Merge pull request #1860 from wpaulino/open-channel-anchors-support
[rust-lightning] / lightning / src / ln / channelmanager.rs
1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
2 // history.
3 //
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
8 // licenses.
9
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
11 //!
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
15 //!
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`find_route`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
19 //!
20 //! [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
21
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
25 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26
27 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
31
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
35 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
36
37 use crate::chain;
38 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
39 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
40 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
41 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
43 // construct one themselves.
44 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
45 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
46 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
47 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
48 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
49 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
50 use crate::routing::router::{DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, Router};
51 use crate::routing::scoring::ProbabilisticScorer;
52 use crate::ln::msgs;
53 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
54 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
55 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
56 #[cfg(test)]
57 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
58 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PendingOutboundPayment};
59 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
60 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, Sign, SignerProvider};
61 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
62 use crate::util::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
63 use crate::util::events;
64 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
65 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
66 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
67 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
68 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
69
70 use crate::io;
71 use crate::prelude::*;
72 use core::{cmp, mem};
73 use core::cell::RefCell;
74 use crate::io::Read;
75 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock};
76 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
77 use core::time::Duration;
78 use core::ops::Deref;
79
80 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
81 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::PaymentSendFailure;
82
83 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
84 //
85 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
86 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
87 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
88 //
89 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
90 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
91 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
92 // before we forward it.
93 //
94 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
95 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
96 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
97 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
98 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
99
100 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
101 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
102         Forward {
103                 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
104                 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
105                 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
106                 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
107         },
108         Receive {
109                 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
110                 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
111                 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
112         },
113         ReceiveKeysend {
114                 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
115                 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
116         },
117 }
118
119 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
120 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
121         pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
122         pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
123         payment_hash: PaymentHash,
124         pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
125         pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
126         pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
127 }
128
129 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
130 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
131         Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
132         Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
133 }
134
135 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
136 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
137 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
138         Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
139         Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
140 }
141
142 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
143         pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
144
145         // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
146         // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
147         // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
148         // HTLCs.
149         //
150         // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
151         prev_short_channel_id: u64,
152         prev_htlc_id: u64,
153         prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
154         prev_user_channel_id: u128,
155 }
156
157 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
158         AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
159         FailHTLC {
160                 htlc_id: u64,
161                 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
162         },
163 }
164
165 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
166 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
167 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
168         // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
169         short_channel_id: u64,
170         htlc_id: u64,
171         incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
172         phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
173
174         // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
175         // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
176         outpoint: OutPoint,
177 }
178
179 enum OnionPayload {
180         /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
181         Invoice {
182                 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
183                 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
184                 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
185         },
186         /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
187         Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
188 }
189
190 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
191 struct ClaimableHTLC {
192         prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
193         cltv_expiry: u32,
194         /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
195         value: u64,
196         onion_payload: OnionPayload,
197         timer_ticks: u8,
198         /// The sum total of all MPP parts
199         total_msat: u64,
200 }
201
202 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
203 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
204 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
205 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
206
207 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
208         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
209                 self.0.write(w)
210         }
211 }
212
213 impl Readable for PaymentId {
214         fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
215                 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
216                 Ok(PaymentId(buf))
217         }
218 }
219
220 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
221 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
222 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
223 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
224
225 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
226         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
227                 self.0.write(w)
228         }
229 }
230
231 impl Readable for InterceptId {
232         fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
233                 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
234                 Ok(InterceptId(buf))
235         }
236 }
237 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
238 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
239 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
240 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
241         PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
242         OutboundRoute {
243                 path: Vec<RouteHop>,
244                 session_priv: SecretKey,
245                 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
246                 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
247                 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
248                 payment_id: PaymentId,
249                 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
250                 payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters>,
251         },
252 }
253 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
254 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
255         fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
256                 match self {
257                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
258                                 0u8.hash(hasher);
259                                 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
260                         },
261                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payment_params } => {
262                                 1u8.hash(hasher);
263                                 path.hash(hasher);
264                                 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
265                                 payment_id.hash(hasher);
266                                 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
267                                 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
268                                 payment_params.hash(hasher);
269                         },
270                 }
271         }
272 }
273 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
274 #[cfg(test)]
275 impl HTLCSource {
276         pub fn dummy() -> Self {
277                 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
278                         path: Vec::new(),
279                         session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
280                         first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
281                         payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
282                         payment_secret: None,
283                         payment_params: None,
284                 }
285         }
286 }
287
288 struct ReceiveError {
289         err_code: u16,
290         err_data: Vec<u8>,
291         msg: &'static str,
292 }
293
294 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>);
295
296 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
297 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
298 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
299 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
300 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
301
302 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
303         err: msgs::LightningError,
304         chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
305         shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
306 }
307 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
308         #[inline]
309         fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
310                 Self {
311                         err: LightningError {
312                                 err: err.clone(),
313                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
314                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
315                                                 channel_id,
316                                                 data: err
317                                         },
318                                 },
319                         },
320                         chan_id: None,
321                         shutdown_finish: None,
322                 }
323         }
324         #[inline]
325         fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
326                 Self {
327                         err: LightningError {
328                                 err,
329                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
330                         },
331                         chan_id: None,
332                         shutdown_finish: None,
333                 }
334         }
335         #[inline]
336         fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
337                 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
338         }
339         #[inline]
340         fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
341                 Self {
342                         err: LightningError {
343                                 err: err.clone(),
344                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
345                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
346                                                 channel_id,
347                                                 data: err
348                                         },
349                                 },
350                         },
351                         chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
352                         shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
353                 }
354         }
355         #[inline]
356         fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
357                 Self {
358                         err: match err {
359                                 ChannelError::Warn(msg) =>  LightningError {
360                                         err: msg.clone(),
361                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
362                                                 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
363                                                         channel_id,
364                                                         data: msg
365                                                 },
366                                                 log_level: Level::Warn,
367                                         },
368                                 },
369                                 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
370                                         err: msg,
371                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
372                                 },
373                                 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
374                                         err: msg.clone(),
375                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
376                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
377                                                         channel_id,
378                                                         data: msg
379                                                 },
380                                         },
381                                 },
382                         },
383                         chan_id: None,
384                         shutdown_finish: None,
385                 }
386         }
387 }
388
389 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
390 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
391 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
392 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
393 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
394
395 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
396 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
397 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
398 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
399 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
400 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
401         /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
402         CommitmentFirst,
403         /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
404         RevokeAndACKFirst,
405 }
406
407 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
408 struct ClaimingPayment {
409         amount_msat: u64,
410         payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
411         receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
412 }
413 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
414         (0, amount_msat, required),
415         (2, payment_purpose, required),
416         (4, receiver_node_id, required),
417 });
418
419 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
420 struct ClaimablePayments {
421         /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
422         /// failed/claimed by the user.
423         ///
424         /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
425         /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
426         ///
427         /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
428         /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
429         claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, (events::PaymentPurpose, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>)>,
430
431         /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
432         /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
433         /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
434         pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
435 }
436
437 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
438 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
439 /// quite some time lag.
440 enum BackgroundEvent {
441         /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
442         /// commitment transaction.
443         ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
444 }
445
446 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
447         /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
448         /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
449         /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
450         /// event can be generated.
451         PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
452         /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user.
453         EmitEvent { event: events::Event },
454 }
455
456 /// State we hold per-peer.
457 pub(super) struct PeerState<Signer: Sign> {
458         /// `temporary_channel_id` or `channel_id` -> `channel`.
459         ///
460         /// Holds all channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once a channel has been assigned a
461         /// `channel_id`, the `temporary_channel_id` key in the map is updated and is replaced by the
462         /// `channel_id`.
463         pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
464         /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
465         latest_features: InitFeatures,
466         /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
467         /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
468         pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
469 }
470
471 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
472 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
473 ///
474 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
475 /// here.
476 ///
477 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
478 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
479 struct PendingInboundPayment {
480         /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
481         payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
482         /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
483         /// this payment being removed.
484         expiry_time: u64,
485         /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
486         user_payment_id: u64,
487         // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
488         payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
489         min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
490 }
491
492 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
493 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
494 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
495 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
496 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
497 /// that implements KeysInterface or Router for its keys manager and router, respectively, but this
498 /// type alias chooses the concrete types of KeysManager and DefaultRouter.
499 ///
500 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
501 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
502         Arc<M>,
503         Arc<T>,
504         Arc<KeysManager>,
505         Arc<KeysManager>,
506         Arc<KeysManager>,
507         Arc<F>,
508         Arc<DefaultRouter<
509                 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
510                 Arc<L>,
511                 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>
512         >>,
513         Arc<L>
514 >;
515
516 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
517 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
518 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
519 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
520 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
521 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
522 /// that implements KeysInterface or Router for its keys manager and router, respectively, but this
523 /// type alias chooses the concrete types of KeysManager and DefaultRouter.
524 ///
525 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
526 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e DefaultRouter<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L, &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>>, &'g L>;
527
528 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
529 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
530 ///
531 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
532 /// to individual Channels.
533 ///
534 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
535 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
536 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
537 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
538 ///
539 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
540 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
541 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
542 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
543 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
544 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
545 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
546 ///
547 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
548 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
549 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
550 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
551 /// object!
552 ///
553 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
554 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
555 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
556 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
557 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
558 ///
559 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
560 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
561 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
562 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
563 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
564 //
565 // Lock order:
566 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
567 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
568 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
569 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
570 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
571 //
572 // Lock order tree:
573 //
574 // `total_consistency_lock`
575 //  |
576 //  |__`forward_htlcs`
577 //  |   |
578 //  |   |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
579 //  |
580 //  |__`per_peer_state`
581 //  |   |
582 //  |   |__`pending_inbound_payments`
583 //  |       |
584 //  |       |__`claimable_payments`
585 //  |       |
586 //  |       |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
587 //  |           |
588 //  |           |__`peer_state`
589 //  |               |
590 //  |               |__`id_to_peer`
591 //  |               |
592 //  |               |__`short_to_chan_info`
593 //  |               |
594 //  |               |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
595 //  |               |
596 //  |               |__`best_block`
597 //  |               |
598 //  |               |__`pending_events`
599 //  |                   |
600 //  |                   |__`pending_background_events`
601 //
602 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
603 where
604         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
605         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
606         ES::Target: EntropySource,
607         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
608         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
609         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
610         R::Target: Router,
611         L::Target: Logger,
612 {
613         default_configuration: UserConfig,
614         genesis_hash: BlockHash,
615         fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
616         chain_monitor: M,
617         tx_broadcaster: T,
618         #[allow(unused)]
619         router: R,
620
621         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
622         #[cfg(test)]
623         pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
624         #[cfg(not(test))]
625         best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
626         secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
627
628         /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
629         /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
630         /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
631         /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
632         ///
633         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
634         pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
635
636         /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
637         /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
638         /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
639         /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
640         /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
641         /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
642         /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
643         /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
644         ///
645         /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
646         ///
647         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
648         pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
649
650         /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
651         ///
652         /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
653         /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
654         /// and via the classic SCID.
655         ///
656         /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
657         /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
658         ///
659         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
660         #[cfg(test)]
661         pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
662         #[cfg(not(test))]
663         forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
664         /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
665         /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
666         ///
667         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
668         pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
669
670         /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
671         /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
672         ///
673         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
674         claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
675
676         /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
677         /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
678         /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
679         /// active channel list on load.
680         ///
681         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
682         outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
683
684         /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
685         ///
686         /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
687         /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
688         /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
689         ///
690         /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
691         /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
692         /// the handling of the events.
693         ///
694         /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
695         /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
696         ///
697         /// TODO:
698         /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
699         /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
700         /// would break backwards compatability.
701         /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
702         /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
703         /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
704         ///
705         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
706         id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
707
708         /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
709         ///
710         /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
711         /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
712         /// confirmation depth.
713         ///
714         /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
715         /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
716         /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
717         ///
718         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
719         #[cfg(test)]
720         pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
721         #[cfg(not(test))]
722         short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
723
724         our_network_key: SecretKey,
725         our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
726
727         inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
728
729         /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
730         /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
731         /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
732         ///
733         /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
734         fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
735
736         /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
737         /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
738         /// keeping additional state.
739         probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
740
741         /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
742         /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
743         /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
744         highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
745
746         /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (message queues and the like). Currently
747         /// the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer basis, as well as the peer's latest
748         /// features.
749         ///
750         /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
751         /// are currently open with that peer.
752         ///
753         /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
754         /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
755         /// channels.
756         ///
757         /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
758         ///
759         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
760         #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
761         per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
762         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
763         pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
764
765         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
766         pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
767         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
768         pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
769         /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
770         /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
771         /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
772         /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
773         /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
774         /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
775         total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
776
777         persistence_notifier: Notifier,
778
779         entropy_source: ES,
780         node_signer: NS,
781         signer_provider: SP,
782
783         logger: L,
784 }
785
786 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
787 ///
788 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
789 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
790 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
791 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
792 pub struct ChainParameters {
793         /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
794         pub network: Network,
795
796         /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
797         ///
798         /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
799         pub best_block: BestBlock,
800 }
801
802 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
803 enum NotifyOption {
804         DoPersist,
805         SkipPersist,
806 }
807
808 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
809 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
810 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
811 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
812 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
813 /// updates are ready for persistence).
814 ///
815 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
816 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
817 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
818 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
819         persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
820         should_persist: F,
821         // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
822         _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
823 }
824
825 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
826         fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
827                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
828         }
829
830         fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
831                 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
832
833                 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
834                         persistence_notifier: notifier,
835                         should_persist: persist_check,
836                         _read_guard: read_guard,
837                 }
838         }
839 }
840
841 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
842         fn drop(&mut self) {
843                 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
844                         self.persistence_notifier.notify();
845                 }
846         }
847 }
848
849 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
850 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
851 ///
852 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
853 ///
854 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
855 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
856 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
857 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
858 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
859
860 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
861 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
862 ///
863 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
864 ///
865 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
866 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
867 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
868 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
869 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
870 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
871 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
872 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
873 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
874 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
875 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
876 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
877 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
878
879 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
880 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
881 /// this value.
882 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
883 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
884 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
885 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
886
887 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
888 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
889 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
890 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
891 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
892 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
893 #[deny(const_err)]
894 #[allow(dead_code)]
895 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
896
897 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
898 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
899 #[deny(const_err)]
900 #[allow(dead_code)]
901 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
902
903 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
904 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
905
906 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
907 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
908 /// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
909 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
910
911 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
912 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
913 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
914         /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
915         pub fee_base_msat: u32,
916         /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
917         pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
918         /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
919         /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
920         /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
921         pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
922 }
923
924 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
925 /// to better separate parameters.
926 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
927 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
928         /// The node_id of our counterparty
929         pub node_id: PublicKey,
930         /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
931         /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
932         /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
933         pub features: InitFeatures,
934         /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
935         /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
936         /// claiming at least this value on chain.
937         ///
938         /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
939         ///
940         /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
941         pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
942         /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
943         /// payments to us through this channel.
944         pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
945         /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
946         /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
947         /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
948         pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
949         /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
950         pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
951 }
952
953 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
954 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
955 pub struct ChannelDetails {
956         /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
957         /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
958         /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
959         /// lifetime of the channel.
960         pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
961         /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
962         pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
963         /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
964         /// our counterparty already.
965         ///
966         /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
967         /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
968         pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
969         /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
970         ///
971         /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
972         pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
973         /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
974         /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
975         ///
976         /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
977         /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
978         ///
979         /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
980         /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
981         ///
982         /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
983         /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
984         /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
985         /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
986         /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
987         pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
988         /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
989         /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
990         /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
991         /// `Some(0)`).
992         ///
993         /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
994         ///
995         /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
996         /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
997         pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
998         /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
999         /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1000         /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1001         /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1002         ///
1003         /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1004         /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1005         ///
1006         /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1007         pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1008         /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1009         pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1010         /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1011         /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1012         /// this value on chain.
1013         ///
1014         /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1015         ///
1016         /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1017         ///
1018         /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1019         pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1020         /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1021         /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1022         /// 0.0.113.
1023         pub user_channel_id: u128,
1024         /// Our total balance.  This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1025         /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1026         /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1027         ///
1028         /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1029         /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1030         /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1031         /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1032         ///
1033         /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1034         pub balance_msat: u64,
1035         /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1036         /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1037         /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1038         /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1039         ///
1040         /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1041         ///
1042         /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1043         /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1044         /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1045         pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1046         /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1047         /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1048         /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1049         /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1050         ///
1051         /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1052         pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1053         /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1054         /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1055         /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1056         /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1057         /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1058         ///
1059         /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1060         /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1061         /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1062         pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1063         /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1064         /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1065         /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1066         /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1067         /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1068         ///
1069         /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1070         ///
1071         /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1072         /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1073         /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1074         pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1075         /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1076         ///
1077         /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1078         pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1079         /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1080         /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1081         /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1082         /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1083         /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1084         ///
1085         /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1086         pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1087         /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1088         pub is_outbound: bool,
1089         /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1090         /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1091         /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1092         /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1093         /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1094         ///
1095         /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1096         pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1097         /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1098         /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1099         ///
1100         /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1101         pub is_usable: bool,
1102         /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1103         pub is_public: bool,
1104         /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1105         /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1106         pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1107         /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1108         pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1109         /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1110         ///
1111         /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1112         pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1113 }
1114
1115 impl ChannelDetails {
1116         /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1117         /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1118         /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1119         ///
1120         /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1121         /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1122         pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1123                 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1124         }
1125
1126         /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1127         /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1128         /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1129         ///
1130         /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1131         /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1132         pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1133                 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1134         }
1135 }
1136
1137 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1138 ///
1139 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1140 #[derive(Clone)]
1141 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1142         /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1143         pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1144         /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1145         /// route hints.
1146         pub phantom_scid: u64,
1147         /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1148         pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1149 }
1150
1151 macro_rules! handle_error {
1152         ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1153                 match $internal {
1154                         Ok(msg) => Ok(msg),
1155                         Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1156                                 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1157                                 {
1158                                         // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1159                                         // entering the macro.
1160                                         assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
1161                                         assert!($self.per_peer_state.try_write().is_ok());
1162                                 }
1163
1164                                 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1165
1166                                 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1167                                         $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1168                                         if let Some(update) = update_option {
1169                                                 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1170                                                         msg: update
1171                                                 });
1172                                         }
1173                                         if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1174                                                 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1175                                                         channel_id, user_channel_id,
1176                                                         reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1177                                                 });
1178                                         }
1179                                 }
1180
1181                                 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1182                                 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1183                                 } else {
1184                                         msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1185                                                 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1186                                                 action: err.action.clone()
1187                                         });
1188                                 }
1189
1190                                 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1191                                         let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1192                                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1193                                                 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1194                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1195                                         }
1196                                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1197                                         {
1198                                                 if let None = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1199                                                         // This shouldn't occour in tests unless an unkown counterparty_node_id
1200                                                         // has been passed to our message handling functions.
