1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
31 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
36 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
39 use chain::{Confirm, Watch, BestBlock};
40 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator};
41 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
42 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 pub use ln::channel::CounterpartyForwardingInfo;
47 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
48 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
49 use routing::router::{Route, RouteHop};
51 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
53 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, OptionalField};
54 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
55 use util::config::UserConfig;
56 use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
57 use util::{byte_utils, events};
58 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
59 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
60 use util::logger::{Logger, Level};
61 use util::errors::APIError;
66 use core::cell::RefCell;
67 use io::{Cursor, Read};
68 use sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
69 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
70 use core::time::Duration;
71 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
72 use std::time::Instant;
74 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
76 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
78 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
79 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
80 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
82 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
83 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
84 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
85 // before we forward it.
87 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
88 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
89 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
90 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
91 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
93 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
94 enum PendingHTLCRouting {
96 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
97 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
100 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
101 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
104 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
105 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
109 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
110 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
111 routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
112 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
113 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
114 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
115 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
118 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
119 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
120 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
121 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
124 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
125 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
126 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
127 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
128 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
131 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
133 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
135 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
136 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
137 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
139 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
141 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
145 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
149 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
150 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
151 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
152 short_channel_id: u64,
154 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
156 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
157 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
162 /// Contains a total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
163 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
164 /// are part of the same payment.
165 Invoice(msgs::FinalOnionHopData),
166 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
167 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
170 struct ClaimableHTLC {
171 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
174 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
177 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
178 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
179 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
180 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
183 session_priv: SecretKey,
184 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
185 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
186 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
191 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
192 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
194 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
195 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
200 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
201 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
203 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
211 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
212 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
214 MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
219 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
221 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
222 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
223 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
224 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
225 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
227 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
228 err: msgs::LightningError,
229 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
231 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
233 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
235 err: LightningError {
237 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
238 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
244 shutdown_finish: None,
248 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
250 err: LightningError {
252 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
254 shutdown_finish: None,
258 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
259 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
262 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
264 err: LightningError {
266 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
267 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
273 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
277 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
280 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
282 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
284 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
286 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
287 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
293 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
295 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
296 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
303 shutdown_finish: None,
308 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
309 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
310 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
311 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
312 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
314 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
315 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
316 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
317 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
318 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
319 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
320 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
322 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
326 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
327 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
328 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
329 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
330 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
331 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
332 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
333 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
334 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
335 /// Map from payment hash to any HTLCs which are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user.
336 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
337 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
339 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
340 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
341 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
342 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
345 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
346 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
347 /// quite some time lag.
348 enum BackgroundEvent {
349 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
350 /// commitment transaction.
351 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
354 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
355 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
357 latest_features: InitFeatures,
360 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
361 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
363 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
365 struct PendingInboundPayment {
366 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
367 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
368 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
369 /// this payment being removed.
371 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
372 user_payment_id: u64,
373 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
374 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
375 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
378 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
379 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
380 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
381 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
382 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
383 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
384 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
385 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
387 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
388 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
389 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
390 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
391 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
392 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
393 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
394 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
395 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
397 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
398 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
400 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
401 /// to individual Channels.
403 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
404 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
405 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
406 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
408 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
409 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
410 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
411 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
412 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
413 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
414 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
416 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
417 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
418 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
419 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
422 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
423 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
424 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
425 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
426 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
428 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
429 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
430 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
431 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
432 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
433 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
434 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
435 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
436 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
437 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
440 default_configuration: UserConfig,
441 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
447 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
449 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
450 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
452 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
453 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
454 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
455 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
457 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
458 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
459 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
460 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
461 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
462 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
464 /// The session_priv bytes of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
465 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
466 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
467 /// PaymentSent/PaymentFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
468 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
469 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
470 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
471 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
473 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
474 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashSet<[u8; 32]>>,
476 our_network_key: SecretKey,
477 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
479 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
480 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
481 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
483 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
484 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
485 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
486 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
488 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
489 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
490 /// are currently open with that peer.
491 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
492 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
494 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
496 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
497 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
498 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
499 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
500 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
501 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
502 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
503 /// PersistenceNotifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
504 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
506 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
513 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
515 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
516 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
517 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
518 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
519 pub struct ChainParameters {
520 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
521 pub network: Network,
523 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
525 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
526 pub best_block: BestBlock,
529 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
535 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
536 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
537 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
538 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
539 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
540 /// updates are ready for persistence).
542 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
543 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
544 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
545 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
546 persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
548 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
549 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
552 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
553 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
554 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
557 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
558 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
560 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
561 persistence_notifier: notifier,
562 should_persist: persist_check,
563 _read_guard: read_guard,
568 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
570 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
571 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
576 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
577 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
579 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
581 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
582 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
583 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
584 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
585 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
587 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
588 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
590 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
592 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
593 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
594 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
595 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
596 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
597 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
598 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
600 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
601 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
603 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
604 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
605 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
606 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
608 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
609 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
610 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
611 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
612 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
613 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
616 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
618 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
619 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
622 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
624 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
625 /// to better separate parameters.
626 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
627 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
628 /// The node_id of our counterparty
629 pub node_id: PublicKey,
630 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
631 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
632 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
633 pub features: InitFeatures,
634 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
635 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
636 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
638 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
640 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
641 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
642 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
643 /// payments to us through this channel.
644 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
647 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
648 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
649 pub struct ChannelDetails {
650 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
651 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
652 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
653 /// lifetime of the channel.
654 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
655 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
656 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
657 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
658 /// our counterparty already.
660 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
661 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
662 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
663 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
664 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
665 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
666 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
667 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
668 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
669 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
670 /// this value on chain.
672 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
674 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
676 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
677 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
678 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
680 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
681 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
682 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
683 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
685 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
686 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
687 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
688 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
689 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
690 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
691 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
692 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
693 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
695 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
696 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
697 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
698 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
699 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
700 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
701 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
702 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
703 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
705 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
707 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
708 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
709 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
710 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
711 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
712 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
713 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
714 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
715 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
717 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
718 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
719 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
720 pub is_outbound: bool,
721 /// True if the channel is confirmed, funding_locked messages have been exchanged, and the
722 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `funding_locked` message exchange implies the
723 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
724 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
725 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
727 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
728 pub is_funding_locked: bool,
729 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
730 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
732 /// This is a strict superset of `is_funding_locked`.
734 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
738 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
739 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
741 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
742 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
743 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
744 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
745 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
746 ParameterError(APIError),
747 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
748 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
749 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
752 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
754 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
755 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
756 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
757 /// paths than the ones selected).
758 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
759 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
760 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
761 /// in over-/re-payment.
763 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
764 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
765 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
767 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
768 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
769 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
770 /// with the latest update_id.
771 PartialFailure(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
774 macro_rules! handle_error {
775 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
778 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
779 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
781 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
782 // entering the macro.
