1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
39 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
40 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
41 // construct one themselves.
42 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
43 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
44 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
45 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
46 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
47 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
48 use crate::routing::router::{DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, RoutePath, Router};
49 use crate::routing::scoring::ProbabilisticScorer;
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
55 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment};
57 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
58 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, ChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
59 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
60 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
61 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
62 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
63 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
64 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
65 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
67 use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
70 use crate::prelude::*;
72 use core::cell::RefCell;
74 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
75 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
76 use core::time::Duration;
79 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
80 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure};
82 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
84 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
85 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
86 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
88 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
89 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
90 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
91 // before we forward it.
93 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
94 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
95 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
96 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
97 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
99 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
100 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
102 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
103 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
104 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
105 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
108 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
109 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
110 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
113 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
114 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
118 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
119 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
120 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
121 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
122 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
123 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
124 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
125 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
128 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
129 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
130 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
131 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
134 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
135 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
136 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
137 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
138 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
141 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
142 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
144 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
145 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
146 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
149 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
150 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
152 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
153 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
156 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
157 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
160 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
164 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
165 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
166 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
167 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
168 short_channel_id: u64,
170 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
171 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
173 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
174 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
179 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
181 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
182 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
183 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
185 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
186 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
189 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
190 struct ClaimableHTLC {
191 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
193 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
195 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
197 /// The sum total of all MPP parts
201 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
202 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
203 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
204 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
206 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
207 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
212 impl Readable for PaymentId {
213 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
214 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
219 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
220 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
221 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
222 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
224 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
225 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
230 impl Readable for InterceptId {
231 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
232 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
237 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
238 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
239 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
240 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
241 OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
244 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
246 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
247 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
248 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
250 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
251 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
255 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
256 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
257 (0, short_channel_id, required),
258 (2, htlc_id, required),
260 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
261 (0, session_priv, required),
266 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
267 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
268 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
269 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
270 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
273 session_priv: SecretKey,
274 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
275 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
276 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
277 payment_id: PaymentId,
278 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
281 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
282 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
283 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
285 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
287 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
289 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
292 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
293 payment_id.hash(hasher);
294 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
295 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
300 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
303 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
304 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
306 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
307 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
308 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
309 payment_secret: None,
314 struct ReceiveError {
320 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
321 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
323 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
324 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
325 pub enum FailureCode {
326 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
327 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
328 TemporaryNodeFailure = 0x2000 | 2,
329 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
330 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
331 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing = 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
332 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
333 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
334 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
335 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
336 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails = 0x4000 | 15,
339 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>);
341 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
342 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
343 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
344 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
345 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
347 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
348 err: msgs::LightningError,
349 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
350 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
352 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
354 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
356 err: LightningError {
358 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
359 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
366 shutdown_finish: None,
370 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
371 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
374 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
376 err: LightningError {
378 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
379 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
385 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
386 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
390 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
393 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
395 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
396 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
400 log_level: Level::Warn,
403 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
405 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
407 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
409 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
410 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
418 shutdown_finish: None,
423 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
424 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
425 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
426 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
427 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
429 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
430 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
431 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
432 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
433 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
434 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
435 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
437 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
441 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
442 struct ClaimingPayment {
444 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
445 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
447 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
448 (0, amount_msat, required),
449 (2, payment_purpose, required),
450 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
453 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
454 struct ClaimablePayments {
455 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
456 /// failed/claimed by the user.
458 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
459 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
461 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
462 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
463 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, (events::PaymentPurpose, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>)>,
465 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
466 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
467 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
468 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
471 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
472 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
473 /// quite some time lag.
474 enum BackgroundEvent {
475 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
476 /// commitment transaction.
477 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
481 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
482 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
483 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
484 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
485 /// event can be generated.
486 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
487 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user.
488 EmitEvent { event: events::Event },
491 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
492 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
493 (2, EmitEvent) => { (0, event, upgradable_required) },
496 /// State we hold per-peer.
497 pub(super) struct PeerState<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
498 /// `temporary_channel_id` or `channel_id` -> `channel`.
500 /// Holds all channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once a channel has been assigned a
501 /// `channel_id`, the `temporary_channel_id` key in the map is updated and is replaced by the
503 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
504 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
505 latest_features: InitFeatures,
506 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
507 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
508 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
509 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
510 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
512 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
513 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
514 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
515 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
517 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
518 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
519 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
520 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
521 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
522 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
523 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
524 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
525 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
526 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
530 impl <Signer: ChannelSigner> PeerState<Signer> {
531 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
532 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
533 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
534 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
535 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
538 self.channel_by_id.is_empty() && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
542 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
543 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
545 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
548 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
549 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
550 struct PendingInboundPayment {
551 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
552 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
553 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
554 /// this payment being removed.
556 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
557 user_payment_id: u64,
558 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
559 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
560 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
563 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
564 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
565 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
566 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
567 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
568 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
569 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
570 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
572 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
573 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
581 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
583 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>
588 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
589 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
590 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
591 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
592 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
593 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
594 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
595 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
596 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
598 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
599 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e DefaultRouter<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L, &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>>, &'g L>;
601 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
602 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
604 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
605 /// to individual Channels.
607 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
608 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
609 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
610 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
612 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
613 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
614 /// returning from [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`], with ChannelManagers, writing updates
615 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during
616 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
617 /// [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the
618 /// `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
620 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
621 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
622 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
624 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
625 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
626 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
627 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
628 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
630 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
631 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
632 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
633 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
635 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
636 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
637 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
639 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
640 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
641 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
642 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
643 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
645 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
646 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
647 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
648 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
649 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
650 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
651 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
652 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
655 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
656 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
657 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
658 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
659 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
663 // `total_consistency_lock`
665 // |__`forward_htlcs`
667 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
669 // |__`per_peer_state`
671 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
673 // | |__`claimable_payments`
675 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
681 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
683 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
687 // | |__`pending_events`
689 // | |__`pending_background_events`
691 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
693 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
694 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
695 ES::Target: EntropySource,
696 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
697 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
698 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
702 default_configuration: UserConfig,
703 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
704 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
710 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
712 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
714 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
715 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
717 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
718 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
719 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
720 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
722 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
723 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
725 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
726 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
727 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
728 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
729 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
730 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
731 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
732 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
734 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
736 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
737 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
739 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
741 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
742 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
743 /// and via the classic SCID.
745 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
746 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
748 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
750 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
752 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
753 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
754 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
756 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
757 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
759 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
760 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
762 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
763 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
765 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
766 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
767 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
768 /// active channel list on load.
770 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
771 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
773 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
775 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
776 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
777 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
779 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
780 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
781 /// the handling of the events.
783 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
784 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
787 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
788 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
789 /// would break backwards compatability.
790 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
791 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
792 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
794 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
795 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
797 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
799 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
800 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
801 /// confirmation depth.
803 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
804 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
805 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
807 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
809 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
811 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
813 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
815 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
817 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
818 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
819 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
821 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
822 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
824 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
825 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
826 /// keeping additional state.
827 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
829 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
830 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
831 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
832 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
834 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
835 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
837 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
838 /// are currently open with that peer.
840 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
841 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
844 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
846 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
847 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
848 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
849 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
850 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
852 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
853 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
854 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
855 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
856 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
857 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
858 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
859 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
860 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
861 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
862 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
864 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
873 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
875 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
876 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
877 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
878 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
879 pub struct ChainParameters {
880 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
881 pub network: Network,
883 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
885 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
886 pub best_block: BestBlock,
889 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
895 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
896 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
897 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
898 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
899 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
900 /// updates are ready for persistence).
902 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
903 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
904 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
905 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
906 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
908 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
909 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
912 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
913 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
914 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
917 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
918 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
920 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
921 persistence_notifier: notifier,
922 should_persist: persist_check,
923 _read_guard: read_guard,
928 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
930 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
931 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
936 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
937 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
939 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
941 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
942 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
943 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
944 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
945 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
947 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
948 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
950 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
952 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
953 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
954 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
955 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
956 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
957 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
958 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
959 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
960 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
961 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
962 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
963 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
964 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
966 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
967 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
969 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
970 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
971 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
972 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
974 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
975 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
976 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
977 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
978 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
979 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
982 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
984 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
985 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
988 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
990 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
991 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
993 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
994 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
995 /// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
996 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
998 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
999 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1000 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1001 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1003 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1004 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1005 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1007 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1008 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1009 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1011 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1012 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1013 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1014 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1015 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1016 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1017 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1018 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1019 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1020 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1021 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1024 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1025 /// to better separate parameters.
1026 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1027 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1028 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1029 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1030 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1031 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1032 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1033 pub features: InitFeatures,
1034 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1035 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1036 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1038 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1040 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1041 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1042 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1043 /// payments to us through this channel.
1044 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1045 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1046 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1047 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1048 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1049 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1050 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1053 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1054 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1055 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1056 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1057 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1058 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1059 /// lifetime of the channel.
1060 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1061 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1062 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1063 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1064 /// our counterparty already.
1066 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1067 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1068 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1069 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1071 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1072 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1073 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1074 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1076 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1077 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1079 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1080 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1082 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1083 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1084 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1085 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1086 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1087 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1088 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1089 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1090 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1093 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1095 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1096 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1097 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1098 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1099 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1100 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1101 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1103 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1104 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1106 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1107 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1108 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1109 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1110 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1111 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1112 /// this value on chain.