1201                                                         let expected_error_str = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", $counterparty_node_id);
1202                                                         match err.action {
1203                                                                 msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1204                                                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { ref channel_id, ref data }
1205                                                                 }
1206                                                                 => {
1207                                                                         assert_eq!(*data, expected_error_str);
1208                                                                         if let Some((err_channel_id, _user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1209                                                                                 assert_eq!(*channel_id, err_channel_id);
1210                                                                         }
1211                                                                 }
1212                                                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1213                                                         }
1214                                                 }
1215                                         }
1216                                 }
1217
1218                                 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1219                                 Err(err)
1220                         },
1221                 }
1222         }
1223 }
1224
1225 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1226         ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {{
1227                 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
1228                 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1229                 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1230                         short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1231                 } else {
1232                         // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1233                         // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1234                         // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1235                         // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1236                         // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1237                         // stage.
1238                         let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1239                         debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1240                 }
1241                 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1242         }}
1243 }
1244
1245 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1246 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1247         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1248                 match $err {
1249                         ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1250                                 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1251                         },
1252                         ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1253                                 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1254                         },
1255                         ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1256                                 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1257                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel);
1258                                 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1259                                 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1260                                         shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1261                         },
1262                 }
1263         }
1264 }
1265
1266 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1267         ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1268                 match $res {
1269                         Ok(res) => res,
1270                         Err(e) => {
1271                                 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1272                                 if drop {
1273                                         $entry.remove_entry();
1274                                 }
1275                                 break Err(res);
1276                         }
1277                 }
1278         }
1279 }
1280
1281 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1282         ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1283                 match $res {
1284                         Ok(res) => res,
1285                         Err(e) => {
1286                                 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1287                                 if drop {
1288                                         $entry.remove_entry();
1289                                 }
1290                                 return Err(res);
1291                         }
1292                 }
1293         }
1294 }
1295
1296 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1297         ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1298                 {
1299                         let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1300                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, channel);
1301                         channel
1302                 }
1303         }
1304 }
1305
1306 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_res {
1307         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1308                 match $err {
1309                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1310                                 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1311                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan);
1312                                 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1313                                 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1314                                 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1315                                 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1316                                 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1317                                 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1318                                 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1319                                 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1320                                 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1321                                 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1322                                                 $chan.force_shutdown(false), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1323                                 (res, true)
1324                         },
1325                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1326                                 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update in progress. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1327                                                 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1328                                                 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1329                                                                 match $action_type {
1330                                                                         RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1331                                                                         RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1332                                                                 }
1333                                                         } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1334                                                         else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1335                                                         else { "nothing" },
1336                                                 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1337                                                 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1338                                                 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1339                                 if !$resend_commitment {
1340                                         debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1341                                 }
1342                                 if !$resend_raa {
1343                                         debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1344                                 }
1345                                 $chan.monitor_updating_paused($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1346                                 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1347                         },
1348                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1349                                 (Ok(()), false)
1350                         },
1351                 }
1352         };
1353         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1354                 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1355                 if drop {
1356                         $entry.remove_entry();
1357                 }
1358                 res
1359         } };
1360         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY) => { {
1361                 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1362                 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1363         } };
1364         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, NO_UPDATE) => {
1365                 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1366         };
1367         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_channel_ready: expr, OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED) => {
1368                 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, false, $resend_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1369         };
1370         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1371                 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1372         };
1373         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1374                 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
1375         };
1376 }
1377
1378 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1379         ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1380                 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1381                         node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1382                         msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1383                 });
1384                 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1385                 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1386                 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1387                 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1388                 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1389                         "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1390                 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1391                         let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1392                         assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1393                                 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1394                 }
1395         }}
1396 }
1397
1398 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1399         ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1400                 if $channel.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1401                         {
1402                                 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1403                                 pending_events.push(events::Event::ChannelReady {
1404                                         channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1405                                         user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1406                                         counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1407                                         channel_type: $channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
1408                                 });
1409                         }
1410                         $channel.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1411                 }
1412         }
1413 }
1414
1415 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1416 where
1417         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1418         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1419         ES::Target: EntropySource,
1420         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1421         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1422         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1423         R::Target: Router,
1424         L::Target: Logger,
1425 {
1426         /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1427         ///
1428         /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1429         /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1430         ///
1431         /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1432         ///
1433         /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1434         /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1435         /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1436         pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1437                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1438                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1439                 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1440                 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1441                 ChannelManager {
1442                         default_configuration: config.clone(),
1443                         genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1444                         fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1445                         chain_monitor,
1446                         tx_broadcaster,
1447                         router,
1448
1449                         best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1450
1451                         outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1452                         pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1453                         pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
1454                         forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1455                         claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
1456                         pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1457                         id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1458                         short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1459
1460                         our_network_key: node_signer.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1461                         our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &node_signer.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap()),
1462                         secp_ctx,
1463
1464                         inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1465                         fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1466
1467                         probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1468
1469                         highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1470
1471                         per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1472
1473                         pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1474                         pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1475                         total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1476                         persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
1477
1478                         entropy_source,
1479                         node_signer,
1480                         signer_provider,
1481
1482                         logger,
1483                 }
1484         }
1485
1486         /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1487         pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1488                 &self.default_configuration
1489         }
1490
1491         fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1492                 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1493                 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1494                 let mut i = 0;
1495                 loop {
1496                         if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1497                                 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1498                         } else {
1499                                 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
1500                         }
1501                         if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1502                                 break;
1503                         }
1504                         i += 1;
1505                         if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1506                 }
1507                 outbound_scid_alias
1508         }
1509
1510         /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1511         ///
1512         /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1513         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1514         /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
1515         /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
1516         /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
1517         ///
1518         /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1519         /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1520         ///
1521         /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1522         /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1523         /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1524         ///
1525         /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1526         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1527         /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1528         /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1529         /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1530         /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1531         ///
1532         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1533         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1534         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1535         pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1536                 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1537                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1538                 }
1539
1540                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1541                 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1542                 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1543
1544                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1545
1546                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key);
1547                 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
1548                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) });
1549                 }
1550
1551                 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1552                 let channel = {
1553                         let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1554                         let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1555                         let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1556                         match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
1557                                 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1558                                 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1559                         {
1560                                 Ok(res) => res,
1561                                 Err(e) => {
1562                                         self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1563                                         return Err(e);
1564                                 },
1565                         }
1566                 };
1567                 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1568
1569                 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1570                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1571                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1572                                 if cfg!(fuzzing) {
1573                                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1574                                 } else {
1575                                         panic!("RNG is bad???");
1576                                 }
1577                         },
1578                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1579                 }
1580
1581                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1582                         node_id: their_network_key,
1583                         msg: res,
1584                 });
1585                 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1586         }
1587
1588         fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1589                 let mut res = Vec::new();
1590                 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
1591                 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
1592                 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
1593                 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
1594                 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
1595                 // the same channel.
1596                 res.reserve(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
1597                 {
1598                         let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1599                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1600                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
1601                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1602                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1603                                 for (channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1604                                         let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1605                                         let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1606                                                 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1607                                         res.push(ChannelDetails {
1608                                                 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1609                                                 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1610                                                         node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1611                                                         features: peer_state.latest_features.clone(),
1612                                                         unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1613                                                         forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1614                                                         // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1615                                                         // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1616                                                         // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1617                                                         // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1618                                                         // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1619                                                         outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1620                                                                 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1621                                                         outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1622                                                 },
1623                                                 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1624                                                 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1625                                                 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1626                                                 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1627                                                 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1628                                                 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1629                                                 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1630                                                 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1631                                                 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1632                                                 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1633                                                 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1634                                                 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1635                                                 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1636                                                 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1637                                                 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1638                                                 confirmations: Some(channel.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1639                                                 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1640                                                 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1641                                                 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1642                                                 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1643                                                 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1644                                                 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1645                                                 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1646                                                 config: Some(channel.config()),
1647                                         });
1648                                 }
1649                         }
1650                 }
1651                 res
1652         }
1653
1654         /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1655         /// more information.
1656         pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1657                 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1658         }
1659
1660         /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to [`find_route`]
1661         /// to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1662         ///
1663         /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1664         /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1665         /// are.
1666         ///
1667         /// [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
1668         pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1669                 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1670                 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1671                 // really wanted anyway.
1672                 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1673         }
1674
1675         /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1676         fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1677                 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1678                 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1679                         Some(transaction) => {
1680                                 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1681                         },
1682                         None => {},
1683                 }
1684                 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1685                         channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1686                         user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1687                         reason: closure_reason
1688                 });
1689         }
1690
1691         fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1692                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1693
1694                 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1695                 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1696                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1697
1698                         let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
1699                         if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
1700                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) });
1701                         }
1702
1703                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1704                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1705                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1706                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1707                                         let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?;
1708                                         failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1709
1710                                         // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1711                                         if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1712                                                 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update);
1713                                                 let (result, is_permanent) =
1714                                                         handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
1715                                                 if is_permanent {
1716                                                         remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1717                                                         break result;
1718                                                 }
1719                                         }
1720
1721                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1722                                                 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
1723                                                 msg: shutdown_msg
1724                                         });
1725
1726                                         if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1727                                                 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1728                                                 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1729                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1730                                                                 msg: channel_update
1731                                                         });
1732                                                 }
1733                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1734                                         }
1735                                         break Ok(());
1736                                 },
1737                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id) })
1738                         }
1739                 };
1740
1741                 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1742                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1743                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
1744                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
1745                 }
1746
1747                 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
1748                 Ok(())
1749         }
1750
1751         /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1752         /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1753         /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1754         ///
1755         ///  * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1756         ///    [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1757         ///    estimate.
1758         ///  * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1759         ///    transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1760         ///    would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1761         ///    counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1762         ///
1763         /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1764         ///
1765         /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1766         /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1767         /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1768         pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1769                 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None)
1770         }
1771
1772         /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1773         /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1774         /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1775         ///
1776         /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1777         /// the channel being closed or not:
1778         ///  * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1779         ///    transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1780         ///    [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1781         ///    estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1782         ///  * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1783         ///    transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1784         ///    will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1785         ///
1786         /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1787         ///
1788         /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1789         /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1790         /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1791         pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1792                 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1793         }
1794
1795         #[inline]
1796         fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1797                 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1798                 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1799                 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1800                         let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
1801                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1802                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1803                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
1804                 }
1805                 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1806                         // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1807                         // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1808                         // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1809                         // ignore the result here.
1810                         let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
1811                 }
1812         }
1813
1814         /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1815         /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
1816         fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
1817         -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1818                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1819                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id);
1820                 let mut chan = {
1821                         if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
1822                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) });
1823                         }
1824                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1825                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1826                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1827                                 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
1828                                         self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
1829                                 } else {
1830                                         self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1831                                 }
1832                                 remove_channel!(self, chan)
1833                         } else {
1834                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) });
1835                         }
1836                 };
1837                 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1838                 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
1839                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1840                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1841                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1842                                 msg: update
1843                         });
1844                 }
1845
1846                 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1847         }
1848
1849         fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1850                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1851                 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
1852                         Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1853                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1854                                 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1855                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1856                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
1857                                                 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1858                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1859                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1860                                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1861                                                         },
1862                                                 }
1863                                         );
1864                                 }
1865                                 Ok(())
1866                         },
1867                         Err(e) => Err(e)
1868                 }
1869         }
1870
1871         /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
1872         /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
1873         /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
1874         /// channel.
1875         pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
1876         -> Result<(), APIError> {
1877                 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
1878         }
1879
1880         /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
1881         /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
1882         /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
1883         ///
1884         /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
1885         /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
1886         pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
1887         -> Result<(), APIError> {
1888                 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
1889         }
1890
1891         /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
1892         /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
1893         pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
1894                 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1895                         let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
1896                 }
1897         }
1898
1899         /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
1900         /// local transaction(s).
1901         pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
1902                 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1903                         let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
1904                 }
1905         }
1906
1907         fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
1908                 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
1909         {
1910                 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1911                 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != cltv_expiry {
1912                         return Err(ReceiveError {
1913                                 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value",
1914                                 err_code: 18,
1915                                 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
1916                         })
1917                 }
1918                 // final_expiry_too_soon
1919                 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
1920                 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
1921                 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
1922                 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
1923                 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
1924                 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1925                 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
1926                         let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
1927                         err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
1928                         err_data.extend_from_slice(&current_height.to_be_bytes());
1929                         return Err(ReceiveError {
1930                                 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
1931                                 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
1932                         });
1933                 }
1934                 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
1935                         return Err(ReceiveError {
1936                                 err_code: 19,
1937                                 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
1938                                 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
1939                         });
1940                 }
1941
1942                 let routing = match hop_data.format {
1943                         msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
1944                                 return Err(ReceiveError {
1945                                         err_code: 0x4000|22,
1946                                         err_data: Vec::new(),
1947                                         msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
1948                                 });
1949                         },
1950                         msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
1951                                 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
1952                                         return Err(ReceiveError {
1953                                                 err_code: 0x4000|22,
1954                                                 err_data: Vec::new(),
1955                                                 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
1956                                         });
1957                                 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
1958                                         PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
1959                                                 payment_data: data,
1960                                                 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1961                                                 phantom_shared_secret,
1962                                         }
1963                                 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
1964                                         // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
1965                                         // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
1966                                         // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
1967                                         // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
1968                                         // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
1969                                         let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1970                                         if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
1971                                                 return Err(ReceiveError {
1972                                                         err_code: 0x4000|22,
1973                                                         err_data: Vec::new(),
1974                                                         msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
1975                                                 });
1976                                         }
1977
1978                                         PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
1979                                                 payment_preimage,
1980                                                 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1981                                         }
1982                                 } else {
1983                                         return Err(ReceiveError {
1984                                                 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
1985                                                 err_data: Vec::new(),
1986                                                 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
1987                                         });
1988                                 }
1989                         },
1990                 };
1991                 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
1992                         routing,
1993                         payment_hash,
1994                         incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1995                         incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
1996                         outgoing_amt_msat: amt_msat,
1997                         outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1998                 })
1999         }
2000
2001         fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2002                 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2003                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2004                                 {
2005                                         log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2006                                         return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2007                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2008                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2009                                                 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2010                                                 failure_code: $err_code,
2011                                         }));
2012                                 }
2013                         }
2014                 }
2015
2016                 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2017                         return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2018                 }
2019
2020                 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key).secret_bytes();
2021
2022                 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2023                         //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2024                         //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2025                         //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2026                         //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2027                         //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2028                         //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2029                         return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2030                 }
2031                 macro_rules! return_err {
2032                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2033                                 {
2034                                         log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2035                                         return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2036                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2037                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2038                                                 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2039                                                         .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2040                                         }));
2041                                 }
2042                         }
2043                 }
2044
2045                 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2046                         Ok(res) => res,
2047                         Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2048                                 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2049                         },
2050                         Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2051                                 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2052                         },
2053                 };
2054
2055                 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2056                         onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2057                                 // OUR PAYMENT!
2058                                 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2059                                         Ok(info) => {
2060                                                 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2061                                                 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2062                                                 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2063                                                 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2064                                                 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2065                                         },
2066                                         Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2067                                 }
2068                         },
2069                         onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2070                                 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2071                                 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2072                                         version: 0,
2073                                         public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2074                                         hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2075                                         hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2076                                 };
2077
2078                                 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2079                                         msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2080                                         msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2081                                                 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2082                                         },
2083                                 };
2084
2085                                 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2086                                         routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2087                                                 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2088                                                 short_channel_id,
2089                                         },
2090                                         payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2091                                         incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2092                                         incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2093                                         outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2094                                         outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2095                                 })
2096                         }
2097                 };
2098
2099                 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref outgoing_amt_msat, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2100                         // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2101                         // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2102                         // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2103                         if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2104                                 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2105                                         let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(short_channel_id).cloned();
2106                                         let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2107                                                 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2108                                                         // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2109                                                         // phantom or an intercept.
2110                                                         if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2111                                                            fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2112                                                            fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)
2113                                                         {
2114                                                                 None
2115                                                         } else {
2116                                                                 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2117                                                         }
2118                                                 },
2119                                                 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2120                                         };
2121                                         let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2122                                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2123                                                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2124                                                 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
2125                                                         break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2126                                                 }
2127                                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2128                                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2129                                                 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2130                                                         None => {
2131                                                                 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
2132                                                                 // have no consistency guarantees.
2133                                                                 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2134                                                         },
2135                                                         Some(chan) => chan
2136                                                 };
2137                                                 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2138                                                         // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2139                                                         // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2140                                                         // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2141                                                         break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2142                                                 }
2143                                                 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2144                                                         // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2145                                                         // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2146                                                         // we don't have the channel here.
2147                                                         break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2148                                                 }
2149                                                 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2150
2151                                                 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2152                                                 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2153                                                 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2154                                                 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2155                                                 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2156                                                 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2157                                                         break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2158                                                 }
2159                                                 if *outgoing_amt_msat < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2160                                                         break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2161                                                 }
2162                                                 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *outgoing_amt_msat, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2163                                                         break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2164                                                 }
2165                                                 chan_update_opt
2166                                         } else {
2167                                                 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
2168                                                         // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
2169                                                         // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
2170                                                         // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
2171                                                         break Some((
2172                                                                 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2173                                                                 0x2000 | 2, None,
2174                                                         ));
2175                                                 }
2176                                                 None
2177                                         };
2178
2179                                         let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2180                                         // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2181                                         // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2182                                         // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2183                                         if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2184                                                 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2185                                         }
2186                                         if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2187                                                 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2188                                         }
2189                                         // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2190                                         // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2191                                         // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2192                                         // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2193                                         // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2194                                         // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2195                                         // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2196                                         // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2197                                         if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2198                                                 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2199                                         }
2200
2201                                         break None;
2202                                 }
2203                                 {
2204                                         let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2205                                         if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2206                                                 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2207                                                         msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2208                                                 }
2209                                                 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2210                                                         msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2211                                                 }
2212                                                 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2213                                                         // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2214                                                         0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2215                                                 }
2216                                                 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2217                                                 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2218                                                 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2219                                         } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
2220                                                 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
2221                                                 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
2222                                                 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
2223                                                 // instead.
2224                                                 code = 0x2000 | 2;
2225                                         }
2226                                         return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2227                                 }
2228                         }
2229                 }
2230
2231                 pending_forward_info
2232         }
2233
2234         /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2235         /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2236         /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2237         ///
2238         /// May be called with peer_state already locked!
2239         fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2240                 if !chan.should_announce() {
2241                         return Err(LightningError {
2242                                 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2243                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2244                         });
2245                 }
2246                 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2247                         return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2248                 }
2249                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2250                 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2251         }
2252
2253         /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2254         /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2255         /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2256         /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2257         /// May be called with peer_state already locked!
