1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::{genesis_block, ChainHash};
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
39 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
40 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
41 // construct one themselves.
42 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
43 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel};
44 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
45 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
46 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
47 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
48 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, Router};
49 use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters};
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
55 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment};
57 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
58 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, ChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
59 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
60 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
61 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
62 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
63 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
64 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
65 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
67 use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
70 use crate::prelude::*;
72 use core::cell::RefCell;
74 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
75 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
76 use core::time::Duration;
79 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
80 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
81 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
83 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
85 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
86 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
87 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
89 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
90 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
91 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
92 // before we forward it.
94 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
95 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
96 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
97 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
98 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
100 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
101 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
103 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
104 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
105 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
106 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
109 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
110 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
111 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
112 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
115 /// This was added in 0.0.116 and will break deserialization on downgrades.
116 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
117 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
118 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
119 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
123 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
124 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
125 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
126 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
127 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
129 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
130 /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
131 /// may overshoot this in either case)
132 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
133 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
134 /// The fee being skimmed off the top of this HTLC. If this is a forward, it'll be the fee we are
135 /// skimming. If we're receiving this HTLC, it's the fee that our counterparty skimmed.
136 pub(super) skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
139 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
140 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
141 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
142 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
145 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
146 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
147 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
148 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
149 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
152 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
153 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
155 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
156 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
157 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
160 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
161 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
163 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
164 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
167 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
168 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
171 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
175 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
176 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
177 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
178 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
179 short_channel_id: u64,
181 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
182 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
184 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
185 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
190 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
192 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
193 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
194 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
196 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
197 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
200 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
201 struct ClaimableHTLC {
202 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
204 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
206 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
207 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
208 sender_intended_value: u64,
209 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
211 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
212 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
213 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
214 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
216 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
217 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
220 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
222 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
223 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
224 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
226 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
227 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
232 impl Readable for PaymentId {
233 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
234 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
239 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
241 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
242 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
243 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
245 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
246 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
251 impl Readable for InterceptId {
252 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
253 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
258 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
259 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
260 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
261 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
262 OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
265 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
267 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
268 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
269 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
271 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
272 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
276 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
277 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
278 (0, short_channel_id, required),
279 (2, htlc_id, required),
281 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
282 (0, session_priv, required),
287 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
288 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
289 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
290 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
291 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
294 session_priv: SecretKey,
295 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
296 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
297 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
298 payment_id: PaymentId,
301 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
302 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
303 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
305 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
307 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
309 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
312 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
313 payment_id.hash(hasher);
314 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
320 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
322 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
323 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
324 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
325 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
326 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
327 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
331 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
332 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
333 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
334 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
335 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
336 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
338 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
344 struct ReceiveError {
350 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
351 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
353 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
354 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
355 pub enum FailureCode {
356 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
357 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
358 TemporaryNodeFailure = 0x2000 | 2,
359 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
360 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
361 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing = 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
362 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
363 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
364 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
365 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
366 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails = 0x4000 | 15,
369 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
370 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
371 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
372 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
373 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
375 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
376 err: msgs::LightningError,
377 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
378 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
380 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
382 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
384 err: LightningError {
386 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
387 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
394 shutdown_finish: None,
398 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
399 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
402 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
404 err: LightningError {
406 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
407 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
413 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
414 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
418 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
421 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
423 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
424 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
428 log_level: Level::Warn,
431 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
433 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
435 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
437 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
438 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
446 shutdown_finish: None,
451 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
452 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
453 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
454 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
455 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
457 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
458 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
459 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
460 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
461 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
462 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
463 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
465 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
469 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
470 struct ClaimingPayment {
472 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
473 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
475 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
476 (0, amount_msat, required),
477 (2, payment_purpose, required),
478 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
481 struct ClaimablePayment {
482 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
483 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
484 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
487 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
488 struct ClaimablePayments {
489 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
490 /// failed/claimed by the user.
492 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
493 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
495 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
496 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
497 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
499 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
500 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
501 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
502 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
505 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
506 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
507 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
508 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
509 enum BackgroundEvent {
510 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
511 /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
512 /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
513 /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
515 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
516 /// are regenerated on startup.
517 ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
518 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
519 /// channel to continue normal operation.
521 /// In general this should be used rather than
522 /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
523 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
524 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
526 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
527 /// are regenerated on startup.
528 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
529 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
530 funding_txo: OutPoint,
531 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
533 /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
534 /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
536 MonitorUpdatesComplete {
537 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
538 channel_id: [u8; 32],
543 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
544 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
545 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
546 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
547 /// event can be generated.
548 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
549 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
550 /// operation of another channel.
552 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
553 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
554 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
555 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
557 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
558 event: events::Event,
559 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
563 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
564 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
565 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
566 (0, event, upgradable_required),
567 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
568 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
569 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
570 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
571 // downgrades to prior versions.
572 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
576 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
577 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
578 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
579 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
580 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
583 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
584 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
585 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
586 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
590 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
591 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
592 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
593 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
594 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
595 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
597 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
598 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
599 channel_id: [u8; 32],
600 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
605 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
607 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
608 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
609 channel_id: prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
610 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
615 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
616 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
620 /// State we hold per-peer.
621 pub(super) struct PeerState<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
622 /// `channel_id` -> `Channel`.
624 /// Holds all funded channels where the peer is the counterparty.
625 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
626 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `OutboundV1Channel`.
628 /// Holds all outbound V1 channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once an outbound channel has
629 /// been assigned a `channel_id`, the entry in this map is removed and one is created in
631 pub(super) outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], OutboundV1Channel<Signer>>,
632 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundV1Channel`.
634 /// Holds all inbound V1 channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once an inbound channel has
635 /// been assigned a `channel_id`, the entry in this map is removed and one is created in
637 pub(super) inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], InboundV1Channel<Signer>>,
638 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
639 latest_features: InitFeatures,
640 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
641 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
642 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
643 /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
644 /// user but which have not yet completed.
646 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
647 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
648 /// for a missing channel.
649 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
650 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
651 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
653 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
654 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
655 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
656 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
658 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
659 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
660 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
661 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
662 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
663 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
664 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
665 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
666 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
667 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
668 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
669 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
670 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
671 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
672 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
676 impl <Signer: ChannelSigner> PeerState<Signer> {
677 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
678 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
679 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
680 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
681 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
684 self.channel_by_id.is_empty() && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
685 && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
688 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including pending channels.
689 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
690 self.channel_by_id.len() +
691 self.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.len() +
692 self.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.len()
695 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
696 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> bool {
697 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
698 self.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
699 self.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
703 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
704 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
706 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
709 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
710 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
711 struct PendingInboundPayment {
712 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
713 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
714 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
715 /// this payment being removed.
717 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
718 user_payment_id: u64,
719 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
720 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
721 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
724 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
725 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
726 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
727 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
728 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
729 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
730 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
731 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
733 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
734 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
742 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
744 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
745 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
746 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
751 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
752 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
753 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
754 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
755 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
756 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
757 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
758 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
759 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
761 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
762 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
771 &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
773 &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
774 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
775 ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
780 macro_rules! define_test_pub_trait { ($vis: vis) => {
781 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`] used in testing.
782 $vis trait AChannelManager {
783 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
784 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
785 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
786 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
787 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
788 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
789 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
790 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
791 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
792 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<Signer = Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
793 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
794 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
795 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
796 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
797 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
798 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
799 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
800 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
803 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
804 define_test_pub_trait!(pub);
805 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
806 define_test_pub_trait!(pub(crate));
807 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
808 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
810 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
811 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
812 ES::Target: EntropySource,
813 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
814 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
815 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
819 type Watch = M::Target;
821 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
823 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
825 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
827 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer;
828 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
830 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
832 type Router = R::Target;
834 type Logger = L::Target;
836 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
839 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
840 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
842 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
843 /// to individual Channels.
845 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
846 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
847 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
848 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
850 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
851 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
852 /// returning from [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`], with ChannelManagers, writing updates
853 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during
854 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
855 /// [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the
856 /// `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
858 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
859 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
860 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
862 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
863 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
864 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
865 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
866 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
868 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
869 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
870 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
871 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
873 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
874 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
875 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
877 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
878 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
879 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
880 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
881 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
883 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
884 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
885 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
886 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
887 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
888 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
889 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
890 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
893 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
894 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
895 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
896 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
897 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
901 // `total_consistency_lock`
903 // |__`forward_htlcs`
905 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
907 // |__`per_peer_state`
909 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
911 // | |__`claimable_payments`
913 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
919 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
921 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
925 // | |__`pending_events`
927 // | |__`pending_background_events`
929 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
931 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
932 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
933 ES::Target: EntropySource,
934 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
935 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
936 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
940 default_configuration: UserConfig,
941 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
942 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
948 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
950 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
952 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
953 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
955 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
956 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
957 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
958 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
960 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
961 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
963 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
964 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
965 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
966 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
967 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
968 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
969 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
970 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
972 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
974 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
975 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
977 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
979 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
980 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
981 /// and via the classic SCID.
983 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
984 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
986 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
988 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
990 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
991 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
992 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
994 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
995 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
997 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
998 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1000 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1001 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1003 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1004 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1005 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1006 /// active channel list on load.
1008 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1009 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1011 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1013 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
1014 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
1015 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
1017 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1018 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1019 /// the handling of the events.
1021 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1022 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1025 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1026 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1027 /// would break backwards compatability.
1028 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1029 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1030 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1032 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1033 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
1035 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1037 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1038 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1039 /// confirmation depth.
1041 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1042 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1043 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1045 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1047 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
1049 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
1051 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1053 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1055 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1056 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1057 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1059 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1060 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1062 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1063 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1064 /// keeping additional state.
1065 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1067 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1068 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1069 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1070 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1072 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1073 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1075 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1076 /// are currently open with that peer.
1078 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1079 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1082 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1084 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1085 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1086 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
1087 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1088 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
1090 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1091 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1092 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1093 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1094 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1096 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1097 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1099 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1100 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1101 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1102 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1104 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1105 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1106 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1107 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1108 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1110 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1112 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1114 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1115 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1116 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1117 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1118 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1119 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1120 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1121 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1122 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1124 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1126 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
1130 signer_provider: SP,
1135 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1137 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1138 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1139 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1140 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1141 pub struct ChainParameters {
1142 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1143 pub network: Network,
1145 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1147 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1148 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1151 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1158 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1159 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1160 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1161 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1162 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1163 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1165 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1166 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1167 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1168 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1169 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1171 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1172 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1175 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1176 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1177 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1178 let _ = cm.get_cm().process_background_events(); // We always persist
1180 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1181 persistence_notifier: &cm.get_cm().persistence_notifier,
1182 should_persist: || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist },
1183 _read_guard: read_guard,
1188 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1189 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first.
1190 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1191 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
1193 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1194 persistence_notifier: notifier,
1195 should_persist: persist_check,
1196 _read_guard: read_guard,
1201 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1202 fn drop(&mut self) {
1203 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1204 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1209 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1210 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1212 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1214 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1215 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1216 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1217 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1218 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1220 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1221 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1223 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1225 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1226 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1227 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1228 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1229 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1230 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1231 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1232 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1233 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1234 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1235 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1236 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1237 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1239 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1240 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1242 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1243 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1244 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1245 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1247 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1248 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1249 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1250 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1251 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1252 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1255 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1257 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1258 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1261 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1263 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1264 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1266 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
1267 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
1268 /// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
1269 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
1271 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1272 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1273 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1275 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1276 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1277 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1279 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1280 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1281 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1282 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1284 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1285 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1286 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1288 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1289 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1290 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1292 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1293 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1294 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1295 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1296 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1297 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1298 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1299 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1300 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1301 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1302 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1305 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1306 /// to better separate parameters.
1307 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1308 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1309 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1310 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1311 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1312 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1313 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1314 pub features: InitFeatures,
1315 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1316 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1317 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1319 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1321 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1322 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1323 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1324 /// payments to us through this channel.
1325 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1326 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1327 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1328 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1329 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1330 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1331 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1334 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1335 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1336 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1337 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1338 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1339 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1340 /// lifetime of the channel.
1341 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1342 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1343 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1344 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1345 /// our counterparty already.