783 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
786 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
788 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
789 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
790 if let Some(update) = update_option {
791 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
797 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
798 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
800 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
801 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
802 action: err.action.clone()
806 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
807 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
810 // Return error in case higher-API need one
817 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
818 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
819 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
821 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
822 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
824 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
825 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
826 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
827 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
829 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
830 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
832 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => {
833 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
834 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
835 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
837 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(false);
838 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
844 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
845 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
849 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
851 $entry.remove_entry();
859 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
860 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
864 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
866 $entry.remove_entry();
874 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
875 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
876 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
878 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
880 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
881 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
882 if let Some(short_id) = $chan.get_short_channel_id() {
883 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
885 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
886 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
887 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
888 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
889 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
890 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
891 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
892 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
893 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
894 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id,
895 $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
898 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
899 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
900 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
901 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
903 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
904 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
906 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
907 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
909 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
910 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
911 if !$resend_commitment {
912 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
915 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
917 $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
918 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
922 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => { {
923 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $entry.key());
925 $entry.remove_entry();
931 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
932 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
933 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
935 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
936 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
940 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
941 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
942 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
943 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
944 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
947 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
952 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
953 ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
954 $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
955 $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $funding_locked: expr) => { {
956 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
957 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
959 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
960 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
962 let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
963 if !forwards.is_empty() {
964 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"),
965 $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
968 if chanmon_update.is_some() {
969 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a funding_locked if there have been
970 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
971 // associated with a funding_locked would be the funding_created/funding_signed
972 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
973 // funding_locked until it's been updated, so we can't have a funding_locked and a
974 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
975 assert!($funding_locked.is_none());
976 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a funding_locked or a
977 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a funding_locked, we
978 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
979 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
982 if let Some(msg) = $funding_locked {
983 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the funding_locked fly
984 // before it should be allowed to.
985 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
986 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
987 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
990 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = $self.get_announcement_sigs($channel_entry.get()) {
991 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
992 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
993 msg: announcement_sigs,
996 $channel_state.short_to_id.insert($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), $channel_entry.get().channel_id());
999 let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
1000 if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
1001 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
1002 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
1003 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
1004 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
1005 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
1006 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
1007 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
1008 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
1009 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
1010 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1011 if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1012 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
1013 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
1014 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
1015 let mut order = $order;
1017 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1019 break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
1023 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1024 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
1025 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1026 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1031 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1032 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
1033 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1034 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1035 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1040 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1044 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1049 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1050 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1051 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1056 if chanmon_update_is_none {
1057 // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
1058 // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
1059 // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
1060 assert!(res.is_ok());
1063 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1067 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1068 ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1069 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1071 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1073 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1074 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1079 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
1080 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
1081 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1082 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1083 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1086 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1088 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1089 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1091 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1093 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
1095 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1096 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1097 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1098 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1099 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1100 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1103 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1104 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1105 fee_estimator: fee_est,
1109 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1111 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1112 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1113 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
1114 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1115 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1116 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1118 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1119 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1121 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
1122 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
1125 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1126 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1128 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1130 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1131 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1132 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1133 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
1141 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels, as
1142 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1143 &self.default_configuration
1146 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1148 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady events to allow
1149 /// tracking of which events correspond with which create_channel call. Note that the
1150 /// user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for
1151 /// user_id here. user_id has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and
1152 /// otherwise ignored.
1154 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
1155 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
1157 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
1158 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
1160 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1161 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1162 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten.
1163 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1164 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1165 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1168 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1169 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, config)?;
1170 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1172 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1173 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1174 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1176 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1177 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
1178 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1179 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1180 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1182 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1185 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1187 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1188 node_id: their_network_key,
1194 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1195 let mut res = Vec::new();
1197 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1198 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1199 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1200 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
1201 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1202 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1203 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1204 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1205 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1206 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1207 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1208 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1209 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1211 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1212 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1213 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1214 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1215 inbound_capacity_msat,
1216 outbound_capacity_msat,
1217 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1218 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1219 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1220 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1221 is_funding_locked: channel.is_usable(),
1222 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1223 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1227 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1228 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1229 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1230 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1236 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1237 /// more information.
1238 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1239 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1242 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1243 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1245 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1246 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1248 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1249 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1250 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1251 // really wanted anyway.
1252 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1255 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1256 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1257 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1259 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1260 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1261 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1263 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
1264 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1265 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1266 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1267 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1268 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
1269 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1270 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
1273 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1274 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1275 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1277 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1278 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
1280 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1283 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1284 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1286 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1287 self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok()
1290 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
1291 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1292 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1301 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1302 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1303 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1304 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1305 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1307 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1308 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1309 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1310 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1311 // ignore the result here.
1312 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1316 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1318 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1319 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1320 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1321 if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id {
1322 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id {
1323 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1326 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1327 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1329 chan.remove_entry().1
1331 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1334 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1335 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
1336 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1337 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1338 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1343 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1346 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
1347 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
1348 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1349 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1350 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None) {
1351 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1352 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1353 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1354 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1355 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1356 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1366 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
1367 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
1368 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
1369 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1370 let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
1374 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
1375 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
1376 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
1378 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1379 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
1380 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1381 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1382 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
1383 failure_code: $err_code,
1384 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1389 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
1390 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
1393 let shared_secret = {
1394 let mut arr = [0; 32];
1395 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
1398 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1400 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
1401 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
1402 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
1403 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
1404 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
1405 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
1406 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
1407 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
1410 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
1411 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1412 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
1413 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
1414 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
1417 let mut channel_state = None;
1418 macro_rules! return_err {
1419 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
1421 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1422 if channel_state.is_none() {
1423 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1425 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1426 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1427 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1428 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
1429 })), channel_state.unwrap());
1434 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1435 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
1436 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac) = {
1437 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
1439 let error_code = match err {
1440 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
1441 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
1442 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
1443 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
1444 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1446 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1449 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
1450 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
1451 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1458 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
1461 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
1462 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
1463 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
1464 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
1465 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
1466 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
1467 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
1468 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
1469 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1470 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1471 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1472 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1476 // final_expiry_too_soon
1477 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
1478 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
1479 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
1480 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
1481 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
1482 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
1483 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1485 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1486 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1487 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1489 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1490 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1491 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1494 let routing = match next_hop_data.format {
1495 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]),
1496 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]),
1497 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
1498 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
1499 return_err!("We don't support MPP keysend payments", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
1500 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
1501 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
1503 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1505 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
1506 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
1507 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
1508 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
1509 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
1510 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
1511 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1512 if hashed_preimage != msg.payment_hash {
1513 return_err!("Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
1516 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
1518 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1521 return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]);
1526 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1527 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1528 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1529 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1531 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1533 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1534 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1535 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1536 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1539 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1540 let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
1541 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1543 // Check two things:
1544 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
1545 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
1546 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
1548 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
1550 // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
1551 // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
1552 chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
1554 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1556 let blinding_factor = {
1557 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1558 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1559 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1560 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
1563 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
1565 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1567 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1570 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1571 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
1574 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
1575 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1576 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1577 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
1578 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1582 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1583 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1584 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
1587 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1588 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1589 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1590 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1594 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1595 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1596 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
1597 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
1598 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
1599 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
1600 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1601 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1602 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1603 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1604 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
1606 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1609 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1611 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
1612 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
1613 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
1614 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
1615 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
1618 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1619 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1620 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1621 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1622 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1623 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1624 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1626 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1627 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1629 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64)
1630 .and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000)
1631 .checked_add(chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat() as u64) });
1632 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1633 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1635 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta() as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1636 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1638 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1639 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now, but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty
1640 // packet sanitization (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational)
1641 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1642 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1644 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1645 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1647 // In theory, we would be safe against unintentional channel-closure, if we only required a margin of LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1648 // But, to be safe against policy reception, we use a longer delay.
