1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::{genesis_block, ChainHash};
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
39 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
40 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
41 // construct one themselves.
42 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
43 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel};
44 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
45 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
46 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
47 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
48 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, Router};
49 use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters};
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
55 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment};
57 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
58 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, ChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
59 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
60 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
61 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
62 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
63 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
64 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
65 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
67 use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
70 use crate::prelude::*;
72 use core::cell::RefCell;
74 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
75 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
76 use core::time::Duration;
79 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
80 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
81 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
83 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
85 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
86 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
87 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
89 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
90 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
91 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
92 // before we forward it.
94 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
95 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
96 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
97 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
98 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
100 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
101 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
103 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
104 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
105 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
106 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
109 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
110 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
111 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
112 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
115 /// This was added in 0.0.116 and will break deserialization on downgrades.
116 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
117 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
118 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
119 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
123 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
124 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
125 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
126 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
127 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
129 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
130 /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
131 /// may overshoot this in either case)
132 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
133 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
134 /// The fee being skimmed off the top of this HTLC. If this is a forward, it'll be the fee we are
135 /// skimming. If we're receiving this HTLC, it's the fee that our counterparty skimmed.
136 pub(super) skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
139 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
140 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
141 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
142 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
145 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
146 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
147 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
148 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
149 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
152 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
153 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
155 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
156 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
157 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
160 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
161 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
163 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
164 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
167 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
168 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
171 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
175 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
176 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
177 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
178 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
179 short_channel_id: u64,
181 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
182 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
184 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
185 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
190 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
192 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
193 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
194 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
196 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
197 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
200 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
201 struct ClaimableHTLC {
202 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
204 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
206 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
207 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
208 sender_intended_value: u64,
209 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
211 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
212 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
213 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
214 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
216 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
217 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
220 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
222 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
223 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
224 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
226 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
227 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
232 impl Readable for PaymentId {
233 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
234 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
239 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
241 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
242 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
243 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
245 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
246 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
251 impl Readable for InterceptId {
252 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
253 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
258 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
259 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
260 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
261 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
262 OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
265 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
267 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
268 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
269 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
271 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
272 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
276 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
277 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
278 (0, short_channel_id, required),
279 (2, htlc_id, required),
281 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
282 (0, session_priv, required),
287 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
288 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
289 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
290 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
291 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
294 session_priv: SecretKey,
295 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
296 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
297 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
298 payment_id: PaymentId,
301 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
302 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
303 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
305 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
307 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
309 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
312 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
313 payment_id.hash(hasher);
314 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
320 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
322 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
323 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
324 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
325 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
326 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
327 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
331 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
332 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
333 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
334 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
335 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
336 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
338 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
344 struct ReceiveError {
350 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
351 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
353 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
354 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
355 pub enum FailureCode {
356 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
357 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
358 TemporaryNodeFailure = 0x2000 | 2,
359 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
360 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
361 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing = 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
362 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
363 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
364 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
365 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
366 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails = 0x4000 | 15,
369 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
370 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
371 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
372 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
373 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
375 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
376 err: msgs::LightningError,
377 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
378 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
380 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
382 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
384 err: LightningError {
386 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
387 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
394 shutdown_finish: None,
398 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
399 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
402 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
404 err: LightningError {
406 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
407 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
413 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
414 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
418 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
421 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
423 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
424 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
428 log_level: Level::Warn,
431 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
433 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
435 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
437 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
438 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
446 shutdown_finish: None,
451 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
452 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
453 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
454 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
455 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
457 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
458 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
459 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
460 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
461 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
462 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
463 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
465 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
469 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
470 struct ClaimingPayment {
472 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
473 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
475 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
476 (0, amount_msat, required),
477 (2, payment_purpose, required),
478 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
481 struct ClaimablePayment {
482 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
483 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
484 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
487 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
488 struct ClaimablePayments {
489 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
490 /// failed/claimed by the user.
492 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
493 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
495 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
496 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
497 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
499 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
500 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
501 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
502 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
505 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
506 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
507 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
508 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
509 enum BackgroundEvent {
510 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel. This is only separated from
511 /// [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the maybe-non-closing variant needs a public
512 /// key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the channel has been force-closed we do not
513 /// need the counterparty node_id.
515 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
516 /// are regenerated on startup.
517 ClosingMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
518 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
519 /// channel to continue normal operation.
521 /// In general this should be used rather than
522 /// [`Self::ClosingMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
523 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
524 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
526 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
527 /// are regenerated on startup.
528 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
529 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
530 funding_txo: OutPoint,
531 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
536 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
537 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
538 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
539 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
540 /// event can be generated.
541 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
542 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
543 /// operation of another channel.
545 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
546 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
547 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
548 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
550 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
551 event: events::Event,
552 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
556 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
557 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
558 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
559 (0, event, upgradable_required),
560 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
561 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
562 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
563 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
564 // downgrades to prior versions.
565 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
569 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
570 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
571 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
572 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
573 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
576 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
577 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
578 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
579 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
583 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
584 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
585 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
586 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
587 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
588 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
590 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
591 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
592 channel_id: [u8; 32],
593 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
598 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
600 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
601 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
602 channel_id: prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
603 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
608 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
609 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
613 /// State we hold per-peer.
614 pub(super) struct PeerState<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
615 /// `channel_id` -> `Channel`.
617 /// Holds all funded channels where the peer is the counterparty.
618 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
619 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `OutboundV1Channel`.
621 /// Holds all outbound V1 channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once an outbound channel has
622 /// been assigned a `channel_id`, the entry in this map is removed and one is created in
624 pub(super) outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], OutboundV1Channel<Signer>>,
625 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundV1Channel`.
627 /// Holds all inbound V1 channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once an inbound channel has
628 /// been assigned a `channel_id`, the entry in this map is removed and one is created in
630 pub(super) inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], InboundV1Channel<Signer>>,
631 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
632 latest_features: InitFeatures,
633 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
634 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
635 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
636 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
637 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
639 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
640 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
641 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
642 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
644 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
645 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
646 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
647 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
648 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
649 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
650 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
651 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
652 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
653 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
654 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
655 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
656 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
657 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
658 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
662 impl <Signer: ChannelSigner> PeerState<Signer> {
663 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
664 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
665 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
666 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
667 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
670 self.channel_by_id.is_empty() && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
673 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including pending channels.
674 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
675 self.channel_by_id.len() +
676 self.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.len() +
677 self.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.len()
680 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
681 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> bool {
682 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
683 self.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
684 self.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
688 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
689 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
691 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
694 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
695 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
696 struct PendingInboundPayment {
697 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
698 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
699 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
700 /// this payment being removed.
702 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
703 user_payment_id: u64,
704 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
705 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
706 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
709 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
710 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
711 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
712 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
713 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
714 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
715 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
716 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
718 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
719 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
727 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
729 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
730 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
731 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
736 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
737 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
738 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
739 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
740 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
741 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
742 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
743 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
744 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
746 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
747 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e DefaultRouter<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L, &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters, ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>, &'g L>;
749 macro_rules! define_test_pub_trait { ($vis: vis) => {
750 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`] used in testing.
751 $vis trait AChannelManager {
752 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
753 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
754 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
755 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
756 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
757 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
758 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
759 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
760 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
761 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<Signer = Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
762 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
763 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
764 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
765 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
766 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
767 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
768 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
769 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
772 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
773 define_test_pub_trait!(pub);
774 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
775 define_test_pub_trait!(pub(crate));
776 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
777 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
779 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
780 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
781 ES::Target: EntropySource,
782 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
783 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
784 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
788 type Watch = M::Target;
790 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
792 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
794 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
796 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer;
797 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
799 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
801 type Router = R::Target;
803 type Logger = L::Target;
805 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
808 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
809 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
811 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
812 /// to individual Channels.
814 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
815 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
816 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
817 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
819 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
820 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
821 /// returning from [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`], with ChannelManagers, writing updates
822 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during
823 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
824 /// [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the
825 /// `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
827 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
828 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
829 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
831 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
832 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
833 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
834 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
835 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
837 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
838 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
839 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
840 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
842 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
843 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
844 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
846 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
847 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
848 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
849 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
850 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
852 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
853 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
854 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
855 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
856 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
857 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
858 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
859 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
862 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
863 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
864 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
865 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
866 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
870 // `total_consistency_lock`
872 // |__`forward_htlcs`
874 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
876 // |__`per_peer_state`
878 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
880 // | |__`claimable_payments`
882 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
888 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
890 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
894 // | |__`pending_events`
896 // | |__`pending_background_events`
898 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
900 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
901 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
902 ES::Target: EntropySource,
903 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
904 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
905 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
909 default_configuration: UserConfig,
910 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
911 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
917 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
919 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
921 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
922 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
924 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
925 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
926 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
927 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
929 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
930 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
932 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
933 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
934 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
935 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
936 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
937 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
938 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
939 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
941 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
943 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
944 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
946 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
948 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
949 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
950 /// and via the classic SCID.
952 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
953 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
955 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
957 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
959 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
960 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
961 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
963 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
964 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
966 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
967 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
969 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
970 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
972 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
973 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
974 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
975 /// active channel list on load.
977 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
978 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
980 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
982 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
983 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
984 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
986 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
987 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
988 /// the handling of the events.
990 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
991 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
994 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
995 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
996 /// would break backwards compatability.
997 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
998 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
999 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1001 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1002 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
1004 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1006 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1007 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1008 /// confirmation depth.
1010 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1011 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1012 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1014 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1016 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
1018 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
1020 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1022 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1024 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1025 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1026 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1028 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1029 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1031 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1032 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1033 /// keeping additional state.
1034 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1036 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1037 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1038 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1039 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1041 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1042 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1044 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1045 /// are currently open with that peer.
1047 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1048 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1051 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1053 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1054 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1055 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
1056 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1057 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
1059 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1060 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1061 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1062 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1063 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1065 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1066 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1068 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1069 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1070 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1071 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1073 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1074 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1075 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1076 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1077 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1079 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1081 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1083 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1084 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1085 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1086 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1087 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1088 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1089 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1090 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1091 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1093 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1094 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1096 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
1100 signer_provider: SP,
1105 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1107 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1108 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1109 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1110 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1111 pub struct ChainParameters {
1112 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1113 pub network: Network,
1115 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1117 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1118 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1121 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1128 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1129 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1130 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1131 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1132 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1133 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1135 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1136 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1137 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1138 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1139 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1141 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1142 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1145 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1146 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1147 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1148 let _ = cm.get_cm().process_background_events(); // We always persist
1150 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1151 persistence_notifier: &cm.get_cm().persistence_notifier,
1152 should_persist: || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist },
1153 _read_guard: read_guard,
1158 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1159 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first.
1160 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1161 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
1163 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1164 persistence_notifier: notifier,
1165 should_persist: persist_check,
1166 _read_guard: read_guard,
1171 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1172 fn drop(&mut self) {
1173 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1174 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1179 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1180 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1182 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1184 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1185 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1186 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1187 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1188 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1190 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1191 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1193 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1195 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1196 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1197 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1198 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1199 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1200 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1201 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1202 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1203 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1204 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1205 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1206 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1207 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1209 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1210 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1212 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1213 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1214 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1215 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1217 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1218 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1219 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1220 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1221 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1222 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1225 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1227 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1228 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1231 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1233 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1234 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1236 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
1237 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
1238 /// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
1239 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
1241 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1242 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1243 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1245 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1246 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1247 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1249 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1250 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1251 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1252 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1254 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1255 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1256 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1258 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1259 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1260 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1262 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1263 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1264 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1265 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1266 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1267 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1268 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1269 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1270 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1271 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1272 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1275 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1276 /// to better separate parameters.
1277 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1278 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1279 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1280 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1281 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1282 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1283 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1284 pub features: InitFeatures,
1285 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1286 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1287 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1289 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1291 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1292 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1293 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1294 /// payments to us through this channel.
