1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
31 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
36 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
39 use chain::{Confirm, Watch, BestBlock};
40 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator};
41 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
42 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 pub use ln::channel::CounterpartyForwardingInfo;
47 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
48 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
49 use routing::router::{Route, RouteHop};
51 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
53 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, OptionalField};
54 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
55 use util::config::UserConfig;
56 use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
57 use util::{byte_utils, events};
58 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
59 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
60 use util::logger::{Logger, Level};
61 use util::errors::APIError;
66 use core::cell::RefCell;
67 use io::{Cursor, Read};
68 use sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
69 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
70 use core::time::Duration;
71 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
72 use std::time::Instant;
74 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
76 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
78 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
79 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
80 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
82 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
83 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
84 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
85 // before we forward it.
87 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
88 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
89 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
90 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
91 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
93 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
94 enum PendingHTLCRouting {
96 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
97 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
100 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
101 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
104 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
105 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
109 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
110 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
111 routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
112 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
113 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
114 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
115 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
118 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
119 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
120 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
121 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
124 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
125 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
126 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
127 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
128 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
131 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
133 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
135 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
136 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
137 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
139 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
141 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
145 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
149 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
150 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
151 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
152 short_channel_id: u64,
154 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
156 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
157 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
162 /// Contains a total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
163 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
164 /// are part of the same payment.
165 Invoice(msgs::FinalOnionHopData),
166 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
167 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
170 struct ClaimableHTLC {
171 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
174 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
177 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
178 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
179 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
180 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
183 session_priv: SecretKey,
184 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
185 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
186 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
191 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
192 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
194 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
195 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
200 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
201 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
203 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
211 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
212 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
214 MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
219 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
221 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
222 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
223 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
224 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
225 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
227 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
228 err: msgs::LightningError,
229 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
231 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
233 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
235 err: LightningError {
237 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
238 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
244 shutdown_finish: None,
248 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
250 err: LightningError {
252 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
254 shutdown_finish: None,
258 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
259 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
262 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
264 err: LightningError {
266 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
267 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
273 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
277 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
280 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
282 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
284 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
286 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
287 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
293 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
295 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
296 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
303 shutdown_finish: None,
308 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
309 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
310 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
311 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
312 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
314 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
315 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
316 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
317 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
318 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
319 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
320 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
322 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
326 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
327 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
328 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
329 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
330 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
331 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
332 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
333 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
334 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
335 /// Map from payment hash to any HTLCs which are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user.
336 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
337 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
339 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
340 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
341 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
342 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
345 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
346 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
347 /// quite some time lag.
348 enum BackgroundEvent {
349 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
350 /// commitment transaction.
351 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
354 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
355 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
357 latest_features: InitFeatures,
360 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
361 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
363 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
365 struct PendingInboundPayment {
366 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
367 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
368 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
369 /// this payment being removed.
371 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
372 user_payment_id: u64,
373 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
374 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
375 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
378 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
379 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
380 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
381 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
382 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
383 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
384 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
385 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
387 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
388 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
389 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
390 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
391 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
392 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
393 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
394 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
395 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
397 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
398 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
400 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
401 /// to individual Channels.
403 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
404 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
405 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
406 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
408 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
409 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
410 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
411 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
412 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
413 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
414 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
416 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
417 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
418 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
419 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
422 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
423 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
424 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
425 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
426 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
428 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
429 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
430 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
431 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
432 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
433 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
434 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
435 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
436 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
437 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
440 default_configuration: UserConfig,
441 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
447 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
449 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
450 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
452 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
453 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
454 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
455 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
457 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
458 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
459 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
460 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
461 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
462 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
464 /// The session_priv bytes of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
465 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
466 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
467 /// PaymentSent/PaymentFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
468 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
469 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
470 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
471 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
473 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
474 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashSet<[u8; 32]>>,
476 our_network_key: SecretKey,
477 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
479 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
480 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
481 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
483 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
484 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
485 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
486 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
488 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
489 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
490 /// are currently open with that peer.
491 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
492 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
495 /// If also holding `channel_state` lock, must lock `channel_state` prior to `per_peer_state`.
496 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
498 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
499 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
500 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
501 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
502 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
503 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
504 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
505 /// PersistenceNotifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
506 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
508 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
515 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
517 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
518 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
519 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
520 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
521 pub struct ChainParameters {
522 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
523 pub network: Network,
525 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
527 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
528 pub best_block: BestBlock,
531 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
537 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
538 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
539 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
540 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
541 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
542 /// updates are ready for persistence).
544 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
545 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
546 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
547 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
548 persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
550 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
551 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
554 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
555 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
556 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
559 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
560 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
562 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
563 persistence_notifier: notifier,
564 should_persist: persist_check,
565 _read_guard: read_guard,
570 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
572 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
573 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
578 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
579 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
581 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
583 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
584 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
585 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
586 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
587 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
589 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
590 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
592 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
594 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
595 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
596 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
597 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
598 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
599 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
600 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
602 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
603 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
605 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
606 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
607 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
608 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
610 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
611 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
612 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
613 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
614 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
615 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
618 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
620 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
621 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
624 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
626 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
627 /// to better separate parameters.
628 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
629 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
630 /// The node_id of our counterparty
631 pub node_id: PublicKey,
632 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
633 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
634 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
635 pub features: InitFeatures,
636 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
637 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
638 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
640 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
642 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
643 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
644 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
645 /// payments to us through this channel.
646 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
649 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
650 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
651 pub struct ChannelDetails {
652 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
653 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
654 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
655 /// lifetime of the channel.
656 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
657 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
658 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
659 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
660 /// our counterparty already.
662 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
663 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
664 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
665 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
666 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
667 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
668 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
669 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
670 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
671 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
672 /// this value on chain.
674 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
676 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
678 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
679 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
680 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
682 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
683 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
684 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
685 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
687 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
688 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
689 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
690 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
691 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
692 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
693 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
694 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
695 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
697 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
698 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
699 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
700 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
701 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
702 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
703 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
704 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
705 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
707 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
709 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
710 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
711 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
712 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
713 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
714 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
715 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
716 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
717 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
719 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
720 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
721 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
722 pub is_outbound: bool,
723 /// True if the channel is confirmed, funding_locked messages have been exchanged, and the
724 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `funding_locked` message exchange implies the
725 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
726 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
727 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
729 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
730 pub is_funding_locked: bool,
731 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
732 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
734 /// This is a strict superset of `is_funding_locked`.
736 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
740 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
741 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
743 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
744 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
745 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
746 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
747 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
748 ParameterError(APIError),
749 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
750 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
751 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
754 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
756 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
757 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
758 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
759 /// paths than the ones selected).
760 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
761 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
762 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
763 /// in over-/re-payment.
765 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
766 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
767 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
769 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
770 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
771 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
772 /// with the latest update_id.
773 PartialFailure(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
776 macro_rules! handle_error {
777 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
780 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
781 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
783 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
784 // entering the macro.