1649 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER) as u64 {
1650 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1656 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1657 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1658 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1659 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1661 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1662 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1664 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1665 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
1666 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
1668 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1670 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1675 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1678 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
1679 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
1680 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
1682 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1683 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1684 if !chan.should_announce() {
1685 return Err(LightningError {
1686 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
1687 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
1690 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1691 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
1694 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
1695 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
1696 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
1697 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
1698 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1699 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1700 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1701 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1702 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1706 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
1708 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1709 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1711 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
1712 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
1713 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
1714 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1715 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
1716 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
1717 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1718 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1721 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1722 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
1724 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1730 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
1731 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1732 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
1733 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
1734 let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
1735 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
1737 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
1738 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
1739 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
1740 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
1741 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
1743 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
1745 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1746 assert!(self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().insert(session_priv_bytes));
1748 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1749 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1750 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1751 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
1752 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1755 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1756 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1758 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1759 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1761 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1762 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
1764 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1766 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1767 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1768 }, onion_packet, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
1770 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
1771 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1772 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
1773 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1774 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
1775 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
1776 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
1777 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
1778 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1781 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
1782 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1783 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1784 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1785 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1786 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1787 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1788 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1796 } else { unreachable!(); }
1800 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
1801 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1803 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
1808 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1810 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1811 /// fields for more info.
1813 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1814 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1815 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1816 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1817 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1818 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1820 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
1822 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
1823 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
1824 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
1826 /// In general, a path may raise:
1827 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
1828 /// node public key) is specified.
1829 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1830 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
1832 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1833 /// relevant updates.
1835 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
1836 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
1837 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1839 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
1840 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
1841 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
1842 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
1844 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
1845 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
1846 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
1847 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
1848 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None)
1851 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
1852 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
1853 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
1855 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
1856 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
1857 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
1858 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
1859 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
1861 let mut total_value = 0;
1862 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1863 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
1864 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
1865 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
1866 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
1867 continue 'path_check;
1869 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
1870 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1871 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
1872 continue 'path_check;
1875 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
1876 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
1878 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
1879 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
1882 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1883 let mut results = Vec::new();
1884 for path in route.paths.iter() {
1885 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, &keysend_preimage));
1887 let mut has_ok = false;
1888 let mut has_err = false;
1889 for res in results.iter() {
1890 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
1891 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
1892 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
1893 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
1900 if has_err && has_ok {
1901 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure(results))
1903 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
1909 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
1910 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
1911 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
1912 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
1913 /// never reach the recipient.
1915 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
1916 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
1918 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
1919 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
1920 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
1922 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
1924 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
1925 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage)) {
1926 Ok(()) => Ok(payment_hash),
1931 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
1932 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
1933 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>
1934 (&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1936 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1938 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
1940 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
1941 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1942 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
1943 } else { unreachable!(); })
1946 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
1948 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
1949 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1952 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
1953 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
1958 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1959 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1960 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1963 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1964 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1965 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1967 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1975 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1976 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
1977 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
1981 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1983 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
1984 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
1986 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1988 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
1989 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
1990 /// keys per-channel).
1992 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
1993 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
1994 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
1996 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
1997 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
1998 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2000 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2001 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2002 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2004 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2005 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2006 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2007 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2011 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2012 let mut output_index = None;
2013 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2014 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2015 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2016 if output_index.is_some() {
2017 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2018 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2021 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2022 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2023 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2026 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2029 if output_index.is_none() {
2030 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2031 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2034 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2038 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
2039 if !chan.should_announce() {
2040 log_trace!(self.logger, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2044 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2046 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
2048 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2049 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2051 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
2052 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
2053 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
2054 node_signature: our_node_sig,
2055 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
2060 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
2061 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
2062 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
2064 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::core::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
2067 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
2068 // smaller than 500:
2069 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
2071 /// Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given
2072 /// arguments, providing them in corresponding events via
2073 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed
2074 /// on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node
2075 /// announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and
2076 /// our network addresses.
2078 /// `rgb` is a node "color" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this
2079 /// node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
2081 /// `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node
2082 /// accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly
2083 /// tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy,
2084 /// addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses.
2086 /// Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 500).
2088 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
2089 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
2090 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2092 if addresses.len() > 500 {
2093 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
2096 // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that
2097 // addresses be sorted for future compatibility.
2098 addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id());
2100 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2101 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
2102 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
2103 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
2104 rgb, alias, addresses,
2105 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2106 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2108 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2109 let node_announce_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2111 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2112 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2114 let mut announced_chans = false;
2115 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2116 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2117 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2119 update_msg: match self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
2124 announced_chans = true;
2126 // If the channel is not public or has not yet reached funding_locked, check the
2127 // next channel. If we don't yet have any public channels, we'll skip the broadcast
2128 // below as peers may not accept it without channels on chain first.
2132 if announced_chans {
2133 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
2134 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
2135 signature: node_announce_sig,
2136 contents: announcement
2142 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
2144 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
2145 /// Will likely generate further events.
2146 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
2147 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2149 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2150 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
2151 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2153 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2154 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2156 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
2157 if short_chan_id != 0 {
2158 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
2159 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2161 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
2162 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2163 match forward_info {
2164 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info,
2165 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2166 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2167 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2168 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2169 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2170 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
2172 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
2173 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }
2176 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2177 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
2178 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
2179 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
2180 // problem, not ours.
2187 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
2188 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2189 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2190 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2191 match forward_info {
2192 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2193 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2195 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
2196 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2197 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
2198 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2199 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2200 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2201 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2202 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2204 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet) {
2206 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2207 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
2209 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
2211 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap();
2212 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
2213 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
2219 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2221 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2222 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
2223 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
2224 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
2225 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
2226 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
2227 // this channel currently :/.
2233 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
2234 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
2236 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
2237 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
2238 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
2240 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2241 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
2243 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
2245 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
2246 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
2247 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
2250 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2252 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2253 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
2254 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
2255 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
2256 // messages when we can.
