814         /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
7815         ///
7816         /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
7817         pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
7818                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7819                 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
7820                 loop {
7821                         let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
7822                         // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
7823                         match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
7824                                 Some(_) => continue,
7825                                 None => return scid_candidate
7826                         }
7827                 }
7828         }
7829
7830         /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
7831         ///
7832         /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
7833         pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
7834                 PhantomRouteHints {
7835                         channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
7836                         phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
7837                         real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
7838                 }
7839         }
7840
7841         /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
7842         /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
7843         /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
7844         ///
7845         /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
7846         /// times to get a unique scid.
7847         pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
7848                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7849                 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
7850                 loop {
7851                         let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
7852                         // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
7853                         if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
7854                         return scid_candidate
7855                 }
7856         }
7857
7858         /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
7859         /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
7860         pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
7861                 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
7862
7863                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7864                 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7865                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7866                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7867                         for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
7868                                 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
7869                         ) {
7870                                 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7871                                         if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
7872                                                 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
7873                                         }
7874                                 }
7875                         }
7876                 }
7877
7878                 inflight_htlcs
7879         }
7880
7881         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7882         pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
7883                 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
7884                 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
7885                 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
7886                 events.into_inner()
7887         }
7888
7889         #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
7890         pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
7891                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7892                 events.push_back((event, None));
7893         }
7894
7895         #[cfg(test)]
7896         pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
7897                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7898                 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
7899         }
7900
7901         #[cfg(test)]
7902         pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
7903                 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
7904         }
7905
7906         #[cfg(test)]
7907         pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
7908                 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
7909         }
7910
7911         /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
7912         /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
7913         /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
7914         /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
7915         fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
7916                 loop {
7917                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7918                         if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7919                                 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7920                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
7921
7922                                 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
7923                                         // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
7924                                         if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
7925                                                 .get_mut(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
7926                                         {
7927                                                 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
7928                                         }
7929                                 }
7930
7931                                 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
7932                                         channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id) {
7933                                         // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
7934                                         // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
7935                                         // update(s) when those blockers complete.
7936                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
7937                                                 &channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7938                                         break;
7939                                 }
7940
7941                                 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
7942                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7943                                                 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
7944                                                 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
7945                                                         log_debug!(self.logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
7946                                                                 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7947                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
7948                                                                 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7949                                                         if further_update_exists {
7950                                                                 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
7951                                                                 // top of the loop.
7952                                                                 continue;
7953                                                         }
7954                                                 } else {
7955                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
7956                                                                 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7957                                                 }
7958                                         }
7959                                 }
7960                         } else {
7961                                 log_debug!(self.logger,
7962                                         "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
7963                                         log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7964                         }
7965                         break;
7966                 }
7967         }
7968
7969         fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
7970                 for action in actions {
7971                         match action {
7972                                 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
7973                                         channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
7974                                 } => {
7975                                         self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, None);
7976                                 }
7977                         }
7978                 }
7979         }
7980
7981         /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
7982         /// using the given event handler.
7983         ///
7984         /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
7985         pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
7986                 &self, handler: H
7987         ) {
7988                 let mut ev;
7989                 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
7990         }
7991 }
7992
7993 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7994 where
7995         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7996         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7997         ES::Target: EntropySource,
7998         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7999         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8000         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8001         R::Target: Router,
8002         L::Target: Logger,
8003 {
8004         /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
8005         /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
8006         /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
8007         /// is always placed next to each other.
8008         ///
8009         /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
8010         /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
8011         /// `MessageSendEvent`s  for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
8012         /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
8013         ///
8014         /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
8015         /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
8016         /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
8017         fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
8018                 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
8019                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8020                         let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8021
8022                         // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
8023                         // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
8024                         if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
8025                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8026                         }
8027
8028                         if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
8029                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8030                         }
8031                         if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
8032                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8033                         }
8034
8035                         let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
8036                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8037                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8038                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8039                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8040                                 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
8041                                         pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
8042                                 }
8043                         }
8044
8045                         if !pending_events.is_empty() {
8046                                 events.replace(pending_events);
8047                         }
8048
8049                         result
8050                 });
8051                 events.into_inner()
8052         }
8053 }
8054
8055 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8056 where
8057         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8058         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8059         ES::Target: EntropySource,
8060         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8061         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8062         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8063         R::Target: Router,
8064         L::Target: Logger,
8065 {
8066         /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
8067         ///
8068         /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
8069         /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
8070         fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
8071                 let mut ev;
8072                 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
8073         }
8074 }
8075
8076 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8077 where
8078         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8079         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8080         ES::Target: EntropySource,
8081         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8082         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8083         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8084         R::Target: Router,
8085         L::Target: Logger,
8086 {
8087         fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8088                 {
8089                         let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
8090                         assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
8091                                 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
8092                         assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
8093                                 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
8094                 }
8095
8096                 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
8097                 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
8098         }
8099
8100         fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
8101                 let _persistence_guard =
8102                         PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8103                                 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8104                 let new_height = height - 1;
8105                 {
8106                         let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
8107                         assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
8108                                 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
8109                         assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
8110                                 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
8111                         *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
8112                 }
8113
8114                 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
8115         }
8116 }
8117
8118 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8119 where
8120         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8121         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8122         ES::Target: EntropySource,
8123         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8124         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8125         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8126         R::Target: Router,
8127         L::Target: Logger,
8128 {
8129         fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8130                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8131                 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8132                 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8133
8134                 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8135                 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
8136
8137                 let _persistence_guard =
8138                         PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8139                                 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8140                 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
8141                         .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
8142
8143                 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8144                 if height < last_best_block_height {
8145                         let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8146                         self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
8147                 }
8148         }
8149
8150         fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
8151                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8152                 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8153                 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8154
8155                 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8156                 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
8157
8158                 let _persistence_guard =
8159                         PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8160                                 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8161                 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
8162
8163                 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
8164
8165                 macro_rules! max_time {
8166                         ($timestamp: expr) => {
8167                                 loop {
8168                                         // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
8169                                         // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
8170                                         // having an explicit local time source.
8171                                         // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
8172                                         // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
8173                                         let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8174                                         if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
8175                                         if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
8176                                                 break;
8177                                         }
8178                                 }
8179                         }
8180                 }
8181                 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
8182                 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8183                 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
8184                         inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
8185                 });
8186         }
8187
8188         fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
8189                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
8190                 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
8191                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8192                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8193                         for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
8194                                 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.context.get_funding_txo(), chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
8195                                         res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
8196                                 }
8197                         }
8198                 }
8199                 res
8200         }
8201
8202         fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
8203                 let _persistence_guard =
8204                         PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8205                                 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8206                 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
8207                         if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
8208                                 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
8209                                         channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
8210                                 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8211                         } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8212                 });
8213         }
8214 }
8215
8216 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8217 where
8218         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8219         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8220         ES::Target: EntropySource,
8221         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8222         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8223         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8224         R::Target: Router,
8225         L::Target: Logger,
8226 {
8227         /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
8228         /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
8229         /// the function.
8230         fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
8231                         (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
8232                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8233                 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8234                 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8235
8236                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8237                 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
8238                 {
8239                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8240                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8241                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8242                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8243                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8244                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8245                                         match phase {
8246                                                 // Retain unfunded channels.
8247                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
8248                                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
8249                                                         let res = f(channel);
8250                                                         if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
8251                                                                 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
8252                                                                         let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
8253                                                                         timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
8254                                                                                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
8255                                                                 }
8256                                                                 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
8257                                                                         send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
8258                                                                         if channel.context.is_usable() {
8259                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8260                                                                                 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
8261                                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
8262                                                                                                 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8263                                                                                                 msg,
8264                                                                                         });
8265                                                                                 }
8266                                                                         } else {
8267                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8268                                                                         }
8269                                                                 }
8270
8271                                                                 {
8272                                                                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8273                                                                         emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
8274                                                                 }
8275
8276                                                                 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
8277                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8278                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
8279                                                                                 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8280                                                                                 msg: announcement_sigs,
8281                                                                         });
8282                                                                         if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8283                                                                                 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
8284                                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
8285                                                                                                 msg: announcement,
8286                                                                                                 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
8287                                                                                                 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
8288                                                                                                 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
8289                                                                                         });
8290                                                                                 }
8291                                                                         }
8292                                                                 }
8293                                                                 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
8294                                                                         if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
8295                                                                                 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
8296                                                                                 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
8297                                                                                 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
8298                                                                                 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
8299                                                                                 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
8300                                                                                 // is always consistent.
8301                                                                                 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
8302                                                                                 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8303                                                                                 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
8304                                                                                         "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
8305                                                                                         fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
8306                                                                         }
8307                                                                 }
8308                                                         } else if let Err(reason) = res {
8309                                                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
8310                                                                 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
8311                                                                 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
8312                                                                 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true));
8313                                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
8314                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
8315                                                                                 msg: update
8316                                                                         });
8317                                                                 }
8318                                                                 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
8319                                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, reason);
8320                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8321                                                                         node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8322                                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
8323                                                                                 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage {
8324                                                                                         channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8325                                                                                         data: reason_message,
8326                                                                                 })
8327                                                                         },
8328                                                                 });
8329                                                                 return false;
8330                                                         }
8331                                                         true
8332                                                 }
8333                                         }
8334                                 });
8335                         }
8336                 }
8337
8338                 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8339                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
8340                                 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
8341                                         // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
8342                                         // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
8343                                         // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
8344                                         // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
8345                                         if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8346                                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
8347                                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
8348
8349                                                 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
8350                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
8351                                                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
8352                                                 false
8353                                         } else { true }
8354                                 });
8355                                 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
8356                         });
8357
8358                         let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8359                         intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
8360                                 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8361                                         let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
8362                                                 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
8363                                                 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
8364                                                 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
8365                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
8366                                                 phantom_shared_secret: None,
8367                                                 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
8368                                         });
8369
8370                                         let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
8371                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
8372                                                 _ => unreachable!(),
8373                                         };
8374                                         timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
8375                                                         HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
8376                                                         HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
8377                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
8378                                         false
8379                                 } else { true }
8380                         });
8381                 }
8382
8383                 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
8384
8385                 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
8386                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
8387                 }
8388         }
8389
8390         /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or
8391         /// may have events that need processing.