1295 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1296 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1297 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1298 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1299 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1300 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1301 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1304 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1305 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1306 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1307 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1308 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1309 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1310 /// lifetime of the channel.
1311 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1312 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1313 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1314 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1315 /// our counterparty already.
1317 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1318 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1319 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1320 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1322 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1323 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1324 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1325 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1327 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1328 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1330 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1331 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1333 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1334 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1335 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1336 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1337 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1338 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1339 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1340 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1341 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1344 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1346 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1347 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1348 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1349 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1350 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1351 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1352 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1354 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1355 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1357 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1358 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1359 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1360 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1361 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1362 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1363 /// this value on chain.
1365 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1367 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1369 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1370 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1371 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1372 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1374 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1375 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1376 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1378 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1379 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1380 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1381 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1382 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1384 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1385 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1386 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1387 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1389 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1390 pub balance_msat: u64,
1391 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1392 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1393 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1394 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1396 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1398 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1399 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1400 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1401 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1402 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1403 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1404 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1405 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1407 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
1408 /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1409 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1410 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1411 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1412 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1413 /// route which is valid.
1414 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1415 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1416 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1417 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1418 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1419 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1421 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1422 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1423 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1424 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1425 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1426 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1427 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1428 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1429 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1431 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1433 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1434 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1435 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1436 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1437 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1439 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1440 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1441 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1442 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1443 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1444 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1445 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1447 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1448 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1449 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1450 pub is_outbound: bool,
1451 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1452 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1453 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1454 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1455 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1457 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1458 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1459 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1460 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1462 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1463 pub is_usable: bool,
1464 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1465 pub is_public: bool,
1466 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1467 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1468 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1469 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1470 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1471 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1473 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1474 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1477 impl ChannelDetails {
1478 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1479 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1480 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1482 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1483 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1484 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1485 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1488 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1489 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1490 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1492 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1493 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1494 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1495 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1498 fn from_channel_context<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner>(context: &ChannelContext<Signer>,
1499 best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures) -> Self {
1501 let balance = context.get_available_balances();
1502 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1503 context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1505 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1506 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1507 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1508 features: latest_features,
1509 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1510 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1511 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1512 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1513 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1514 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1515 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1516 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1517 Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1518 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1520 funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1521 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1522 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1523 channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1524 short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1525 outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1526 inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1527 channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1528 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1529 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1530 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1531 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1532 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1533 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1534 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1535 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1536 confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1537 confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1538 force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1539 is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1540 is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1541 is_usable: context.is_live(),
1542 is_public: context.should_announce(),
1543 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1544 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1545 config: Some(context.config()),
1550 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1551 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1552 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1553 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1554 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1556 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1558 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1559 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1560 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1563 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1564 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1565 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1567 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1568 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1569 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1571 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1572 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1573 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1575 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1576 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1580 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1582 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1584 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1585 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1586 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1587 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1589 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1590 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1591 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1594 macro_rules! handle_error {
1595 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1596 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1597 // entering the macro.
1598 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1599 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1603 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1604 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1606 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1607 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1608 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1609 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1613 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1614 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1615 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1616 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1621 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1622 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1624 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1625 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1626 action: err.action.clone()
1630 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1631 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1632 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1633 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1634 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1638 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1643 ($self: ident, $internal: expr) => {
1646 Err((chan, msg_handle_err)) => {
1647 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1648 handle_error!($self, Err(msg_handle_err), counterparty_node_id).map_err(|err| (chan, err))
1654 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1655 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
1656 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.channel_id());
1657 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1658 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
1659 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1661 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1662 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1663 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1664 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1665 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1667 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1668 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1670 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1674 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1675 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1676 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1678 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1679 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1681 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1682 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1684 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1685 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1686 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$channel.context);
1687 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
1688 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1689 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1693 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_context: expr, $channel_id: expr, PREFUNDED) => {
1695 // We should only ever have `ChannelError::Close` when prefunded channels error.
1696 // In any case, just close the channel.
1697 ChannelError::Warn(msg) | ChannelError::Ignore(msg) | ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1698 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing prefunded channel {} due to an error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1699 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$channel_context);
1700 let shutdown_res = $channel_context.force_shutdown(false);
1701 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel_context.get_user_id(),
1702 shutdown_res, None))
1708 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1709 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1713 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1715 $entry.remove_entry();
1723 macro_rules! try_v1_outbound_chan_entry {
1724 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1728 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut().context, $entry.key(), PREFUNDED);
1730 $entry.remove_entry();
1738 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1739 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1743 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1745 $entry.remove_entry();
1753 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1754 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1756 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1757 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context);
1763 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1764 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1765 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1766 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1767 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1769 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1770 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1771 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1772 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
1773 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
1774 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1775 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
1776 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
1777 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
1778 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1783 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
1784 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1785 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
1786 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
1787 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
1788 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
1789 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1790 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1791 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1793 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
1798 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1799 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1800 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1801 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
1802 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
1803 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
1804 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1805 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1806 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
1808 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1813 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
1814 ($self: ident, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
1815 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
1816 &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
1817 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
1818 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
1819 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
1820 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
1821 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
1822 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
1823 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
1825 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
1826 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
1827 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1833 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
1834 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
1836 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
1837 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
1838 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
1839 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
1840 updates.announcement_sigs);
1841 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
1842 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
1845 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
1846 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
1847 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
1849 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
1851 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1852 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1854 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
1855 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1856 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1857 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
1862 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
1863 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING, $remove: expr) => { {
1864 // update_maps_on_chan_removal needs to be able to take id_to_peer, so make sure we can in
1865 // any case so that it won't deadlock.
1866 debug_assert_ne!($self.id_to_peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1867 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
1868 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
1871 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1872 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
1873 log_bytes!($chan.context.channel_id()[..]));
1876 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1877 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure",
1878 log_bytes!($chan.context.channel_id()[..]));
1879 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$chan.context);
1880 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(
1881 "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.context.channel_id(),
1882 $chan.context.get_user_id(), $chan.context.force_shutdown(false),
1883 $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok()));
1887 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1888 $chan.complete_one_mon_update($update_id);
1889 if $chan.no_monitor_updates_pending() {
1890 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
1896 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr) => {
1897 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
1901 macro_rules! process_events_body {
1902 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
1903 let mut processed_all_events = false;
1904 while !processed_all_events {
1905 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
1909 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
1912 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
1913 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
1914 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1916 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
1917 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
1918 if $self.process_background_events() == NotifyOption::DoPersist { result = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
1920 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
1921 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
1922 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
1923 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
1927 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
1928 let num_events = pending_events.len();
1929 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
1930 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
1933 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
1935 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
1936 $event_to_handle = event;
1938 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
1939 post_event_actions.push(action);
1944 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1945 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
1946 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
1947 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
1950 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
1951 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
1952 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
1953 processed_all_events = false;
1956 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1957 $self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1963 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1965 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1966 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1967 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1968 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1969 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1970 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1974 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
1976 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1977 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
1979 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1981 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
1982 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
1983 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
1986 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
1987 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
1988 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
1989 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1990 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1991 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1992 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1993 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1995 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1996 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1997 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2002 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2004 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
2005 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2006 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2007 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2008 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
2009 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2010 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2011 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2013 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2016 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2017 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2019 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2021 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
2023 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2025 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2026 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2027 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2028 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2029 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2030 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2031 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2041 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2042 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2043 &self.default_configuration
2046 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2047 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2048 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2051 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2052 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2054 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2056 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2060 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2065 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2067 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2068 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2069 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2070 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2071 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2073 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2074 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2076 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2077 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2078 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2080 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2081 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2082 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2084 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2085 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2086 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2087 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2088 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2089 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2091 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2092 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2093 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2094 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
2095 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2096 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2099 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2100 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2101 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2103 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2105 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2106 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2108 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2110 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2111 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2112 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2113 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2114 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2115 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
2119 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2124 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
2126 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2127 match peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2128 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2130 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2132 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2135 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
2138 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2139 node_id: their_network_key,
2142 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2145 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2146 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2147 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2148 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2149 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2150 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2151 // the same channel.
2152 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2154 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2155 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2156 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2157 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2158 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2159 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
2160 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2161 peer_state.latest_features.clone());
2169 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2170 /// more information.
2171 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2172 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2173 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2174 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2175 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2176 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2177 // the same channel.
2178 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2180 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2181 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2182 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2183 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2184 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2185 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
2186 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2187 peer_state.latest_features.clone());
2190 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter() {
2191 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2192 peer_state.latest_features.clone());
2195 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter() {
2196 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2197 peer_state.latest_features.clone());
2205 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2206 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2208 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2209 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2211 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2212 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2213 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2214 // really wanted anyway.
2215 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2218 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2219 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2220 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2221 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2223 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2224 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2225 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2226 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2227 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2230 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height, features.clone()))
2236 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2237 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2239 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2240 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2241 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2243 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2244 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2245 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2246 .filter_map(|(_, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2247 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2248 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2249 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2250 total_msat: *total_msat,
2253 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2254 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2256 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2257 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2259 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2264 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
2265 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, context: &ChannelContext<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
2266 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2267 match context.unbroadcasted_funding() {
2268 Some(transaction) => {
2269 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2270 channel_id: context.channel_id(), transaction
2275 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2276 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
2277 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
2278 reason: closure_reason
2282 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2283 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2285 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
2286 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
2287 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2289 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2290 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2292 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2293 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2294 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2295 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2296 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().context.get_funding_txo();
2297 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2298 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut()
2299 .get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2300 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2302 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2303 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2304 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2305 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2306 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2310 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2311 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2312 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2313 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
2314 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
2317 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2318 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
2319 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
2320 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2324 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2328 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id) })
2332 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2333 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2334 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2335 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2338 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
2342 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2343 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2344 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2346 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
2347 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2349 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2350 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
2351 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2352 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2354 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2356 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2357 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2358 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2361 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2362 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2363 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2364 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2365 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2366 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2369 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2370 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2371 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2373 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2374 /// the channel being closed or not:
2375 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2376 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2377 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2378 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2379 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2380 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2381 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2383 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2384 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2385 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2386 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2388 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2390 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2391 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2392 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2395 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2396 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2397 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2398 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2399 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2400 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2404 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2405 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
2406 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2407 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2408 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2409 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2410 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2411 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2413 if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2414 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2415 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2416 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2417 // ignore the result here.
2418 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2422 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2423 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2424 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2425 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2426 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2427 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2428 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2429 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2430 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2431 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2432 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2433 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2435 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2437 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2438 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2439 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, closure_reason);
2440 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan);
2441 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2442 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2443 } else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2444 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2445 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, closure_reason);
2446 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan);
2447 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
2448 // Prefunded channel has no update
2449 (None, chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2450 } else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2451 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2452 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, closure_reason);
2453 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan);
2454 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
2455 // Prefunded channel has no update
2456 (None, chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2458 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) });
2461 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
2462 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2463 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2468 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
2471 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2472 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2473 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2474 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2475 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2476 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2477 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2478 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2479 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2480 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2481 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2482 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2493 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2494 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2495 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2497 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2498 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2499 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2502 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2503 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2504 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2506 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2507 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2508 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2509 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2510 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2513 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2514 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2515 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2516 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2517 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2521 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2522 /// local transaction(s).