1347 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1348 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1349 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1350 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1352 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1353 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1354 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1355 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1357 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1358 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1360 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1361 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1363 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1364 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1365 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1366 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1367 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1368 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1369 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1370 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1371 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1374 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1376 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1377 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1378 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1379 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1380 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1381 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1382 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1384 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1385 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1387 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1388 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1389 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1390 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1391 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1392 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1393 /// this value on chain.
1395 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1397 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1399 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1400 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1401 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1402 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1404 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1405 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1406 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1408 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1409 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1410 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1411 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1412 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1414 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1415 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1416 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1417 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1419 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1420 pub balance_msat: u64,
1421 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1422 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1423 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1424 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1426 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1428 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1429 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1430 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1431 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1432 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1433 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1434 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1435 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1437 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
1438 /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1439 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1440 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1441 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1442 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1443 /// route which is valid.
1444 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1445 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1446 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1447 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1448 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1449 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1451 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1452 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1453 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1454 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1455 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1456 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1457 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1458 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1459 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1461 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1463 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1464 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1465 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1466 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1467 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1469 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1470 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1471 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1472 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1473 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1474 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1475 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1477 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1478 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1479 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1480 pub is_outbound: bool,
1481 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1482 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1483 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1484 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1485 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1487 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1488 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1489 /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
1490 /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
1491 pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
1492 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1493 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1495 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1496 pub is_usable: bool,
1497 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1498 pub is_public: bool,
1499 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1500 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1501 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1502 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1503 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1504 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1506 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1507 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1510 impl ChannelDetails {
1511 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1512 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1513 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1515 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1516 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1517 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1518 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1521 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1522 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1523 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1525 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1526 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1527 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1528 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1531 fn from_channel_context<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, F: Deref>(
1532 context: &ChannelContext<Signer>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
1533 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
1535 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1537 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
1538 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1539 context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1541 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1542 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1543 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1544 features: latest_features,
1545 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1546 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1547 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1548 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1549 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1550 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1551 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1552 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1553 Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1554 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1556 funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1557 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1558 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1559 channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1560 short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1561 outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1562 inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1563 channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1564 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1565 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1566 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1567 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1568 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1569 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1570 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1571 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1572 confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1573 confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1574 force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1575 is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1576 is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1577 is_usable: context.is_live(),
1578 is_public: context.should_announce(),
1579 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1580 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1581 config: Some(context.config()),
1582 channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
1587 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1588 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
1589 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
1590 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
1591 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
1592 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
1593 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
1594 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
1595 /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
1597 /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
1599 /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
1600 /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
1602 /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
1603 NegotiatingClosingFee,
1604 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
1605 /// to drop the channel.
1609 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1610 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1611 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1612 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1613 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1615 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1617 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1618 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1619 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1622 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1623 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1624 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1626 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1627 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1628 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1630 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1631 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1632 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1634 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1635 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1639 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1641 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1643 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1644 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1645 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1646 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1648 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1649 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1650 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1653 macro_rules! handle_error {
1654 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1655 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1656 // entering the macro.
1657 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1658 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1662 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1663 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1665 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1666 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1667 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1668 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1672 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1673 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1674 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1675 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1680 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1681 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1683 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1684 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1685 action: err.action.clone()
1689 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1690 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1691 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1692 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1693 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1697 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1702 ($self: ident, $internal: expr) => {
1705 Err((chan, msg_handle_err)) => {
1706 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1707 handle_error!($self, Err(msg_handle_err), counterparty_node_id).map_err(|err| (chan, err))
1713 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1714 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
1715 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.channel_id());
1716 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1717 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
1718 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1720 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1721 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1722 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1723 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1724 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1726 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1727 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1729 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1733 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1734 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1735 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1737 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1738 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1740 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1741 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1743 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1744 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1745 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$channel.context);
1746 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
1747 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1748 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1752 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_context: expr, $channel_id: expr, PREFUNDED) => {
1754 // We should only ever have `ChannelError::Close` when prefunded channels error.
1755 // In any case, just close the channel.
1756 ChannelError::Warn(msg) | ChannelError::Ignore(msg) | ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1757 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing prefunded channel {} due to an error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1758 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$channel_context);
1759 let shutdown_res = $channel_context.force_shutdown(false);
1760 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel_context.get_user_id(),
1761 shutdown_res, None))
1767 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1768 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1772 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1774 $entry.remove_entry();
1782 macro_rules! try_v1_outbound_chan_entry {
1783 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1787 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut().context, $entry.key(), PREFUNDED);
1789 $entry.remove_entry();
1797 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1798 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1802 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1804 $entry.remove_entry();
1812 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1813 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1815 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1816 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context);
1822 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1823 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1824 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1825 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1826 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1828 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1829 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1830 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1831 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
1832 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
1833 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1834 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
1835 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
1836 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
1837 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1842 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
1843 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1844 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
1845 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
1846 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
1847 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
1848 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1849 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1850 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1852 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
1857 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1858 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1859 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1860 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
1861 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
1862 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
1863 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1864 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1865 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
1867 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1872 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
1873 ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
1874 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
1875 &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
1876 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
1877 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
1878 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
1879 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
1880 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
1881 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
1882 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
1884 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
1885 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
1886 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1892 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
1893 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
1895 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
1896 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
1897 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
1898 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
1899 updates.announcement_sigs);
1900 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
1901 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
1904 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
1905 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
1906 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
1908 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
1910 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1911 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1913 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
1914 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1915 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1916 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
1921 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
1922 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $remove: expr, $completed: expr) => { {
1923 // update_maps_on_chan_removal needs to be able to take id_to_peer, so make sure we can in
1924 // any case so that it won't deadlock.
1925 debug_assert_ne!($self.id_to_peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1926 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
1928 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1929 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
1930 log_bytes!($chan.context.channel_id()[..]));
1933 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1934 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure",
1935 log_bytes!($chan.context.channel_id()[..]));
1936 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$chan.context);
1937 let res = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(
1938 "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.context.channel_id(),
1939 $chan.context.get_user_id(), $chan.context.force_shutdown(false),
1940 $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok()));
1944 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1950 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING_INITIAL_MONITOR, $remove: expr) => {
1951 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state,
1952 $per_peer_state_lock, $chan, _internal, $remove,
1953 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
1955 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
1956 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING_INITIAL_MONITOR, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
1958 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING, $remove: expr) => { {
1959 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
1960 .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
1961 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
1962 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
1963 // filter for uniqueness here.
1964 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
1965 .unwrap_or_else(|| {
1966 in_flight_updates.push($update);
1967 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
1969 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
1970 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state,
1971 $per_peer_state_lock, $chan, _internal, $remove,
1973 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
1974 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
1975 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
1979 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr) => {
1980 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $funding_txo, $update, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
1984 macro_rules! process_events_body {
1985 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
1986 let mut processed_all_events = false;
1987 while !processed_all_events {
1988 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
1992 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
1995 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
1996 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
1997 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1999 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2000 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2001 if $self.process_background_events() == NotifyOption::DoPersist { result = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
2003 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2004 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2005 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2006 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2010 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2011 let num_events = pending_events.len();
2012 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2013 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2016 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2018 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2019 $event_to_handle = event;
2021 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2022 post_event_actions.push(action);
2027 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2028 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2029 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2030 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2033 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2034 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2035 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2036 processed_all_events = false;
2039 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
2040 $self.persistence_notifier.notify();
2046 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2048 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
2049 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2050 ES::Target: EntropySource,
2051 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2052 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2053 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2057 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2059 /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2061 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2062 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2064 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2066 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2067 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2068 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2071 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2072 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2073 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2075 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2076 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2077 current_timestamp: u32,
2079 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2080 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2081 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2082 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2084 default_configuration: config.clone(),
2085 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
2086 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2091 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2093 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
2094 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2095 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2096 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2097 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
2098 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2099 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2100 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2102 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2105 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2106 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2108 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2110 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2112 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2114 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2115 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2116 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2117 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2118 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2119 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2129 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2130 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2131 &self.default_configuration
2134 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2135 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2136 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2139 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2140 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2142 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2144 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2148 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2153 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2155 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2156 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2157 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2158 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2159 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2161 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2162 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2164 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2165 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2166 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2168 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2169 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2170 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2172 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2173 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2174 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2175 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2176 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2177 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2179 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2180 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2181 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2182 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
2183 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2184 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2187 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2188 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2189 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2191 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2193 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2194 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2196 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2198 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2199 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2200 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2201 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2202 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2203 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
2207 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2212 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
2214 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2215 match peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2216 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2218 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2220 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2223 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
2226 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2227 node_id: their_network_key,
2230 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2233 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2234 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2235 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2236 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2237 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2238 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2239 // the same channel.
2240 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2242 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2243 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2244 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2245 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2246 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2247 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
2248 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2249 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2257 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2258 /// more information.
2259 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2260 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2261 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2262 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2263 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2264 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2265 // the same channel.
2266 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2268 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2269 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2270 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2271 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2272 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2273 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
2274 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2275 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2278 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter() {
2279 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2280 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2283 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter() {
2284 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2285 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2293 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2294 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2296 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2297 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2299 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2300 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2301 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2302 // really wanted anyway.
2303 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2306 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2307 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2308 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2309 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2311 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2312 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2313 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2314 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2315 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2318 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2319 features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator))
2325 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2326 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2328 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2329 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2330 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2332 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2333 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2334 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2335 .filter_map(|(_, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2336 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2337 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2338 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2339 total_msat: *total_msat,
2342 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2343 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2345 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2346 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2348 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2353 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
2354 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, context: &ChannelContext<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
2355 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2356 match context.unbroadcasted_funding() {
2357 Some(transaction) => {
2358 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2359 channel_id: context.channel_id(), transaction
2364 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2365 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
2366 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
2367 reason: closure_reason
2371 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2372 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2374 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
2375 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
2376 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2378 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2379 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2381 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2382 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2383 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2384 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2385 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().context.get_funding_txo();
2386 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2387 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut()
2388 .get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2389 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2391 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2392 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2393 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2394 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2395 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2399 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2400 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2401 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2402 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry).map(|_| ());
2405 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2406 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
2407 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
2408 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2412 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2416 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id) })
2420 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2421 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2422 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2423 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2426 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
2430 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2431 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2432 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2434 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
2435 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2437 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2438 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
2439 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2440 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2442 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2444 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2445 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2446 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2449 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2450 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2451 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2452 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2453 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2454 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2457 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2458 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2459 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2461 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2462 /// the channel being closed or not:
2463 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2464 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2465 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2466 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2467 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2468 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2469 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2471 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2472 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2473 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2474 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2476 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2478 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2479 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2480 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2483 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2484 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2485 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2486 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2487 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2488 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2492 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2493 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
2494 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2495 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2496 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2497 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2498 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2499 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2501 if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2502 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2503 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2504 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2505 // ignore the result here.
2506 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2510 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2511 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2512 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2513 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2514 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2515 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2516 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2517 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2518 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2519 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2520 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2521 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2523 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2525 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2526 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2527 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, closure_reason);
2528 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan);
2529 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2530 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2531 } else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2532 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2533 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, closure_reason);
2534 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan);
2535 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
2536 // Prefunded channel has no update
2537 (None, chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2538 } else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2539 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2540 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, closure_reason);
2541 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan);
2542 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
2543 // Prefunded channel has no update
2544 (None, chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2546 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) });
2549 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
2550 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2551 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2556 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
2559 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2560 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2561 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2562 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2563 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2564 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2565 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2566 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2567 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2568 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2569 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2570 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2581 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2582 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2583 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2585 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2586 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2587 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2590 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2591 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2592 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2594 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2595 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2596 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2597 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2598 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2601 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2602 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2603 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2604 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2605 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2609 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2610 /// local transaction(s).