8392         ///
8393         /// In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call
8394         /// [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`].
8395         ///
8396         /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
8397         /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
8398         pub fn get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(&self) -> Future {
8399                 self.event_persist_notifier.get_future()
8400         }
8401
8402         /// Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
8403         pub fn get_and_clear_needs_persistence(&self) -> bool {
8404                 self.needs_persist_flag.swap(false, Ordering::AcqRel)
8405         }
8406
8407         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
8408         pub fn get_event_or_persist_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
8409                 self.event_persist_notifier.notify_pending()
8410         }
8411
8412         /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
8413         /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
8414         pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
8415                 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
8416         }
8417
8418         /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8419         /// [`ChannelManager`].
8420         pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
8421                 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
8422         }
8423
8424         /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8425         /// [`ChannelManager`].
8426         ///
8427         /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
8428         /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
8429         #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
8430         pub fn bolt11_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
8431                 provided_bolt11_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8432         }
8433
8434         /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8435         /// [`ChannelManager`].
8436         fn bolt12_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
8437                 provided_bolt12_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8438         }
8439
8440         /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8441         /// [`ChannelManager`].
8442         pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
8443                 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
8444         }
8445
8446         /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8447         /// [`ChannelManager`].
8448         pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
8449                 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
8450         }
8451
8452         /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8453         /// [`ChannelManager`].
8454         pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
8455                 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
8456         }
8457 }
8458
8459 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8460         ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8461 where
8462         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8463         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8464         ES::Target: EntropySource,
8465         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8466         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8467         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8468         R::Target: Router,
8469         L::Target: Logger,
8470 {
8471         fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
8472                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8473                 // open_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8474                 // change to the contents.
8475                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8476                         let res = self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8477                         let persist = match &res {
8478                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => {
8479                                         debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't close a new channel");
8480                                         NotifyOption::DoPersist
8481                                 },
8482                                 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8483                         };
8484                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8485                         persist
8486                 });
8487         }
8488
8489         fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
8490                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8491                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8492                          msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8493         }
8494
8495         fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
8496                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8497                 // accept_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8498                 // change to the contents.
8499                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8500                         let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8501                         NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents
8502                 });
8503         }
8504
8505         fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
8506                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8507                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8508                          msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8509         }
8510
8511         fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
8512                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8513                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8514         }
8515
8516         fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
8517                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8518                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8519         }
8520
8521         fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
8522                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8523                 // channel_ready message - while the channel's state will change, any channel_ready message
8524                 // will ultimately be re-sent on startup and the `ChannelMonitor` won't be updated so we
8525                 // will not force-close the channel on startup.
8526                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8527                         let res = self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8528                         let persist = match &res {
8529                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8530                                 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8531                         };
8532                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8533                         persist
8534                 });
8535         }
8536
8537         fn handle_stfu(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Stfu) {
8538                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8539                         "Quiescence not supported".to_owned(),
8540                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8541         }
8542
8543         fn handle_splice(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Splice) {
8544                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8545                         "Splicing not supported".to_owned(),
8546                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8547         }
8548
8549         fn handle_splice_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceAck) {
8550                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8551                         "Splicing not supported (splice_ack)".to_owned(),
8552                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8553         }
8554
8555         fn handle_splice_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceLocked) {
8556                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8557                         "Splicing not supported (splice_locked)".to_owned(),
8558                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8559         }
8560
8561         fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
8562                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8563                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8564         }
8565
8566         fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
8567                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8568                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8569         }
8570
8571         fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
8572                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8573                 // update_add_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8574                 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8575                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8576                         let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8577                         let persist = match &res {
8578                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8579                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8580                                 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8581                         };
8582                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8583                         persist
8584                 });
8585         }
8586
8587         fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
8588                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8589                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8590         }
8591
8592         fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
8593                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8594                 // update_fail_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8595                 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8596                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8597                         let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8598                         let persist = match &res {
8599                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8600                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8601                                 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8602                         };
8603                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8604                         persist
8605                 });
8606         }
8607
8608         fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
8609                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8610                 // update_fail_malformed_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state
8611                 // only the `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8612                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8613                         let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8614                         let persist = match &res {
8615                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8616                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8617                                 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8618                         };
8619                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8620                         persist
8621                 });
8622         }
8623
8624         fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
8625                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8626                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8627         }
8628
8629         fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
8630                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8631                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8632         }
8633
8634         fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
8635                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8636                 // update_fee message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8637                 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8638                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8639                         let res = self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8640                         let persist = match &res {
8641                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8642                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8643                                 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8644                         };
8645                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8646                         persist
8647                 });
8648         }
8649
8650         fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
8651                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8652                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8653         }
8654
8655         fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
8656                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8657                         if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
8658                                 persist
8659                         } else {
8660                                 NotifyOption::DoPersist
8661                         }
8662                 });
8663         }
8664
8665         fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
8666                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8667                         let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8668                         let persist = match &res {
8669                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8670                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8671                                 Ok(persist) => *persist,
8672                         };
8673                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8674                         persist
8675                 });
8676         }
8677
8678         fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
8679                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
8680                         self, || NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents);
8681                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8682                 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8683                 let remove_peer = {
8684                         log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
8685                                 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8686                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
8687                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8688                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8689                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8690                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8691                                         let context = match phase {
8692                                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
8693                                                         if chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger).is_ok() {
8694                                                                 // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
8695                                                                 return true;
8696                                                         }
8697                                                         &mut chan.context
8698                                                 },
8699                                                 // Unfunded channels will always be removed.
8700                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
8701                                                         &mut chan.context
8702                                                 },
8703                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
8704                                                         &mut chan.context
8705                                                 },
8706                                         };
8707                                         // Clean up for removal.
8708                                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
8709                                         self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
8710                                         failed_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false));
8711                                         false
8712                                 });
8713                                 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
8714                                 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
8715                                 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
8716                                 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
8717                                         match msg {
8718                                                 // V1 Channel Establishment
8719                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
8720                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
8721                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
8722                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
8723                                                 // V2 Channel Establishment
8724                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8725                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8726                                                 // Common Channel Establishment
8727                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
8728                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
8729                                                 // Quiescence
8730                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendStfu { .. } => false,
8731                                                 // Splicing
8732                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSplice { .. } => false,
8733                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceAck { .. } => false,
8734                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceLocked { .. } => false,
8735                                                 // Interactive Transaction Construction
8736                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
8737                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
8738                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
8739                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
8740                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
8741                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
8742                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
8743                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
8744                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
8745                                                 // Channel Operations
8746                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
8747                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
8748                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
8749                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
8750                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
8751                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
8752                                                 // Gossip
8753                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
8754                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8755                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
8756                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8757                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
8758                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
8759                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
8760                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
8761                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
8762                                         }
8763                                 });
8764                                 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
8765                                 peer_state.is_connected = false;
8766                                 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
8767                         } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
8768                 };
8769                 if remove_peer {
8770                         per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
8771                 }
8772                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
8773
8774                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
8775                         self.finish_close_channel(failure);
8776                 }
8777         }
8778
8779         fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
8780                 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
8781                         log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8782                         return Err(());
8783                 }
8784
8785                 let mut res = Ok(());
8786
8787                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8788                         // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
8789                         // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
8790                         // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
8791                         // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
8792                         let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
8793                         let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
8794
8795                         {
8796                                 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8797                                 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
8798                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
8799                                                 if inbound_peer_limited {
8800                                                         res = Err(());
8801                                                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8802                                                 }
8803                                                 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
8804                                                         channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8805                                                         inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8806                                                         latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
8807                                                         pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
8808                                                         in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8809                                                         monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
8810                                                         actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8811                                                         is_connected: true,
8812                                                 }));
8813                                         },
8814                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
8815                                                 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
8816                                                 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
8817
8818                                                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8819                                                 if inbound_peer_limited &&
8820                                                         Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
8821                                                         peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
8822                                                 {
8823                                                         res = Err(());
8824                                                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8825                                                 }
8826
8827                                                 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
8828                                                 peer_state.is_connected = true;
8829                                         },
8830                                 }
8831                         }
8832
8833                         log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8834
8835                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8836                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
8837                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8838                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8839                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8840
8841                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(|(_, phase)|
8842                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else {
8843                                                 // Since unfunded channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer, and they're not persisted
8844                                                 // (so won't be recovered after a crash), they shouldn't exist here and we would never need to
8845                                                 // worry about closing and removing them.