2523 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2524 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2525 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2529 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(
2530 &self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32], payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2531 amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>, allow_underpay: bool,
2532 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
2533 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError> {
2534 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2535 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
2536 return Err(ReceiveError {
2537 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
2539 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2542 // final_expiry_too_soon
2543 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2544 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2546 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2547 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2548 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2549 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2550 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2551 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2552 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2553 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2554 return Err(ReceiveError {
2555 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2556 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2559 if (!allow_underpay && hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat) ||
2560 (allow_underpay && hop_data.amt_to_forward >
2561 amt_msat.saturating_add(counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)))
2563 return Err(ReceiveError {
2565 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2566 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2570 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2571 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2572 return Err(ReceiveError {
2573 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2574 err_data: Vec::new(),
2575 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2578 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage, payment_metadata } => {
2579 if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2580 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2581 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2582 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2583 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2584 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2585 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2586 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2587 return Err(ReceiveError {
2588 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2589 err_data: Vec::new(),
2590 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2593 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && payment_data.is_some() {
2594 return Err(ReceiveError {
2595 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2596 err_data: Vec::new(),
2597 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2600 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2604 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2606 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2607 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2610 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2611 phantom_shared_secret,
2614 return Err(ReceiveError {
2615 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2616 err_data: Vec::new(),
2617 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2622 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2625 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2626 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2627 outgoing_amt_msat: hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2628 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2629 skimmed_fee_msat: counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
2633 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
2634 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC
2635 ) -> Result<(onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg> {
2636 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2637 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2639 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2640 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2641 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2642 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2643 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2644 failure_code: $err_code,
2650 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2651 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2654 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
2655 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
2656 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2658 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2659 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2660 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2661 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2662 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2663 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2664 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2665 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2667 macro_rules! return_err {
2668 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2670 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2671 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2672 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2673 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2674 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2675 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2681 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2683 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2684 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2686 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2687 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2690 let (outgoing_scid, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, next_packet_pk_opt) = match next_hop {
2691 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
2692 next_hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData {
2693 format: msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id }, amt_to_forward,
2694 outgoing_cltv_value,
2697 let next_pk = onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx,
2698 msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &shared_secret);
2699 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(next_pk))
2701 // We'll do receive checks in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] so we have access to the
2702 // inbound channel's state.
2703 onion_utils::Hop::Receive { .. } => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
2704 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
2705 next_hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData { format: msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. }, .. }, ..
2707 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0; 0]);
2711 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
2712 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
2713 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2714 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
2715 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2716 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2717 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2718 // phantom or an intercept.
2719 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2720 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2721 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.genesis_hash)
2725 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2728 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2730 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2731 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2732 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2733 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
2734 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2736 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2737 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2738 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2740 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
2741 // have no consistency guarantees.
2742 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2746 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2747 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2748 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2749 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2750 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2752 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
2753 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2754 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2755 // we don't have the channel here.
2756 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2758 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
2760 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2761 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2762 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2763 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2764 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2765 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2766 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
2767 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
2768 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
2769 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
2770 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2772 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
2775 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2776 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2778 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
2779 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2783 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
2784 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
2785 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
2786 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
2788 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2795 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2796 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2797 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2798 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2799 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2800 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2802 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2803 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2805 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2806 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2807 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2808 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2809 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2810 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2811 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2812 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2813 if (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2814 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2820 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2821 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2822 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2823 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2825 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2826 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2828 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2829 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2830 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2832 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2833 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2834 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2835 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
2836 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
2837 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
2838 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
2842 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2844 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt))
2847 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
2848 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, shared_secret: [u8; 32], decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop,
2849 allow_underpay: bool, next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
2850 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2851 macro_rules! return_err {
2852 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2854 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2855 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2856 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2857 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2858 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2859 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2865 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2867 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
2868 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat)
2871 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2872 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2873 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2874 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2875 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2877 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2880 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2881 debug_assert!(next_packet_pubkey_opt.is_some());
2882 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2884 public_key: next_packet_pubkey_opt.unwrap_or(Err(secp256k1::Error::InvalidPublicKey)),
2885 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2886 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2889 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2890 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2891 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2892 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2896 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2897 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2898 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2901 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2902 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2903 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2904 outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2905 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2906 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
2912 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2913 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2914 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2916 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
2917 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
2918 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2920 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2921 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
2922 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2923 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
2924 return Err(LightningError {
2925 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2926 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2929 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2930 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2932 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()));
2933 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2936 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2937 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
2938 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2939 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2941 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
2942 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
2943 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2945 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2946 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
2947 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2948 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()));
2949 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2950 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2954 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2957 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2958 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()));
2959 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2961 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
2962 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
2963 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
2964 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
2965 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
2968 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2969 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2971 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
2972 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
2973 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2974 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2975 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2976 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2977 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2978 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2980 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
2981 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
2982 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
2984 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
2986 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2993 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2994 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2995 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv_bytes)
2998 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2999 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3000 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3002 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3003 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3004 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3006 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
3007 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
3008 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
3010 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash)
3011 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute { err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()})?;
3013 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3014 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3015 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
3016 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3019 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3020 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3021 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3022 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3023 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3024 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3025 if !chan.get().context.is_live() {
3026 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3028 let funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3029 let send_res = chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3030 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3032 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3033 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3035 }, onion_packet, None, &self.logger);
3036 match break_chan_entry!(self, send_res, chan) {
3037 Some(monitor_update) => {
3038 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3039 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
3040 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3043 if update_res == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress {
3044 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3045 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3046 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3047 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3048 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3049 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3050 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3056 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3057 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3058 // `channel_by_id` map.
3059 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3060 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3065 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3066 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3068 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3073 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3075 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3076 /// fields for more info.
3078 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3079 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3081 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3083 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3084 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3085 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3086 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3087 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3089 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3090 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3091 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3092 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3093 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3095 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3096 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3097 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3098 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3100 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3102 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3103 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3104 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3106 /// In general, a path may raise:
3107 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3108 /// node public key) is specified.
3109 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
3110 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
3112 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3113 /// relevant updates.
3115 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3116 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3117 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3119 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3120 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3121 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3122 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3123 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3124 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3125 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3126 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3127 self.pending_outbound_payments
3128 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3129 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3130 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
3133 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3134 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3135 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3136 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3137 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3138 self.pending_outbound_payments
3139 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3140 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3141 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3142 &self.pending_events,
3143 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3144 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
3148 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3149 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3150 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3151 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3152 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3153 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
3157 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3158 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3159 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3163 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3164 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3168 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3169 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3170 /// retries are exhausted.
3172 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3173 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3175 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3176 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3177 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3179 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
3180 /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
3182 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3183 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3184 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3185 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3186 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3189 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3190 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3191 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3192 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3193 /// never reach the recipient.
3195 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3196 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3198 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3199 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3201 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3202 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3203 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3204 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3205 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3206 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3207 &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3208 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3209 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
3212 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3213 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3215 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3218 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3219 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3220 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3221 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3222 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3223 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3224 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3225 &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
3226 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3227 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
3230 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3231 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3232 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3233 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3234 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3235 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3236 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3237 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3238 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
3241 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3244 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3245 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3248 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3249 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3250 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&OutboundV1Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3251 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
3252 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3253 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3254 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3255 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3257 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3258 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3259 let (chan, msg) = match peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3261 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3263 let funding_res = chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
3264 .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3265 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3266 let user_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
3267 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
3268 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None))
3269 } else { unreachable!(); });
3271 Ok((chan, funding_msg)) => (chan, funding_msg),
3272 Err((chan, err)) => {
3273 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3274 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3276 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3277 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3278 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3284 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3286 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3287 log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3292 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3293 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3296 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3297 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3298 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3300 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3301 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3302 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.context.channel_id(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
3303 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
3312 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3313 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
3314 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3318 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3320 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3321 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3323 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3324 /// across the p2p network.
3326 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3327 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3329 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3330 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3331 /// keys per-channel).
3333 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3334 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3335 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3337 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3338 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3339 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3341 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3342 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3343 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3344 /// for more details.
3346 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3347 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3348 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3349 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3351 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3352 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3353 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3354 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3359 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3360 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3361 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3362 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3363 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3364 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 1 {
3365 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3366 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3370 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
3371 if tx.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3372 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3373 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3377 let mut output_index = None;
3378 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3379 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3380 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
3381 if output_index.is_some() {
3382 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3383 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3386 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3389 if output_index.is_none() {
3390 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3391 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3394 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
3398 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
3400 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3401 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3402 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3403 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3405 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3406 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3408 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3409 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3411 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3413 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3414 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3415 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3416 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3417 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3418 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3419 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3420 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
3421 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
3422 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3423 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
3424 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3425 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3429 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3430 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3431 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3432 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3433 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3434 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3435 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3436 if !peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) {
3437 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3438 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3442 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3443 let channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
3444 let mut config = channel.context.config();
3445 config.apply(config_update);
3446 if !channel.context.update_config(&config) {
3449 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3450 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3451 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3452 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3453 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3461 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
3463 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3464 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3465 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3466 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3468 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3469 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3471 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3472 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3474 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3476 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3477 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3478 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3479 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3480 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3481 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3482 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3483 pub fn update_channel_config(
3484 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
3485 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3486 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
3489 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
3490 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
3492 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
3493 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
3495 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
3496 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
3497 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
3498 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
3499 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
3501 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
3502 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
3503 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
3506 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3509 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
3510 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3511 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
3512 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
3513 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
3514 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3515 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3517 let next_hop_scid = {
3518 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3519 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
3520 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
3521 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3522 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3523 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
3525 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
3526 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3527 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
3530 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
3532 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3533 err: format!("Funded channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}. Channel may still be opening.",
3534 log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id)
3539 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3540 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3541 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3544 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
3545 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
3546 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
3548 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3550 let skimmed_fee_msat =
3551 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
3552 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
3553 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
3554 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
3557 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
3558 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3559 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3560 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
3561 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
3563 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
3567 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
3568 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
3570 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3573 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3574 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3575 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3577 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3578 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3579 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3582 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
3583 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3584 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3585 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3586 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
3587 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3588 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3591 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
3592 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
3593 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3594 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3599 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3601 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3602 /// Will likely generate further events.
3603 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3604 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3606 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
3607 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3608 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3610 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3611 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3613 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3614 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3615 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3617 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3618 match forward_info {
3619 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3620 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3621 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3622 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3623 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
3626 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3627 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3628 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3630 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3631 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3632 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3633 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3634 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3635 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3638 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3639 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3641 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3644 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3645 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3651 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3652 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3654 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3658 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3659 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3661 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3665 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3666 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3667 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3668 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3669 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3671 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3672 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3673 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3674 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3675 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3677 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3679 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3680 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3684 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3685 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
3686 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3687 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None)
3689 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3690 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3696 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3699 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3702 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3703 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3704 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3705 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3706 // problem, not ours.
3712 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3713 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3715 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3719 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3720 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3721 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3722 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3725 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3726 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3727 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3728 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3729 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3732 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3733 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3734 match forward_info {
3735 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3736 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
3737 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3738 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3739 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
3742 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3743 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3744 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3745 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3746 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3747 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3748 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3749 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3751 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
3752 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
3753 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, &self.logger)
3755 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3756 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3758 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3760 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3761 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3762 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3763 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3768 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3769 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3771 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3772 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3773 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
3774 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
3776 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3777 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3779 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
3781 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3782 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3783 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3792 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3793 match forward_info {
3794 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3795 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3796 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3797 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
3798 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
3801 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
3802 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3803 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3805 RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret), payment_metadata };
3806 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
3807 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
3809 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry } => {
3810 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
3811 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
3814 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
3815 payment_data, None, onion_fields)
3818 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3821 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3822 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3823 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3824 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3825 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3826 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3827 phantom_shared_secret,
3829 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
3830 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
3831 // if routing nodes overpay
3832 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
3833 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3835 total_value_received: None,
3836 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3839 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
3842 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
3844 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3845 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3846 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
3847 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3848 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3849 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
3851 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3852 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3853 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3854 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3855 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3856 phantom_shared_secret,
3858 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
3859 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3861 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
3864 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
3865 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3866 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3867 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3868 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3871 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3872 ($purpose: expr) => {{
3873 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
3874 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
3875 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
3876 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
3878 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3879 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3880 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3882 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
3883 .entry(payment_hash)
3884 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
3885 .or_insert_with(|| {
3886 committed_to_claimable = true;
3888 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
3891 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
3892 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
3893 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), log_keysend(!is_keysend));
3894 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3896 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
3897 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3898 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3900 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
3901 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
3902 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3905 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
3907 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
3908 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
3909 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
3910 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3911 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
3912 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
3913 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
3914 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3915 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3916 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3918 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3920 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
3921 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
3922 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
3923 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3924 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
3925 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
3926 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3927 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3928 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
3929 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
3930 committed_to_claimable = true;
3932 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3933 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3934 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
3935 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
3936 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
3937 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
3938 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
3939 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
3940 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3941 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3945 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
3946 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3947 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3948 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
3949 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
3951 payment_claimable_generated = true;
3953 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3954 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3956 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3957 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
3958 committed_to_claimable = true;
3961 payment_claimable_generated
3965 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3966 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3967 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3968 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3969 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3970 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3971 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3972 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3973 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3974 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3975 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3976 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3977 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3978 Ok(result) => result,
3980 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3981 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3984 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
3985 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
3986 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
3987 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
3988 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
3989 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3992 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3993 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3994 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
3996 check_total_value!(purpose);
3998 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3999 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4000 check_total_value!(purpose);
4004 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4005 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4006 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4007 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4009 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4010 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4011 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4012 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4013 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4014 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4015 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4016 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4018 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4019 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4020 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4022 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4023 if payment_claimable_generated {
4024 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4030 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4031 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4039 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4040 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4041 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4042 &self.pending_events, &self.logger,
4043 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
4044 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv));
4046 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4047 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4049 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4051 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4052 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4053 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4055 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4057 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4058 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4059 events.append(&mut new_events);
4062 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4064 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4065 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4066 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4068 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
4069 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4071 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4072 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4073 if background_events.is_empty() {
4074 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4077 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4079 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
4080 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4081 // monitor updating completing.
