1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`find_route`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 //! [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
25 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
35 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
38 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
39 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
40 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
41 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
43 // construct one themselves.
44 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
45 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
46 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
47 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
48 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
49 use crate::routing::router::{InFlightHtlcs, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, RouteParameters};
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
53 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
54 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, Recipient};
55 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
56 use crate::util::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
57 use crate::util::{byte_utils, events};
58 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
59 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
60 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
61 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
62 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
65 use crate::prelude::*;
67 use core::cell::RefCell;
69 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock};
70 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
71 use core::time::Duration;
74 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
76 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
77 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
78 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
80 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
81 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
82 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
83 // before we forward it.
85 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
86 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
87 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
88 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
89 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
91 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
92 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
94 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
95 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a "real" SCID, an
96 /// outbound SCID alias, or a phantom node SCID.
97 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
100 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
101 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
102 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
105 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
106 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
110 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
111 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
112 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
113 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
114 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
115 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
116 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
117 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
120 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
121 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
122 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
123 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
126 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
127 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
128 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
129 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
130 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
133 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
134 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
136 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
137 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
138 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
141 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
142 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
144 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
147 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
148 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
151 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
155 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
156 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
157 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
158 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
159 short_channel_id: u64,
161 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
162 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
164 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
165 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
170 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
172 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
173 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
174 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
176 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
177 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
180 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
181 struct ClaimableHTLC {
182 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
184 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
186 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
188 /// The sum total of all MPP parts
192 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
193 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
194 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
195 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
197 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
198 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
203 impl Readable for PaymentId {
204 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
205 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
209 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
210 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
211 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
212 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
213 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
216 session_priv: SecretKey,
217 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
218 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
219 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
220 payment_id: PaymentId,
221 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
222 payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters>,
225 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
226 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
227 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
229 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
231 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
233 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payment_params } => {
236 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
237 payment_id.hash(hasher);
238 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
239 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
240 payment_params.hash(hasher);
245 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
248 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
249 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
251 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
252 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
253 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
254 payment_secret: None,
255 payment_params: None,
260 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
261 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
263 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
271 struct ReceiveError {
277 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
278 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
280 MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
285 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>);
287 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
288 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
289 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
290 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
291 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
293 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
294 err: msgs::LightningError,
295 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
296 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
298 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
300 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
302 err: LightningError {
304 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
305 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
312 shutdown_finish: None,
316 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
318 err: LightningError {
320 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
323 shutdown_finish: None,
327 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
328 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
331 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
333 err: LightningError {
335 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
336 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
342 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
343 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
347 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
350 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
352 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
353 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
357 log_level: Level::Warn,
360 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
362 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
364 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
366 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
367 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
375 shutdown_finish: None,
380 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
381 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
382 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
383 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
384 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
386 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
387 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
388 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
389 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
390 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
391 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
392 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
394 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
398 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
399 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
400 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
401 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
402 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
403 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
406 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
407 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
408 /// quite some time lag.
409 enum BackgroundEvent {
410 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
411 /// commitment transaction.
412 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
415 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
416 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
418 latest_features: InitFeatures,
421 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
422 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
424 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
427 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
428 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
429 struct PendingInboundPayment {
430 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
431 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
432 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
433 /// this payment being removed.
435 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
436 user_payment_id: u64,
437 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
438 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
439 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
442 /// Stores the session_priv for each part of a payment that is still pending. For versions 0.0.102
443 /// and later, also stores information for retrying the payment.
444 pub(crate) enum PendingOutboundPayment {
446 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
449 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
450 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
451 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
452 pending_amt_msat: u64,
453 /// Used to track the fee paid. Only present if the payment was serialized on 0.0.103+.
454 pending_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
455 /// The total payment amount across all paths, used to verify that a retry is not overpaying.
457 /// Our best known block height at the time this payment was initiated.
458 starting_block_height: u32,
460 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
461 /// been resolved. This ensures we don't look up pending payments in ChannelMonitors on restart
462 /// and add a pending payment that was already fulfilled.
464 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
465 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
466 timer_ticks_without_htlcs: u8,
468 /// When a payer gives up trying to retry a payment, they inform us, letting us generate a
469 /// `PaymentFailed` event when all HTLCs have irrevocably failed. This avoids a number of race
470 /// conditions in MPP-aware payment retriers (1), where the possibility of multiple
471 /// `PaymentPathFailed` events with `all_paths_failed` can be pending at once, confusing a
472 /// downstream event handler as to when a payment has actually failed.
474 /// (1) https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1164
476 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
477 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
481 impl PendingOutboundPayment {
482 fn is_fulfilled(&self) -> bool {
484 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => true,
488 fn abandoned(&self) -> bool {
490 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => true,
494 fn get_pending_fee_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
496 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { pending_fee_msat, .. } => pending_fee_msat.clone(),
501 fn payment_hash(&self) -> Option<PaymentHash> {
503 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None,
504 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
505 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => *payment_hash,
506 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
510 fn mark_fulfilled(&mut self) {
511 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
512 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
513 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
514 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
515 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
516 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. }
519 let payment_hash = self.payment_hash();
520 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, payment_hash, timer_ticks_without_htlcs: 0 };
523 fn mark_abandoned(&mut self) -> Result<(), ()> {
524 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
525 let our_payment_hash;
526 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
527 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } |
528 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } =>
530 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } |
531 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } => {
532 our_payment_hash = *payment_hash;
536 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash: our_payment_hash };
540 /// panics if path is None and !self.is_fulfilled
541 fn remove(&mut self, session_priv: &[u8; 32], path: Option<&Vec<RouteHop>>) -> bool {
542 let remove_res = match self {
543 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
544 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
545 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
546 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
547 session_privs.remove(session_priv)
551 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
552 let path = path.expect("Fulfilling a payment should always come with a path");
553 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
554 *pending_amt_msat -= path_last_hop.fee_msat;
555 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
556 *fee_msat -= path.get_path_fees();
563 fn insert(&mut self, session_priv: [u8; 32], path: &Vec<RouteHop>) -> bool {
564 let insert_res = match self {
565 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
566 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
567 session_privs.insert(session_priv)
569 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => false,
570 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => false,
573 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
574 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
575 *pending_amt_msat += path_last_hop.fee_msat;
576 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
577 *fee_msat += path.get_path_fees();
584 fn remaining_parts(&self) -> usize {
586 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
587 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
588 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
589 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
596 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
597 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
598 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
599 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
600 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
601 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
602 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
604 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
605 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
607 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
608 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
609 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
610 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
611 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
612 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
613 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
614 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
616 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
617 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
619 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
620 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
622 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
623 /// to individual Channels.
625 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
626 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
627 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
628 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
630 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
631 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
632 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
633 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
634 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
635 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
636 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
638 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
639 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
640 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
641 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
644 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
645 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
646 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
647 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
648 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
650 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
651 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
652 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
653 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
654 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
657 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
658 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
659 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
660 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
661 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
665 // `total_consistency_lock`
667 // |__`forward_htlcs`
669 // |__`pending_inbound_payments`
671 // | |__`claimable_htlcs`
673 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments`
675 // | |__`channel_state`
679 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
681 // | |__`per_peer_state`
683 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
687 // | |__`pending_events`
689 // | |__`pending_background_events`
691 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
692 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
693 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
694 K::Target: KeysInterface,
695 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
698 default_configuration: UserConfig,
699 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
700 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
704 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
706 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
708 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
709 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
711 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
712 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
713 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>,
714 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
715 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>,
717 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
718 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
719 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
720 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
722 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
723 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
725 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
726 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
727 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
728 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
729 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
730 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
731 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
732 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
734 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
736 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
737 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment>>,
739 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
741 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
742 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
743 /// and via the classic SCID.
745 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
746 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
748 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
750 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
752 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
754 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
755 /// failed/claimed by the user.
757 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
758 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
760 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
761 claimable_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, (events::PaymentPurpose, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>)>>,
763 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
764 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
765 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
766 /// active channel list on load.
768 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
769 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
771 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
773 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
774 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
775 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
777 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
778 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
779 /// the handling of the events.
782 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
783 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
784 /// would break backwards compatability.
785 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
786 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
787 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
789 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
790 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
792 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
794 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
795 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
796 /// confirmation depth.
798 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
799 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
800 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
802 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
804 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
806 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
808 our_network_key: SecretKey,
809 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
811 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
813 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
814 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
815 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
817 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
818 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
820 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
821 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
822 /// keeping additional state.
823 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
825 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
826 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
827 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
828 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
830 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
831 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
832 /// are currently open with that peer.
833 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
834 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
837 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
838 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
840 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
841 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
842 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
843 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
844 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
845 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
846 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
847 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
848 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
849 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
850 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
852 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
859 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
861 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
862 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
863 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
864 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
865 pub struct ChainParameters {
866 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
867 pub network: Network,
869 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
871 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
872 pub best_block: BestBlock,
875 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
881 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
882 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
883 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
884 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
885 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
886 /// updates are ready for persistence).
888 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
889 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
890 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
891 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
892 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
894 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
895 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
898 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
899 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
900 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
903 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
904 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
906 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
907 persistence_notifier: notifier,
908 should_persist: persist_check,
909 _read_guard: read_guard,
914 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
916 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
917 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
922 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
923 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
925 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
927 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
928 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
929 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
930 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
931 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
933 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
934 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
936 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
938 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
939 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
940 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
941 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
942 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
943 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
944 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
945 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
946 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
947 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
948 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
949 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
950 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
952 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
953 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
955 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
956 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
957 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
958 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
960 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
961 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
962 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
963 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
964 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
965 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
968 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
970 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
971 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
974 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
976 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
977 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
979 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
980 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
981 /// [`ChannelManager::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
982 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
984 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
985 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
986 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
987 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
988 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
989 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
990 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
991 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
992 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
993 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
994 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
997 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
998 /// to better separate parameters.
999 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1000 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1001 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1002 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1003 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1004 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1005 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1006 pub features: InitFeatures,
1007 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1008 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1009 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1011 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1013 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1014 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1015 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1016 /// payments to us through this channel.
1017 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1018 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1019 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1020 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1021 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1022 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1023 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1026 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
1027 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1028 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1029 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1030 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1031 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1032 /// lifetime of the channel.
1033 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1034 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1035 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1036 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1037 /// our counterparty already.
1039 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1040 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1041 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1042 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1044 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1045 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1046 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1047 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1049 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1050 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1052 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1053 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1055 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1056 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1057 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1058 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1059 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1060 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1061 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1062 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1063 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1066 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1068 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1069 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1070 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1071 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1072 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1073 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1074 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1076 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1077 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1079 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1080 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1081 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1082 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1083 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1084 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1085 /// this value on chain.