8846                                                 debug_assert!(false);
8847                                                 None
8848                                         }
8849                                 ).for_each(|chan| {
8850                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
8851                                                 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8852                                                 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
8853                                         });
8854                                 });
8855                         }
8856
8857                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
8858                         //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
8859                 });
8860                 res
8861         }
8862
8863         fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
8864                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8865
8866                 match &msg.data as &str {
8867                         "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
8868                         "link failed to shutdown" =>
8869                         {
8870                                 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
8871                                 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
8872                                 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
8873                                 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
8874                                 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
8875                                 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
8876                                 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
8877                                 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
8878                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8879                                         let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8880                                         if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8881                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8882                                         if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
8883                                                 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
8884                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
8885                                                                 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8886                                                                 msg,
8887                                                         });
8888                                                 }
8889                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8890                                                         node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8891                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
8892                                                                 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
8893                                                                         channel_id: msg.channel_id,
8894                                                                         data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
8895                                                                 },
8896                                                                 log_level: Level::Trace,
8897                                                         }
8898                                                 });
8899                                         }
8900                                 }
8901                                 return;
8902                         }
8903                         _ => {}
8904                 }
8905
8906                 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
8907                         let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
8908                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8909                                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8910                                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8911                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8912                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8913                                 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
8914                                 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
8915                                 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
8916                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
8917                         };
8918                         for channel_id in channel_ids {
8919                                 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
8920                                 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
8921                         }
8922                 } else {
8923                         {
8924                                 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
8925                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8926                                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8927                                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8928                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8929                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8930                                 if let Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
8931                                         if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
8932                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
8933                                                         node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8934                                                         msg,
8935                                                 });
8936                                                 return;
8937                                         }
8938                                 }
8939                         }
8940
8941                         // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
8942                         let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
8943                 }
8944         }
8945
8946         fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
8947                 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
8948         }
8949
8950         fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
8951                 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
8952         }
8953
8954         fn get_chain_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
8955                 Some(vec![self.chain_hash])
8956         }
8957
8958         fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
8959                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8960                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8961                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8962         }
8963
8964         fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
8965                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8966                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8967                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8968         }
8969
8970         fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
8971                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8972                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8973                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8974         }
8975
8976         fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
8977                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8978                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8979                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8980         }
8981
8982         fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
8983                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8984                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8985                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8986         }
8987
8988         fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
8989                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8990                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8991                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8992         }
8993
8994         fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
8995                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8996                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8997                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8998         }
8999
9000         fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
9001                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9002                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9003                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9004         }
9005
9006         fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
9007                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9008                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9009                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9010         }
9011 }
9012
9013 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9014 OffersMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9015 where
9016         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9017         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9018         ES::Target: EntropySource,
9019         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9020         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9021         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9022         R::Target: Router,
9023         L::Target: Logger,
9024 {
9025         fn handle_message(&self, message: OffersMessage) -> Option<OffersMessage> {
9026                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
9027                 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
9028
9029                 match message {
9030                         OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request) => {
9031                                 let amount_msats = match InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::amount_msats(
9032                                         &invoice_request
9033                                 ) {
9034                                         Ok(amount_msats) => Some(amount_msats),
9035                                         Err(error) => return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
9036                                 };
9037                                 let invoice_request = match invoice_request.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
9038                                         Ok(invoice_request) => invoice_request,
9039                                         Err(()) => {
9040                                                 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidMetadata;
9041                                                 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9042                                         },
9043                                 };
9044                                 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
9045
9046                                 match self.create_inbound_payment(amount_msats, relative_expiry, None) {
9047                                         Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) if invoice_request.keys.is_some() => {
9048                                                 let payment_paths = vec![
9049                                                         self.create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(payment_secret),
9050                                                 ];
9051                                                 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
9052                                                 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys(
9053                                                         payment_paths, payment_hash
9054                                                 );
9055                                                 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
9056                                                 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
9057                                                         self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
9058                                                 );
9059                                                 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
9060                                                 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
9061                                                         payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
9062                                                 );
9063                                                 match builder.and_then(|b| b.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)) {
9064                                                         Ok(invoice) => Some(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
9065                                                         Err(error) => Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
9066                                                 }
9067                                         },
9068                                         Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
9069                                                 let payment_paths = vec![
9070                                                         self.create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(payment_secret),
9071                                                 ];
9072                                                 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
9073                                                 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with(payment_paths, payment_hash);
9074                                                 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
9075                                                 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
9076                                                         self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
9077                                                 );
9078                                                 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
9079                                                 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with_no_std(
9080                                                         payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
9081                                                 );
9082                                                 let response = builder.and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build())
9083                                                         .map_err(|e| OffersMessage::InvoiceError(e.into()))
9084                                                         .and_then(|invoice|
9085                                                                 match invoice.sign(|invoice| self.node_signer.sign_bolt12_invoice(invoice)) {
9086                                                                         Ok(invoice) => Ok(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
9087                                                                         Err(SignError::Signing(())) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
9088                                                                                         InvoiceError::from_string("Failed signing invoice".to_string())
9089                                                                         )),
9090                                                                         Err(SignError::Verification(_)) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
9091                                                                                         InvoiceError::from_string("Failed invoice signature verification".to_string())
9092                                                                         )),
9093                                                                 });
9094                                                 match response {
9095                                                         Ok(invoice) => Some(invoice),
9096                                                         Err(error) => Some(error),
9097                                                 }
9098                                         },
9099                                         Err(()) => {
9100                                                 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount.into()))
9101                                         },
9102                                 }
9103                         },
9104                         OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice) => {
9105                                 match invoice.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
9106                                         Err(()) => {
9107                                                 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string("Unrecognized invoice".to_owned())))
9108                                         },
9109                                         Ok(_) if invoice.invoice_features().requires_unknown_bits_from(&self.bolt12_invoice_features()) => {
9110                                                 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(Bolt12SemanticError::UnknownRequiredFeatures.into()))
9111                                         },
9112                                         Ok(payment_id) => {
9113                                                 if let Err(e) = self.send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&invoice, payment_id) {
9114                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed paying invoice: {:?}", e);
9115                                                         Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string(format!("{:?}", e))))
9116                                                 } else {
9117                                                         None
9118                                                 }
9119                                         },
9120                                 }
9121                         },
9122                         OffersMessage::InvoiceError(invoice_error) => {
9123                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received invoice_error: {}", invoice_error);
9124                                 None
9125                         },
9126                 }
9127         }
9128
9129         fn release_pending_messages(&self) -> Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>> {
9130                 core::mem::take(&mut self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap())
9131         }
9132 }
9133
9134 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9135 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9136 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
9137         let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
9138         node_features.set_keysend_optional();
9139         node_features
9140 }
9141
9142 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9143 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9144 ///
9145 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
9146 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
9147 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
9148 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt11_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
9149         provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9150 }
9151
9152 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9153 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9154 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt12_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
9155         provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9156 }
9157
9158 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9159 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9160 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
9161         provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9162 }
9163
9164 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9165 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9166 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
9167         ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
9168 }
9169
9170 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9171 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9172 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
9173         // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
9174         // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
9175         // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
9176         let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
9177         features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
9178         features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
9179         features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
9180         features.set_static_remote_key_required();
9181         features.set_payment_secret_required();
9182         features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
9183         features.set_wumbo_optional();
9184         features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
9185         features.set_channel_type_optional();
9186         features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
9187         features.set_zero_conf_optional();
9188         if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
9189                 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
9190         }
9191         features
9192 }
9193
9194 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9195 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9196
9197 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
9198         (2, fee_base_msat, required),
9199         (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
9200         (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
9201 });
9202
9203 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
9204         (2, node_id, required),
9205         (4, features, required),
9206         (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
9207         (8, forwarding_info, option),
9208         (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9209         (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9210 });
9211
9212 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
9213         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9214                 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9215                 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9216                 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
9217                 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
9218                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9219                         (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
9220                         (2, self.channel_id, required),
9221                         (3, self.channel_type, option),
9222                         (4, self.counterparty, required),
9223                         (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
9224                         (6, self.funding_txo, option),
9225                         (7, self.config, option),
9226                         (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
9227                         (9, self.confirmations, option),
9228                         (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
9229                         (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9230                         (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9231                         (16, self.balance_msat, required),
9232                         (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9233                         (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
9234                         (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9235                         (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
9236                         (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
9237                         (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
9238                         (26, self.is_outbound, required),
9239                         (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
9240                         (30, self.is_usable, required),
9241                         (32, self.is_public, required),
9242                         (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9243                         (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9244                         (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9245                         (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9246                         (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
9247                 });
9248                 Ok(())
9249         }
9250 }
9251
9252 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
9253         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9254                 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9255                         (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
9256                         (2, channel_id, required),
9257                         (3, channel_type, option),
9258                         (4, counterparty, required),
9259                         (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
9260                         (6, funding_txo, option),
9261                         (7, config, option),
9262                         (8, short_channel_id, option),
9263                         (9, confirmations, option),
9264                         (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
9265                         (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9266                         (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9267                         (16, balance_msat, required),
9268                         (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9269                         // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
9270                         // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
9271                         (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
9272                         (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9273                         (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
9274                         (22, confirmations_required, option),
9275                         (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
9276                         (26, is_outbound, required),
9277                         (28, is_channel_ready, required),
9278                         (30, is_usable, required),
9279                         (32, is_public, required),
9280                         (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9281                         (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9282                         (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9283                         (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9284                         (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
9285                 });
9286
9287                 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9288                 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9289                 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
9290                 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
9291                         ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
9292
9293                 Ok(Self {
9294                         inbound_scid_alias,
9295                         channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
9296                         channel_type,
9297                         counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
9298                         outbound_scid_alias,
9299                         funding_txo,
9300                         config,
9301                         short_channel_id,
9302                         channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
9303                         unspendable_punishment_reserve,
9304                         user_channel_id,
9305                         balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
9306                         outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9307                         next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
9308                         next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
9309                         inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9310                         confirmations_required,
9311                         confirmations,
9312                         force_close_spend_delay,
9313                         is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
9314                         is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
9315                         is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
9316                         is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
9317                         inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
9318                         inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
9319                         feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
9320                         channel_shutdown_state,
9321                 })
9322         }
9323 }
9324
9325 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
9326         (2, channels, required_vec),
9327         (4, phantom_scid, required),
9328         (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
9329 });
9330
9331 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
9332         (0, Forward) => {
9333                 (0, onion_packet, required),
9334                 (2, short_channel_id, required),
9335         },
9336         (1, Receive) => {
9337                 (0, payment_data, required),
9338                 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9339                 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9340                 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9341                 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9342         },
9343         (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
9344                 (0, payment_preimage, required),
9345                 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9346                 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9347                 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
9348                 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9349         },
9350 ;);
9351
9352 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
9353         (0, routing, required),
9354         (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
9355         (4, payment_hash, required),
9356         (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
9357         (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
9358         (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
9359         (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9360 });
9361
9362
9363 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9364         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9365                 match self {
9366                         HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
9367                                 0u8.write(writer)?;
9368                                 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9369                                 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9370                                 reason.write(writer)?;
9371                         },
9372                         HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9373                                 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
9374                         }) => {
9375                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
9376                                 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9377                                 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9378                                 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
9379                                 failure_code.write(writer)?;
9380                         },
9381                 }
9382                 Ok(())
9383         }
9384 }
9385
9386 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9387         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9388                 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9389                 match id {
9390                         0 => {
9391                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
9392                                         channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9393                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9394                                         reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
9395                                 }))
9396                         },
9397                         1 => {
9398                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9399                                         channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9400                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9401                                         sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
9402                                         failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
9403                                 }))
9404                         },
9405                         // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
9406                         // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
9407                         // messages contained in the variants.