2258         fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2259                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2260                 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2261                         None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2262                         Some(id) => id,
2263                 };
2264
2265                 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2266         }
2267         fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2268                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2269                 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2270
2271                 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2272                         chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2273                         short_channel_id,
2274                         timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2275                         flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2276                         cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2277                         htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2278                         htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2279                         fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2280                         fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2281                         excess_data: Vec::new(),
2282                 };
2283
2284                 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
2285                 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
2286
2287                 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2288                         signature: sig,
2289                         contents: unsigned
2290                 })
2291         }
2292
2293         // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2294         pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2295                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2296                 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
2297                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2298
2299                 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2300                         .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2301                 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2302                 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2303                         return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2304                 }
2305                 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2306
2307                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2308
2309                 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2310                         let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2311                                 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2312                                 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
2313                         };
2314
2315                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2316                         let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2317                         if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
2318                                 return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!" });
2319                         }
2320                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2321                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2322                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
2323                                 match {
2324                                         if !chan.get().is_live() {
2325                                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2326                                         }
2327                                         break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2328                                                 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2329                                                         path: path.clone(),
2330                                                         session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2331                                                         first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2332                                                         payment_id,
2333                                                         payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2334                                                         payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2335                                                 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2336                                                 chan)
2337                                 } {
2338                                         Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2339                                                 let update_err = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update);
2340                                                 let chan_id = chan.get().channel_id();
2341                                                 match (update_err,
2342                                                         handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_err, chan,
2343                                                                 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true))
2344                                                 {
2345                                                         (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure, Err(e)) => break Err(e),
2346                                                         (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed, Ok(())) => {},
2347                                                         (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress, Err(_)) => {
2348                                                                 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
2349                                                                 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
2350                                                                 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
2351                                                                 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
2352                                                                 // which we do in the send_payment check for
2353                                                                 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
2354                                                                 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
2355                                                         },
2356                                                         _ => unreachable!(),
2357                                                 }
2358
2359                                                 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan_id));
2360                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2361                                                         node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2362                                                         updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2363                                                                 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2364                                                                 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2365                                                                 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2366                                                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2367                                                                 update_fee: None,
2368                                                                 commitment_signed,
2369                                                         },
2370                                                 });
2371                                         },
2372                                         None => { },
2373                                 }
2374                         } else {
2375                                 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
2376                                 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
2377                                 // `channel_by_id` map.
2378                                 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
2379                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
2380                         }
2381                         return Ok(());
2382                 };
2383
2384                 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2385                         Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2386                         Err(e) => {
2387                                 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2388                         },
2389                 }
2390         }
2391
2392         /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2393         ///
2394         /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
2395         /// fields for more info.
2396         ///
2397         /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
2398         /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
2399         /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
2400         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a second payment with the same
2401         /// [`PaymentId`].
2402         ///
2403         /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
2404         /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
2405         /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
2406         /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
2407         /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
2408         ///
2409         /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
2410         /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
2411         ///
2412         /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2413         /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2414         /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
2415         ///
2416         /// In general, a path may raise:
2417         ///  * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2418         ///    node public key) is specified.
2419         ///  * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2420         ///    (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2421         ///    failure).
2422         ///  * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2423         ///    relevant updates.
2424         ///
2425         /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2426         /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2427         /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2428         ///
2429         /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
2430         /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
2431         /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
2432         /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
2433         /// payment_secret.
2434         ///
2435         /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
2436         /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
2437         /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2438         ///
2439         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2440         /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
2441         pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2442                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2443                 self.pending_outbound_payments
2444                         .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2445                                 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2446                                 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2447         }
2448
2449         #[cfg(test)]
2450         fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2451                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2452                 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2453                         |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2454                         self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2455         }
2456
2457         #[cfg(test)]
2458         pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2459                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2460                 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, route, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
2461         }
2462
2463
2464         /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2465         ///
2466         /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2467         /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2468         /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, if the payment
2469         /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success), or if
2470         /// further retries have been disabled with [`abandon_payment`].
2471         ///
2472         /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2473         /// [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]
2474         pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2475                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2476                 self.pending_outbound_payments.retry_payment_with_route(route, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2477                         |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2478                         self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2479         }
2480
2481         /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur.
2482         ///
2483         /// After this method returns, no future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id`
2484         /// are allowed. If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be
2485         /// generated as soon as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
2486         ///
2487         /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2488         /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2489         /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2490         ///
2491         /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
2492         /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, the payment may still be in the pending state
2493         /// upon restart. This allows further calls to [`retry_payment`] (and requiring a second call
2494         /// to [`abandon_payment`] to mark the payment as failed again). Otherwise, future calls to
2495         /// [`retry_payment`] will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`].
2496         ///
2497         /// [`abandon_payment`]: Self::abandon_payment
2498         /// [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment
2499         /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2500         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2501         pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2502                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2503                 if let Some(payment_failed_ev) = self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id) {
2504                         self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(payment_failed_ev);
2505                 }
2506         }
2507
2508         /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2509         /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2510         /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2511         /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2512         /// never reach the recipient.
2513         ///
2514         /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
2515         /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
2516         ///
2517         /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2518         /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2519         ///
2520         /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2521         ///
2522         /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2523         pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2524                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2525                 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(route, payment_preimage, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2526                         |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2527                         self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2528         }
2529
2530         /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
2531         /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
2532         /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
2533         pub fn send_probe(&self, hops: Vec<RouteHop>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2534                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2535                 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(hops, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2536                         |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2537                         self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2538         }
2539
2540         /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
2541         /// payment probe.
2542         #[cfg(test)]
2543         pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
2544                 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
2545         }
2546
2547         /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2548         /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2549         fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2550                 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2551         ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2552                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2553                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
2554                 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
2555                         return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })
2556                 }
2557
2558                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2559                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2560                 let (chan, msg) = {
2561                         let (res, chan) = {
2562                                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2563                                         Some(mut chan) => {
2564                                                 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2565
2566                                                 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2567                                                         .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2568                                                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2569                                                         } else { unreachable!(); })
2570                                                 , chan)
2571                                         },
2572                                         None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) }) },
2573                                 }
2574                         };
2575                         match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2576                                 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2577                                         (chan, funding_msg)
2578                                 },
2579                                 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2580                                         err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2581                                 }) },
2582                         }
2583                 };
2584
2585                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2586                         node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2587                         msg,
2588                 });
2589                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2590                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2591                                 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2592                         },
2593                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2594                                 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
2595                                 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
2596                                         panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
2597                                 }
2598                                 e.insert(chan);
2599                         }
2600                 }
2601                 Ok(())
2602         }
2603
2604         #[cfg(test)]
2605         pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2606                 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2607                         Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2608                 })
2609         }
2610
2611         /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2612         ///
2613         /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2614         /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2615         ///
2616         /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
2617         /// across the p2p network.
2618         ///
2619         /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2620         /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2621         ///
2622         /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2623         /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2624         /// keys per-channel).
2625         ///
2626         /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2627         /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2628         /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2629         ///
2630         /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2631         /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2632         /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2633         ///
2634         /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
2635         /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
2636         /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
2637         /// for more details.
2638         ///
2639         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2640         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2641         pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2642                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2643
2644                 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2645                         if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2646                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2647                                         err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2648                                 });
2649                         }
2650                 }
2651                 {
2652                         let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2653                         // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools at the next block. However, the modules
2654                         // constituting our Lightning node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if
2655                         // the wallet module is in advance on the LDK view, allow one more block of headroom.
2656                         if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 2 {
2657                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2658                                         err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
2659                                 });
2660                         }
2661                 }
2662                 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2663                         let mut output_index = None;
2664                         let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2665                         for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2666                                 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2667                                         if output_index.is_some() {
2668                                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2669                                                         err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2670                                                 });
2671                                         }
2672                                         if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2673                                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2674                                                         err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2675                                                 });
2676                                         }
2677                                         output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2678                                 }
2679                         }
2680                         if output_index.is_none() {
2681                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2682                                         err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2683                                 });
2684                         }
2685                         Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2686                 })
2687         }
2688
2689         /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
2690         ///
2691         /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
2692         /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
2693         /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
2694         /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
2695         ///
2696         /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
2697         /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
2698         ///
2699         /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
2700         /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
2701         ///
2702         /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
2703         ///
2704         /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
2705         /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
2706         /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
2707         /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
2708         /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2709         /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
2710         /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
2711         pub fn update_channel_config(
2712                 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
2713         ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2714                 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
2715                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2716                                 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
2717                         });
2718                 }
2719
2720                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
2721                         &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
2722                 );
2723                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2724                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
2725                 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
2726                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) });
2727                 }
2728                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2729                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2730                 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2731                         if !peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) {
2732                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2733                                         err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
2734                                 });
2735                         }
2736                 }
2737                 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2738                         let channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
2739                         if !channel.update_config(config) {
2740                                 continue;
2741                         }
2742                         if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
2743                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
2744                         } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
2745                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2746                                         node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2747                                         msg,
2748                                 });
2749                         }
2750                 }
2751                 Ok(())
2752         }
2753
2754         /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
2755         /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
2756         ///
2757         /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
2758         /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
2759         ///
2760         /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
2761         /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
2762         /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
2763         /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
2764         /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
2765         ///
2766         /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
2767         /// you from forwarding more than you received.
2768         ///
2769         /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
2770         /// backwards.
2771         ///
2772         /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
2773         /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
2774         // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
2775         // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
2776         pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2777                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2778
2779                 let next_hop_scid = {
2780                         let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2781                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id) {
2782                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2783                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2784                                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
2785                                         Some(chan) => {
2786                                                 if !chan.is_usable() {
2787                                                         return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2788                                                                 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
2789                                                         })
2790                                                 }
2791                                                 chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.outbound_scid_alias())
2792                                         },
2793                                         None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2794                                                 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id)
2795                                         })
2796                                 }
2797                         } else {
2798                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) });
2799                         }
2800                 };
2801
2802                 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
2803                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
2804                                 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
2805                         })?;
2806
2807                 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
2808                         PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
2809                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
2810                         },
2811                         _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
2812                 };
2813                 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
2814                         outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
2815                 };
2816
2817                 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
2818                         payment.prev_short_channel_id,
2819                         payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
2820                         payment.prev_user_channel_id,
2821                         vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
2822                 )];
2823                 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
2824                 Ok(())
2825         }
2826
2827         /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
2828         /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
2829         ///
2830         /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
2831         /// backwards.
2832         ///
2833         /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
2834         pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2835                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2836
2837                 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
2838                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
2839                                 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
2840                         })?;
2841
2842                 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
2843                         let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2844                                 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
2845                                 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
2846                                 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
2847                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
2848                                 phantom_shared_secret: None,
2849                         });
2850
2851                         let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
2852                         let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
2853                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
2854                 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
2855
2856                 Ok(())
2857         }
2858
2859         /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
2860         ///
2861         /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
2862         /// Will likely generate further events.
2863         pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
2864                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2865
2866                 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2867                 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
2868                 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
2869                 {
2870                         let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
2871                         mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
2872
2873                         for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
2874                                 if short_chan_id != 0 {
2875                                         macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
2876                                                 () => {
2877                                                         for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2878                                                                 match forward_info {
2879                                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
2880                                                                                 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
2881                                                                                 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2882                                                                                         routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
2883                                                                                         outgoing_cltv_value, incoming_amt_msat: _
2884                                                                                 }
2885                                                                         }) => {
2886                                                                                 macro_rules! failure_handler {
2887                                                                                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
2888                                                                                                 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2889
2890                                                                                                 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2891                                                                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2892                                                                                                         outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2893                                                                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2894                                                                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2895                                                                                                         phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
2896                                                                                                 });
2897
2898                                                                                                 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
2899                                                                                                         HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
2900                                                                                                 } else {
2901                                                                                                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
2902                                                                                                 };
2903
2904                                                                                                 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
2905                                                                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
2906                                                                                                         reason
2907                                                                                                 ));
2908                                                                                                 continue;
2909                                                                                         }
2910                                                                                 }
2911                                                                                 macro_rules! fail_forward {
2912                                                                                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
2913                                                                                                 {
2914                                                                                                         failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
2915                                                                                                 }
2916                                                                                         }
2917                                                                                 }
2918                                                                                 macro_rules! failed_payment {
2919                                                                                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
2920                                                                                                 {
2921                                                                                                         failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
2922                                                                                                 }
2923                                                                                         }
2924                                                                                 }
2925                                                                                 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
2926                                                                                         let phantom_secret_res = self.node_signer.get_node_secret(Recipient::PhantomNode);
2927                                                                                         if phantom_secret_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
2928                                                                                                 let phantom_shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &phantom_secret_res.unwrap()).secret_bytes();
2929                                                                                                 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
2930                                                                                                         Ok(res) => res,
2931                                                                                                         Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2932                                                                                                                 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
2933                                                                                                                 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
2934                                                                                                                 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
2935                                                                                                                 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
2936                                                                                                                 // of the onion.
2937                                                                                                                 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
2938                                                                                                         },
2939                                                                                                         Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2940                                                                                                                 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
2941                                                                                                         },
2942                                                                                                 };
2943                                                                                                 match next_hop {
2944                                                                                                         onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
2945                                                                                                                 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
2946                                                                                                                         Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
2947                                                                                                                         Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
2948                                                                                                                 }
2949                                                                                                         },
2950                                                                                                         _ => panic!(),
2951                                                                                                 }
2952                                                                                         } else {
2953                                                                                                 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
2954                                                                                         }
2955                                                                                 } else {
2956                                                                                         fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
2957                                                                                 }
2958                                                                         },
2959                                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2960                                                                                 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
2961                                                                                 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
2962                                                                                 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
2963                                                                                 // problem, not ours.
2964                                                                         }
2965                                                                 }
2966                                                         }
2967                                                 }
2968                                         }
2969                                         let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
2970                                                 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
2971                                                 None => {
2972                                                         forwarding_channel_not_found!();
2973                                                         continue;
2974                                                 }
2975                                         };
2976                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2977                                         let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2978                                         if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
2979                                                 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
2980                                                 continue;
2981                                         }
2982                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2983                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2984                                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
2985                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2986                                                         forwarding_channel_not_found!();
2987                                                         continue;
2988                                                 },
2989                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2990                                                         for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2991                                                                 match forward_info {
2992                                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
2993                                                                                 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
2994                                                                                 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2995                                                                                         incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
2996                                                                                         routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, incoming_amt_msat: _,
2997                                                                                 },
2998                                                                         }) => {
2999                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3000                                                                                 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3001                                                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3002                                                                                         outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3003                                                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3004                                                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3005                                                                                         // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3006                                                                                         phantom_shared_secret: None,
3007                                                                                 });
3008                                                                                 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
3009                                                                                         payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
3010                                                                                         onion_packet, &self.logger)
3011                                                                                 {
3012                                                                                         if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3013                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3014                                                                                         } else {
3015                                                                                                 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3016                                                                                         }
3017                                                                                         let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3018                                                                                         failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3019                                                                                                 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3020                                                                                                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3021                                                                                         ));
3022                                                                                         continue;
3023                                                                                 }
3024                                                                         },
3025                                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3026                                                                                 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3027                                                                         },
3028                                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3029                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3030                                                                                 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
3031                                                                                         htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
3032                                                                                 ) {
3033                                                                                         if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3034                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3035                                                                                         } else {
3036                                                                                                 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
3037                                                                                         }
3038                                                                                         // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3039                                                                                         // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3040                                                                                         // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3041                                                                                         continue;
3042                                                                                 }
3043                                                                         },
3044                                                                 }
3045                                                         }
3046                                                 }
3047                                         }
3048                                 } else {
3049                                         for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3050                                                 match forward_info {
3051                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3052                                                                 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3053                                                                 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3054                                                                         routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, ..
3055                                                                 }
3056                                                         }) => {
3057                                                                 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3058                                                                         PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3059                                                                                 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3060                                                                                 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data }, Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret)
3061                                                                         },
3062                                                                         PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3063                                                                                 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None, None),
3064                                                                         _ => {
3065                                                                                 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3066                                                                         }
3067                                                                 };
3068                                                                 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3069                                                                         prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3070                                                                                 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3071                                                                                 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3072                                                                                 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3073                                                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3074                                                                                 phantom_shared_secret,
3075                                                                         },
3076                                                                         value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3077                                                                         timer_ticks: 0,
3078                                                                         total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3079                                                                         cltv_expiry,
3080                                                                         onion_payload,
3081                                                                 };
3082
3083                                                                 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3084                                                                         ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3085                                                                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3086                                                                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3087                                                                                         &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
3088                                                                                 );
3089                                                                                 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3090                                                                                                 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3091                                                                                                 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3092                                                                                                 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3093                                                                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3094                                                                                                 phantom_shared_secret,
3095                                                                                         }), payment_hash,
3096                                                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
3097                                                                                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3098                                                                                 ));
3099                                                                         }
3100                                                                 }
3101                                                                 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
3102                                                                 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3103                                                                 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3104                                                                         receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3105                                                                                 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3106                                                                 }
3107
3108                                                                 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3109                                                                         ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3110                                                                                 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
3111                                                                                 let purpose = || {
3112                                                                                         events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3113                                                                                                 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3114                                                                                                 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3115                                                                                         }
3116                                                                                 };
3117                                                                                 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3118                                                                                 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3119                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3120                                                                                         continue
3121                                                                                 }
3122                                                                                 let (_, htlcs) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3123                                                                                         .or_insert_with(|| (purpose(), Vec::new()));
3124                                                                                 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3125                                                                                         if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3126                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3127                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3128                                                                                                 continue
3129                                                                                         }
3130                                                                                 }
3131                                                                                 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.value;
3132                                                                                 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3133                                                                                         total_value += htlc.value;
3134                                                                                         match &htlc.onion_payload {
3135                                                                                                 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3136                                                                                                         if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3137                                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3138                                                                                                                         log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3139                                                                                                                 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3140                                                                                                         }
3141                                                                                                         if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3142                                                                                                 },
3143                                                                                                 _ => unreachable!(),
3144                                                                                         }
3145                                                                                 }
3146                                                                                 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data.total_msat {
3147                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3148                                                                                                 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data.total_msat);
3149                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3150                                                                                 } else if total_value == $payment_data.total_msat {
3151                                                                                         let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3152                                                                                         htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3153                                                                                         new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3154                                                                                                 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3155                                                                                                 payment_hash,
3156                                                                                                 purpose: purpose(),
3157                                                                                                 amount_msat: total_value,
3158                                                                                                 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3159                                                                                                 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3160                                                                                         });
3161                                                                                         payment_claimable_generated = true;
3162                                                                                 } else {
3163                                                                                         // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3164                                                                                         // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3165                                                                                         // MPP parts.
3166                                                                                         htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3167                                                                                 }
3168                                                                                 payment_claimable_generated
3169                                                                         }}
3170                                                                 }
3171
3172                                                                 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3173                                                                 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3174                                                                 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3175                                                                 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3176                                                                 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3177                                                                 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3178                                                                 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3179                                                                 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3180                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3181                                                                                 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3182                                                                                         OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3183                                                                                                 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3184                                                                                                 let payment_preimage = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3185                                                                                                         Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
3186                                                                                                         Err(()) => {
3187                                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3188                                                                                                                 continue
3189                                                                                                         }
3190                                                                                                 };
3191                                                                                                 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3192                                                                                         },
3193                                                                                         OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3194                                                                                                 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3195                                                                                                 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3196                                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3197                                                                                                         continue
3198                                                                                                 }
3199                                                                                                 match claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
3200                                                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3201                                                                                                                 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3202                                                                                                                 e.insert((purpose.clone(), vec![claimable_htlc]));
3203                                                                                                                 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3204                                                                                                                 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3205                                                                                                                         receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3206                                                                                                                         payment_hash,
3207                                                                                                                         amount_msat: outgoing_amt_msat,
3208                                                                                                                         purpose,
3209                                                                                                                         via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3210                                                                                                                         via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3211                                                                                                                 });
3212                                                                                                         },
3213                                                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3214                                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3215                                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3216                                                                                                         }
3217                                                                                                 }
3218                                                                                         }
3219                                                                                 }
3220                                                                         },
3221                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3222                                                                                 if payment_data.is_none() {
3223                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3224                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3225                                                                                         continue
3226                                                                                 };
3227                                                                                 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3228                                                                                 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3229                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3230                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3231                                                                                 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3232                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3233                                                                                                 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3234                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3235                                                                                 } else {
3236                                                                                         let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3237                                                                                         if payment_claimable_generated {
3238                                                                                                 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3239                                                                                         }
3240                                                                                 }
3241                                                                         },
3242                                                                 };
3243                                                         },
3244                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3245                                                                 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3246                                                         }
3247                                                 }
3248                                         }
3249                                 }
3250                         }
3251                 }
3252
3253                 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3254                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3255                 }
3256                 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3257
3258                 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
3259                 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
3260                 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
3261                 // network stack.