1087 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1089 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1091 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1092 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1093 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1094 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1096 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1097 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1098 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1099 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1101 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1102 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1103 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1104 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1106 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1107 pub balance_msat: u64,
1108 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1109 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1110 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1111 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1113 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1115 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1116 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1117 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1118 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1119 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1120 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1121 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1122 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1124 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1125 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1126 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1127 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1128 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1129 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1130 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1132 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1133 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1134 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1135 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1136 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1137 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1138 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1139 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1140 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1142 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1144 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1145 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1146 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1147 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1148 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1149 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1150 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1151 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1152 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1154 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1155 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1156 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1157 pub is_outbound: bool,
1158 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1159 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1160 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1161 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1162 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1164 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1165 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1166 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1167 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1169 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1170 pub is_usable: bool,
1171 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1172 pub is_public: bool,
1173 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1174 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1175 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1176 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1177 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1178 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1180 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1181 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1184 impl ChannelDetails {
1185 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1186 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1187 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1189 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1190 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1191 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1192 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1195 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1196 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1197 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1199 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1200 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1201 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1202 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1206 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
1207 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
1208 /// states for more.
1209 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
1210 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
1211 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
1212 /// send the payment at all.
1214 /// You can freely resend the payment in full (with the parameter error fixed).
1216 /// Because the payment failed outright, no payment tracking is done, you do not need to call
1217 /// [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] and [`ChannelManager::retry_payment`] will *not* work
1218 /// for this payment.
1219 ParameterError(APIError),
1220 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
1221 /// from attempting to send the payment at all.
1223 /// You can freely resend the payment in full (with the parameter error fixed).
1225 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1228 /// Because the payment failed outright, no payment tracking is done, you do not need to call
1229 /// [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] and [`ChannelManager::retry_payment`] will *not* work
1230 /// for this payment.
1231 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
1232 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
1233 /// You can freely resend the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
1234 /// paths than the ones selected).
1236 /// Because the payment failed outright, no payment tracking is done, you do not need to call
1237 /// [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] and [`ChannelManager::retry_payment`] will *not* work
1238 /// for this payment.
1239 AllFailedResendSafe(Vec<APIError>),
1240 /// Indicates that a payment for the provided [`PaymentId`] is already in-flight and has not
1241 /// yet completed (i.e. generated an [`Event::PaymentSent`]) or been abandoned (via
1242 /// [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]).
1244 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
1246 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
1247 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
1248 /// in over-/re-payment.
1250 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1251 /// send_payment, and any `Err`s which are not [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] can be
1252 /// safely retried via [`ChannelManager::retry_payment`].
1254 /// Any entries which contain `Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInprogress)` or `Ok(())` MUST NOT be
1255 /// retried as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent
1256 /// (in the case of `Ok(())`) or will send once a [`MonitorEvent::Completed`] is provided for
1257 /// the next-hop channel with the latest update_id.
1259 /// The errors themselves, in the same order as the route hops.
1260 results: Vec<Result<(), APIError>>,
1261 /// If some paths failed without irrevocably committing to the new HTLC(s), this will
1262 /// contain a [`RouteParameters`] object which can be used to calculate a new route that
1263 /// will pay all remaining unpaid balance.
1264 failed_paths_retry: Option<RouteParameters>,
1265 /// The payment id for the payment, which is now at least partially pending.
1266 payment_id: PaymentId,
1270 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1272 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1274 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1275 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1276 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1277 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1279 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1280 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1281 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1284 macro_rules! handle_error {
1285 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1288 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1289 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1291 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1292 // entering the macro.
1293 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
1294 assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
1297 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1299 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1300 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1301 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1302 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1306 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1307 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1308 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1309 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1314 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1315 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1317 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1318 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1319 action: err.action.clone()
1323 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1324 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1327 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1334 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1335 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {{
1336 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
1337 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1338 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1339 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1341 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1342 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1343 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1344 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1345 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1347 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1348 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1350 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1354 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1355 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1356 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1358 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1359 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1361 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1362 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1364 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1365 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1366 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel);
1367 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1368 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1369 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1375 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1376 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1380 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1382 $entry.remove_entry();
1390 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1391 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1395 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1397 $entry.remove_entry();
1405 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1406 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1408 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1409 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, channel);
1415 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_res {
1416 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1418 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1419 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1420 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan);
1421 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1422 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1423 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1424 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1425 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1426 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1427 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1428 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1429 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1430 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1431 $chan.force_shutdown(false), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1434 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1435 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update in progress. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1436 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1437 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1438 match $action_type {
1439 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1440 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1442 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1443 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1445 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1446 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1447 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1448 if !$resend_commitment {
1449 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1452 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1454 $chan.monitor_updating_paused($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1455 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1457 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1462 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1463 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1465 $entry.remove_entry();
1469 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY) => { {
1470 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1471 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1473 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, NO_UPDATE) => {
1474 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1476 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_channel_ready: expr, OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED) => {
1477 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, false, $resend_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1479 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1480 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1482 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1483 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
1487 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1488 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1489 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1490 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1491 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1493 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1494 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1495 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1496 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1497 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1498 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1499 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1500 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1501 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1502 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1507 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1508 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1509 if $channel.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1511 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1512 pending_events.push(events::Event::ChannelReady {
1513 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1514 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1515 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1516 channel_type: $channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
1519 $channel.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1524 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
1525 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
1526 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1527 K::Target: KeysInterface,
1528 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1531 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1533 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1534 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1536 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1538 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1539 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1540 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1541 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1542 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1543 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1544 let inbound_pmt_key_material = keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1545 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1547 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1548 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1549 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1553 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1555 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1556 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1557 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1559 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1560 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1561 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1562 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1563 claimable_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1564 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1565 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1567 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1568 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap()),
1571 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1572 fake_scid_rand_bytes: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1574 probing_cookie_secret: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1576 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1578 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1580 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1581 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1582 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1583 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
1591 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1592 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1593 &self.default_configuration
1596 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1597 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1598 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1601 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1602 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1604 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
1606 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1610 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1615 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1617 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1618 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1619 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
1620 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
1621 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
1623 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1624 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1626 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1627 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1628 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1630 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1631 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1632 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1633 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1634 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1635 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1637 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1638 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1639 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1640 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1641 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1642 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1646 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1647 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1648 Some(peer_state) => {
1649 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1650 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1651 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1652 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1653 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key,
1654 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1655 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1659 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1664 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1667 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1669 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1670 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1671 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1673 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1674 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1675 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1676 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1678 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1680 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1683 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1685 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1686 node_id: their_network_key,
1689 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1692 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1693 let mut res = Vec::new();
1695 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1696 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1697 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1698 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1699 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1700 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1701 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1702 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1703 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1704 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1705 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1706 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1707 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1708 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1709 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1710 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1711 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1712 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1713 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1714 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1715 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1717 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1718 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1719 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1720 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1721 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1722 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1723 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1724 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1725 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1726 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1727 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1728 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1729 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1730 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1731 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1732 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1733 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1734 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1735 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1736 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1737 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1738 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1739 config: Some(channel.config()),
1743 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1744 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1745 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1746 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1752 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1753 /// more information.
1754 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1755 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1758 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to [`find_route`]
1759 /// to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1761 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1762 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1765 /// [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
1766 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1767 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1768 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1769 // really wanted anyway.
1770 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1773 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1774 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1775 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1776 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1777 Some(transaction) => {
1778 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1782 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1783 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1784 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1785 reason: closure_reason
1789 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1790 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1792 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1793 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1794 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1795 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1796 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1797 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1798 if *counterparty_node_id != chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id(){
1799 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
1801 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = {
1802 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1803 match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1804 Some(peer_state) => {
1805 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1806 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1807 chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
1809 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
1812 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1814 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1815 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1816 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
1817 let (result, is_permanent) =
1818 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
1820 remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1825 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1826 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
1830 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1831 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1832 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1833 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1837 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1841 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1845 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1846 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
1847 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
1850 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
1854 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1855 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1856 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1858 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1859 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1861 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1862 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1863 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1864 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1866 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1868 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1869 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1870 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1871 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1872 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None)
1875 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1876 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1877 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1879 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1880 /// the channel being closed or not:
1881 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1882 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1883 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1884 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1885 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1886 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1887 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1889 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1891 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1892 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1893 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1894 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1895 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1899 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1900 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1901 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1902 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1903 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
1904 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1905 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
1907 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1908 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1909 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1910 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1911 // ignore the result here.
1912 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1916 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1917 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
1918 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
1919 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1921 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1922 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1923 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1924 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *peer_node_id {
1925 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1927 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
1928 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
1930 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1932 remove_channel!(self, chan)
1934 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1937 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1938 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
1939 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1940 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1941 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1946 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1949 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1950 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1951 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
1952 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1953 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1954 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1955 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1956 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1957 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1967 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
1968 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
1969 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
1971 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
1972 -> Result<(), APIError> {
1973 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
1976 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
1977 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
1978 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
1980 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
1981 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
1982 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
1983 -> Result<(), APIError> {
1984 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
1987 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
1988 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
1989 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
1990 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1991 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
1995 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
1996 /// local transaction(s).
1997 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
1998 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1999 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2003 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2004 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2006 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2007 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != cltv_expiry {
2008 return Err(ReceiveError {
2009 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value",
2011 err_data: byte_utils::be32_to_array(cltv_expiry).to_vec()
2014 // final_expiry_too_soon
2015 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2016 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2017 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2018 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2019 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2020 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2021 return Err(ReceiveError {
2023 err_data: Vec::new(),
2024 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2027 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2028 return Err(ReceiveError {
2030 err_data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(amt_msat).to_vec(),
2031 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2035 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2036 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2037 return Err(ReceiveError {
2038 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2039 err_data: Vec::new(),
2040 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2043 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
2044 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2045 return Err(ReceiveError {
2046 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2047 err_data: Vec::new(),
2048 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2050 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2051 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2053 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2054 phantom_shared_secret,
2056 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2057 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2058 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2059 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2060 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2061 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2062 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2063 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2064 return Err(ReceiveError {
2065 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2066 err_data: Vec::new(),
2067 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2071 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2073 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2076 return Err(ReceiveError {
2077 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2078 err_data: Vec::new(),
2079 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2084 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2087 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2088 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2089 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_msat,
2090 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2094 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2095 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2096 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2098 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2099 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2100 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2101 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2102 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2103 failure_code: $err_code,
2109 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2110 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2113 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key).secret_bytes();
2115 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2116 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2117 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2118 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2119 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2120 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2121 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2122 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2124 macro_rules! return_err {
2125 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2127 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2128 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2129 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2130 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2131 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
2137 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2139 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2140 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2142 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2143 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2147 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2148 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2150 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2152 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2153 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2154 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2155 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2156 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2158 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2161 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2162 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2163 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2165 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2166 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2167 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2170 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2171 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2172 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2173 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2177 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2178 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2179 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2182 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2183 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2184 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2185 outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2186 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2191 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref outgoing_amt_msat, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2192 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2193 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2194 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2195 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2196 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
2197 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
2198 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2199 let forwarding_id_opt = match id_option {
2200 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2201 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2203 if fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
2206 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2209 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => Some(chan_id.clone()),
2211 let chan_update_opt = if let Some(forwarding_id) = forwarding_id_opt {
2212 let chan = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2214 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and by_id maps have
2215 // no consistency guarantees.