785 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
788 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
790 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
791 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
792 if let Some(update) = update_option {
793 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
799 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
800 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
802 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
803 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
804 action: err.action.clone()
808 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
809 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
812 // Return error in case higher-API need one
819 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
820 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
821 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
823 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
824 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
826 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
827 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
828 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
829 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
831 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
832 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
834 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => {
835 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
836 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
837 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
839 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(false);
840 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
846 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
847 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
851 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
853 $entry.remove_entry();
861 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
862 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
866 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
868 $entry.remove_entry();
876 macro_rules! remove_channel {
877 ($channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
879 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
880 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
881 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
888 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
889 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
890 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
892 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
894 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
895 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
896 if let Some(short_id) = $chan.get_short_channel_id() {
897 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
899 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
900 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
901 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
902 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
903 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
904 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
905 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
906 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
907 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
908 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id,
909 $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
912 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
913 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
914 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
915 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
917 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
918 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
920 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
921 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
923 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
924 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
925 if !$resend_commitment {
926 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
929 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
931 $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
932 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
936 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => { {
937 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $entry.key());
939 $entry.remove_entry();
945 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
946 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
947 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
949 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
950 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
954 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
955 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
956 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
957 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
958 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
961 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
966 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
967 ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
968 $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
969 $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $funding_locked: expr) => { {
970 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
971 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
973 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
974 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
976 let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
977 if !forwards.is_empty() {
978 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"),
979 $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
982 if chanmon_update.is_some() {
983 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a funding_locked if there have been
984 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
985 // associated with a funding_locked would be the funding_created/funding_signed
986 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
987 // funding_locked until it's been updated, so we can't have a funding_locked and a
988 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
989 assert!($funding_locked.is_none());
990 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a funding_locked or a
991 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a funding_locked, we
992 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
993 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
996 if let Some(msg) = $funding_locked {
997 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the funding_locked fly
998 // before it should be allowed to.
999 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
1000 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
1001 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1004 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = $self.get_announcement_sigs($channel_entry.get()) {
1005 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1006 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1007 msg: announcement_sigs,
1010 $channel_state.short_to_id.insert($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), $channel_entry.get().channel_id());
1013 let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
1014 if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
1015 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
1016 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
1017 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
1018 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
1019 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
1020 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
1021 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
1022 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
1023 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
1024 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1025 if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1026 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
1027 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
1028 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
1029 let mut order = $order;
1031 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1033 break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
1037 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1038 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
1039 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1040 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1045 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1046 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
1047 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1048 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1049 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1054 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1058 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1063 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1064 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1065 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1070 if chanmon_update_is_none {
1071 // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
1072 // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
1073 // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
1074 assert!(res.is_ok());
1077 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1081 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1082 ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1083 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1085 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1087 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1088 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1093 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
1094 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
1095 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1096 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1097 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1100 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1102 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1103 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1105 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1107 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
1109 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1110 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1111 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1112 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1113 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1114 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1117 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1118 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1119 fee_estimator: fee_est,
1123 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1125 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1126 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1127 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
1128 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1129 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1130 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1132 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1133 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1135 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
1136 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
1139 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1140 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1142 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1144 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1145 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1146 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1147 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
1155 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels, as
1156 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1157 &self.default_configuration
1160 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1162 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady events to allow
1163 /// tracking of which events correspond with which create_channel call. Note that the
1164 /// user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for
1165 /// user_id here. user_id has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and
1166 /// otherwise ignored.
1168 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
1169 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
1171 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
1172 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
1174 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1175 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1176 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten.
1177 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1178 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1179 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1182 let their_features = {
1183 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1184 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1185 Some(peer_state) => peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone(),
1186 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1189 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1190 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, config)?;
1191 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1193 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1194 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1195 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1197 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1198 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
1199 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1200 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1201 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1203 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1206 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1208 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1209 node_id: their_network_key,
1215 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1216 let mut res = Vec::new();
1218 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1219 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1220 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1221 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
1222 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1223 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1224 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1225 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1226 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1227 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1228 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1229 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1230 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1232 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1233 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1234 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1235 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1236 inbound_capacity_msat,
1237 outbound_capacity_msat,
1238 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1239 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1240 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1241 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1242 is_funding_locked: channel.is_usable(),
1243 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1244 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1248 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1249 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1250 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1251 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1257 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1258 /// more information.
1259 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1260 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1263 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1264 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1266 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1267 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1269 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1270 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1271 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1272 // really wanted anyway.
1273 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1276 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1277 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1278 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1280 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1281 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1282 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1284 let counterparty_node_id;
1285 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1286 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1287 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1288 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1289 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1290 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1291 counterparty_node_id = chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1292 let their_features = {
1293 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1294 match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1295 Some(peer_state) => peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone(),
1296 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
1299 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features)?;
1300 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1302 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1303 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1304 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1305 let (result, is_permanent) =
1306 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
1308 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1314 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1315 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1319 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1320 let channel = remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1321 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1322 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1329 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1333 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1334 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1337 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, counterparty_node_id);
1342 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1343 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1344 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1345 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1346 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1348 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1349 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1350 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1351 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1352 // ignore the result here.
1353 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1357 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1359 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1360 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1361 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1362 if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id {
1363 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id {
1364 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1367 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1368 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1370 chan.remove_entry().1
1372 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1375 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1376 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
1377 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1378 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1379 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1384 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1387 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
1388 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
1389 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1390 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1391 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None) {
1392 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1393 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1394 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1395 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1396 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1397 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1407 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
1408 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
1409 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
1410 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1411 let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
1415 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
1416 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
1417 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
1419 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1420 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
1421 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1422 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1423 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
1424 failure_code: $err_code,
1425 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1430 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
1431 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
1434 let shared_secret = {
1435 let mut arr = [0; 32];
1436 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
1439 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1441 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
1442 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
1443 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
1444 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
1445 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
1446 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
1447 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
1448 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
1451 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
1452 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1453 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
1454 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
1455 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
1458 let mut channel_state = None;
1459 macro_rules! return_err {
1460 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
1462 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1463 if channel_state.is_none() {
1464 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1466 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1467 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1468 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1469 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
1470 })), channel_state.unwrap());
1475 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1476 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
1477 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac) = {
1478 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
1480 let error_code = match err {
1481 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
1482 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
1483 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
1484 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
1485 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1487 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1490 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
1491 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
1492 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1499 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
1502 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
1503 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
1504 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
1505 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
1506 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
1507 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
1508 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
1509 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
1510 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1511 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1512 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1513 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1517 // final_expiry_too_soon
1518 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
1519 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
1520 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
1521 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
1522 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
1523 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
1524 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1526 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1527 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1528 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1530 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1531 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1532 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1535 let routing = match next_hop_data.format {
1536 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]),
1537 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]),
1538 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
1539 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
1540 return_err!("We don't support MPP keysend payments", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
1541 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
1542 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
1544 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1546 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
1547 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
1548 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
1549 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
1550 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
1551 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
1552 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1553 if hashed_preimage != msg.payment_hash {
1554 return_err!("Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
1557 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
1559 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1562 return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]);
1567 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1568 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1569 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1570 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1572 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1574 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1575 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1576 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1577 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1580 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1581 let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
1582 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1584 // Check two things:
1585 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
1586 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
1587 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
1589 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
1591 // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
1592 // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
1593 chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
1595 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1597 let blinding_factor = {
1598 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1599 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1600 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1601 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
1604 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
1606 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1608 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1611 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1612 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
1615 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
1616 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1617 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1618 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
1619 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1623 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1624 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1625 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
1628 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1629 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1630 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1631 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1635 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1636 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1637 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
1638 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
1639 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
1640 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
1641 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1642 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1643 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1644 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1645 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
1647 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1650 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1652 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
1653 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
1654 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
1655 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
1656 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
1659 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1660 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1661 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1662 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1663 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1664 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1665 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1667 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1668 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1670 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64)
1671 .and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000)
1672 .checked_add(chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat() as u64) });
1673 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1674 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1676 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta() as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1677 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1679 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1680 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now, but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty
1681 // packet sanitization (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational)
1682 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1683 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1685 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1686 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1688 // In theory, we would be safe against unintentional channel-closure, if we only required a margin of LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1689 // But, to be safe against policy reception, we use a longer delay.