9408                         // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
9409                         // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
9410                         // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
9411                         2 => {
9412                                 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9413                                 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9414                                 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9415                                 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9416                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
9417                         },
9418                         3 => {
9419                                 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9420                                 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9421                                 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9422                                 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9423                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
9424                         },
9425                         _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
9426                 }
9427         }
9428 }
9429
9430 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
9431         (0, Forward),
9432         (1, Fail),
9433 );
9434
9435 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
9436         (0, short_channel_id, required),
9437         (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9438         (2, outpoint, required),
9439         (4, htlc_id, required),
9440         (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
9441         (7, user_channel_id, option),
9442 });
9443
9444 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
9445         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9446                 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
9447                         OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
9448                         OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
9449                 };
9450                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9451                         (0, self.prev_hop, required),
9452                         (1, self.total_msat, required),
9453                         (2, self.value, required),
9454                         (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
9455                         (4, payment_data, option),
9456                         (5, self.total_value_received, option),
9457                         (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
9458                         (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9459                         (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9460                 });
9461                 Ok(())
9462         }
9463 }
9464
9465 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
9466         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9467                 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9468                         (0, prev_hop, required),
9469                         (1, total_msat, option),
9470                         (2, value_ser, required),
9471                         (3, sender_intended_value, option),
9472                         (4, payment_data_opt, option),
9473                         (5, total_value_received, option),
9474                         (6, cltv_expiry, required),
9475                         (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9476                         (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9477                 });
9478                 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
9479                 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
9480                 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
9481                         Some(p) => {
9482                                 if payment_data.is_some() {
9483                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9484                                 }
9485                                 if total_msat.is_none() {
9486                                         total_msat = Some(value);
9487                                 }
9488                                 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
9489                         },
9490                         None => {
9491                                 if total_msat.is_none() {
9492                                         if payment_data.is_none() {
9493                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9494                                         }
9495                                         total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
9496                                 }
9497                                 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
9498                         },
9499                 };
9500                 Ok(Self {
9501                         prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
9502                         timer_ticks: 0,
9503                         value,
9504                         sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
9505                         total_value_received,
9506                         total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
9507                         onion_payload,
9508                         cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
9509                         counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
9510                 })
9511         }
9512 }
9513
9514 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
9515         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9516                 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9517                 match id {
9518                         0 => {
9519                                 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
9520                                 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
9521                                 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
9522                                 let mut payment_id = None;
9523                                 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
9524                                 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
9525                                 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9526                                         (0, session_priv, required),
9527                                         (1, payment_id, option),
9528                                         (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
9529                                         (4, path_hops, required_vec),
9530                                         (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
9531                                         (6, blinded_tail, option),
9532                                 });
9533                                 if payment_id.is_none() {
9534                                         // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
9535                                         // instead.
9536                                         payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
9537                                 }
9538                                 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
9539                                 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
9540                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9541                                 }
9542                                 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
9543                                         if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
9544                                                 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
9545                                                         *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9546                                                 }
9547                                         }
9548                                 }
9549                                 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
9550                                         session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
9551                                         first_hop_htlc_msat,
9552                                         path,
9553                                         payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
9554                                 })
9555                         }
9556                         1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
9557                         _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
9558                 }
9559         }
9560 }
9561
9562 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
9563         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
9564                 match self {
9565                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
9566                                 0u8.write(writer)?;
9567                                 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
9568                                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9569                                         (0, session_priv, required),
9570                                         (1, payment_id_opt, option),
9571                                         (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
9572                                         // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
9573                                         (4, path.hops, required_vec),
9574                                         (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
9575                                         (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
9576                                  });
9577                         }
9578                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
9579                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
9580                                 field.write(writer)?;
9581                         }
9582                 }
9583                 Ok(())
9584         }
9585 }
9586
9587 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
9588         (0, forward_info, required),
9589         (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
9590         (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
9591         (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
9592         (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
9593 });
9594
9595 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
9596         (1, FailHTLC) => {
9597                 (0, htlc_id, required),
9598                 (2, err_packet, required),
9599         };
9600         (0, AddHTLC)
9601 );
9602
9603 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
9604         (0, payment_secret, required),
9605         (2, expiry_time, required),
9606         (4, user_payment_id, required),
9607         (6, payment_preimage, required),
9608         (8, min_value_msat, required),
9609 });
9610
9611 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9612 where
9613         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9614         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9615         ES::Target: EntropySource,
9616         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9617         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9618         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9619         R::Target: Router,
9620         L::Target: Logger,
9621 {
9622         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9623                 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
9624
9625                 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
9626
9627                 self.chain_hash.write(writer)?;
9628                 {
9629                         let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
9630                         best_block.height().write(writer)?;
9631                         best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
9632                 }
9633
9634                 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
9635                 {
9636                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9637                         let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
9638                         for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9639                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9640                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9641                                 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
9642                                         serializable_peer_count += 1;
9643                                 }
9644
9645                                 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
9646                                         |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_broadcast() } else { false }
9647                                 ).count();
9648                         }
9649
9650                         (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
9651
9652                         for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9653                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9654                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9655                                 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
9656                                         |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
9657                                                 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() { Some(channel) } else { None }
9658                                         } else { None }
9659                                 ) {
9660                                         channel.write(writer)?;
9661                                 }
9662                         }
9663                 }
9664
9665                 {
9666                         let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9667                         (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9668                         for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
9669                                 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
9670                                 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9671                                 for forward in pending_forwards {
9672                                         forward.write(writer)?;
9673                                 }
9674                         }
9675                 }
9676
9677                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9678
9679                 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9680                 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
9681                 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9682
9683                 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
9684                 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
9685                 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9686                 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
9687                         payment_hash.write(writer)?;
9688                         (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9689                         for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
9690                                 htlc.write(writer)?;
9691                         }
9692                         htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
9693                         htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
9694                 }
9695
9696                 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
9697                 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
9698                 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9699                         // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
9700                         // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
9701                         // per_peer_state lock at all.
9702                         peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
9703                 }
9704
9705                 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
9706                 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
9707                         // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
9708                         // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
9709                         // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
9710                         // no channels.
9711                         if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
9712                                 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
9713                                 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
9714                                 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
9715                                         monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
9716                                                 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
9717                                                 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
9718                                 }
9719                         }
9720                 }
9721
9722                 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
9723                 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
9724                 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
9725                 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
9726                 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
9727                 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
9728                         // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
9729                         // well save the space and not write any events here.
9730                         0u64.write(writer)?;
9731                 } else {
9732                         (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9733                         for (event, _) in events.iter() {
9734                                 event.write(writer)?;
9735                         }
9736                 }
9737
9738                 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
9739                 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
9740                 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
9741                 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
9742                 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
9743                 0u64.write(writer)?;
9744
9745                 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
9746                 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
9747                 // likely to be identical.
9748                 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
9749                 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
9750
9751                 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9752                 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
9753                         hash.write(writer)?;
9754                         pending_payment.write(writer)?;
9755                 }
9756
9757                 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
9758                 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
9759                 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9760                         if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
9761                                 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
9762                         }
9763                 }
9764                 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
9765                 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9766                         match outbound {
9767                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
9768                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
9769                                         for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
9770                                                 session_priv.write(writer)?;
9771                                         }
9772                                 }
9773                                 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
9774                                 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
9775                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
9776                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
9777                         }
9778                 }
9779
9780                 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
9781                 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
9782                 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9783                         match outbound {
9784                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
9785                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
9786                                         pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
9787                                 },
9788                                 _ => {},
9789                         }
9790                 }
9791
9792                 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
9793                 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9794                 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
9795                         pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
9796                 }
9797
9798                 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
9799                 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
9800                         // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
9801                         // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
9802                         pending_claiming_payments = None;
9803                 }
9804
9805                 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
9806                 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
9807                         for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
9808                                 if !updates.is_empty() {
9809                                         if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(HashMap::new()); }
9810                                         in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
9811                                 }
9812                         }
9813                 }
9814
9815                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9816                         (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
9817                         (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
9818                         (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
9819                         (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
9820                         (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
9821                         (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
9822                         (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
9823                         (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
9824                         (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
9825                         (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
9826                         (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
9827                         (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
9828                 });
9829
9830                 Ok(())
9831         }
9832 }
9833
9834 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
9835         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9836                 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
9837                 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
9838                         event.write(w)?;
9839                         action.write(w)?;
9840                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
9841                                 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
9842                                 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
9843                                 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
9844                                 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
9845                                 // check that the event is sane here.
9846                                 let event_encoded = event.encode();
9847                                 let event_read: Option<Event> =
9848                                         MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
9849                                 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
9850                         }
9851                 }
9852                 Ok(())
9853         }
9854 }
9855 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
9856         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9857                 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9858                 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
9859                 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
9860                         MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
9861                         len) as usize);
9862                 for _ in 0..len {
9863                         let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
9864                         let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
9865                         if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
9866                                 events.push_back((ev, action));
9867                         } else if action.is_some() {
9868                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9869                         }
9870                 }
9871                 Ok(events)
9872         }
9873 }
9874
9875 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
9876         (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
9877         (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
9878         (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
9879         (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
9880         (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
9881 );
9882
9883 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
9884 ///
9885 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
9886 /// is:
9887 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
9888 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
9889 ///    `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
9890 ///    This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
9891 ///    [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
9892 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
9893 ///    same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
9894 ///    [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
9895 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
9896 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
9897 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
9898 ///    Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
9899 ///    will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
9900 ///    the next step.
9901 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
9902 ///    [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
9903 ///
9904 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
9905 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
9906 ///
9907 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
9908 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
9909 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
9910 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
9911 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
9912 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
9913 ///
9914 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
9915 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9916 where
9917         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9918         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9919         ES::Target: EntropySource,
9920         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9921         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9922         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9923         R::Target: Router,
9924         L::Target: Logger,
9925 {
9926         /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
9927         pub entropy_source: ES,
9928
9929         /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
9930         pub node_signer: NS,
9931
9932         /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
9933         /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
9934         /// signing data.
9935         pub signer_provider: SP,
9936
9937         /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
9938         ///
9939         /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
9940         pub fee_estimator: F,
9941         /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
9942         ///
9943         /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
9944         /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
9945         /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
9946         pub chain_monitor: M,
9947
9948         /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
9949         /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
9950         /// force-closed during deserialization.
9951         pub tx_broadcaster: T,
9952         /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
9953         /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
9954         ///
9955         /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
9956         pub router: R,
9957         /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
9958         /// deserialization.