2216 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2220 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2221 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2222 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2223 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2224 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2226 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2227 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2228 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2229 // we don't have the channel here.
2230 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2232 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2234 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2235 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2236 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2237 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2238 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2239 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2240 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2242 if *outgoing_amt_msat < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2243 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2245 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *outgoing_amt_msat, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2246 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2250 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2252 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2259 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2260 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2261 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2262 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2263 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2264 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2266 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2267 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2269 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2270 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2271 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2272 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2273 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2274 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2275 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2276 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2277 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2278 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2284 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2285 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2286 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2287 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2289 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2290 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2292 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2293 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2294 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2296 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2297 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2298 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2300 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2305 pending_forward_info
2308 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2309 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2310 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2312 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2313 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2314 if !chan.should_announce() {
2315 return Err(LightningError {
2316 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2317 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2320 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2321 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2323 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2324 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2327 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2328 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2329 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2330 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2331 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2332 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2333 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2334 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2335 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2339 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2341 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2342 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2343 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2345 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2346 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2348 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2349 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2350 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2351 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2352 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2353 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2354 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2355 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2358 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
2359 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
2361 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2367 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2368 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2369 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2370 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2371 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2373 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2374 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2375 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2376 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2377 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2379 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2381 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2383 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2384 let id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2385 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2386 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
2389 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2390 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2391 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
2393 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
2394 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
2396 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2397 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2399 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2400 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2402 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2403 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2405 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2406 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2407 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2410 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2411 let update_err = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
2412 let chan_id = chan.get().channel_id();
2414 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_err, chan,
2415 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true))
2417 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure, Err(e)) => break Err(e),
2418 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed, Ok(())) => {},
2419 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress, Err(_)) => {
2420 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
2421 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
2422 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
2423 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
2424 // which we do in the send_payment check for
2425 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
2426 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
2428 _ => unreachable!(),
2431 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan_id));
2432 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2433 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2434 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2435 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2436 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2437 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2438 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2447 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
2448 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the `by_id` map.
2449 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
2450 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
2455 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2456 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2458 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2463 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2465 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
2466 /// fields for more info.
2468 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
2469 /// method will error with an [`APIError::RouteError`]. Note, however, that once a payment
2470 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
2471 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a second payment with the same
2474 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
2475 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
2476 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
2477 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
2478 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
2480 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
2481 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
2483 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2484 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2485 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
2487 /// In general, a path may raise:
2488 /// * [`APIError::RouteError`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2489 /// node public key) is specified.
2490 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2491 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2493 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2494 /// relevant updates.
2496 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2497 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2498 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2500 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
2501 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
2502 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
2503 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
2506 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
2507 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
2508 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2510 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2511 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
2512 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2513 let onion_session_privs = self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, *payment_secret, payment_id, route)?;
2514 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None, payment_id, None, onion_session_privs)
2518 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2519 self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, route)
2522 fn add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2523 let mut onion_session_privs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2524 for _ in 0..route.paths.len() {
2525 onion_session_privs.push(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
2528 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2529 match pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
2530 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => Err(PaymentSendFailure::DuplicatePayment),
2531 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2532 let payment = entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2533 session_privs: HashSet::new(),
2534 pending_amt_msat: 0,
2535 pending_fee_msat: Some(0),
2538 starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
2539 total_msat: route.get_total_amount(),
2542 for (path, session_priv_bytes) in route.paths.iter().zip(onion_session_privs.iter()) {
2543 assert!(payment.insert(*session_priv_bytes, path));
2546 Ok(onion_session_privs)
2551 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2552 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
2553 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
2555 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
2556 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
2558 let mut total_value = 0;
2559 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2560 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2561 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
2562 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
2563 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
2564 continue 'path_check;
2566 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
2567 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
2568 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
2569 continue 'path_check;
2572 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2573 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
2575 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
2576 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
2578 if let Some(amt_msat) = recv_value_msat {
2579 debug_assert!(amt_msat >= total_value);
2580 total_value = amt_msat;
2583 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2584 let mut results = Vec::new();
2585 debug_assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), onion_session_privs.len());
2586 for (path, session_priv) in route.paths.iter().zip(onion_session_privs.into_iter()) {
2587 let mut path_res = self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &route.payment_params, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage, session_priv);
2590 Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress) => {
2591 // While a MonitorUpdateInProgress is an Err(_), the payment is still
2592 // considered "in flight" and we shouldn't remove it from the
2593 // PendingOutboundPayment set.
2596 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2597 if let Some(payment) = pending_outbounds.get_mut(&payment_id) {
2598 let removed = payment.remove(&session_priv, Some(path));
2599 debug_assert!(removed, "This can't happen as the payment has an entry for this path added by callers");
2601 debug_assert!(false, "This can't happen as the payment was added by callers");
2602 path_res = Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Internal error: payment disappeared during processing. Please report this bug!".to_owned() });
2606 results.push(path_res);
2608 let mut has_ok = false;
2609 let mut has_err = false;
2610 let mut pending_amt_unsent = 0;
2611 let mut max_unsent_cltv_delta = 0;
2612 for (res, path) in results.iter().zip(route.paths.iter()) {
2613 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
2614 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
2615 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress) = res {
2616 // MonitorUpdateInProgress is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
2620 } else if res.is_err() {
2621 pending_amt_unsent += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2622 max_unsent_cltv_delta = cmp::max(max_unsent_cltv_delta, path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta);
2625 if has_err && has_ok {
2626 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure {
2629 failed_paths_retry: if pending_amt_unsent != 0 {
2630 if let Some(payment_params) = &route.payment_params {
2631 Some(RouteParameters {
2632 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2633 final_value_msat: pending_amt_unsent,
2634 final_cltv_expiry_delta: max_unsent_cltv_delta,
2640 // If we failed to send any paths, we should remove the new PaymentId from the
2641 // `pending_outbound_payments` map, as the user isn't expected to `abandon_payment`.
2642 let removed = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&payment_id).is_some();
2643 debug_assert!(removed, "We should always have a pending payment to remove here");
2644 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedResendSafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
2650 /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2652 /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2653 /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2654 /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, if the payment
2655 /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success), or if
2656 /// further retries have been disabled with [`abandon_payment`].
2658 /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2659 /// [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]
2660 pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2661 const RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE: u64 = 10;
2662 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2663 if path.len() == 0 {
2664 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2665 err: "length-0 path in route".to_string()
2670 let mut onion_session_privs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2671 for _ in 0..route.paths.len() {
2672 onion_session_privs.push(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
2675 let (total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret) = {
2676 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2677 match outbounds.get_mut(&payment_id) {
2679 let res = match payment {
2680 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2681 total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret, pending_amt_msat, ..
2683 let retry_amt_msat: u64 = route.paths.iter().map(|path| path.last().unwrap().fee_msat).sum();
2684 if retry_amt_msat + *pending_amt_msat > *total_msat * (100 + RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE) / 100 {
2685 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2686 err: format!("retry_amt_msat of {} will put pending_amt_msat (currently: {}) more than 10% over total_payment_amt_msat of {}", retry_amt_msat, pending_amt_msat, total_msat).to_string()
2689 (*total_msat, *payment_hash, *payment_secret)
2691 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => {
2692 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2693 err: "Unable to retry payments that were initially sent on LDK versions prior to 0.0.102".to_string()
2696 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {
2697 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2698 err: "Payment already completed".to_owned()
2701 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {
2702 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2703 err: "Payment already abandoned (with some HTLCs still pending)".to_owned()
2707 for (path, session_priv_bytes) in route.paths.iter().zip(onion_session_privs.iter()) {
2708 assert!(payment.insert(*session_priv_bytes, path));
2713 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2714 err: format!("Payment with ID {} not found", log_bytes!(payment_id.0)),
2718 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, payment_id, Some(total_msat), onion_session_privs)
2721 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur.
2723 /// After this method returns, any future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id`
2724 /// will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`]. If no such event has been generated,
2725 /// an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event will be generated as soon as there are no remaining
2726 /// pending HTLCs for this payment.
2728 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2729 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2730 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2732 /// [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment
2733 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2734 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2735 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2736 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2738 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2739 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
2740 if let Ok(()) = payment.get_mut().mark_abandoned() {
2741 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
2742 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2744 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
2752 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2753 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2754 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2755 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2756 /// never reach the recipient.
2758 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
2759 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
2761 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2762 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2764 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2766 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2767 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2768 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
2770 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
2772 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
2773 let onion_session_privs = self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, None, payment_id, &route)?;
2775 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage), payment_id, None, onion_session_privs) {
2776 Ok(()) => Ok(payment_hash),
2781 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
2782 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
2783 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
2784 pub fn send_probe(&self, hops: Vec<RouteHop>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2785 let payment_id = PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
2787 let payment_hash = self.probing_cookie_from_id(&payment_id);
2790 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2791 err: "No need probing a path with less than two hops".to_string()
2795 let route = Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None };
2796 let onion_session_privs = self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, None, payment_id, &route)?;
2798 match self.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &None, None, payment_id, None, onion_session_privs) {
2799 Ok(()) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2804 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
2806 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
2807 let target_payment_hash = self.probing_cookie_from_id(payment_id);
2808 target_payment_hash == *payment_hash
2811 /// Returns the 'probing cookie' for the given [`PaymentId`].
2812 fn probing_cookie_from_id(&self, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> PaymentHash {
2813 let mut preimage = [0u8; 64];
2814 preimage[..32].copy_from_slice(&self.probing_cookie_secret);
2815 preimage[32..].copy_from_slice(&payment_id.0);
2816 PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage).into_inner())
2819 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2820 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2821 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2822 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], _counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2823 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2825 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2827 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2829 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2830 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2831 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2832 } else { unreachable!(); })
2835 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2837 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2838 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2841 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2842 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2847 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2848 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2849 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2852 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2853 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2854 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2856 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2857 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
2858 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
2859 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
2868 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2869 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2870 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2874 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2876 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2877 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2879 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
2880 /// across the p2p network.
2882 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2883 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2885 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2886 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2887 /// keys per-channel).
2889 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2890 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2891 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2893 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2894 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2895 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2897 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
2898 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
2899 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
2900 /// for more details.