1690 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER) as u64 {
1691 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1697 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1698 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1699 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1700 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1702 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1703 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1705 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1706 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
1707 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
1709 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1711 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1716 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1719 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
1720 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
1721 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
1723 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1724 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1725 if !chan.should_announce() {
1726 return Err(LightningError {
1727 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
1728 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
1731 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1732 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
1735 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
1736 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
1737 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
1738 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
1739 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1740 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1741 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1742 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1743 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1747 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
1749 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1750 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1752 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
1753 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
1754 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
1755 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1756 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
1757 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
1758 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1759 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1762 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1763 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
1765 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1771 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
1772 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1773 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
1774 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
1775 let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
1776 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
1778 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
1779 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
1780 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
1781 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
1782 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
1784 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
1786 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1787 assert!(self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().insert(session_priv_bytes));
1789 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1790 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1791 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1792 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
1793 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1796 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1797 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1799 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1800 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1802 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1803 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
1805 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1807 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1808 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1809 }, onion_packet, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
1811 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
1812 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1813 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
1814 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1815 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
1816 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
1817 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
1818 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
1819 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1822 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
1823 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1824 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1825 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1826 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1827 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1828 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1829 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1837 } else { unreachable!(); }
1841 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
1842 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1844 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
1849 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1851 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1852 /// fields for more info.
1854 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1855 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1856 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1857 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1858 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1859 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1861 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
1863 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
1864 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
1865 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
1867 /// In general, a path may raise:
1868 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
1869 /// node public key) is specified.
1870 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1871 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
1873 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1874 /// relevant updates.
1876 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
1877 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
1878 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1880 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
1881 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
1882 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
1883 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
1885 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
1886 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
1887 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
1888 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
1889 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None)
1892 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
1893 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
1894 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
1896 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
1897 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
1898 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
1899 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
1900 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
1902 let mut total_value = 0;
1903 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1904 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
1905 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
1906 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
1907 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
1908 continue 'path_check;
1910 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
1911 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1912 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
1913 continue 'path_check;
1916 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
1917 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
1919 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
1920 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
1923 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1924 let mut results = Vec::new();
1925 for path in route.paths.iter() {
1926 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, &keysend_preimage));
1928 let mut has_ok = false;
1929 let mut has_err = false;
1930 for res in results.iter() {
1931 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
1932 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
1933 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
1934 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
1941 if has_err && has_ok {
1942 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure(results))
1944 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
1950 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
1951 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
1952 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
1953 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
1954 /// never reach the recipient.
1956 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
1957 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
1959 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
1960 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
1961 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
1963 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
1965 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
1966 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage)) {
1967 Ok(()) => Ok(payment_hash),
1972 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
1973 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
1974 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>
1975 (&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1977 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1979 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
1981 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
1982 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1983 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
1984 } else { unreachable!(); })
1987 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
1989 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
1990 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1993 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
1994 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
1999 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2000 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2001 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2004 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2005 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2006 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2008 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2016 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2017 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2018 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2022 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2024 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2025 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2027 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
2029 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2030 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2031 /// keys per-channel).
2033 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2034 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2035 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2037 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2038 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2039 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2041 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2042 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2043 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2045 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2046 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2047 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2048 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2052 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2053 let mut output_index = None;
2054 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2055 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2056 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2057 if output_index.is_some() {
2058 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2059 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2062 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2063 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2064 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2067 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2070 if output_index.is_none() {
2071 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2072 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2075 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2079 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
2080 if !chan.should_announce() {
2081 log_trace!(self.logger, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2085 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2087 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
2089 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2090 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2092 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
2093 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
2094 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
2095 node_signature: our_node_sig,
2096 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
2101 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
2102 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
2103 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
2105 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::core::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
2108 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
2109 // smaller than 500:
2110 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
2112 /// Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given
2113 /// arguments, providing them in corresponding events via
2114 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed
2115 /// on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node
2116 /// announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and
2117 /// our network addresses.
2119 /// `rgb` is a node "color" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this
2120 /// node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
2122 /// `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node
2123 /// accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly
2124 /// tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy,
2125 /// addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses.
2127 /// Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 500).
2129 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
2130 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
2131 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2133 if addresses.len() > 500 {
2134 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
2137 // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that
2138 // addresses be sorted for future compatibility.
2139 addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id());
2141 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2142 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
2143 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
2144 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
2145 rgb, alias, addresses,
2146 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2147 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2149 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2150 let node_announce_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2152 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2153 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2155 let mut announced_chans = false;
2156 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2157 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2158 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2160 update_msg: match self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
2165 announced_chans = true;
2167 // If the channel is not public or has not yet reached funding_locked, check the
2168 // next channel. If we don't yet have any public channels, we'll skip the broadcast
2169 // below as peers may not accept it without channels on chain first.
2173 if announced_chans {
2174 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
2175 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
2176 signature: node_announce_sig,
2177 contents: announcement
2183 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
2185 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
2186 /// Will likely generate further events.
2187 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
2188 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2190 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2191 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
2192 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2194 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2195 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2197 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
2198 if short_chan_id != 0 {
2199 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
2200 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2202 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
2203 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2204 match forward_info {
2205 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info,
2206 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2207 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2208 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2209 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2210 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2211 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
2213 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
2214 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }
2217 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2218 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
2219 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
2220 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
2221 // problem, not ours.
2228 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
2229 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2230 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2231 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2232 match forward_info {
2233 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2234 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2236 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
2237 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2238 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
2239 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2240 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2241 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2242 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2243 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2245 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet) {
2247 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2248 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
2250 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
2252 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap();
2253 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
2254 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
2260 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2262 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2263 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
2264 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
2265 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
2266 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
2267 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
2268 // this channel currently :/.
2274 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
2275 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
2277 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
2278 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
2279 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
2281 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2282 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
2284 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
2286 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
2287 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
2288 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
2291 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2293 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2294 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
2295 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
2296 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
2297 // messages when we can.