1114 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1116 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1118 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1119 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1120 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1121 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1123 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1124 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1125 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1127 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1128 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1129 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1130 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1131 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1133 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1134 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1135 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1136 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1138 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1139 pub balance_msat: u64,
1140 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1141 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1142 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1143 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1145 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1147 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1148 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1149 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1150 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1151 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1152 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1153 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1154 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1156 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1157 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1158 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1159 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1160 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1161 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1162 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1164 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1165 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1166 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1167 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1168 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1169 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1170 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1171 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1172 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1174 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1176 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1177 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1178 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1179 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1180 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1182 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1183 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1184 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1185 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1186 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1187 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1188 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1190 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1191 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1192 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1193 pub is_outbound: bool,
1194 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1195 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1196 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1197 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1198 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1200 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1201 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1202 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1203 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1205 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1206 pub is_usable: bool,
1207 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1208 pub is_public: bool,
1209 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1210 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1211 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1212 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1213 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1214 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1216 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1217 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1220 impl ChannelDetails {
1221 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1222 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1223 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1225 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1226 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1227 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1228 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1231 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1232 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1233 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1235 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1236 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1237 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1238 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1241 fn from_channel<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner>(channel: &Channel<Signer>,
1242 best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures) -> Self {
1244 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1245 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1246 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1248 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1249 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1250 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1251 features: latest_features,
1252 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1253 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1254 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1255 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1256 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1257 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1258 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1259 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1260 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1261 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1263 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1264 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1265 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1266 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1267 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1268 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1269 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1270 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1271 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(channel.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1272 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1273 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1274 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1275 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1276 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1277 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1278 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1279 confirmations: Some(channel.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1280 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1281 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1282 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1283 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1284 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1285 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1286 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1287 config: Some(channel.config()),
1292 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1293 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1294 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1295 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1296 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1298 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1300 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1301 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1302 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1305 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1306 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1307 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1309 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1310 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1311 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1313 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1314 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1315 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1317 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1318 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1322 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1324 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1326 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1327 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1328 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1329 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1331 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1332 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1333 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1336 macro_rules! handle_error {
1337 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1340 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1341 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1342 // entering the macro.
1343 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1344 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1346 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1348 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1349 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1350 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1351 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1355 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1356 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1357 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1358 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1363 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1364 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1366 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1367 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1368 action: err.action.clone()
1372 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1373 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1374 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1375 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1376 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1380 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1387 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1388 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {{
1389 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
1390 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1391 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1392 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1394 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1395 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1396 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1397 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1398 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1400 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1401 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1403 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1407 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1408 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1409 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1411 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1412 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1414 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1415 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1417 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1418 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1419 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel);
1420 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1421 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1422 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1428 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1429 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1433 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1435 $entry.remove_entry();
1443 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1444 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1448 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1450 $entry.remove_entry();
1458 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1459 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1461 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1462 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, channel);
1468 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1469 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1470 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1471 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1472 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1474 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1475 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1476 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1477 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1478 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1479 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1480 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1481 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1482 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1483 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1488 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1489 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1490 if $channel.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1492 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1493 pending_events.push(events::Event::ChannelReady {
1494 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1495 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1496 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1497 channel_type: $channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
1500 $channel.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1505 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
1506 ($self: ident, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
1507 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
1508 &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
1509 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
1510 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1511 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.is_usable() {
1512 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
1513 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
1514 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
1515 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
1517 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
1518 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
1519 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1525 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
1526 .remove(&$chan.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
1528 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
1529 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
1530 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
1531 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
1532 updates.announcement_sigs);
1533 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
1534 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
1537 let channel_id = $chan.channel_id();
1538 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
1539 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
1541 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
1543 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1544 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1546 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
1547 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1548 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1549 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
1554 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
1555 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING, $remove: expr) => { {
1556 // update_maps_on_chan_removal needs to be able to take id_to_peer, so make sure we can in
1557 // any case so that it won't deadlock.
1558 debug_assert!($self.id_to_peer.try_lock().is_ok());
1560 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1561 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
1562 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1565 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1566 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure",
1567 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1568 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan);
1569 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(
1570 "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.channel_id(),
1571 $chan.get_user_id(), $chan.force_shutdown(false),
1572 $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok()));
1576 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1577 if ($update_id == 0 || $chan.get_next_monitor_update()
1578 .expect("We can't be processing a monitor update if it isn't queued")
1579 .update_id == $update_id) &&
1580 $chan.get_latest_monitor_update_id() == $update_id
1582 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
1588 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr) => {
1589 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
1593 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1595 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1596 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1597 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1598 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1599 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1600 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1604 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
1606 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1607 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
1609 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1611 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
1612 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
1613 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
1616 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
1617 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
1618 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
1619 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1620 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1621 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1622 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1623 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1625 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1626 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1627 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1632 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1634 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1635 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1636 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
1637 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1638 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
1639 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1640 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1641 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1643 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1646 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1647 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1649 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1651 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1653 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1655 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1656 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1657 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1658 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
1668 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1669 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1670 &self.default_configuration
1673 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1674 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1675 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1678 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1679 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1681 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
1683 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1687 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1692 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1694 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1695 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1696 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
1697 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
1698 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
1700 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1701 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1703 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1704 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1705 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1707 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1708 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1709 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1710 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1711 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1712 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1714 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1715 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1716 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1717 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1718 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1719 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1722 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1723 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1724 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1726 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1728 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
1729 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
1731 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1733 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1734 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1735 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1736 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
1737 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1738 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1742 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1747 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1749 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1750 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1751 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1753 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1755 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1758 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1761 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1762 node_id: their_network_key,
1765 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1768 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1769 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
1770 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
1771 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
1772 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
1773 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
1774 // the same channel.
1775 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
1777 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1778 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1779 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
1780 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1781 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1782 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1783 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel(channel, best_block_height,
1784 peer_state.latest_features.clone());
1792 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
1793 /// more information.
1794 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1795 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1798 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1799 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1801 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1802 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1804 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1805 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1806 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1807 // really wanted anyway.
1808 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1811 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
1812 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1813 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1814 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1816 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
1817 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1818 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1819 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1820 return peer_state.channel_by_id
1823 ChannelDetails::from_channel(channel, best_block_height, features.clone()))
1829 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
1830 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1832 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
1833 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
1834 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
1836 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
1837 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
1838 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
1839 .filter_map(|(_, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
1840 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
1841 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
1842 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
1843 total_msat: *total_msat,
1846 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
1847 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
1849 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
1850 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
1852 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
1857 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1858 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1859 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1860 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1861 Some(transaction) => {
1862 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1866 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1867 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1868 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1869 reason: closure_reason
1873 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1874 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1876 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1877 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1878 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1880 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
1881 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
1883 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1884 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1885 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1886 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1887 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
1888 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1889 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut()
1890 .get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?;
1891 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1893 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
1894 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
1895 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
1896 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1897 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
1901 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1902 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
1903 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1904 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
1905 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
1908 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1909 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1910 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1911 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1915 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1919 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id) })
1923 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1924 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1925 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
1926 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
1929 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
1933 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1934 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1935 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1937 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1938 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1940 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1941 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1942 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1943 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1945 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
1947 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1948 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1949 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1950 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
1951 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1952 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None)
1955 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1956 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1957 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1959 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1960 /// the channel being closed or not:
1961 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1962 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1963 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1964 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1965 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1966 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1967 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1969 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
1971 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1972 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1973 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1974 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
1975 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1976 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1980 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1981 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1982 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1983 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1984 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
1985 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1986 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1987 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
1989 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1990 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1991 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1992 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1993 // ignore the result here.
1994 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
1998 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1999 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2000 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2001 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2002 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2003 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2004 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2006 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2007 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2008 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2009 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2010 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) });
2012 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2014 remove_channel!(self, chan)
2016 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) });
2019 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2020 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2021 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2022 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2023 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2028 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
2031 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2032 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2033 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2034 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2035 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2036 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2037 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2038 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2039 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2040 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2041 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2042 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2053 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2054 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2055 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2057 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2058 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2059 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2062 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2063 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2064 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2066 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2067 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2068 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2069 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2070 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2073 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2074 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2075 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2076 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2077 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2081 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2082 /// local transaction(s).
2083 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2084 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2085 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2089 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2090 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2092 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2093 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != cltv_expiry {
2094 return Err(ReceiveError {
2095 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value",
2097 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2100 // final_expiry_too_soon
2101 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2102 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2104 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2105 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2106 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2107 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2108 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2109 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2110 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2111 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2112 return Err(ReceiveError {
2113 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2114 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2117 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2118 return Err(ReceiveError {
2120 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2121 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2125 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2126 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2127 return Err(ReceiveError {
2128 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2129 err_data: Vec::new(),
2130 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2133 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
2134 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2135 return Err(ReceiveError {
2136 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2137 err_data: Vec::new(),
2138 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2140 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2141 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2143 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2144 phantom_shared_secret,
2146 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2147 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2148 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2149 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2150 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2151 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2152 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2153 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2154 return Err(ReceiveError {
2155 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2156 err_data: Vec::new(),
2157 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2161 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2163 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2166 return Err(ReceiveError {
2167 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2168 err_data: Vec::new(),
2169 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2174 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2177 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2178 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2179 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_msat,
2180 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2184 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2185 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2186 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2188 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2189 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2190 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2191 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2192 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2193 failure_code: $err_code,
2199 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2200 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2203 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
2204 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
2205 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2207 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2208 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2209 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2210 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2211 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2212 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2213 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2214 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2216 macro_rules! return_err {
2217 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2219 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2220 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2221 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2222 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2223 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2224 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2230 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2232 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2233 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2235 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2236 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2240 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2241 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2243 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2245 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2246 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2247 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2248 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2249 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2251 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2254 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2255 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2256 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2258 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2259 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2260 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2263 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2264 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2265 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2266 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2270 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2271 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2272 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2275 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2276 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2277 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2278 outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2279 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2284 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref outgoing_amt_msat, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2285 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2286 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2287 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2288 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2289 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2290 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(short_channel_id).cloned();
2291 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2292 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2293 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2294 // phantom or an intercept.
2295 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2296 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2297 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)
2301 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2304 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2306 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2307 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2308 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2309 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
2310 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2312 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2313 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2314 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2316 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
2317 // have no consistency guarantees.
2318 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2322 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2323 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2324 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2325 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2326 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2328 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2329 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2330 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2331 // we don't have the channel here.