3262                 self.check_free_holding_cells();
3263
3264                 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3265                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3266                 events.append(&mut new_events);
3267         }
3268
3269         /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3270         ///
3271         /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3272         /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3273         ///
3274         /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3275         fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3276                 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3277                 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3278                 if background_events.is_empty() {
3279                         return false;
3280                 }
3281
3282                 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3283                         match event {
3284                                 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3285                                         // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3286                                         // monitor updating completing.
3287                                         let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
3288                                 },
3289                         }
3290                 }
3291                 true
3292         }
3293
3294         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3295         /// Process background events, for functional testing
3296         pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3297                 self.process_background_events();
3298         }
3299
3300         fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
3301                 if !chan.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
3302                 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3303                 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3304                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3305                                 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3306                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3307                 }
3308                 if !chan.is_live() {
3309                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3310                                 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3311                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3312                 }
3313                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3314                         log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3315
3316                 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.logger);
3317                 NotifyOption::DoPersist
3318         }
3319
3320         #[cfg(fuzzing)]
3321         /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3322         /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3323         /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3324         /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3325         pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3326                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3327                         let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3328
3329                         let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3330
3331                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3332                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3333                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3334                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3335                                 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
3336                                         let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3337                                         if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3338                                 }
3339                         }
3340
3341                         should_persist
3342                 });
3343         }
3344
3345         /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3346         ///
3347         /// This currently includes:
3348         ///  * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3349         ///  * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3350         ///    than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3351         ///    the channel.
3352         ///  * Expiring a channel's previous `ChannelConfig` if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3353         ///    with the current `ChannelConfig`.
3354         ///
3355         /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3356         /// estimate fetches.
3357         pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3358                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3359                         let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3360                         if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3361
3362                         let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3363
3364                         let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
3365                         let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3366                         {
3367                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3368                                 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3369                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3370                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3371                                         let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
3372                                         peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3373                                                 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3374                                                 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3375
3376                                                 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3377                                                         let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3378                                                         handle_errors.push((Err(err), *counterparty_node_id));
3379                                                         if needs_close { return false; }
3380                                                 }
3381
3382                                                 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3383                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3384                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3385                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3386                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3387                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3388                                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3389                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3390                                                                                 msg: update
3391                                                                         });
3392                                                                 }
3393                                                                 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3394                                                                 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3395                                                         },
3396                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3397                                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3398                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3399                                                                                 msg: update
3400                                                                         });
3401                                                                 }
3402                                                                 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3403                                                                 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3404                                                         },
3405                                                         _ => {},
3406                                                 }
3407
3408                                                 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
3409
3410                                                 true
3411                                         });
3412                                 }
3413                         }
3414
3415                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
3416                                 if htlcs.is_empty() {
3417                                         // This should be unreachable
3418                                         debug_assert!(false);
3419                                         return false;
3420                                 }
3421                                 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3422                                         // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3423                                         // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3424                                         if htlcs[0].total_msat == htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.value) {
3425                                                 return true;
3426                                         } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| {
3427                                                 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3428                                                 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3429                                         }) {
3430                                                 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.drain(..).map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
3431                                                 return false;
3432                                         }
3433                                 }
3434                                 true
3435                         });
3436
3437                         for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3438                                 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
3439                                 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
3440                                 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
3441                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
3442                         }
3443
3444                         for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3445                                 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3446                         }
3447
3448                         self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self.pending_events);
3449
3450                         // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
3451                         // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
3452                         // than block the message queueing pipeline.
3453                         if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
3454                                 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3455                         }
3456
3457                         should_persist
3458                 });
3459         }
3460
3461         /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3462         /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3463         /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3464         ///
3465         /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
3466         /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
3467         /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
3468         /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
3469         ///
3470         /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
3471         /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
3472         /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
3473         /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
3474         pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
3475                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3476
3477                 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3478                 if let Some((_, mut sources)) = removed_source {
3479                         for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3480                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3481                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
3482                                 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
3483                                 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
3484                                 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
3485                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3486                         }
3487                 }
3488         }
3489
3490         /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3491         /// that we want to return and a channel.
3492         ///
3493         /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3494         /// forwarding
3495         fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3496                 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3497                 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3498                 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3499                 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3500                 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3501                         chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3502                 } else {
3503                         chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3504                 };
3505                 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3506                         self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3507                 } else {
3508                         (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3509                 }
3510         }
3511
3512
3513         /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3514         /// that we want to return and a channel.
3515         fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3516                 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
3517                 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
3518                         let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
3519                         if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3520                                 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
3521                                 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
3522                                 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3523                         }
3524                         (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3525                         msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3526                         upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3527                         (desired_err_code, enc.0)
3528                 } else {
3529                         // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
3530                         // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
3531                         // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
3532                         // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
3533                         (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3534                 }
3535         }
3536
3537         // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3538         // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3539         // be surfaced to the user.
3540         fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
3541                 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
3542                 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
3543         ) {
3544                 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
3545                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3546                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
3547                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3548                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3549                                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3550                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3551                                                 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
3552                                         },
3553                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3554                                 }
3555                         } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
3556                 };
3557
3558                 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3559                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
3560                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
3561                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3562                 }
3563         }
3564
3565         /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3566         /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
3567         fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
3568                 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3569                 {
3570                         // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is not held when calling this
3571                         // function.
3572                         // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock_order requirement for
3573                         // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
3574                         // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock aquired would.
3575                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3576                         for (_, peer) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3577                                 assert!(peer.try_lock().is_ok());
3578                         }
3579                 }
3580
3581                 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3582                 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3583                 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3584                 //timer handling.
3585
3586                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3587                 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3588                 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3589                 match source {
3590                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => {
3591                                 self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_params, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
3592                         },
3593                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
3594                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
3595                                 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
3596
3597                                 let mut forward_event = None;
3598                                 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
3599                                 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3600                                         forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
3601                                 }
3602                                 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
3603                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3604                                                 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
3605                                         },
3606                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3607                                                 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
3608                                         }
3609                                 }
3610                                 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
3611                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3612                                 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
3613                                         pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3614                                                 time_forwardable: time
3615                                         });
3616                                 }
3617                                 pending_events.push(events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
3618                                         prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
3619                                         failed_next_destination: destination,
3620                                 });
3621                         },
3622                 }
3623         }
3624
3625         /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
3626         /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
3627         ///
3628         /// Note that calling this method does *not* guarantee that the payment has been claimed. You
3629         /// *must* wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] event which upon a successful claim will be
3630         /// provided to your [`EventHandler`] when [`process_pending_events`] is next called.
3631         ///
3632         /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3633         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
3634         /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3635         /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3636         ///
3637         /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
3638         /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
3639         /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
3640         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3641         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3642         pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
3643                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3644
3645                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3646
3647                 let mut sources = {
3648                         let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3649                         if let Some((payment_purpose, sources)) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
3650                                 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3651                                 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3652                                         if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3653                                                 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3654                                                         .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3655                                                 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
3656                                                 break;
3657                                         }
3658                                 }
3659
3660                                 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
3661                                         ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: sources.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
3662                                         payment_purpose, receiver_node_id,
3663                                 });
3664                                 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
3665                                         debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
3666                                         log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
3667                                                 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3668                                 }
3669                                 sources
3670                         } else { return; }
3671                 };
3672                 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3673
3674                 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we check that all channels which contain a claimable
3675                 // HTLC still exist. While this isn't guaranteed to remain true if a channel closes while
3676                 // we're claiming (or even after we claim, before the commitment update dance completes),
3677                 // it should be a relatively rare race, and we'd rather not claim HTLCs that require us to
3678                 // go on-chain (and lose the on-chain fee to do so) than just reject the payment.
3679                 //
3680                 // Note that we'll still always get our funds - as long as the generated
3681                 // `ChannelMonitorUpdate` makes it out to the relevant monitor we can claim on-chain.
3682                 //
3683                 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3684                 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3685                 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3686                 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3687                 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3688                 // it.
3689                 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
3690                 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
3691                 let mut valid_mpp = true;
3692                 let mut errs = Vec::new();
3693                 let mut per_peer_state = Some(self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap());
3694                 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3695                         let (counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3696                                 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3697                                 None => {
3698                                         valid_mpp = false;
3699                                         break;
3700                                 }
3701                         };
3702
3703                         if let None = per_peer_state.as_ref().unwrap().get(&counterparty_node_id) {
3704                                 valid_mpp = false;
3705                                 break;
3706                         }
3707
3708                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.as_ref().unwrap().get(&counterparty_node_id).unwrap();
3709                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3710                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3711
3712                         if let None = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&chan_id) {
3713                                 valid_mpp = false;
3714                                 break;
3715                         }
3716
3717                         if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
3718                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
3719                                 debug_assert!(false);
3720                                 valid_mpp = false;
3721                                 break;
3722                         }
3723
3724                         expected_amt_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
3725                         if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
3726                                 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
3727                                 // that there's one payment here and move on.
3728                                 if sources.len() != 1 {
3729                                         log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
3730                                         debug_assert!(false);
3731                                         valid_mpp = false;
3732                                         break;
3733                                 }
3734                         }
3735
3736                         claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
3737                 }
3738                 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
3739                         mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3740                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
3741                         log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
3742                         return;
3743                 }
3744                 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
3745                         mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3746                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
3747                         log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
3748                                 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
3749                         return;
3750                 }
3751                 if valid_mpp {
3752                         for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3753                                 if per_peer_state.is_none() { per_peer_state = Some(self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap()); }
3754                                 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(per_peer_state.take().unwrap(),
3755                                         htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
3756                                         |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
3757                                 {
3758                                         if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
3759                                                 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
3760                                                 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
3761                                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
3762                                         } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
3763                                 }
3764                         }
3765                 }
3766                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3767                 if !valid_mpp {
3768                         for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3769                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3770                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
3771                                 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
3772                                 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
3773                                 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
3774                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3775                         }
3776                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
3777                 }
3778
3779                 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
3780                 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
3781                         let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3782                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
3783                 }
3784         }
3785
3786         fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
3787                 per_peer_state_lock: RwLockReadGuard<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
3788                 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
3789         -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
3790                 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
3791
3792                 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
3793
3794                 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3795                         Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
3796                         None => None
3797                 };
3798
3799                 let (found_channel, mut peer_state_opt) = if counterparty_node_id_opt.is_some() && per_peer_state_lock.get(&counterparty_node_id_opt.unwrap()).is_some() {
3800                         let peer_mutex = per_peer_state_lock.get(&counterparty_node_id_opt.unwrap()).unwrap();
3801                         let peer_state = peer_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3802                         let found_channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(&chan_id);
3803                         (found_channel, Some(peer_state))
3804                 }  else { (false, None) };
3805
3806                 if found_channel {
3807                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_opt.as_mut().unwrap();
3808                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3809                                 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3810                                 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
3811                                         Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
3812                                                 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
3813                                                         match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update) {
3814                                                                 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
3815                                                                 e => {
3816                                                                         log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
3817                                                                                 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3818                                                                                 payment_preimage, e);
3819                                                                         let err = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err();
3820                                                                         mem::drop(peer_state_opt);
3821                                                                         mem::drop(per_peer_state_lock);
3822                                                                         self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)));
3823                                                                         return Err((counterparty_node_id, err));
3824                                                                 }
3825                                                         }
3826                                                         if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
3827                                                                 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
3828                                                                         log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3829                                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3830                                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
3831                                                                         updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3832                                                                                 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3833                                                                                 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
3834                                                                                 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3835                                                                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3836                                                                                 update_fee: None,
3837                                                                                 commitment_signed,
3838                                                                         }
3839                                                                 });
3840                                                         }
3841                                                         mem::drop(peer_state_opt);
3842                                                         mem::drop(per_peer_state_lock);
3843                                                         self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)));
3844                                                         Ok(())
3845                                                 } else {
3846                                                         Ok(())
3847                                                 }
3848                                         },
3849                                         Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
3850                                                 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update) {
3851                                                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
3852                                                         e => {
3853                                                                 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
3854                                                                 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
3855                                                                 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same update and try
3856                                                                 // again on restart.
3857                                                                 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
3858                                                                         "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
3859                                                                         payment_preimage, e);
3860                                                         },
3861                                                 }
3862                                                 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
3863                                                 if drop {
3864                                                         chan.remove_entry();
3865                                                 }
3866                                                 mem::drop(peer_state_opt);
3867                                                 mem::drop(per_peer_state_lock);
3868                                                 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
3869                                                 Err((counterparty_node_id, res))
3870                                         },
3871                                 }
3872                         } else {
3873                                 // We've held the peer_state mutex since finding the channel and setting
3874                                 // found_channel to true, so the channel can't have been dropped.
3875                                 unreachable!()
3876                         }
3877                 } else {
3878                         let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3879                                 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
3880                                 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
3881                                         payment_preimage,
3882                                 }],
3883                         };
3884                         // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
3885                         // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
3886                         let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
3887                         if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
3888                                 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
3889                                 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
3890                                 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
3891                                 // again on restart.
3892                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3893                                         payment_preimage, update_res);
3894                         }
3895                         mem::drop(peer_state_opt);
3896                         mem::drop(per_peer_state_lock);
3897                         // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
3898                         // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
3899                         // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
3900                         // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
3901                         // `PaymentForwarded`).
3902                         self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
3903                         Ok(())
3904                 }
3905         }
3906
3907         fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
3908                 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
3909         }
3910
3911         fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
3912                 match source {
3913                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
3914                                 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage, session_priv, path, from_onchain, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
3915                         },
3916                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
3917                                 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
3918                                 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(), hop_data, payment_preimage,
3919                                         |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
3920                                                 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
3921                                                         let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
3922                                                                 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
3923                                                         } else { None };
3924
3925                                                         let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
3926                                                         let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
3927
3928                                                         Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
3929                                                                 fee_earned_msat,
3930                                                                 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
3931                                                                 prev_channel_id,
3932                                                                 next_channel_id,
3933                                                         }})
3934                                                 } else { None }
3935                                         });
3936                                 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
3937                                         let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3938                                         let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
3939                                 }
3940                         },
3941                 }
3942         }
3943
3944         /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
3945         pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
3946                 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
3947         }
3948
3949         fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
3950                 for action in actions.into_iter() {
3951                         match action {
3952                                 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
3953                                         let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
3954                                         if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
3955                                                 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
3956                                                         payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3957                                                 });
3958                                         }
3959                                 },
3960                                 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event } => {
3961                                         self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(event);
3962                                 },
3963                         }
3964                 }
3965         }
3966
3967         /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
3968         /// update completion.
3969         fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
3970                 channel: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
3971                 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
3972                 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
3973                 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
3974         -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
3975                 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
3976
3977                 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get_counterparty_node_id();
3978                 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
3979                         htlc_forwards = Some((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.outbound_scid_alias()),
3980                                 channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
3981                 }
3982
3983                 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
3984                         send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
3985                 }
3986                 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
3987                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
3988                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
3989                                 msg,
3990                         });
3991                 }
3992
3993                 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
3994
3995                 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
3996                         if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
3997                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3998                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
3999                                         updates: update,
4000                                 });
4001                         }
4002                 } }
4003                 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
4004                         if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
4005                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4006                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4007                                         msg: revoke_and_ack,
4008                                 });
4009                         }
4010                 } }
4011                 match order {
4012                         RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
4013                                 handle_cs!();
4014                                 handle_raa!();
4015                         },
4016                         RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
4017                                 handle_raa!();
4018                                 handle_cs!();
4019                         },
4020                 }
4021
4022                 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
4023                         log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
4024                         self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4025                 }
4026
4027                 htlc_forwards
4028         }
4029
4030         fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
4031                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4032
4033                 let htlc_forwards;
4034                 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims, counterparty_node_id) = {
4035                         let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
4036                                 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4037                                 None => {
4038                                         // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
4039                                         // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
4040                                         let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4041                                         match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4042                                                 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4043                                                 None => return,
4044                                         }
4045                                 }
4046                         };
4047                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4048                         let mut peer_state_lock;
4049                         let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4050                         if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt { return }
4051                         peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4052                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4053                         let mut channel = {
4054                                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()){
4055                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4056                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4057                                 }
4058                         };
4059                         if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4060                                 return;
4061                         }
4062
4063                         let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, &self.default_configuration, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
4064                         let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() {
4065                                 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
4066                                 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
4067                                 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
4068                                 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
4069                                 // now.
4070                                 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()) {
4071                                         Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4072                                                 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4073                                                 msg,
4074                                         })
4075                                 } else { None }
4076                         } else { None };
4077                         htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, channel.get_mut(), updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready, updates.announcement_sigs);
4078                         if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4079                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4080                         }
4081
4082                         (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs, counterparty_node_id)
4083                 };
4084                 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
4085                         self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
4086                 }
4087                 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
4088                 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4089                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id: funding_txo.to_channel_id() };
4090                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
4091                 }
4092         }
4093
4094         /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4095         ///
4096         /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4097         /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4098         /// the channel.
4099         ///
4100         /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4101         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4102         /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4103         ///
4104         /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4105         /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4106         /// used to accept such channels.
4107         ///
4108         /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4109         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4110         pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4111                 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4112         }
4113
4114         /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4115         /// it as confirmed immediately.