2611 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2612 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2613 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2617 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(
2618 &self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32], payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2619 amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>, allow_underpay: bool,
2620 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
2621 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError> {
2622 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2623 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
2624 return Err(ReceiveError {
2625 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
2627 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2630 // final_expiry_too_soon
2631 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2632 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2634 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2635 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2636 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2637 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2638 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2639 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2640 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2641 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2642 return Err(ReceiveError {
2643 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2644 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2647 if (!allow_underpay && hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat) ||
2648 (allow_underpay && hop_data.amt_to_forward >
2649 amt_msat.saturating_add(counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)))
2651 return Err(ReceiveError {
2653 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2654 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2658 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2659 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2660 return Err(ReceiveError {
2661 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2662 err_data: Vec::new(),
2663 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2666 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage, payment_metadata } => {
2667 if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2668 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2669 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2670 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2671 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2672 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2673 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2674 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2675 return Err(ReceiveError {
2676 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2677 err_data: Vec::new(),
2678 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2681 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && payment_data.is_some() {
2682 return Err(ReceiveError {
2683 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2684 err_data: Vec::new(),
2685 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2688 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2692 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2694 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2695 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2698 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2699 phantom_shared_secret,
2702 return Err(ReceiveError {
2703 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2704 err_data: Vec::new(),
2705 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2710 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2713 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2714 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2715 outgoing_amt_msat: hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2716 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2717 skimmed_fee_msat: counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
2721 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
2722 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC
2723 ) -> Result<(onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg> {
2724 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2725 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2727 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2728 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2729 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2730 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2731 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2732 failure_code: $err_code,
2738 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2739 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2742 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
2743 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
2744 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2746 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2747 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2748 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2749 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2750 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2751 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2752 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2753 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2755 macro_rules! return_err {
2756 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2758 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2759 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2760 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2761 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2762 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2763 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2769 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2771 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2772 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2774 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2775 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2778 let (outgoing_scid, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, next_packet_pk_opt) = match next_hop {
2779 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
2780 next_hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData {
2781 format: msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id }, amt_to_forward,
2782 outgoing_cltv_value,
2785 let next_pk = onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx,
2786 msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &shared_secret);
2787 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(next_pk))
2789 // We'll do receive checks in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] so we have access to the
2790 // inbound channel's state.
2791 onion_utils::Hop::Receive { .. } => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
2792 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
2793 next_hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData { format: msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. }, .. }, ..
2795 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0; 0]);
2799 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
2800 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
2801 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2802 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
2803 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2804 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2805 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2806 // phantom or an intercept.
2807 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2808 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2809 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.genesis_hash)
2813 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2816 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2818 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2819 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2820 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2821 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
2822 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2824 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2825 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2826 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2828 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
2829 // have no consistency guarantees.
2830 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2834 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2835 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2836 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2837 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2838 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2840 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
2841 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2842 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2843 // we don't have the channel here.
2844 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2846 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
2848 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2849 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2850 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2851 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2852 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2853 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2854 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
2855 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
2856 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
2857 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
2858 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2860 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
2863 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2864 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2866 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
2867 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2871 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
2872 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
2873 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
2874 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
2876 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2883 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2884 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2885 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2886 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2887 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2888 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2890 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2891 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2893 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2894 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2895 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2896 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2897 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2898 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2899 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2900 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2901 if (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2902 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2908 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2909 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2910 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2911 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2913 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2914 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2916 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2917 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2918 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2920 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2921 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2922 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2923 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
2924 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
2925 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
2926 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
2930 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2932 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt))
2935 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
2936 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, shared_secret: [u8; 32], decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop,
2937 allow_underpay: bool, next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
2938 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2939 macro_rules! return_err {
2940 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2942 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2943 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2944 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2945 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2946 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2947 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2953 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2955 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
2956 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat)
2959 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2960 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2961 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2962 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2963 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2965 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2968 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2969 debug_assert!(next_packet_pubkey_opt.is_some());
2970 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2972 public_key: next_packet_pubkey_opt.unwrap_or(Err(secp256k1::Error::InvalidPublicKey)),
2973 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2974 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2977 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2978 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2979 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2980 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2984 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2985 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2986 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2989 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2990 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2991 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2992 outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2993 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2994 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
3000 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3001 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3002 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3004 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3005 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3006 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3008 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3009 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3010 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3011 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3012 return Err(LightningError {
3013 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3014 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3017 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3018 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3020 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()));
3021 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3024 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3025 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3026 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3027 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3029 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3030 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3031 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3033 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3034 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3035 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3036 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()));
3037 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3038 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3042 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3045 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3046 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()));
3047 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3049 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3050 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3051 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3052 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3053 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3056 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3057 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
3059 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3060 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3061 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3062 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3063 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3064 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3065 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3066 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3068 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3069 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3070 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3072 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3074 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3081 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3082 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3083 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv_bytes)
3086 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3087 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3088 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3090 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3091 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3092 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3094 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
3095 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
3096 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
3098 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash)
3099 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute { err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()})?;
3101 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3102 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3103 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
3104 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3107 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3108 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3109 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3110 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3111 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3112 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3113 if !chan.get().context.is_live() {
3114 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3116 let funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3117 let send_res = chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3118 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3120 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3121 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3123 }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
3124 match break_chan_entry!(self, send_res, chan) {
3125 Some(monitor_update) => {
3126 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3127 Err(e) => break Err(e),
3129 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3130 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3131 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3132 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3133 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3134 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3135 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3143 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3144 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3145 // `channel_by_id` map.
3146 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3147 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3152 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3153 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3155 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3160 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3162 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3163 /// fields for more info.
3165 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3166 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3168 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3170 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3171 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3172 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3173 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3174 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3176 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3177 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3178 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3179 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3180 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3182 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3183 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3184 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3185 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3187 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3189 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3190 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3191 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3193 /// In general, a path may raise:
3194 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3195 /// node public key) is specified.
3196 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
3197 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
3199 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3200 /// relevant updates.
3202 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3203 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3204 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3206 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3207 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3208 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3209 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3210 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3211 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3212 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3213 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3214 self.pending_outbound_payments
3215 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3216 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3217 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
3220 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3221 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3222 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3223 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3224 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3225 self.pending_outbound_payments
3226 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3227 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3228 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3229 &self.pending_events,
3230 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3231 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
3235 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3236 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3237 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3238 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3239 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3240 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
3244 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3245 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3246 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3250 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3251 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3255 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3256 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3257 /// retries are exhausted.
3259 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3260 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3262 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3263 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3264 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3266 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
3267 /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
3269 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3270 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3271 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3272 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3273 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3276 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3277 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3278 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3279 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3280 /// never reach the recipient.
3282 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3283 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3285 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3286 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3288 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3289 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3290 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3291 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3292 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3293 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3294 &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3295 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3296 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
3299 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3300 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3302 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3305 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3306 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3307 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3308 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3309 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3310 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3311 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3312 &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
3313 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3314 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
3317 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3318 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3319 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3320 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3321 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3322 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3323 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3324 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3325 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
3328 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3331 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3332 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3335 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3336 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3337 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&OutboundV1Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3338 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
3339 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3340 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3341 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3342 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3344 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3345 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3346 let (chan, msg) = match peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3348 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3350 let funding_res = chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
3351 .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3352 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3353 let user_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
3354 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
3355 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None))
3356 } else { unreachable!(); });
3358 Ok((chan, funding_msg)) => (chan, funding_msg),
3359 Err((chan, err)) => {
3360 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3361 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3363 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3364 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3365 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3371 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3373 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3374 log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3379 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3380 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3383 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3384 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3385 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3387 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3388 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3389 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.context.channel_id(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
3390 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
3399 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3400 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
3401 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3405 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3407 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3408 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3410 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3411 /// across the p2p network.
3413 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3414 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3416 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3417 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3418 /// keys per-channel).
3420 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3421 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3422 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3424 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3425 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3426 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3428 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3429 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3430 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3431 /// for more details.
3433 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3434 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3435 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3436 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3438 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3439 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3440 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3441 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3446 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3447 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3448 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3449 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3450 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3451 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 1 {
3452 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3453 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3457 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
3458 if tx.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3459 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3460 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3464 let mut output_index = None;
3465 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3466 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3467 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
3468 if output_index.is_some() {
3469 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3470 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3473 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3476 if output_index.is_none() {
3477 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3478 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3481 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
3485 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
3487 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3488 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3489 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3490 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3492 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3493 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3495 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3496 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3498 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3500 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3501 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3502 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3503 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3504 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3505 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3506 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3507 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
3508 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
3509 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3510 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
3511 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3512 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3516 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3517 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3518 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3519 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3520 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3521 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3522 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3523 if !peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) {
3524 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3525 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3529 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3530 let channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
3531 let mut config = channel.context.config();
3532 config.apply(config_update);
3533 if !channel.context.update_config(&config) {
3536 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3537 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3538 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3539 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3540 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3548 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
3550 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3551 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3552 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3553 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3555 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3556 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3558 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3559 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3561 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3563 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3564 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3565 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3566 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3567 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3568 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3569 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3570 pub fn update_channel_config(
3571 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
3572 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3573 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
3576 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
3577 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
3579 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
3580 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
3582 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
3583 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
3584 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
3585 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
3586 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
3588 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
3589 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
3590 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
3593 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3596 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
3597 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3598 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
3599 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
3600 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
3601 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3602 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3604 let next_hop_scid = {
3605 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3606 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
3607 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
3608 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3609 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3610 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
3612 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
3613 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3614 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
3617 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
3619 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3620 err: format!("Funded channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}. Channel may still be opening.",
3621 log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id)
3626 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3627 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3628 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3631 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
3632 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
3633 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
3635 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3637 let skimmed_fee_msat =
3638 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
3639 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
3640 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
3641 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
3644 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
3645 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3646 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3647 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
3648 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
3650 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
3654 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
3655 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
3657 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3660 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3661 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3662 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3664 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3665 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3666 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3669 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
3670 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3671 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3672 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3673 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
3674 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3675 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3678 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
3679 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
3680 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3681 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3686 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3688 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3689 /// Will likely generate further events.
3690 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3691 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3693 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
3694 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3695 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3697 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3698 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3700 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3701 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3702 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3704 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3705 match forward_info {
3706 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3707 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3708 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3709 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3710 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
3713 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3714 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3715 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3717 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3718 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3719 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3720 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3721 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3722 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3725 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3726 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3728 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3731 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3732 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3738 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3739 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3741 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3745 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3746 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3748 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3752 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3753 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3754 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3755 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3756 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3758 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3759 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3760 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3761 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3762 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3764 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3766 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3767 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3771 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3772 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
3773 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3774 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None)
3776 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3777 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3783 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3786 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3789 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3790 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3791 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3792 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3793 // problem, not ours.
3799 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3800 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3802 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3806 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3807 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3808 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3809 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3812 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3813 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3814 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3815 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3816 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3819 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3820 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3821 match forward_info {
3822 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3823 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
3824 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3825 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3826 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
3829 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3830 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3831 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3832 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3833 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3834 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3835 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3836 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3838 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
3839 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
3840 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, &self.fee_estimator,
3843 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3844 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3846 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3848 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3849 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3850 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3851 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3856 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3857 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3859 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3860 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3861 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
3862 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
3864 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3865 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3867 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
3869 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3870 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3871 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3880 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3881 match forward_info {
3882 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3883 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3884 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3885 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
3886 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
3889 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
3890 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3891 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3893 RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret), payment_metadata };
3894 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
3895 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
3897 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry } => {
3898 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
3899 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
3902 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
3903 payment_data, None, onion_fields)
3906 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3909 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3910 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3911 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3912 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3913 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3914 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3915 phantom_shared_secret,
3917 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
3918 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
3919 // if routing nodes overpay
3920 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
3921 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3923 total_value_received: None,
3924 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3927 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
3930 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
3932 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3933 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3934 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
3935 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3936 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3937 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
3939 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3940 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3941 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3942 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3943 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3944 phantom_shared_secret,
3946 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
3947 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3949 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
3952 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
3953 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3954 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3955 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3956 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3959 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3960 ($purpose: expr) => {{
3961 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
3962 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
3963 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
3964 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
3966 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3967 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3968 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3970 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
3971 .entry(payment_hash)
3972 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
3973 .or_insert_with(|| {
3974 committed_to_claimable = true;
3976 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
3979 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
3980 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
3981 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), log_keysend(!is_keysend));
3982 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3984 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
3985 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3986 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3988 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
3989 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
3990 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3993 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
3995 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
3996 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
3997 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
3998 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3999 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
4000 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4001 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4002 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
4003 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
4004 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
4006 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
4008 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
4009 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
4010 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4011 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4012 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4013 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
4014 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4015 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4016 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4017 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4018 committed_to_claimable = true;
4020 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
4021 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4022 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
4023 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
4024 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
4025 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
4026 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
4027 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
4028 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
4029 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4033 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4034 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4035 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4036 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4037 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4039 payment_claimable_generated = true;
4041 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
4042 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
4044 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4045 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4046 committed_to_claimable = true;
4049 payment_claimable_generated
4053 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
4054 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
4055 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4056 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4057 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4058 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4059 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4060 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4061 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4062 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4063 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4064 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4065 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4066 Ok(result) => result,
4068 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4069 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4072 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4073 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4074 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4075 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4076 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4077 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4080 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4081 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4082 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4084 check_total_value!(purpose);
4086 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4087 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4088 check_total_value!(purpose);
4092 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4093 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4094 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4095 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4097 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4098 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4099 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4100 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4101 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4102 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4103 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4104 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4106 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4107 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4108 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4110 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4111 if payment_claimable_generated {
4112 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4118 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4119 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4127 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4128 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4129 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4130 &self.pending_events, &self.logger,
4131 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
4132 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv));
4134 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4135 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4137 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4139 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4140 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4141 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4143 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4145 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4146 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4147 events.append(&mut new_events);
4150 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4152 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4153 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4154 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4156 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4158 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4159 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4160 if background_events.is_empty() {
4161 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4164 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4166 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
4167 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4168 // monitor updating completing.