2298 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
2299 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
2300 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
2307 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
2308 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
2311 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
2312 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
2313 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
2314 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
2315 ChannelError::Ignore(_) => {
2316 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
2318 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2319 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
2320 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
2321 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2322 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2324 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
2326 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
2328 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
2332 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2333 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
2336 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
2337 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2338 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2339 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2340 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2341 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
2342 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2343 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
2344 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2346 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
2354 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2355 match forward_info {
2356 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2357 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
2358 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2359 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload) = match routing {
2360 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
2361 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data)),
2362 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
2363 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage)),
2365 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
2368 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
2369 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
2370 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2371 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2372 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2373 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2375 value: amt_to_forward,
2380 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
2382 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
2383 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
2384 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
2386 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2387 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
2388 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2389 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
2390 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
2392 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
2397 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
2398 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
2399 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
2400 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
2401 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
2402 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
2403 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2404 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
2405 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2406 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
2407 OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => {
2408 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we didn't have a corresponding inbound payment.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2409 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2411 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
2412 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
2413 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2414 e.insert(vec![claimable_htlc]);
2415 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
2417 amt: amt_to_forward,
2418 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage),
2421 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2422 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2423 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2429 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
2431 if let OnionPayload::Invoice(ref data) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
2434 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2435 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2438 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
2439 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2440 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2441 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
2442 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
2443 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
2444 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2446 let mut total_value = 0;
2447 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
2448 .or_insert(Vec::new());
2449 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
2450 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
2451 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2452 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2456 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
2457 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2458 total_value += htlc.value;
2459 match &htlc.onion_payload {
2460 OnionPayload::Invoice(htlc_payment_data) => {
2461 if htlc_payment_data.total_msat != payment_data.total_msat {
2462 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
2463 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, htlc_payment_data.total_msat);
2464 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
2466 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
2468 _ => unreachable!(),
2471 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > payment_data.total_msat {
2472 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
2473 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, payment_data.total_msat);
2474 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2477 } else if total_value == payment_data.total_msat {
2478 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
2480 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
2481 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
2482 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
2483 user_payment_id: inbound_payment.get().user_payment_id,
2487 // Only ever generate at most one PaymentReceived
2488 // per registered payment_hash, even if it isn't
2490 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
2492 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
2493 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
2500 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2501 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
2509 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
2510 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
2513 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
2514 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
2517 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
2518 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2519 events.append(&mut new_events);
2522 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
2524 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
2525 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
2527 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
2528 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
2529 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
2530 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
2531 if background_events.is_empty() {
2535 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
2537 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
2538 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
2539 // monitor updating completing.
2540 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
2547 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
2548 /// Process background events, for functional testing
2549 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
2550 self.process_background_events();
2553 /// If a peer is disconnected we mark any channels with that peer as 'disabled'.
2554 /// After some time, if channels are still disabled we need to broadcast a ChannelUpdate
2555 /// to inform the network about the uselessness of these channels.
2557 /// This method handles all the details, and must be called roughly once per minute.
2559 /// Note that in some rare cases this may generate a `chain::Watch::update_channel` call.
2560 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
2561 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
2562 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
2563 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
2565 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2566 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2567 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter_mut() {
2568 match chan.channel_update_status() {
2569 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
2570 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
2571 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
2572 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
2573 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
2574 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2575 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2579 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2580 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
2582 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
2583 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2584 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2588 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2589 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
2599 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
2600 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
2601 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
2602 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
2603 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
2604 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
2605 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2607 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2608 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
2609 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
2610 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
2611 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
2612 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
2613 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
2614 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
2615 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
2616 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
2617 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
2623 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
2624 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
2625 // be surfaced to the user.
2626 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
2627 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
2629 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
2630 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
2631 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2632 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
2633 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&chan_entry.get()) {
2634 (0x1000|7, upd.encode_with_len())
2636 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
2639 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
2641 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2642 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
2643 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
2645 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } => {
2647 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
2648 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
2649 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&session_priv_bytes)
2651 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2652 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2654 rejected_by_dest: false,
2662 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2669 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
2670 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
2671 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
2672 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
2673 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
2674 /// still-available channels.
2675 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
2676 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
2677 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
2678 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
2681 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
2682 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
2683 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
2685 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, .. } => {
2687 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
2688 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
2689 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&session_priv_bytes)
2691 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2694 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2695 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2696 match &onion_error {
2697 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
2699 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
2701 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
2702 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
2703 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
2704 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
2705 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
2706 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
2707 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
2712 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2713 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2714 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
2715 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
2717 error_code: onion_error_code,
2719 error_data: onion_error_data
2723 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
2729 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
2730 // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
2731 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
2732 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
2734 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
2735 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
2736 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2737 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2738 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
2739 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
2741 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
2743 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
2749 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. }) => {
2750 let err_packet = match onion_error {
2751 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
2752 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
2753 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
2754 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
2756 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
2757 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2758 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
2762 let mut forward_event = None;
2763 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2764 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
2766 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
2767 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2768 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
2770 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2771 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
2774 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2775 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
2776 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2777 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2778 time_forwardable: time
2785 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
2786 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
2787 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
2789 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
2790 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
2791 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
2792 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
2794 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
2796 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
2797 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
2798 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
2799 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2801 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2803 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2804 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
2805 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
2806 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
2808 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
2809 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
2810 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
2811 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
2813 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
2814 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
2815 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
2816 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
2817 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
2819 let mut valid_mpp = true;
2820 for htlc in sources.iter() {
2821 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
2827 let mut errs = Vec::new();
2828 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
2829 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
2831 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
2832 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
2833 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
2834 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
2835 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
2836 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
2837 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
2839 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
2840 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
2841 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
2842 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
2843 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
2844 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
2845 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
2846 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
2848 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
2849 ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
2850 // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
2851 // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
2852 // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
2853 // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
2855 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
2860 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
2861 // which were generated.
2862 channel_state.take();
2864 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
2865 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
2866 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
2873 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
2874 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
2875 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
2876 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
2877 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2879 return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed
2883 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
2884 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
2885 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
2886 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
2887 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2888 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
2889 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
2890 payment_preimage, e);
2891 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
2892 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2893 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
2894 Some(htlc_value_msat)
2897 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
2898 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
2899 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2900 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2901 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2902 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2903 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2904 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
2905 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2906 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2912 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
2914 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
2917 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
2918 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2919 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
2920 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
2921 payment_preimage, e);
2923 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
2924 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
2926 chan.remove_entry();
2928 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
2931 } else { unreachable!(); }
2934 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool) {
2936 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } => {
2937 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2939 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
2940 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
2941 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&session_priv_bytes)
2943 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2944 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
2948 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
2951 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
2952 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
2953 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
2954 let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
2955 let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
2956 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
2957 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
2960 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
2961 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2962 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
2963 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2964 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
2967 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
2968 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
2969 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
2970 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
2971 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
2972 payment_preimage, e);
2974 // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
2975 // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
2976 // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
2977 // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
2980 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2981 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
2982 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
2983 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
2987 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
2988 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
2989 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
2992 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2993 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
2995 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
3003 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
3004 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
3005 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
3008 /// Restores a single, given channel to normal operation after a
3009 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
3012 /// All ChannelMonitor updates up to and including highest_applied_update_id must have been
3013 /// fully committed in every copy of the given channels' ChannelMonitors.
3015 /// Note that there is no effect to calling with a highest_applied_update_id other than the
3016 /// current latest ChannelMonitorUpdate and one call to this function after multiple
3017 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures is fine. The highest_applied_update_id field
3018 /// exists largely only to prevent races between this and concurrent update_monitor calls.