4082 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4084 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update } => {
4085 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4088 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4089 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4090 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4091 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4092 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4093 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4094 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update.update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
4096 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Ok(()),
4100 // TODO: If this channel has since closed, we're likely providing a payment
4101 // preimage update, which we must ensure is durable! We currently don't,
4102 // however, ensure that.
4104 log_error!(self.logger,
4105 "Failed to provide ChannelMonitorUpdate to closed channel! This likely lost us a payment preimage!");
4107 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4111 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4114 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4115 /// Process background events, for functional testing
4116 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4117 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4118 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4121 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4122 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
4123 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4124 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4125 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4126 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4127 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4129 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4130 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4131 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4132 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4134 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4135 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4137 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.logger);
4138 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4142 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4143 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4144 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4145 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4146 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4147 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4148 let mut should_persist = self.process_background_events();
4150 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4152 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4153 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4154 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4155 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4156 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
4157 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4158 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4166 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4168 /// This currently includes:
4169 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4170 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4171 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4173 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4174 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4175 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4177 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4178 /// estimate fetches.
4180 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4181 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4182 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4183 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4184 let mut should_persist = self.process_background_events();
4186 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4188 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4189 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4190 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4192 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4193 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4194 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4195 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4196 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4197 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4198 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
4199 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4200 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4202 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4203 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
4204 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
4205 if needs_close { return false; }
4208 match chan.channel_update_status() {
4209 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
4210 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
4211 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
4212 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
4213 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
4214 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
4215 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
4217 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4218 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
4219 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4220 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4224 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4226 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
4229 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
4231 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4232 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
4233 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4234 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4238 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4240 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
4246 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4248 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
4249 log_debug!(self.logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
4250 counterparty_node_id, log_bytes!(*chan_id));
4251 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4252 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4253 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
4254 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
4255 channel_id: *chan_id,
4256 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
4264 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
4265 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
4270 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
4271 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
4272 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
4273 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
4274 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
4275 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
4276 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
4277 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
4278 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4279 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
4280 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
4281 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
4282 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
4283 // have no channels to the peer.
4284 let remove_entry = {
4285 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
4286 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
4289 entry.remove_entry();
4292 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
4297 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
4298 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4299 // This should be unreachable
4300 debug_assert!(false);
4303 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
4304 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
4305 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
4306 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
4307 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
4308 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
4309 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
4312 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
4313 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
4314 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
4316 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
4317 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
4324 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
4325 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
4326 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
4327 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
4328 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4331 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4332 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4335 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self.pending_events);
4337 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
4338 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
4339 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
4340 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
4341 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4348 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
4349 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
4350 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
4352 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
4353 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
4354 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
4355 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
4357 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
4358 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
4359 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
4360 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
4361 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
4362 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
4365 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
4366 /// reason for the failure.
4368 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
4369 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
4370 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4372 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
4373 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
4374 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
4375 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
4376 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4377 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
4378 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4383 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
4384 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
4385 match failure_code {
4386 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
4387 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
4388 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
4389 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4390 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4391 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code as u16, htlc_msat_height_data)
4396 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4397 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4399 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
4401 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4402 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
4403 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
4404 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
4405 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
4406 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
4407 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
4409 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
4411 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
4412 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
4414 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4419 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4420 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4421 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4422 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
4423 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
4424 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
4425 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
4426 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
4427 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
4428 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4430 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4431 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4432 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4433 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
4435 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
4436 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
4437 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
4438 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
4439 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4443 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
4444 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
4445 // be surfaced to the user.
4446 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
4447 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
4448 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
4450 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
4451 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4452 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
4453 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4454 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4455 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
4456 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
4457 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
4459 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4461 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
4464 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
4465 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
4466 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
4467 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4471 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
4472 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
4473 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
4474 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
4475 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
4476 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
4477 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
4478 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
4479 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
4482 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
4483 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
4484 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
4487 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4488 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
4489 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4491 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
4492 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
4493 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
4494 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
4495 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4497 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
4498 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
4499 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
4501 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
4502 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4503 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4504 push_forward_ev = true;
4506 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
4507 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4508 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
4510 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4511 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
4514 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
4515 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4516 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4517 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
4518 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
4519 failed_next_destination: destination,
4525 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
4526 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
4528 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
4529 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
4530 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
4531 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
4533 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
4534 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
4535 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
4536 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
4538 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
4539 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
4540 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
4541 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
4542 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4543 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4544 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4545 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4547 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4550 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4551 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
4552 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4553 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
4554 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4555 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4556 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4557 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
4562 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
4563 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
4564 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id,
4566 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
4567 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
4568 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
4569 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4574 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
4576 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
4577 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
4578 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
4579 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
4580 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
4581 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
4582 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
4583 let mut valid_mpp = true;
4584 let mut errs = Vec::new();
4585 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4586 for htlc in sources.iter() {
4587 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
4588 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4589 debug_assert!(false);
4593 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
4595 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
4596 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4597 debug_assert!(false);
4601 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
4602 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
4604 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4605 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4606 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4607 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4610 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4611 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4612 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4613 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4617 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4618 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
4619 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
4620 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
4622 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4623 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4624 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4625 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4626 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4631 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4632 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4633 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4634 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4635 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
4636 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
4637 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4639 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4642 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
4643 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4644 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4645 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4649 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
4650 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
4651 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
4652 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4655 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4656 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
4657 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4658 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
4662 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
4663 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4664 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
4667 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
4668 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
4669 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4670 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4671 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id();
4672 let fulfill_res = chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
4674 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
4675 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
4676 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
4677 log_bytes!(chan_id), action);
4678 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
4680 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4681 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update);
4682 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
4683 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4684 if let Err(e) = res {
4685 // TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge
4686 // of the HTLC's monitor with a preimage. We should retry this monitor
4687 // update over and over again until morale improves.
4688 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}", payment_preimage);
4689 return Err((counterparty_node_id, e));
4696 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4697 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4698 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4702 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4703 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
4704 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
4705 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4706 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4707 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4708 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
4709 // again on restart.
4710 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4711 payment_preimage, update_res);
4713 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
4714 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
4715 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
4716 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
4717 // `PaymentForwarded`).
4718 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
4722 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4723 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
4726 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4728 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4729 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage, session_priv, path, from_onchain, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
4731 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4732 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4733 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
4734 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
4735 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4736 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4737 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4740 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
4741 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4743 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4744 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
4745 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_id),
4746 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
4748 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: None,
4752 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
4753 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4754 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4760 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4761 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4762 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4765 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
4766 for action in actions.into_iter() {
4768 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
4769 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4770 if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
4771 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4772 payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4776 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
4777 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
4779 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
4780 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
4781 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker));
4788 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
4789 /// update completion.
4790 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4791 channel: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
4792 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
4793 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
4794 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
4795 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
4796 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
4797 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()),
4798 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
4799 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
4800 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
4801 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
4802 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
4804 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
4806 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
4807 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4808 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
4809 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
4812 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4813 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
4815 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
4816 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4817 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4822 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
4823 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
4824 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4825 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4830 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
4831 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
4832 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4833 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4834 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4839 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
4843 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
4849 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
4850 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
4851 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
4855 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4856 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
4857 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
4863 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
4864 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
4866 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
4867 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4869 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
4870 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
4871 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4872 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4873 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4878 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4879 let mut peer_state_lock;
4880 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4881 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
4882 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4883 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4885 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()){
4886 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4887 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4890 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}",
4891 highest_applied_update_id, channel.get().context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
4892 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4895 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, highest_applied_update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel.get_mut());
4898 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4900 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4901 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4904 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4905 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4906 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4908 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4909 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4910 /// used to accept such channels.
4912 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4913 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4914 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4915 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4918 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4919 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4921 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4922 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4923 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4925 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4926 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4928 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4929 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4931 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4932 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4934 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4935 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4936 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4937 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4940 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4941 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4943 let peers_without_funded_channels =
4944 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
4945 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4946 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4947 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4948 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4949 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4950 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
4951 match peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4952 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4953 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_accept() {
4954 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4957 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4958 } else if channel.get().context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4959 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4960 node_id: channel.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4961 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4962 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4965 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4966 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4967 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4969 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4970 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4971 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4972 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
4973 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4974 node_id: channel.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4975 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4976 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
4979 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4980 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4981 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
4985 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4986 node_id: channel.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4987 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4990 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4991 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) });
4997 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
4998 /// or 0-conf channels.
5000 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
5001 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
5002 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
5003 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> bool {
5004 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
5005 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5007 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5008 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
5009 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5010 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
5011 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
5012 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
5013 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
5017 return peers_without_funded_channels;
5020 fn unfunded_channel_count(
5021 peer: &PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, best_block_height: u32
5023 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
5024 for (_, chan) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
5025 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
5026 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
5027 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
5028 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
5030 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5033 for (_, chan) in peer.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter() {
5034 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
5035 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5038 num_unfunded_channels
5041 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5042 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
5043 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5046 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
5047 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5050 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
5051 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
5052 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
5053 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
5055 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
5056 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
5057 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
5058 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
5059 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
5061 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5062 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5064 debug_assert!(false);
5065 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
5067 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5068 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5070 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5071 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5072 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5073 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
5074 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
5075 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
5077 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5078 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
5079 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5082 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5083 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
5084 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5085 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
5086 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5089 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5090 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
5091 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
5094 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
5095 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
5099 let channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
5100 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
5102 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
5103 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
5105 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
5106 if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
5107 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5109 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5110 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5111 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
5114 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5115 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
5116 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
5117 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5118 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
5119 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
5120 channel_type: channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
5123 peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, channel);
5128 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5129 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
5130 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5131 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5133 debug_assert!(false);
5134 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
5136 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5137 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5138 match peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
5139 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5140 try_v1_outbound_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan);
5141 (chan.get().context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().context.get_user_id())
5143 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
5146 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5147 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
5148 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
5149 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5150 channel_value_satoshis: value,
5152 user_channel_id: user_id,
5157 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5158 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5160 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5161 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5163 debug_assert!(false);
5164 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
5167 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5168 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5169 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor) =
5170 match peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
5171 Some(inbound_chan) => {
5172 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger) {
5174 Err((mut inbound_chan, err)) => {
5175 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
5176 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
5177 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
5178 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &inbound_chan.context);
5179 let user_id = inbound_chan.context.get_user_id();
5180 let shutdown_res = inbound_chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
5181 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(format!("{}", err),
5182 msg.temporary_channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None));
5186 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
5189 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
5190 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5191 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
5193 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5194 match self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
5195 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5196 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5197 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
5198 funding_msg.channel_id))
5200 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
5201 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
5205 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
5206 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
5207 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
5208 // until we have persisted our monitor.