9959         pub logger: L,
9960         /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
9961         /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
9962         pub default_config: UserConfig,
9963
9964         /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
9965         /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
9966         ///
9967         /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
9968         /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
9969         /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
9970         /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
9971         ///
9972         /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
9973         /// this struct.
9974         ///
9975         /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
9976         pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
9977 }
9978
9979 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9980                 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9981 where
9982         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9983         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9984         ES::Target: EntropySource,
9985         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9986         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9987         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9988         R::Target: Router,
9989         L::Target: Logger,
9990 {
9991         /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
9992         /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
9993         /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
9994         pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
9995                         mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
9996                 Self {
9997                         entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
9998                         channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
9999                 }
10000         }
10001 }
10002
10003 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
10004 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
10005 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10006         ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
10007 where
10008         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
10009         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10010         ES::Target: EntropySource,
10011         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10012         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10013         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10014         R::Target: Router,
10015         L::Target: Logger,
10016 {
10017         fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10018                 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
10019                 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
10020         }
10021 }
10022
10023 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10024         ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
10025 where
10026         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
10027         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10028         ES::Target: EntropySource,
10029         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10030         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10031         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10032         R::Target: Router,
10033         L::Target: Logger,
10034 {
10035         fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10036                 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
10037
10038                 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10039                 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10040                 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10041
10042                 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
10043
10044                 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10045                 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10046                 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10047                 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10048                 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10049                 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
10050                 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
10051                 for _ in 0..channel_count {
10052                         let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
10053                                 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
10054                         ))?;
10055                         let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10056                         funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
10057                         if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
10058                                 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
10059                                                 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
10060                                                 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
10061                                                 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
10062                                         // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
10063                                         log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
10064                                         log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
10065                                         if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
10066                                                 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
10067                                                         &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
10068                                         }
10069                                         if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
10070                                                 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
10071                                                         &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
10072                                         }
10073                                         if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
10074                                                 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
10075                                                         &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
10076                                         }
10077                                         if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
10078                                                 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
10079                                                         &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
10080                                         }
10081                                         let mut shutdown_result = channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
10082                                         if shutdown_result.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid.is_some() {
10083                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10084                                         }
10085                                         if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = shutdown_result.monitor_update {
10086                                                 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10087                                                         counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
10088                                                 });
10089                                         }
10090                                         failed_htlcs.append(&mut shutdown_result.dropped_outbound_htlcs);
10091                                         channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10092                                                 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10093                                                 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10094                                                 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
10095                                                 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10096                                                 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10097                                         }, None));
10098                                         for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
10099                                                 let mut found_htlc = false;
10100                                                 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
10101                                                         if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
10102                                                 }
10103                                                 if !found_htlc {
10104                                                         // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
10105                                                         // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
10106                                                         // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
10107                                                         // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
10108                                                         // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
10109                                                         // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
10110                                                         // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
10111                                                         log_info!(args.logger,
10112                                                                 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
10113                                                                 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
10114                                                         failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10115                                                 }
10116                                         }
10117                                 } else {
10118                                         log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
10119                                                 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
10120                                                 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10121                                         if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
10122                                                 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10123                                         }
10124                                         if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() {
10125                                                 id_to_peer.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
10126                                         }
10127                                         match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
10128                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
10129                                                         let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
10130                                                         by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10131                                                 },
10132                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
10133                                                         let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
10134                                                         by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10135                                                         entry.insert(by_id_map);
10136                                                 }
10137                                         }
10138                                 }
10139                         } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
10140                                 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
10141                                 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
10142                                 // safely discard the channel.
10143                                 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false);
10144                                 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10145                                         channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10146                                         user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10147                                         reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
10148                                         counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10149                                         channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10150                                 }, None));
10151                         } else {
10152                                 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
10153                                 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10154                                 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10155                                 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10156                                 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10157                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10158                         }
10159                 }
10160
10161                 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10162                         if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
10163                                 log_info!(args.logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
10164                                         &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10165                                 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
10166                                         update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
10167                                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
10168                                 };
10169                                 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
10170                         }
10171                 }
10172
10173                 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
10174                 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10175                 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10176                 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
10177                         let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
10178                         let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10179                         let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
10180                         for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
10181                                 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
10182                         }
10183                         forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
10184                 }
10185
10186                 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10187                 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10188                 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
10189                         let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10190                         let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10191                         let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
10192                         for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
10193                                 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
10194                         }
10195                         claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
10196                 }
10197
10198                 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
10199                         PeerState {
10200                                 channel_by_id,
10201                                 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
10202                                 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
10203                                 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
10204                                 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10205                                 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
10206                                 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10207                                 is_connected: false,
10208                         }
10209                 };
10210
10211                 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10212                 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
10213                 for _ in 0..peer_count {
10214                         let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
10215                         let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new());
10216                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
10217                         peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
10218                         per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
10219                 }
10220
10221                 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10222                 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
10223                         VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
10224                 for _ in 0..event_count {
10225                         match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
10226                                 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
10227                                 None => continue,
10228                         }
10229                 }
10230
10231                 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10232                 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
10233                         match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
10234                                 0 => {
10235                                         // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
10236                                         // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
10237                                         // on-startup monitor updates.
10238                                         let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
10239                                         let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
10240                                 }
10241                                 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
10242                         }
10243                 }
10244
10245                 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
10246                 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10247
10248                 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10249                 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
10250                 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
10251                         if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
10252                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10253                         }
10254                 }
10255
10256                 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10257                 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
10258                         HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
10259                 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
10260                         let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
10261                         let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
10262                                 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
10263                         };
10264                         if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
10265                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10266                         };
10267                 }
10268
10269                 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
10270                 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
10271                 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
10272                 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
10273                 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
10274                 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10275                 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10276                 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
10277                 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
10278                 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
10279                 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
10280                 let mut events_override = None;
10281                 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
10282                 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10283                         (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
10284                         (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
10285                         (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
10286                         (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
10287                         (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
10288                         (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
10289                         (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
10290                         (8, events_override, option),
10291                         (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
10292                         (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
10293                         (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
10294                         (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
10295                 });
10296                 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
10297                         fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10298                 }
10299
10300                 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
10301                         probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10302                 }
10303
10304                 if let Some(events) = events_override {
10305                         pending_events_read = events;
10306                 }
10307
10308                 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
10309                         pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
10310                 }
10311
10312                 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
10313                         pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
10314                 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
10315                         let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
10316                         for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
10317                                 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
10318                         }
10319                         pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
10320                 }
10321                 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
10322                         pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
10323                         retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
10324                 };
10325
10326                 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
10327                 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
10328                 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
10329                 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
10330                 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
10331                 //
10332                 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
10333                 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
10334                 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
10335                 //
10336                 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
10337                 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
10338                 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
10339                         ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
10340                          $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
10341                         ) => { {
10342                                 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
10343                                 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10344                                 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
10345                                         log_trace!(args.logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
10346                                                 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10347                                         max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
10348                                         pending_background_events.push(
10349                                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10350                                                         counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10351                                                         funding_txo: $funding_txo,
10352                                                         update: update.clone(),
10353                                                 });
10354                                 }
10355                                 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
10356                                         // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
10357                                         // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
10358                                         // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
10359                                         pending_background_events.push(
10360                                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
10361                                                         counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10362                                                         channel_id: $funding_txo.to_channel_id(),
10363                                                 });
10364                                 }
10365                                 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
10366                                         log_error!(args.logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
10367                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10368                                 }
10369                                 max_in_flight_update_id
10370                         } }
10371                 }
10372
10373                 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
10374                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
10375                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10376                         for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
10377                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
10378                                         // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
10379                                         // discarded.
10380                                         let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10381                                         let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
10382                                                 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
10383                                         let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
10384                                         if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
10385                                                 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
10386                                                         max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
10387                                                                 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
10388                                                                         funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, ""));
10389                                                 }
10390                                         }
10391                                         if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
10392                                                 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
10393                                                 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10394                                                 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
10395                                                         chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
10396                                                 log_error!(args.logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
10397                                                 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10398                                                 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10399                                                 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10400                                                 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10401                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10402                                         }
10403                                 } else {
10404                                         // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
10405                                         // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
10406                                         debug_assert!(false);
10407                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10408                                 }
10409                         }
10410                 }
10411
10412                 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
10413                         for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
10414                                 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
10415                                         // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
10416                                         // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
10417                                         // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
10418                                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
10419                                                 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(HashMap::new()))
10420                                         });
10421                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10422                                         handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
10423                                                 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, "closed ");
10424                                 } else {
10425                                         log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10426                                         log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.",
10427                                                 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10428                                         log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10429                                         log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10430                                         log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10431                                         log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10432                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10433                                 }
10434                         }
10435                 }
10436
10437                 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
10438                 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
10439
10440                 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
10441                 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
10442                 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
10443                 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
10444
10445                 {
10446                         // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
10447                         // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
10448                         // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
10449                         // corresponding `Channel` at all).