2257 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
2258 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
2259 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
2266 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
2267 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
2270 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
2271 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
2272 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
2273 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
2274 ChannelError::Ignore(_) => {
2275 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
2277 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2278 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
2279 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
2280 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2281 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2283 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
2285 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
2287 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
2291 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2292 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
2295 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
2296 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2297 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2298 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2299 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2300 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
2301 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2302 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
2303 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2305 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
2313 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2314 match forward_info {
2315 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2316 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
2317 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2318 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload) = match routing {
2319 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
2320 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data)),
2321 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
2322 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage)),
2324 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
2327 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
2328 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
2329 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2330 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2331 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2332 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2334 value: amt_to_forward,
2339 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
2341 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
2342 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
2343 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
2345 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2346 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
2347 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2348 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
2349 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
2351 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
2356 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
2357 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
2358 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
2359 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
2360 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
2361 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
2362 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2363 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
2364 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2365 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
2366 OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => {
2367 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we didn't have a corresponding inbound payment.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2368 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2370 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
2371 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
2372 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2373 e.insert(vec![claimable_htlc]);
2374 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
2376 amt: amt_to_forward,
2377 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage),
2380 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2381 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2382 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2388 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
2390 if let OnionPayload::Invoice(ref data) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
2393 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2394 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2397 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
2398 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2399 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2400 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
2401 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
2402 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
2403 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2405 let mut total_value = 0;
2406 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
2407 .or_insert(Vec::new());
2408 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
2409 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
2410 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2411 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2415 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
2416 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2417 total_value += htlc.value;
2418 match &htlc.onion_payload {
2419 OnionPayload::Invoice(htlc_payment_data) => {
2420 if htlc_payment_data.total_msat != payment_data.total_msat {
2421 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
2422 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, htlc_payment_data.total_msat);
2423 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
2425 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
2427 _ => unreachable!(),
2430 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > payment_data.total_msat {
2431 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
2432 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, payment_data.total_msat);
2433 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2436 } else if total_value == payment_data.total_msat {
2437 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
2439 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
2440 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
2441 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
2442 user_payment_id: inbound_payment.get().user_payment_id,
2446 // Only ever generate at most one PaymentReceived
2447 // per registered payment_hash, even if it isn't
2449 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
2451 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
2452 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
2459 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2460 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
2468 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
2469 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
2472 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
2473 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
2476 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
2477 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2478 events.append(&mut new_events);
2481 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
2483 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
2484 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
2486 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
2487 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
2488 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
2489 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
2490 if background_events.is_empty() {
2494 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
2496 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
2497 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
2498 // monitor updating completing.
2499 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
2506 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
2507 /// Process background events, for functional testing
2508 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
2509 self.process_background_events();
2512 /// If a peer is disconnected we mark any channels with that peer as 'disabled'.
2513 /// After some time, if channels are still disabled we need to broadcast a ChannelUpdate
2514 /// to inform the network about the uselessness of these channels.
2516 /// This method handles all the details, and must be called roughly once per minute.
2518 /// Note that in some rare cases this may generate a `chain::Watch::update_channel` call.
2519 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
2520 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
2521 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
2522 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
2524 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2525 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2526 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter_mut() {
2527 match chan.channel_update_status() {
2528 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
2529 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
2530 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
2531 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
2532 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
2533 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2534 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2538 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2539 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
2541 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
2542 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2543 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2547 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2548 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
2558 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
2559 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
2560 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
2561 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
2562 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
2563 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
2564 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2566 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2567 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
2568 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
2569 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
2570 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
2571 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
2572 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
2573 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
2574 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
2575 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
2576 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
2582 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
2583 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
2584 // be surfaced to the user.
2585 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
2586 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
2588 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
2589 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
2590 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2591 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
2592 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&chan_entry.get()) {
2593 (0x1000|7, upd.encode_with_len())
2595 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
2598 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
2600 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2601 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
2602 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
2604 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } => {
2606 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
2607 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
2608 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&session_priv_bytes)
2610 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2611 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2613 rejected_by_dest: false,
2621 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2628 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
2629 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
2630 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
2631 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
2632 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
2633 /// still-available channels.
2634 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
2635 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
2636 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
2637 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
2640 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
2641 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
2642 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
2644 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, .. } => {
2646 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
2647 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
2648 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&session_priv_bytes)
2650 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2653 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2654 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2655 match &onion_error {
2656 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
2658 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
2660 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
2661 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
2662 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
2663 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
2664 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
2665 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
2666 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
2671 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2672 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2673 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
2674 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
2676 error_code: onion_error_code,
2678 error_data: onion_error_data
2682 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
2688 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
2689 // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
2690 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
2691 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
2693 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
2694 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
2695 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2696 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2697 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
2698 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
2700 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
2702 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
2708 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. }) => {
2709 let err_packet = match onion_error {
2710 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
2711 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
2712 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
2713 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
2715 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
2716 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2717 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
2721 let mut forward_event = None;
2722 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2723 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
2725 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
2726 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2727 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
2729 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2730 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
2733 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2734 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
2735 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2736 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2737 time_forwardable: time
2744 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
2745 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
2746 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
2748 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
2749 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
2750 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
2751 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
2753 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
2755 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
2756 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
2757 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
2758 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2760 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2762 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2763 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
2764 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
2765 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
2767 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
2768 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
2769 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
2770 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
2772 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
2773 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
2774 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
2775 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
2776 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
2778 let mut valid_mpp = true;
2779 for htlc in sources.iter() {
2780 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
2786 let mut errs = Vec::new();
2787 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
2788 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
2790 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
2791 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
2792 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
2793 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
2794 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
2795 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
2796 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
2798 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
2799 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
2800 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
2801 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
2802 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
2803 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
2804 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
2805 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
2807 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
2808 ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
2809 // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
2810 // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
2811 // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
2812 // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
2814 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
2819 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
2820 // which were generated.
2821 channel_state.take();
2823 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
2824 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
2825 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
2832 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
2833 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
2834 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
2835 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
2836 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2838 return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed
2842 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
2843 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
2844 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
2845 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
2846 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2847 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
2848 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
2849 payment_preimage, e);
2850 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
2851 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2852 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
2853 Some(htlc_value_msat)
2856 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
2857 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
2858 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2859 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2860 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2861 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2862 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2863 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
2864 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2865 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2871 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
2873 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
2876 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
2877 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2878 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
2879 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
2880 payment_preimage, e);
2882 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
2883 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
2885 chan.remove_entry();
2887 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
2890 } else { unreachable!(); }
2893 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool) {
2895 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } => {
2896 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2898 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
2899 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
2900 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&session_priv_bytes)
2902 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2903 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
2907 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
2910 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
2911 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
2912 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
2913 let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
2914 let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
2915 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
2916 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
2919 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
2920 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2921 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
2922 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2923 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
2926 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
2927 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
2928 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
2929 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
2930 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
2931 payment_preimage, e);
2933 // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
2934 // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
2935 // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
2936 // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
2939 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2940 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
2941 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
2942 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
2946 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
2947 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
2948 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
2951 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2952 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
2954 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
2962 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
2963 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
2964 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
2967 /// Restores a single, given channel to normal operation after a
2968 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
2971 /// All ChannelMonitor updates up to and including highest_applied_update_id must have been
2972 /// fully committed in every copy of the given channels' ChannelMonitors.
2974 /// Note that there is no effect to calling with a highest_applied_update_id other than the
2975 /// current latest ChannelMonitorUpdate and one call to this function after multiple
2976 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures is fine. The highest_applied_update_id field
2977 /// exists largely only to prevent races between this and concurrent update_monitor calls.
2979 /// Thus, the anticipated use is, at a high level:
2980 /// 1) You register a chain::Watch with this ChannelManager,
2981 /// 2) it stores each update to disk, and begins updating any remote (eg watchtower) copies of
2982 /// said ChannelMonitors as it can, returning ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures
2983 /// any time it cannot do so instantly,
2984 /// 3) update(s) are applied to each remote copy of a ChannelMonitor,
2985 /// 4) once all remote copies are updated, you call this function with the update_id that
2986 /// completed, and once it is the latest the Channel will be re-enabled.