4169 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4171 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update } => {
4172 let mut updated_chan = false;
4174 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4175 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4176 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4177 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4178 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4179 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4180 updated_chan = true;
4181 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4182 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan).map(|_| ())
4184 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Ok(()),
4189 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
4190 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4192 // TODO: If this channel has since closed, we're likely providing a payment
4193 // preimage update, which we must ensure is durable! We currently don't,
4194 // however, ensure that.
4196 log_error!(self.logger,
4197 "Failed to provide ChannelMonitorUpdate to closed channel! This likely lost us a payment preimage!");
4199 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4201 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
4202 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4203 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4204 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4205 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4206 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
4207 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4209 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
4210 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
4211 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4212 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4213 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
4219 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4222 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4223 /// Process background events, for functional testing
4224 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4225 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4226 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4229 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4230 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
4231 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4232 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4233 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4234 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4235 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4237 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4238 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4239 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4240 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4242 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4243 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4245 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
4246 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4250 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4251 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4252 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4253 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4254 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4255 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4256 let mut should_persist = self.process_background_events();
4258 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4260 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4261 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4262 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4263 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4264 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
4265 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4266 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4274 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4276 /// This currently includes:
4277 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4278 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4279 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4281 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4282 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4283 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4285 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4286 /// estimate fetches.
4288 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4289 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4290 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4291 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4292 let mut should_persist = self.process_background_events();
4294 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4296 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4297 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4298 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4300 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4301 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4302 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4303 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4304 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4305 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4306 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
4307 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4308 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4310 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4311 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
4312 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
4313 if needs_close { return false; }
4316 match chan.channel_update_status() {
4317 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
4318 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
4319 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
4320 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
4321 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
4322 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
4323 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
4325 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4326 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
4327 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4328 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4332 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4334 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
4337 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
4339 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4340 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
4341 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4342 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4346 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4348 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
4354 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4356 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
4357 log_debug!(self.logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
4358 counterparty_node_id, log_bytes!(*chan_id));
4359 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4360 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4361 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
4362 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
4363 channel_id: *chan_id,
4364 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
4372 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
4373 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
4378 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
4379 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
4380 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
4381 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
4382 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
4383 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
4384 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
4385 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
4386 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4387 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
4388 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
4389 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
4390 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
4391 // have no channels to the peer.
4392 let remove_entry = {
4393 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
4394 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
4397 entry.remove_entry();
4400 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
4405 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
4406 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4407 // This should be unreachable
4408 debug_assert!(false);
4411 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
4412 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
4413 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
4414 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
4415 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
4416 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
4417 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
4420 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
4421 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
4422 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
4424 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
4425 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
4432 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
4433 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
4434 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
4435 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
4436 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4439 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4440 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4443 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self.pending_events);
4445 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
4446 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
4447 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
4448 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
4449 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4456 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
4457 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
4458 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
4460 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
4461 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
4462 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
4463 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
4465 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
4466 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
4467 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
4468 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
4469 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
4470 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
4473 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
4474 /// reason for the failure.
4476 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
4477 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
4478 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4480 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
4481 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
4482 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
4483 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
4484 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4485 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
4486 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4491 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
4492 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
4493 match failure_code {
4494 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
4495 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
4496 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
4497 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4498 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4499 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code as u16, htlc_msat_height_data)
4504 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4505 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4507 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
4509 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4510 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
4511 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
4512 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
4513 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
4514 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
4515 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
4517 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
4519 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
4520 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
4522 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4527 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4528 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4529 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4530 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
4531 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
4532 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
4533 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
4534 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
4535 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
4536 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4538 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4539 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4540 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4541 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
4543 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
4544 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
4545 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
4546 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
4547 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4551 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
4552 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
4553 // be surfaced to the user.
4554 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
4555 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
4556 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
4558 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
4559 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4560 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
4561 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4562 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4563 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
4564 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
4565 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
4567 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4569 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
4572 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
4573 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
4574 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
4575 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4579 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
4580 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
4581 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
4582 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
4583 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
4584 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
4585 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
4586 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
4587 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
4590 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
4591 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
4592 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
4595 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4596 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
4597 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4599 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
4600 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
4601 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
4602 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
4603 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4605 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
4606 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
4607 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
4609 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
4610 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4611 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4612 push_forward_ev = true;
4614 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
4615 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4616 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
4618 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4619 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
4622 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
4623 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4624 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4625 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
4626 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
4627 failed_next_destination: destination,
4633 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
4634 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
4636 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
4637 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
4638 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
4639 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
4641 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
4642 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
4643 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
4644 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
4646 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
4647 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
4648 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
4649 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
4650 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4651 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4652 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4653 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4655 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4658 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4659 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
4660 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4661 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
4662 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4663 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4664 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4665 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
4670 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
4671 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
4672 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id,
4674 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
4675 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
4676 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
4677 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4682 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
4684 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
4685 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
4686 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
4687 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
4688 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
4689 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
4690 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
4691 let mut valid_mpp = true;
4692 let mut errs = Vec::new();
4693 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4694 for htlc in sources.iter() {
4695 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
4696 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4697 debug_assert!(false);
4701 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
4703 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
4704 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4705 debug_assert!(false);
4709 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
4710 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
4712 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4713 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4714 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4715 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4718 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4719 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4720 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4721 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4725 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4726 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
4727 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
4728 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
4730 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4731 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4732 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4733 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4734 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4739 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4740 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4741 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4742 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4743 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
4744 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
4745 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4747 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4750 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
4751 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4752 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4753 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4757 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
4758 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
4759 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
4760 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4762 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
4763 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
4764 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
4765 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
4768 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4769 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
4770 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4771 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
4775 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
4776 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4777 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
4780 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
4781 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
4782 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4783 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4784 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id();
4785 let fulfill_res = chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
4787 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
4788 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
4789 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
4790 log_bytes!(chan_id), action);
4791 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
4794 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
4795 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4796 if let Err(e) = res {
4797 // TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge
4798 // of the HTLC's monitor with a preimage. We should retry this monitor
4799 // update over and over again until morale improves.
4800 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}", payment_preimage);
4801 return Err((counterparty_node_id, e));
4804 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
4805 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
4806 // monitor update as a background event.
4807 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
4808 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
4809 counterparty_node_id,
4810 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
4811 update: monitor_update.clone(),
4819 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4820 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4821 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4827 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4828 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
4829 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
4830 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4831 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4832 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4833 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
4834 // again on restart.
4835 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4836 payment_preimage, update_res);
4839 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
4840 // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
4842 // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
4843 // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
4844 // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
4845 // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
4846 // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
4847 // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
4848 // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
4849 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
4850 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
4851 prev_hop.outpoint, preimage_update,
4854 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
4855 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
4856 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
4857 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
4858 // `PaymentForwarded`).
4859 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
4863 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4864 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
4867 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4869 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4870 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
4871 "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
4872 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage, session_priv, path, from_onchain, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
4874 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4875 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4876 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
4877 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
4878 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4879 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4880 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4883 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
4884 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4886 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4887 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
4888 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_id),
4889 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
4891 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: None,
4895 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
4896 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4897 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4903 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4904 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4905 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4908 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
4909 for action in actions.into_iter() {
4911 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
4912 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4913 if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
4914 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4915 payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4919 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
4920 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
4922 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
4923 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
4924 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker));
4931 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
4932 /// update completion.
4933 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4934 channel: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
4935 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
4936 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
4937 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
4938 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
4939 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
4940 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()),
4941 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
4942 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
4943 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
4944 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
4945 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
4947 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
4949 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
4950 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4951 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
4952 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
4955 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4956 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
4958 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
4959 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4960 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4965 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
4966 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
4967 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4968 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4973 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
4974 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
4975 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4976 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4977 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4982 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
4986 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
4992 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
4993 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
4994 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
4998 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4999 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
5000 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
5006 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
5007 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5009 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
5010 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5012 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5013 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5014 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5015 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5016 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5021 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5022 let mut peer_state_lock;
5023 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
5024 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
5025 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5026 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5028 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5031 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5032 .remove(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5033 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5034 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5035 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5038 let remaining_in_flight =
5039 if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
5040 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
5043 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
5044 highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
5045 remaining_in_flight);
5046 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
5049 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
5052 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
5054 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
5055 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
5058 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5059 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5060 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5062 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
5063 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
5064 /// used to accept such channels.
5066 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5067 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5068 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5069 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
5072 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
5073 /// it as confirmed immediately.
5075 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5076 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5077 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5079 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
5080 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
5082 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
5083 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
5085 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
5086 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
5088 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5089 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5090 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5091 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
5094 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5095 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5097 let peers_without_funded_channels =
5098 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
5099 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5100 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5101 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
5102 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5103 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5104 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
5105 match peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
5106 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
5107 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_accept() {
5108 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
5111 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
5112 } else if channel.get().context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
5113 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5114 node_id: channel.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5115 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5116 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
5119 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5120 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
5121 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
5123 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5124 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5125 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5126 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
5127 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5128 node_id: channel.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5129 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5130 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
5133 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5134 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
5135 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
5139 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5140 node_id: channel.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5141 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
5144 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
5145 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) });
5151 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
5152 /// or 0-conf channels.
5154 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
5155 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
5156 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
5157 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> bool {
5158 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
5159 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5161 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5162 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
5163 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5164 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
5165 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
5166 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
5167 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
5171 return peers_without_funded_channels;
5174 fn unfunded_channel_count(
5175 peer: &PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, best_block_height: u32
5177 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
5178 for (_, chan) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
5179 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
5180 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
5181 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
5182 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
5184 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5187 for (_, chan) in peer.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter() {
5188 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
5189 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5192 num_unfunded_channels
5195 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5196 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
5197 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5200 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
5201 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5204 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
5205 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
5206 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
5207 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
5209 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
5210 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
5211 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
5212 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
5213 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
5215 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5216 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5218 debug_assert!(false);
5219 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
5221 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5222 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5224 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5225 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5226 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5227 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
5228 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
5229 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
5231 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5232 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
5233 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5236 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5237 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
5238 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5239 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
5240 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5243 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5244 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
5245 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
5248 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
5249 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
5253 let channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
5254 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
5256 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
5257 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
5259 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
5260 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
5261 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
5262 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5264 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5265 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5267 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5268 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5269 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
5272 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5273 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
5274 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
5275 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5276 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
5277 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
5278 channel_type: channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
5281 peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, channel);
5286 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5287 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
5288 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5289 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5291 debug_assert!(false);
5292 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
5294 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5295 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5296 match peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
5297 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5298 try_v1_outbound_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan);
5299 (chan.get().context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().context.get_user_id())
5301 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
5304 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5305 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
5306 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
5307 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5308 channel_value_satoshis: value,
5310 user_channel_id: user_id,
5315 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5316 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5318 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5319 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5321 debug_assert!(false);
5322 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
5325 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5326 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5327 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor) =
5328 match peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
5329 Some(inbound_chan) => {
5330 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger) {
5332 Err((mut inbound_chan, err)) => {
5333 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
5334 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
5335 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
5336 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &inbound_chan.context);
5337 let user_id = inbound_chan.context.get_user_id();
5338 let shutdown_res = inbound_chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
5339 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(format!("{}", err),
5340 msg.temporary_channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None));
5344 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
5347 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
5348 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5349 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
5351 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5352 match self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
5353 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5354 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5355 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
5356 funding_msg.channel_id))
5358 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
5359 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
5363 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
5364 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
5365 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
5366 // until we have persisted our monitor.