3020 /// Thus, the anticipated use is, at a high level:
3021 /// 1) You register a chain::Watch with this ChannelManager,
3022 /// 2) it stores each update to disk, and begins updating any remote (eg watchtower) copies of
3023 /// said ChannelMonitors as it can, returning ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures
3024 /// any time it cannot do so instantly,
3025 /// 3) update(s) are applied to each remote copy of a ChannelMonitor,
3026 /// 4) once all remote copies are updated, you call this function with the update_id that
3027 /// completed, and once it is the latest the Channel will be re-enabled.
3028 pub fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
3029 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3031 let chan_restoration_res;
3032 let mut pending_failures = {
3033 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3034 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3035 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
3036 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
3037 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
3039 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
3043 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, pending_failures, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked) = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger);
3044 let channel_update = if funding_locked.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() && !channel.get().should_announce() {
3045 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
3046 // funding_locked and the channel is in a usable state. Further, we rely on the
3047 // normal announcement_signatures process to send a channel_update for public
3048 // channels, only generating a unicast channel_update if this is a private channel.
3049 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3050 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3051 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()).unwrap(),
3054 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, raa, commitment_update, order, None, pending_forwards, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked);
3055 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
3056 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
3060 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
3061 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
3062 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
3066 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3067 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
3068 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
3071 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(), their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration)
3072 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
3073 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3074 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3075 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
3076 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
3077 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3078 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
3079 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3080 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
3082 entry.insert(channel);
3088 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3089 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
3090 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3091 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3092 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
3093 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3094 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3095 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
3097 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, their_features), channel_state, chan);
3098 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
3100 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
3103 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3104 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
3105 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
3106 channel_value_satoshis: value,
3108 user_channel_id: user_id,
3113 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3114 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
3115 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3116 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3117 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3118 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
3119 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3120 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3121 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
3123 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
3125 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
3128 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
3129 // lock before watch_channel
3130 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
3132 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
3133 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
3134 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
3135 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
3136 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
3137 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
3138 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
3139 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
3140 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
3141 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
3142 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
3144 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
3145 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
3146 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
3147 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
3148 // until we have persisted our monitor.
3149 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3153 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3154 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3155 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
3156 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3157 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
3159 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3160 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
3161 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3170 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3172 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3173 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3174 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3175 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3176 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3177 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3178 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3180 let (monitor, funding_tx) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
3181 Ok(update) => update,
3182 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
3184 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
3185 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
3189 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3192 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
3193 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
3197 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3198 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3199 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3200 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3201 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3202 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3203 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3205 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3206 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
3207 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3208 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
3209 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
3210 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
3211 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
3212 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
3213 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
3214 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
3215 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
3216 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
3217 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
3218 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3219 msg: announcement_sigs,
3221 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
3222 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3223 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3224 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
3229 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3233 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3234 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
3235 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
3236 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3237 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3239 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
3240 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
3241 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3242 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3245 let (shutdown, closing_signed, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
3246 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
3248 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
3249 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
3250 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3251 let (result, is_permanent) =
3252 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
3254 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
3260 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
3261 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3262 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
3266 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3267 // TODO: Do not send this if the monitor update failed.
3268 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3269 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
3276 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3279 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
3280 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3283 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
3287 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3288 let (tx, chan_option) = {
3289 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3290 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3291 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
3292 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
3293 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3294 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3296 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
3297 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3298 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3299 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3304 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
3305 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
3306 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
3307 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
3308 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
3309 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
3310 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3312 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
3313 } else { (tx, None) }
3315 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3318 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
3319 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
3320 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
3322 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
3323 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3324 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3325 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3333 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3334 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
3335 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
3336 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
3338 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
3339 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
3340 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
3341 //but we should prevent it anyway.
3343 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
3344 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3346 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3347 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3348 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3349 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3352 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
3353 // Ensure error_code has the UPDATE flag set, since by default we send a
3354 // channel update along as part of failing the HTLC.
3355 assert!((error_code & 0x1000) != 0);
3356 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
3357 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
3358 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
3359 match pending_forward_info {
3360 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3361 let reason = if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
3362 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{
3363 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
3364 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
3365 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
3366 res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]);
3370 // The only case where we'd be unable to
3371 // successfully get a channel update is if the
3372 // channel isn't in the fully-funded state yet,
3373 // implying our counterparty is trying to route
3374 // payments over the channel back to themselves
3375 // (cause no one else should know the short_id
3376 // is a lightning channel yet). We should have
3377 // no problem just calling this
3378 // unknown_next_peer (0x4000|10).
3379 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
3381 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3382 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3383 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3386 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
3388 _ => pending_forward_info
3391 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3393 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3398 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3399 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3400 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
3401 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3402 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3403 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3404 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3405 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3407 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
3409 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3412 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false);
3416 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3417 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3418 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3419 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3420 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3421 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3422 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3424 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
3426 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3431 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3432 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3433 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3434 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3435 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3436 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3437 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3439 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
3440 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
3441 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
3443 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
3446 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3450 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3451 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3452 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3453 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3454 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3455 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3456 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3458 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update) =
3459 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
3460 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
3461 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
3462 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
3463 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
3464 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
3469 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3470 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
3471 //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
3473 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
3474 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3475 msg: revoke_and_ack,
3477 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
3478 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3479 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3480 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3481 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3482 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3483 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3484 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3486 commitment_signed: msg,
3490 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3491 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3492 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3498 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3503 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
3504 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
3505 let mut forward_event = None;
3506 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
3507 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3508 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3509 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
3511 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3512 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
3513 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
3514 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
3515 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
3517 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3518 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
3519 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
3521 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3522 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
3523 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
3528 match forward_event {
3530 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3531 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3532 time_forwardable: time
3540 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3541 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3543 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3544 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3545 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3546 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3547 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3548 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3550 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
3551 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail_in) =
3552 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3553 htlcs_to_fail = htlcs_to_fail_in;
3554 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3555 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
3556 assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && closing_signed.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
3557 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
3559 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures) {
3561 } else { unreachable!(); }
3564 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
3565 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3566 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3570 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3571 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3572 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3576 break Ok((pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"), chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
3578 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3581 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
3583 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) => {
3584 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
3585 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
3587 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
3594 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3595 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3596 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3597 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3598 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3599 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3600 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3602 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
3604 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3609 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3610 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3611 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3613 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3614 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3615 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3616 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3618 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
3619 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
3622 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
3623 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), msg), channel_state, chan),
3624 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
3625 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
3626 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
3629 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3634 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
3635 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3636 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3637 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3638 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
3639 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3641 // It's not a local channel
3642 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
3645 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3646 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3647 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3648 if chan.get().should_announce() {
3649 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
3650 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
3651 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
3652 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
3654 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
3656 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3657 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
3658 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
3659 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
3661 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
3664 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
3666 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
3669 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3670 let chan_restoration_res;
3671 let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround) = {
3672 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3673 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3675 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3676 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3677 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3678 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3680 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
3681 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
3682 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
3683 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
3684 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, order, htlcs_failed_forward, shutdown) =
3685 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3686 let mut channel_update = None;
3687 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
3688 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3689 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3692 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
3693 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
3694 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
3695 // they have the latest channel parameters.