5209 let new_channel_id = funding_msg.channel_id;
5210 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
5211 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5215 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
5217 let chan = e.insert(chan);
5218 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, monitor_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
5219 per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING, { peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&new_channel_id) });
5221 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
5222 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
5223 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
5224 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
5225 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
5226 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
5227 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
5228 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { shutdown_finish: Some((res, _)), .. }) = &mut res {
5236 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5237 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5238 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5239 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5241 debug_assert!(false);
5242 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5245 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5246 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5247 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5248 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5249 let monitor = try_chan_entry!(self,
5250 chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan);
5251 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor);
5252 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5253 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
5254 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
5255 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
5256 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
5257 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
5258 shutdown_finish.0.take();
5263 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5267 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5268 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5269 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5271 debug_assert!(false);
5272 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5274 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5275 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5276 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5277 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5278 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
5279 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
5280 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
5281 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().context.channel_id()));
5282 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5283 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5284 msg: announcement_sigs,
5286 } else if chan.get().context.is_usable() {
5287 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
5288 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
5289 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
5290 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
5291 // announcement_signatures.
5292 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().context.channel_id()));
5293 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5294 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5295 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5302 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5303 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan.get_mut());
5308 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5312 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5313 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
5314 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
5315 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5316 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5318 debug_assert!(false);
5319 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5321 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5322 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5323 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5324 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
5326 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
5327 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
5328 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
5329 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
5332 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().context.get_funding_txo();
5333 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self,
5334 chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
5335 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
5337 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
5338 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
5339 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
5340 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
5341 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5342 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5347 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
5348 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5349 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5350 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
5351 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
5355 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5358 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
5359 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
5360 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5361 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5367 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5368 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5369 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5371 debug_assert!(false);
5372 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5374 let (tx, chan_option) = {
5375 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5376 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5377 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5378 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
5379 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
5380 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
5381 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5382 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5387 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
5388 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
5389 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
5390 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
5391 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
5392 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
5393 } else { (tx, None) }
5395 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5398 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
5399 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
5400 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
5402 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
5403 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5404 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5405 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5406 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5410 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5415 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5416 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
5417 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
5418 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
5420 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
5421 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
5422 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
5423 //but we should prevent it anyway.
5425 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
5426 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5427 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5429 debug_assert!(false);
5430 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5432 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5433 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5434 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5435 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5437 let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
5438 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
5439 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(msg, shared_secret, next_hop,
5440 chan.get().context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt),
5441 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
5443 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
5444 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
5445 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
5446 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
5447 match pending_forward_info {
5448 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
5449 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
5450 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
5451 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
5453 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
5454 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
5455 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5456 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
5457 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
5460 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
5462 _ => pending_forward_info
5465 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
5467 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5472 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5473 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
5474 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5475 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5477 debug_assert!(false);
5478 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5480 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5481 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5482 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5483 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5484 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
5486 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5489 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
5493 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5494 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5495 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5497 debug_assert!(false);
5498 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5500 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5501 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5502 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5503 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5504 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
5506 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5511 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5512 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5513 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5515 debug_assert!(false);
5516 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5518 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5519 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5520 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5521 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5522 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
5523 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
5524 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
5526 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
5529 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5533 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5534 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5535 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5537 debug_assert!(false);
5538 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5540 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5541 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5542 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5543 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5544 let funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo();
5545 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5546 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5547 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
5548 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5549 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
5550 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
5553 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5558 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
5559 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
5560 let mut push_forward_event = false;
5561 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
5562 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
5563 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5564 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5565 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
5566 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
5567 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
5568 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
5570 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
5571 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
5573 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5574 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
5575 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
5576 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5577 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5578 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
5580 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5581 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
5582 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
5584 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
5585 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5586 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
5587 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5588 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
5589 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
5590 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
5591 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
5592 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
5595 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5596 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
5598 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5599 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
5600 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5601 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5602 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5603 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5604 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
5605 phantom_shared_secret: None,
5608 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
5609 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
5610 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
5615 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
5616 // payments are being processed.
5617 if forward_htlcs_empty {
5618 push_forward_event = true;
5620 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5621 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
5628 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
5629 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
5632 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
5633 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5634 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
5636 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
5640 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued.
5641 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
5642 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5643 let forward_ev_exists = pending_events.iter()
5644 .find(|(ev, _)| if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false })
5646 if !forward_ev_exists {
5647 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5649 Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
5654 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
5655 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other event
5656 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
5657 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
5658 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
5659 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
5660 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
5662 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
5663 .get(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
5664 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
5665 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5666 channel_funding_outpoint,
5667 counterparty_node_id,
5672 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5673 let (htlcs_to_fail, res) = {
5674 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5675 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5677 debug_assert!(false);
5678 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5679 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
5680 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5681 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5682 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5683 let funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo();
5684 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5685 let res = if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5686 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
5687 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5688 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5689 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
5691 (htlcs_to_fail, res)
5693 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5696 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5700 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5701 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5702 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5704 debug_assert!(false);
5705 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5707 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5708 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5709 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5710 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5711 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
5713 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5718 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5719 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5720 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5722 debug_assert!(false);
5723 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5725 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5726 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5727 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5728 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5729 if !chan.get().context.is_usable() {
5730 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
5733 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5734 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5735 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
5736 msg, &self.default_configuration
5738 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5739 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5740 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap()),
5743 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5748 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5749 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5750 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5751 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
5753 // It's not a local channel
5754 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5757 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5758 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
5759 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
5760 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5762 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5763 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5764 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5765 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5766 if chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5767 if chan.get().context.should_announce() {
5768 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5769 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5770 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5771 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5773 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5775 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5776 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5777 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5778 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5780 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5781 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
5784 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5786 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5789 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5791 let need_lnd_workaround = {
5792 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5794 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5796 debug_assert!(false);
5797 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5799 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5800 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5801 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5802 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5803 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5804 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5805 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5806 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5807 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5808 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
5809 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
5810 let mut channel_update = None;
5811 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5812 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5813 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5816 } else if chan.get().context.is_usable() {
5817 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5818 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5819 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5820 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5821 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5822 node_id: chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5827 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5828 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
5829 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5830 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5831 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5832 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5836 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5840 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
5841 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
5844 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5845 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5850 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
5851 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5852 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5854 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5855 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5856 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5857 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5858 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5859 match monitor_event {
5860 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5861 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5862 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5863 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5865 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5866 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5867 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5868 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5871 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5872 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5873 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
5874 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
5876 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5877 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5878 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5879 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
5882 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
5883 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5884 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5885 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5886 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5887 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5888 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5889 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5890 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
5891 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5892 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5896 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5897 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5899 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5901 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, reason);
5902 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5903 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5904 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5905 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5912 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5913 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
5919 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5920 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5923 has_pending_monitor_events
5926 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5927 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5928 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5930 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5931 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5932 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
5935 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5936 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5937 /// update was applied.
5938 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5939 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5940 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5941 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5943 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
5944 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
5945 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
5946 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
5948 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5949 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5951 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5952 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5953 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
5954 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5955 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
5956 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
5957 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger);
5958 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5959 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
5961 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
5962 has_monitor_update = true;
5964 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(
5965 funding_txo.expect("channel is live"), monitor_update);
5966 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5967 let channel_id: [u8; 32] = *channel_id;
5968 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5969 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING,
5970 peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id));
5972 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, res));
5974 continue 'peer_loop;
5983 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5984 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5985 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5988 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5989 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5995 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5996 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5997 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5998 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5999 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
6000 let mut has_update = false;
6002 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6004 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6005 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6006 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6007 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6008 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
6009 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
6010 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
6011 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
6013 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6014 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
6017 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
6018 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
6019 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
6020 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6021 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6026 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
6028 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
6029 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
6030 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
6036 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
6037 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
6045 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
6046 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
6052 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
6053 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
6055 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
6056 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6057 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
6058 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
6059 // reorganized out of the main chain.
6060 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
6061 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
6062 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
6063 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
6064 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
6065 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
6066 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
6067 assert!(should_broadcast);
6068 } else { unreachable!(); }
6069 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
6070 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
6071 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
6074 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6078 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
6079 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
6081 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
6082 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
6085 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6087 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6088 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6089 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
6090 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6091 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
6092 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
6093 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
6094 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
6095 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
6096 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
6097 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
6098 // never fail a payment too early.
6099 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
6101 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
6104 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
6109 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
6112 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
6113 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
6115 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
6116 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
6117 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
6118 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
6120 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
6122 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
6123 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
6127 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
6128 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
6130 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
6132 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
6133 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
6135 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
6136 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
6137 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
6138 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
6139 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
6140 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
6141 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
6142 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
6143 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
6144 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
6145 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
6148 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
6149 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
6151 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
6154 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
6156 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6158 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
6159 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6160 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
6161 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
6162 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
6165 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
6166 /// stored external to LDK.
6168 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
6169 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
6170 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
6172 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
6173 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
6176 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
6177 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
6178 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
6179 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
6181 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
6182 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
6183 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
6184 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
6185 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
6187 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
6188 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
6189 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
6190 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
6191 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
6193 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
6194 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
6196 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
6197 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
6201 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
6202 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
6204 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
6206 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
6207 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
6209 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6210 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
6211 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
6212 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
6213 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
6214 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
6215 min_final_cltv_expiry)
6218 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
6219 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
6221 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
6224 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
6226 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
6228 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
6229 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
6232 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
6233 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
6235 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6236 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
6237 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
6240 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
6241 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
6243 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
6244 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
6245 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6246 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
6248 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
6249 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
6250 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
6251 Some(_) => continue,
6252 None => return scid_candidate
6257 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
6259 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
6260 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
6262 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
6263 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
6264 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
6268 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
6269 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
6270 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
6272 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
6273 /// times to get a unique scid.
6274 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
6275 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6276 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
6278 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
6279 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
6280 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
6281 return scid_candidate
6285 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
6286 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
6287 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
6288 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
6290 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6291 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6292 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6293 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6294 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
6295 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
6296 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
6297 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
6306 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6307 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
6308 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
6309 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
6310 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
6314 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
6315 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
6316 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6317 events.push_back((event, None));
6321 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
6322 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6323 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
6327 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
6328 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
6332 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
6333 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
6336 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
6337 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
6338 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
6339 /// making progress and then any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
6340 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
6341 let mut errors = Vec::new();
6343 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6344 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6345 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6346 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
6348 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
6349 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
6350 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6351 .get_mut(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
6353 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
6357 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
6358 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id) {
6359 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
6360 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
6361 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
6362 log_trace!(self.logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
6363 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6367 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
6368 debug_assert_eq!(chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
6369 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.get_mut().unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
6370 log_debug!(self.logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
6371 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6372 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update);
6373 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
6374 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
6375 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
6377 errors.push((e, counterparty_node_id));
6379 if further_update_exists {
6380 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
6385 log_trace!(self.logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
6386 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6390 log_debug!(self.logger,
6391 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
6392 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6396 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in errors {
6397 let res = Err::<(), _>(err);
6398 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
6402 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
6403 for action in actions {
6405 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6406 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
6408 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, None);
6414 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
6415 /// using the given event handler.
6417 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
6418 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
6422 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
6426 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6428 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6429 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6430 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6431 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6432 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6433 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6437 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
6438 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
6439 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
6440 /// is always placed next to each other.