4116         ///
4117         /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4118         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4119         /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4120         ///
4121         /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4122         /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4123         ///
4124         /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4125         /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4126         ///
4127         /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4128         /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4129         ///
4130         /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4131         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4132         pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4133                 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4134         }
4135
4136         fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4137                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4138
4139                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4140                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4141                 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4142                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) });
4143                 }
4144                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4145                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4146                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4147                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4148                                 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4149                                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4150                                 }
4151                                 if accept_0conf {
4152                                         channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4153                                 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4154                                         let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4155                                                 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4156                                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4157                                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4158                                                 }
4159                                         };
4160                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4161                                         let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4162                                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4163                                 }
4164
4165                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4166                                         node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4167                                         msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4168                                 });
4169                         }
4170                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4171                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) });
4172                         }
4173                 }
4174                 Ok(())
4175         }
4176
4177         fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4178                 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4179                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4180                 }
4181
4182                 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4183                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4184                 }
4185
4186                 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
4187                 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
4188                 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
4189
4190                 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4191                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4192                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4193                 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4194                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4195                 }
4196                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4197                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4198                 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
4199                         counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration,
4200                         self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4201                 {
4202                         Err(e) => {
4203                                 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4204                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4205                         },
4206                         Ok(res) => res
4207                 };
4208                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4209                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4210                                 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4211                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4212                         },
4213                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4214                                 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4215                                         if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4216                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4217                                         }
4218                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4219                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4220                                                 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4221                                         });
4222                                 } else {
4223                                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4224                                         pending_events.push(
4225                                                 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4226                                                         temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4227                                                         counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4228                                                         funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4229                                                         push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4230                                                         channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4231                                                 }
4232                                         );
4233                                 }
4234
4235                                 entry.insert(channel);
4236                         }
4237                 }
4238                 Ok(())
4239         }
4240
4241         fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4242                 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4243                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4244                         let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4245                         if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4246                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4247                         }
4248                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4249                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4250                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4251                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4252                                         try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan);
4253                                         (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4254                                 },
4255                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4256                         }
4257                 };
4258                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4259                 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4260                         temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4261                         counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4262                         channel_value_satoshis: value,
4263                         output_script,
4264                         user_channel_id: user_id,
4265                 });
4266                 Ok(())
4267         }
4268
4269         fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4270                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4271                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4272                 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4273                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4274                 }
4275                 let ((funding_msg, monitor, mut channel_ready), mut chan) = {
4276                         let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4277                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4278                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4279                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4280                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4281                                         (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
4282                                 },
4283                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4284                         }
4285                 };
4286                 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the peer_state
4287                 // lock before watch_channel
4288                 match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
4289                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4290                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
4291                                 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4292                                 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4293                                 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4294                                 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4295                                 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
4296                                 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
4297                                 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4298                                 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(false);
4299                                 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4300                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
4301                         },
4302                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
4303                                 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4304                                 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4305                                 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4306                                 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4307                                 chan.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, channel_ready.is_some(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4308                                 channel_ready = None; // Don't send the channel_ready now
4309                         },
4310                 }
4311                 // It's safe to unwrap as we've held the `per_peer_state` read lock since checking that the
4312                 // peer exists, despite the inner PeerState potentially having no channels after removing
4313                 // the channel above.
4314                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4315                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4316                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4317                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4318                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4319                         },
4320                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4321                                 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4322                                 match id_to_peer.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
4323                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4324                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4325                                                         "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
4326                                                         funding_msg.channel_id))
4327                                         },
4328                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
4329                                                 i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
4330                                         }
4331                                 }
4332                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4333                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4334                                         msg: funding_msg,
4335                                 });
4336                                 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4337                                         send_channel_ready!(self, peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
4338                                 }
4339                                 e.insert(chan);
4340                         }
4341                 }
4342                 Ok(())
4343         }
4344
4345         fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4346                 let funding_tx = {
4347                         let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4348                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4349                         let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4350                         if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4351                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4352                         }
4353
4354                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4355                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4356                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4357                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4358                                         let (monitor, funding_tx, channel_ready) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger) {
4359                                                 Ok(update) => update,
4360                                                 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan),
4361                                         };
4362                                         match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
4363                                                 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4364                                                 e => {
4365                                                         let mut res = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, channel_ready.is_some(), OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED);
4366                                                         if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4367                                                                 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4368                                                                 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4369                                                                 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4370                                                                 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4371                                                                         shutdown_finish.0.take();
4372                                                                 }
4373                                                         }
4374                                                         return res
4375                                                 },
4376                                         }
4377                                         if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4378                                                 send_channel_ready!(self, peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get(), msg);
4379                                         }
4380                                         funding_tx
4381                                 },
4382                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4383                         }
4384                 };
4385                 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
4386                 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
4387                 Ok(())
4388         }
4389
4390         fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4391                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4392                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4393                 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4394                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id));
4395                 }
4396                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4397                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4398                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4399                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4400                                 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, self.get_our_node_id(),
4401                                         self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
4402                                 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4403                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4404                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4405                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4406                                                 msg: announcement_sigs,
4407                                         });
4408                                 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4409                                         // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4410                                         // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4411                                         // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4412                                         // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4413                                         // announcement_signatures.
4414                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4415                                         if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4416                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4417                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4418                                                         msg,
4419                                                 });
4420                                         }
4421                                 }
4422
4423                                 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, chan.get_mut());
4424
4425                                 Ok(())
4426                         },
4427                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4428                 }
4429         }
4430
4431         fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4432                 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4433                 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4434                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4435                         let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4436                         if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4437                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4438                         }
4439                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4440                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4441                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4442                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4443
4444                                         if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4445                                                 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4446                                                         log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4447                                                         if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4448                                         }
4449
4450                                         let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
4451                                         dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4452
4453                                         // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4454                                         if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
4455                                                 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update);
4456                                                 let (result, is_permanent) =
4457                                                         handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
4458                                                 if is_permanent {
4459                                                         remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
4460                                                         break result;
4461                                                 }
4462                                         }
4463
4464                                         if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4465                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4466                                                         node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4467                                                         msg,
4468                                                 });
4469                                         }
4470
4471                                         break Ok(());
4472                                 },
4473                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4474                         }
4475                 };
4476                 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4477                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
4478                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
4479                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4480                 }
4481
4482                 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
4483                 Ok(())
4484         }
4485
4486         fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4487                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4488                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4489                 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4490                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4491                 }
4492                 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4493                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4494                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4495                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4496                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4497                                         let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
4498                                         if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4499                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4500                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4501                                                         msg,
4502                                                 });
4503                                         }
4504                                         if tx.is_some() {
4505                                                 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4506                                                 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4507                                                 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4508                                                 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4509                                                 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4510                                                 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
4511                                         } else { (tx, None) }
4512                                 },
4513                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4514                         }
4515                 };
4516                 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4517                         log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4518                         self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4519                 }
4520                 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4521                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4522                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4523                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4524                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4525                                         msg: update
4526                                 });
4527                         }
4528                         self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4529                 }
4530                 Ok(())
4531         }
4532
4533         fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4534                 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4535                 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4536                 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4537                 //
4538                 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4539                 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4540                 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4541                 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4542
4543                 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4544                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4545                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4546                 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4547                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4548                 }
4549                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4550                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4551                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4552                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4553
4554                                 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4555                                         // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4556                                         // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4557                                         // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4558                                         match pending_forward_info {
4559                                                 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4560                                                         let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4561                                                                 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
4562                                                                 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
4563                                                         } else {
4564                                                                 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
4565                                                         }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
4566                                                         let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4567                                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4568                                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4569                                                                 reason
4570                                                         };
4571                                                         PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4572                                                 },
4573                                                 _ => pending_forward_info
4574                                         }
4575                                 };
4576                                 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
4577                         },
4578                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4579                 }
4580                 Ok(())
4581         }
4582
4583         fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4584                 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4585                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4586                         let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4587                         if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4588                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id));
4589                         }
4590                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4591                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4592                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4593                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4594                                         try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
4595                                 },
4596                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4597                         }
4598                 };
4599                 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
4600                 Ok(())
4601         }
4602
4603         fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4604                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4605                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4606                 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4607                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id));
4608                 }
4609                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4610                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4611                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4612                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4613                                 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
4614                         },
4615                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4616                 }
4617                 Ok(())
4618         }
4619
4620         fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4621                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4622                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4623                 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4624                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4625                 }
4626                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4627                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4628                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4629                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4630                                 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4631                                         let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4632                                         try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
4633                                 }
4634                                 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
4635                                 Ok(())
4636                         },
4637                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4638                 }
4639         }
4640
4641         fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4642                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4643                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4644                 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4645                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4646                 }
4647                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4648                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4649                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4650                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4651                                 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
4652                                         match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
4653                                                 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan),
4654                                                 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
4655                                                         assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
4656                                                         let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &update);
4657                                                         try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan);
4658                                                         unreachable!();
4659                                                 },
4660                                                 Ok(res) => res
4661                                         };
4662                                 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update);
4663                                 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some()) {
4664                                         return Err(e);
4665                                 }
4666
4667                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4668                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4669                                         msg: revoke_and_ack,
4670                                 });
4671                                 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
4672                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4673                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4674                                                 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4675                                                         update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4676                                                         update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4677                                                         update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4678                                                         update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4679                                                         update_fee: None,
4680                                                         commitment_signed: msg,
4681                                                 },
4682                                         });
4683                                 }
4684                                 Ok(())
4685                         },
4686                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4687                 }
4688         }
4689
4690         #[inline]
4691         fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4692                 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4693                         let mut forward_event = None;
4694                         let mut new_intercept_events = Vec::new();
4695                         let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
4696                         if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4697                                 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4698                                         let scid = match forward_info.routing {
4699                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4700                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4701                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4702                                         };
4703                                         // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
4704                                         let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
4705
4706                                         let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4707                                         let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
4708                                         match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
4709                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4710                                                         entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4711                                                                 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
4712                                                 },
4713                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4714                                                         if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
4715                                                            fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
4716                                                         {
4717                                                                 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
4718                                                                 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4719                                                                 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
4720                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4721                                                                                 new_intercept_events.push(events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
4722                                                                                         requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
4723                                                                                         payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
4724                                                                                         inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
4725                                                                                         expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
4726                                                                                         intercept_id
4727                                                                                 });
4728                                                                                 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4729                                                                                         prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
4730                                                                         },
4731                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4732                                                                                 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
4733                                                                                 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4734                                                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4735                                                                                         outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4736                                                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4737                                                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4738                                                                                         phantom_shared_secret: None,
4739                                                                                 });
4740
4741                                                                                 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
4742                                                                                                 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
4743                                                                                                 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
4744                                                                                 ));
4745                                                                         }
4746                                                                 }
4747                                                         } else {
4748                                                                 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
4749                                                                 // payments are being processed.
4750                                                                 if forward_htlcs_empty {
4751                                                                         forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
4752                                                                 }
4753                                                                 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4754                                                                         prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
4755                                                         }
4756                                                 }
4757                                         }
4758                                 }
4759                         }
4760
4761                         for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
4762                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4763                         }
4764
4765                         if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
4766                                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4767                                 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
4768                         }
4769
4770                         match forward_event {
4771                                 Some(time) => {
4772                                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4773                                         pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4774                                                 time_forwardable: time
4775                                         });
4776                                 }
4777                                 None => {},
4778                         }
4779                 }
4780         }
4781
4782         fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4783                 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
4784                 let res = loop {
4785                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4786                         let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4787                         if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4788                                 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4789                         }
4790                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4791                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4792                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4793                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4794                                         let was_paused_for_mon_update = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
4795                                         let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
4796                                                 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
4797                                         htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
4798                                         let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &raa_updates.monitor_update);
4799                                         if was_paused_for_mon_update {
4800                                                 assert!(update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
4801                                                 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
4802                                                 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
4803                                                 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4804                                                 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
4805                                                 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Existing pending monitor update prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
4806                                         }
4807                                         if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4808                                                 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan,
4809                                                                 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
4810                                                                 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(), false,
4811                                                                 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4812                                                                 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
4813                                                         break Err(e);
4814                                                 } else { unreachable!(); }
4815                                         }
4816                                         if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
4817                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4818                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4819                                                         updates,
4820                                                 });
4821                                         }
4822                                         break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4823                                                         raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
4824                                                         chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
4825                                                                 .unwrap_or(chan.get().outbound_scid_alias()),
4826                                                         chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
4827                                                         chan.get().get_user_id()))
4828                                 },
4829                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4830                         }
4831                 };
4832                 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
4833                 match res {
4834                         Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
4835                                 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, user_channel_id)) =>
4836                         {
4837                                 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4838                                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: channel_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
4839                                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
4840                                 }
4841                                 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, user_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
4842                                 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
4843                                 Ok(())
4844                         },
4845                         Err(e) => Err(e)
4846                 }
4847         }
4848
4849         fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4850                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4851                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4852                 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4853                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id));
4854                 }
4855                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4856                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4857                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4858                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4859                                 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
4860                         },
4861                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4862                 }
4863                 Ok(())
4864         }
4865
4866         fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4867                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4868                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4869                 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4870                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id));
4871                 }
4872                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4873                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4874                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4875                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4876                                 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
4877                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
4878                                 }
4879
4880                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
4881                                         msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
4882                                                 self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(),
4883                                                 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), msg, &self.default_configuration
4884                                         ), chan),
4885                                         // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
4886                                         // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
4887                                         update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4888                                 });
4889                         },
4890                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4891                 }
4892                 Ok(())
4893         }
4894
4895         /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
4896         fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4897                 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
4898                         Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
4899                         None => {
4900                                 // It's not a local channel
4901                                 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
4902                         }
4903                 };
4904                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4905                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
4906                 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4907                         return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
4908                 }
4909                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4910                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4911                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4912                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4913                                 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4914                                         if chan.get().should_announce() {
4915                                                 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
4916                                                 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
4917                                                 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
4918                                                 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4919                                         }
4920                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
4921                                 }
4922                                 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
4923                                 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
4924                                 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
4925                                         return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4926                                 } else {
4927                                         log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
4928                                         try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
4929                                 }
4930                         },
4931                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
4932                 }
4933                 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
4934         }
4935
4936         fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4937                 let htlc_forwards;
4938                 let need_lnd_workaround = {
4939                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4940
4941                         let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4942                         if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4943                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id));
4944                         }
4945                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4946                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4947                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4948                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4949                                         // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
4950                                         // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
4951                                         // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
4952                                         // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
4953                                         let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
4954                                                 msg, &self.logger, self.our_network_pubkey.clone(), self.genesis_hash,
4955                                                 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
4956                                         let mut channel_update = None;
4957                                         if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
4958                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4959                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4960                                                         msg,
4961                                                 });
4962                                         } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4963                                                 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
4964                                                 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
4965                                                 // they have the latest channel parameters.
4966                                                 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4967                                                         channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4968                                                                 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4969                                                                 msg,
4970                                                         });
4971                                                 }
4972                                         }
4973                                         let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
4974                                         htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
4975                                                 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
4976                                                 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
4977                                         if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4978                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4979                                         }
4980                                         need_lnd_workaround
4981                                 },
4982                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4983                         }
4984                 };
4985
4986                 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
4987                         self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
4988                 }
4989
4990                 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
4991                         self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
4992                 }
4993                 Ok(())
4994         }
4995
4996         /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
4997         fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
4998                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4999                 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5000                 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5001                 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5002                         for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5003                                 match monitor_event {
5004                                         MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5005                                                 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5006                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5007                                                         self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5008                                                 } else {
5009                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5010                                                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5011                                                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5012                                                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5013                                                 }
5014                                         },
5015                                         MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5016                                         MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5017                                                 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
5018                                                         Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
5019                                                         None => {
5020                                                                 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5021                                                                 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5022                                                                 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5023                                                                 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
5024                                                         }
5025                                                 };
5026                                                 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
5027                                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5028                                                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5029                                                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5030                                                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5031                                                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5032                                                                 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5033                                                                         let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5034                                                                         failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5035                                                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5036                                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5037                                                                                         msg: update
5038                                                                                 });
5039                                                                         }
5040                                                                         let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5041                                                                                 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5042                                                                         } else {
5043                                                                                 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5044                                                                         };
5045                                                                         self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5046                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5047                                                                                 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5048                                                                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5049                                                                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5050                                                                                 },
5051                                                                         });
5052                                                                 }
5053                                                         }
5054                                                 }
5055                                         },
5056                                         MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5057                                                 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
5058                                         },
5059                                 }
5060                         }
5061                 }
5062
5063                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5064                         self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5065                 }
5066
5067                 has_pending_monitor_events
5068         }
5069
5070         /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5071         /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5072         /// update events as a separate process method here.
5073         #[cfg(fuzzing)]
5074         pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5075                 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
5076         }
5077
5078         /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5079         /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5080         /// update was applied.
5081         fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5082                 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5083                 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5084                 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5085                 {
5086                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5087
5088                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5089                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5090                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5091                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5092                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5093                                         match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
5094                                                 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
5095                                                         if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5096                                                                 failed_htlcs.push((
5097                                                                         holding_cell_failed_htlcs,
5098                                                                         *channel_id,
5099                                                                         chan.get_counterparty_node_id()
5100                                                                 ));
5101                                                         }
5102                                                         if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
5103                                                                 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update) {
5104                                                                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
5105                                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5106                                                                                         node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5107                                                                                         updates: commitment_update,
5108                                                                                 });
5109                                                                         },
5110                                                                         e => {
5111                                                                                 has_monitor_update = true;
5112                                                                                 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, channel_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
5113                                                                                 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
5114                                                                                 if close_channel { return false; }
5115                                                                         },
5116                                                                 }
5117                                                         }
5118                                                         true
5119                                                 },
5120                                                 Err(e) => {
5121                                                         let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5122                                                         handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5123                                                         // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
5124                                                         !close_channel
5125                                                 }
5126                                         }
5127                                 });
5128                         }
5129                 }
5130
5131                 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5132                 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5133                         self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5134                 }
5135
5136                 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5137                         let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5138                 }
5139
5140                 has_update
5141         }
5142
5143         /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5144         /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5145         /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5146         fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5147                 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5148                 let mut has_update = false;
5149                 {
5150                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5151
5152                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5153                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5154                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5155                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5156                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5157                                         match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5158                                                 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5159                                                         if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5160                                                                 has_update = true;
5161                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5162                                                                         node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5163                                                                 });
5164                                                         }
5165                                                         if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5166                                                                 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5167                                                                 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5168                                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5169                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5170                                                                                 msg: update
5171                                                                         });
5172                                                                 }
5173
5174                                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5175
5176                                                                 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5177                                                                 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5178                                                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
5179                                                                 false
5180                                                         } else { true }
5181                                                 },
5182                                                 Err(e) => {
5183                                                         has_update = true;
5184                                                         let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5185                                                         handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5186                                                         !close_channel
5187                                                 }
5188                                         }
5189                                 });
5190                         }
5191                 }
5192
5193                 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5194                         let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5195                 }
5196
5197                 has_update
5198         }
5199
5200         /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5201         /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5202         /// Channel object.
5203         fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5204                 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5205                         // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5206                         // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5207                         // reorganized out of the main chain.
5208                         // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5209                         // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5210                         // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5211                         // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5212                         if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5213                                 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5214                                 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5215                                         assert!(should_broadcast);
5216                                 } else { unreachable!(); }
5217                                 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5218                         }
5219                         self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5220                 }
5221         }
5222
5223         fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5224                 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5225
5226                 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5227                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5228                 }
5229
5230                 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5231
5232                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5233                 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5234                 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5235                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5236                                 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5237                                         payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5238                                         user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5239                                         // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5240                                         // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5241                                         // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5242                                         // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5243                                         // never fail a payment too early.
5244                                         // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5245                                         // timestamps.
5246                                         expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5247                                 });
5248                         },
5249                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5250                 }
5251                 Ok(payment_secret)
5252         }
5253
5254         /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5255         /// to pay us.