3696 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3697 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3698 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
3701 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
3702 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order, monitor_update_opt, Vec::new(), None, funding_locked);
3703 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
3704 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
3706 (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround)
3708 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3711 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
3712 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id);
3714 if let Some(funding_locked_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
3715 self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, &funding_locked_msg)?;
3720 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
3721 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
3722 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
3723 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
3724 /// (C-not exported) Cause its doc(hidden) anyway
3726 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3727 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3728 let counterparty_node_id;
3729 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3730 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3731 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3733 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3734 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("Failed to find corresponding channel for id {}", channel_id.to_hex())}),
3735 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3736 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
3737 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel".to_owned()});
3739 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
3740 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
3742 if !chan.get().is_live() {
3743 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3745 counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3746 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) =
3747 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
3749 if let Err(_e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3752 log_debug!(self.logger, "Updating fee resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3753 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3754 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3755 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3756 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3757 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3758 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3759 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3760 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3770 match handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id) {
3771 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3772 Err(e) => { Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })}
3776 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
3777 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
3778 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3779 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
3780 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
3781 for monitor_event in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
3782 match monitor_event {
3783 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
3784 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
3785 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
3786 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.onchain_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true);
3788 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
3789 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3792 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(funding_outpoint) => {
3793 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3794 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3795 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
3796 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3797 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3798 if let Some(mut chan) = by_id.remove(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
3799 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3800 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3802 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
3803 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3804 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3808 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3809 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3810 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
3811 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
3819 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3820 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3823 has_pending_monitor_events
3826 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
3827 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
3828 /// update was applied.
3830 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
3831 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
3832 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
3833 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
3834 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
3835 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
3836 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3837 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3839 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3840 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3841 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
3842 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3843 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3845 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
3846 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
3847 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
3848 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
3849 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id));
3851 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
3852 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3853 has_monitor_update = true;
3854 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), channel_id);
3855 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
3856 if close_channel { return false; }
3858 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3859 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3860 updates: commitment_update,
3867 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
3868 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
3875 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
3876 for (failures, channel_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
3877 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id);
3880 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3881 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3887 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
3888 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
3890 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
3891 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3892 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
3893 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
3894 // reorganized out of the main chain.
3895 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
3896 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
3897 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
3898 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
3899 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
3900 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
3901 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
3902 assert!(should_broadcast);
3903 } else { unreachable!(); }
3904 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
3906 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3910 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
3911 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
3913 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
3915 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3916 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3917 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3918 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3919 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
3920 payment_secret, min_value_msat, user_payment_id, payment_preimage,
3921 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
3922 // its updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
3923 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
3924 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
3925 // never fail a payment too early.
3926 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
3928 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
3931 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
3936 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
3939 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
3940 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you, returning the first and storing the second.
3942 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
3943 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
3944 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
3946 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
3948 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
3949 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
3950 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
3951 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3952 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> (PaymentHash, PaymentSecret) {
3953 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
3954 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3957 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id)
3958 .expect("RNG Generated Duplicate PaymentHash"))
3961 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
3962 /// stored external to LDK.
3964 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
3965 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
3966 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
3968 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) must be globally unique. This
3969 /// method may return an Err if another payment with the same payment_hash is still pending.
3971 /// `user_payment_id` will be provided back in [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id`] events to
3972 /// allow tracking of which events correspond with which calls to this and
3973 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]. `user_payment_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply
3974 /// copied to events and otherwise ignored. It may be used to correlate PaymentReceived events
3975 /// with invoice metadata stored elsewhere.
3977 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
3978 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
3979 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
3980 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
3982 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
3983 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
3984 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
3985 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
3986 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
3988 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
3989 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
3990 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
3991 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
3992 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
3994 /// Pending inbound payments are stored in memory and in serialized versions of this
3995 /// [`ChannelManager`]. If potentially unbounded numbers of inbound payments may exist and
3996 /// space is limited, you may wish to rate-limit inbound payment creation.
3998 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
4000 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
4001 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
4003 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4004 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
4005 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id
4006 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
4007 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id)
4010 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))]
4011 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
4012 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
4013 let event_handler = |event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
4014 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
4019 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4020 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4021 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4022 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4023 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4026 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
4027 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
4028 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4029 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4031 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
4032 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
4033 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
4034 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4037 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
4038 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4041 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
4042 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4043 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
4045 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
4046 events.replace(pending_events);
4055 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4057 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4058 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4059 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4060 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4063 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
4065 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
4066 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
4068 /// Pending events are persisted as part of [`ChannelManager`]. While these events are cleared
4069 /// when processed, an [`EventHandler`] must be able to handle previously seen events when
4070 /// restarting from an old state.
4071 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
4072 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4073 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4075 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
4076 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
4077 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
4078 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4081 let mut pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
4082 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
4083 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4086 for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
4087 handler.handle_event(event);
4095 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4097 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4098 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4099 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4100 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4103 fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
4105 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4106 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), block.header.prev_blockhash,
4107 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
4108 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
4109 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
4112 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
4113 self.transactions_confirmed(&block.header, &txdata, height);
4114 self.best_block_updated(&block.header, height);
4117 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
4118 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4119 let new_height = height - 1;
4121 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
4122 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
4123 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
4124 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
4125 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
4126 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
4129 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, &self.logger));
4133 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4135 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4136 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4137 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4138 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4141 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
4142 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4143 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4144 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4146 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
4147 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
4149 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4150 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, &self.logger).map(|a| (a, Vec::new())));
4153 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
4154 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4155 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4156 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4158 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
4159 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
4161 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4163 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
4165 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, &self.logger));
4167 macro_rules! max_time {
4168 ($timestamp: expr) => {
4170 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
4171 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
4172 // having an explicit local time source.
4173 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
4174 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
4175 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
4176 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
4177 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
4183 max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
4184 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
4185 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4186 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
4187 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
4191 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
4192 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4193 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_id.len());
4194 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
4195 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
4196 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
4202 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
4203 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4204 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
4205 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
4206 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
4207 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|_| (None, Vec::new()))
4208 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
4209 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
4214 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4216 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4217 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4218 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4219 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4222 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
4223 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
4225 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage>>
4226 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
4227 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4228 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4229 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4231 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4232 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4234 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4235 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4236 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4237 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4238 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
4239 let res = f(channel);
4240 if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res {
4241 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
4242 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
4243 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4244 failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
4248 if let Some(funding_locked) = chan_res {
4249 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
4250 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4251 msg: funding_locked,
4253 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
4254 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4255 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4256 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4257 msg: announcement_sigs,
4259 } else if channel.is_usable() {
4260 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures but with private channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4261 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4262 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4263 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel).unwrap(),
4266 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4268 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
4270 } else if let Err(e) = res {
4271 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
4272 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4274 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
4275 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
4276 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
4277 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
4278 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4282 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4283 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4284 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
4291 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
4292 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, htlcs| {
4293 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4294 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
4295 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
4296 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
4297 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
4298 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
4299 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
4300 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
4301 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4302 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
4303 data: htlc_msat_height_data
4308 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
4313 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
4315 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
4316 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
4320 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
4321 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
4322 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
4324 /// Note that the feature `allow_wallclock_use` must be enabled to use this function.