2332 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2334 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2336 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2337 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2338 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2339 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2340 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2341 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2342 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2344 if *outgoing_amt_msat < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2345 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2347 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *outgoing_amt_msat, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2348 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2352 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
2353 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
2354 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
2355 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
2357 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2364 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2365 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2366 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2367 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2368 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2369 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2371 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2372 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2374 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2375 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2376 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2377 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2378 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2379 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2380 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2381 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2382 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2383 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2389 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2390 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2391 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2392 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2394 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2395 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2397 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2398 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2399 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2401 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2402 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2403 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2404 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
2405 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
2406 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
2407 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
2411 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2416 pending_forward_info
2419 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2420 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2421 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2423 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
2424 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
2425 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2427 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2428 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
2429 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2430 if !chan.should_announce() {
2431 return Err(LightningError {
2432 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2433 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2436 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2437 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2439 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2440 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2443 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2444 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
2445 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2446 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2448 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
2449 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
2450 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2452 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2453 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
2454 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2455 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2456 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2457 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2461 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2463 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2464 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2465 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2467 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2468 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2470 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2471 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2472 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2473 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2474 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2475 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2476 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2477 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2479 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
2480 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
2481 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
2483 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
2485 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2492 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2493 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2494 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv_bytes)
2497 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2498 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
2499 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2501 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2502 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
2503 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2505 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2506 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
2507 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2508 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2509 return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()});
2511 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2513 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2514 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2515 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2516 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
2519 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2520 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
2521 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
2522 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2523 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2524 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
2525 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2526 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
2528 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2529 let send_res = chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
2530 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2532 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2533 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2535 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2536 }, onion_packet, &self.logger);
2537 match break_chan_entry!(self, send_res, chan) {
2538 Some(monitor_update) => {
2539 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2540 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
2541 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
2544 if update_res == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress {
2545 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
2546 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
2547 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
2548 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
2549 // which we do in the send_payment check for
2550 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
2551 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
2557 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
2558 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
2559 // `channel_by_id` map.
2560 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
2561 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
2566 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2567 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2569 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2574 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2576 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
2577 /// fields for more info.
2579 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
2580 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
2582 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
2584 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
2585 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
2586 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
2587 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
2588 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
2590 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
2591 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
2592 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
2593 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
2594 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
2596 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
2597 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
2598 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
2599 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
2601 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
2603 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
2604 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2605 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
2607 /// In general, a path may raise:
2608 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2609 /// node public key) is specified.
2610 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2611 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2613 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2614 /// relevant updates.
2616 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
2617 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2618 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2620 /// # A caution on `payment_secret`
2622 /// `payment_secret` is unrelated to `payment_hash` (or [`PaymentPreimage`]) and exists to
2623 /// authenticate the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization)
2624 /// attacks. For newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one,
2625 /// the [`Route`] must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a
2626 /// recipient-provided `payment_secret`.
2628 /// If a `payment_secret` *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret
2629 /// feature bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the
2630 /// [`Route`], we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2632 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2633 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2634 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
2635 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
2636 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
2637 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2638 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2639 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2640 self.pending_outbound_payments
2641 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2642 |path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2643 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2646 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment`], but will automatically find a route based on
2647 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2648 pub fn send_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
2649 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2650 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2651 self.pending_outbound_payments
2652 .send_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
2653 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
2654 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
2655 &self.pending_events,
2656 |path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2657 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2661 fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2662 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2663 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2664 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2665 |path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2666 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2670 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2671 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2672 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
2676 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
2677 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
2678 /// retries are exhausted.
2680 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
2681 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
2683 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2684 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2685 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2687 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
2688 /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
2690 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2691 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2692 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2693 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2694 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, &self.pending_events);
2697 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2698 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2699 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2700 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2701 /// never reach the recipient.
2703 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
2704 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
2706 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2707 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2709 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2711 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2712 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2713 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2714 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2715 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
2716 route, payment_preimage, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
2718 |path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2719 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2722 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
2723 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2725 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
2728 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
2729 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
2730 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2731 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2732 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, payment_id,
2733 retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
2734 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2735 &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
2736 |path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2737 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2740 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
2741 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
2742 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
2743 pub fn send_probe(&self, hops: Vec<RouteHop>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2744 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2745 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2746 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(hops, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2747 |path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2748 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2751 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
2754 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
2755 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
2758 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2759 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2760 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2761 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2762 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2763 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2764 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2765 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2767 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2768 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2771 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2773 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2775 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2776 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2777 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2778 } else { unreachable!(); })
2781 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) }) },
2784 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2785 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2788 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2789 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
2794 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2795 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2798 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2799 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2800 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2802 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2803 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
2804 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
2805 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
2814 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2815 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2816 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2820 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2822 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2823 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2825 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
2826 /// across the p2p network.
2828 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2829 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2831 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2832 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2833 /// keys per-channel).
2835 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2836 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2837 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2839 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2840 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2841 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2843 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
2844 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
2845 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
2846 /// for more details.
2848 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2849 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2850 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2851 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2853 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2854 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2855 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2856 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2861 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2862 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools at the next block. However, the modules
2863 // constituting our Lightning node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if
2864 // the wallet module is in advance on the LDK view, allow one more block of headroom.
2865 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 2 {
2866 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2867 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
2871 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2872 let mut output_index = None;
2873 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2874 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2875 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2876 if output_index.is_some() {
2877 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2878 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2881 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2882 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2883 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2886 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2889 if output_index.is_none() {
2890 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2891 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2894 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2898 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
2900 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
2901 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
2902 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
2903 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
2905 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
2906 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
2908 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
2909 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
2911 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
2913 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
2914 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
2915 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
2916 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
2917 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2918 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
2919 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
2920 pub fn update_channel_config(
2921 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
2922 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2923 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
2924 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2925 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
2929 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
2930 &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
2932 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2933 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2934 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2935 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2936 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2937 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2938 if !peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) {
2939 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2940 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
2944 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2945 let channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
2946 if !channel.update_config(config) {
2949 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
2950 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
2951 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
2952 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2953 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2961 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
2962 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
2964 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
2965 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
2967 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
2968 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
2969 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
2970 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
2971 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
2973 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
2974 /// you from forwarding more than you received.
2976 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
2979 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
2980 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
2981 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
2982 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
2983 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2984 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2986 let next_hop_scid = {
2987 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2988 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
2989 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
2990 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2991 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2992 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
2994 if !chan.is_usable() {
2995 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2996 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
2999 chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.outbound_scid_alias())
3001 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3002 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id)
3007 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3008 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3009 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3012 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
3013 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
3014 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
3016 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3018 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
3019 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
3022 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
3023 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3024 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3025 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
3026 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
3028 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
3032 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
3033 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
3035 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3038 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3039 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3040 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3042 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3043 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3044 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3047 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
3048 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3049 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3050 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3051 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
3052 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3053 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3056 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
3057 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
3058 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3059 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3064 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3066 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3067 /// Will likely generate further events.
3068 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3069 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3071 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
3072 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3073 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3075 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3076 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3078 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3079 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3080 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3082 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3083 match forward_info {
3084 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3085 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3086 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3087 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3088 outgoing_cltv_value, incoming_amt_msat: _
3091 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3092 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3093 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3095 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3096 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3097 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3098 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3099 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3100 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3103 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3104 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3106 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3109 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3110 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3116 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3117 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3119 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3123 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3124 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3126 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3130 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3131 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3132 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3133 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3134 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3136 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3137 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3138 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3139 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3140 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3142 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3144 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3145 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3149 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3150 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3151 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3152 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3158 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3161 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3164 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3165 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3166 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3167 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3168 // problem, not ours.
3174 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3175 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3177 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3181 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3182 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3183 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3184 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3187 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3188 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3189 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3190 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3191 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3194 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3195 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3196 match forward_info {
3197 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3198 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
3199 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3200 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3201 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, incoming_amt_msat: _,
3204 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3205 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3206 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3207 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3208 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3209 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3210 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3211 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3213 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
3214 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
3215 onion_packet, &self.logger)
3217 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3218 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3220 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3222 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3223 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3224 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3225 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3230 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3231 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3233 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3234 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3235 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
3236 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
3238 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3239 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3241 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
3243 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3244 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3245 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3254 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3255 match forward_info {
3256 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3257 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3258 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3259 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, ..
3262 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3263 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3264 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3265 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data }, Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret)
3267 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3268 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None, None),
3270 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3273 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3274 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3275 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3276 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3277 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3278 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3279 phantom_shared_secret,
3281 value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3283 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3288 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3289 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3290 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3291 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3292 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
3294 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3295 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3296 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3297 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3298 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3299 phantom_shared_secret,
3301 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
3302 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3306 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
3307 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3308 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3309 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3310 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3313 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3314 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3315 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
3317 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3318 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3319 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3322 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3323 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3324 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3327 let (_, htlcs) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3328 .or_insert_with(|| (purpose(), Vec::new()));
3329 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3330 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3331 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3332 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3336 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.value;
3337 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3338 total_value += htlc.value;
3339 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3340 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3341 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3342 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3343 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3344 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3346 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3348 _ => unreachable!(),
3351 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data.total_msat {
3352 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3353 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data.total_msat);
3354 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3355 } else if total_value == $payment_data.total_msat {
3356 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3357 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3358 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3359 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3362 amount_msat: total_value,
3363 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3364 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3366 payment_claimable_generated = true;
3368 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3369 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3371 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3373 payment_claimable_generated
3377 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3378 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3379 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3380 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3381 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3382 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3383 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3384 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3385 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3386 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3387 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3388 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3389 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3390 Ok(result) => result,
3392 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3393 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3397 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
3398 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
3399 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
3400 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
3401 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
3402 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3406 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3408 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3409 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3410 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3411 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3414 match claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
3415 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3416 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3417 e.insert((purpose.clone(), vec![claimable_htlc]));
3418 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3419 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3420 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3422 amount_msat: outgoing_amt_msat,
3424 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3425 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3428 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3429 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3430 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3436 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3437 if payment_data.is_none() {
3438 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3439 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3442 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3443 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3444 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3445 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3446 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3447 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3448 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3449 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3451 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3452 if payment_claimable_generated {
3453 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3459 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3460 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3468 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3469 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
3470 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3471 &self.pending_events, &self.logger,
3472 |path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3473 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv));
3475 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3476 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3478 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3480 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
3481 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
3482 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
3484 self.check_free_holding_cells();
3486 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3487 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3488 events.append(&mut new_events);
3491 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3493 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3494 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3496 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3497 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3498 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3499 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3500 if background_events.is_empty() {
3504 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3506 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3507 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3508 // monitor updating completing.