2902 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2903 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2904 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2905 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2907 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2908 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2909 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2910 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2915 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2916 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools at the next block. However, the modules
2917 // constituting our Lightning node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if
2918 // the wallet module is in advance on the LDK view, allow one more block of headroom.
2919 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 2 {
2920 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2921 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
2925 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2926 let mut output_index = None;
2927 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2928 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2929 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2930 if output_index.is_some() {
2931 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2932 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2935 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2936 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2937 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2940 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2943 if output_index.is_none() {
2944 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2945 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2948 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2952 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
2954 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
2955 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
2956 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
2957 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
2959 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
2960 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
2962 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
2963 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
2965 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
2967 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
2968 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
2969 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
2970 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
2971 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2972 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
2973 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
2974 pub fn update_channel_config(
2975 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
2976 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2977 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
2978 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2979 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
2983 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
2984 &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
2987 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2988 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2989 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2990 let channel_counterparty_node_id = channel_state.by_id.get(channel_id)
2991 .ok_or(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2992 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found", log_bytes!(*channel_id)),
2994 .get_counterparty_node_id();
2995 if channel_counterparty_node_id != *counterparty_node_id {
2996 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2997 err: "counterparty node id mismatch".to_owned(),
3001 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3002 let channel = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
3003 if !channel.update_config(config) {
3006 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3007 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3008 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3009 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3010 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3019 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3021 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3022 /// Will likely generate further events.
3023 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3024 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3026 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
3027 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3028 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3029 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3031 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3032 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3034 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3035 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3036 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3038 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3039 match forward_info {
3040 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3041 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
3042 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3043 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3044 outgoing_cltv_value, incoming_amt_msat: _
3047 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3048 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3049 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3051 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3052 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3053 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3054 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3055 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3056 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3059 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3060 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3062 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3065 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3066 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: $err_code, data: $err_data },
3072 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3073 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3075 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3079 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3080 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3082 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3086 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3087 let phantom_secret_res = self.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3088 if phantom_secret_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3089 let phantom_shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &phantom_secret_res.unwrap()).secret_bytes();
3090 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3092 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3093 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3094 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3095 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3096 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3098 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3100 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3101 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3105 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3106 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3107 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3108 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3114 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3117 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3120 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3121 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3122 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3123 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3124 // problem, not ours.
3130 let forward_chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3131 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
3133 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3137 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3138 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3139 match channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3140 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3141 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3144 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3145 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3146 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3147 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3148 match forward_info {
3149 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3150 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint ,
3151 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3152 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3153 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, incoming_amt_msat: _,
3156 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3157 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3158 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3159 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3160 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3161 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3162 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3163 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3165 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet, &self.logger) {
3167 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3168 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3170 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3172 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3173 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3174 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data },
3175 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3181 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3183 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3184 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
3185 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
3186 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
3187 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
3188 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
3189 // this channel currently :/.
3195 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3196 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3198 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3199 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3200 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
3202 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3203 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3205 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
3207 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3208 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3209 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3212 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3214 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3215 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
3216 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
3217 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
3218 // messages when we can.
3219 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
3220 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
3221 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
3228 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
3229 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
3232 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
3233 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
3234 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3235 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
3236 ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
3237 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
3239 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
3240 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
3241 let mut channel = remove_channel!(self, chan);
3242 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
3243 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel.channel_id(), channel.get_user_id(), channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
3246 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
3250 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3251 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
3253 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
3257 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
3258 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3259 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3260 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3261 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3262 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
3263 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3264 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
3265 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3267 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
3274 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3275 match forward_info {
3276 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3277 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
3278 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3279 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, ..
3282 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3283 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3284 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3285 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data }, Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret)
3287 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3288 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None, None),
3290 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3293 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3294 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3295 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3296 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3297 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3298 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3299 phantom_shared_secret,
3301 value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3303 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3308 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3309 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3310 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
3311 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3312 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
3314 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3315 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3316 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3317 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3318 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3319 phantom_shared_secret,
3321 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data },
3322 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3327 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3328 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3329 let mut payment_received_generated = false;
3331 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3332 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3333 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3336 let mut claimable_htlcs = self.claimable_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
3337 let (_, htlcs) = claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3338 .or_insert_with(|| (purpose(), Vec::new()));
3339 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3340 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3341 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3342 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3346 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.value;
3347 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3348 total_value += htlc.value;
3349 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3350 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3351 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3352 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3353 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3354 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3356 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3358 _ => unreachable!(),
3361 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data.total_msat {
3362 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3363 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data.total_msat);
3364 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3365 } else if total_value == $payment_data.total_msat {
3366 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3367 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3370 amount_msat: total_value,
3372 payment_received_generated = true;
3374 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3375 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3377 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3379 payment_received_generated
3383 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3384 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3385 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3386 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3387 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3388 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3389 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3390 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3391 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3392 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3393 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3394 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3395 let payment_preimage = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3396 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
3398 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3402 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3404 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3405 match self.claimable_htlcs.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_hash) {
3406 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3407 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3408 e.insert((purpose.clone(), vec![claimable_htlc]));
3409 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3411 amount_msat: outgoing_amt_msat,
3415 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3416 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3417 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3423 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3424 if payment_data.is_none() {
3425 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3426 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3429 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3430 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3431 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3432 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3433 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3434 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3435 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3436 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3438 let payment_received_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3439 if payment_received_generated {
3440 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3446 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3447 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3455 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3456 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason, destination);
3458 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3460 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3461 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3464 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3465 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3466 events.append(&mut new_events);
3469 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3471 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3472 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3474 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3475 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3476 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3477 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3478 if background_events.is_empty() {
3482 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3484 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3485 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3486 // monitor updating completing.
3487 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
3494 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3495 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3496 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3497 self.process_background_events();
3500 fn update_channel_fee(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
3501 if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
3502 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3503 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3504 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3505 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3506 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3508 if !chan.is_live() {
3509 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3510 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3511 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3513 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3514 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3516 let mut retain_channel = true;
3517 let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
3520 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3521 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3525 let ret_err = match res {
3526 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
3527 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3528 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
3529 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3530 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3531 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3532 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3533 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3534 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3535 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3536 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3543 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
3544 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3552 (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
3556 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3557 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3558 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3559 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3560 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3561 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3562 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3564 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3566 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3568 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3569 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3570 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3571 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3572 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3573 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3575 handle_errors.push(err);
3585 fn remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self) {
3586 // If an outbound payment was completed, and no pending HTLCs remain, we should remove it
3587 // from the map. However, if we did that immediately when the last payment HTLC is claimed,
3588 // this could race the user making a duplicate send_payment call and our idempotency
3589 // guarantees would be violated. Instead, we wait a few timer ticks to do the actual
3590 // removal. This should be more than sufficient to ensure the idempotency of any
3591 // `send_payment` calls that were made at the same time the `PaymentSent` event was being
3593 let mut pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3594 let pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3595 pending_outbound_payments.retain(|payment_id, payment| {
3596 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, timer_ticks_without_htlcs, .. } = payment {
3597 let mut no_remaining_entries = session_privs.is_empty();
3598 if no_remaining_entries {
3599 for ev in pending_events.iter() {
3601 events::Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: Some(ev_payment_id), .. } |
3602 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ev_payment_id, .. } |
3603 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_id: Some(ev_payment_id), .. } => {
3604 if payment_id == ev_payment_id {
3605 no_remaining_entries = false;
3613 if no_remaining_entries {
3614 *timer_ticks_without_htlcs += 1;
3615 *timer_ticks_without_htlcs <= IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3617 *timer_ticks_without_htlcs = 0;
3624 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3626 /// This currently includes:
3627 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3628 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3629 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3631 /// * Expiring a channel's previous `ChannelConfig` if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3632 /// with the current `ChannelConfig`.
3634 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3635 /// estimate fetches.
3636 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3637 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3638 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3639 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3641 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3643 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3644 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3646 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3647 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3648 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3649 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3650 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
3651 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3652 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3654 handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
3656 if !retain_channel { return false; }
3658 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3659 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3660 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
3661 if needs_close { return false; }
3664 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3665 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3666 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3667 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3668 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3669 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3670 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3671 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3675 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3676 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3678 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3679 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3680 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3684 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3685 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3690 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
3696 self.claimable_htlcs.lock().unwrap().retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
3697 if htlcs.is_empty() {
3698 // This should be unreachable
3699 debug_assert!(false);
3702 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3703 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3704 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3705 if htlcs[0].total_msat == htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.value) {
3707 } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| {
3708 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3709 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3711 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.into_iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.prev_hop.clone(), payment_hash.clone())));
3718 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3719 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
3720 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone()), &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 23, data: Vec::new() }, receiver );
3723 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3724 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3727 self.remove_stale_resolved_payments();
3733 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3734 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3735 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3737 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
3738 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
3739 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentReceived`] event. Alternatively, the payment
3740 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
3742 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
3743 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
3744 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
3745 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
3746 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
3747 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3749 let removed_source = self.claimable_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(payment_hash);
3750 if let Some((_, mut sources)) = removed_source {
3751 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3752 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3753 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3754 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3755 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(
3756 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
3757 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data },
3758 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash });
3763 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3764 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3766 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3768 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3769 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3770 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3771 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3772 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3773 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3774 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3776 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3778 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3779 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3781 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3786 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3787 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3788 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3789 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
3790 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
3791 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
3792 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3793 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
3794 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
3795 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3797 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3798 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3799 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3800 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
3802 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
3803 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
3804 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
3805 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
3806 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3810 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3811 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3812 // be surfaced to the user.
3813 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
3814 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
3815 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
3817 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3818 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
3819 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3820 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3821 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
3823 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3826 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
3827 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data }, receiver);
3831 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3832 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
3833 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason,destination: HTLCDestination) {
3834 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3836 // Ensure that the `channel_state` lock is not held when calling this function.
3837 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock_order requirement for
3838 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `channel_state` lock, which calling this
3839 // function with the `channel_state` locked would.