4325 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
4326 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
4327 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
4330 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
4331 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
4333 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
4334 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
4337 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4338 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
4339 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
4340 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
4341 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4345 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
4346 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
4347 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
4348 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
4352 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
4353 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4354 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4355 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4356 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4357 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4360 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
4361 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4362 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4365 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
4366 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4367 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4370 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
4371 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4372 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4375 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
4376 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4377 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4380 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
4381 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4382 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4385 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
4386 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4387 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4390 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
4391 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4392 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4395 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
4396 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4397 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4400 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
4401 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4402 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4405 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
4406 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4407 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4410 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
4411 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4412 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4415 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
4416 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4417 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4420 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
4421 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4422 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4425 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
4426 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4427 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4430 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
4431 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4432 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4435 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
4436 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4437 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
4440 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
4445 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
4446 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4447 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4450 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
4451 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4452 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4453 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
4455 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4456 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4457 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4458 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4459 if no_connection_possible {
4460 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
4461 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
4462 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
4463 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4464 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4466 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
4467 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4468 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4478 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
4479 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
4480 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
4481 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
4482 if chan.is_shutdown() {
4483 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4484 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4488 no_channels_remain = false;
4494 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
4496 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4497 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4498 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4499 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4500 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4501 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4502 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4503 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4504 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4505 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4506 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4507 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
4508 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
4509 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
4510 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4511 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4512 &events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => true,
4513 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
4514 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
4515 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
4519 if no_channels_remain {
4520 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
4523 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4524 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4528 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
4529 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
4531 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4534 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4535 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
4536 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4537 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
4538 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
4541 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
4542 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
4547 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4548 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4549 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4550 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
4551 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
4552 if !chan.have_received_message() {
4553 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
4554 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
4555 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
4559 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
4560 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4561 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
4567 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
4570 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
4571 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4573 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
4574 for chan in self.list_channels() {
4575 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
4576 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
4577 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id));
4581 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
4582 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id));
4587 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
4588 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
4589 struct PersistenceNotifier {
4590 /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
4591 /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
4592 persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
4595 impl PersistenceNotifier {
4598 persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
4604 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
4605 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4610 guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
4611 let result = *guard;
4619 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
4620 fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
4621 let current_time = Instant::now();
4623 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
4624 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4629 guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
4630 // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
4631 // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
4632 // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
4633 // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
4635 let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
4636 let result = *guard;
4637 if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
4641 match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
4642 None => return result,
4648 // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
4650 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
4651 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4652 *persistence_lock = true;
4653 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
4658 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4659 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4661 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
4663 (0, onion_packet, required),
4664 (2, short_channel_id, required),
4667 (0, payment_data, required),
4668 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
4670 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
4671 (0, payment_preimage, required),
4672 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
4676 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
4677 (0, routing, required),
4678 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
4679 (4, payment_hash, required),
4680 (6, amt_to_forward, required),
4681 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required)
4684 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailureMsg, ;
4688 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
4693 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
4694 (0, short_channel_id, required),
4695 (2, outpoint, required),
4696 (4, htlc_id, required),
4697 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
4700 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
4701 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
4702 let payment_data = match &self.onion_payload {
4703 OnionPayload::Invoice(data) => Some(data.clone()),
4706 let keysend_preimage = match self.onion_payload {
4707 OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => None,
4708 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => Some(preimage.clone()),
4713 (0, self.prev_hop, required), (2, self.value, required),
4714 (4, payment_data, option), (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
4715 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
4721 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
4722 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4723 let mut prev_hop = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
4725 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
4726 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
4727 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
4731 (0, prev_hop, required), (2, value, required),
4732 (4, payment_data, option), (6, cltv_expiry, required),
4733 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
4735 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
4737 if payment_data.is_some() {
4738 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
4740 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
4743 if payment_data.is_none() {
4744 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
4746 OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data.unwrap())
4750 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
4758 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCSource,
4759 (0, OutboundRoute) => {
4760 (0, session_priv, required),
4761 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
4762 (4, path, vec_type),
4764 (1, PreviousHopData)
4767 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
4768 (0, LightningError) => {
4772 (0, failure_code, required),
4773 (2, data, vec_type),
4777 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
4779 (0, forward_info, required),
4780 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
4781 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
4782 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
4785 (0, htlc_id, required),
4786 (2, err_packet, required),
4790 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
4791 (0, payment_secret, required),
4792 (2, expiry_time, required),
4793 (4, user_payment_id, required),
4794 (6, payment_preimage, required),
4795 (8, min_value_msat, required),
4798 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4799 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4800 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4801 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4802 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4805 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
4806 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
4808 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
4810 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
4812 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4813 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
4814 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
4817 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4818 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
4819 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
4820 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
4821 unfunded_channels += 1;
4824 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
4825 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
4826 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
4827 channel.write(writer)?;
4831 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4832 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
4833 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
4834 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4835 for forward in pending_forwards {
4836 forward.write(writer)?;
4840 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4841 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
4842 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4843 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4844 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
4845 htlc.write(writer)?;
4849 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4850 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4851 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4852 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
4853 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4854 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
4857 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4858 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4859 for event in events.iter() {
4860 event.write(writer)?;
4863 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
4864 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4865 for event in background_events.iter() {
4867 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
4869 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
4870 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
4875 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
4876 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
4878 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4879 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4880 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
4881 hash.write(writer)?;
4882 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
4885 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4886 (pending_outbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4887 for session_priv in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
4888 session_priv.write(writer)?;
4891 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {});
4897 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
4899 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
4901 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
4902 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling:
4903 /// <(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)
4904 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
4905 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
4906 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints the same
4907 /// way you would handle a `chain::Filter` call using ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch() and
4908 /// ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
4909 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
4910 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
4911 /// 6) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local chain::Watch.
4913 /// Note that the ordering of #4-6 is not of importance, however all three must occur before you
4914 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized ChannelManager.
4916 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
4917 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
4918 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
4919 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
4920 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
4921 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
4922 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4923 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4924 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4925 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4926 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4929 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
4930 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
4932 pub keys_manager: K,
4934 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
4936 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
4937 pub fee_estimator: F,
4938 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
4940 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
4941 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
4942 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
4943 pub chain_monitor: M,
4945 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
4946 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
4947 /// force-closed during deserialization.
4948 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
4949 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
4950 /// deserialization.
4952 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
4953 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
4954 pub default_config: UserConfig,
4956 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
4957 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
4959 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
4960 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
4961 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
4962 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
4964 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
4967 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
4968 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
4971 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4972 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4973 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4974 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4975 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4976 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4979 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
4980 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
4981 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
4982 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
4983 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
4985 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
4986 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
4991 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
4992 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
4993 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4994 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
4995 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4996 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4997 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4998 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5001 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5002 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
5003 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
5007 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5008 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
5009 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5010 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5011 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5012 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5015 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5016 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
5018 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5019 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5020 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5022 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5024 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5025 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
5026 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
5027 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
5028 for _ in 0..channel_count {
5029 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, &args.keys_manager)?;
5030 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
5031 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
5032 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
5033 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
5034 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
5035 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
5036 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
5037 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
5038 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
5039 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
5040 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
5041 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
5042 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
5043 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
5044 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
5045 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5046 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
5047 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
5048 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
5049 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
5050 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
5051 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
5052 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
5053 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
5055 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5056 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
5058 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
5061 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5062 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
5063 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
5064 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
5065 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
5066 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5070 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
5071 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
5072 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
5076 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
5077 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5078 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
5079 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
5080 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5081 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5082 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
5083 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
5084 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
5086 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
5089 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5090 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
5091 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
5092 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5093 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5094 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
5095 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
5096 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
5098 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
5101 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5102 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
5103 for _ in 0..peer_count {
5104 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
5105 let peer_state = PeerState {
5106 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
5108 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
5111 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5112 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
5113 for _ in 0..event_count {
5114 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
5115 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
5120 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5121 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
5122 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
5123 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5124 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
5125 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5129 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5130 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5132 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5133 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
5134 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
5135 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
5136 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5140 let pending_outbound_payments_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5141 let mut pending_outbound_payments: HashSet<[u8; 32]> = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
5142 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count {
5143 if !pending_outbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?) {
5144 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5148 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {});
5150 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5151 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5153 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
5155 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
5156 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
5157 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
5159 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
5161 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
5166 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
5168 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
5169 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments),
5171 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
5172 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &args.keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
5175 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
5176 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
5178 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
5180 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
5181 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
5182 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
5183 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
5185 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
5186 logger: args.logger,
5187 default_configuration: args.default_config,
5190 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5191 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
5194 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
5195 //connection or two.