3509 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
3516 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3517 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3518 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3519 self.process_background_events();
3522 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
3523 if !chan.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
3524 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3525 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
3526 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3527 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3528 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3530 if !chan.is_live() {
3531 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3532 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3533 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3535 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3536 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3538 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.logger);
3539 NotifyOption::DoPersist
3543 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3544 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3545 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3546 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3547 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3548 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3549 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3551 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3553 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3554 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3555 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3556 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3557 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
3558 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3559 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3567 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3569 /// This currently includes:
3570 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3571 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3572 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3574 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3575 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
3576 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
3578 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
3579 /// estimate fetches.
3581 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3582 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
3583 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3584 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3585 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3586 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3588 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3590 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
3591 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3592 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
3594 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3595 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3596 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3597 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3598 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
3599 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
3600 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3601 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3602 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3604 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3605 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3606 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
3607 if needs_close { return false; }
3610 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3611 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3612 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3613 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3614 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3615 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3616 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3617 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3621 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3622 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3624 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3625 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3626 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3630 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3631 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3636 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
3640 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
3641 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
3646 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
3647 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
3648 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
3649 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
3650 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
3651 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
3652 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
3653 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
3654 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3655 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
3656 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
3657 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
3658 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
3659 // have no channels to the peer.
3660 let remove_entry = {
3661 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
3662 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
3665 entry.remove_entry();
3668 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
3673 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
3674 if htlcs.is_empty() {
3675 // This should be unreachable
3676 debug_assert!(false);
3679 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3680 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3681 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3682 if htlcs[0].total_msat == htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.value) {
3684 } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| {
3685 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3686 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3688 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.drain(..).map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
3695 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3696 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
3697 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
3698 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
3699 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
3702 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3703 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3706 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self.pending_events);
3708 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
3709 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
3710 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
3711 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
3712 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3719 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3720 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3721 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3723 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
3724 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
3725 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
3726 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
3728 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
3729 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
3730 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
3731 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
3732 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
3733 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
3736 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
3737 /// reason for the failure.
3739 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
3740 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
3741 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3743 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3744 if let Some((_, mut sources)) = removed_source {
3745 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3746 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
3747 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
3748 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
3749 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3754 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
3755 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
3756 match failure_code {
3757 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
3758 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
3759 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
3760 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3761 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
3762 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code as u16, htlc_msat_height_data)
3767 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3768 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3770 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3772 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3773 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3774 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3775 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3776 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3777 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3778 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3780 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3782 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3783 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3785 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3790 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3791 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3792 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3793 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
3794 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
3795 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
3796 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3797 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
3798 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
3799 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3801 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3802 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3803 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3804 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
3806 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
3807 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
3808 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
3809 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
3810 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3814 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3815 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3816 // be surfaced to the user.
3817 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
3818 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
3819 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
3821 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
3822 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3823 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
3824 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3825 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3826 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3827 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3828 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
3830 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3832 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
3835 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3836 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
3837 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
3838 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3842 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3843 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
3844 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
3845 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
3846 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
3847 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
3848 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
3849 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
3850 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
3853 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3854 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3855 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3858 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3859 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3860 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3862 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
3863 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
3864 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
3865 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
3866 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
3868 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
3869 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
3870 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
3872 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
3873 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
3874 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3875 push_forward_ev = true;
3877 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
3878 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3879 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
3881 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3882 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
3885 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
3886 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
3887 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3888 pending_events.push(events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
3889 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
3890 failed_next_destination: destination,
3896 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
3897 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
3899 /// Note that calling this method does *not* guarantee that the payment has been claimed. You
3900 /// *must* wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] event which upon a successful claim will be
3901 /// provided to your [`EventHandler`] when [`process_pending_events`] is next called.
3903 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3904 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
3905 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3906 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3908 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
3909 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
3910 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
3911 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3912 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3913 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
3914 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3916 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3919 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3920 if let Some((payment_purpose, sources)) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
3921 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3922 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3923 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3924 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3925 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3926 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
3931 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
3932 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: sources.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
3933 payment_purpose, receiver_node_id,
3935 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
3936 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
3937 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
3938 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3943 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3945 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we check that all channels which contain a claimable
3946 // HTLC still exist. While this isn't guaranteed to remain true if a channel closes while
3947 // we're claiming (or even after we claim, before the commitment update dance completes),
3948 // it should be a relatively rare race, and we'd rather not claim HTLCs that require us to
3949 // go on-chain (and lose the on-chain fee to do so) than just reject the payment.
3951 // Note that we'll still always get our funds - as long as the generated
3952 // `ChannelMonitorUpdate` makes it out to the relevant monitor we can claim on-chain.
3954 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3955 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3956 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3957 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3958 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3960 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
3961 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
3962 let mut valid_mpp = true;
3963 let mut errs = Vec::new();
3964 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3965 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3966 let (counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3967 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3974 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3975 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3980 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3981 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3983 if peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&chan_id).is_none() {
3988 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
3989 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
3990 debug_assert!(false);
3995 expected_amt_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
3996 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
3997 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
3998 // that there's one payment here and move on.
3999 if sources.len() != 1 {
4000 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
4001 debug_assert!(false);
4007 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
4009 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4010 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4011 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4012 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4015 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4016 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4017 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4018 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4022 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4023 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
4024 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
4025 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
4027 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4028 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4029 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4030 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4031 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4036 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4037 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4038 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4039 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4040 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
4041 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
4042 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4044 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4047 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
4048 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4049 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4050 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4054 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
4055 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
4056 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
4057 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4059 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4060 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
4061 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4062 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
4066 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
4067 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id).map(
4068 |peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap()
4072 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
4073 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
4074 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4075 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4076 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4077 let fulfill_res = chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
4079 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
4080 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
4081 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
4082 log_bytes!(chan_id), action);
4083 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
4085 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4086 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update);
4087 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
4088 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4089 if let Err(e) = res {
4090 // TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge
4091 // of the HTLC's monitor with a preimage. We should retry this monitor
4092 // update over and over again until morale improves.
4093 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}", payment_preimage);
4094 return Err((counterparty_node_id, e));
4100 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4101 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4102 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4106 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4107 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
4108 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
4109 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4110 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4111 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4112 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
4113 // again on restart.
4114 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4115 payment_preimage, update_res);
4117 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
4118 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
4119 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
4120 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
4121 // `PaymentForwarded`).
4122 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
4126 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4127 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
4130 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4132 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4133 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage, session_priv, path, from_onchain, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
4135 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4136 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4137 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
4138 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
4139 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4140 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4141 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4144 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4145 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
4147 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4149 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4155 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
4156 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4157 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4163 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4164 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4165 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4168 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
4169 for action in actions.into_iter() {
4171 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
4172 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4173 if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
4174 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4175 payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4179 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event } => {
4180 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(event);
4186 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
4187 /// update completion.
4188 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4189 channel: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
4190 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
4191 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
4192 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
4193 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
4194 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
4195 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()),
4196 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
4197 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
4198 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
4199 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
4200 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
4202 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
4204 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get_counterparty_node_id();
4205 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4206 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.outbound_scid_alias()),
4207 channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
4210 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4211 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
4213 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
4214 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4215 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4220 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
4222 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
4223 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
4224 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4225 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4230 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
4231 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
4232 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4233 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4234 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4239 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
4243 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
4249 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
4250 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
4251 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4257 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
4258 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
4260 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
4261 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4263 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
4264 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
4265 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4266 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4267 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4272 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4273 let mut peer_state_lock;
4274 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4275 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
4276 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4277 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4279 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()){
4280 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4281 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4284 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}",
4285 highest_applied_update_id, channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id());
4286 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4289 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, highest_applied_update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel.get_mut());
4292 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4294 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4295 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4298 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4299 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4300 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4302 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4303 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4304 /// used to accept such channels.
4306 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4307 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4308 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4309 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4312 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4313 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4315 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4316 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4317 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4319 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4320 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4322 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4323 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4325 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4326 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4328 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4329 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4330 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4331 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4334 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4335 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4337 let peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| !peer.channel_by_id.is_empty());
4338 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4339 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4340 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4341 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4342 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4343 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.len() == 1;
4344 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4345 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4346 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4347 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4350 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4351 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4352 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4353 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4354 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4355 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4358 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4359 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4360 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4362 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4363 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4364 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4365 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
4366 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4367 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4368 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4369 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
4372 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4373 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4374 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
4378 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4379 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4380 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4383 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4384 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) });
4390 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
4391 /// or 0-conf channels.
4393 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
4394 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
4395 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
4396 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> bool {
4397 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
4398 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4400 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4401 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
4402 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4403 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
4404 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
4405 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.channel_by_id.len() {
4406 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
4410 return peers_without_funded_channels;
4413 fn unfunded_channel_count(
4414 peer: &PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, best_block_height: u32
4416 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
4417 for (_, chan) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
4418 if !chan.is_outbound() && chan.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
4419 chan.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
4421 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
4424 num_unfunded_channels
4427 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4428 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4429 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4432 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4433 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4436 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
4437 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
4438 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
4439 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4441 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
4442 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
4443 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
4444 let channeled_peers_without_funding = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| !node.channel_by_id.is_empty());
4446 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4447 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4449 debug_assert!(false);
4450 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
4452 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4453 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4455 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4456 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4457 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4458 if peer_state.channel_by_id.is_empty() &&
4459 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
4460 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
4462 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4463 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
4464 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4467 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4468 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
4469 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4470 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
4471 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4474 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
4475 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
4476 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4479 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4480 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4484 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4485 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4486 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4487 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4489 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4490 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4491 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4492 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4494 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4495 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4496 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4499 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4500 pending_events.push(
4501 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4502 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4503 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4504 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4505 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4506 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4511 entry.insert(channel);
4517 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4518 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4519 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4520 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4522 debug_assert!(false);
4523 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4525 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4526 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4527 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4528 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4529 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan);
4530 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4532 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4535 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4536 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4537 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4538 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4539 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4541 user_channel_id: user_id,
4546 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4547 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4549 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4550 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4552 debug_assert!(false);
4553 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4556 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4557 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4558 let ((funding_msg, monitor), chan) =
4559 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4560 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4561 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
4563 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4566 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4567 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4568 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4570 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4571 match self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().entry(chan.channel_id()) {
4572 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4573 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4574 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
4575 funding_msg.channel_id))
4577 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
4578 i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
4582 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4583 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4584 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4585 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4586 let new_channel_id = funding_msg.channel_id;
4587 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4588 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4592 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
4594 let chan = e.insert(chan);
4595 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, monitor_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
4596 per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING, { peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&new_channel_id) });
4598 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4599 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4600 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4601 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4602 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
4603 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
4604 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4605 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { shutdown_finish: Some((res, _)), .. }) = &mut res {
4613 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4614 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4615 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4616 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4618 debug_assert!(false);
4619 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4622 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4623 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4624 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4625 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4626 let monitor = try_chan_entry!(self,
4627 chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan);
4628 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor);
4629 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4630 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4631 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4632 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4633 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4634 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4635 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4640 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4644 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4645 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4646 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4648 debug_assert!(false);
4649 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4651 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4652 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4653 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4654 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4655 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
4656 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
4657 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4658 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4659 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4660 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4661 msg: announcement_sigs,
4663 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4664 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4665 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4666 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4667 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4668 // announcement_signatures.