2987 pub fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
2988 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2990 let chan_restoration_res;
2991 let mut pending_failures = {
2992 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2993 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2994 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
2995 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
2996 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
2998 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
3002 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, pending_failures, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked) = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger);
3003 let channel_update = if funding_locked.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() && !channel.get().should_announce() {
3004 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
3005 // funding_locked and the channel is in a usable state. Further, we rely on the
3006 // normal announcement_signatures process to send a channel_update for public
3007 // channels, only generating a unicast channel_update if this is a private channel.
3008 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3009 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3010 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()).unwrap(),
3013 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, raa, commitment_update, order, None, pending_forwards, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked);
3014 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
3015 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
3019 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
3020 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
3021 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
3025 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3026 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
3027 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
3030 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(), their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration)
3031 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
3032 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3033 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3034 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
3035 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
3036 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3037 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
3038 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3039 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
3041 entry.insert(channel);
3047 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3048 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
3049 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3050 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3051 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
3052 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3053 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3054 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
3056 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, their_features), channel_state, chan);
3057 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
3059 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
3062 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3063 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
3064 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
3065 channel_value_satoshis: value,
3067 user_channel_id: user_id,
3072 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3073 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
3074 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3075 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3076 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3077 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
3078 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3079 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3080 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
3082 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
3084 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
3087 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
3088 // lock before watch_channel
3089 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
3091 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
3092 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
3093 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
3094 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
3095 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
3096 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
3097 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
3098 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
3099 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
3100 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
3101 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
3103 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
3104 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
3105 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
3106 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
3107 // until we have persisted our monitor.
3108 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3112 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3113 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3114 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
3115 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3116 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
3118 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3119 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
3120 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3129 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3131 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3132 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3133 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3134 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3135 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3136 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3137 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3139 let (monitor, funding_tx) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
3140 Ok(update) => update,
3141 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
3143 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
3144 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
3148 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3151 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
3152 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
3156 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3157 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3158 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3159 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3160 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3161 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3162 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3164 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3165 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
3166 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3167 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
3168 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
3169 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
3170 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
3171 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
3172 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
3173 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
3174 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
3175 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
3176 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
3177 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3178 msg: announcement_sigs,
3180 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
3181 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3182 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3183 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
3188 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3192 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3193 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
3194 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3195 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3197 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
3198 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
3199 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3200 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3202 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.fee_estimator, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
3203 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
3204 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3205 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3209 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3210 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3211 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3215 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
3216 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
3217 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3219 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
3220 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
3222 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3225 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
3226 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3228 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
3229 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3230 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3231 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3239 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3240 let (tx, chan_option) = {
3241 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3242 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3243 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
3244 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
3245 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3246 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3248 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
3249 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3250 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3251 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3256 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
3257 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
3258 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
3259 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
3260 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
3261 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
3262 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3264 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
3265 } else { (tx, None) }
3267 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3270 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
3271 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
3272 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
3274 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
3275 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3276 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3277 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3285 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3286 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
3287 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
3288 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
3290 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
3291 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
3292 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
3293 //but we should prevent it anyway.
3295 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
3296 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3298 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3299 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3300 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3301 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3304 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
3305 // Ensure error_code has the UPDATE flag set, since by default we send a
3306 // channel update along as part of failing the HTLC.
3307 assert!((error_code & 0x1000) != 0);
3308 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
3309 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
3310 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
3311 match pending_forward_info {
3312 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3313 let reason = if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
3314 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{
3315 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
3316 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
3317 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
3318 res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]);
3322 // The only case where we'd be unable to
3323 // successfully get a channel update is if the
3324 // channel isn't in the fully-funded state yet,
3325 // implying our counterparty is trying to route
3326 // payments over the channel back to themselves
3327 // (cause no one else should know the short_id
3328 // is a lightning channel yet). We should have
3329 // no problem just calling this
3330 // unknown_next_peer (0x4000|10).
3331 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
3333 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3334 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3335 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3338 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
3340 _ => pending_forward_info
3343 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3345 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3350 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3351 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3352 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
3353 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3354 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3355 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3356 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3357 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3359 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
3361 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3364 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false);
3368 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3369 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3370 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3371 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3372 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3373 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3374 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3376 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
3378 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3383 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3384 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3385 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3386 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3387 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3388 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3389 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3391 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
3392 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
3393 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
3395 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
3398 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3402 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3403 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3404 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3405 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3406 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3407 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3408 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3410 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update) =
3411 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
3412 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
3413 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
3414 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
3415 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
3416 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
3421 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3422 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
3423 //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
3425 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
3426 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3427 msg: revoke_and_ack,
3429 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
3430 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3431 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3432 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3433 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3434 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3435 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3436 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3438 commitment_signed: msg,
3442 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3443 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3444 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3450 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3455 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
3456 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
3457 let mut forward_event = None;
3458 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
3459 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3460 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3461 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
3463 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3464 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
3465 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
3466 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
3467 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
3469 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3470 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
3471 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
3473 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3474 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
3475 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
3480 match forward_event {
3482 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3483 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3484 time_forwardable: time
3492 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3493 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3495 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3496 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3497 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3498 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3499 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3500 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3502 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
3503 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail_in) =
3504 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3505 htlcs_to_fail = htlcs_to_fail_in;
3506 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3507 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
3508 assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && closing_signed.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
3509 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
3511 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures) {
3513 } else { unreachable!(); }
3516 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
3517 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3518 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3522 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3523 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3524 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3528 break Ok((pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"), chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
3530 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3533 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
3535 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) => {
3536 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
3537 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
3539 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
3546 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3547 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3548 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3549 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3550 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3551 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3552 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3554 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
3556 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3561 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3562 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3563 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3565 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3566 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3567 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3568 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3570 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
3571 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
3574 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
3575 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), msg), channel_state, chan),
3576 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
3577 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
3578 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
3581 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3586 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
3587 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3588 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3589 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3590 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
3591 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3593 // It's not a local channel
3594 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
3597 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3598 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3599 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3600 if chan.get().should_announce() {
3601 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
3602 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
3603 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
3604 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
3606 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
3608 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3609 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
3610 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
3611 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
3613 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
3616 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
3618 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
3621 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3622 let chan_restoration_res;
3623 let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround) = {
3624 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3625 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3627 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3628 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3629 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3630 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3632 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
3633 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
3634 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
3635 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
3636 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, order, htlcs_failed_forward, shutdown) =
3637 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3638 let mut channel_update = None;
3639 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
3640 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3641 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3644 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
3645 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
3646 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
3647 // they have the latest channel parameters.