6442 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
6443 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
6444 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
6445 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
6447 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
6448 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
6449 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
6450 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
6451 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
6452 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6453 let mut result = self.process_background_events();
6455 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
6456 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
6457 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
6458 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6461 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
6462 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6464 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
6465 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6468 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
6469 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6470 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6471 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6472 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6473 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
6474 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
6478 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
6479 events.replace(pending_events);
6488 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6490 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6491 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6492 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6493 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6494 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6495 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6499 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
6501 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
6502 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
6503 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
6505 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
6509 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6511 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6512 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6513 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6514 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6515 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6516 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6520 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6522 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6523 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
6524 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
6525 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
6526 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
6529 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
6530 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
6533 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6534 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6535 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6536 let new_height = height - 1;
6538 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
6539 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
6540 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
6541 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
6542 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
6543 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
6546 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6550 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6552 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6553 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6554 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6555 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6556 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6557 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6561 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6562 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6563 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6564 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6566 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6567 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
6569 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6570 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6571 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
6572 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
6574 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6575 if height < last_best_block_height {
6576 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6577 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6581 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6582 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6583 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6584 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6586 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6587 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
6589 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6590 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6591 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
6593 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6595 macro_rules! max_time {
6596 ($timestamp: expr) => {
6598 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
6599 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
6600 // having an explicit local time source.
6601 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
6602 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
6603 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6604 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
6605 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
6611 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
6612 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6613 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
6614 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
6618 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
6619 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
6620 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
6621 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6622 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6623 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
6624 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.context.get_funding_txo(), chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
6625 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
6632 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
6633 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6634 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6635 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
6636 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
6637 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
6638 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
6639 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6640 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6645 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6647 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6648 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6649 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6650 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6651 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6652 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6656 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
6657 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
6659 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
6660 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
6661 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6662 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6663 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6665 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6666 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
6668 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6669 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6670 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6671 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6672 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6673 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
6674 let res = f(channel);
6675 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
6676 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
6677 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
6678 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
6679 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
6681 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
6682 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
6683 if channel.context.is_usable() {
6684 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
6685 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
6686 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6687 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6692 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
6697 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6698 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
6701 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
6702 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
6703 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6704 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6705 msg: announcement_sigs,
6707 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6708 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
6709 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6711 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6712 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6713 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
6718 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
6719 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
6720 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
6721 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
6722 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
6723 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
6724 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
6725 // is always consistent.
6726 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
6727 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
6728 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
6729 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
6730 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
6733 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
6734 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
6735 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
6736 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
6737 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true));
6738 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
6739 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6743 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
6744 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, reason);
6745 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6746 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6747 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
6748 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
6749 data: reason_message,
6759 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6760 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
6761 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
6762 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
6763 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
6764 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
6765 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
6766 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6767 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6768 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
6770 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
6771 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
6772 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
6776 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
6779 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6780 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
6781 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6782 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6783 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
6784 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
6785 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6786 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6787 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
6790 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
6791 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6792 _ => unreachable!(),
6794 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
6795 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
6796 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
6797 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
6803 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
6805 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
6806 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
6810 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
6812 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
6813 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
6815 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
6816 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
6819 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6820 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
6821 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
6824 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
6825 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
6826 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
6827 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
6830 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6831 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6832 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6833 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6836 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6837 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6839 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6840 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6841 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6842 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6843 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
6846 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6847 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6848 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
6849 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
6852 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6853 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6854 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6855 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
6858 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6859 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6860 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
6861 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6865 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
6866 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6868 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6869 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6870 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6871 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6872 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6873 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6877 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
6878 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6879 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6882 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
6883 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6884 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6885 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6888 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
6889 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6890 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6893 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
6894 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6895 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6896 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6899 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6900 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6901 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6904 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6905 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6906 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6909 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6910 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6911 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6914 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6915 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6916 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6919 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6920 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6921 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6924 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6925 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6926 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6929 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6930 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6931 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6934 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6935 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6936 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6939 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6940 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6941 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6944 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6945 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6946 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6949 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6950 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6951 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6954 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6955 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6956 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6959 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6960 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6961 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6964 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6965 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6966 let force_persist = self.process_background_events();
6967 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6968 if force_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { NotifyOption::DoPersist } else { persist }
6970 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6975 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6976 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6977 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6980 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
6981 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6982 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6983 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6985 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
6986 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6987 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
6988 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6989 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6990 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6991 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6992 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6993 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6994 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
6995 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
7000 peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
7001 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7002 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
7005 peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
7006 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7007 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
7010 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
7012 // V1 Channel Establishment
7013 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
7014 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
7015 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
7016 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
7017 // V2 Channel Establishment
7018 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
7019 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
7020 // Common Channel Establishment
7021 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
7022 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
7023 // Interactive Transaction Construction
7024 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
7025 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
7026 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
7027 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
7028 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
7029 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
7030 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
7031 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
7032 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
7033 // Channel Operations
7034 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
7035 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
7036 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
7037 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
7038 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
7039 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
7041 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
7042 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
7043 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
7044 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
7045 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
7046 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
7047 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
7048 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
7049 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
7052 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
7053 peer_state.is_connected = false;
7054 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
7055 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
7058 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
7060 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
7062 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7063 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
7067 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
7068 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
7069 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7073 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7075 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
7076 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
7077 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
7078 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
7079 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
7080 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
7083 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7084 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
7085 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
7086 if inbound_peer_limited {
7089 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
7090 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7091 outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7092 inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7093 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
7094 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7095 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
7096 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
7100 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
7101 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
7102 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
7104 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7105 if inbound_peer_limited &&
7106 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
7107 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
7112 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
7113 peer_state.is_connected = true;
7118 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7120 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7121 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7122 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7123 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7124 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7125 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
7126 let retain = if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
7127 if !chan.context.have_received_message() {
7128 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
7129 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
7130 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
7134 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
7135 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7136 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
7141 if retain && chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
7142 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.default_configuration) {
7143 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
7144 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
7145 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7154 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
7158 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
7159 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7161 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
7162 let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = {
7163 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7164 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
7165 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
7166 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7167 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7168 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned()
7169 .chain(peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.keys().cloned())
7170 .chain(peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.keys().cloned()).collect()
7172 for channel_id in channel_ids {
7173 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
7174 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
7178 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
7179 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7180 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
7181 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
7182 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7183 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7184 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
7185 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
7186 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
7187 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7195 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
7196 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
7200 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
7201 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
7204 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
7205 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
7208 fn get_genesis_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
7209 Some(vec![ChainHash::from(&self.genesis_hash[..])])
7212 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
7213 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7214 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7215 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7218 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
7219 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7220 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7221 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7224 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
7225 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7226 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7227 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7230 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
7231 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7232 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7233 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7236 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
7237 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7238 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7239 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7242 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
7243 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7244 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7245 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7248 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
7249 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7250 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7251 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7254 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
7255 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7256 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7257 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7260 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
7261 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7262 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7263 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7267 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7268 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7269 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
7270 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
7273 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7274 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7276 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
7277 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
7278 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
7279 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InvoiceFeatures {
7280 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
7283 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7284 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7285 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
7286 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
7289 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7290 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7291 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
7292 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
7295 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7296 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7297 pub fn provided_init_features(_config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
7298 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
7299 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
7300 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
7301 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
7302 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
7303 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
7304 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
7305 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
7306 features.set_payment_secret_required();
7307 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
7308 features.set_wumbo_optional();
7309 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
7310 features.set_channel_type_optional();
7311 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
7312 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
7314 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
7315 if _config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
7316 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
7322 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
7323 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
7325 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
7326 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
7327 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
7328 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
7331 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
7332 (2, node_id, required),
7333 (4, features, required),
7334 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
7335 (8, forwarding_info, option),
7336 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7337 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7340 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
7341 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7342 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7343 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
7344 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
7345 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
7346 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7347 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
7348 (2, self.channel_id, required),
7349 (3, self.channel_type, option),
7350 (4, self.counterparty, required),
7351 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
7352 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
7353 (7, self.config, option),
7354 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
7355 (9, self.confirmations, option),
7356 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
7357 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
7358 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
7359 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
7360 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
7361 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
7362 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
7363 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
7364 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
7365 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
7366 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
7367 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
7368 (30, self.is_usable, required),
7369 (32, self.is_public, required),
7370 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7371 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7372 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
7373 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
7379 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
7380 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7381 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7382 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
7383 (2, channel_id, required),
7384 (3, channel_type, option),
7385 (4, counterparty, required),
7386 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7387 (6, funding_txo, option),
7388 (7, config, option),
7389 (8, short_channel_id, option),
7390 (9, confirmations, option),
7391 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
7392 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
7393 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
7394 (16, balance_msat, required),
7395 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
7396 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
7397 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
7398 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
7399 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
7400 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
7401 (22, confirmations_required, option),
7402 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
7403 (26, is_outbound, required),
7404 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
7405 (30, is_usable, required),
7406 (32, is_public, required),
7407 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7408 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7409 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
7410 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
7413 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7414 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
7415 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
7416 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
7417 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
7421 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
7423 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
7424 outbound_scid_alias,
7428 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
7429 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
7431 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
7432 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
7433 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
7434 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
7435 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
7436 confirmations_required,
7438 force_close_spend_delay,
7439 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
7440 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
7441 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
7442 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
7443 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
7444 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
7445 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
7450 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
7451 (2, channels, vec_type),
7452 (4, phantom_scid, required),
7453 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
7456 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
7458 (0, onion_packet, required),
7459 (2, short_channel_id, required),
7462 (0, payment_data, required),
7463 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
7464 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
7465 (3, payment_metadata, option),
7467 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
7468 (0, payment_preimage, required),
7469 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
7470 (3, payment_metadata, option),
7471 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
7475 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
7476 (0, routing, required),
7477 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
7478 (4, payment_hash, required),
7479 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
7480 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
7481 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
7482 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
7486 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
7487 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7489 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
7491 channel_id.write(writer)?;
7492 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7493 reason.write(writer)?;
7495 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7496 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
7499 channel_id.write(writer)?;
7500 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7501 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
7502 failure_code.write(writer)?;
7509 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
7510 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7511 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7514 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
7515 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7516 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7517 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
7521 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7522 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7523 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7524 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
7525 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
7528 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
7529 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
7530 // messages contained in the variants.
7531 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
7532 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
7533 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
7535 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
7536 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
7537 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
7538 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
7539 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
7542 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
7543 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
7544 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
7545 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
7546 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
7548 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
7553 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
7558 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
7559 (0, short_channel_id, required),
7560 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
7561 (2, outpoint, required),
7562 (4, htlc_id, required),
7563 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
7566 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
7567 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7568 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
7569 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
7570 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
7572 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7573 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
7574 (1, self.total_msat, required),
7575 (2, self.value, required),
7576 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
7577 (4, payment_data, option),
7578 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
7579 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
7580 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
7581 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
7587 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
7588 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7589 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7590 (0, prev_hop, required),
7591 (1, total_msat, option),
7592 (2, value_ser, required),
7593 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
7594 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
7595 (5, total_value_received, option),
7596 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
7597 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
7598 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
7600 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
7601 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
7602 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
7604 if payment_data.is_some() {
7605 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7607 if total_msat.is_none() {
7608 total_msat = Some(value);
7610 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
7613 if total_msat.is_none() {
7614 if payment_data.is_none() {
7615 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7617 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
7619 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
7623 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
7626 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
7627 total_value_received,
7628 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
7630 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
7631 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
7636 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
7637 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7638 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7641 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
7642 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
7643 let mut path_hops: Option<Vec<RouteHop>> = Some(Vec::new());
7644 let mut payment_id = None;
7645 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
7646 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
7647 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7648 (0, session_priv, required),
7649 (1, payment_id, option),
7650 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
7651 (4, path_hops, vec_type),
7652 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
7653 (6, blinded_tail, option),
7655 if payment_id.is_none() {
7656 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
7658 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
7660 let path = Path { hops: path_hops.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?, blinded_tail };
7661 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
7662 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7664 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
7665 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
7666 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
7667 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7671 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7672 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
7673 first_hop_htlc_msat,
7675 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
7678 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7679 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
7684 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
7685 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
7687 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
7689 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
7690 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7691 (0, session_priv, required),
7692 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
7693 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
7694 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
7695 (4, path.hops, vec_type),
7696 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
7697 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
7700 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
7702 field.write(writer)?;
7709 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
7710 (0, forward_info, required),
7711 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
7712 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
7713 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
7714 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
7717 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
7719 (0, htlc_id, required),
7720 (2, err_packet, required),
7725 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
7726 (0, payment_secret, required),
7727 (2, expiry_time, required),
7728 (4, user_payment_id, required),
7729 (6, payment_preimage, required),
7730 (8, min_value_msat, required),
7733 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7735 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7736 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7737 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7738 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7739 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7740 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7744 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7745 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
7747 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7749 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
7751 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7752 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
7753 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
7756 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
7758 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7759 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
7760 let mut number_of_channels = 0;
7761 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7762 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7763 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7764 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7765 serializable_peer_count += 1;
7767 number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len();
7768 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
7769 if !channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
7770 unfunded_channels += 1;
7775 ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
7777 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7778 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7779 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7780 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
7781 if channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
7782 channel.write(writer)?;
7789 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7790 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7791 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
7792 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7793 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7794 for forward in pending_forwards {
7795 forward.write(writer)?;
7800 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7802 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7803 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
7804 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7806 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
7807 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
7808 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7809 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
7810 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7811 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7812 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
7813 htlc.write(writer)?;
7815 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
7816 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
7819 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
7820 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
7821 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7822 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
7823 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
7824 // per_peer_state lock at all.