3840 assert!(self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
3843 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3844 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3845 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3848 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3849 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3850 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3852 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => {
3853 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3854 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3855 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3856 let mut all_paths_failed = false;
3857 let mut full_failure_ev = None;
3858 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3859 if !payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
3860 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3863 if payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3864 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received failure of HTLC with payment_hash {} after payment completion", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3867 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3868 all_paths_failed = true;
3869 if payment.get().abandoned() {
3870 full_failure_ev = Some(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3872 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3878 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3881 let mut retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
3882 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3883 Some(RouteParameters {
3884 payment_params: payment_params_data.clone(),
3885 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3886 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3889 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3891 let path_failure = match &onion_error {
3892 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3894 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3896 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3898 if self.payment_is_probe(payment_hash, &payment_id) {
3899 if !payment_retryable {
3900 events::Event::ProbeSuccessful {
3902 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3906 events::Event::ProbeFailed {
3908 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3914 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
3915 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
3916 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
3917 if let Some(scid) = short_channel_id {
3918 retry.as_mut().map(|r| r.payment_params.previously_failed_channels.push(scid));
3920 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3921 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3922 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3923 payment_failed_permanently: !payment_retryable,
3930 error_code: onion_error_code,
3932 error_data: onion_error_data
3936 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3942 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
3943 // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
3944 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as find_route
3945 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
3947 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
3948 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
3949 let scid = path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id;
3950 retry.as_mut().map(|r| r.payment_params.previously_failed_channels.push(scid));
3952 if self.payment_is_probe(payment_hash, &payment_id) {
3953 events::Event::ProbeFailed {
3955 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3957 short_channel_id: Some(scid),
3960 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3961 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3962 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3963 payment_failed_permanently: false,
3964 network_update: None,
3967 short_channel_id: Some(scid),
3970 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
3972 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
3977 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3978 pending_events.push(path_failure);
3979 if let Some(ev) = full_failure_ev { pending_events.push(ev); }
3981 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret, outpoint }) => {
3982 let err_packet = match onion_error {
3983 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
3984 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
3985 if let Some(phantom_ss) = phantom_shared_secret {
3986 let phantom_packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
3987 let encrypted_phantom_packet = onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, &phantom_packet);
3988 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &encrypted_phantom_packet.data[..])
3990 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
3991 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
3994 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
3995 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3996 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
4000 let mut forward_event = None;
4001 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4002 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4003 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
4005 match forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
4006 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4007 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
4009 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4010 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
4013 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
4014 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4015 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
4016 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4017 time_forwardable: time
4020 pending_events.push(events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
4021 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
4022 failed_next_destination: destination
4028 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentReceived`], generating any
4029 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
4031 /// Note that calling this method does *not* guarantee that the payment has been claimed. You
4032 /// *must* wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] event which upon a successful claim will be
4033 /// provided to your [`EventHandler`] when [`process_pending_events`] is next called.
4035 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
4036 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
4037 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
4038 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
4040 /// [`Event::PaymentReceived`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentReceived
4041 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
4042 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
4043 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4044 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4045 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
4046 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4047 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4049 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4051 let removed_source = self.claimable_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&payment_hash);
4052 if let Some((payment_purpose, mut sources)) = removed_source {
4053 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
4055 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
4056 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
4057 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
4058 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
4060 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
4061 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
4062 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
4063 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
4064 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
4066 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
4067 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
4068 let mut valid_mpp = true;
4069 let mut errs = Vec::new();
4070 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
4071 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4072 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4073 for htlc in sources.iter() {
4074 let chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4075 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
4082 if let None = channel_state.by_id.get(&chan_id) {
4087 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
4088 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4089 debug_assert!(false);
4093 expected_amt_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
4094 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
4095 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
4096 // that there's one payment here and move on.
4097 if sources.len() != 1 {
4098 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
4099 debug_assert!(false);
4105 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
4107 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4108 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4111 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4112 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4113 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4117 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4118 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
4119 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
4120 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4121 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4122 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4123 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4124 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
4125 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4127 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
4128 ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
4129 // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
4130 // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
4131 // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
4132 // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
4134 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
4138 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4140 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4141 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
4142 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
4143 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
4144 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(
4145 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
4146 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data },
4147 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash } );
4151 if claimed_any_htlcs {
4152 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4154 purpose: payment_purpose,
4155 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
4159 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
4160 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4161 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4162 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4167 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
4168 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4169 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
4170 let chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4171 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
4173 return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed
4177 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4178 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
4179 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
4180 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
4181 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4182 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4184 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
4185 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4186 payment_preimage, e);
4187 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
4188 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4189 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
4190 Some(htlc_value_msat)
4194 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
4195 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
4196 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4197 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4198 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4199 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4200 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4201 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
4202 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4203 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4209 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
4211 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
4214 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
4215 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4216 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4218 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
4219 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
4220 payment_preimage, e);
4223 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4224 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
4226 chan.remove_entry();
4228 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
4231 } else { return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed }
4234 fn finalize_claims(&self, mut sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4235 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4236 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4237 for source in sources.drain(..) {
4238 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } = source {
4239 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4240 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4241 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4242 assert!(payment.get().is_fulfilled());
4243 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, None) {
4244 pending_events.push(
4245 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4247 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash(),
4257 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4259 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4260 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4261 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4262 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4263 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4264 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4265 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4266 if !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
4267 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4268 let fee_paid_msat = payment.get().get_pending_fee_msat();
4269 pending_events.push(
4270 events::Event::PaymentSent {
4271 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
4277 payment.get_mut().mark_fulfilled();
4281 // We currently immediately remove HTLCs which were fulfilled on-chain.
4282 // This could potentially lead to removing a pending payment too early,
4283 // with a reorg of one block causing us to re-add the fulfilled payment on
4285 // TODO: We should have a second monitor event that informs us of payments
4286 // irrevocably fulfilled.
4287 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
4288 let payment_hash = Some(PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()));
4289 pending_events.push(
4290 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4299 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
4302 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4303 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4304 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
4305 let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
4306 let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
4307 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
4308 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
4311 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
4312 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4313 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4314 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4315 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4318 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4319 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
4320 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
4321 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update);
4322 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4323 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4324 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4325 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
4326 // again on restart.
4327 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4328 payment_preimage, update_res);
4330 // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
4331 // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
4332 // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
4333 // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
4336 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4337 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
4338 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4339 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4343 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4344 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4345 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4348 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4349 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4350 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
4352 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4354 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4364 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4365 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4366 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4369 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
4370 /// update completion.
4371 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4372 channel: &mut Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
4373 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
4374 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
4375 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
4376 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
4377 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
4379 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get_counterparty_node_id();
4380 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4381 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.outbound_scid_alias()),
4382 channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), pending_forwards));
4385 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4386 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
4388 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
4389 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4390 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4395 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
4397 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
4398 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
4399 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4400 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4405 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
4406 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
4407 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4408 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4409 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4414 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
4418 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
4424 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
4425 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
4426 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4432 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
4433 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4436 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims, counterparty_node_id) = {
4437 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4438 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4439 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4440 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4441 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4443 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4447 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4448 let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
4449 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() {
4450 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
4451 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
4452 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
4453 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
4455 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()) {
4456 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4457 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4462 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(&mut channel_state.pending_msg_events, channel.get_mut(), updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready, updates.announcement_sigs);
4463 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4464 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4467 (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs, counterparty_node_id)
4469 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
4470 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
4472 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
4473 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4474 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id: funding_txo.to_channel_id() };
4475 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2, receiver);
4479 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4481 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4482 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4485 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4486 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4487 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4489 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4490 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4491 /// used to accept such channels.
4493 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4494 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4495 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4496 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4499 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4500 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4502 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4503 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4504 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4506 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4507 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4509 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4510 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4512 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4513 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4515 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4516 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4517 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4518 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4521 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4522 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4524 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4525 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4526 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4527 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4528 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4529 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4531 if *counterparty_node_id != channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id() {
4532 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
4535 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4536 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4537 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4538 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4539 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4540 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4543 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4544 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4545 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4548 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4549 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4550 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4553 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4554 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist".to_owned() });
4560 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4561 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4562 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4565 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4566 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4569 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
4570 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
4571 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
4573 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4574 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager,
4575 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &their_features, msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration,
4576 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4579 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4580 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4584 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4585 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4586 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4587 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4588 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4589 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4591 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4592 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4593 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4594 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4596 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4597 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4598 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4601 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4602 pending_events.push(
4603 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4604 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4605 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4606 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4607 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4608 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4613 entry.insert(channel);
4619 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4620 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4621 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4622 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4623 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4624 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4625 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4626 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4628 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &their_features), chan);
4629 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4631 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4634 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4635 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4636 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4637 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4638 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4640 user_channel_id: user_id,
4645 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4646 let ((funding_msg, monitor, mut channel_ready), mut chan) = {
4647 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4648 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4649 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4650 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4651 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4652 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4653 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4655 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
4657 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4660 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
4661 // lock before watch_channel
4662 match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
4663 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4664 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
4665 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4666 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4667 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4668 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4669 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
4670 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
4671 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4672 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(false);
4673 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4674 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
4676 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
4677 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4678 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4679 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4680 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4681 chan.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, channel_ready.is_some(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4682 channel_ready = None; // Don't send the channel_ready now
4685 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4686 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4687 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4688 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4689 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4691 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4692 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4693 match id_to_peer.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
4694 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4695 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4696 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
4697 funding_msg.channel_id))
4699 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
4700 i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
4703 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4704 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4707 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4708 send_channel_ready!(self, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
4716 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4718 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4719 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4720 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4721 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4722 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4723 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4724 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4726 let (monitor, funding_tx, channel_ready) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
4727 Ok(update) => update,
4728 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan),
4730 match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
4731 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4733 let mut res = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, channel_ready.is_some(), OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED);
4734 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4735 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4736 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4737 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4738 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4739 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4745 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4746 send_channel_ready!(self, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get(), msg);
4750 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4753 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
4754 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
4758 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4759 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4760 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4761 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4762 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4763 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4764 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4766 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, self.get_our_node_id(),
4767 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
4768 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4769 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4770 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4771 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4772 msg: announcement_sigs,
4774 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4775 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4776 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4777 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4778 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4779 // announcement_signatures.