4669 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4670 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4671 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4672 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4678 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, chan.get_mut());
4682 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4686 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4687 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4688 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4689 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4690 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4692 debug_assert!(false);
4693 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4695 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4696 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4697 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4698 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4700 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4701 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4702 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4703 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4706 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
4707 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self,
4708 chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
4709 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4711 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4712 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
4713 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
4714 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
4715 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4716 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4721 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4722 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
4723 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4724 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
4725 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
4729 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4732 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4733 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
4734 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
4735 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4741 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4742 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4743 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4745 debug_assert!(false);
4746 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4748 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4749 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4750 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4751 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4752 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4753 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
4754 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4755 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4756 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4761 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4762 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4763 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4764 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4765 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4766 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
4767 } else { (tx, None) }
4769 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4772 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4773 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4774 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4776 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4777 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4778 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4779 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4780 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4784 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4789 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4790 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4791 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4792 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4794 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4795 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4796 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4797 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4799 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4800 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4801 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4803 debug_assert!(false);
4804 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4806 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4807 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4808 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4809 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4811 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4812 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4813 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4814 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4815 match pending_forward_info {
4816 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4817 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4818 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
4819 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
4821 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
4822 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
4823 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4824 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4825 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4828 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4830 _ => pending_forward_info
4833 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
4835 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4840 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4841 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4842 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4843 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4845 debug_assert!(false);
4846 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4848 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4849 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4850 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4851 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4852 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
4854 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4857 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
4861 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4862 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4863 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4865 debug_assert!(false);
4866 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4868 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4869 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4870 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4871 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4872 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
4874 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4879 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4880 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4881 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4883 debug_assert!(false);
4884 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4886 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4887 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4888 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4889 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4890 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4891 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4892 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
4894 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
4897 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4901 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4902 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4903 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4905 debug_assert!(false);
4906 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4908 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4909 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4910 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4911 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4912 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
4913 let monitor_update = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
4914 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
4915 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4916 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
4917 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
4919 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4924 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4925 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4926 let mut push_forward_event = false;
4927 let mut new_intercept_events = Vec::new();
4928 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
4929 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4930 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4931 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
4932 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4933 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4934 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4936 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
4937 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
4939 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4940 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
4941 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
4942 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4943 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4944 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
4946 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4947 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
4948 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
4950 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
4951 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4952 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
4953 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4954 new_intercept_events.push(events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
4955 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
4956 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
4957 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
4958 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
4961 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4962 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
4964 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4965 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
4966 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4967 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4968 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4969 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4970 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4971 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4974 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
4975 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
4976 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
4981 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
4982 // payments are being processed.
4983 if forward_htlcs_empty {
4984 push_forward_event = true;
4986 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4987 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
4994 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
4995 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4998 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
4999 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5000 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
5002 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
5006 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued.
5007 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
5008 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5009 let forward_ev_exists = pending_events.iter()
5010 .find(|ev| if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false })
5012 if !forward_ev_exists {
5013 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5015 Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
5020 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5021 let (htlcs_to_fail, res) = {
5022 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5023 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5025 debug_assert!(false);
5026 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5027 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
5028 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5029 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5030 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5031 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
5032 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5033 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
5034 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5035 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5036 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5037 (htlcs_to_fail, res)
5039 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5042 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5046 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5047 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5048 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5050 debug_assert!(false);
5051 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5053 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5054 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5055 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5056 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5057 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
5059 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5064 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5065 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5066 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5068 debug_assert!(false);
5069 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5071 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5072 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5073 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5074 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5075 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
5076 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
5079 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5080 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5081 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
5082 msg, &self.default_configuration
5084 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5085 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5086 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap()),
5089 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5094 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5095 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5096 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5097 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
5099 // It's not a local channel
5100 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5103 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5104 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
5105 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
5106 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5108 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5109 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5110 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5111 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5112 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5113 if chan.get().should_announce() {
5114 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5115 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5116 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5117 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5119 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5121 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5122 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5123 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5124 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5126 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5127 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
5130 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5132 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5135 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5137 let need_lnd_workaround = {
5138 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5140 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5142 debug_assert!(false);
5143 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5145 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5146 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5147 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5148 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5149 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5150 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5151 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5152 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5153 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5154 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
5155 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
5156 let mut channel_update = None;
5157 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5158 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5159 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5162 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5163 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5164 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5165 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5166 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5167 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5168 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5173 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5174 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
5175 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5176 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5177 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5178 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5182 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5186 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
5187 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
5190 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5191 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5196 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
5197 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5198 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5200 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5201 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5202 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5203 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5204 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5205 match monitor_event {
5206 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5207 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5208 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5209 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5211 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5212 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5213 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5214 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5217 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5218 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5219 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
5220 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
5222 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5223 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5224 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5225 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
5228 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
5229 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5230 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5231 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5232 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5233 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5234 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5235 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5236 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5237 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5238 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5242 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5243 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5245 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5247 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5248 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5249 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5250 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5251 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5258 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5259 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
5265 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5266 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5269 has_pending_monitor_events
5272 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5273 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5274 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5276 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5277 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5278 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5279 NotifyOption::DoPersist
5281 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
5286 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5287 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5288 /// update was applied.
5289 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5290 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5291 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5292 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5294 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
5295 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
5296 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
5297 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
5299 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5300 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5302 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5303 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5304 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
5305 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
5306 let funding_txo = chan.get_funding_txo();
5307 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
5308 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger);
5309 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5310 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
5312 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
5313 has_monitor_update = true;
5315 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(
5316 funding_txo.expect("channel is live"), monitor_update);
5317 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5318 let channel_id: [u8; 32] = *channel_id;
5319 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5320 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING,
5321 peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id));
5323 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, res));
5325 continue 'peer_loop;
5334 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5335 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5336 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5339 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5340 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5346 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5347 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5348 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5349 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5350 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5351 let mut has_update = false;
5353 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5355 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5356 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5357 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5358 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5359 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5360 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5361 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5362 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5364 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5365 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5368 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5369 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5370 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5371 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5372 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5377 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5379 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5380 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5381 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
5387 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5388 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5396 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5397 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5403 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5404 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5406 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5407 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5408 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5409 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5410 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5411 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5412 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5413 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5414 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5415 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5416 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5417 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5418 assert!(should_broadcast);
5419 } else { unreachable!(); }
5420 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5422 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5426 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5427 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5429 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5430 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5433 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5435 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5436 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5437 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5438 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5439 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5440 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5441 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5442 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5443 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5444 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5445 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5446 // never fail a payment too early.
5447 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5449 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5452 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5457 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5460 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5461 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5463 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
5464 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
5465 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5466 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5468 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5470 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5471 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5475 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5476 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5478 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5480 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5481 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5483 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5484 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5485 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
5486 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
5487 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
5488 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5489 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
5490 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5491 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
5492 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5493 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
5496 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5497 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5499 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5502 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5504 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5506 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5507 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5508 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5509 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5510 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5513 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5514 /// stored external to LDK.
5516 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5517 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5518 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5520 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5521 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5524 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5525 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5526 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5527 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5529 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5530 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5531 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5532 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5533 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5535 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5536 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5537 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
5538 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5539 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
5541 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
5542 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
5544 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5545 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5549 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5550 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5552 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5554 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5555 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5557 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5558 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5559 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
5560 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5561 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
5562 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5563 min_final_cltv_expiry)
5566 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5567 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5569 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5572 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5574 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5576 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5577 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5580 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5581 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5583 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5584 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5585 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5588 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5589 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5591 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5592 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5593 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5594 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5596 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5597 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5598 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
5599 Some(_) => continue,
5600 None => return scid_candidate
5605 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5607 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5608 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5610 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5611 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5612 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5616 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
5617 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
5618 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
5620 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
5621 /// times to get a unique scid.
5622 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5623 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5624 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5626 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5627 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5628 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
5629 return scid_candidate
5633 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
5634 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
5635 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
5636 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
5638 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5639 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5640 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5641 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5642 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5643 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
5644 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
5645 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
5654 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5655 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5656 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5657 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
5658 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5662 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
5663 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
5664 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5669 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
5670 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5671 if events.is_empty() { None } else { Some(events.remove(0)) }
5675 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5676 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
5680 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5681 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
5684 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
5685 /// using the given event handler.
5687 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
5688 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
5691 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock until the returned future completes so that
5692 // we can be sure no other persists happen while processing events.
5693 let _read_guard = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
5695 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5697 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5698 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5699 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5700 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5703 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5704 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5705 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5708 for event in pending_events {
5709 handler(event).await;
5712 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
5713 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
5718 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5720 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5721 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5722 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5723 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5724 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5725 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5729 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
5730 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
5731 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
5732 /// is always placed next to each other.