7825 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
7828 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
7829 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
7830 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
7831 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
7832 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
7834 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7835 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
7836 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
7837 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
7838 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
7839 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
7840 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
7845 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7846 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
7847 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
7848 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
7849 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
7850 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
7851 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
7852 // well save the space and not write any events here.
7853 0u64.write(writer)?;
7855 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7856 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
7857 event.write(writer)?;
7861 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
7862 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
7863 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
7864 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
7865 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
7866 0u64.write(writer)?;
7868 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
7869 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
7870 // likely to be identical.
7871 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7872 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7874 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7875 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
7876 hash.write(writer)?;
7877 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
7880 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
7881 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
7882 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7883 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
7884 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
7887 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
7888 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7890 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7891 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7892 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
7893 session_priv.write(writer)?;
7896 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
7897 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
7901 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
7902 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
7903 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7905 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7906 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7907 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
7913 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
7914 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7915 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
7916 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
7919 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
7920 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
7921 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
7922 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
7923 pending_claiming_payments = None;
7926 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7927 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
7928 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7929 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
7930 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7931 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
7932 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7933 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
7934 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
7935 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7936 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
7937 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
7944 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
7945 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7946 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
7947 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
7950 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
7951 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
7952 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
7953 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
7954 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
7955 // check that the event is sane here.
7956 let event_encoded = event.encode();
7957 let event_read: Option<Event> =
7958 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
7959 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
7965 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
7966 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7967 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7968 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
7969 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
7970 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
7973 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
7974 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
7975 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
7976 events.push_back((ev, action));
7977 } else if action.is_some() {
7978 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7985 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
7987 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
7989 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7990 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
7991 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
7992 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
7993 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
7994 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
7995 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
7996 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
7997 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7998 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
7999 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
8000 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
8001 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
8003 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
8004 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
8006 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
8007 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
8009 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
8010 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
8011 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
8012 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
8013 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
8014 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
8016 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
8017 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8019 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8020 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8021 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8022 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8023 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8024 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8028 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
8029 pub entropy_source: ES,
8031 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
8032 pub node_signer: NS,
8034 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
8035 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
8037 pub signer_provider: SP,
8039 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
8041 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
8042 pub fee_estimator: F,
8043 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
8045 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
8046 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
8047 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
8048 pub chain_monitor: M,
8050 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
8051 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
8052 /// force-closed during deserialization.
8053 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
8054 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
8055 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
8057 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
8059 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
8060 /// deserialization.
8062 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
8063 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
8064 pub default_config: UserConfig,
8066 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
8067 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
8069 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
8070 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
8071 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
8072 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
8074 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
8077 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
8078 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
8081 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8082 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8084 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8085 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8086 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8087 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8088 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8089 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8093 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
8094 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
8095 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
8096 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
8097 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
8099 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
8100 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
8105 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
8106 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
8107 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8108 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
8110 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8111 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8112 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8113 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8114 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8115 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8119 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8120 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
8121 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
8125 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8126 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
8128 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8129 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8130 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8131 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8132 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8133 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8137 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8138 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8140 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8141 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8142 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8144 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
8146 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8147 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8148 let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8149 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8150 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8151 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
8152 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
8153 for _ in 0..channel_count {
8154 let mut channel: Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (
8155 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
8157 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8158 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
8159 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
8160 if channel.get_latest_complete_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
8161 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
8162 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
8163 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
8164 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_complete_monitor_update_id());
8165 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
8166 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
8167 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
8168 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
8169 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8170 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
8171 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
8172 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
8173 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
8174 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
8175 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
8176 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
8177 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
8178 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
8179 let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
8180 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = monitor_update {
8181 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
8182 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
8185 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
8186 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
8187 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8188 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
8189 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
8191 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
8192 let mut found_htlc = false;
8193 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
8194 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
8197 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
8198 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
8199 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
8200 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
8201 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
8202 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
8203 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
8204 log_info!(args.logger,
8205 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
8206 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
8207 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8211 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
8212 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
8213 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
8214 channel.complete_all_mon_updates_through(monitor.get_latest_update_id());
8215 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
8216 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8218 if channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
8219 id_to_peer.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
8221 match peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
8222 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
8223 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
8224 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel);
8226 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
8227 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
8228 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel);
8229 entry.insert(by_id_map);
8233 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
8234 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
8235 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
8236 // safely discard the channel.
8237 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false);
8238 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
8239 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8240 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
8241 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
8244 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
8245 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
8246 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
8247 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
8248 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
8249 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8253 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8254 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
8255 log_info!(args.logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
8256 log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
8257 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
8258 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
8259 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
8261 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
8265 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
8266 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8267 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
8268 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
8269 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8270 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8271 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
8272 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
8273 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
8275 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
8278 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8279 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
8280 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
8281 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8282 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8283 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
8284 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
8285 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
8287 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
8290 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8291 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>)>()));
8292 for _ in 0..peer_count {
8293 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
8294 let peer_state = PeerState {
8295 channel_by_id: peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new()),
8296 outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8297 inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8298 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
8299 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
8300 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
8301 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8302 is_connected: false,
8304 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
8307 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8308 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
8309 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
8310 for _ in 0..event_count {
8311 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
8312 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
8317 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8318 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
8319 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8321 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
8322 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
8323 // on-startup monitor updates.
8324 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
8325 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
8327 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8331 for (node_id, peer_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8332 let peer_state = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
8333 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
8334 for update in chan.uncompleted_unblocked_mon_updates() {
8335 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.context.get_funding_txo() {
8336 log_trace!(args.logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for channel {}",
8337 update.update_id, log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
8338 pending_background_events.push(
8339 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
8340 counterparty_node_id: *node_id, funding_txo, update: update.clone(),
8343 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8349 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
8350 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8352 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8353 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
8354 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
8355 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
8356 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8360 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8361 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
8362 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
8363 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
8364 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
8365 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
8366 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
8368 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
8369 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8373 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
8374 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
8375 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
8376 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
8377 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
8378 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
8379 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
8380 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
8381 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
8382 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
8383 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
8384 let mut events_override = None;
8385 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8386 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
8387 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
8388 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
8389 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
8390 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
8391 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
8392 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
8393 (8, events_override, option),
8394 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
8395 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
8396 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
8398 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
8399 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8402 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
8403 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8406 if let Some(events) = events_override {
8407 pending_events_read = events;
8410 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
8411 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
8414 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
8415 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
8416 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
8417 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
8418 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
8419 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
8421 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
8423 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
8424 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
8425 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
8429 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
8430 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
8431 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
8432 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
8433 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
8434 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
8435 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
8437 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8438 if id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
8439 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
8440 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
8441 if path.hops.is_empty() {
8442 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
8443 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8446 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
8447 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
8448 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
8449 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
8450 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
8451 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
8452 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
8453 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
8455 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
8456 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
8457 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
8458 retry_strategy: None,
8459 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
8460 payment_params: None,
8461 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
8462 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
8463 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8464 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8465 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8466 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
8467 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
8468 total_msat: path_amt,
8469 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
8471 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
8472 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
8477 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
8479 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
8480 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
8481 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
8482 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
8484 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
8485 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
8486 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
8487 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
8488 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
8489 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
8490 forwards.retain(|forward| {
8491 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
8492 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
8493 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
8494 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
8499 !forwards.is_empty()
8501 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
8502 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
8503 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
8504 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
8505 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
8506 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
8507 intercepted_id != ev_id
8514 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
8515 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
8516 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
8517 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
8518 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
8519 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
8520 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
8521 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
8522 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
8523 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
8524 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
8525 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv, path, false, &pending_events, &args.logger);
8526 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
8535 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
8536 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
8537 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
8538 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
8539 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
8540 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
8541 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
8542 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
8546 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
8547 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
8549 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
8550 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
8551 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
8552 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8554 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
8555 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
8556 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8558 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
8559 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
8561 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
8562 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
8564 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
8567 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
8568 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
8569 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
8571 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
8575 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
8576 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
8577 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
8578 if htlcs.is_empty() {
8579 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8581 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
8582 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
8583 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
8584 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
8585 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
8586 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
8587 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
8588 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
8590 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
8591 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8595 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
8597 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
8599 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
8600 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
8602 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
8603 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
8608 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8609 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8611 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
8613 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8615 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
8616 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
8617 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
8618 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8622 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
8623 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
8624 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8625 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8626 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
8627 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
8628 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
8630 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
8631 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
8632 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
8634 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
8635 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
8636 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
8637 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
8638 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
8639 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8641 if chan.context.is_usable() {
8642 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
8643 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
8644 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
8645 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
8646 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8652 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
8654 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8655 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
8656 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
8657 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
8658 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
8659 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
8660 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
8661 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
8662 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
8663 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
8664 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
8666 for claimable_htlc in payment.htlcs {
8667 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
8669 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
8670 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
8671 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
8672 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
8674 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
8675 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
8676 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
8677 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
8679 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
8680 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
8681 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
8682 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
8684 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
8685 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
8686 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
8687 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8688 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8689 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
8690 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
8693 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
8694 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
8697 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
8700 purpose: payment.purpose,
8701 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
8707 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
8708 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
8709 for (_, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
8710 for action in actions.iter() {
8711 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
8712 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
8713 Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), ..
8715 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
8716 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
8717 .entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
8718 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
8723 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
8725 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
8726 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8730 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
8732 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
8733 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
8734 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
8735 router: args.router,
8737 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
8739 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
8740 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
8741 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
8742 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
8744 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
8745 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
8746 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
8747 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
8748 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
8749 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
8751 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
8756 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
8758 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
8760 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
8761 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
8762 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
8763 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
8764 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
8765 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
8766 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
8768 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
8769 node_signer: args.node_signer,
8770 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
8772 logger: args.logger,
8773 default_configuration: args.default_config,
8776 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
8777 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
8778 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
8779 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
8780 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
8783 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
8784 //connection or two.
8786 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
8792 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8793 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8794 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
8795 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
8796 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
8797 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
8798 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
8799 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
8800 use crate::ln::msgs;
8801 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
8802 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
8803 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
8804 use crate::util::test_utils;
8805 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
8806 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
8809 fn test_notify_limits() {
8810 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
8811 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
8812 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8813 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8814 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8815 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8817 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
8818 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
8819 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8820 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8821 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8823 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8825 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
8826 // to connect messages with new values
8827 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
8828 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
8829 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
8830 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
8831 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
8832 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
8834 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
8835 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8836 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8837 // ... but the last node should not.
8838 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8839 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
8840 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8841 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8843 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
8844 // about the channel.