4780 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4781 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4782 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4783 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4789 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, chan.get_mut());
4793 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4797 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4798 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4799 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4800 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4801 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4803 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4804 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4805 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4806 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4809 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4810 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4811 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4812 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4815 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), chan_entry);
4816 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4818 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4819 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
4820 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
4821 let (result, is_permanent) =
4822 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
4824 remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
4829 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4830 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4831 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4838 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4841 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4842 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
4843 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
4846 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
4850 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4851 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4852 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4853 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4854 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4855 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4856 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4857 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4859 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
4860 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4861 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4862 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4867 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4868 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4869 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4870 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4871 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4872 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
4873 } else { (tx, None) }
4875 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4878 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4879 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4880 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4882 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4883 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4884 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4885 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4889 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4894 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4895 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4896 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4897 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4899 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4900 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4901 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4902 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4904 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4905 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4906 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4908 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4909 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4910 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4911 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4914 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4915 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4916 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4917 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4918 match pending_forward_info {
4919 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4920 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4921 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
4922 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, real_code, &error_data)
4924 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[])
4926 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4927 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4928 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4931 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4933 _ => pending_forward_info
4936 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
4938 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4943 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4944 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4945 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4946 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4947 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4948 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4949 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4950 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4952 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
4954 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4957 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
4961 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4962 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4963 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4964 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4965 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4966 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4967 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4969 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), chan);
4971 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4976 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4977 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4978 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4979 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4980 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4981 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4982 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4984 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4985 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4986 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
4988 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), chan);
4991 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4995 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4996 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4997 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4998 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4999 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5000 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5001 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5003 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
5004 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
5005 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan),
5006 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
5007 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
5008 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
5009 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan);
5014 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
5015 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some()) {
5019 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5020 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5021 msg: revoke_and_ack,
5023 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
5024 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5025 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5026 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
5027 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5028 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5029 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5030 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5032 commitment_signed: msg,
5038 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5043 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
5044 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
5045 let mut forward_event = None;
5046 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5047 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5048 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
5049 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
5051 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5052 match forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
5053 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
5054 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
5055 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
5057 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5058 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5059 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
5061 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5062 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5063 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, forward_info })));
5068 match forward_event {
5070 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5071 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5072 time_forwardable: time
5080 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5081 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
5083 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5084 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5085 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5086 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5087 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5088 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5090 let was_paused_for_mon_update = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
5091 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
5092 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5093 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
5094 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update);
5095 if was_paused_for_mon_update {
5096 assert!(update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
5097 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
5098 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
5099 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
5100 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
5101 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Existing pending monitor update prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
5103 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5104 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan,
5105 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
5106 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(), false,
5107 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
5108 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
5110 } else { unreachable!(); }
5112 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
5113 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5114 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5118 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
5119 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
5120 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
5121 .unwrap_or(chan.get().outbound_scid_alias()),
5122 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
5124 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5127 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5129 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
5130 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) =>
5132 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
5133 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: channel_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5134 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2, receiver);
5136 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
5137 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
5144 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5145 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5146 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5147 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5148 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5149 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5150 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5152 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
5154 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5159 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5160 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5161 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5163 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5164 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5165 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5166 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5168 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
5169 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
5172 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5173 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5174 self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), msg), chan),
5175 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5176 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5177 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
5180 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5185 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5186 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5187 let chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5188 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
5190 // It's not a local channel
5191 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5194 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5195 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5196 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5197 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5198 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5199 if chan.get().should_announce() {
5200 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5201 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5202 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5203 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5205 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5207 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5208 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5209 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5210 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5212 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5213 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
5216 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5218 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5221 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5223 let need_lnd_workaround = {
5224 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5225 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5227 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5228 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5229 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5230 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5232 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5233 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5234 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5235 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5236 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5237 msg, &self.logger, self.our_network_pubkey.clone(), self.genesis_hash,
5238 &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
5239 let mut channel_update = None;
5240 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5241 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5242 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5245 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5246 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5247 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5248 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5249 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5250 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5251 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5256 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5257 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
5258 &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5259 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5260 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5261 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5265 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5269 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
5270 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
5273 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5274 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5279 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
5280 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5281 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5282 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5283 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5284 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5285 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5286 match monitor_event {
5287 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5288 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5289 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5290 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5292 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5293 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5294 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
5297 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5298 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5299 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5300 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5301 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5302 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5303 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5304 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5305 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5306 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5307 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5311 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5312 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5314 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5316 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5317 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5318 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5319 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5320 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5325 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5326 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
5332 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5333 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5336 has_pending_monitor_events
5339 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5340 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5341 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5343 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5344 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
5347 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5348 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5349 /// update was applied.
5351 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
5352 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
5353 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
5354 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
5355 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5356 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5357 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5358 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5360 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5361 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5362 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5363 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5365 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5366 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
5367 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
5368 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5370 holding_cell_failed_htlcs,
5372 chan.get_counterparty_node_id()
5375 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
5376 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
5377 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
5378 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5379 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5380 updates: commitment_update,
5384 has_monitor_update = true;
5385 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, channel_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
5386 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
5387 if close_channel { return false; }
5394 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5395 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5396 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
5403 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5404 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5405 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5408 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5409 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5415 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5416 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5417 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5418 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5419 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5420 let mut has_update = false;
5422 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5423 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5424 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5425 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5427 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5428 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5429 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5430 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5432 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5433 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5436 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5437 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5438 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5439 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5440 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5445 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5447 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5448 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5449 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
5455 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5456 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5463 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5464 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5470 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5471 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5473 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5474 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5475 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5476 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5477 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5478 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5479 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5480 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5481 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5482 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5483 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5484 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5485 assert!(should_broadcast);
5486 } else { unreachable!(); }
5487 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5489 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5493 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5494 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5496 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5497 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5500 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5502 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5503 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5504 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5505 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5506 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5507 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5508 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5509 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5510 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5511 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5512 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5513 // never fail a payment too early.
5514 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5516 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5519 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5524 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5527 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5528 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5530 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
5531 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5532 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5534 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5536 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5537 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5541 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5542 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5544 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5546 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5547 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5548 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
5549 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5550 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5551 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, &self.keys_manager, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5554 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5555 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5557 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5560 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5562 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5564 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5565 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5566 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5567 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5568 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5571 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5572 /// stored external to LDK.
5574 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5575 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5576 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5578 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5579 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5582 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5583 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5584 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5585 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5587 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5588 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5589 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5590 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5591 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5593 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5594 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5595 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
5596 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5597 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
5599 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
5600 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
5602 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5603 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5607 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5608 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5610 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5612 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5613 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5614 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5615 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5618 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5619 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5621 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5624 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5626 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5628 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5629 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5632 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5633 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5635 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5636 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5637 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5640 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5641 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5643 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5644 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5645 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5646 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5648 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
5649 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5650 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
5651 Some(_) => continue,
5652 None => return scid_candidate
5657 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5659 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5660 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5662 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5663 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5664 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5668 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
5669 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
5670 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
5671 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
5673 for chan in self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.values() {
5674 for htlc_source in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
5675 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
5676 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
5684 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5685 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5686 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5687 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
5688 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5693 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5694 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().is_empty()
5698 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5699 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().clear()
5702 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
5703 /// using the given event handler.
5705 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
5706 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
5709 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock until the returned future completes so that
5710 // we can be sure no other persists happen while processing events.
5711 let _read_guard = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
5713 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5715 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5716 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5717 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5718 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5721 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5722 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5723 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5726 for event in pending_events {
5727 handler(event).await;
5730 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
5731 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
5736 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
5737 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
5738 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5739 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5740 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5743 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5744 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5745 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5746 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5748 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5749 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5750 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5751 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5754 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5755 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5757 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5758 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5761 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5762 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5763 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
5765 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5766 events.replace(pending_events);
5775 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
5777 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
5778 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5779 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5780 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5783 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5785 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5786 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5787 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5788 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5789 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5791 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5792 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5793 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5794 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5797 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5798 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5799 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5802 for event in pending_events {
5803 handler.handle_event(event);
5811 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
5813 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
5814 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5815 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5816 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5819 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5821 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5822 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
5823 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5824 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5825 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5828 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
5829 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
5832 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5833 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5834 let new_height = height - 1;
5836 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5837 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5838 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5839 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5840 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5841 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5844 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5848 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
5850 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
5851 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5852 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5853 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5856 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5857 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5858 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5859 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5861 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5862 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5864 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5865 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger)
5866 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5868 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5869 if height < last_best_block_height {
5870 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5871 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5875 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5876 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5877 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5878 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5880 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5881 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5883 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5885 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5887 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5889 macro_rules! max_time {
5890 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5892 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5893 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5894 // having an explicit local time source.
5895 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5896 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5897 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5898 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5899 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5905 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5906 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5907 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5908 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5912 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
5913 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5914 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
5915 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
5916 if let (Some(funding_txo), block_hash) = (chan.get_funding_txo(), chan.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
5917 res.push((funding_txo.txid, block_hash));
5923 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5924 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5925 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5926 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5927 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
5928 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
5929 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5930 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5935 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
5937 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
5938 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5939 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5940 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5943 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
5944 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
5946 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
5947 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
5948 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5949 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5950 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5952 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5953 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5955 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5956 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5957 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5958 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
5959 let res = f(channel);
5960 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
5961 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
5962 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
5963 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5965 }, HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
5967 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
5968 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
5969 if channel.is_usable() {
5970 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5971 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
5972 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5973 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5978 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5982 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
5984 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
5985 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5986 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5987 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5988 msg: announcement_sigs,
5990 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5991 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, height) {
5992 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5994 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5995 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5996 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap(),
6001 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
6002 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6003 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
6004 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
6005 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
6006 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
6007 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
6008 // is always consistent.
6009 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
6010 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
6011 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
6012 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
6013 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
6016 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
6017 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel);
6018 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
6019 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
6020 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
6021 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
6022 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6026 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
6027 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
6028 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6029 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6030 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
6031 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6032 data: reason_message,
6041 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6042 self.claimable_htlcs.lock().unwrap().retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
6043 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
6044 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
6045 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
6046 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
6047 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
6048 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6049 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
6050 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
6052 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
6053 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
6054 data: htlc_msat_height_data
6055 }, HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
6059 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
6063 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
6065 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
6066 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(source, &payment_hash, reason, destination);
6070 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
6071 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
6072 /// [`await_persistable_update`], [`await_persistable_update_timeout`], or a future returned by
6073 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
6075 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
6077 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
6078 /// [`await_persistable_update_timeout`]: Self::await_persistable_update_timeout
6079 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
6080 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
6081 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
6082 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
6085 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
6086 /// [`await_persistable_update`], `await_persistable_update_timeout`, or a future returned by
6087 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
6089 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
6090 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
6091 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
6092 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
6095 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when a persistable update is available. Note that
6096 /// callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this [`ChannelManager`] and
6097 /// should instead register actions to be taken later.