10450                         // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
10451                         // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
10452                         // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
10453                         // 0.0.102+
10454                         for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10455                                 let counterparty_opt = id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10456                                 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
10457                                         for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
10458                                                 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
10459                                                         if path.hops.is_empty() {
10460                                                                 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
10461                                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10462                                                         }
10463
10464                                                         let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
10465                                                         let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
10466                                                         session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
10467                                                         match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
10468                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
10469                                                                         let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
10470                                                                         log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
10471                                                                                 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), &htlc.payment_hash);
10472                                                                 },
10473                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
10474                                                                         let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
10475                                                                         entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
10476                                                                                 retry_strategy: None,
10477                                                                                 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
10478                                                                                 payment_params: None,
10479                                                                                 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
10480                                                                                 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
10481                                                                                 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10482                                                                                 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10483                                                                                 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10484                                                                                 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10485                                                                                 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
10486                                                                                 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
10487                                                                                 total_msat: path_amt,
10488                                                                                 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
10489                                                                                 remaining_max_total_routing_fee_msat: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10490                                                                         });
10491                                                                         log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
10492                                                                                 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash,  log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
10493                                                                 }
10494                                                         }
10495                                                 }
10496                                         }
10497                                         for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
10498                                                 match htlc_source {
10499                                                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
10500                                                                 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
10501                                                                         info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
10502                                                                                 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
10503                                                                 };
10504                                                                 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
10505                                                                 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
10506                                                                 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
10507                                                                 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
10508                                                                 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
10509                                                                 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
10510                                                                         forwards.retain(|forward| {
10511                                                                                 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
10512                                                                                         if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
10513                                                                                                 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
10514                                                                                                         &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10515                                                                                                 false
10516                                                                                         } else { true }
10517                                                                                 } else { true }
10518                                                                         });
10519                                                                         !forwards.is_empty()
10520                                                                 });
10521                                                                 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
10522                                                                         if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
10523                                                                                 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
10524                                                                                         &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10525                                                                                 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
10526                                                                                         if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
10527                                                                                                 intercepted_id != ev_id
10528                                                                                         } else { true }
10529                                                                                 });
10530                                                                                 false
10531                                                                         } else { true }
10532                                                                 });
10533                                                         },
10534                                                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
10535                                                                 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
10536                                                                         let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
10537                                                                         // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
10538                                                                         // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
10539                                                                         // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
10540                                                                         // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
10541                                                                         // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
10542                                                                         // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
10543                                                                         // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
10544                                                                         // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
10545                                                                         let compl_action =
10546                                                                                 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
10547                                                                                         channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
10548                                                                                         counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
10549                                                                                 };
10550                                                                         pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
10551                                                                                 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &args.logger);
10552                                                                         pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
10553                                                                 }
10554                                                         },
10555                                                 }
10556                                         }
10557                                 }
10558
10559                                 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
10560                                 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
10561                                 // payments.
10562                                 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
10563                                         .into_iter()
10564                                         .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
10565                                                 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
10566                                                         if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
10567                                                                 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
10568                                                                         // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
10569                                                                         // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
10570                                                                         // channel_id -> peer map entry).
10571                                                                         counterparty_opt.is_none(),
10572                                                                         counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10573                                                                         monitor.get_funding_txo().0))
10574                                                         } else { None }
10575                                                 } else {
10576                                                         // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
10577                                                         // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
10578                                                         // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
10579                                                         // channel still live case here.
10580                                                         None
10581                                                 }
10582                                         });
10583                                 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
10584                                         pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
10585                                 }
10586                         }
10587                 }
10588
10589                 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
10590                         // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
10591                         // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
10592                         // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
10593                         // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
10594                         // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
10595                         pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
10596                                 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
10597                         }, None));
10598                 }
10599
10600                 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
10601                 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
10602
10603                 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
10604                 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
10605                         if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
10606                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10607                         }
10608                         if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
10609                                 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
10610                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10611                                 }
10612                                 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
10613                                         purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
10614                                 {
10615                                         let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10616                                                 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
10617                                         });
10618                                         if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10619                                 }
10620                         } else {
10621                                 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
10622                                         let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10623                                                 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
10624                                         });
10625                                         if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10626                                 }
10627                         }
10628                 } else {
10629                         // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
10630                         // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
10631                         for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
10632                                 if htlcs.is_empty() {
10633                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10634                                 }
10635                                 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
10636                                         OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
10637                                                 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
10638                                                         events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
10639                                                                 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
10640                                                                         Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
10641                                                                         None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
10642                                                                                 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
10643                                                                                 Err(()) => {
10644                                                                                         log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
10645                                                                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10646                                                                                 }
10647                                                                         }
10648                                                                 },
10649                                                                 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
10650                                                         }
10651                                                 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10652                                         },
10653                                         OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
10654                                                 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
10655                                 };
10656                                 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10657                                         purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
10658                                 });
10659                         }
10660                 }
10661
10662                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10663                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10664
10665                 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
10666                         Ok(key) => key,
10667                         Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10668                 };
10669                 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
10670                         if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
10671                                 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
10672                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10673                         }
10674                 }
10675
10676                 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
10677                 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
10678                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10679                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10680                         for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
10681                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
10682                                         if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
10683                                                 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
10684                                                 loop {
10685                                                         outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
10686                                                                 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &chain_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
10687                                                         if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
10688                                                 }
10689                                                 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
10690                                         } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
10691                                                 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
10692                                                 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
10693                                                 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
10694                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10695                                         }
10696                                         if chan.context.is_usable() {
10697                                                 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
10698                                                         // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
10699                                                         // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
10700                                                         log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
10701                                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10702                                                 }
10703                                         }
10704                                 } else {
10705                                         // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
10706                                         // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
10707                                         debug_assert!(false);
10708                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10709                                 }
10710                         }
10711                 }
10712
10713                 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
10714
10715                 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10716                         for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
10717                                 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
10718                                         log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
10719                                         let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
10720                                         let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
10721                                         let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
10722                                         if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
10723                                                 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
10724                                                         .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
10725                                                 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
10726                                         }
10727                                         for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
10728                                                 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
10729
10730                                                 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
10731                                                 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
10732                                                 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
10733                                                 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
10734                                                 //
10735                                                 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
10736                                                 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
10737                                                 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
10738                                                 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
10739                                                 // reason to.
10740                                                 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
10741                                                 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
10742                                                 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
10743                                                 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
10744                                                 // restart.
10745                                                 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
10746                                                 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
10747                                                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
10748                                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10749                                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10750                                                         if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
10751                                                                 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
10752                                                         }
10753                                                 }
10754                                                 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
10755                                                         previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
10756                                                 }
10757                                         }
10758                                         pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
10759                                                 receiver_node_id,
10760                                                 payment_hash,
10761                                                 purpose: payment.purpose,
10762                                                 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
10763                                                 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
10764                                                 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
10765                                         }, None));
10766                                 }
10767                         }
10768                 }
10769
10770                 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
10771                         if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
10772                                 for (_, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
10773                                         for action in actions.iter() {
10774                                                 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
10775                                                         downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
10776                                                                 Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), ..
10777                                                 } = action {
10778                                                         if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
10779                                                                 log_trace!(args.logger,
10780                                                                         "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
10781                                                                         blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id());
10782                                                                 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
10783                                                                         .entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
10784                                                                         .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
10785                                                         } else {
10786                                                                 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
10787                                                                 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
10788                                                                 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
10789                                                                 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
10790                                                                 // anymore.
10791                                                         }
10792                                                 }
10793                                                 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately { .. } = action {
10794                                                         debug_assert!(false, "Non-event-generating channel freeing should not appear in our queue");
10795                                                 }
10796                                         }
10797                                 }
10798                                 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
10799                         } else {
10800                                 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
10801                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10802                         }
10803                 }
10804
10805                 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
10806                         chain_hash,
10807                         fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
10808                         chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
10809                         tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
10810                         router: args.router,
10811
10812                         best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
10813
10814                         inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
10815                         pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
10816                         pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
10817                         pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
10818
10819                         forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
10820                         claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
10821                         outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
10822                         id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
10823                         short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
10824                         fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
10825
10826                         probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
10827
10828                         our_network_pubkey,
10829                         secp_ctx,
10830
10831                         highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
10832
10833                         per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
10834
10835                         pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
10836                         pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
10837                         pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
10838                         total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
10839                         background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
10840
10841                         event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
10842                         needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
10843
10844                         funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
10845
10846                         pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
10847
10848                         entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
10849                         node_signer: args.node_signer,
10850                         signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
10851
10852                         logger: args.logger,
10853                         default_configuration: args.default_config,
10854                 };
10855
10856                 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
10857                         let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
10858                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
10859                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
10860                         channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
10861                 }
10862
10863                 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding) in pending_claims_to_replay {
10864                         // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
10865                         // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
10866                         // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
10867                         channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value),
10868                                 downstream_closed, true, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding);
10869                 }
10870
10871                 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
10872                 //connection or two.
10873
10874                 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
10875         }
10876 }
10877
10878 #[cfg(test)]
10879 mod tests {
10880         use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
10881         use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
10882         use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
10883         use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
10884         use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
10885         use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
10886         use crate::ln::ChannelId;
10887         use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
10888         use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
10889         use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
10890         use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
10891         use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
10892         use crate::util::errors::APIError;
10893         use crate::util::test_utils;
10894         use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
10895         use crate::sign::EntropySource;
10896
10897         #[test]
10898         fn test_notify_limits() {
10899                 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
10900                 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
10901                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10902                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10903                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
10904                 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10905
10906                 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
10907                 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
10908                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10909                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10910                 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10911
10912                 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10913
10914                 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
10915                 // to connect messages with new values
10916                 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
10917                 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
10918                 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
10919                         &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
10920                 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
10921                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
10922
10923                 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
10924                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10925                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10926                 // ... but the last node should not.
10927                 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10928                 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
10929                 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10930                 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10931
10932                 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
10933                 // about the channel.
10934                 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10935                 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10936                 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10937
10938                 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
10939                 // parties.
10940                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10941                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10942                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10943                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10944                 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10945                 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10946
10947                 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
10948                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
10949                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
10950
10951                 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
10952                 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
10953                 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
10954                 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
10955                 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
10956                 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
10957
10958                 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
10959                 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
10960                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
10961                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
10962                 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10963                 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10964                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
10965                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
10966
10967                 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
10968                 // the channel info has updated.
10969                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
10970                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
10971                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10972                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10973                 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
10974                 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
10975         }
10976
10977         #[test]
10978         fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
10979                 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
10980                 // expected.
10981                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10982                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10983                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10984                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10985                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10986
10987                 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
10988                 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
10989                 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
10990                 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
10991
10992                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
10993                 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
10994                 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
10995                 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
10996                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
10997                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
10998                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
10999                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
11000                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11001                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11002                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11003                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
11004
11005                 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
11006                 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11007                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11008                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11009                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11010                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11011                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11012                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11013                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11014                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11015                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11016                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11017                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
11018                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11019                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11020                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11021                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11022                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11023                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11024                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11025                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11026                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11027                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
11028
11029                 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
11030                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
11031                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
11032                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11033                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11034                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11035                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
11036
11037                 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
11038                 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
11039                 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
11040                 // lightning messages manually.