5734 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
5735 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
5736 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
5737 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
5739 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
5740 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
5741 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
5742 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5743 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5744 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5745 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5747 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5748 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5749 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5750 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5753 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5754 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5756 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5757 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5760 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5761 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5762 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5763 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5764 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5765 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
5766 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
5770 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5771 events.replace(pending_events);
5780 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5782 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5783 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5784 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5785 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5786 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5787 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5791 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5793 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5794 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5795 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5796 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5797 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5799 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5800 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5801 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5802 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5805 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5806 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5807 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5810 for event in pending_events {
5811 handler.handle_event(event);
5819 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5821 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5822 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5823 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5824 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5825 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5826 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5830 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5832 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5833 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
5834 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5835 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5836 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5839 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
5840 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
5843 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5844 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5845 let new_height = height - 1;
5847 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5848 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5849 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5850 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5851 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5852 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5855 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5859 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5861 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5862 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5863 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5864 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5865 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5866 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5870 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5871 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5872 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5873 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5875 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5876 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5878 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5879 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
5880 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5882 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5883 if height < last_best_block_height {
5884 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5885 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5889 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5890 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5891 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5892 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5894 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5895 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5897 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5899 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5901 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5903 macro_rules! max_time {
5904 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5906 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5907 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5908 // having an explicit local time source.
5909 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5910 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5911 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5912 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5913 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5919 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5920 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5921 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5922 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5926 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
5927 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
5928 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5929 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5930 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5931 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5932 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.get_funding_txo(), chan.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
5933 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
5940 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5941 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5942 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5943 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5944 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
5945 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
5946 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5947 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5952 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5954 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5955 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5956 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5957 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5958 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5959 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5963 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
5964 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
5966 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
5967 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
5968 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5969 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5970 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5972 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5973 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5975 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5976 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5977 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5978 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5979 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5980 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
5981 let res = f(channel);
5982 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
5983 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
5984 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
5985 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
5986 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
5988 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
5989 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
5990 if channel.is_usable() {
5991 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5992 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
5993 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5994 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5999 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6003 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
6005 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
6006 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6007 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6008 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6009 msg: announcement_sigs,
6011 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6012 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
6013 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6015 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6016 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6017 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
6022 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
6023 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6024 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
6025 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
6026 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
6027 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
6028 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
6029 // is always consistent.
6030 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
6031 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
6032 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
6033 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
6034 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
6037 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
6038 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel);
6039 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
6040 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
6041 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
6042 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
6043 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6047 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
6048 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
6049 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6050 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6051 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
6052 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6053 data: reason_message,
6063 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6064 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
6065 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
6066 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
6067 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
6068 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
6069 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
6070 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6071 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6072 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
6074 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
6075 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
6076 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
6080 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
6083 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6084 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
6085 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6086 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6087 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
6088 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
6089 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6090 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6091 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
6094 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
6095 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6096 _ => unreachable!(),
6098 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
6099 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
6100 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
6101 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
6107 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
6109 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
6110 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
6114 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
6115 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
6116 /// [`await_persistable_update`], [`await_persistable_update_timeout`], or a future returned by
6117 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
6119 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
6121 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
6122 /// [`await_persistable_update_timeout`]: Self::await_persistable_update_timeout
6123 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
6124 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
6125 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
6126 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
6129 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
6130 /// [`await_persistable_update`], `await_persistable_update_timeout`, or a future returned by
6131 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
6133 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
6134 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
6135 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
6136 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
6139 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when a persistable update is available. Note that
6140 /// callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this [`ChannelManager`] and
6141 /// should instead register actions to be taken later.
6142 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
6143 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
6146 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6147 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
6148 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
6151 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
6152 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
6153 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
6154 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
6157 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6158 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6159 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6160 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6163 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6164 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6166 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6167 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6168 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6169 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6170 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
6173 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6174 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6175 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
6176 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
6179 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6180 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6181 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6182 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
6185 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6186 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6187 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
6188 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6192 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
6193 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6195 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6196 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6197 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6198 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6199 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6200 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6204 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
6205 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6206 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6209 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
6210 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6211 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6214 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6215 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6216 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6219 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6220 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6221 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6224 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6225 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6226 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6229 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6230 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6231 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6234 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6235 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6236 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6239 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6240 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6241 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6244 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6245 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6246 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6249 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6250 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6251 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6254 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6255 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6256 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6259 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6260 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6261 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6264 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6265 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6266 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6269 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6270 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6271 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6274 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6275 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6276 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6279 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6280 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6281 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6284 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6289 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6290 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6291 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6294 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
6295 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6296 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6297 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6299 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
6300 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6301 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
6302 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6303 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6304 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6305 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6306 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6307 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6308 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
6309 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6314 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6316 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
6317 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
6318 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
6319 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
6320 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
6321 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
6322 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
6323 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
6324 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
6325 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
6326 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
6327 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
6328 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6329 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6330 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6331 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
6332 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
6333 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6334 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6335 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6336 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6339 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
6340 peer_state.is_connected = false;
6341 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
6342 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
6345 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
6347 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6349 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6350 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6354 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
6355 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
6356 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6360 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6362 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
6363 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
6364 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
6365 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
6366 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
6367 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
6370 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6371 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6372 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6373 if inbound_peer_limited {
6376 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6377 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
6378 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6379 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6380 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
6384 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6385 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
6386 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6388 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6389 if inbound_peer_limited &&
6390 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
6391 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
6396 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
6397 peer_state.is_connected = true;
6402 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6404 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6405 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6406 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6407 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6408 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6409 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6410 let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6411 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6412 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6413 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6414 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6418 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6419 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6420 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6425 if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6426 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.default_configuration) {
6427 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
6428 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
6429 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6438 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6442 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6443 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6445 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6446 let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = {
6447 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6448 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6449 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6450 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6451 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6452 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
6454 for channel_id in channel_ids {
6455 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6456 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6460 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6461 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6462 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6463 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6464 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6465 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6466 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6467 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6468 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6469 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6477 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6478 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6482 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6483 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6486 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
6487 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6491 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6492 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6493 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
6494 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6497 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6498 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6500 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6501 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6502 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6503 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6504 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6507 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6508 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6509 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
6510 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6513 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6514 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6515 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6516 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
6519 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6520 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6521 pub fn provided_init_features(_config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
6522 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
6523 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
6524 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
6525 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
6526 features.set_data_loss_protect_optional();
6527 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
6528 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
6529 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
6530 features.set_payment_secret_required();
6531 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
6532 features.set_wumbo_optional();
6533 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
6534 features.set_channel_type_optional();
6535 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
6536 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
6538 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
6539 if _config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
6540 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
6546 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6547 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6549 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6550 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6551 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6552 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6555 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6556 (2, node_id, required),
6557 (4, features, required),
6558 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6559 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6560 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6561 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6564 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
6565 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6566 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6567 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6568 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
6569 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
6570 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6571 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
6572 (2, self.channel_id, required),
6573 (3, self.channel_type, option),
6574 (4, self.counterparty, required),
6575 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
6576 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
6577 (7, self.config, option),
6578 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
6579 (9, self.confirmations, option),
6580 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
6581 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6582 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6583 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
6584 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6585 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6586 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6587 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6588 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6589 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
6590 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
6591 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
6592 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
6593 (30, self.is_usable, required),
6594 (32, self.is_public, required),
6595 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6596 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6597 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6598 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
6604 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
6605 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6606 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6607 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6608 (2, channel_id, required),
6609 (3, channel_type, option),
6610 (4, counterparty, required),
6611 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6612 (6, funding_txo, option),
6613 (7, config, option),
6614 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6615 (9, confirmations, option),
6616 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6617 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6618 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6619 (16, balance_msat, required),
6620 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6621 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6622 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6623 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6624 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6625 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6626 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6627 (26, is_outbound, required),
6628 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
6629 (30, is_usable, required),
6630 (32, is_public, required),
6631 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6632 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6633 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6634 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
6637 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6638 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6639 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
6640 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
6641 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
6645 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
6647 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
6648 outbound_scid_alias,
6652 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
6653 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
6655 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
6656 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6657 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
6658 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6659 confirmations_required,
6661 force_close_spend_delay,
6662 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
6663 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
6664 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
6665 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
6666 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
6667 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
6668 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
6673 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6674 (2, channels, vec_type),
6675 (4, phantom_scid, required),
6676 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6679 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6681 (0, onion_packet, required),
6682 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6685 (0, payment_data, required),
6686 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6687 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6689 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6690 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6691 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6695 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6696 (0, routing, required),
6697 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6698 (4, payment_hash, required),
6699 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
6700 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
6701 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
6705 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6706 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6708 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6710 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6711 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6712 reason.write(writer)?;
6714 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6715 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6718 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6719 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6720 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6721 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6728 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6729 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6730 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6733 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6734 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6735 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6736 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6740 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6741 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6742 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6743 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6744 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6747 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6748 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6749 // messages contained in the variants.
