1 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
3 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
4 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
5 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
7 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
8 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
9 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
14 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
15 use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
18 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
19 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
20 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
21 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
22 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
24 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
25 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
26 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
27 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
29 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,FeeEstimator};
30 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
31 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
32 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
33 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
34 use routing::router::{Route, RouteHop};
37 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
38 use chain::keysinterface::{ChannelKeys, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemoryChannelKeys};
39 use util::config::UserConfig;
40 use util::{byte_utils, events};
41 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
42 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
43 use util::logger::Logger;
44 use util::errors::APIError;
47 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
48 use std::io::{Cursor, Read};
49 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock};
50 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
51 use std::time::Duration;
52 use std::marker::{Sync, Send};
55 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
57 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
58 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
59 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
61 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
62 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
63 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
64 // before we forward it.
66 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
67 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
68 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
69 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
70 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
72 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
73 enum PendingHTLCRouting {
75 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
76 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
79 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
80 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
84 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
85 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
86 routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
87 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
88 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
89 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
90 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
93 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
94 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
95 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
96 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
99 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
100 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
101 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
102 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
103 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
106 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
108 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
110 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
114 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
118 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
119 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
120 pub(super) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
121 short_channel_id: u64,
123 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
126 struct ClaimableHTLC {
127 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
129 /// Filled in when the HTLC was received with a payment_secret packet, which contains a
130 /// total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
131 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
132 /// are part of the same payment.
133 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
137 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
138 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
139 pub(super) enum HTLCSource {
140 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
143 session_priv: SecretKey,
144 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
145 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
146 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
151 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
152 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
154 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
155 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
160 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
161 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
163 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
171 /// payment_hash type, use to cross-lock hop
172 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
173 pub struct PaymentHash(pub [u8;32]);
174 /// payment_preimage type, use to route payment between hop
175 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
176 pub struct PaymentPreimage(pub [u8;32]);
177 /// payment_secret type, use to authenticate sender to the receiver and tie MPP HTLCs together
178 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
179 pub struct PaymentSecret(pub [u8;32]);
181 type ShutdownResult = (Option<OutPoint>, ChannelMonitorUpdate, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
183 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
184 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
185 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
186 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
187 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
189 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
190 err: msgs::LightningError,
191 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
193 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
195 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
197 err: LightningError {
199 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
200 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
202 data: err.to_string()
206 shutdown_finish: None,
210 fn ignore_no_close(err: &'static str) -> Self {
212 err: LightningError {
214 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
216 shutdown_finish: None,
220 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
221 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
224 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
226 err: LightningError {
228 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
229 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
231 data: err.to_string()
235 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
239 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
242 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
244 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
246 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
248 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
249 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
251 data: msg.to_string()
255 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
257 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
258 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
260 data: msg.to_string()
265 shutdown_finish: None,
270 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
271 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
272 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
273 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
274 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
276 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
277 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
278 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
279 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
280 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
281 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
282 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
284 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
288 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
289 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
290 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<ChanSigner>>,
291 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
292 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
293 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
294 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
295 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
296 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
297 /// (payment_hash, payment_secret) -> Vec<HTLCs> for tracking HTLCs that
298 /// were to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
299 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
300 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
302 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<(PaymentHash, Option<PaymentSecret>), Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
303 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
304 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
305 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
308 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
309 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
311 latest_features: InitFeatures,
314 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
315 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
317 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
318 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
319 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
320 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
321 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
322 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
323 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
324 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = Arc<ChannelManager<InMemoryChannelKeys, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>>;
326 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
327 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
328 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
329 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
330 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
331 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
332 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
333 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
334 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemoryChannelKeys, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
336 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
337 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
339 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
340 /// to individual Channels.
342 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
343 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
344 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
345 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
347 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
348 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
349 /// returning from ManyChannelMonitor::add_/update_monitor, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
350 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
351 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
352 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
353 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
355 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager), which
356 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
357 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
358 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
361 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
362 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
363 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
364 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
365 /// timer_chan_freshness_every_min roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
367 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
368 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
369 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
370 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
371 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
372 pub struct ChannelManager<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
373 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
374 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
375 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
376 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
379 default_configuration: UserConfig,
380 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
386 pub(super) latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
388 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
389 last_block_hash: Mutex<BlockHash>,
390 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
393 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>,
395 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>,
396 our_network_key: SecretKey,
398 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
399 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
400 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
402 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
403 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
404 /// are currently open with that peer.
405 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
406 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
408 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
410 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
411 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
412 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
413 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
414 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
421 /// The amount of time we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time between when
422 /// we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
423 pub(crate) const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
424 /// The amount of time we're willing to wait to claim money back to us
425 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24 * 7;
427 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
428 /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
429 /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
430 /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
431 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
432 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 12; //TODO?
433 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
435 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
436 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
437 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
438 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
439 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
440 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
443 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
445 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
446 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
449 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
451 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
452 pub struct ChannelDetails {
453 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
454 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
455 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
456 /// lifetime of the channel.
457 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
458 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
459 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
460 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
461 /// The node_id of our counterparty
462 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
463 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
464 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
465 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
466 pub counterparty_features: InitFeatures,
467 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
468 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
469 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
471 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
472 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
473 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
474 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
475 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
476 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
477 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
478 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
479 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
480 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
481 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
482 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
483 /// the peer is connected, and (c) no monitor update failure is pending resolution.