5256         ///
5257         /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5258         /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5259         ///
5260         /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
5261         /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5262         /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5263         ///
5264         /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5265         ///
5266         /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5267         /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5268         ///
5269         /// # Note
5270         ///
5271         /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5272         /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5273         ///
5274         /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5275         ///
5276         /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5277         /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5278         /// [`PaymentClaimable::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::payment_preimage
5279         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5280         pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5281                 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5282         }
5283
5284         /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5285         /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5286         ///
5287         /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5288         ///
5289         /// # Note
5290         /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5291         ///
5292         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5293         #[deprecated]
5294         pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5295                 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5296                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5297                 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5298                 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5299         }
5300
5301         /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5302         /// stored external to LDK.
5303         ///
5304         /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5305         /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5306         /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5307         ///
5308         /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5309         /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5310         /// payments.
5311         ///
5312         /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5313         /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5314         /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5315         /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5316         ///
5317         /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5318         /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5319         /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5320         /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5321         /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5322         ///
5323         /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5324         /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5325         /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
5326         /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5327         /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
5328         ///
5329         /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
5330         /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
5331         ///
5332         /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5333         /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5334         ///
5335         /// # Note
5336         ///
5337         /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5338         /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5339         ///
5340         /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5341         ///
5342         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5343         /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5344         pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5345                 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5346         }
5347
5348         /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5349         /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5350         ///
5351         /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5352         ///
5353         /// # Note
5354         /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5355         ///
5356         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5357         #[deprecated]
5358         pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5359                 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5360         }
5361
5362         /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5363         /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5364         ///
5365         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5366         pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5367                 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5368         }
5369
5370         /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5371         /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5372         ///
5373         /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5374         pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5375                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5376                 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5377                 loop {
5378                         let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5379                         // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5380                         match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
5381                                 Some(_) => continue,
5382                                 None => return scid_candidate
5383                         }
5384                 }
5385         }
5386
5387         /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5388         ///
5389         /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5390         pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5391                 PhantomRouteHints {
5392                         channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5393                         phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5394                         real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5395                 }
5396         }
5397
5398         /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
5399         /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
5400         /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
5401         ///
5402         /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
5403         /// times to get a unique scid.
5404         pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5405                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5406                 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5407                 loop {
5408                         let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5409                         // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5410                         if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
5411                         return scid_candidate
5412                 }
5413         }
5414
5415         /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
5416         /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
5417         pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
5418                 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
5419
5420                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5421                 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5422                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5423                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5424                         for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5425                                 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
5426                                         if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
5427                                                 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
5428                                         }
5429                                 }
5430                         }
5431                 }
5432
5433                 inflight_htlcs
5434         }
5435
5436         #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5437         pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5438                 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5439                 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
5440                 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5441                 events.into_inner()
5442         }
5443
5444         #[cfg(test)]
5445         pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
5446                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5447                 if events.is_empty() { None } else { Some(events.remove(0)) }
5448         }
5449
5450         #[cfg(test)]
5451         pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5452                 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
5453         }
5454
5455         #[cfg(test)]
5456         pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5457                 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
5458         }
5459
5460         /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
5461         /// using the given event handler.
5462         ///
5463         /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
5464         pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
5465                 &self, handler: H
5466         ) {
5467                 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock until the returned future completes so that
5468                 // we can be sure no other persists happen while processing events.
5469                 let _read_guard = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
5470
5471                 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5472
5473                 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5474                 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5475                 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5476                         result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5477                 }
5478
5479                 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5480                 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5481                         result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5482                 }
5483
5484                 for event in pending_events {
5485                         handler(event).await;
5486                 }
5487
5488                 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
5489                         self.persistence_notifier.notify();
5490                 }
5491         }
5492 }
5493
5494 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5495 where
5496         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5497         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5498         ES::Target: EntropySource,
5499         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5500         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5501         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5502         R::Target: Router,
5503         L::Target: Logger,
5504 {
5505         /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
5506         /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
5507         /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
5508         /// is always placed next to each other.
5509         ///
5510         /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
5511         /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
5512         /// `MessageSendEvent`s  for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
5513         /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
5514         ///
5515         /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
5516         /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
5517         /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
5518         fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5519                 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5520                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5521                         let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5522
5523                         // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5524                         // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5525                         if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5526                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5527                         }
5528
5529                         if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5530                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5531                         }
5532                         if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5533                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5534                         }
5535
5536                         let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5537                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5538                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5539                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5540                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5541                                 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
5542                                         let mut peer_pending_events = Vec::new();
5543                                         mem::swap(&mut peer_pending_events, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
5544                                         pending_events.append(&mut peer_pending_events);
5545                                 }
5546                         }
5547
5548                         if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5549                                 events.replace(pending_events);
5550                         }
5551
5552                         result
5553                 });
5554                 events.into_inner()
5555         }
5556 }
5557
5558 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5559 where
5560         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5561         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5562         ES::Target: EntropySource,
5563         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5564         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5565         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5566         R::Target: Router,
5567         L::Target: Logger,
5568 {
5569         /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5570         ///
5571         /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5572         /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5573         fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5574                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5575                         let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5576
5577                         // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5578                         // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5579                         if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5580                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5581                         }
5582
5583                         let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5584                         if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5585                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5586                         }
5587
5588                         for event in pending_events {
5589                                 handler.handle_event(event);
5590                         }
5591
5592                         result
5593                 });
5594         }
5595 }
5596
5597 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5598 where
5599         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5600         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5601         ES::Target: EntropySource,
5602         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5603         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5604         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5605         R::Target: Router,
5606         L::Target: Logger,
5607 {
5608         fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5609                 {
5610                         let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5611                         assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
5612                                 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5613                         assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5614                                 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5615                 }
5616
5617                 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
5618                 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
5619         }
5620
5621         fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5622                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5623                 let new_height = height - 1;
5624                 {
5625                         let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5626                         assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5627                                 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5628                         assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5629                                 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5630                         *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5631                 }
5632
5633                 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), self.default_configuration.clone(), &self.logger));
5634         }
5635 }
5636
5637 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5638 where
5639         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5640         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5641         ES::Target: EntropySource,
5642         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5643         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5644         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5645         R::Target: Router,
5646         L::Target: Logger,
5647 {
5648         fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5649                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5650                 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5651                 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5652
5653                 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5654                 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5655
5656                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5657                 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
5658                         .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5659
5660                 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5661                 if height < last_best_block_height {
5662                         let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5663                         self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), self.default_configuration.clone(), &self.logger));
5664                 }
5665         }
5666
5667         fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5668                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5669                 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5670                 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5671
5672                 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5673                 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5674
5675                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5676
5677                 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5678
5679                 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), self.default_configuration.clone(), &self.logger));
5680
5681                 macro_rules! max_time {
5682                         ($timestamp: expr) => {
5683                                 loop {
5684                                         // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5685                                         // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5686                                         // having an explicit local time source.
5687                                         // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5688                                         // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5689                                         let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5690                                         if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5691                                         if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5692                                                 break;
5693                                         }
5694                                 }
5695                         }
5696                 }
5697                 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5698                 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5699                 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5700                         inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5701                 });
5702         }
5703
5704         fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
5705                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
5706                 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5707                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5708                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5709                         for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5710                                 if let (Some(funding_txo), block_hash) = (chan.get_funding_txo(), chan.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
5711                                         res.push((funding_txo.txid, block_hash));
5712                                 }
5713                         }
5714                 }
5715                 res
5716         }
5717
5718         fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5719                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5720                 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5721                         if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5722                                 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
5723                                         channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
5724                                 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5725                         } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5726                 });
5727         }
5728 }
5729
5730 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5731 where
5732         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5733         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5734         ES::Target: EntropySource,
5735         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5736         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5737         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5738         R::Target: Router,
5739         L::Target: Logger,
5740 {
5741         /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
5742         /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
5743         /// the function.
5744         fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
5745                         (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
5746                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5747                 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5748                 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5749
5750                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5751                 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5752                 {
5753                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5754                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5755                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5756                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5757                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5758                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
5759                                         let res = f(channel);
5760                                         if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
5761                                                 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
5762                                                         let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
5763                                                         timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
5764                                                                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
5765                                                 }
5766                                                 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
5767                                                         send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
5768                                                         if channel.is_usable() {
5769                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5770                                                                 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
5771                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5772                                                                                 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5773                                                                                 msg,
5774                                                                         });
5775                                                                 }
5776                                                         } else {
5777                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5778                                                         }
5779                                                 }
5780
5781                                                 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
5782
5783                                                 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
5784                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5785                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5786                                                                 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5787                                                                 msg: announcement_sigs,
5788                                                         });
5789                                                         if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5790                                                                 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
5791                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5792                                                                                 msg: announcement,
5793                                                                                 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5794                                                                                 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5795                                                                                 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap(),
5796                                                                         });
5797                                                                 }
5798                                                         }
5799                                                 }
5800                                                 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
5801                                                         if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5802                                                                 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
5803                                                                 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
5804                                                                 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
5805                                                                 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
5806                                                                 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
5807                                                                 // is always consistent.
5808                                                                 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
5809                                                                 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
5810                                                                 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
5811                                                                         "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
5812                                                                         fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
5813                                                         }
5814                                                 }
5815                                         } else if let Err(reason) = res {
5816                                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel);
5817                                                 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
5818                                                 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
5819                                                 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
5820                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
5821                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5822                                                                 msg: update
5823                                                         });
5824                                                 }
5825                                                 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
5826                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
5827                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5828                                                         node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5829                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
5830                                                                 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
5831                                                                 data: reason_message,
5832                                                         } },
5833                                                 });
5834                                                 return false;
5835                                         }
5836                                         true
5837                                 });
5838                         }
5839                 }
5840
5841                 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5842                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
5843                                 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
5844                                         // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
5845                                         // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
5846                                         // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
5847                                         // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
5848                                         if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
5849                                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5850                                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
5851
5852                                                 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
5853                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
5854                                                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
5855                                                 false
5856                                         } else { true }
5857                                 });
5858                                 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
5859                         });
5860
5861                         let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5862                         intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
5863                                 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
5864                                         let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5865                                                 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
5866                                                 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
5867                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
5868                                                 phantom_shared_secret: None,
5869                                                 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
5870                                         });
5871
5872                                         let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
5873                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
5874                                                 _ => unreachable!(),
5875                                         };
5876                                         timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
5877                                                         HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
5878                                                         HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
5879                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
5880                                         false
5881                                 } else { true }
5882                         });
5883                 }
5884
5885                 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
5886
5887                 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
5888                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
5889                 }
5890         }
5891
5892         /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
5893         /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
5894         /// [`await_persistable_update`], [`await_persistable_update_timeout`], or a future returned by
5895         /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
5896         ///
5897         /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
5898         ///
5899         /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
5900         /// [`await_persistable_update_timeout`]: Self::await_persistable_update_timeout
5901         /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
5902         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
5903         pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5904                 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
5905         }
5906
5907         /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
5908         /// [`await_persistable_update`], `await_persistable_update_timeout`, or a future returned by
5909         /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
5910         ///
5911         /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
5912         /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
5913         pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
5914                 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
5915         }
5916
5917         /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when a persistable update is available. Note that
5918         /// callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this [`ChannelManager`] and
5919         /// should instead register actions to be taken later.
5920         pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
5921                 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
5922         }
5923
5924         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5925         pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
5926                 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
5927         }
5928
5929         /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
5930         /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
5931         pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
5932                 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
5933         }
5934
5935         /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
5936         /// [`ChannelManager`].
5937         pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
5938                 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
5939         }
5940
5941         /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
5942         /// [`ChannelManager`].
5943         ///
5944         /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
5945         /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
5946         #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
5947         pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> InvoiceFeatures {
5948                 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
5949         }
5950
5951         /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
5952         /// [`ChannelManager`].
5953         pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
5954                 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
5955         }
5956
5957         /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
5958         /// [`ChannelManager`].
5959         pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
5960                 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
5961         }
5962
5963         /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
5964         /// [`ChannelManager`].
5965         pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
5966                 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
5967         }
5968 }
5969
5970 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
5971         ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5972 where
5973         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5974         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5975         ES::Target: EntropySource,
5976         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5977         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5978         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5979         R::Target: Router,
5980         L::Target: Logger,
5981 {
5982         fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
5983                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5984                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5985         }
5986
5987         fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
5988                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5989                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5990         }
5991
5992         fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
5993                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5994                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5995         }
5996
5997         fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
5998                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5999                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6000         }
6001
6002         fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6003                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6004                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6005         }
6006
6007         fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6008                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6009                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6010         }
6011
6012         fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6013                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6014                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6015         }
6016
6017         fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6018                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6019                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6020         }
6021
6022         fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6023                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6024                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6025         }
6026
6027         fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6028                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6029                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6030         }
6031
6032         fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6033                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6034                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6035         }
6036
6037         fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6038                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6039                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6040         }
6041
6042         fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6043                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6044                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6045         }
6046
6047         fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6048                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6049                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6050         }
6051
6052         fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6053                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6054                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6055         }
6056
6057         fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6058                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6059                         if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6060                                 persist
6061                         } else {
6062                                 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6063                         }
6064                 });
6065         }
6066
6067         fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6068                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6069                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6070         }
6071
6072         fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
6073                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6074                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6075                 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
6076                 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6077                 {
6078                         log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates. We believe we {} make future connections to this peer.",
6079                                 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id), if no_connection_possible { "cannot" } else { "can" });
6080                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
6081                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6082                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6083                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6084                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6085                                         chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6086                                         if chan.is_shutdown() {
6087                                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
6088                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6089                                                 return false;
6090                                         } else {
6091                                                 no_channels_remain = false;
6092                                         }
6093                                         true
6094                                 });
6095                                 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6096                                         match msg {
6097                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
6098                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
6099                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
6100                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
6101                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
6102                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
6103                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
6104                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
6105                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
6106                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
6107                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
6108                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
6109                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6110                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6111                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
6112                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
6113                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6114                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6115                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6116                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6117                                         }
6118                                 });
6119                         }
6120                 }
6121                 if no_channels_remain {
6122                         per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
6123                 }
6124                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6125
6126                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6127                         self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6128                 }
6129         }
6130
6131         fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) -> Result<(), ()> {
6132                 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
6133                         log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting with no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6134                         return Err(());
6135                 }
6136
6137                 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6138
6139                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6140
6141                 {
6142                         let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6143                         match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6144                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6145                                         e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6146                                                 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
6147                                                 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6148                                                 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6149                                         }));
6150                                 },
6151                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6152                                         e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6153                                 },
6154                         }
6155                 }
6156
6157                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6158
6159                 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6160                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6161                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6162                         let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6163                         peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6164                                 let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6165                                         if !chan.have_received_message() {
6166                                                 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6167                                                 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6168                                                 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6169                                                 // drop it.
6170                                                 false
6171                                         } else {
6172                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6173                                                         node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6174                                                         msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6175                                                 });
6176                                                 true
6177                                         }
6178                                 } else { true };
6179                                 if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6180                                         if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.default_configuration) {
6181                                                 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
6182                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
6183                                                                 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6184                                                                 msg, update_msg,
6185                                                         });
6186                                                 }
6187                                         }
6188                                 }
6189                                 retain
6190                         });
6191                 }
6192                 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6193                 Ok(())
6194         }
6195
6196         fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6197                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6198
6199                 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6200                         let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = {
6201                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6202                                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6203                                 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt { return; }
6204                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6205                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6206                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
6207                         };
6208                         for channel_id in channel_ids {
6209                                 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6210                                 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6211                         }
6212                 } else {
6213                         {
6214                                 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6215                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6216                                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6217                                 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt { return; }
6218                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6219                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6220                                 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6221                                         if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6222                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6223                                                         node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6224                                                         msg,
6225                                                 });
6226                                                 return;
6227                                         }
6228                                 }
6229                         }
6230
6231                         // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6232                         let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6233                 }
6234         }
6235
6236         fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6237                 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6238         }
6239
6240         fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
6241                 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6242         }
6243 }
6244
6245 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6246 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6247 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
6248         provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6249 }
6250
6251 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6252 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6253 ///
6254 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6255 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6256 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6257 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6258         provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6259 }
6260
6261 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6262 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6263 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
6264         provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6265 }
6266
6267 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6268 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6269 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6270         ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
6271 }
6272
6273 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6274 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6275 pub fn provided_init_features(_config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
6276         // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
6277         // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the ChannelMessageHandler impl for
6278         // ErroringMessageHandler.
6279         let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
6280         features.set_data_loss_protect_optional();
6281         features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
6282         features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
6283         features.set_static_remote_key_required();
6284         features.set_payment_secret_required();
6285         features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
6286         features.set_wumbo_optional();
6287         features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
6288         features.set_channel_type_optional();
6289         features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
6290         features.set_zero_conf_optional();
6291         #[cfg(anchors)]
6292         { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
6293                 if _config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
6294                         features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
6295                 }
6296         }
6297         features
6298 }
6299
6300 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6301 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6302
6303 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6304         (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6305         (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6306         (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6307 });
6308
6309 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6310         (2, node_id, required),
6311         (4, features, required),
6312         (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6313         (8, forwarding_info, option),
6314         (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6315         (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6316 });
6317
6318 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
6319         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6320                 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6321                 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6322                 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
6323                 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
6324                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6325                         (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
6326                         (2, self.channel_id, required),
6327                         (3, self.channel_type, option),
6328                         (4, self.counterparty, required),
6329                         (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
6330                         (6, self.funding_txo, option),
6331                         (7, self.config, option),
6332                         (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
6333                         (9, self.confirmations, option),
6334                         (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
6335                         (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6336                         (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6337                         (16, self.balance_msat, required),
6338                         (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6339                         // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6340                         // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6341                         (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6342                         (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6343                         (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
6344                         (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
6345                         (26, self.is_outbound, required),
6346                         (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
6347                         (30, self.is_usable, required),
6348                         (32, self.is_public, required),
6349                         (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6350                         (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6351                         (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6352                 });
6353                 Ok(())
6354         }
6355 }
6356
6357 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
6358         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6359                 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6360                         (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6361                         (2, channel_id, required),
6362                         (3, channel_type, option),
6363                         (4, counterparty, required),
6364                         (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6365                         (6, funding_txo, option),
6366                         (7, config, option),
6367                         (8, short_channel_id, option),
6368                         (9, confirmations, option),
6369                         (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6370                         (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6371                         (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6372                         (16, balance_msat, required),
6373                         (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6374                         // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6375                         // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6376                         (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6377                         (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6378                         (22, confirmations_required, option),
6379                         (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6380                         (26, is_outbound, required),
6381                         (28, is_channel_ready, required),
6382                         (30, is_usable, required),
6383                         (32, is_public, required),
6384                         (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6385                         (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6386                         (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6387                 });
6388
6389                 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6390                 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6391                 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
6392                 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
6393                         ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
6394
6395                 Ok(Self {
6396                         inbound_scid_alias,
6397                         channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
6398                         channel_type,
6399                         counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
6400                         outbound_scid_alias,
6401                         funding_txo,
6402                         config,
6403                         short_channel_id,
6404                         channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
6405                         unspendable_punishment_reserve,
6406                         user_channel_id,
6407                         balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
6408                         outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6409                         next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
6410                         inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6411                         confirmations_required,
6412                         confirmations,
6413                         force_close_spend_delay,
6414                         is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
6415                         is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
6416                         is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
6417                         is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
6418                         inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
6419                         inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
6420                 })
6421         }
6422 }
6423
6424 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6425         (2, channels, vec_type),
6426         (4, phantom_scid, required),
6427         (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6428 });
6429
6430 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6431         (0, Forward) => {
6432                 (0, onion_packet, required),
6433                 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6434         },
6435         (1, Receive) => {
6436                 (0, payment_data, required),
6437                 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6438                 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6439         },
6440         (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6441                 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6442                 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6443         },
6444 ;);
6445
6446 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6447         (0, routing, required),
6448         (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6449         (4, payment_hash, required),
6450         (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
6451         (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
6452         (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
6453 });
6454
6455
6456 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6457         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6458                 match self {
6459                         HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6460                                 0u8.write(writer)?;
6461                                 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6462                                 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6463                                 reason.write(writer)?;
6464                         },
6465                         HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6466                                 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6467                         }) => {
6468                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
6469                                 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6470                                 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6471                                 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6472                                 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6473                         },
6474                 }
6475                 Ok(())
6476         }
6477 }
6478
6479 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6480         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6481                 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6482                 match id {
6483                         0 => {
6484                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6485                                         channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6486                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6487                                         reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6488                                 }))
6489                         },
6490                         1 => {
6491                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6492                                         channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6493                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6494                                         sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6495                                         failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6496                                 }))
6497                         },
6498                         // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6499                         // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6500                         // messages contained in the variants.