11041                 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
11042                 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
11043                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
11044
11045                 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11046                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11047                 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
11048                 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
11049                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11050                 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11051                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
11052                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11053                 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11054                 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
11055                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11056                 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11057                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11058                 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
11059                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11060                 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11061                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
11062                 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11063                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11064                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
11065                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11066                 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
11067                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11068                 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11069                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
11070                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11071
11072                 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
11073                 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
11074                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11075                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
11076                 match events[0] {
11077                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
11078                                 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
11079                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
11080                                 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
11081                         },
11082                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11083                 }
11084                 match events[1] {
11085                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
11086                                 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
11087                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
11088                                 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
11089                         },
11090                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11091                 }
11092         }
11093
11094         #[test]
11095         fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
11096                 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
11097                 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
11098         }
11099
11100         fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
11101                 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
11102                 //      outbound regular payment fails as expected.
11103                 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
11104                 //      fails as expected.
11105                 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
11106                 //      payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
11107                 //      reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
11108                 //      secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
11109                 //      `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
11110                 //      payment secrets and reject otherwise.
11111                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11112                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11113                 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11114                 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
11115                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11116                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11117                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11118                 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11119                 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11120
11121                 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
11122                 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
11123                 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
11124
11125                 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11126                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11127                         PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
11128                         TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
11129                 let route = find_route(
11130                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11131                         None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11132                 ).unwrap();
11133                 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11134                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11135                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11136                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11137                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11138                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11139                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11140                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11141                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11142                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11143                 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
11144                 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
11145                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11146                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11147                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11148                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11149                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11150                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11151                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11152                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11153                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11154                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11155                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11156                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11157
11158                 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11159                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11160
11161                 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11162                 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11163                 let route = find_route(
11164                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11165                         None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11166                 ).unwrap();
11167                 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11168                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11169                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11170                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11171                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11172                 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11173                 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11174                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11175
11176                 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
11177                 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11178                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11179                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
11180                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11181                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11182                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11183                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11184                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11185                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11186                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11187                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11188                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11189                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11190                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11191                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11192                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11193                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11194                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11195                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11196                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11197                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11198                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11199                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11200
11201                 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
11202                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11203
11204                 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11205                 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
11206                 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11207                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
11208                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11209                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11210                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11211                 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11212                 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11213                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11214
11215                 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11216                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11217                         PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
11218                         100_000
11219                 );
11220                 let route = find_route(
11221                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11222                         None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11223                 ).unwrap();
11224                 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
11225                 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11226                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
11227                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11228                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11229                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11230                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11231                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11232                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11233                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11234                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11235                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11236                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11237                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11238                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11239                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11240                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11241                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11242                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11243                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11244                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11245                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11246                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11247
11248                 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11249                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11250         }
11251
11252         #[test]
11253         fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
11254                 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
11255                 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
11256                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11257                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11258                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11259                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11260
11261                 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11262                 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11263
11264                 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11265                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11266                         PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11267                 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
11268                 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11269                 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11270                 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11271                 let route = find_route(
11272                         &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11273                         nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11274                 ).unwrap();
11275
11276                 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11277                 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
11278                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
11279                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11280                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
11281                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11282                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11283
11284                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11285                 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11286                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11287                 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11288                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11289                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11290                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11291
11292                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
11293         }
11294
11295         #[test]
11296         fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
11297                 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
11298                 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
11299                 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11300                 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
11301                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11302                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11303                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11304                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11305
11306                 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11307                 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11308
11309                 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11310                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11311                         PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11312                 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
11313                 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11314                 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11315                 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11316                 let route = find_route(
11317                         &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11318                         nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11319                 ).unwrap();
11320
11321                 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11322                 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11323                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
11324                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
11325                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11326                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
11327                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
11328                         PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11329                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11330
11331                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11332                 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11333                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11334                 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11335                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11336                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11337                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11338
11339                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
11340         }
11341
11342         #[test]
11343         fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
11344                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
11345                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
11346                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
11347                 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11348
11349                 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11350                 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11351                 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11352                 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11353
11354                 // Marshall an MPP route.
11355                 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
11356                 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
11357                 route.paths.push(path);
11358                 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11359                 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
11360                 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
11361                 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
11362                 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
11363                 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
11364
11365                 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11366                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
11367                 .unwrap_err() {
11368                         PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
11369                                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
11370                         },
11371                         _ => panic!("unexpected error")
11372                 }
11373         }
11374
11375         #[test]
11376         fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
11377                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11378                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11379                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11380                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11381
11382                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11383
11384                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11385                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11386
11387                 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11388                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
11389                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11390                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
11391
11392                 {
11393                         // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
11394                         // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
11395                         let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
11396                         // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
11397                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
11398                         assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
11399                 }
11400
11401                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
11402
11403                 {
11404                         // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
11405                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
11406                 }
11407         }
11408
11409         #[test]
11410         fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
11411                 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
11412                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11413                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11414                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11415                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11416
11417                 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
11418                 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11419                         payment_secret,
11420                         total_msat: 100_000,
11421                 };
11422
11423                 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
11424                 // payment verification fails as expected.
11425                 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
11426                 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
11427                 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
11428                         Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
11429                         Err(()) => {
11430                                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
11431                         }
11432                 }
11433
11434                 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
11435                 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
11436         }
11437
11438         #[test]
11439         fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
11440                 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
11441                 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
11442                 // the channel is successfully closed.
11443                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11444                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11445                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11446                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11447
11448                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11449                 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11450                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
11451                 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11452                 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
11453
11454                 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
11455                 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().into_inner());
11456                 {
11457                         // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
11458                         // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
11459                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11460                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11461                 }
11462
11463                 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
11464                 {
11465                         // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
11466                         // as it has the funding transaction.
11467                         let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11468                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11469                         assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11470                 }
11471
11472                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11473
11474                 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11475
11476                 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
11477                 {
11478                         let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11479                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11480                         assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11481                 }
11482                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11483
11484                 {
11485                         // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
11486                         // as it has the funding transaction.
11487                         let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11488                         assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11489                         assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11490                 }
11491                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11492                 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11493                 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
11494                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11495                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11496                 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
11497                 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
11498                 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
11499
11500                 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11501                 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
11502                 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11503                 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
11504
11505                 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11506                 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
11507                 {
11508                         // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
11509                         // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
11510                         // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
11511                         // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
11512                         let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11513                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11514                         assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11515                 }
11516
11517                 {
11518                         // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
11519                         // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
11520                         // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
11521                         // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
11522                         let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11523                         assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11524                         assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11525                 }
11526
11527                 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
11528                 {
11529                         // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
11530                         // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
11531                         // closing transaction).
11532                         // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
11533                         // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
11534                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11535
11536                         // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s  `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
11537                         // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
11538                         let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11539                         assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11540                         assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11541                 }
11542
11543                 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11544
11545                 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
11546                 {
11547                         // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
11548                         // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
11549                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11550                 }
11551                 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11552
11553                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
11554                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
11555         }
11556
11557         fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
11558                 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
11559                 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11560         }
11561
11562         fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
11563                 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
11564                 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11565         }
11566
11567         fn check_channel_unavailable_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_channel_id: ChannelId, peer_node_id: PublicKey) {
11568                 let expected_message = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_channel_id, peer_node_id);
11569                 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11570         }
11571
11572         fn check_api_misuse_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
11573                 let expected_message = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_string();
11574                 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11575         }
11576
11577         fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
11578                 match res_err {
11579                         Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
11580                                 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
11581                         },
11582                         Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
11583                                 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
11584                         },
11585                         Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
11586                         Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
11587                 }
11588         }
11589
11590         #[test]
11591         fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
11592                 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
11593                 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
11594                 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
11595                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11596                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11597                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
11598                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11599
11600                 // Dummy values
11601                 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
11602                 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
11603                 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
11604
11605                 // Test the API functions.
11606                 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None), unkown_public_key);
11607
11608                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
11609
11610                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11611
11612                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11613
11614                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11615
11616                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
11617
11618                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
11619         }
11620
11621         #[test]
11622         fn test_api_calls_with_unavailable_channel() {
11623                 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` and a `channel_id`
11624                 // as input, behaves as expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is a known peer in the
11625                 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map, but the peer state doesn't contain a channel with
11626                 // the given `channel_id`.
11627                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11628                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11629                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
11630                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11631
11632                 let counterparty_node_id = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11633
11634                 // Dummy values
11635                 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
11636
11637                 // Test the API functions.
11638                 check_api_misuse_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, 42));
11639
11640                 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11641
11642                 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11643
11644                 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11645
11646                 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(InterceptId([0; 32]), &channel_id, counterparty_node_id, 1_000_000), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11647
11648                 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&counterparty_node_id, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11649         }
11650
11651         #[test]
11652         fn test_connection_limiting() {
11653                 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
11654                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11655                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11656                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11657                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11658
11659                 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11660
11661                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11662                 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11663
11664                 let mut funding_tx = None;
11665                 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
11666                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11667                         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11668
11669                         if idx == 0 {
11670                                 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
11671                                 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
11672                                 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
11673                                 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
11674                                 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11675
11676                                 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
11677                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11678                                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11679
11680                                 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11681
11682                                 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
11683                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11684                                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11685                         }
11686                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11687                 }
11688
11689                 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
11690                 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11691                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11692                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11693                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11694
11695                 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
11696                 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
11697                 // limit.
11698                 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
11699                 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
11700                         let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11701                                 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11702                         peer_pks.push(random_pk);
11703                         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11704                                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11705                         }, true).unwrap();
11706                 }
11707                 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11708                         &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11709                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11710                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11711                 }, true).unwrap_err();
11712
11713                 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
11714                 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
11715                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11716                 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11717                 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
11718                 for ev in chan_closed_events {
11719                         if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
11720                 }
11721                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11722                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11723                 }, true).unwrap();
11724                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11725                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11726                 }, true).unwrap_err();
11727
11728                 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
11729                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11730                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11731                 }, false).unwrap();
11732                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11733
11734                 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
11735                 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
11736                 // open channels.
11737                 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
11738                 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
11739                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
11740                         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
11741                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11742                 }
11743                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11744                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
11745                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11746
11747                 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
11748                 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11749                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
11750
11751                 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
11752                 // "protected" and can connect again.
11753                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
11754                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11755                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11756                 }, true).unwrap();
11757                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11758
11759                 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
11760                 // last_random_pk.