5367 let new_channel_id = funding_msg.channel_id;
5368 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
5369 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5373 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
5375 let chan = e.insert(chan);
5376 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, monitor_res, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
5377 per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING_INITIAL_MONITOR,
5378 { peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&new_channel_id) });
5380 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
5381 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
5382 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
5383 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
5384 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
5385 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
5386 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
5387 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { shutdown_finish: Some((res, _)), .. }) = &mut res {
5395 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5396 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5397 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5398 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5400 debug_assert!(false);
5401 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5404 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5405 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5406 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5407 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5408 let monitor = try_chan_entry!(self,
5409 chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan);
5410 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor);
5411 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
5412 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
5413 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
5414 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
5415 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
5416 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
5417 shutdown_finish.0.take();
5422 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5426 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5427 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5428 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5430 debug_assert!(false);
5431 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5433 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5434 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5435 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5436 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5437 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
5438 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
5439 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
5440 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().context.channel_id()));
5441 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5442 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5443 msg: announcement_sigs,
5445 } else if chan.get().context.is_usable() {
5446 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
5447 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
5448 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
5449 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
5450 // announcement_signatures.
5451 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().context.channel_id()));
5452 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5453 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5454 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5461 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5462 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan.get_mut());
5467 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5471 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5472 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
5473 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
5474 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5475 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5477 debug_assert!(false);
5478 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5480 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5481 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5482 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5483 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
5485 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
5486 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
5487 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
5488 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
5491 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().context.get_funding_txo();
5492 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self,
5493 chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
5494 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
5496 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
5497 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
5498 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
5499 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
5500 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5501 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5506 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
5507 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5508 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
5509 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry).map(|_| ());
5513 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5516 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
5517 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
5518 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5519 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5525 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5526 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5527 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5529 debug_assert!(false);
5530 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5532 let (tx, chan_option) = {
5533 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5534 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5535 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5536 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
5537 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
5538 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
5539 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5540 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5545 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
5546 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
5547 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
5548 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
5549 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
5550 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
5551 } else { (tx, None) }
5553 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5556 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
5557 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
5558 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
5560 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
5561 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5562 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5563 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5564 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5568 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5573 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5574 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
5575 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
5576 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
5578 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
5579 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
5580 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
5581 //but we should prevent it anyway.
5583 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
5584 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5585 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5587 debug_assert!(false);
5588 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5590 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5591 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5592 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5593 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5595 let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
5596 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
5597 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(msg, shared_secret, next_hop,
5598 chan.get().context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt),
5599 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
5601 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
5602 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
5603 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
5604 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
5605 match pending_forward_info {
5606 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
5607 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
5608 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
5609 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
5611 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
5612 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
5613 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5614 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
5615 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
5618 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
5620 _ => pending_forward_info
5623 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), chan);
5625 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5630 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5631 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
5632 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5633 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5635 debug_assert!(false);
5636 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5638 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5639 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5640 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5641 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5642 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
5644 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5647 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
5651 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5652 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5653 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5655 debug_assert!(false);
5656 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5658 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5659 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5660 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5661 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5662 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
5664 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5669 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5670 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5671 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5673 debug_assert!(false);
5674 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5676 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5677 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5678 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5679 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5680 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
5681 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
5682 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
5684 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
5687 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5691 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5692 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5693 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5695 debug_assert!(false);
5696 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5698 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5699 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5700 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5701 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5702 let funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo();
5703 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5704 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5705 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5706 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan).map(|_| ())
5709 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5714 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
5715 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
5716 let mut push_forward_event = false;
5717 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
5718 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
5719 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5720 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5721 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
5722 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
5723 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
5724 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
5726 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
5727 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
5729 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5730 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
5731 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
5732 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5733 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5734 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
5736 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5737 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
5738 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
5740 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
5741 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5742 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
5743 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5744 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
5745 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
5746 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
5747 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
5748 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
5751 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5752 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
5754 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5755 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
5756 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5757 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5758 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5759 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5760 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
5761 phantom_shared_secret: None,
5764 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
5765 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
5766 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
5771 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
5772 // payments are being processed.
5773 if forward_htlcs_empty {
5774 push_forward_event = true;
5776 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5777 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
5784 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
5785 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
5788 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
5789 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5790 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
5792 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
5796 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued.
5797 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
5798 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5799 let forward_ev_exists = pending_events.iter()
5800 .find(|(ev, _)| if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false })
5802 if !forward_ev_exists {
5803 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5805 Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
5810 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
5811 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
5812 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
5813 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
5814 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
5815 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
5816 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
5818 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
5819 .get(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
5820 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
5821 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5822 channel_funding_outpoint,
5823 counterparty_node_id,
5828 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5829 let (htlcs_to_fail, res) = {
5830 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5831 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5833 debug_assert!(false);
5834 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5835 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
5836 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5837 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5838 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5839 let funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo();
5840 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), chan);
5841 let res = if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5842 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
5843 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan).map(|_| ())
5845 (htlcs_to_fail, res)
5847 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5850 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5854 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5855 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5856 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5858 debug_assert!(false);
5859 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5861 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5862 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5863 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5864 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5865 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
5867 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5872 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5873 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5874 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5876 debug_assert!(false);
5877 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5879 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5880 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5881 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5882 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5883 if !chan.get().context.is_usable() {
5884 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
5887 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5888 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5889 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
5890 msg, &self.default_configuration
5892 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5893 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5894 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap()),
5897 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5902 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5903 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5904 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5905 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
5907 // It's not a local channel
5908 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5911 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5912 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
5913 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
5914 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5916 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5917 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5918 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5919 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5920 if chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5921 if chan.get().context.should_announce() {
5922 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5923 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5924 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5925 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5927 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5929 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5930 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5931 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5932 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5934 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5935 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
5938 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5940 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5943 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5945 let need_lnd_workaround = {
5946 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5948 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5950 debug_assert!(false);
5951 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5953 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5954 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5955 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5956 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5957 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5958 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5959 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5960 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5961 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5962 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
5963 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
5964 let mut channel_update = None;
5965 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5966 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5967 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5970 } else if chan.get().context.is_usable() {
5971 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5972 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5973 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5974 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5975 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5976 node_id: chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5981 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5982 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
5983 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5984 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5985 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5986 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5990 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5994 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
5995 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
5998 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5999 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
6004 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
6005 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
6006 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
6008 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6009 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
6010 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
6011 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
6012 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
6013 match monitor_event {
6014 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
6015 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
6016 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
6017 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
6019 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
6020 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
6021 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6022 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6025 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
6026 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
6027 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
6028 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
6030 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
6031 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
6032 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6033 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
6036 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
6037 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6038 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6039 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6040 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6041 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6042 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
6043 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
6044 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
6045 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6046 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6050 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
6051 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
6053 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
6055 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, reason);
6056 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6057 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6058 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
6059 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
6066 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
6067 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
6073 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6074 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6077 has_pending_monitor_events
6080 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
6081 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
6082 /// update events as a separate process method here.
6084 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
6085 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6086 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
6089 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
6090 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
6091 /// update was applied.
6092 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
6093 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
6094 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
6095 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
6097 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
6098 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
6099 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
6100 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
6102 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6103 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6105 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6106 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6107 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
6108 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
6109 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6110 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
6111 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
6112 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
6113 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
6115 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
6116 has_monitor_update = true;
6118 let channel_id: [u8; 32] = *channel_id;
6119 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6120 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING,
6121 peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id));
6123 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, res));
6125 continue 'peer_loop;
6134 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
6135 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
6136 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
6139 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
6140 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
6146 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
6147 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
6148 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
6149 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
6150 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
6151 let mut has_update = false;
6153 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6155 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6156 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6157 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6158 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6159 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
6160 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
6161 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
6162 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
6164 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6165 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
6168 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
6169 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
6170 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
6171 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6172 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6177 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
6179 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
6180 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
6181 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
6187 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
6188 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
6196 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
6197 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
6203 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
6204 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
6206 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
6207 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6208 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
6209 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
6210 // reorganized out of the main chain.
6211 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
6212 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
6213 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
6214 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
6215 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
6216 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
6217 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
6218 assert!(should_broadcast);
6219 } else { unreachable!(); }
6220 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
6221 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
6222 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
6225 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6229 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
6232 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
6233 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
6235 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
6236 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
6237 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
6238 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
6240 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
6242 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
6243 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
6247 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
6248 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
6250 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
6252 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
6253 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
6255 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
6256 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
6257 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
6258 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
6259 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
6260 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
6261 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
6262 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
6263 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
6264 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
6265 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
6268 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
6269 /// stored external to LDK.
6271 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
6272 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
6273 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
6275 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
6276 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
6279 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
6280 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
6281 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
6282 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
6284 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
6285 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
6286 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
6287 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
6288 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
6290 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
6291 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
6292 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
6293 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
6294 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
6296 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
6297 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
6299 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
6300 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
6304 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
6305 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
6307 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
6309 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
6310 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
6312 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6313 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
6314 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
6315 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
6316 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
6317 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
6318 min_final_cltv_expiry)
6321 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
6322 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
6324 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6325 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
6326 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
6329 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
6330 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
6332 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
6333 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
6334 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6335 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
6337 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
6338 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
6339 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
6340 Some(_) => continue,
6341 None => return scid_candidate
6346 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
6348 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
6349 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
6351 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
6352 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
6353 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
6357 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
6358 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
6359 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
6361 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
6362 /// times to get a unique scid.
6363 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
6364 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6365 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
6367 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
6368 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
6369 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
6370 return scid_candidate
6374 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
6375 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
6376 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
6377 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
6379 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6380 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6381 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6382 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6383 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
6384 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
6385 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
6386 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
6395 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6396 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
6397 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
6398 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
6399 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
6403 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
6404 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
6405 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6406 events.push_back((event, None));
6410 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
6411 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6412 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
6416 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
6417 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
6421 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
6422 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
6425 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
6426 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
6427 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
6428 /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
6429 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
6430 let mut errors = Vec::new();
6432 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6433 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6434 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6435 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
6437 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
6438 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
6439 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6440 .get_mut(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
6442 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
6446 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
6447 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id) {
6448 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
6449 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
6450 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
6451 log_trace!(self.logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
6452 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6456 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
6457 debug_assert_eq!(chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
6458 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.get_mut().unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
6459 log_debug!(self.logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
6460 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6461 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
6462 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
6464 errors.push((e, counterparty_node_id));
6466 if further_update_exists {
6467 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
6472 log_trace!(self.logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
6473 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6477 log_debug!(self.logger,
6478 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
6479 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6483 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in errors {
6484 let res = Err::<(), _>(err);
6485 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
6489 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
6490 for action in actions {
6492 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6493 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
6495 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, None);
6501 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
6502 /// using the given event handler.
6504 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
6505 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
6509 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
6513 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6515 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6516 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6517 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6518 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6519 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6520 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6524 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
6525 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
6526 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
6527 /// is always placed next to each other.
6529 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
6530 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
6531 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
6532 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
6534 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
6535 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
6536 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
6537 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
6538 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
6539 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6540 let mut result = self.process_background_events();
6542 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
6543 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
6544 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
6545 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6548 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
6549 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6551 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
6552 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6555 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
6556 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6557 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6558 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6559 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6560 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
6561 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
6565 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
6566 events.replace(pending_events);
6575 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6577 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6578 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6579 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6580 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6581 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6582 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6586 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
6588 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
6589 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
6590 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
6592 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
6596 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6598 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6599 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6600 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6601 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6602 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6603 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6607 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6609 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6610 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
6611 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
6612 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
6613 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
6616 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
6617 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
6620 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6621 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6622 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6623 let new_height = height - 1;
6625 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
6626 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
6627 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
6628 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
6629 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
6630 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
6633 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6637 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6639 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6640 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6641 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6642 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6643 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6644 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6648 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6649 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6650 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6651 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6653 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6654 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
6656 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6657 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6658 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
6659 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
6661 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6662 if height < last_best_block_height {
6663 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6664 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6668 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6669 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6670 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6671 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6673 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6674 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
6676 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6677 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6678 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
6680 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6682 macro_rules! max_time {
6683 ($timestamp: expr) => {
6685 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
6686 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
6687 // having an explicit local time source.