3648 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3649 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3650 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
3653 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
3654 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order, monitor_update_opt, Vec::new(), None, funding_locked);
3655 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
3656 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
3658 (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround)
3660 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3663 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
3664 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id);
3666 if let Some(funding_locked_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
3667 self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, &funding_locked_msg)?;
3672 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
3673 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
3674 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
3675 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
3676 /// (C-not exported) Cause its doc(hidden) anyway
3678 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3679 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3680 let counterparty_node_id;
3681 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3682 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3683 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3685 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3686 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("Failed to find corresponding channel for id {}", channel_id.to_hex())}),
3687 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3688 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
3689 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel".to_owned()});
3691 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
3692 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
3694 if !chan.get().is_live() {
3695 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3697 counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3698 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) =
3699 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
3701 if let Err(_e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3704 log_debug!(self.logger, "Updating fee resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3705 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3706 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3707 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3708 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3709 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3710 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3711 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3712 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3722 match handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id) {
3723 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3724 Err(e) => { Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })}
3728 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
3729 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
3730 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3731 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
3732 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
3733 for monitor_event in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
3734 match monitor_event {
3735 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
3736 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
3737 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
3738 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.onchain_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true);
3740 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
3741 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3744 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(funding_outpoint) => {
3745 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3746 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3747 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
3748 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3749 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3750 if let Some(mut chan) = by_id.remove(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
3751 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3752 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3754 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
3755 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3756 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3760 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3761 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3762 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
3763 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
3771 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3772 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3775 has_pending_monitor_events
3778 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
3779 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
3780 /// update was applied.
3782 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
3783 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
3784 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
3785 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
3786 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
3787 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
3788 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3789 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3791 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3792 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3793 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
3794 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3795 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3797 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
3798 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
3799 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
3800 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
3801 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id));
3803 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
3804 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3805 has_monitor_update = true;
3806 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), channel_id);
3807 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
3808 if close_channel { return false; }
3810 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3811 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3812 updates: commitment_update,
3819 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
3820 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
3827 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
3828 for (failures, channel_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
3829 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id);
3832 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3833 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3839 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
3840 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
3842 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
3843 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3844 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
3845 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
3846 // reorganized out of the main chain.
3847 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
3848 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
3849 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
3850 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
3851 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
3852 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
3853 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
3854 assert!(should_broadcast);
3855 } else { unreachable!(); }
3856 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
3858 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3862 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
3863 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
3865 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
3867 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3868 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3869 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3870 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3871 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
3872 payment_secret, min_value_msat, user_payment_id, payment_preimage,
3873 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
3874 // its updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
3875 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
3876 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
3877 // never fail a payment too early.
3878 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
3880 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
3883 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
3888 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
3891 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
3892 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you, returning the first and storing the second.
3894 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
3895 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
3896 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
3898 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
3900 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
3901 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
3902 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
3903 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3904 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> (PaymentHash, PaymentSecret) {
3905 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
3906 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3909 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id)
3910 .expect("RNG Generated Duplicate PaymentHash"))
3913 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
3914 /// stored external to LDK.
3916 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
3917 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
3918 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
3920 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) must be globally unique. This
3921 /// method may return an Err if another payment with the same payment_hash is still pending.
3923 /// `user_payment_id` will be provided back in [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id`] events to
3924 /// allow tracking of which events correspond with which calls to this and
3925 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]. `user_payment_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply
3926 /// copied to events and otherwise ignored. It may be used to correlate PaymentReceived events
3927 /// with invoice metadata stored elsewhere.
3929 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
3930 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
3931 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
3932 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
3934 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
3935 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
3936 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
3937 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
3938 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
3940 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
3941 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
3942 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
3943 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
3944 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
3946 /// Pending inbound payments are stored in memory and in serialized versions of this
3947 /// [`ChannelManager`]. If potentially unbounded numbers of inbound payments may exist and
3948 /// space is limited, you may wish to rate-limit inbound payment creation.
3950 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
3952 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
3953 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
3955 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3956 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
3957 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id
3958 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
3959 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id)
3962 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))]
3963 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
3964 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
3965 let event_handler = |event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
3966 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
3971 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3972 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3973 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3974 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3975 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3978 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
3979 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
3980 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3981 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3983 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
3984 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
3985 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
3986 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3989 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
3990 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3993 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
3994 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3995 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
3997 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
3998 events.replace(pending_events);
4007 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4009 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4010 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4011 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4012 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4015 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
4017 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
4018 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
4020 /// Pending events are persisted as part of [`ChannelManager`]. While these events are cleared
4021 /// when processed, an [`EventHandler`] must be able to handle previously seen events when
4022 /// restarting from an old state.
4023 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
4024 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4025 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4027 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
4028 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
4029 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
4030 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4033 let mut pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
4034 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
4035 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4038 for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
4039 handler.handle_event(event);
4047 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4049 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4050 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4051 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4052 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4055 fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
4057 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4058 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), block.header.prev_blockhash,
4059 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
4060 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
4061 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
4064 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
4065 self.transactions_confirmed(&block.header, &txdata, height);
4066 self.best_block_updated(&block.header, height);
4069 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
4070 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4071 let new_height = height - 1;
4073 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
4074 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
4075 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
4076 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
4077 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
4078 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
4081 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, &self.logger));
4085 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4087 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4088 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4089 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4090 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4093 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
4094 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4095 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4096 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4098 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
4099 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
4101 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4102 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, &self.logger).map(|a| (a, Vec::new())));
4105 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
4106 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4107 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4108 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4110 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
4111 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
4113 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4115 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
4117 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, &self.logger));
4119 macro_rules! max_time {
4120 ($timestamp: expr) => {
4122 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
4123 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
4124 // having an explicit local time source.
4125 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
4126 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
4127 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
4128 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
4129 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
4135 max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
4136 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
4137 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4138 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
4139 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
4143 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
4144 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4145 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_id.len());
4146 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
4147 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
4148 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
4154 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
4155 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4156 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
4157 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
4158 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
4159 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|_| (None, Vec::new()))
4160 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
4161 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
4166 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4168 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4169 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4170 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4171 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4174 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
4175 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
4177 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage>>
4178 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
4179 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4180 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4181 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4183 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4184 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4186 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4187 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4188 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4189 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4190 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
4191 let res = f(channel);
4192 if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res {
4193 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
4194 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
4195 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4196 failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
4200 if let Some(funding_locked) = chan_res {
4201 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
4202 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4203 msg: funding_locked,
4205 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
4206 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4207 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4208 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4209 msg: announcement_sigs,
4211 } else if channel.is_usable() {
4212 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures but with private channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4213 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4214 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4215 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel).unwrap(),
4218 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4220 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
4222 } else if let Err(e) = res {
4223 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
4224 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4226 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
4227 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
4228 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
4229 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
4230 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4234 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4235 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4236 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
4243 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
4244 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, htlcs| {
4245 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4246 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
4247 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
4248 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
4249 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
4250 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
4251 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
4252 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
4253 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4254 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
4255 data: htlc_msat_height_data
4260 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
4265 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
4267 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
4268 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
4272 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
4273 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
4274 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
4276 /// Note that the feature `allow_wallclock_use` must be enabled to use this function.