6501                         // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6502                         // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6503                         // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6504                         2 => {
6505                                 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6506                                 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6507                                 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6508                                 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6509                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6510                         },
6511                         3 => {
6512                                 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6513                                 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6514                                 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6515                                 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6516                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6517                         },
6518                         _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6519                 }
6520         }
6521 }
6522
6523 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6524         (0, Forward),
6525         (1, Fail),
6526 );
6527
6528 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6529         (0, short_channel_id, required),
6530         (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6531         (2, outpoint, required),
6532         (4, htlc_id, required),
6533         (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6534 });
6535
6536 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6537         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6538                 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
6539                         OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
6540                         OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
6541                 };
6542                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6543                         (0, self.prev_hop, required),
6544                         (1, self.total_msat, required),
6545                         (2, self.value, required),
6546                         (4, payment_data, option),
6547                         (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6548                         (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6549                 });
6550                 Ok(())
6551         }
6552 }
6553
6554 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6555         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6556                 let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6557                 let mut value = 0;
6558                 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6559                 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6560                 let mut total_msat = None;
6561                 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6562                 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6563                         (0, prev_hop, required),
6564                         (1, total_msat, option),
6565                         (2, value, required),
6566                         (4, payment_data, option),
6567                         (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6568                         (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6569                 });
6570                 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6571                         Some(p) => {
6572                                 if payment_data.is_some() {
6573                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6574                                 }
6575                                 if total_msat.is_none() {
6576                                         total_msat = Some(value);
6577                                 }
6578                                 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6579                         },
6580                         None => {
6581                                 if total_msat.is_none() {
6582                                         if payment_data.is_none() {
6583                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6584                                         }
6585                                         total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
6586                                 }
6587                                 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
6588                         },
6589                 };
6590                 Ok(Self {
6591                         prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6592                         timer_ticks: 0,
6593                         value,
6594                         total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
6595                         onion_payload,
6596                         cltv_expiry,
6597                 })
6598         }
6599 }
6600
6601 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6602         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6603                 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6604                 match id {
6605                         0 => {
6606                                 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6607                                 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6608                                 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
6609                                 let mut payment_id = None;
6610                                 let mut payment_secret = None;
6611                                 let mut payment_params = None;
6612                                 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6613                                         (0, session_priv, required),
6614                                         (1, payment_id, option),
6615                                         (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6616                                         (3, payment_secret, option),
6617                                         (4, path, vec_type),
6618                                         (5, payment_params, option),
6619                                 });
6620                                 if payment_id.is_none() {
6621                                         // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6622                                         // instead.
6623                                         payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6624                                 }
6625                                 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6626                                         session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6627                                         first_hop_htlc_msat,
6628                                         path: path.unwrap(),
6629                                         payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6630                                         payment_secret,
6631                                         payment_params,
6632                                 })
6633                         }
6634                         1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6635                         _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6636                 }
6637         }
6638 }
6639
6640 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6641         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
6642                 match self {
6643                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payment_params } => {
6644                                 0u8.write(writer)?;
6645                                 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6646                                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6647                                         (0, session_priv, required),
6648                                         (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6649                                         (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6650                                         (3, payment_secret, option),
6651                                         (4, *path, vec_type),
6652                                         (5, payment_params, option),
6653                                  });
6654                         }
6655                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6656                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
6657                                 field.write(writer)?;
6658                         }
6659                 }
6660                 Ok(())
6661         }
6662 }
6663
6664 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
6665         (0, forward_info, required),
6666         (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
6667         (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6668         (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6669         (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6670 });
6671
6672 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6673         (1, FailHTLC) => {
6674                 (0, htlc_id, required),
6675                 (2, err_packet, required),
6676         };
6677         (0, AddHTLC)
6678 );
6679
6680 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6681         (0, payment_secret, required),
6682         (2, expiry_time, required),
6683         (4, user_payment_id, required),
6684         (6, payment_preimage, required),
6685         (8, min_value_msat, required),
6686 });
6687
6688 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6689 where
6690         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6691         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6692         ES::Target: EntropySource,
6693         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6694         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6695         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6696         R::Target: Router,
6697         L::Target: Logger,
6698 {
6699         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6700                 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6701
6702                 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6703
6704                 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
6705                 {
6706                         let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6707                         best_block.height().write(writer)?;
6708                         best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
6709                 }
6710
6711                 {
6712                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6713                         let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
6714                         let mut number_of_channels = 0;
6715                         for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6716                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6717                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6718                                 number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len();
6719                                 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
6720                                         if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6721                                                 unfunded_channels += 1;
6722                                         }
6723                                 }
6724                         }
6725
6726                         ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
6727
6728                         for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6729                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6730                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6731                                 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
6732                                         if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6733                                                 channel.write(writer)?;
6734                                         }
6735                                 }
6736                         }
6737                 }
6738
6739                 {
6740                         let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6741                         (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6742                         for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
6743                                 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6744                                 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6745                                 for forward in pending_forwards {
6746                                         forward.write(writer)?;
6747                                 }
6748                         }
6749                 }
6750
6751                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6752
6753                 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6754                 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
6755                 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6756
6757                 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
6758                 (claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6759                 for (payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops)) in claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
6760                         payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6761                         (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6762                         for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
6763                                 htlc.write(writer)?;
6764                         }
6765                         htlc_purposes.push(purpose);
6766                 }
6767
6768                 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6769                 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6770                         peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
6771                         let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6772                         peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
6773                 }
6774
6775                 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6776                 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6777                 for event in events.iter() {
6778                         event.write(writer)?;
6779                 }
6780
6781                 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
6782                 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6783                 for event in background_events.iter() {
6784                         match event {
6785                                 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
6786                                         0u8.write(writer)?;
6787                                         funding_txo.write(writer)?;
6788                                         monitor_update.write(writer)?;
6789                                 },
6790                         }
6791                 }
6792
6793                 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
6794                 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
6795                 // likely to be identical.
6796                 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6797                 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6798
6799                 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6800                 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
6801                         hash.write(writer)?;
6802                         pending_payment.write(writer)?;
6803                 }
6804
6805                 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
6806                 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
6807                 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6808                         if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
6809                                 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
6810                         }
6811                 }
6812                 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
6813                 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6814                         match outbound {
6815                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6816                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6817                                         for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
6818                                                 session_priv.write(writer)?;
6819                                         }
6820                                 }
6821                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
6822                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
6823                         }
6824                 }
6825
6826                 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
6827                 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
6828                 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6829                         match outbound {
6830                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6831                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6832                                         pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
6833                                 },
6834                                 _ => {},
6835                         }
6836                 }
6837
6838                 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
6839                 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6840                 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
6841                         pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
6842                 }
6843
6844                 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
6845                 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
6846                         // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
6847                         // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
6848                         pending_claiming_payments = None;
6849                 } else {
6850                         debug_assert!(false, "While we have code to serialize pending_claiming_payments, the map should always be empty until a later PR");
6851                 }
6852
6853                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6854                         (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
6855                         (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
6856                         (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
6857                         (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
6858                         (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
6859                         (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
6860                         (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
6861                         (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
6862                 });
6863
6864                 Ok(())
6865         }
6866 }
6867
6868 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
6869 ///
6870 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
6871 /// is:
6872 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6873 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
6874 ///    `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
6875 ///    This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
6876 ///    [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
6877 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
6878 ///    same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
6879 ///    [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
6880 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6881 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
6882 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
6883 ///    Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
6884 ///    will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
6885 ///    the next step.
6886 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
6887 ///    [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
6888 ///
6889 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
6890 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
6891 ///
6892 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
6893 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
6894 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
6895 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
6896 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
6897 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
6898 ///
6899 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
6900 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
6901 where
6902         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6903         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6904         ES::Target: EntropySource,
6905         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6906         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6907         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6908         R::Target: Router,
6909         L::Target: Logger,
6910 {
6911         /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
6912         pub entropy_source: ES,
6913
6914         /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
6915         pub node_signer: NS,
6916
6917         /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
6918         /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
6919         /// signing data.
6920         pub signer_provider: SP,
6921
6922         /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6923         ///
6924         /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
6925         pub fee_estimator: F,
6926         /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6927         ///
6928         /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
6929         /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
6930         /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
6931         pub chain_monitor: M,
6932
6933         /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
6934         /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
6935         /// force-closed during deserialization.
6936         pub tx_broadcaster: T,
6937         /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
6938         /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
6939         ///
6940         /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
6941         pub router: R,
6942         /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
6943         /// deserialization.
6944         pub logger: L,
6945         /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
6946         /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
6947         pub default_config: UserConfig,
6948
6949         /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
6950         /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
6951         ///
6952         /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
6953         /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
6954         /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
6955         /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
6956         ///
6957         /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
6958         /// this struct.
6959         ///
6960         /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
6961         pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
6962 }
6963
6964 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
6965                 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6966 where
6967         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6968         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6969         ES::Target: EntropySource,
6970         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6971         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6972         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6973         R::Target: Router,
6974         L::Target: Logger,
6975 {
6976         /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
6977         /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
6978         /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
6979         pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
6980                         mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
6981                 Self {
6982                         entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
6983                         channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
6984                 }
6985         }
6986 }
6987
6988 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
6989 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
6990 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
6991         ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
6992 where
6993         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6994         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6995         ES::Target: EntropySource,
6996         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6997         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6998         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6999         R::Target: Router,
7000         L::Target: Logger,
7001 {
7002         fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7003                 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
7004                 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
7005         }
7006 }
7007
7008 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7009         ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
7010 where
7011         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7012         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7013         ES::Target: EntropySource,
7014         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7015         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7016         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7017         R::Target: Router,
7018         L::Target: Logger,
7019 {
7020         fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7021                 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7022
7023                 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7024                 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7025                 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7026
7027                 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7028
7029                 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7030                 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7031                 let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7032                 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7033                 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7034                 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
7035                 for _ in 0..channel_count {
7036                         let mut channel: Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (
7037                                 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
7038                         ))?;
7039                         let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7040                         funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
7041                         if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
7042                                 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7043                                                 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7044                                                 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7045                                                 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7046                                         // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
7047                                         log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
7048                                         log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7049                                                 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7050                                         log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7051                                         log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7052                                         log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7053                                         log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7054                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7055                                 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7056                                                 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7057                                                 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7058                                                 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7059                                         // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
7060                                         log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
7061                                         log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
7062                                         log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7063                                                 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7064                                         let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
7065                                         failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
7066                                         monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7067                                         channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7068                                                 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7069                                                 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7070                                                 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
7071                                         });
7072                                         for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7073                                                 let mut found_htlc = false;
7074                                                 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7075                                                         if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
7076                                                 }
7077                                                 if !found_htlc {
7078                                                         // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
7079                                                         // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
7080                                                         // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
7081                                                         // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
7082                                                         // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
7083                                                         // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
7084                                                         // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
7085                                                         log_info!(args.logger,
7086                                                                 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
7087                                                                 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7088                                                         failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7089                                                 }
7090                                         }
7091                                 } else {
7092                                         log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7093                                         if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
7094                                                 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7095                                         }
7096                                         if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7097                                                 id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
7098                                         }
7099                                         match peer_channels.entry(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
7100                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7101                                                         let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
7102                                                         by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7103                                                 },
7104                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7105                                                         let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
7106                                                         by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7107                                                         entry.insert(by_id_map);
7108                                                 }
7109                                         }
7110                                 }
7111                         } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
7112                                 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
7113                                 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
7114                                 // safely discard the channel.
7115                                 let _ = channel.force_shutdown(false);
7116                                 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7117                                         channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7118                                         user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7119                                         reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
7120                                 });
7121                         } else {
7122                                 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7123                                 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7124                                 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7125                                 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7126                                 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7127                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7128                         }
7129                 }
7130
7131                 for (funding_txo, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
7132                         if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
7133                                 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
7134                                 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7135                         }
7136                 }
7137
7138                 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
7139                 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7140                 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7141                 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
7142                         let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7143                         let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7144                         let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
7145                         for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
7146                                 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
7147                         }
7148                         forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
7149                 }
7150
7151                 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7152                 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7153                 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
7154                         let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7155                         let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7156                         let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
7157                         for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
7158                                 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
7159                         }
7160                         claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
7161                 }
7162
7163                 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7164                 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>)>()));
7165                 for _ in 0..peer_count {
7166                         let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7167                         let peer_state = PeerState {
7168                                 channel_by_id: peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new()),
7169                                 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
7170                                 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7171                         };
7172                         per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
7173                 }
7174
7175                 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7176                 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
7177                 for _ in 0..event_count {
7178                         match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
7179                                 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
7180                                 None => continue,
7181                         }
7182                 }
7183
7184                 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7185                 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
7186                 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
7187                         match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7188                                 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
7189                                 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7190                         }
7191                 }
7192
7193                 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
7194                 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7195
7196                 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7197                 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
7198                 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
7199                         if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
7200                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7201                         }
7202                 }
7203
7204                 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7205                 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
7206                         HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
7207                 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
7208                         let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
7209                         let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
7210                                 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
7211                         };
7212                         if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
7213                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7214                         };
7215                 }
7216
7217                 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
7218                 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
7219                 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
7220                 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
7221                 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
7222                 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7223                 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7224                 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
7225                 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
7226                 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7227                         (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
7228                         (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7229                         (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
7230                         (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7231                         (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
7232                         (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
7233                         (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7234                         (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
7235                 });
7236                 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
7237                         fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7238                 }
7239
7240                 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
7241                         probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7242                 }
7243
7244                 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
7245                         pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
7246                 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
7247                         let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
7248                         for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
7249                                 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
7250                         }
7251                         pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
7252                 } else {
7253                         // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
7254                         // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
7255                         // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
7256                         // corresponding `Channel` at all).
7257                         // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
7258                         // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
7259                         // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
7260                         // 0.0.102+
7261                         for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7262                                 if id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
7263                                         for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
7264                                                 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
7265                                                         if path.is_empty() {
7266                                                                 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
7267                                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7268                                                         }
7269                                                         let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
7270                                                         let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
7271                                                         session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
7272                                                         match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
7273                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7274                                                                         let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
7275                                                                         log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
7276                                                                                 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
7277                                                                 },
7278                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7279                                                                         let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
7280                                                                         entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
7281                                                                                 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
7282                                                                                 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
7283                                                                                 payment_secret,
7284                                                                                 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
7285                                                                                 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
7286                                                                                 total_msat: path_amt,
7287                                                                                 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
7288                                                                         });
7289                                                                         log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
7290                                                                                 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0),  log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
7291                                                                 }
7292                                                         }
7293                                                 }
7294                                         }
7295                                         for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7296                                                 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) = htlc_source {
7297                                                         let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
7298                                                                 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
7299                                                                         info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
7300                                                         };
7301                                                         // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
7302                                                         // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
7303                                                         // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
7304                                                         // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
7305                                                         // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
7306                                                         forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
7307                                                                 forwards.retain(|forward| {
7308                                                                         if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
7309                                                                                 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7310                                                                                         log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7311                                                                                                 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7312                                                                                         false
7313                                                                                 } else { true }
7314                                                                         } else { true }
7315                                                                 });
7316                                                                 !forwards.is_empty()
7317                                                         });
7318                                                         pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
7319                                                                 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7320                                                                         log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7321                                                                                 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7322                                                                         pending_events_read.retain(|event| {
7323                                                                                 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
7324                                                                                         intercepted_id != ev_id
7325                                                                                 } else { true }
7326                                                                         });
7327                                                                         false
7328                                                                 } else { true }
7329                                                         });
7330                                                 }
7331                                         }
7332                                 }
7333                         }
7334                 }
7335
7336                 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
7337                         // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
7338                         // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
7339                         // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
7340                         // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
7341                         // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
7342                         pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7343                                 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
7344                         });
7345                 }
7346
7347                 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
7348                 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
7349
7350                 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
7351                 if let Some(mut purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
7352                         if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
7353                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7354                         }
7355                         for (purpose, (payment_hash, previous_hops)) in purposes.drain(..).zip(claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..)) {
7356                                 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7357                         }
7358                 } else {
7359                         // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
7360                         // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
7361                         for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
7362                                 if previous_hops.is_empty() {
7363                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7364                                 }
7365                                 let purpose = match &previous_hops[0].onion_payload {
7366                                         OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
7367                                                 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
7368                                                         events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
7369                                                                 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
7370                                                                         Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
7371                                                                         None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
7372                                                                                 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
7373                                                                                 Err(()) => {
7374                                                                                         log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7375                                                                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7376                                                                                 }
7377                                                                         }
7378                                                                 },
7379                                                                 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
7380                                                         }
7381                                                 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7382                                         },
7383                                         OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
7384                                                 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
7385                                 };
7386                                 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7387                         }
7388                 }
7389
7390                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7391                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7392
7393                 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
7394                         pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
7395                 }
7396
7397                 let our_network_key = match args.node_signer.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node) {
7398                         Ok(key) => key,
7399                         Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7400                 };
7401                 let our_network_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &our_network_key);
7402                 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
7403                         if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
7404                                 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
7405                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7406                         }
7407                 }
7408
7409                 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
7410                 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
7411                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7412                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7413                         for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7414                                 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
7415                                         let mut outbound_scid_alias;
7416                                         loop {
7417                                                 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
7418                                                         .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
7419                                                 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
7420                                         }
7421                                         chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7422                                 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
7423                                         // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7424                                         // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7425                                         log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7426                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7427                                 }
7428                                 if chan.is_usable() {
7429                                         if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
7430                                                 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7431                                                 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7432                                                 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7433                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7434                                         }
7435                                 }
7436                         }
7437                 }
7438
7439                 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
7440
7441                 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7442                         for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
7443                                 if let Some((payment_purpose, claimable_htlcs)) = claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
7444                                         log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7445                                         let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
7446                                         let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
7447                                         let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
7448                                         if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
7449                                                 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
7450                                                         .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
7451                                                 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
7452                                         }
7453                                         for claimable_htlc in claimable_htlcs {
7454                                                 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
7455
7456                                                 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
7457                                                 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
7458                                                 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
7459                                                 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
7460                                                 //
7461                                                 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
7462                                                 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
7463                                                 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
7464                                                 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
7465                                                 // reason to.