6688 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
6689 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
6690 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6691 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
6692 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
6698 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
6699 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6700 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
6701 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
6705 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
6706 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
6707 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
6708 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6709 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6710 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
6711 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.context.get_funding_txo(), chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
6712 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
6719 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
6720 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6721 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6722 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
6723 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
6724 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
6725 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
6726 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6727 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6732 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6734 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6735 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6736 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6737 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6738 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6739 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6743 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
6744 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
6746 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
6747 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
6748 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6749 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6750 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6752 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6753 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
6755 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6756 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6757 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6758 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6759 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6760 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
6761 let res = f(channel);
6762 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
6763 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
6764 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
6765 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
6766 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
6768 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
6769 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
6770 if channel.context.is_usable() {
6771 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
6772 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
6773 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6774 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6779 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
6784 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6785 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
6788 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
6789 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
6790 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6791 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6792 msg: announcement_sigs,
6794 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6795 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
6796 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6798 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6799 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6800 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
6805 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
6806 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
6807 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
6808 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
6809 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
6810 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
6811 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
6812 // is always consistent.
6813 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
6814 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
6815 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
6816 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
6817 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
6820 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
6821 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
6822 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
6823 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
6824 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true));
6825 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
6826 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6830 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
6831 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, reason);
6832 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6833 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6834 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
6835 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
6836 data: reason_message,
6846 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6847 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
6848 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
6849 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
6850 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
6851 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
6852 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
6853 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6854 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6855 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
6857 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
6858 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
6859 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
6863 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
6866 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6867 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
6868 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6869 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6870 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
6871 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
6872 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6873 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6874 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
6877 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
6878 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6879 _ => unreachable!(),
6881 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
6882 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
6883 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
6884 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
6890 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
6892 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
6893 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
6897 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
6899 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
6900 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
6902 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
6903 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
6906 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6907 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
6908 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
6911 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
6912 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
6913 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
6914 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
6917 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6918 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6919 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6920 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6923 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6924 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6926 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6927 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6928 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6929 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6930 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
6933 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6934 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6935 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
6936 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
6939 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6940 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6941 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6942 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
6945 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6946 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6947 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
6948 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6952 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
6953 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6955 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6956 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6957 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6958 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6959 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6960 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6964 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
6965 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6966 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6969 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
6970 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6971 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6972 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6975 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
6976 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6977 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6980 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
6981 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6982 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6983 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6986 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6987 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6988 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6991 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6992 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6993 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6996 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6997 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6998 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7001 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
7002 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7003 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7006 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
7007 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7008 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7011 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
7012 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7013 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7016 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
7017 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7018 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7021 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
7022 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7023 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7026 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
7027 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7028 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7031 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
7032 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7033 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7036 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
7037 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7038 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7041 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
7042 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7043 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7046 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
7047 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7048 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7051 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
7052 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
7053 let force_persist = self.process_background_events();
7054 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
7055 if force_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { NotifyOption::DoPersist } else { persist }
7057 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
7062 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
7063 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7064 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7067 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
7068 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7069 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7070 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7072 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
7073 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7074 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
7075 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7076 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7077 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7078 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
7079 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
7080 if chan.is_shutdown() {
7081 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7082 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
7087 peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
7088 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7089 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
7092 peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
7093 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7094 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
7097 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
7099 // V1 Channel Establishment
7100 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
7101 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
7102 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
7103 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
7104 // V2 Channel Establishment
7105 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
7106 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
7107 // Common Channel Establishment
7108 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
7109 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
7110 // Interactive Transaction Construction
7111 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
7112 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
7113 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
7114 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
7115 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
7116 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
7117 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
7118 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
7119 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
7120 // Channel Operations
7121 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
7122 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
7123 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
7124 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
7125 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
7126 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
7128 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
7129 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
7130 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
7131 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
7132 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
7133 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
7134 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
7135 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
7136 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
7139 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
7140 peer_state.is_connected = false;
7141 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
7142 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
7145 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
7147 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
7149 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7150 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
7154 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
7155 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
7156 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7160 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7162 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
7163 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
7164 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
7165 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
7166 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
7167 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
7170 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7171 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
7172 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
7173 if inbound_peer_limited {
7176 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
7177 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7178 outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7179 inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7180 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
7181 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7182 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
7183 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
7184 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
7188 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
7189 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
7190 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
7192 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7193 if inbound_peer_limited &&
7194 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
7195 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
7200 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
7201 peer_state.is_connected = true;
7206 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7208 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7209 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7210 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7211 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7212 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7213 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
7214 let retain = if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
7215 if !chan.context.have_received_message() {
7216 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
7217 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
7218 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
7222 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
7223 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7224 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
7229 if retain && chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
7230 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.default_configuration) {
7231 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
7232 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
7233 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7242 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
7246 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
7247 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7249 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
7250 let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = {
7251 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7252 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
7253 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
7254 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7255 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7256 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned()
7257 .chain(peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.keys().cloned())
7258 .chain(peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.keys().cloned()).collect()
7260 for channel_id in channel_ids {
7261 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
7262 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
7266 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
7267 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7268 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
7269 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
7270 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7271 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7272 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
7273 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
7274 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
7275 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7283 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
7284 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
7288 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
7289 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
7292 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
7293 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
7296 fn get_genesis_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
7297 Some(vec![ChainHash::from(&self.genesis_hash[..])])
7300 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
7301 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7302 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7303 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7306 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
7307 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7308 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7309 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7312 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
7313 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7314 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7315 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7318 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
7319 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7320 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7321 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7324 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
7325 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7326 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7327 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7330 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
7331 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7332 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7333 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7336 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
7337 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7338 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7339 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7342 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
7343 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7344 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7345 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7348 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
7349 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7350 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7351 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7355 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7356 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7357 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
7358 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
7361 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7362 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7364 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
7365 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
7366 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
7367 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InvoiceFeatures {
7368 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
7371 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7372 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7373 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
7374 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
7377 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7378 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7379 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
7380 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
7383 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7384 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7385 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
7386 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
7387 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
7388 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
7389 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
7390 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
7391 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
7392 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
7393 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
7394 features.set_payment_secret_required();
7395 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
7396 features.set_wumbo_optional();
7397 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
7398 features.set_channel_type_optional();
7399 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
7400 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
7401 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
7402 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
7407 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
7408 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
7410 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
7411 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
7412 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
7413 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
7416 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
7417 (2, node_id, required),
7418 (4, features, required),
7419 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
7420 (8, forwarding_info, option),
7421 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7422 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7425 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
7426 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7427 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7428 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
7429 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
7430 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
7431 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7432 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
7433 (2, self.channel_id, required),
7434 (3, self.channel_type, option),
7435 (4, self.counterparty, required),
7436 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
7437 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
7438 (7, self.config, option),
7439 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
7440 (9, self.confirmations, option),
7441 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
7442 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
7443 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
7444 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
7445 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
7446 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
7447 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
7448 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
7449 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
7450 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
7451 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
7452 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
7453 (30, self.is_usable, required),
7454 (32, self.is_public, required),
7455 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7456 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7457 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
7458 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
7459 (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
7465 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
7466 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7467 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7468 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
7469 (2, channel_id, required),
7470 (3, channel_type, option),
7471 (4, counterparty, required),
7472 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7473 (6, funding_txo, option),
7474 (7, config, option),
7475 (8, short_channel_id, option),
7476 (9, confirmations, option),
7477 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
7478 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
7479 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
7480 (16, balance_msat, required),
7481 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
7482 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
7483 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
7484 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
7485 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
7486 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
7487 (22, confirmations_required, option),
7488 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
7489 (26, is_outbound, required),
7490 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
7491 (30, is_usable, required),
7492 (32, is_public, required),
7493 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7494 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7495 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
7496 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
7497 (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
7500 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7501 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
7502 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
7503 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
7504 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
7508 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
7510 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
7511 outbound_scid_alias,
7515 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
7516 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
7518 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
7519 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
7520 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
7521 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
7522 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
7523 confirmations_required,
7525 force_close_spend_delay,
7526 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
7527 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
7528 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
7529 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
7530 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
7531 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
7532 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
7533 channel_shutdown_state,
7538 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
7539 (2, channels, vec_type),
7540 (4, phantom_scid, required),
7541 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
7544 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
7546 (0, onion_packet, required),
7547 (2, short_channel_id, required),
7550 (0, payment_data, required),
7551 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
7552 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
7553 (3, payment_metadata, option),
7555 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
7556 (0, payment_preimage, required),
7557 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
7558 (3, payment_metadata, option),
7559 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
7563 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
7564 (0, routing, required),
7565 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
7566 (4, payment_hash, required),
7567 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
7568 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
7569 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
7570 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
7574 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
7575 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7577 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
7579 channel_id.write(writer)?;
7580 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7581 reason.write(writer)?;
7583 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7584 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
7587 channel_id.write(writer)?;
7588 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7589 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
7590 failure_code.write(writer)?;
7597 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
7598 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7599 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7602 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
7603 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7604 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7605 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
7609 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7610 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7611 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7612 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
7613 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
7616 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
7617 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
7618 // messages contained in the variants.
7619 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
7620 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
7621 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
7623 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
7624 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
7625 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
7626 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
7627 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
7630 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
7631 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
7632 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
7633 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
7634 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
7636 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
7641 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
7646 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
7647 (0, short_channel_id, required),
7648 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
7649 (2, outpoint, required),
7650 (4, htlc_id, required),
7651 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
7654 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
7655 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7656 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
7657 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
7658 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
7660 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7661 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
7662 (1, self.total_msat, required),
7663 (2, self.value, required),
7664 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
7665 (4, payment_data, option),
7666 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
7667 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
7668 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
7669 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
7675 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
7676 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7677 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7678 (0, prev_hop, required),
7679 (1, total_msat, option),
7680 (2, value_ser, required),
7681 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
7682 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
7683 (5, total_value_received, option),
7684 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
7685 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
7686 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
7688 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
7689 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
7690 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
7692 if payment_data.is_some() {
7693 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7695 if total_msat.is_none() {
7696 total_msat = Some(value);
7698 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
7701 if total_msat.is_none() {
7702 if payment_data.is_none() {
7703 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7705 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
7707 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
7711 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
7714 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
7715 total_value_received,
7716 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
7718 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
7719 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
7724 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
7725 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7726 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7729 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
7730 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
7731 let mut path_hops: Option<Vec<RouteHop>> = Some(Vec::new());
7732 let mut payment_id = None;
7733 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
7734 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
7735 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7736 (0, session_priv, required),
7737 (1, payment_id, option),
7738 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
7739 (4, path_hops, vec_type),
7740 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
7741 (6, blinded_tail, option),
7743 if payment_id.is_none() {
7744 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
7746 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
7748 let path = Path { hops: path_hops.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?, blinded_tail };
7749 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
7750 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7752 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
7753 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
7754 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
7755 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7759 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7760 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
7761 first_hop_htlc_msat,
7763 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
7766 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7767 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
7772 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
7773 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
7775 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
7777 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
7778 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7779 (0, session_priv, required),
7780 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
7781 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
7782 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
7783 (4, path.hops, vec_type),
7784 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
7785 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
7788 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
7790 field.write(writer)?;
7797 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
7798 (0, forward_info, required),
7799 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
7800 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
7801 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
7802 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
7805 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
7807 (0, htlc_id, required),
7808 (2, err_packet, required),
7813 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
7814 (0, payment_secret, required),
7815 (2, expiry_time, required),
7816 (4, user_payment_id, required),
7817 (6, payment_preimage, required),
7818 (8, min_value_msat, required),
7821 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7823 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7824 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7825 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7826 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7827 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7828 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7832 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7833 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
7835 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7837 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
7839 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7840 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
7841 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
7844 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
7846 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7847 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
7848 let mut number_of_channels = 0;
7849 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7850 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7851 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7852 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7853 serializable_peer_count += 1;
7855 number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len();
7856 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
7857 if !channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
7858 unfunded_channels += 1;
7863 ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
7865 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7866 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7867 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7868 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
7869 if channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
7870 channel.write(writer)?;
7877 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7878 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7879 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
7880 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7881 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7882 for forward in pending_forwards {
7883 forward.write(writer)?;
7888 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7890 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7891 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
7892 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7894 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
7895 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
7896 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7897 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
7898 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7899 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7900 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
7901 htlc.write(writer)?;
7903 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
7904 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
7907 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
7908 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
7909 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7910 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
7911 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
7912 // per_peer_state lock at all.