6098 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
6099 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
6102 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6103 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
6104 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
6107 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
6108 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
6109 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
6110 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
6114 impl<M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
6115 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
6116 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
6117 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6118 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6119 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6122 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
6123 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6124 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6127 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
6128 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6129 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6132 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6133 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6134 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6137 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6138 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6139 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6142 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6143 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6144 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6147 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6148 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6149 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6152 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6153 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6154 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6157 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6158 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6159 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6162 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6163 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6164 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6167 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6168 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6169 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6172 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6173 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6174 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6177 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6178 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6179 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6182 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6183 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6184 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6187 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6188 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6189 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6192 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6193 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6194 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6197 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6198 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6199 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6202 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6207 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6208 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6209 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6212 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
6213 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6214 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6215 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
6217 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6218 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
6219 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
6220 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates. We believe we {} make future connections to this peer.",
6221 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id), if no_connection_possible { "cannot" } else { "can" });
6222 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6223 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6224 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6225 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6226 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
6227 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6230 no_channels_remain = false;
6235 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6237 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6238 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6239 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6240 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6241 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6242 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6243 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6244 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6245 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6246 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6247 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6248 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6249 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6250 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6251 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6252 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6253 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6254 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6255 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6256 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6260 if no_channels_remain {
6261 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
6264 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6265 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6269 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) -> Result<(), ()> {
6270 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
6271 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting with no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6275 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6277 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6280 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6281 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6282 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6283 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6284 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6287 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6288 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6293 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6294 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
6295 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
6296 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6297 let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6298 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6299 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6300 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6301 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6305 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6306 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6307 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6312 if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6313 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()) {
6314 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
6315 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
6316 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6324 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6328 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6329 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6331 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6332 for chan in self.list_channels() {
6333 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
6334 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6335 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6340 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6341 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6342 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6343 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6346 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6347 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6348 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6356 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6357 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6361 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6362 provided_node_features()
6365 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
6366 provided_init_features()
6370 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6371 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6372 pub fn provided_node_features() -> NodeFeatures {
6373 provided_init_features().to_context()
6376 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6377 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6379 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6380 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6381 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6382 pub fn provided_invoice_features() -> InvoiceFeatures {
6383 provided_init_features().to_context()
6386 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6387 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6388 pub fn provided_channel_features() -> ChannelFeatures {
6389 provided_init_features().to_context()
6392 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6393 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6394 pub fn provided_init_features() -> InitFeatures {
6395 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
6396 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the ChannelMessageHandler impl for
6397 // ErroringMessageHandler.
6398 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
6399 features.set_data_loss_protect_optional();
6400 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
6401 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
6402 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
6403 features.set_payment_secret_required();
6404 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
6405 features.set_wumbo_optional();
6406 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
6407 features.set_channel_type_optional();
6408 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
6409 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
6413 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6414 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6416 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6417 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6418 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6419 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6422 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6423 (2, node_id, required),
6424 (4, features, required),
6425 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6426 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6427 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6428 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6431 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
6432 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6433 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6434 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6435 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
6436 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
6437 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6438 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
6439 (2, self.channel_id, required),
6440 (3, self.channel_type, option),
6441 (4, self.counterparty, required),
6442 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
6443 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
6444 (7, self.config, option),
6445 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
6446 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
6447 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6448 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6449 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
6450 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6451 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6452 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6453 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6454 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6455 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
6456 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
6457 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
6458 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
6459 (30, self.is_usable, required),
6460 (32, self.is_public, required),
6461 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6462 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6463 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6469 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
6470 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6471 init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6472 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6473 (2, channel_id, required),
6474 (3, channel_type, option),
6475 (4, counterparty, required),
6476 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6477 (6, funding_txo, option),
6478 (7, config, option),
6479 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6480 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6481 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6482 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6483 (16, balance_msat, required),
6484 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6485 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6486 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6487 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6488 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6489 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6490 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6491 (26, is_outbound, required),
6492 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
6493 (30, is_usable, required),
6494 (32, is_public, required),
6495 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6496 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6497 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6500 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6501 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6502 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
6503 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
6504 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
6508 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
6510 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
6511 outbound_scid_alias,
6515 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
6516 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
6518 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
6519 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6520 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
6521 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6522 confirmations_required,
6523 force_close_spend_delay,
6524 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
6525 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
6526 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
6527 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
6528 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
6529 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
6534 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6535 (2, channels, vec_type),
6536 (4, phantom_scid, required),
6537 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6540 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6542 (0, onion_packet, required),
6543 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6546 (0, payment_data, required),
6547 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6548 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6550 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6551 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6552 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6556 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6557 (0, routing, required),
6558 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6559 (4, payment_hash, required),
6560 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
6561 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
6562 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
6566 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6567 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6569 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6571 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6572 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6573 reason.write(writer)?;
6575 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6576 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6579 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6580 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6581 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6582 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6589 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6590 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6591 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6594 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6595 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6596 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6597 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6601 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6602 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6603 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6604 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6605 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6608 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6609 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6610 // messages contained in the variants.
6611 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6612 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6613 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6615 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6616 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6617 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6618 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6619 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6622 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6623 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6624 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6625 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6626 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6628 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6633 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6638 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6639 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6640 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6641 (2, outpoint, required),
6642 (4, htlc_id, required),
6643 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6646 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6647 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6648 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
6649 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
6650 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
6652 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6653 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
6654 (1, self.total_msat, required),
6655 (2, self.value, required),
6656 (4, payment_data, option),
6657 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6658 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6664 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6665 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6666 let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6668 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6669 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6670 let mut total_msat = None;
6671 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6672 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6673 (0, prev_hop, required),
6674 (1, total_msat, option),
6675 (2, value, required),
6676 (4, payment_data, option),
6677 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6678 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6680 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6682 if payment_data.is_some() {
6683 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6685 if total_msat.is_none() {
6686 total_msat = Some(value);
6688 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6691 if total_msat.is_none() {
6692 if payment_data.is_none() {
6693 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6695 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
6697 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
6701 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6704 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
6711 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6712 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6713 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6716 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6717 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6718 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
6719 let mut payment_id = None;
6720 let mut payment_secret = None;
6721 let mut payment_params = None;
6722 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6723 (0, session_priv, required),
6724 (1, payment_id, option),
6725 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6726 (3, payment_secret, option),
6727 (4, path, vec_type),
6728 (5, payment_params, option),
6730 if payment_id.is_none() {
6731 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6733 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6735 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6736 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6737 first_hop_htlc_msat,
6738 path: path.unwrap(),
6739 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6744 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6745 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6750 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6751 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
6753 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payment_params } => {
6755 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6756 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6757 (0, session_priv, required),
6758 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6759 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6760 (3, payment_secret, option),
6761 (4, *path, vec_type),
6762 (5, payment_params, option),
6765 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6767 field.write(writer)?;
6774 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
6775 (0, LightningError) => {
6779 (0, failure_code, required),
6780 (2, data, vec_type),
6784 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
6785 (0, forward_info, required),
6786 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6787 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6788 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6791 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6793 (0, htlc_id, required),
6794 (2, err_packet, required),
6799 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6800 (0, payment_secret, required),
6801 (2, expiry_time, required),
6802 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6803 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6804 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6807 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(PendingOutboundPayment,
6809 (0, session_privs, required),
6812 (0, session_privs, required),
6813 (1, payment_hash, option),
6814 (3, timer_ticks_without_htlcs, (default_value, 0)),
6817 (0, session_privs, required),
6818 (1, pending_fee_msat, option),
6819 (2, payment_hash, required),
6820 (4, payment_secret, option),
6821 (6, total_msat, required),
6822 (8, pending_amt_msat, required),
6823 (10, starting_block_height, required),
6826 (0, session_privs, required),
6827 (2, payment_hash, required),
6831 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
6832 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
6833 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6834 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6835 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6838 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6839 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6841 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6843 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
6845 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6846 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
6847 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
6851 // Take `channel_state` lock temporarily to avoid creating a lock order that requires
6852 // that the `forward_htlcs` lock is taken after `channel_state`
6853 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6854 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
6855 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6856 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6857 unfunded_channels += 1;
6860 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
6861 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6862 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6863 channel.write(writer)?;
6869 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6870 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6871 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
6872 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6873 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6874 for forward in pending_forwards {
6875 forward.write(writer)?;
6880 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6881 let claimable_htlcs = self.claimable_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6882 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6884 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
6885 (claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6886 for (payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops)) in claimable_htlcs.iter() {
6887 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6888 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6889 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
6890 htlc.write(writer)?;
6892 htlc_purposes.push(purpose);
6895 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6896 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6897 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6898 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
6899 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6900 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
6903 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6904 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6905 for event in events.iter() {
6906 event.write(writer)?;
6909 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
6910 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6911 for event in background_events.iter() {
6913 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
6915 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
6916 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
6921 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
6922 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
6923 // likely to be identical.
6924 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6925 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6927 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6928 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
6929 hash.write(writer)?;
6930 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
6933 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
6934 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
6935 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6936 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
6937 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
6940 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
6941 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6943 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6944 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6945 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
6946 session_priv.write(writer)?;
6949 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
6950 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
6954 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
6955 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
6956 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6958 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6959 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6960 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
6965 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6966 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
6967 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
6968 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
6969 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
6970 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
6971 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
6978 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
6980 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
6982 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6983 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
6984 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
6985 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
6986 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
6987 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
6988 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
6989 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
6990 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6991 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
6992 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
6993 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
6994 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
6996 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
6997 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
6999 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
7000 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
7002 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
7003 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
7004 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
7005 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
7006 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
7007 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
7009 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
7010 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
7011 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
7012 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7013 K::Target: KeysInterface,
7014 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7017 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
7018 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
7020 pub keys_manager: K,
7022 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7024 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
7025 pub fee_estimator: F,
7026 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7028 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
7029 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
7030 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
7031 pub chain_monitor: M,
7033 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
7034 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
7035 /// force-closed during deserialization.
7036 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
7037 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
7038 /// deserialization.
7040 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
7041 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
7042 pub default_config: UserConfig,
7044 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
7045 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
7047 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
7048 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
7049 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
7050 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
7052 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
7055 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
7056 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>,
7059 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
7060 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>
7061 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
7062 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7063 K::Target: KeysInterface,
7064 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7067 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
7068 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
7069 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
7070 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
7071 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>) -> Self {
7073 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
7074 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
7079 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
7080 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
7081 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
7082 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>>)
7083 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
7084 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7085 K::Target: KeysInterface,
7086 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7089 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7090 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
7091 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
7095 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
7096 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>)
7097 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
7098 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7099 K::Target: KeysInterface,
7100 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7103 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7104 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7106 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7107 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7108 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7110 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7112 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7113 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7114 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7115 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7116 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7117 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
7118 for _ in 0..channel_count {
7119 let mut channel: Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (&args.keys_manager, best_block_height))?;
7120 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7121 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
7122 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
7123 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7124 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7125 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7126 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7127 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
7128 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
7129 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7130 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7131 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7132 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7133 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7134 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7135 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7136 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7137 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7138 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7139 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7140 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
7141 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
7142 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
7143 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7144 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7145 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
7146 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
7147 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7148 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7149 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7150 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7151 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
7154 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7155 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
7156 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7158 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7159 id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
7161 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7163 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
7164 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
7165 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
7166 // safely discard the channel.