6750 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6751 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6752 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6754 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6755 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6756 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6757 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6758 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6761 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6762 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6763 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6764 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6765 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6767 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6772 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6777 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6778 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6779 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6780 (2, outpoint, required),
6781 (4, htlc_id, required),
6782 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6785 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6786 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6787 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
6788 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
6789 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
6791 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6792 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
6793 (1, self.total_msat, required),
6794 (2, self.value, required),
6795 (4, payment_data, option),
6796 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6797 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6803 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6804 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6805 let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
6807 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6808 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6809 let mut total_msat = None;
6810 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6811 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6812 (0, prev_hop, required),
6813 (1, total_msat, option),
6814 (2, value, required),
6815 (4, payment_data, option),
6816 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6817 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6819 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6821 if payment_data.is_some() {
6822 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6824 if total_msat.is_none() {
6825 total_msat = Some(value);
6827 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6830 if total_msat.is_none() {
6831 if payment_data.is_none() {
6832 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6834 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
6836 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
6840 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6843 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
6850 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6851 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6852 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6855 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
6856 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6857 let mut path: Option<Vec<RouteHop>> = Some(Vec::new());
6858 let mut payment_id = None;
6859 let mut payment_secret = None;
6860 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
6861 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6862 (0, session_priv, required),
6863 (1, payment_id, option),
6864 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6865 (3, payment_secret, option),
6866 (4, path, vec_type),
6867 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
6869 if payment_id.is_none() {
6870 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6872 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6874 if path.is_none() || path.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
6875 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6877 let path = path.unwrap();
6878 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
6879 if params.final_cltv_expiry_delta == 0 {
6880 params.final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta;
6883 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6884 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6885 first_hop_htlc_msat,
6887 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6891 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6892 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6897 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6898 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
6900 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret } => {
6902 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6903 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6904 (0, session_priv, required),
6905 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6906 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6907 (3, payment_secret, option),
6908 (4, *path, vec_type),
6909 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
6912 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6914 field.write(writer)?;
6921 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
6922 (0, forward_info, required),
6923 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
6924 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6925 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6926 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6929 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6931 (0, htlc_id, required),
6932 (2, err_packet, required),
6937 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6938 (0, payment_secret, required),
6939 (2, expiry_time, required),
6940 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6941 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6942 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6945 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6947 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6948 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6949 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6950 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6951 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6952 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6956 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6957 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6959 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6961 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
6963 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6964 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
6965 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
6968 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
6970 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6971 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
6972 let mut number_of_channels = 0;
6973 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6974 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6975 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6976 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
6977 serializable_peer_count += 1;
6979 number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len();
6980 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
6981 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6982 unfunded_channels += 1;
6987 ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
6989 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6990 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6991 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6992 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
6993 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6994 channel.write(writer)?;
7001 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7002 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7003 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
7004 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7005 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7006 for forward in pending_forwards {
7007 forward.write(writer)?;
7012 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7014 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7015 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
7016 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7018 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
7019 (claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7020 for (payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops)) in claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
7021 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7022 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7023 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
7024 htlc.write(writer)?;
7026 htlc_purposes.push(purpose);
7029 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
7030 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
7031 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7032 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
7033 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
7034 // per_peer_state lock at all.
7035 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
7038 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
7039 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
7040 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
7041 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
7042 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
7044 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7045 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
7046 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
7047 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
7048 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
7049 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
7050 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
7055 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7056 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7057 for event in events.iter() {
7058 event.write(writer)?;
7061 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
7062 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7063 for event in background_events.iter() {
7065 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
7067 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
7068 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
7073 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
7074 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
7075 // likely to be identical.
7076 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7077 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7079 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7080 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
7081 hash.write(writer)?;
7082 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
7085 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
7086 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
7087 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7088 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
7089 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
7092 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
7093 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7095 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7096 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7097 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
7098 session_priv.write(writer)?;
7101 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
7102 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
7106 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
7107 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
7108 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7110 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7111 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7112 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
7118 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
7119 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7120 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
7121 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
7124 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
7125 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
7126 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
7127 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
7128 pending_claiming_payments = None;
7131 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7132 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
7133 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7134 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
7135 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7136 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
7137 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7138 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
7139 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7140 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
7147 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
7149 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
7151 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7152 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
7153 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
7154 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
7155 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
7156 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
7157 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
7158 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
7159 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7160 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
7161 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
7162 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
7163 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
7165 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
7166 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
7168 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
7169 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
7171 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
7172 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
7173 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
7174 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
7175 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
7176 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
7178 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
7179 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7181 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7182 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7183 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7184 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7185 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7186 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7190 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
7191 pub entropy_source: ES,
7193 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
7194 pub node_signer: NS,
7196 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
7197 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
7199 pub signer_provider: SP,
7201 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7203 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
7204 pub fee_estimator: F,
7205 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7207 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
7208 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
7209 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
7210 pub chain_monitor: M,
7212 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
7213 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
7214 /// force-closed during deserialization.
7215 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
7216 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
7217 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
7219 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
7221 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
7222 /// deserialization.
7224 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
7225 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
7226 pub default_config: UserConfig,
7228 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
7229 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
7231 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
7232 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
7233 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
7234 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
7236 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
7239 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
7240 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
7243 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7244 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7246 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7247 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7248 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7249 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7250 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7251 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7255 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
7256 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
7257 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
7258 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
7259 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
7261 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
7262 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
7267 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
7268 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
7269 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7270 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
7272 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7273 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7274 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7275 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7276 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7277 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7281 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7282 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
7283 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
7287 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7288 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
7290 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7291 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7292 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7293 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7294 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7295 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7299 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7300 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7302 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7303 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7304 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7306 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7308 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7309 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7310 let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7311 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7312 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7313 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
7314 for _ in 0..channel_count {
7315 let mut channel: Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (
7316 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
7318 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7319 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
7320 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
7321 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7322 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7323 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7324 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7325 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
7326 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
7327 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7328 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7329 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7330 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7331 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7332 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7333 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7334 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7335 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7336 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7337 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7338 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
7339 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
7340 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
7341 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7342 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7343 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
7344 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
7345 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7346 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7347 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7348 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7349 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
7351 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7352 let mut found_htlc = false;
7353 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7354 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
7357 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
7358 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
7359 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
7360 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
7361 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
7362 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
7363 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
7364 log_info!(args.logger,
7365 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
7366 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7367 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7371 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7372 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
7373 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7375 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7376 id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
7378 match peer_channels.entry(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
7379 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7380 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
7381 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7383 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7384 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
7385 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7386 entry.insert(by_id_map);
7390 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
7391 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
7392 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
7393 // safely discard the channel.
7394 let _ = channel.force_shutdown(false);
7395 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7396 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7397 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7398 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
7401 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7402 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7403 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7404 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7405 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7406 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7410 for (funding_txo, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
7411 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
7412 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
7413 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7417 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
7418 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7419 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7420 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
7421 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7422 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7423 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
7424 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
7425 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
7427 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
7430 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7431 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7432 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
7433 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7434 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7435 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
7436 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
7437 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
7439 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
7442 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7443 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>)>()));
7444 for _ in 0..peer_count {
7445 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7446 let peer_state = PeerState {
7447 channel_by_id: peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new()),
7448 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
7449 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7450 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
7451 is_connected: false,
7453 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
7456 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7457 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
7458 for _ in 0..event_count {
7459 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
7460 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
7465 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7466 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
7467 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
7468 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7469 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
7470 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7474 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
7475 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7477 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7478 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
7479 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
7480 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
7481 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7485 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7486 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
7487 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
7488 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
7489 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
7490 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
7491 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
7493 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
7494 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7498 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
7499 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
7500 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
7501 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
7502 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
7503 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7504 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7505 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
7506 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
7507 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = Some(Vec::new());
7508 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7509 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
7510 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7511 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
7512 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7513 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
7514 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7515 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
7516 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7517 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
7519 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
7520 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7523 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
7524 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7527 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
7528 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
7531 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
7532 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
7533 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
7534 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
7535 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
7536 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
7538 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
7540 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
7541 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
7542 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
7546 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
7547 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
7548 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
7549 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
7550 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
7551 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
7552 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
7554 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7555 if id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
7556 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
7557 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
7558 if path.is_empty() {
7559 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
7560 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7563 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
7564 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
7565 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
7566 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
7567 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7568 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
7569 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
7570 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
7572 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7573 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
7574 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
7575 retry_strategy: None,
7576 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
7577 payment_params: None,
7578 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
7579 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
7581 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
7582 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
7583 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
7584 total_msat: path_amt,
7585 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
7587 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
7588 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
7593 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7595 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
7596 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
7597 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
7598 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
7600 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
7601 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
7602 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
7603 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
7604 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
7605 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
7606 forwards.retain(|forward| {
7607 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
7608 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7609 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7610 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7615 !forwards.is_empty()
7617 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
7618 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7619 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7620 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7621 pending_events_read.retain(|event| {
7622 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
7623 intercepted_id != ev_id
7630 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
7631 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
7632 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
7633 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
7634 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
7635 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
7636 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
7637 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
7638 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
7639 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
7640 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
7641 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv, path, false, &pending_events, &args.logger);
7642 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
7651 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
7652 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
7653 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
7654 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
7655 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
7656 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
7657 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7658 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
7662 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
7663 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
7665 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
7666 if let Some(mut purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
7667 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
7668 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7670 for (purpose, (payment_hash, previous_hops)) in purposes.drain(..).zip(claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..)) {
7671 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7674 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
7675 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
7676 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
7677 if previous_hops.is_empty() {
7678 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7680 let purpose = match &previous_hops[0].onion_payload {
7681 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
7682 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
7683 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
7684 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
7685 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
7686 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
7687 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
7689 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7690 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7694 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
7696 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7698 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
7699 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
7701 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7705 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7706 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7708 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
7710 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7712 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
7713 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
7714 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
7715 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7719 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
7720 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
7721 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7722 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7723 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7724 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
7725 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
7727 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
7728 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
7729 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
7731 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7732 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
7733 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7734 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7735 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7736 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7738 if chan.is_usable() {
7739 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
7740 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7741 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7742 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7743 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7749 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
7751 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7752 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
7753 if let Some((payment_purpose, claimable_htlcs)) = claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
7754 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7755 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
7756 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
7757 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
7758 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
7759 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
7760 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
7761 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
7763 for claimable_htlc in claimable_htlcs {
7764 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
7766 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
7767 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
7768 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
7769 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
7771 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
7772 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
7773 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
7774 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
7776 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
7777 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
7778 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
7779 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
7781 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
7782 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
7783 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
7784 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7785 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7786 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
7787 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
7790 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
7791 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
7794 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
7797 purpose: payment_purpose,
7798 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
7804 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
7805 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get_mut(&node_id) {
7806 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
7808 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
7809 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7813 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
7815 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
7816 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
7817 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
7818 router: args.router,
7820 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
7822 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
7823 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
7824 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
7825 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
7827 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
7828 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
7829 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
7830 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
7831 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
7832 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
7834 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
7839 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
7841 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
7843 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
7844 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
7845 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
7846 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
7848 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
7849 node_signer: args.node_signer,
7850 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
7852 logger: args.logger,
7853 default_configuration: args.default_config,
7856 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7857 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
7858 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
7859 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7860 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7863 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
7864 //connection or two.