11761                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11762                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
11763         }
11764
11765         #[test]
11766         fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
11767                 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
11768                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11769                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11770                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11771                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11772
11773                 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11774
11775                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11776                 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11777
11778                 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
11779                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11780                         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11781                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11782                 }
11783
11784                 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
11785                 // rejected.
11786                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11787                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11788                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11789
11790                 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
11791                 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11792                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11793
11794                 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
11795                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11796                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11797                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11798         }
11799
11800         #[test]
11801         fn test_0conf_limiting() {
11802                 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
11803                 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
11804                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11805                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11806                 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
11807                 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11808                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
11809                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11810
11811                 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11812
11813                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11814                 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11815
11816                 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
11817                 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
11818                         let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11819                                 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11820                         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11821                                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11822                         }, true).unwrap();
11823
11824                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11825                         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11826                         match events[0] {
11827                                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11828                                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
11829                                 }
11830                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11831                         }
11832                         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
11833                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11834                 }
11835
11836                 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
11837                 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11838                         &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11839                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11840                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11841                 }, true).unwrap();
11842                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11843                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11844                 match events[0] {
11845                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11846                                 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
11847                                         Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
11848                                                 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
11849                                         _ => panic!(),
11850                                 }
11851                         }
11852                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11853                 }
11854                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
11855                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11856
11857                 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
11858                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11859                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11860                 match events[0] {
11861                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11862                                 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
11863                         }
11864                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11865                 }
11866                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
11867         }
11868
11869         #[test]
11870         fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
11871                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
11872                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
11873                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
11874                 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11875                 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
11876                 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
11877                 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
11878                         amt_msat: 100,
11879                         outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
11880                         payment_metadata: None,
11881                         keysend_preimage: None,
11882                         payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11883                                 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
11884                         }),
11885                         custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11886                 };
11887                 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
11888                 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
11889                 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundOnionErr { err_code, .. }) =
11890                         node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
11891                                 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat))
11892                 {
11893                         assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
11894                 } else { panic!(); }
11895
11896                 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
11897                 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
11898                         amt_msat: 100,
11899                         outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
11900                         payment_metadata: None,
11901                         keysend_preimage: None,
11902                         payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11903                                 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
11904                         }),
11905                         custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11906                 };
11907                 assert!(node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
11908                         sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat)).is_ok());
11909         }
11910
11911         #[test]
11912         fn test_final_incorrect_cltv(){
11913                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
11914                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
11915                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
11916                 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11917
11918                 let result = node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
11919                         amt_msat: 100,
11920                         outgoing_cltv_value: 22,
11921                         payment_metadata: None,
11922                         keysend_preimage: None,
11923                         payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11924                                 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: 100,
11925                         }),
11926                         custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11927                 }, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), 100, 23, None, true, None);
11928
11929                 // Should not return an error as this condition:
11930                 // https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/4dcc377209509b13cf89a4b91fde7d478f5b46d8/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L334
11931                 // is not satisfied.
11932                 assert!(result.is_ok());
11933         }
11934
11935         #[test]
11936         fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
11937                 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
11938                 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
11939                 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11940                 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
11941
11942                 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
11943                 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11944
11945                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
11946                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
11947                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
11948                         &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
11949                 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11950
11951                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11952                 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11953
11954                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11955                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
11956                 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11957                 match &msg_events[0] {
11958                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
11959                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11960                                 match action {
11961                                         ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
11962                                                 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
11963                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
11964                                 }
11965                         }
11966                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11967                 }
11968
11969                 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11970                 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11971                 match events[0] {
11972                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
11973                                 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
11974                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11975                 }
11976                 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11977         }
11978
11979         #[test]
11980         fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
11981                 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
11982                 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
11983                 // the channel without the anchors feature.
11984                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11985                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11986                 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
11987                 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
11988                 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11989                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
11990                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11991
11992                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None, None).unwrap();
11993                 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11994                 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
11995
11996                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11997                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11998                 match events[0] {
11999                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12000                                 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12001                         }
12002                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12003                 }
12004
12005                 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12006                 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
12007
12008                 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12009                 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
12010
12011                 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
12012                 // not have generated any events.
12013                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
12014         }
12015
12016         #[test]
12017         fn test_update_channel_config() {
12018                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12019                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12020                 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
12021                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
12022                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12023                 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12024                 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
12025
12026                 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
12027                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12028                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12029
12030                 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
12031                 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
12032                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
12033                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12034                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12035                 match &events[0] {
12036                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12037                         _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12038                 }
12039
12040                 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
12041                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12042                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12043
12044                 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
12045                 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12046                         cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
12047                         ..Default::default()
12048                 }).unwrap();
12049                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
12050                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12051                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12052                 match &events[0] {
12053                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12054                         _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12055                 }
12056
12057                 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
12058                 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12059                         forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
12060                         ..Default::default()
12061                 }).unwrap();
12062                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
12063                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
12064                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12065                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12066                 match &events[0] {
12067                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12068                         _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12069                 }
12070
12071                 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
12072                 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
12073                 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
12074                 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
12075                 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
12076                 assert!(
12077                         matches!(
12078                                 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12079                                         forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
12080                                         ..Default::default()
12081                                 }),
12082                                 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
12083                         )
12084                 );
12085                 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
12086                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
12087                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12088                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12089         }
12090
12091         #[test]
12092         fn test_payment_display() {
12093                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
12094                 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12095                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
12096                 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12097                 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12098                 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12099         }
12100
12101         #[test]
12102         fn test_trigger_lnd_force_close() {
12103                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12104                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12105                 let user_config = test_default_channel_config();
12106                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
12107                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12108
12109                 // Open a channel, immediately disconnect each other, and broadcast Alice's latest state.
12110                 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12111                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12112                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12113                 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12114                 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
12115                 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
12116                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12117                 {
12118                         let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12119                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12120                         check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12121                 }
12122
12123                 // Since they're disconnected, Bob won't receive Alice's `Error` message. Reconnect them
12124                 // such that Bob sends a `ChannelReestablish` to Alice since the channel is still open from
12125                 // their side.
12126                 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12127                         features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12128                 }, true).unwrap();
12129                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12130                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12131                 }, false).unwrap();
12132                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
12133                 let channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
12134                         nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
12135                 );
12136                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channel_reestablish);
12137
12138                 // Alice should respond with an error since the channel isn't known, but a bogus
12139                 // `ChannelReestablish` should be sent first, such that we actually trigger Bob to force
12140                 // close even if it was an lnd node.
12141                 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12142                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12143                 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = &msg_events[0] {
12144                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12145                         assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 0);
12146                         assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
12147                         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
12148                 } else { panic!() };
12149                 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
12150                 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
12151                 let expected_close_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
12152                         err: "Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_string()
12153                 };
12154                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, expected_close_reason, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12155                 {
12156                         let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12157                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12158                         check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12159                 }
12160         }
12161 }
12162
12163 #[cfg(ldk_bench)]
12164 pub mod bench {
12165         use crate::chain::Listen;
12166         use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
12167         use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
12168         use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
12169         use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
12170         use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
12171         use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
12172         use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
12173         use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
12174         use crate::util::test_utils;
12175         use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
12176
12177         use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
12178         use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
12179         use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
12180
12181         use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
12182
12183         use criterion::Criterion;
12184
12185         type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
12186                 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
12187                         &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
12188                         &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
12189                 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
12190                 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
12191                 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
12192
12193         struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
12194                 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
12195         }
12196         impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
12197                 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
12198                 #[inline]
12199                 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
12200                 #[inline]
12201                 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
12202         }
12203
12204         pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
12205                 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
12206         }
12207
12208         pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
12209                 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
12210                 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
12211                 // calls per node.
12212                 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
12213                 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
12214
12215                 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
12216                 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
12217                 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12218                 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
12219                 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
12220
12221                 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
12222                 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
12223                 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
12224
12225                 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
12226                 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
12227                 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
12228                 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12229                         network,
12230                         best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12231                 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12232                 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
12233
12234                 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12235                 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
12236                 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
12237                 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
12238                 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12239                         network,
12240                         best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12241                 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12242                 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
12243
12244                 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12245                         features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12246                 }, true).unwrap();
12247                 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12248                         features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12249                 }, false).unwrap();
12250                 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12251                 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12252                 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12253
12254                 let tx;
12255                 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
12256                         tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
12257                                 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
12258                         }]};
12259                         node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
12260                 } else { panic!(); }
12261
12262                 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12263                 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12264                 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12265                 match events_b[0] {
12266                         Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12267                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12268                         },
12269                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12270                 }
12271
12272                 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12273                 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12274                 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12275                 match events_a[0] {
12276                         Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12277                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12278                         },
12279                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12280                 }
12281
12282                 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
12283
12284                 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), 42, vec![tx]);
12285                 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
12286                 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
12287
12288                 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12289                 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12290                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12291                 match msg_events[0] {
12292                         MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
12293                                 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
12294                                 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12295                         },
12296                         _ => panic!(),
12297                 }
12298                 match msg_events[1] {
12299                         MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12300                         _ => panic!(),
12301                 }
12302
12303                 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12304                 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12305                 match events_a[0] {
12306                         Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12307                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12308                         },
12309                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12310                 }
12311
12312                 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12313                 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12314                 match events_b[0] {
12315                         Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12316                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12317                         },
12318                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12319                 }
12320
12321                 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
12322                 macro_rules! send_payment {
12323                         ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
12324                                 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
12325                                         .with_bolt11_features($node_b.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
12326                                 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
12327                                 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
12328                                 payment_count += 1;
12329                                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
12330                                 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
12331
12332                                 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
12333                                         PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
12334                                         RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
12335                                         Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
12336                                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
12337                                 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12338                                 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
12339                                 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
12340                                 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
12341                                 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
12342                                 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12343
12344                                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
12345                                 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
12346                                 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
12347                                 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
12348
12349                                 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
12350                                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
12351                                                 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
12352                                                 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
12353                                                 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
12354                                         },
12355                                         _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
12356                                 }
12357
12358                                 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
12359                                 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
12360                                 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
12361                                 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12362
12363                                 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
12364                         }
12365                 }
12366
12367                 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
12368                         send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
12369                         send_payment!(node_b, node_a);
12370                 }));
12371         }
12372 }