7167 let _ = channel.force_shutdown(false);
7168 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7169 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7170 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7171 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
7174 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7175 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7176 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7177 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7178 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7179 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7183 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
7184 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
7185 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
7186 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7190 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
7191 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7192 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7193 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
7194 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7195 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7196 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
7197 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
7198 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
7200 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
7203 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7204 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7205 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
7206 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7207 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7208 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
7209 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
7210 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
7212 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
7215 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7216 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
7217 for _ in 0..peer_count {
7218 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7219 let peer_state = PeerState {
7220 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
7222 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
7225 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7226 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
7227 for _ in 0..event_count {
7228 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
7229 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
7233 if forward_htlcs_count > 0 {
7234 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
7235 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
7236 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
7237 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
7238 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
7239 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7240 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
7244 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7245 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
7246 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
7247 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7248 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
7249 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7253 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
7254 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7256 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7257 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
7258 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
7259 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
7260 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7264 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7265 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
7266 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
7267 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
7268 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
7269 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
7270 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
7272 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
7273 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7277 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
7278 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
7279 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
7280 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
7281 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7282 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7283 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
7284 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7285 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
7286 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
7287 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
7288 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
7289 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7290 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
7292 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
7293 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7296 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
7297 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7300 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
7301 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
7302 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
7303 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
7304 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
7305 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
7307 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
7309 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
7310 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
7311 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
7312 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
7313 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
7314 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
7315 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
7317 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7318 if by_id.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
7319 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
7320 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
7321 if path.is_empty() {
7322 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
7323 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7325 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
7326 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
7327 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
7328 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
7329 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7330 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
7331 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
7332 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
7334 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7335 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
7336 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
7337 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
7338 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
7340 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
7341 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
7342 total_msat: path_amt,
7343 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
7345 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
7346 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
7355 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
7356 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
7358 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
7359 if let Some(mut purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
7360 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
7361 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7363 for (purpose, (payment_hash, previous_hops)) in purposes.drain(..).zip(claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..)) {
7364 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7367 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
7368 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
7369 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
7370 if previous_hops.is_empty() {
7371 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7373 let purpose = match &previous_hops[0].onion_payload {
7374 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
7375 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
7376 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
7377 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
7378 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
7379 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
7380 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
7382 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7383 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7387 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
7389 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7391 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
7392 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
7394 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7398 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7399 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7401 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
7402 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
7405 let our_network_key = match args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node) {
7407 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7409 let our_network_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &our_network_key);
7410 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
7411 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
7412 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
7413 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7417 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
7418 for (chan_id, chan) in by_id.iter_mut() {
7419 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
7420 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
7422 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
7423 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.keys_manager);
7424 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
7426 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7427 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
7428 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7429 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7430 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7431 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7433 if chan.is_usable() {
7434 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
7435 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7436 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7437 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7438 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7443 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
7445 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7446 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
7447 if let Some((payment_purpose, claimable_htlcs)) = claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
7448 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7449 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
7450 for claimable_htlc in claimable_htlcs {
7451 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
7453 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
7454 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
7455 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
7456 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
7458 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
7459 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
7460 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
7461 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
7463 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
7464 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
7465 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
7466 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
7468 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
7469 if let Some(channel) = by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
7470 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
7472 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
7473 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
7476 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
7478 purpose: payment_purpose,
7479 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
7485 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
7487 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
7488 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
7489 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
7491 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
7493 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
7495 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7497 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
7498 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
7499 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
7501 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
7502 claimable_htlcs: Mutex::new(claimable_htlcs),
7503 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
7504 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
7505 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
7506 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
7508 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
7514 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
7516 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
7518 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
7519 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
7520 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
7521 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
7523 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
7524 logger: args.logger,
7525 default_configuration: args.default_config,
7528 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7529 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
7530 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
7531 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
7534 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
7535 //connection or two.
7537 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
7543 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7544 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7545 use core::time::Duration;
7546 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
7547 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
7548 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
7549 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7550 use crate::ln::msgs;
7551 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
7552 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
7553 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7554 use crate::util::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
7555 use crate::util::test_utils;
7556 use crate::chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
7559 fn test_notify_limits() {
7560 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
7561 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
7562 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7563 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7564 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7565 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7567 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
7568 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
7569 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7570 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7571 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7573 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7575 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
7576 // to connect messages with new values
7577 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7578 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7579 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7580 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7582 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
7583 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7584 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7585 // ... but the last node should not.
7586 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7587 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
7588 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7589 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7591 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
7592 // about the channel.
7593 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7594 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7595 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7597 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
7599 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7600 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7601 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7602 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7603 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7604 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7606 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
7607 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7608 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7610 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
7611 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
7612 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
7613 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
7614 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
7615 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
7617 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
7618 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
7619 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7620 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7621 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7622 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7623 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7624 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7626 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
7627 // the channel info has updated.
7628 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7629 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7630 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7631 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7632 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7633 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7637 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
7638 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
7640 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7641 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7642 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7643 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7644 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7646 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
7647 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7648 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
7649 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
7651 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
7652 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
7653 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
7654 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
7655 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
7656 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
7657 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7658 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7659 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7660 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
7662 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
7663 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7664 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7665 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7666 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7667 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7668 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7669 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7670 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7671 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7672 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7673 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
7674 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7675 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7676 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7677 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7678 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7679 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7680 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7681 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7682 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7683 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
7685 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
7686 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
7687 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7688 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7689 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7690 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
7692 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
7693 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
7694 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
7695 // lightning messages manually.
7696 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7697 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
7698 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7700 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7701 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7702 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
7703 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7704 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7705 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
7706 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7707 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7708 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
7709 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7710 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7711 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7712 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7713 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7714 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7715 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
7716 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7717 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7718 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
7719 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7720 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7721 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7722 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7723 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
7724 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7726 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
7727 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
7728 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7729 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
7731 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
7732 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
7733 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
7734 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
7736 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7739 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7740 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7741 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7742 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7744 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7747 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7748 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7749 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7750 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7752 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7757 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
7758 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
7759 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
7760 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
7761 // fails as expected.
7762 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7763 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7764 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7765 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7766 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7767 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7768 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7770 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
7771 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
7772 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
7774 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
7775 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7776 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id()),
7777 final_value_msat: 100_000,
7778 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
7780 let route = find_route(
7781 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
7782 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7784 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7785 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7786 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7787 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7788 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7789 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7790 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7791 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7792 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7793 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
7794 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
7795 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7796 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
7797 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7798 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7799 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7800 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7801 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7802 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7803 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7804 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7805 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7806 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7808 // Finally, claim the original payment.
7809 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7811 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
7812 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7813 let route = find_route(
7814 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
7815 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7817 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7818 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7819 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7820 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7821 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
7822 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
7823 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
7825 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
7826 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7827 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
7828 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7829 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7830 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7831 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7832 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7833 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7834 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7835 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7836 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7837 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
7838 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7839 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7840 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7841 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7842 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7843 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7844 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7845 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7846 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7847 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7849 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
7850 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7854 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
7855 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
7856 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
7857 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7858 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7859 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7860 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7862 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7863 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7864 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7865 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7867 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7868 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7869 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7870 final_value_msat: 10_000,
7871 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7873 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7874 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7875 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7876 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7877 let route = find_route(
7878 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7879 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7882 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7883 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
7884 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash, None, PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
7885 nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
7886 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7888 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7889 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7890 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7891 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7892 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7893 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7894 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7896 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
7900 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
7901 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
7902 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7903 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7904 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7905 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7907 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7908 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7909 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7910 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7912 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7913 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7914 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7915 final_value_msat: 10_000,
7916 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7918 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7919 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7920 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7921 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7922 let route = find_route(
7923 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7924 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7927 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7928 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7929 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
7930 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, Some(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
7931 nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
7932 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7934 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7935 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7936 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7937 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7938 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7939 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7940 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7942 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
7946 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
7947 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7948 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7949 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
7950 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7952 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7953 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7954 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7955 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7957 // Marshall an MPP route.
7958 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
7959 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
7960 route.paths.push(path);
7961 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7962 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
7963 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
7964 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
7965 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
7966 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
7968 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None, PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap_err() {
7969 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
7970 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
7971 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
7976 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
7977 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
7978 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7979 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7980 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7981 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7983 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
7984 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
7986 total_msat: 100_000,
7989 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
7990 // payment verification fails as expected.
7991 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
7992 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
7993 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
7994 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
7996 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
8000 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
8001 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
8005 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
8006 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
8007 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
8008 // the channel is successfully closed.
8009 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8010 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8011 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8012 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8014 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8015 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8016 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel);
8017 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8018 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
8020 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
8021 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
8023 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
8024 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
8025 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8026 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8029 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8031 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8032 // as it has the funding transaction.
8033 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8034 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8035 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8037 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8040 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8042 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8044 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8045 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8046 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8048 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8049 // as it has the funding transaction.
8050 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8051 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8052 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8054 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8055 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8056 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8057 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8058 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8059 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8060 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
8062 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8063 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8064 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8065 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
8067 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8068 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
8070 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
8071 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
8072 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
8073 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
8074 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8075 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8076 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8078 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
8079 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
8080 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
8081 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
8082 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8083 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8084 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8087 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8089 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
8090 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
8091 // closing transaction).
8092 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
8093 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
8094 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8096 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
8097 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
8098 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8099 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8100 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8103 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8105 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
8107 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
8108 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
8109 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8111 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8113 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8114 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8118 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
8120 use crate::chain::Listen;
8121 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
8122 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, KeysInterface, InMemorySigner};
8123 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId};
8124 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
8125 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
8126 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
8127 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
8128 use crate::util::test_utils;
8129 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
8130 use crate::util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
8132 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8133 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8134 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
8136 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
8140 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
8141 node: &'a ChannelManager<
8142 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
8143 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
8144 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
8145 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
8146 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>,
8151 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
8152 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
8155 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
8156 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
8157 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
8159 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
8160 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
8162 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
8163 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
8165 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
8166 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
8168 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8169 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
8170 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
8171 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
8172 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8174 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
8176 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
8178 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8179 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
8180 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
8181 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
8182 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8184 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
8186 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
8188 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8189 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8190 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8191 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8192 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8195 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
8196 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8197 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
8199 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8200 } else { panic!(); }
8202 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8203 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8205 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
8208 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8211 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
8212 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
8214 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8215 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8216 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
8217 match msg_events[0] {
8218 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
8219 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
8220 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8224 match msg_events[1] {
8225 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8229 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8230 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
8232 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8233 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
8235 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8238 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8239 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
8241 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8242 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8244 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8247 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger_a);
8249 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
8250 macro_rules! send_payment {
8251 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
8252 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
8253 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id())
8254 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
8255 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
8256 let seed = [3u8; 32];
8257 let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42);
8258 let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8259 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph.read_only(),
8260 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
8262 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
8263 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
8265 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
8266 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
8268 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8269 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
8270 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8271 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
8272 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8273 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8274 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8275 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8277 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
8278 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
8279 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8280 expect_payment_claimed!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
8282 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
8283 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
8284 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8285 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8286 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
8288 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
8291 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
8292 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8293 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8294 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8296 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
8301 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
8302 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);