7913 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
7916 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
7917 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
7918 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
7919 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
7920 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
7922 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7923 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
7924 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
7925 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
7926 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
7927 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
7928 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
7933 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7934 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
7935 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
7936 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
7937 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
7938 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
7939 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
7940 // well save the space and not write any events here.
7941 0u64.write(writer)?;
7943 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7944 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
7945 event.write(writer)?;
7949 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
7950 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
7951 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
7952 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
7953 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
7954 0u64.write(writer)?;
7956 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
7957 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
7958 // likely to be identical.
7959 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7960 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7962 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7963 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
7964 hash.write(writer)?;
7965 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
7968 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
7969 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
7970 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7971 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
7972 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
7975 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
7976 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7978 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7979 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7980 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
7981 session_priv.write(writer)?;
7984 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
7985 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
7989 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
7990 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
7991 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7993 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7994 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7995 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
8001 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
8002 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8003 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
8004 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
8007 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
8008 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
8009 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
8010 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
8011 pending_claiming_payments = None;
8014 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
8015 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
8016 for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
8017 if !updates.is_empty() {
8018 if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(HashMap::new()); }
8019 in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
8024 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8025 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
8026 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
8027 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
8028 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
8029 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
8030 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
8031 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
8032 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
8033 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
8034 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
8035 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
8036 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
8043 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
8044 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8045 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
8046 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
8049 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
8050 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
8051 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
8052 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
8053 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
8054 // check that the event is sane here.
8055 let event_encoded = event.encode();
8056 let event_read: Option<Event> =
8057 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
8058 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
8064 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
8065 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8066 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8067 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
8068 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
8069 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
8072 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
8073 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
8074 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
8075 events.push_back((ev, action));
8076 } else if action.is_some() {
8077 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8084 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
8085 (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
8086 (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
8087 (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
8088 (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
8089 (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
8092 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
8094 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
8096 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
8097 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
8098 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
8099 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
8100 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
8101 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
8102 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
8103 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
8104 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
8105 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
8106 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
8107 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
8108 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
8110 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
8111 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
8113 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
8114 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
8116 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
8117 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
8118 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
8119 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
8120 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
8121 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
8123 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
8124 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8126 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8127 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8128 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8129 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8130 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8131 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8135 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
8136 pub entropy_source: ES,
8138 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
8139 pub node_signer: NS,
8141 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
8142 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
8144 pub signer_provider: SP,
8146 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
8148 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
8149 pub fee_estimator: F,
8150 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
8152 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
8153 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
8154 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
8155 pub chain_monitor: M,
8157 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
8158 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
8159 /// force-closed during deserialization.
8160 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
8161 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
8162 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
8164 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
8166 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
8167 /// deserialization.
8169 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
8170 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
8171 pub default_config: UserConfig,
8173 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
8174 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
8176 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
8177 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
8178 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
8179 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
8181 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
8184 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
8185 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
8188 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8189 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8191 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8192 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8193 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8194 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8195 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8196 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8200 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
8201 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
8202 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
8203 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
8204 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
8206 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
8207 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
8212 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
8213 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
8214 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8215 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
8217 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8218 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8219 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8220 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8221 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8222 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8226 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8227 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
8228 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
8232 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8233 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
8235 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8236 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8237 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8238 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8239 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8240 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8244 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8245 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8247 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8248 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8249 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8251 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
8253 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8254 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8255 let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8256 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8257 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8258 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
8259 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
8260 for _ in 0..channel_count {
8261 let mut channel: Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (
8262 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
8264 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8265 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
8266 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
8267 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
8268 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
8269 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
8270 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
8271 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
8272 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
8273 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
8274 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
8275 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
8276 let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
8277 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = monitor_update {
8278 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
8279 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
8282 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
8283 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
8284 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8285 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
8286 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
8288 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
8289 let mut found_htlc = false;
8290 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
8291 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
8294 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
8295 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
8296 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
8297 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
8298 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
8299 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
8300 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
8301 log_info!(args.logger,
8302 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
8303 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
8304 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8308 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
8309 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
8310 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
8311 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
8312 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8314 if channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
8315 id_to_peer.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
8317 match peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
8318 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
8319 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
8320 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel);
8322 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
8323 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
8324 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel);
8325 entry.insert(by_id_map);
8329 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
8330 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
8331 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
8332 // safely discard the channel.
8333 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false);
8334 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
8335 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8336 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
8337 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
8340 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
8341 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
8342 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
8343 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
8344 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
8345 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8349 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8350 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
8351 log_info!(args.logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
8352 log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
8353 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
8354 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
8355 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
8357 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
8361 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
8362 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8363 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
8364 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
8365 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8366 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8367 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
8368 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
8369 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
8371 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
8374 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8375 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
8376 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
8377 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8378 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8379 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
8380 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
8381 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
8383 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
8386 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
8389 outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8390 inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8391 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
8392 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
8393 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8394 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
8395 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8396 is_connected: false,
8400 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8401 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>)>()));
8402 for _ in 0..peer_count {
8403 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
8404 let peer_chans = peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new());
8405 let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
8406 peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
8407 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
8410 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8411 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
8412 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
8413 for _ in 0..event_count {
8414 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
8415 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
8420 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8421 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
8422 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8424 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
8425 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
8426 // on-startup monitor updates.
8427 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
8428 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
8430 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8434 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
8435 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8437 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8438 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
8439 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
8440 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
8441 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8445 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8446 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
8447 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
8448 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
8449 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
8450 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
8451 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
8453 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
8454 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8458 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
8459 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
8460 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
8461 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
8462 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
8463 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
8464 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
8465 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
8466 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
8467 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
8468 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
8469 let mut events_override = None;
8470 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
8471 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8472 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
8473 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
8474 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
8475 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
8476 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
8477 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
8478 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
8479 (8, events_override, option),
8480 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
8481 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
8482 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
8483 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
8485 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
8486 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8489 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
8490 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8493 if let Some(events) = events_override {
8494 pending_events_read = events;
8497 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
8498 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
8501 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
8502 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
8503 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
8504 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
8505 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
8506 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
8508 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
8510 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
8511 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
8512 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
8515 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
8516 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
8517 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
8518 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
8519 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
8521 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
8522 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
8523 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
8525 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
8526 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
8527 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
8528 ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
8529 $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
8531 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
8532 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
8533 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
8534 log_trace!(args.logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
8535 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, log_bytes!($funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
8536 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
8537 pending_background_events.push(
8538 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
8539 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
8540 funding_txo: $funding_txo,
8541 update: update.clone(),
8544 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
8545 // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
8546 // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
8547 // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
8548 pending_background_events.push(
8549 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
8550 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
8551 channel_id: $funding_txo.to_channel_id(),
8554 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
8555 log_error!(args.logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
8556 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8558 max_in_flight_update_id
8562 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
8563 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
8564 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8565 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
8566 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
8568 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8569 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
8570 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
8571 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
8572 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
8573 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
8574 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
8575 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
8576 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, ""));
8579 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
8580 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
8581 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
8582 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
8583 log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
8584 log_error!(args.logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
8585 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
8586 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
8587 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
8588 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
8589 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8594 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
8595 for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
8596 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
8597 // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
8598 // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
8599 // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
8600 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
8601 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(HashMap::new()))
8603 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8604 handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
8605 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, "closed ");
8607 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
8608 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.",
8609 log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
8610 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
8611 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
8612 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
8613 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
8614 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8619 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
8620 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
8622 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
8623 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
8624 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
8625 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
8628 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
8629 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
8630 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
8631 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
8632 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
8633 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
8634 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
8636 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8637 let counterparty_opt = id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
8638 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
8639 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
8640 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
8641 if path.hops.is_empty() {
8642 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
8643 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8646 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
8647 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
8648 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
8649 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
8650 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
8651 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
8652 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
8653 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
8655 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
8656 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
8657 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
8658 retry_strategy: None,
8659 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
8660 payment_params: None,
8661 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
8662 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
8663 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8664 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8665 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8666 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
8667 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
8668 total_msat: path_amt,
8669 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
8671 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
8672 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
8677 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
8679 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
8680 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
8681 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
8682 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
8684 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
8685 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
8686 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
8687 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
8688 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
8689 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
8690 forwards.retain(|forward| {
8691 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
8692 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
8693 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
8694 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
8699 !forwards.is_empty()
8701 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
8702 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
8703 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
8704 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
8705 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
8706 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
8707 intercepted_id != ev_id
8714 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
8715 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
8716 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
8717 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
8718 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
8719 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
8720 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
8721 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
8722 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
8723 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
8724 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
8725 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv, path, false, &pending_events, &args.logger);
8726 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
8733 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
8734 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
8736 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
8738 .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
8739 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
8740 if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
8741 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
8742 // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
8743 // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
8744 // channel_id -> peer map entry).
8745 counterparty_opt.is_none(),
8746 monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()))
8749 // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
8750 // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
8751 // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
8752 // channel still live case here.
8756 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
8757 pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
8762 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
8763 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
8764 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
8765 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
8766 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
8767 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
8768 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
8769 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
8773 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
8774 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
8776 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
8777 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
8778 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
8779 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8781 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
8782 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
8783 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8785 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
8786 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
8788 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
8789 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
8791 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
8794 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
8795 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
8796 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
8798 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
8802 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
8803 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
8804 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
8805 if htlcs.is_empty() {
8806 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8808 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
8809 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
8810 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
8811 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
8812 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
8813 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
8814 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
8815 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
8817 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
8818 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8822 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
8824 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
8826 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
8827 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
8829 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
8830 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
8835 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8836 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8838 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
8840 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8842 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
8843 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
8844 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
8845 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8849 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
8850 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
8851 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8852 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8853 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
8854 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
8855 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
8857 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
8858 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
8859 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
8861 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
8862 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
8863 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
8864 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
8865 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
8866 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8868 if chan.context.is_usable() {
8869 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
8870 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
8871 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
8872 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
8873 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8879 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
8881 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8882 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
8883 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
8884 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
8885 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
8886 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
8887 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
8888 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
8889 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
8890 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
8891 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
8893 for claimable_htlc in payment.htlcs {
8894 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
8896 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
8897 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
8898 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
8899 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
8901 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
8902 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
8903 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
8904 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
8906 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
8907 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
8908 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
8909 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
8911 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
8912 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
8913 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
8914 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8915 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8916 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
8917 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
8920 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
8921 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
8924 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
8927 purpose: payment.purpose,
8928 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
8934 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
8935 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
8936 for (_, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
8937 for action in actions.iter() {
8938 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
8939 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
8940 Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), ..
8942 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
8943 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
8944 .entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
8945 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
8950 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
8952 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
8953 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8957 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
8959 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
8960 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
8961 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
8962 router: args.router,
8964 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
8966 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
8967 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
8968 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
8969 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
8971 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
8972 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
8973 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
8974 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
8975 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
8976 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
8978 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
8983 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
8985 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
8987 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
8988 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
8989 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
8990 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
8991 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
8992 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
8994 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
8995 node_signer: args.node_signer,
8996 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
8998 logger: args.logger,
8999 default_configuration: args.default_config,
9002 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
9003 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
9004 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
9005 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
9006 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
9009 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_chan_id) in pending_claims_to_replay {
9010 // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
9011 // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
9012 // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
9013 channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value),
9014 downstream_closed, downstream_chan_id);
9017 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
9018 //connection or two.
9020 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
9026 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
9027 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
9028 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
9029 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
9030 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
9031 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
9032 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
9033 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
9034 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
9035 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
9036 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
9037 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
9038 use crate::util::test_utils;
9039 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
9040 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
9043 fn test_notify_limits() {
9044 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
9045 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
9046 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9047 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9048 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9049 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9051 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
9052 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
9053 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9054 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9055 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9057 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9059 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
9060 // to connect messages with new values
9061 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
9062 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
9063 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
9064 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
9065 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
9066 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
9068 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
9069 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9070 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9071 // ... but the last node should not.
9072 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9073 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
9074 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9075 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9077 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
9078 // about the channel.
9079 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
9080 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
9081 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9083 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
9085 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
9086 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
9087 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
9088 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
9089 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9090 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9092 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
9093 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
9094 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
9096 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
9097 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
9098 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
9099 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
9100 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
9101 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
9103 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
9104 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
9105 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
9106 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
9107 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9108 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9109 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
9110 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
9112 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
9113 // the channel info has updated.