7466                                                 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
7467                                                 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
7468                                                 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
7469                                                 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
7470                                                 // restart.
7471                                                 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
7472                                                 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
7473                                                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
7474                                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7475                                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7476                                                         if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
7477                                                                 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
7478                                                         }
7479                                                 }
7480                                                 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
7481                                                         previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
7482                                                 }
7483                                         }
7484                                         pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
7485                                                 receiver_node_id,
7486                                                 payment_hash,
7487                                                 purpose: payment_purpose,
7488                                                 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
7489                                         });
7490                                 }
7491                         }
7492                 }
7493
7494                 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
7495                         genesis_hash,
7496                         fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
7497                         chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
7498                         tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
7499                         router: args.router,
7500
7501                         best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
7502
7503                         inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
7504                         pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
7505                         pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments { pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()) },
7506                         pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
7507
7508                         forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
7509                         claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
7510                         outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
7511                         id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
7512                         short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
7513                         fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
7514
7515                         probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
7516
7517                         our_network_key,
7518                         our_network_pubkey,
7519                         secp_ctx,
7520
7521                         highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
7522
7523                         per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
7524
7525                         pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
7526                         pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
7527                         total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
7528                         persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
7529
7530                         entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
7531                         node_signer: args.node_signer,
7532                         signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
7533
7534                         logger: args.logger,
7535                         default_configuration: args.default_config,
7536                 };
7537
7538                 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7539                         let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
7540                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
7541                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7542                         channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7543                 }
7544
7545                 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
7546                 //connection or two.
7547
7548                 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
7549         }
7550 }
7551
7552 #[cfg(test)]
7553 mod tests {
7554         use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7555         use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7556         use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7557         use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
7558         use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdsa::Signature;
7559         use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
7560         use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
7561         use bitcoin::Txid;
7562         use core::time::Duration;
7563         use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
7564         use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
7565         use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, InterceptId};
7566         use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7567         use crate::ln::msgs;
7568         use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, OptionalField};
7569         use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
7570         use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7571         use crate::util::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
7572         use crate::util::test_utils;
7573         use crate::util::config::ChannelConfig;
7574         use crate::chain::keysinterface::EntropySource;
7575
7576         #[test]
7577         fn test_notify_limits() {
7578                 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
7579                 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
7580                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7581                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7582                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7583                 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7584
7585                 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
7586                 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
7587                 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7588                 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7589                 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7590
7591                 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7592
7593                 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
7594                 // to connect messages with new values
7595                 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7596                 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7597                 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7598                 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7599
7600                 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
7601                 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7602                 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7603                 // ... but the last node should not.
7604                 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7605                 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
7606                 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7607                 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7608
7609                 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
7610                 // about the channel.
7611                 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7612                 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7613                 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7614
7615                 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
7616                 // parties.
7617                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7618                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7619                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7620                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7621                 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7622                 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7623
7624                 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
7625                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7626                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7627
7628                 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
7629                 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
7630                 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
7631                 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
7632                 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
7633                 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
7634
7635                 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
7636                 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
7637                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7638                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7639                 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7640                 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7641                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7642                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7643
7644                 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
7645                 // the channel info has updated.
7646                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7647                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7648                 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7649                 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7650                 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7651                 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7652         }
7653
7654         #[test]
7655         fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
7656                 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
7657                 // expected.
7658                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7659                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7660                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7661                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7662                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7663
7664                 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
7665                 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7666                 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
7667                 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
7668
7669                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
7670                 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
7671                 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
7672                 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
7673                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
7674                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
7675                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7676                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7677                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7678                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
7679
7680                 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
7681                 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7682                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7683                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7684                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7685                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7686                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7687                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7688                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7689                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7690                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7691                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
7692                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7693                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7694                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7695                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7696                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7697                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7698                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7699                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7700                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7701                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
7702
7703                 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
7704                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
7705                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7706                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7707                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7708                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
7709
7710                 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
7711                 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
7712                 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
7713                 // lightning messages manually.
7714                 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7715                 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
7716                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7717
7718                 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7719                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7720                 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
7721                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7722                 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7723                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
7724                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7725                 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7726                 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
7727                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7728                 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7729                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7730                 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7731                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7732                 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7733                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
7734                 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7735                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7736                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
7737                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7738                 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7739                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7740                 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7741                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
7742                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7743
7744                 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
7745                 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
7746                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7747                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
7748                 match events[0] {
7749                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
7750                                 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
7751                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
7752                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
7753                         },
7754                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7755                 }
7756                 match events[1] {
7757                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7758                                 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7759                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7760                                 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7761                         },
7762                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7763                 }
7764                 match events[2] {
7765                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7766                                 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7767                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7768                                 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7769                         },
7770                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7771                 }
7772         }
7773
7774         #[test]
7775         fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
7776                 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
7777                 //      outbound regular payment fails as expected.
7778                 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
7779                 //      fails as expected.
7780                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7781                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7782                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7783                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7784                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7785                 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7786                 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7787
7788                 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
7789                 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
7790                 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
7791
7792                 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
7793                 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7794                         payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id()),
7795                         final_value_msat: 100_000,
7796                         final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
7797                 };
7798                 let route = find_route(
7799                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
7800                         None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7801                 ).unwrap();
7802                 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7803                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7804                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7805                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7806                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7807                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7808                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7809                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7810                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7811                 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
7812                 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
7813                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7814                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
7815                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7816                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7817                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7818                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7819                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7820                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7821                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7822                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7823                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7824                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7825
7826                 // Finally, claim the original payment.
7827                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7828
7829                 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
7830                 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7831                 let route = find_route(
7832                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
7833                         None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7834                 ).unwrap();
7835                 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7836                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7837                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7838                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7839                 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
7840                 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
7841                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
7842
7843                 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
7844                 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7845                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
7846                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7847                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7848                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7849                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7850                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7851                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7852                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7853                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7854                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7855                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
7856                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7857                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7858                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7859                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7860                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7861                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7862                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7863                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7864                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7865                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7866
7867                 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
7868                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7869         }
7870
7871         #[test]
7872         fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
7873                 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
7874                 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
7875                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7876                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7877                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7878                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7879
7880                 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7881                 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7882                 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7883                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7884
7885                 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
7886                 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7887                         payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7888                         final_value_msat: 10_000,
7889                         final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7890                 };
7891                 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
7892                 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7893                 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7894                 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7895                 let route = find_route(
7896                         &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7897                         nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7898                 ).unwrap();
7899
7900                 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7901                 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
7902                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash, None, PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
7903                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
7904                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7905
7906                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7907                 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7908                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7909                 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7910                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7911                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7912                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7913
7914                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
7915         }
7916
7917         #[test]
7918         fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
7919                 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
7920                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7921                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7922                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7923                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7924
7925                 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7926                 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7927                 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7928                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7929
7930                 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
7931                 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7932                         payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7933                         final_value_msat: 10_000,
7934                         final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7935                 };
7936                 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
7937                 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7938                 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7939                 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7940                 let route = find_route(
7941                         &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7942                         nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7943                 ).unwrap();
7944
7945                 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7946                 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7947                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
7948                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, Some(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
7949                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
7950                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7951
7952                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7953                 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7954                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7955                 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7956                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7957                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7958                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7959
7960                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
7961         }
7962
7963         #[test]
7964         fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
7965                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7966                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7967                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
7968                 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7969
7970                 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7971                 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7972                 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7973                 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7974
7975                 // Marshall an MPP route.
7976                 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
7977                 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
7978                 route.paths.push(path);
7979                 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7980                 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
7981                 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
7982                 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
7983                 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
7984                 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
7985
7986                 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None, PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap_err() {
7987                         PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
7988                                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))                        },
7989                         _ => panic!("unexpected error")
7990                 }
7991         }
7992
7993         #[test]
7994         fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
7995                 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
7996                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7997                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7998                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7999                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8000
8001                 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
8002                 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
8003                         payment_secret,
8004                         total_msat: 100_000,
8005                 };
8006
8007                 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
8008                 // payment verification fails as expected.
8009                 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
8010                 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
8011                 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
8012                         Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
8013                         Err(()) => {
8014                                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
8015                         }
8016                 }
8017
8018                 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
8019                 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
8020         }
8021
8022         #[test]
8023         fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
8024                 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
8025                 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
8026                 // the channel is successfully closed.
8027                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8028                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8029                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8030                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8031
8032                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8033                 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8034                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
8035                 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8036                 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
8037
8038                 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
8039                 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
8040                 {
8041                         // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
8042                         // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
8043                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8044                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8045                 }
8046
8047                 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8048                 {
8049                         // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8050                         // as it has the funding transaction.
8051                         let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8052                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8053                         assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8054
8055                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8056                 }
8057
8058                 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8059
8060                 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8061                 {
8062                         let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8063                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8064                         assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8065
8066                         // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8067                         // as it has the funding transaction.
8068                         let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8069                         assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8070                         assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8071                 }
8072                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8073                 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8074                 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8075                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8076                 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8077                 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8078                 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
8079
8080                 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8081                 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8082                 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8083                 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
8084
8085                 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8086                 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
8087                 {
8088                         // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
8089                         // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
8090                         // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
8091                         // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
8092                         let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8093                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8094                         assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8095
8096                         // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
8097                         // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
8098                         // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
8099                         // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
8100                         let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8101                         assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8102                         assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8103                 }
8104
8105                 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8106                 {
8107                         // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
8108                         // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
8109                         // closing transaction).
8110                         // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
8111                         // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
8112                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8113
8114                         // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s  `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
8115                         // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
8116                         let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8117                         assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8118                         assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8119                 }
8120
8121                 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8122
8123                 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
8124                 {
8125                         // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
8126                         // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
8127                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8128                 }
8129                 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8130
8131                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8132                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8133         }
8134
8135         fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8136                 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
8137                 check_api_misuse_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8138         }
8139
8140         fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8141                 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
8142                 check_api_misuse_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8143         }
8144
8145         fn check_api_misuse_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
8146                 match res_err {
8147                         Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8148                                 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8149                         },
8150                         Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
8151                         Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8152                 }
8153         }
8154
8155         #[test]
8156         fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
8157                 // Tests that our API functions and message handlers that expects a `counterparty_node_id`
8158                 // as input, behaves as expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
8159                 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
8160                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8161                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
8162                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
8163                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
8164
8165                 // Boilerplate code to produce `open_channel` and `accept_channel` msgs more densly than
8166                 // creating dummy ones.
8167                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8168                 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8169                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8170                 let accept_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8171
8172                 // Dummy values
8173                 let channel_id = [4; 32];
8174                 let signature = Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() });
8175                 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8176                 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
8177
8178                 // Dummy msgs
8179                 let funding_created_msg = msgs::FundingCreated {
8180                         temporary_channel_id: open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id,
8181                         funding_txid: Txid::from_hex("ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap(),
8182                         funding_output_index: 0,
8183                         signature: signature,
8184                 };
8185
8186                 let funding_signed_msg = msgs::FundingSigned {
8187                         channel_id: channel_id,
8188                         signature: signature,
8189                 };
8190
8191                 let channel_ready_msg = msgs::ChannelReady {
8192                         channel_id: channel_id,
8193                         next_per_commitment_point: unkown_public_key,
8194                         short_channel_id_alias: None,
8195                 };
8196
8197                 let announcement_signatures_msg = msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
8198                         channel_id: channel_id,
8199                         short_channel_id: 0,
8200                         node_signature: signature,
8201                         bitcoin_signature: signature,
8202                 };
8203
8204                 let channel_reestablish_msg = msgs::ChannelReestablish {
8205                         channel_id: channel_id,
8206                         next_local_commitment_number: 0,
8207                         next_remote_commitment_number: 0,
8208                         data_loss_protect: OptionalField::Absent,
8209                 };
8210
8211                 let closing_signed_msg = msgs::ClosingSigned {
8212                         channel_id: channel_id,
8213                         fee_satoshis: 1000,
8214                         signature: signature,
8215                         fee_range: None,
8216                 };
8217
8218                 let shutdown_msg = msgs::Shutdown {
8219                         channel_id: channel_id,
8220                         scriptpubkey: Script::new(),
8221                 };
8222
8223                 let onion_routing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
8224                         version: 255,
8225                         public_key: Ok(unkown_public_key),
8226                         hop_data: [1; 20*65],
8227                         hmac: [2; 32]
8228                 };
8229
8230                 let update_add_htlc_msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
8231                         channel_id: channel_id,
8232                         htlc_id: 0,
8233                         amount_msat: 1000000,
8234                         payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
8235                         cltv_expiry: 821716,
8236                         onion_routing_packet
8237                 };
8238
8239                 let commitment_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
8240                         channel_id: channel_id,
8241                         signature: signature,
8242                         htlc_signatures: Vec::new(),
8243                 };
8244
8245                 let update_fee_msg = msgs::UpdateFee {
8246                         channel_id: channel_id,
8247                         feerate_per_kw: 1000,
8248                 };
8249
8250                 let malformed_update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
8251                         channel_id: channel_id,
8252                         htlc_id: 0,
8253                         sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
8254                         failure_code: 0x8000,
8255                 };
8256
8257                 let fulfill_update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
8258                         channel_id: channel_id,
8259                         htlc_id: 0,
8260                         payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage([1; 32]),
8261                 };
8262
8263                 let fail_update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
8264                         channel_id: channel_id,
8265                         htlc_id: 0,
8266                         reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
8267                 };
8268
8269                 let revoke_and_ack_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
8270                         channel_id: channel_id,
8271                         per_commitment_secret: [1; 32],
8272                         next_per_commitment_point: unkown_public_key,
8273                 };
8274
8275                 // Test the API functions and message handlers.
8276                 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
8277
8278                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&unkown_public_key, &open_channel_msg);
8279
8280                 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&unkown_public_key, &accept_channel_msg);
8281
8282                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
8283
8284                 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&unkown_public_key, &funding_created_msg);
8285
8286                 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&unkown_public_key, &funding_signed_msg);
8287
8288                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_ready(&unkown_public_key, &channel_ready_msg);
8289
8290                 nodes[1].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&unkown_public_key, &announcement_signatures_msg);
8291
8292                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8293
8294                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8295
8296                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8297
8298                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
8299
8300                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
8301
8302                 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&unkown_public_key, &shutdown_msg);
8303
8304                 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&unkown_public_key, &closing_signed_msg);
8305
8306                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&unkown_public_key, &channel_reestablish_msg);
8307
8308                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&unkown_public_key, &update_add_htlc_msg);
8309
8310                 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&unkown_public_key, &commitment_signed_msg);
8311
8312                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&unkown_public_key, &malformed_update_msg);
8313
8314                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&unkown_public_key, &fail_update_msg);
8315
8316                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&unkown_public_key, &fulfill_update_msg);
8317
8318                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&unkown_public_key, &revoke_and_ack_msg);
8319
8320                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&unkown_public_key, &update_fee_msg);
8321         }
8322
8323         #[cfg(anchors)]
8324         #[test]
8325         fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
8326                 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
8327                 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
8328                 // the channel without the anchors feature.
8329                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8330                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8331                 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
8332                 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8333                 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8334                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
8335                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8336
8337                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
8338                 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8339                 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8340
8341                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8342                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8343                 match events[0] {
8344                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8345                                 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8346                         }
8347                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8348                 }
8349
8350                 let error_msg = get_err_msg!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8351                 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
8352
8353                 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8354                 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8355
8356                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8357         }
8358 }
8359
8360 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
8361 pub mod bench {
8362         use crate::chain::Listen;
8363         use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
8364         use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
8365         use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId};
8366         use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
8367         use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
8368         use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
8369         use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
8370         use crate::util::test_utils;
8371         use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
8372         use crate::util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
8373
8374         use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8375         use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8376         use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
8377
8378         use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
8379
8380         use test::Bencher;
8381
8382         struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
8383                 node: &'a ChannelManager<
8384                         &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
8385                                 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
8386                                 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
8387                         &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
8388                         &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
8389                         &'a test_utils::TestLogger>,
8390         }
8391
8392         #[cfg(test)]
8393         #[bench]
8394         fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
8395                 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
8396         }
8397
8398         pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
8399                 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
8400                 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
8401                 // calls per node.
8402                 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
8403                 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
8404
8405                 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
8406                 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
8407                 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8408                 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger_a)));
8409
8410                 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
8411                 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
8412
8413                 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
8414                 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
8415                 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
8416                 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8417                         network,
8418                         best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
8419                 });
8420                 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
8421
8422                 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8423                 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
8424                 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
8425                 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
8426                 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8427                         network,
8428                         best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
8429                 });
8430                 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
8431
8432                 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_b.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8433                 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_a.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8434                 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8435                 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8436                 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8437
8438                 let tx;
8439                 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
8440                         tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8441                                 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
8442                         }]};
8443                         node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8444                 } else { panic!(); }
8445
8446                 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8447                 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8448
8449                 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
8450
8451                 let block = Block {
8452                         header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8453                         txdata: vec![tx],
8454                 };
8455                 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
8456                 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
8457
8458                 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8459                 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8460                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
8461                 match msg_events[0] {
8462                         MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
8463                                 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
8464                                 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8465                         },
8466                         _ => panic!(),
8467                 }
8468                 match msg_events[1] {
8469                         MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8470                         _ => panic!(),
8471                 }
8472
8473                 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8474                 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
8475                 match events_a[0] {
8476                         Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8477                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
8478                         },
8479                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8480                 }
8481
8482                 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8483                 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
8484                 match events_b[0] {
8485                         Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8486                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8487                         },
8488                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8489                 }
8490
8491                 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger_a);
8492
8493                 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
8494                 macro_rules! send_payment {
8495                         ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
8496                                 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
8497                                 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id())
8498                                         .with_features($node_b.invoice_features());
8499                                 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
8500                                 let seed = [3u8; 32];
8501                                 let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42);
8502                                 let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8503                                 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph.read_only(),
8504                                         Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
8505
8506                                 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
8507                                 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
8508                                 payment_count += 1;
8509                                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
8510                                 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
8511
8512                                 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8513                                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
8514                                 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8515                                 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
8516                                 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8517                                 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8518                                 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8519                                 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8520
8521                                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
8522                                 expect_payment_claimable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
8523                                 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8524                                 expect_payment_claimed!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
8525
8526                                 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
8527                                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
8528                                                 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8529                                                 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8530                                                 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
8531                                         },
8532                                         _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
8533                                 }
8534
8535                                 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
8536                                 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8537                                 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8538                                 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8539
8540                                 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
8541                         }
8542                 }
8543
8544                 bench.iter(|| {
8545                         send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
8546                         send_payment!(node_b, node_a);
8547                 });
8548         }
8549 }