4277 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
4278 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
4279 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
4282 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
4283 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
4285 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
4286 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
4289 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4290 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
4291 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
4292 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
4293 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4297 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
4298 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
4299 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
4300 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
4304 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
4305 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4306 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4307 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4308 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4309 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4312 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
4313 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4314 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4317 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
4318 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4319 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4322 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
4323 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4324 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4327 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
4328 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4329 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4332 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
4333 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4334 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4337 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
4338 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4339 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4342 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
4343 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4344 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4347 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
4348 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4349 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4352 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
4353 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4354 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4357 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
4358 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4359 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4362 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
4363 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4364 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4367 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
4368 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4369 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4372 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
4373 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4374 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4377 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
4378 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4379 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4382 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
4383 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4384 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4387 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
4388 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4389 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
4392 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
4397 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
4398 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4399 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4402 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
4403 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4404 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4405 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
4407 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4408 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4409 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4410 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4411 if no_connection_possible {
4412 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
4413 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
4414 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
4415 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4416 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4418 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
4419 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4420 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4430 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
4431 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
4432 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
4433 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
4434 if chan.is_shutdown() {
4435 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4436 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4440 no_channels_remain = false;
4446 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
4448 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4449 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4450 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4451 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4452 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4453 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4454 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4455 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4456 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4457 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4458 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4459 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
4460 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
4461 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
4462 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4463 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4464 &events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => true,
4465 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
4466 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
4467 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
4471 if no_channels_remain {
4472 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
4475 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4476 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4480 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
4481 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
4483 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4486 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4487 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
4488 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4489 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
4490 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
4493 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
4494 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
4499 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4500 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4501 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4502 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
4503 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
4504 if !chan.have_received_message() {
4505 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
4506 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
4507 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
4511 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
4512 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4513 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
4519 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
4522 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
4523 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4525 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
4526 for chan in self.list_channels() {
4527 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
4528 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
4529 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id));
4533 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
4534 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id));
4539 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
4540 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
4541 struct PersistenceNotifier {
4542 /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
4543 /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
4544 persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
4547 impl PersistenceNotifier {
4550 persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
4556 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
4557 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4562 guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
4563 let result = *guard;
4571 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
4572 fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
4573 let current_time = Instant::now();
4575 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
4576 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4581 guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
4582 // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
4583 // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
4584 // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
4585 // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
4587 let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
4588 let result = *guard;
4589 if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
4593 match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
4594 None => return result,
4600 // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
4602 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
4603 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4604 *persistence_lock = true;
4605 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
4610 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4611 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4613 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
4615 (0, onion_packet, required),
4616 (2, short_channel_id, required),
4619 (0, payment_data, required),
4620 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
4622 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
4623 (0, payment_preimage, required),
4624 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
4628 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
4629 (0, routing, required),
4630 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
4631 (4, payment_hash, required),
4632 (6, amt_to_forward, required),
4633 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required)
4636 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailureMsg, ;
4640 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
4645 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
4646 (0, short_channel_id, required),
4647 (2, outpoint, required),
4648 (4, htlc_id, required),
4649 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
4652 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
4653 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
4654 let payment_data = match &self.onion_payload {
4655 OnionPayload::Invoice(data) => Some(data.clone()),
4658 let keysend_preimage = match self.onion_payload {
4659 OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => None,
4660 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => Some(preimage.clone()),
4665 (0, self.prev_hop, required), (2, self.value, required),
4666 (4, payment_data, option), (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
4667 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
4673 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
4674 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4675 let mut prev_hop = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
4677 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
4678 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
4679 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
4683 (0, prev_hop, required), (2, value, required),
4684 (4, payment_data, option), (6, cltv_expiry, required),
4685 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
4687 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
4689 if payment_data.is_some() {
4690 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
4692 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
4695 if payment_data.is_none() {
4696 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
4698 OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data.unwrap())
4702 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
4710 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCSource,
4711 (0, OutboundRoute) => {
4712 (0, session_priv, required),
4713 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
4714 (4, path, vec_type),
4716 (1, PreviousHopData)
4719 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
4720 (0, LightningError) => {
4724 (0, failure_code, required),
4725 (2, data, vec_type),
4729 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
4731 (0, forward_info, required),
4732 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
4733 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
4734 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
4737 (0, htlc_id, required),
4738 (2, err_packet, required),
4742 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
4743 (0, payment_secret, required),
4744 (2, expiry_time, required),
4745 (4, user_payment_id, required),
4746 (6, payment_preimage, required),
4747 (8, min_value_msat, required),
4750 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4751 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4752 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4753 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4754 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4757 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
4758 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
4760 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
4762 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
4764 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4765 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
4766 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
4769 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4770 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
4771 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
4772 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
4773 unfunded_channels += 1;
4776 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
4777 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
4778 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
4779 channel.write(writer)?;
4783 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4784 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
4785 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
4786 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4787 for forward in pending_forwards {
4788 forward.write(writer)?;
4792 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4793 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
4794 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4795 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4796 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
4797 htlc.write(writer)?;
4801 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4802 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4803 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4804 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
4805 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4806 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
4809 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4810 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4811 for event in events.iter() {
4812 event.write(writer)?;
4815 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
4816 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4817 for event in background_events.iter() {
4819 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
4821 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
4822 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
4827 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
4828 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
4830 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4831 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4832 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
4833 hash.write(writer)?;
4834 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
4837 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4838 (pending_outbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4839 for session_priv in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
4840 session_priv.write(writer)?;
4843 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {});
4849 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
4851 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
4853 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
4854 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling:
4855 /// <(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)
4856 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
4857 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
4858 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints the same
4859 /// way you would handle a `chain::Filter` call using ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch() and
4860 /// ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
4861 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
4862 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
4863 /// 6) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local chain::Watch.
4865 /// Note that the ordering of #4-6 is not of importance, however all three must occur before you
4866 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized ChannelManager.
4868 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
4869 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
4870 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
4871 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
4872 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
4873 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
4874 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4875 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4876 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4877 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4878 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4881 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
4882 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
4884 pub keys_manager: K,
4886 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
4888 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
4889 pub fee_estimator: F,
4890 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
4892 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
4893 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
4894 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
4895 pub chain_monitor: M,
4897 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
4898 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
4899 /// force-closed during deserialization.
4900 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
4901 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
4902 /// deserialization.
4904 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
4905 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
4906 pub default_config: UserConfig,
4908 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
4909 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
4911 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
4912 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
4913 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
4914 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
4916 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
4919 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
4920 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
4923 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4924 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4925 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4926 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4927 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4928 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4931 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
4932 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
4933 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
4934 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
4935 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
4937 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
4938 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
4943 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
4944 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
4945 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4946 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
4947 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4948 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4949 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4950 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4953 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4954 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
4955 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
4959 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4960 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
4961 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4962 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4963 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4964 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4967 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4968 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
4970 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4971 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4972 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4974 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4976 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4977 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
4978 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
4979 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
4980 for _ in 0..channel_count {
4981 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, &args.keys_manager)?;
4982 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
4983 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
4984 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
4985 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
4986 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
4987 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
4988 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
4989 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
4990 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
4991 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
4992 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
4993 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
4994 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
4995 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
4996 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
4997 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4998 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
4999 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
5000 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
5001 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
5002 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
5003 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
5004 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
5005 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
5007 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5008 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
5010 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
5013 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5014 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
5015 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
5016 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
5017 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
5018 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5022 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
5023 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
5024 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
5028 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
5029 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5030 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
5031 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
5032 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5033 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5034 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
5035 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
5036 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
5038 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
5041 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5042 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
5043 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
5044 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5045 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5046 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
5047 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
5048 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
5050 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
5053 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5054 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
5055 for _ in 0..peer_count {
5056 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
5057 let peer_state = PeerState {
5058 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
5060 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
5063 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5064 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
5065 for _ in 0..event_count {
5066 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
5067 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
5072 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5073 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
5074 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
5075 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5076 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
5077 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5081 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5082 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5084 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5085 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
5086 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
5087 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
5088 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5092 let pending_outbound_payments_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5093 let mut pending_outbound_payments: HashSet<[u8; 32]> = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
5094 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count {
5095 if !pending_outbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?) {
5096 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5100 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {});
5102 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5103 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5105 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
5107 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
5108 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
5109 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
5111 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
5113 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
5118 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
5120 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
5121 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments),
5123 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
5124 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &args.keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
5127 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
5128 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
5130 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
5132 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
5133 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
5134 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
5135 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
5137 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
5138 logger: args.logger,
5139 default_configuration: args.default_config,
5142 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5143 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
5146 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
5147 //connection or two.