7866 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
7872 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7873 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7874 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
7875 use core::time::Duration;
7876 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
7877 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
7878 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
7879 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, InterceptId};
7880 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7881 use crate::ln::msgs;
7882 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
7883 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
7884 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7885 use crate::util::test_utils;
7886 use crate::util::config::ChannelConfig;
7887 use crate::chain::keysinterface::EntropySource;
7890 fn test_notify_limits() {
7891 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
7892 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
7893 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7894 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7895 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7896 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7898 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
7899 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
7900 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7901 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7902 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7904 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7906 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
7907 // to connect messages with new values
7908 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7909 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7910 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
7911 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
7912 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
7913 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
7915 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
7916 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7917 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7918 // ... but the last node should not.
7919 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7920 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
7921 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7922 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7924 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
7925 // about the channel.
7926 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7927 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7928 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7930 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
7932 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7933 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7934 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7935 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7936 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7937 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7939 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
7940 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7941 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7943 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
7944 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
7945 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
7946 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
7947 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
7948 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
7950 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
7951 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
7952 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7953 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7954 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7955 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7956 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7957 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7959 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
7960 // the channel info has updated.
7961 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7962 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7963 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7964 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7965 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7966 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7970 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
7971 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
7973 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7974 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7975 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7976 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7977 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7979 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
7980 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7981 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
7982 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
7984 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
7985 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
7986 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
7987 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
7988 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
7989 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
7990 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7991 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7992 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7993 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
7995 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
7996 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7997 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7998 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7999 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8000 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8001 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8002 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8003 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8004 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8005 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8006 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
8007 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8008 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8009 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8010 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8011 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8012 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8013 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8014 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8015 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8016 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8018 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
8019 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
8020 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8021 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8022 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8023 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
8025 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
8026 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
8027 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
8028 // lightning messages manually.
8029 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8030 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
8031 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8033 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8034 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8035 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
8036 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8037 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8038 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
8039 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8040 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8041 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
8042 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8043 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8044 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8045 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8046 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8047 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8048 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
8049 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8050 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8051 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
8052 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8053 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8054 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8055 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8056 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
8057 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8059 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
8060 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
8061 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8062 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
8064 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
8065 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
8066 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
8067 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
8069 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8072 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8073 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8074 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8075 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8077 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8080 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8081 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8082 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8083 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8085 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8090 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
8091 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
8092 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
8093 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
8094 // fails as expected.
8095 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8096 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8097 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8098 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8099 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8100 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8101 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8103 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
8104 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
8105 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
8107 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
8108 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8109 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV),
8110 final_value_msat: 100_000,
8112 let route = find_route(
8113 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8114 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8116 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8117 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8118 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8119 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8120 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8121 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8122 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8123 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8124 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8125 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
8126 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
8127 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8128 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8129 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8130 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8131 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8132 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8133 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8134 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8135 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8136 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8137 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8138 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8140 // Finally, claim the original payment.
8141 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8143 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
8144 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8145 let route = find_route(
8146 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8147 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8149 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8150 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8151 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8152 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8153 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
8154 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
8155 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
8157 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
8158 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8159 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8160 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8161 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8162 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8163 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8164 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8165 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8166 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8167 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8168 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8169 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8170 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8171 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8172 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8173 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8174 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8175 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8176 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8177 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8178 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8179 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8181 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
8182 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8186 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
8187 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
8188 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
8189 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8190 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8191 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8192 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8194 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8195 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8197 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8198 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8199 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8200 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8202 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8203 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8204 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8205 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8206 let route = find_route(
8207 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8208 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8211 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8212 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
8213 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash, None, PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8214 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8215 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8217 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8218 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8219 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8220 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8221 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8222 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8223 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8225 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
8229 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
8230 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
8231 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8232 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8233 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8234 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8236 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8237 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8239 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8240 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8241 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8242 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8244 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8245 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8246 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8247 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8248 let route = find_route(
8249 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8250 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8253 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8254 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8255 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
8256 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, Some(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8257 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8258 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8260 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8261 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8262 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8263 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8264 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8265 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8266 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8268 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
8272 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
8273 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8274 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8275 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8276 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8278 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8279 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8280 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8281 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8283 // Marshall an MPP route.
8284 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8285 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8286 route.paths.push(path);
8287 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8288 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8289 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8290 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8291 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8292 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8294 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None, PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap_err() {
8295 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
8296 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
8298 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
8303 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
8304 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8305 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8306 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8307 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8309 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8311 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8312 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8314 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8315 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8316 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8317 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8320 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
8321 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
8322 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8323 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
8324 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
8325 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
8328 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
8331 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
8332 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
8337 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
8338 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
8339 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8340 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8341 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8342 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8344 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
8345 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
8347 total_msat: 100_000,
8350 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
8351 // payment verification fails as expected.
8352 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
8353 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
8354 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
8355 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
8357 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
8361 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
8362 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
8366 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
8367 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
8368 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
8369 // the channel is successfully closed.
8370 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8371 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8372 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8373 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8375 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8376 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8377 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
8378 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8379 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
8381 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
8382 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
8384 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
8385 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
8386 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8387 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8390 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8392 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8393 // as it has the funding transaction.
8394 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8395 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8396 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8399 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8401 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8403 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8405 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8406 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8407 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8411 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8412 // as it has the funding transaction.
8413 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8414 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8415 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8417 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8418 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8419 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8420 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8421 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8422 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8423 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
8425 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8426 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8427 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8428 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
8430 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8431 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
8433 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
8434 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
8435 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
8436 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
8437 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8438 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8439 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8443 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
8444 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
8445 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
8446 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
8447 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8448 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8449 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8452 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8454 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
8455 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
8456 // closing transaction).
8457 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
8458 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
8459 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8461 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
8462 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
8463 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8464 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8465 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8468 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8470 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
8472 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
8473 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
8474 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8476 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8478 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8479 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8482 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8483 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
8484 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8487 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8488 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
8489 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8492 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
8494 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8495 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8497 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
8498 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8500 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
8501 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8506 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
8507 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
8508 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
8509 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
8510 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8511 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
8512 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
8513 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
8516 let channel_id = [4; 32];
8517 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8518 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
8520 // Test the API functions.
8521 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
8523 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
8525 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8527 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8529 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8531 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
8533 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
8537 fn test_connection_limiting() {
8538 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
8539 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8540 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8541 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8542 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8544 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8546 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8547 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8549 let mut funding_tx = None;
8550 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
8551 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8552 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8555 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
8556 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
8557 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
8558 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
8559 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8561 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8562 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8563 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8565 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8566 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8568 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8571 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
8572 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8573 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8574 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8575 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8577 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
8578 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
8580 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
8581 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
8582 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8583 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8584 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
8585 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8586 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8588 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8589 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8590 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8591 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err();
8593 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
8594 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
8595 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8596 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8597 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
8598 for ev in chan_closed_events {
8599 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
8601 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8602 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8603 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8604 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err();
8606 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
8607 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8608 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
8609 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8611 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
8612 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
8614 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
8615 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
8616 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
8617 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
8618 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8620 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8621 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
8622 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8624 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
8625 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8626 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
8628 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
8629 // "protected" and can connect again.
8630 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
8631 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8632 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8633 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8635 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
8637 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8638 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
8642 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
8643 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
8644 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8645 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8646 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8647 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8649 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8651 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8652 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8654 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
8655 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8656 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8657 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8660 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
8662 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8663 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8664 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8666 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
8667 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8668 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8670 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
8671 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8672 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8673 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8677 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
8678 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
8679 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
8680 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8681 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8682 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
8683 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8684 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
8685 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8687 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8689 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8690 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8692 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
8693 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
8694 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8695 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8696 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8697 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8699 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8700 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8702 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8703 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
8705 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8707 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
8708 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8711 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
8712 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8713 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8714 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8715 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8716 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8717 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8719 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8720 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
8721 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
8722 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
8726 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8728 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
8729 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8731 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
8732 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8733 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8735 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8736 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
8738 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8740 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
8745 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
8746 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
8747 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
8748 // the channel without the anchors feature.
8749 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8750 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8751 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
8752 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8753 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8754 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
8755 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8757 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
8758 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8759 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8761 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8762 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8764 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8765 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8767 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8770 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8771 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
8773 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8774 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8776 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8780 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
8782 use crate::chain::Listen;
8783 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
8784 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
8785 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
8786 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId};
8787 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
8788 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
8789 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
8790 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
8791 use crate::util::test_utils;
8792 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
8794 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8795 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8796 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
8798 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
8802 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
8803 node: &'a ChannelManager<
8804 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
8805 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
8806 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
8807 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
8808 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
8809 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>,
8814 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
8815 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
8818 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
8819 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
8820 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
8822 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
8824 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
8825 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
8826 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8827 let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
8828 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
8830 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
8831 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
8833 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
8834 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
8835 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
8836 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8838 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
8840 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
8842 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8843 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
8844 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
8845 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
8846 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8848 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
8850 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
8852 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_b.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8853 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_a.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
8854 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8855 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8856 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8859 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
8860 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8861 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
8863 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8864 } else { panic!(); }
8866 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8867 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8869 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
8872 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8875 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
8876 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
8878 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8879 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8880 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
8881 match msg_events[0] {
8882 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
8883 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
8884 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8888 match msg_events[1] {
8889 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8893 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8894 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
8896 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8897 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
8899 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8902 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8903 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
8905 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8906 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8908 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8911 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a);
8913 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
8914 macro_rules! send_payment {
8915 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
8916 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
8917 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
8918 .with_features($node_b.invoice_features());
8919 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8920 let seed = [3u8; 32];
8921 let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42);
8922 let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8923 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph.read_only(),
8924 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
8926 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
8927 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
8929 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
8930 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
8932 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8933 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
8934 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8935 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
8936 let (raa, cs) = do_get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
8937 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8938 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8939 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8941 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
8942 expect_payment_claimable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
8943 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8944 expect_payment_claimed!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
8946 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
8947 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
8948 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8949 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8950 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
8952 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
8955 let (raa, cs) = do_get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
8956 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8957 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8958 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8960 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
8965 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
8966 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);