5197 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
5203 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
5204 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
5205 use core::time::Duration;
5206 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
5207 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
5208 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
5210 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
5211 use routing::router::{get_keysend_route, get_route};
5212 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
5213 use util::test_utils;
5215 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
5217 fn test_wait_timeout() {
5218 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
5220 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
5223 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
5224 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
5226 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
5227 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
5228 thread::spawn(move || {
5230 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
5231 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5232 *persistence_lock = true;
5235 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
5241 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
5242 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
5244 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
5247 if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
5252 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
5254 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
5257 if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
5264 fn test_notify_limits() {
5265 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
5266 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
5267 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5268 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5269 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5270 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5272 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
5273 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
5274 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5275 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5276 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5278 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5280 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
5281 // to connect messages with new values
5282 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
5283 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
5284 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
5285 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
5287 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
5288 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5289 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5290 // ... but the last node should not.
5291 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5292 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
5293 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5294 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5296 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
5297 // about the channel.
5298 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
5299 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
5300 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5302 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
5304 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
5305 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
5306 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
5307 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
5308 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5309 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5311 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
5312 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
5313 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
5315 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
5316 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
5317 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
5318 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
5319 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
5320 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
5322 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
5323 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
5324 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
5325 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
5326 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5327 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5328 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
5329 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
5331 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
5332 // the channel info has updated.
5333 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
5334 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
5335 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5336 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5337 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
5338 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
5342 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
5343 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
5345 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5346 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5347 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5348 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5349 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5350 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
5352 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
5353 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
5354 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap(), &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 100_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
5355 let (payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
5356 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
5357 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
5358 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
5359 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
5360 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5361 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5362 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5363 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
5365 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
5366 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
5367 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5368 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5369 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5370 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
5371 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
5372 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5373 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
5374 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5375 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5376 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5377 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5378 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5379 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5380 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5381 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5382 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5383 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5384 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5385 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
5386 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5388 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
5389 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
5390 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5391 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5392 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5393 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
5395 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
5396 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
5397 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
5398 // lightning messages manually.
5399 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
5400 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
5401 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5402 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5403 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
5404 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5405 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5406 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
5407 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5408 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5409 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
5410 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5411 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5412 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5413 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
5414 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5415 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5416 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
5417 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5418 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5419 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
5420 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5421 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
5422 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5423 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5424 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
5425 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5427 // There's an existing bug that generates a PaymentSent event for each MPP path, so handle that here.
5428 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5430 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage: ref preimage } => {
5431 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
5433 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5436 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage: ref preimage } => {
5437 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
5439 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5444 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
5445 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
5446 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
5447 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
5448 // fails as expected.
5449 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5450 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5451 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5452 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5453 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5454 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
5456 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
5457 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
5458 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
5460 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
5461 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap(), &expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 100_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
5462 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
5463 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5464 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5465 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5466 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
5467 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
5468 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5469 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
5470 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5471 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5472 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5473 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5474 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5475 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5476 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5477 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5478 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5479 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5480 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5481 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
5482 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
5484 // Finally, claim the original payment.
5485 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
5487 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
5488 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
5489 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap(), &expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 100_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
5490 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
5491 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5492 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5493 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5494 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
5495 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
5496 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
5498 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
5499 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
5500 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
5501 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5502 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5503 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5504 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
5505 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
5506 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5507 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
5508 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5509 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5510 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5511 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5512 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5513 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5514 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5515 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5516 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5517 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5518 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5519 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
5520 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
5522 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
5523 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
5527 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
5528 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
5529 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
5530 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5531 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5532 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5533 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5535 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
5536 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
5537 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
5538 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
5540 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5541 let network_graph = nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap();
5542 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
5543 let route = get_keysend_route(&payer_pubkey, &network_graph, &payee_pubkey,
5544 Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()), &vec![], 10000, 40,
5545 nodes[0].logger).unwrap();
5547 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
5548 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
5549 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
5550 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5552 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5553 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
5554 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5555 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5556 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5557 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5558 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
5560 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
5564 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
5565 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
5566 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5567 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5568 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5569 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5571 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
5572 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
5573 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
5574 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
5576 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5577 let network_graph = nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap();
5578 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
5579 let route = get_keysend_route(&payer_pubkey, &network_graph, &payee_pubkey,
5580 Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()), &vec![], 10000, 40,
5581 nodes[0].logger).unwrap();
5583 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
5584 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
5585 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
5586 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
5587 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5589 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5590 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
5591 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5592 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5593 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5594 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5595 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
5597 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
5601 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "unstable"))]
5604 use chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor;
5605 use chain::channelmonitor::Persist;
5606 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
5607 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
5608 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
5609 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
5610 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
5611 use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
5612 use routing::router::get_route;
5613 use util::test_utils;
5614 use util::config::UserConfig;
5615 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
5617 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
5618 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
5619 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
5621 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
5625 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
5626 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
5627 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
5628 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
5629 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
5630 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
5631 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
5636 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
5637 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
5640 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
5641 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
5642 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
5644 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
5645 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
5647 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
5648 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
5650 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
5651 config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
5653 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
5654 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
5655 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
5656 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
5657 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
5659 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
5661 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
5663 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
5664 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
5665 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
5666 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
5667 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
5669 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
5671 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
5673 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
5674 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
5675 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
5676 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
5677 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
5680 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
5681 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
5682 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
5684 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
5685 } else { panic!(); }
5687 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
5688 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
5690 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
5693 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5696 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
5697 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
5699 node_a.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
5700 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5701 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
5702 match msg_events[0] {
5703 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref msg, .. } => {
5704 node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
5705 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
5709 match msg_events[1] {
5710 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5714 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
5716 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
5717 macro_rules! send_payment {
5718 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
5719 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
5720 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &dummy_graph, &$node_b.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()),
5721 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), &[], 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a).unwrap();
5723 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
5724 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
5726 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
5727 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, 0).unwrap();
5729 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
5730 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
5731 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5732 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
5733 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
5734 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5735 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
5736 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
5738 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
5739 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
5740 assert!($node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
5742 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
5743 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
5744 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
5745 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5746 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
5748 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
5751 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
5752 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5753 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
5754 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
5756 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
5761 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
5762 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);