9114 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
9115 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
9116 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9117 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9118 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
9119 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
9123 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
9124 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
9126 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9127 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9128 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9129 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9130 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9132 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
9133 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
9134 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
9135 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
9137 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
9138 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
9139 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
9140 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
9141 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
9142 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
9143 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
9144 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
9145 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9146 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9147 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9148 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
9150 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
9151 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9152 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9153 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9154 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9155 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9156 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9157 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9158 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9159 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9160 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9161 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9162 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9163 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9164 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9165 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9166 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9167 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9168 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9169 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9170 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9171 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9172 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
9174 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
9175 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
9176 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
9177 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9178 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9179 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9180 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
9182 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
9183 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
9184 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
9185 // lightning messages manually.
9186 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9187 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
9188 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9190 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9191 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9192 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
9193 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9194 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9195 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
9196 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9197 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9198 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
9199 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9200 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9201 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9202 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
9203 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9204 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9205 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
9206 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9207 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9208 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
9209 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9210 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
9211 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9212 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9213 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
9214 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9216 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
9217 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
9218 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9219 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
9221 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
9222 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
9223 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
9224 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
9226 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9229 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
9230 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
9231 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
9232 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
9234 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9237 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
9238 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
9239 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
9240 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
9242 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9247 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
9248 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
9249 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
9252 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
9253 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
9254 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
9255 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
9256 // fails as expected.
9257 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
9258 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
9259 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
9260 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
9261 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
9262 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
9263 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9264 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9265 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
9266 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
9267 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
9268 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9269 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9270 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9271 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9273 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
9274 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
9275 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
9277 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
9278 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9279 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
9280 final_value_msat: 100_000,
9282 let route = find_route(
9283 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
9284 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9286 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9287 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9288 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9289 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9290 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9291 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9292 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9293 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9294 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9295 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9296 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
9297 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
9298 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9299 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9300 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9301 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9302 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9303 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9304 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9305 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9306 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9307 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9308 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9309 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9311 // Finally, claim the original payment.
9312 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
9314 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
9315 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9316 let route = find_route(
9317 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
9318 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9320 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9321 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9322 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9323 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9324 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9325 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9326 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9327 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
9329 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
9330 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
9331 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9332 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9333 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9334 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9335 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9336 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9337 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9338 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9339 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9340 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9341 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9342 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9343 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9344 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9345 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9346 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9347 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9348 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9349 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9350 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9351 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9352 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9354 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
9355 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
9357 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
9358 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
9359 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9360 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
9361 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9362 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9363 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9364 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9365 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9366 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
9368 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
9369 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9370 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
9371 final_value_msat: 100_000,
9373 let route = find_route(
9374 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
9375 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9377 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
9378 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9379 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
9380 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9381 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9382 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9383 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9384 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9385 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9386 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9387 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9388 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9389 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9390 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9391 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9392 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9393 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9394 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9395 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9396 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9397 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9398 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9399 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9401 // Finally, claim the original payment.
9402 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
9406 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
9407 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
9408 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
9409 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9410 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9411 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9412 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9414 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9415 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9417 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9418 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9419 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false),
9420 final_value_msat: 10_000,
9422 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
9423 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9424 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9425 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9426 let route = find_route(
9427 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9428 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9431 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9432 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
9433 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
9434 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
9435 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
9436 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
9437 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9439 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9440 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
9441 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9442 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9443 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9444 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9445 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
9447 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
9451 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
9452 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
9453 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
9454 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
9455 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
9456 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9457 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9458 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
9459 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9461 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9462 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9464 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9465 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9466 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false),
9467 final_value_msat: 10_000,
9469 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
9470 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9471 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9472 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9473 let route = find_route(
9474 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9475 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9478 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9479 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
9480 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
9481 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
9482 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
9483 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
9484 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
9485 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
9486 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9488 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9489 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
9490 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9491 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9492 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9493 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9494 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
9496 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
9500 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
9501 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9502 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9503 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9504 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9506 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9507 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9508 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9509 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9511 // Marshall an MPP route.
9512 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
9513 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
9514 route.paths.push(path);
9515 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9516 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
9517 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
9518 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
9519 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
9520 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
9522 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9523 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
9525 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
9526 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
9528 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
9533 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
9534 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9535 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9536 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9537 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9539 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9541 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9542 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9544 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9545 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
9546 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9547 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9550 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
9551 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
9552 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9553 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
9554 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
9555 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
9558 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9561 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
9562 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
9567 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
9568 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
9569 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9570 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9571 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9572 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9574 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
9575 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
9577 total_msat: 100_000,
9580 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
9581 // payment verification fails as expected.
9582 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
9583 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
9584 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
9585 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
9587 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
9591 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
9592 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
9596 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
9597 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
9598 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
9599 // the channel is successfully closed.
9600 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9601 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9602 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9603 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9605 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9606 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9607 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
9608 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9609 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9611 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
9612 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
9614 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
9615 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
9616 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9617 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9620 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9622 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
9623 // as it has the funding transaction.
9624 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9625 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
9626 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9629 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9631 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9633 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9635 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9636 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
9637 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9639 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9642 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
9643 // as it has the funding transaction.
9644 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9645 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
9646 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9648 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9649 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9650 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
9651 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9652 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9653 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9654 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9655 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
9657 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9658 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9659 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9660 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
9662 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9663 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
9665 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
9666 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
9667 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
9668 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
9669 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9670 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
9671 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9675 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
9676 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
9677 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
9678 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
9679 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9680 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
9681 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9684 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9686 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
9687 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
9688 // closing transaction).
9689 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
9690 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
9691 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9693 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
9694 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
9695 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9696 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
9697 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9700 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9702 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
9704 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
9705 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
9706 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9708 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9710 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
9711 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
9714 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
9715 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
9716 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
9719 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
9720 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
9721 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
9724 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
9726 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
9727 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
9729 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
9730 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
9732 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
9733 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
9738 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
9739 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
9740 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
9741 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
9742 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9743 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
9744 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
9745 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
9748 let channel_id = [4; 32];
9749 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9750 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
9752 // Test the API functions.
9753 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
9755 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
9757 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
9759 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
9761 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
9763 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
9765 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
9769 fn test_connection_limiting() {
9770 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
9771 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9772 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9773 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9774 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9776 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
9778 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9779 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9781 let mut funding_tx = None;
9782 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
9783 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9784 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9787 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9788 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
9789 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
9790 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
9791 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9793 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9794 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9795 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9797 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9799 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
9800 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9801 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9803 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9806 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
9807 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9808 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9809 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
9810 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9812 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
9813 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
9815 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
9816 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
9817 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9818 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9819 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
9820 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9821 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9824 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9825 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9826 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9827 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9828 }, true).unwrap_err();
9830 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
9831 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
9832 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9833 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9834 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
9835 for ev in chan_closed_events {
9836 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
9838 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9839 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9841 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
9842 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9843 }, true).unwrap_err();
9845 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
9846 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
9847 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9849 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9851 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
9852 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
9854 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
9855 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
9856 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
9857 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
9858 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9860 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9861 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
9862 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9864 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
9865 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9866 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
9868 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
9869 // "protected" and can connect again.
9870 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
9871 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
9872 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9874 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9876 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
9878 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9879 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
9883 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
9884 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
9885 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9886 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9887 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9888 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9890 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
9892 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9893 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9895 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
9896 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9897 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9898 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9901 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
9903 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9904 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
9905 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9907 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
9908 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9909 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9911 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
9912 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9913 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
9914 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9918 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
9919 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
9920 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
9921 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9922 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9923 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
9924 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
9925 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
9926 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9928 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
9930 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9931 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9933 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
9934 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
9935 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9936 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9937 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9938 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9941 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9942 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9944 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9945 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
9947 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9949 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
9950 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9953 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
9954 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9955 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9956 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9957 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9959 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9960 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9962 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9963 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
9964 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
9965 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
9969 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9971 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
9972 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9974 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
9975 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9976 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9978 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9979 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
9981 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9983 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
9987 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
9988 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
9989 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
9990 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
9991 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
9992 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
9993 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
9994 let hop_data = msgs::OnionHopData {
9995 amt_to_forward: 100,
9996 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
9997 format: msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode {
9998 keysend_preimage: None,
9999 payment_metadata: None,
10000 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
10001 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
10005 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
10006 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
10007 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::ReceiveError { err_code, .. }) =
10008 node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10009 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat))
10011 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
10012 } else { panic!(); }
10014 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
10015 let hop_data = msgs::OnionHopData { // This is the same hop_data as above, OnionHopData doesn't implement Clone
10016 amt_to_forward: 100,
10017 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
10018 format: msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode {
10019 keysend_preimage: None,
10020 payment_metadata: None,
10021 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
10022 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
10026 assert!(node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10027 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat)).is_ok());
10031 fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
10032 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
10033 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
10034 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
10035 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
10037 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
10038 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
10040 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10041 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10042 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
10043 &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
10044 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10046 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10047 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10049 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10050 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
10051 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10052 match &msg_events[0] {
10053 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
10054 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10056 ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
10057 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
10058 _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
10061 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10064 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10065 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10067 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
10068 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
10069 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10071 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10075 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
10076 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
10077 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
10078 // the channel without the anchors feature.
10079 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10080 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10081 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
10082 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
10083 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
10084 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
10085 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10087 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
10088 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10089 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
10091 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10092 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10094 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10095 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
10097 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10100 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10101 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
10103 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10104 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
10106 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
10110 fn test_update_channel_config() {
10111 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10112 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
10113 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
10114 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
10115 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
10116 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10117 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
10119 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
10120 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10121 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
10123 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
10124 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
10125 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
10126 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10127 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10129 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10130 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
10133 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
10134 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10135 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
10137 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
10138 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
10139 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
10140 ..Default::default()
10142 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
10143 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10144 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10146 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10147 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
10150 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
10151 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
10152 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
10153 ..Default::default()
10155 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
10156 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
10157 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10158 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10160 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10161 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
10168 use crate::chain::Listen;
10169 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
10170 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
10171 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
10172 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
10173 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
10174 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
10175 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
10176 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
10177 use crate::util::test_utils;
10178 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
10180 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
10181 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
10182 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
10184 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
10186 use criterion::Criterion;
10188 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
10189 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
10190 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
10191 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
10192 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
10193 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
10194 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
10196 struct ANodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
10197 node: &'a Manager<'a, P>,
10199 impl<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'a, P> {
10200 type CM = Manager<'a, P>;
10202 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'a, P> { self.node }
10204 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
10207 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
10208 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
10211 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
10212 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
10213 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
10215 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
10216 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
10218 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
10219 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
10220 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
10221 let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
10222 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
10224 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
10225 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
10226 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
10228 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
10229 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
10230 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
10231 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
10233 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
10234 }, genesis_block.header.time);
10235 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
10237 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
10238 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
10239 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
10240 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
10241 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
10243 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
10244 }, genesis_block.header.time);
10245 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
10247 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
10248 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10250 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
10251 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10252 }, false).unwrap();
10253 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
10254 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
10255 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10258 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
10259 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
10260 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
10262 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
10263 } else { panic!(); }
10265 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
10266 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10267 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
10268 match events_b[0] {
10269 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10270 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
10272 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10275 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10276 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10277 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
10278 match events_a[0] {
10279 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10280 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
10282 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10285 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
10287 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), 42, vec![tx]);
10288 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
10289 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
10291 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10292 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10293 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
10294 match msg_events[0] {
10295 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
10296 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
10297 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
10301 match msg_events[1] {
10302 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10306 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10307 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
10308 match events_a[0] {
10309 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10310 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
10312 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10315 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10316 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
10317 match events_b[0] {
10318 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10319 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
10321 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10324 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
10325 macro_rules! send_payment {
10326 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
10327 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
10328 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.invoice_features()).unwrap();
10329 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
10330 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
10331 payment_count += 1;
10332 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
10333 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
10335 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
10336 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), RouteParameters {
10337 payment_params, final_value_msat: 10_000,
10338 }, Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
10339 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
10340 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10341 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
10342 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
10343 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
10344 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
10345 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
10347 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
10348 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
10349 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
10350 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
10352 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
10353 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
10354 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
10355 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10356 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
10358 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
10361 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
10362 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
10363 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
10364 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10366 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
10370 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
10371 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
10372 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);