8845 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8846 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8847 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8849 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
8851 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8852 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8853 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8854 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8855 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8856 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8858 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
8859 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8860 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8862 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
8863 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
8864 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
8865 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
8866 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
8867 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
8869 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
8870 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
8871 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
8872 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
8873 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8874 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8875 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8876 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8878 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
8879 // the channel info has updated.
8880 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
8881 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
8882 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8883 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8884 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8885 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8889 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
8890 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
8892 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8893 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8894 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8895 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8896 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8898 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
8899 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8900 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
8901 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
8903 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
8904 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
8905 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
8906 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
8907 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
8908 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
8909 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
8910 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
8911 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8912 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8913 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8914 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
8916 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
8917 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8918 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8919 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8920 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8921 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8922 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8923 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8924 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8925 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8926 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8927 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8928 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
8929 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8930 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8931 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8932 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8933 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8934 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8935 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8936 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8937 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8938 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8940 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
8941 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
8942 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
8943 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8944 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8945 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8946 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
8948 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
8949 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
8950 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
8951 // lightning messages manually.
8952 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8953 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
8954 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8956 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8957 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8958 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
8959 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8960 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8961 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
8962 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8963 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8964 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
8965 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8966 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8967 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8968 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8969 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8970 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8971 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
8972 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8973 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8974 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
8975 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8976 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8977 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8978 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8979 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
8980 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8982 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
8983 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
8984 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8985 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
8987 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
8988 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
8989 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
8990 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
8992 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8995 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8996 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8997 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8998 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
9000 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9003 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
9004 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
9005 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
9006 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
9008 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9013 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
9014 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
9015 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
9018 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
9019 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
9020 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
9021 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
9022 // fails as expected.
9023 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
9024 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
9025 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
9026 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
9027 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
9028 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
9029 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9030 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9031 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
9032 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
9033 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
9034 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9035 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9036 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9037 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9039 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
9040 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
9041 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
9043 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
9044 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9045 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
9046 final_value_msat: 100_000,
9048 let route = find_route(
9049 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
9050 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9052 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9053 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9054 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9055 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9056 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9057 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9058 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9059 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9060 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9061 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9062 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
9063 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
9064 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9065 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9066 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9067 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9068 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9069 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9070 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9071 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9072 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9073 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9074 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9075 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9077 // Finally, claim the original payment.
9078 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
9080 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
9081 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9082 let route = find_route(
9083 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
9084 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9086 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9087 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9088 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9089 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9090 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9091 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9092 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9093 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
9095 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
9096 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
9097 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9098 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9099 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9100 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9101 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9102 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9103 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9104 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9105 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9106 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9107 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9108 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9109 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9110 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9111 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9112 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9113 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9114 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9115 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9116 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9117 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9118 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9120 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
9121 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
9123 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
9124 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
9125 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9126 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
9127 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9128 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9129 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9130 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9131 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9132 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
9134 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
9135 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9136 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
9137 final_value_msat: 100_000,
9139 let route = find_route(
9140 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
9141 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9143 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
9144 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9145 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
9146 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9147 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9148 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9149 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9150 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9151 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9152 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9153 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9154 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9155 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9156 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9157 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9158 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9159 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9160 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9161 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9162 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9163 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9164 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9165 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9167 // Finally, claim the original payment.
9168 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
9172 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
9173 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
9174 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
9175 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9176 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9177 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9178 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9180 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9181 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9183 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9184 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9185 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false),
9186 final_value_msat: 10_000,
9188 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
9189 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9190 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9191 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9192 let route = find_route(
9193 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9194 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9197 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9198 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
9199 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
9200 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
9201 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
9202 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
9203 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9205 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9206 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
9207 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9208 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9209 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9210 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9211 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
9213 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
9217 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
9218 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
9219 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
9220 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
9221 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
9222 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9223 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9224 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
9225 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9227 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9228 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9230 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9231 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9232 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false),
9233 final_value_msat: 10_000,
9235 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
9236 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9237 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9238 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9239 let route = find_route(
9240 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9241 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9244 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9245 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
9246 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
9247 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
9248 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
9249 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
9250 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
9251 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
9252 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9254 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9255 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
9256 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9257 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9258 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9259 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9260 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
9262 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
9266 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
9267 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9268 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9269 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9270 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9272 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9273 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9274 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9275 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9277 // Marshall an MPP route.
9278 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
9279 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
9280 route.paths.push(path);
9281 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9282 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
9283 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
9284 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
9285 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
9286 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
9288 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9289 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
9291 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
9292 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
9294 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
9299 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
9300 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9301 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9302 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9303 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9305 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9307 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9308 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9310 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9311 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
9312 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9313 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9316 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
9317 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
9318 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9319 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
9320 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
9321 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
9324 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9327 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
9328 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
9333 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
9334 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
9335 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9336 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9337 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9338 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9340 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
9341 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
9343 total_msat: 100_000,
9346 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
9347 // payment verification fails as expected.
9348 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
9349 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
9350 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
9351 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
9353 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
9357 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
9358 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
9362 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
9363 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
9364 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
9365 // the channel is successfully closed.
9366 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9367 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9368 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9369 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9371 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9372 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9373 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
9374 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9375 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9377 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
9378 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
9380 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
9381 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
9382 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9383 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9386 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9388 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
9389 // as it has the funding transaction.
9390 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9391 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
9392 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9395 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9397 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9399 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9401 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9402 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
9403 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9405 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9408 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
9409 // as it has the funding transaction.
9410 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9411 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
9412 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9414 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9415 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9416 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
9417 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9418 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9419 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9420 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9421 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
9423 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9424 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9425 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9426 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
9428 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9429 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
9431 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
9432 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
9433 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
9434 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
9435 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9436 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
9437 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9441 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
9442 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
9443 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
9444 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
9445 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9446 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
9447 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9450 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9452 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
9453 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
9454 // closing transaction).
9455 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
9456 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
9457 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9459 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
9460 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
9461 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9462 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
9463 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9466 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9468 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
9470 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
9471 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
9472 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9474 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9476 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
9477 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
9480 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
9481 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
9482 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
9485 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
9486 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
9487 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
9490 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
9492 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
9493 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
9495 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
9496 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
9498 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
9499 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
9504 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
9505 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
9506 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
9507 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
9508 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9509 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
9510 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
9511 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
9514 let channel_id = [4; 32];
9515 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9516 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
9518 // Test the API functions.
9519 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
9521 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
9523 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
9525 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
9527 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
9529 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
9531 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
9535 fn test_connection_limiting() {
9536 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
9537 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9538 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9539 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9540 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9542 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
9544 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9545 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9547 let mut funding_tx = None;
9548 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
9549 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9550 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9553 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9554 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
9555 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
9556 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
9557 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9559 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9560 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9561 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9563 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9565 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
9566 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9567 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9569 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9572 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
9573 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9574 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9575 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
9576 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9578 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
9579 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
9581 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
9582 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
9583 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9584 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9585 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
9586 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9587 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9590 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9591 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9592 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9593 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9594 }, true).unwrap_err();
9596 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
9597 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
9598 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9599 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9600 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
9601 for ev in chan_closed_events {
9602 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
9604 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9605 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9607 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
9608 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9609 }, true).unwrap_err();
9611 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
9612 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
9613 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9615 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9617 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
9618 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
9620 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
9621 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
9622 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
9623 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
9624 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9626 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9627 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
9628 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9630 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
9631 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9632 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
9634 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
9635 // "protected" and can connect again.
9636 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
9637 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
9638 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9640 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9642 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
9644 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9645 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
9649 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
9650 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
9651 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9652 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9653 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9654 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9656 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
9658 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9659 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9661 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
9662 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9663 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9664 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9667 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
9669 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9670 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
9671 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9673 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
9674 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9675 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9677 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
9678 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9679 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
9680 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9684 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
9685 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
9686 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
9687 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9688 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9689 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
9690 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
9691 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
9692 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9694 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
9696 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9697 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9699 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
9700 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
9701 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9702 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9703 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9704 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9707 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9708 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9710 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9711 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
9713 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9715 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
9716 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9719 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
9720 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9721 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9722 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9723 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9725 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9726 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9728 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9729 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
9730 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
9731 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
9735 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9737 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
9738 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9740 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
9741 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9742 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9744 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9745 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
9747 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9749 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
9753 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
9754 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
9755 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
9756 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
9757 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
9758 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
9759 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
9760 let hop_data = msgs::OnionHopData {
9761 amt_to_forward: 100,
9762 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
9763 format: msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode {
9764 keysend_preimage: None,
9765 payment_metadata: None,
9766 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
9767 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
9771 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
9772 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
9773 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::ReceiveError { err_code, .. }) =
9774 node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9775 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat))
9777 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
9778 } else { panic!(); }
9780 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
9781 let hop_data = msgs::OnionHopData { // This is the same hop_data as above, OnionHopData doesn't implement Clone
9782 amt_to_forward: 100,
9783 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
9784 format: msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode {
9785 keysend_preimage: None,
9786 payment_metadata: None,
9787 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
9788 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
9792 assert!(node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9793 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat)).is_ok());
9798 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
9799 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
9800 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
9801 // the channel without the anchors feature.
9802 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9803 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9804 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
9805 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
9806 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
9807 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
9808 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9810 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
9811 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9812 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
9814 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9815 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9817 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9818 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9820 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9823 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9824 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
9826 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9827 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
9829 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9833 fn test_update_channel_config() {
9834 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9835 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
9836 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
9837 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
9838 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
9839 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9840 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
9842 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
9843 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9844 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
9846 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
9847 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
9848 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
9849 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9850 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9852 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9853 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
9856 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
9857 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9858 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
9860 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
9861 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
9862 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
9863 ..Default::default()
9865 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
9866 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9867 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9869 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9870 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
9873 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
9874 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
9875 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
9876 ..Default::default()
9878 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
9879 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
9880 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9881 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9883 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9884 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
9891 use crate::chain::Listen;
9892 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
9893 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
9894 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
9895 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
9896 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
9897 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
9898 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
9899 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
9900 use crate::util::test_utils;
9901 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
9903 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
9904 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
9905 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
9907 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
9909 use criterion::Criterion;
9911 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
9912 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
9913 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
9914 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
9915 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
9916 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
9917 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
9919 struct ANodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
9920 node: &'a Manager<'a, P>,
9922 impl<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'a, P> {
9923 type CM = Manager<'a, P>;
9925 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'a, P> { self.node }
9927 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
9930 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
9931 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
9934 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
9935 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
9936 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
9938 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
9940 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
9941 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
9942 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
9943 let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
9944 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
9946 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
9947 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
9949 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
9950 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
9951 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
9952 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
9954 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
9956 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
9958 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
9959 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
9960 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
9961 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
9962 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
9964 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
9966 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
9968 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
9969 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9971 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
9972 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9974 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9975 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
9976 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9979 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
9980 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9981 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
9983 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9984 } else { panic!(); }
9986 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
9987 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9988 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
9990 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9991 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
9993 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9996 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9997 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9998 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
10000 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10001 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
10003 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10006 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
10008 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), 42, vec![tx]);
10009 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
10010 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
10012 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10013 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10014 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
10015 match msg_events[0] {
10016 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
10017 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
10018 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
10022 match msg_events[1] {
10023 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10027 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10028 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
10029 match events_a[0] {
10030 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10031 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
10033 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10036 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10037 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
10038 match events_b[0] {
10039 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10040 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
10042 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10045 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
10046 macro_rules! send_payment {
10047 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
10048 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
10049 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.invoice_features()).unwrap();
10050 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
10051 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
10052 payment_count += 1;
10053 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
10054 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
10056 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
10057 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), RouteParameters {
10058 payment_params, final_value_msat: 10_000,
10059 }, Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
10060 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
10061 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10062 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
10063 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
10064 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
10065 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
10066 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
10068 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
10069 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
10070 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
10071 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
10073 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
10074 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
10075 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
10076 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10077 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
10079 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
10082 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
10083 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
10084 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
10085 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10087 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
10091 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
10092 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
10093 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);