5149 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
5155 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
5156 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
5157 use core::time::Duration;
5158 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
5159 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
5160 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
5162 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
5163 use routing::router::{get_keysend_route, get_route};
5164 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
5165 use util::test_utils;
5167 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
5169 fn test_wait_timeout() {
5170 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
5172 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
5175 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
5176 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
5178 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
5179 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
5180 thread::spawn(move || {
5182 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
5183 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5184 *persistence_lock = true;
5187 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
5193 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
5194 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
5196 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
5199 if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
5204 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
5206 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
5209 if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
5216 fn test_notify_limits() {
5217 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
5218 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
5219 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5220 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5221 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5222 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5224 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
5225 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
5226 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5227 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5228 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5230 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5232 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
5233 // to connect messages with new values
5234 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
5235 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
5236 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
5237 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
5239 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
5240 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5241 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5242 // ... but the last node should not.
5243 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5244 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
5245 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5246 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5248 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
5249 // about the channel.
5250 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
5251 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
5252 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5254 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
5256 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
5257 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
5258 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
5259 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
5260 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5261 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5263 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
5264 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
5265 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
5267 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
5268 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
5269 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
5270 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
5271 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
5272 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
5274 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
5275 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
5276 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
5277 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
5278 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5279 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5280 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
5281 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
5283 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
5284 // the channel info has updated.
5285 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
5286 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
5287 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5288 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5289 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
5290 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
5294 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
5295 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
5297 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5298 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5299 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5300 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5301 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5302 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
5304 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
5305 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
5306 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap(), &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 100_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
5307 let (payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
5308 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
5309 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
5310 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
5311 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
5312 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5313 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5314 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5315 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
5317 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
5318 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
5319 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5320 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5321 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5322 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
5323 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
5324 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5325 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
5326 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5327 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5328 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5329 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5330 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5331 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5332 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5333 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5334 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5335 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5336 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5337 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
5338 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5340 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
5341 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
5342 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5343 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5344 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5345 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
5347 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
5348 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
5349 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
5350 // lightning messages manually.
5351 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
5352 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
5353 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5354 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5355 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
5356 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5357 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5358 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
5359 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5360 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5361 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
5362 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5363 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5364 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5365 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
5366 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5367 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5368 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
5369 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5370 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5371 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
5372 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5373 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
5374 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5375 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5376 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
5377 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5379 // There's an existing bug that generates a PaymentSent event for each MPP path, so handle that here.
5380 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5382 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage: ref preimage } => {
5383 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
5385 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5388 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage: ref preimage } => {
5389 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
5391 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5396 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
5397 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
5398 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
5399 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
5400 // fails as expected.
5401 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5402 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5403 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5404 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5405 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5406 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
5408 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
5409 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
5410 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
5412 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
5413 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap(), &expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 100_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
5414 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
5415 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5416 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5417 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5418 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
5419 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
5420 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5421 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
5422 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5423 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5424 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5425 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5426 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5427 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5428 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5429 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5430 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5431 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5432 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5433 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
5434 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
5436 // Finally, claim the original payment.
5437 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
5439 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
5440 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
5441 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap(), &expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 100_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
5442 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
5443 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5444 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5445 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5446 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
5447 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
5448 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
5450 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
5451 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
5452 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
5453 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5454 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5455 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5456 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
5457 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
5458 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5459 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
5460 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5461 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5462 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5463 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5464 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5465 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5466 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5467 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5468 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5469 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5470 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5471 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
5472 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
5474 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
5475 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
5479 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
5480 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
5481 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
5482 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5483 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5484 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5485 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5487 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
5488 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
5489 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
5490 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
5492 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5493 let network_graph = nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap();
5494 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
5495 let route = get_keysend_route(&payer_pubkey, &network_graph, &payee_pubkey,
5496 Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()), &vec![], 10000, 40,
5497 nodes[0].logger).unwrap();
5499 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
5500 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
5501 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
5502 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5504 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5505 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
5506 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5507 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5508 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5509 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5510 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
5512 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
5516 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
5517 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
5518 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5519 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5520 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5521 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5523 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
5524 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
5525 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
5526 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
5528 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5529 let network_graph = nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap();
5530 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
5531 let route = get_keysend_route(&payer_pubkey, &network_graph, &payee_pubkey,
5532 Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()), &vec![], 10000, 40,
5533 nodes[0].logger).unwrap();
5535 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
5536 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
5537 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
5538 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
5539 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5541 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5542 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
5543 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5544 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5545 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5546 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5547 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
5549 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
5553 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "unstable"))]
5556 use chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor;
5557 use chain::channelmonitor::Persist;
5558 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
5559 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
5560 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
5561 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
5562 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
5563 use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
5564 use routing::router::get_route;
5565 use util::test_utils;
5566 use util::config::UserConfig;
5567 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
5569 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
5570 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
5571 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
5573 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
5577 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
5578 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
5579 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
5580 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
5581 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
5582 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
5583 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
5588 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
5589 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
5592 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
5593 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
5594 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
5596 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
5597 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
5599 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
5600 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
5602 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
5603 config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
5605 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
5606 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
5607 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
5608 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
5609 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
5611 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
5613 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
5615 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
5616 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
5617 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
5618 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
5619 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
5621 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
5623 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
5625 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
5626 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
5627 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
5630 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
5631 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
5632 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
5634 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
5635 } else { panic!(); }
5637 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
5638 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
5640 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
5643 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5646 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
5647 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
5649 node_a.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
5650 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5651 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
5652 match msg_events[0] {
5653 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref msg, .. } => {
5654 node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
5655 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
5659 match msg_events[1] {
5660 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5664 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
5666 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
5667 macro_rules! send_payment {
5668 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
5669 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
5670 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &dummy_graph, &$node_b.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()),
5671 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), &[], 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a).unwrap();
5673 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
5674 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
5676 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
5677 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, 0).unwrap();
5679 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
5680 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
5681 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5682 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
5683 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
5684 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5685 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
5686 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
5688 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
5689 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
5690 assert!($node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
5692 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
5693 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
5694 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
5695 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5696 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
5698 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
5701 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
5702 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5703 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
5704 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
5706 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
5711 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
5712 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);