487 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
488 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
491 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
492 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
493 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
494 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
495 ParameterError(APIError),
496 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
497 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
498 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
501 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
503 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
504 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
505 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
506 /// paths than the ones selected).
507 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
508 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
509 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
510 /// in over-/re-payment.
512 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
513 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
514 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
516 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
517 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
518 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
519 /// with the latest update_id.
520 PartialFailure(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
523 macro_rules! handle_error {
524 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr) => {
527 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
528 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
530 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
531 // entering the macro.
532 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
535 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
537 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
538 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
539 if let Some(update) = update_option {
540 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
546 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
547 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
549 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
550 node_id: $their_node_id,
551 action: err.action.clone()
555 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
556 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
559 // Return error in case higher-API need one
566 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
567 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
570 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
571 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
573 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
574 log_trace!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
575 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
576 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
577 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
579 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
581 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_)) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
586 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
587 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
590 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
591 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
593 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
594 log_trace!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
595 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
596 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
597 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
599 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
601 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg)) => {
602 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
603 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
604 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
605 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
607 let shutdown_res = chan.force_shutdown(false);
608 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
614 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
615 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
616 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
618 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
620 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
621 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]));
622 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
623 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
624 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
626 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
627 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
628 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
629 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
630 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
631 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
632 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
633 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
634 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
635 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()));
638 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
639 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
640 log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]),
641 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
643 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
644 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
646 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
647 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
649 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
650 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
651 if !$resend_commitment {
652 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
655 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
657 $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
658 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor"), *$entry.key()))
664 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
665 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
666 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
668 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
669 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
673 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
674 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
675 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
676 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
677 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
680 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
685 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>
686 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
687 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
688 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
689 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
692 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
694 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
695 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
697 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
699 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
701 /// Users must provide the current blockchain height from which to track onchain channel
702 /// funding outpoints and send payments with reliable timelocks.
704 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
705 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods.
706 /// However, rather than calling these methods directly, the user should register
707 /// the ChannelManager as a listener to the BlockNotifier and call the BlockNotifier's
708 /// `block_(dis)connected` methods, which will notify all registered listeners in one
710 pub fn new(network: Network, fee_est: F, monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, current_blockchain_height: usize) -> Result<ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>, secp256k1::Error> {
711 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
713 let res = ChannelManager {
714 default_configuration: config.clone(),
715 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
716 //genesis_hash: Sha256dHash::from_hex("0f9188f13cb7b2c71f2a335e3a4fc328bf5beb436012afca590b1a11466e2206").unwrap(),
717 fee_estimator: fee_est,
721 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(current_blockchain_height),
722 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(Default::default()),
725 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
726 by_id: HashMap::new(),
727 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
728 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
729 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
730 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
732 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
734 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
736 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
738 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
739 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
749 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
751 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
752 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
753 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
754 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
756 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
757 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
759 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
760 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
761 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
762 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
763 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "channel_value must be at least 1000 satoshis" });
766 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
767 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, config)?;
768 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
770 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
771 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
772 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
773 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
774 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
775 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" });
777 panic!("RNG is bad???");
780 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
782 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
783 node_id: their_network_key,
789 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<ChanSigner>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
790 let mut res = Vec::new();
792 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
793 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
794 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
795 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
796 res.push(ChannelDetails {
797 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
798 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
799 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
800 counterparty_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
801 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
802 inbound_capacity_msat,
803 outbound_capacity_msat,
804 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
805 is_live: channel.is_live(),
809 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
810 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
811 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.remote_network_id) {
812 chan.counterparty_features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
818 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
819 /// more information.
820 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
821 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
824 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
825 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
827 /// These are guaranteed to have their is_live value set to true, see the documentation for
828 /// ChannelDetails::is_live for more info on exactly what the criteria are.
829 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
830 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
831 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
832 // really wanted anyway.
833 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
836 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
837 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
838 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
840 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
841 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
842 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
844 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
845 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
846 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
847 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
848 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
849 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
850 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
851 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(),
854 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
855 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
856 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
858 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
859 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
861 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel"})
864 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
865 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
867 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
868 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
873 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
874 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
875 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
884 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
885 let (funding_txo_option, monitor_update, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
886 log_trace!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
887 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
888 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
890 if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_option {
891 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
892 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
893 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
894 // ignore the result here.
895 let _ = self.monitor.update_monitor(funding_txo, monitor_update);
899 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
900 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
901 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
902 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
905 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
906 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
907 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
908 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
909 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
916 log_trace!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
917 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
918 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
919 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
920 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
926 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
927 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
928 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
929 for chan in self.list_channels() {
930 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
934 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>) {
935 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
936 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
938 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
939 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
940 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
941 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
942 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
943 failure_code: $err_code,
944 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
949 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
950 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
953 let shared_secret = {
954 let mut arr = [0; 32];
955 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
958 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
960 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
961 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
962 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
963 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
964 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
965 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
966 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
967 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
970 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
971 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
972 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
973 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
974 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
977 let mut channel_state = None;
978 macro_rules! return_err {
979 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
981 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
982 if channel_state.is_none() {
983 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
985 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
986 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
987 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
988 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
989 })), channel_state.unwrap());
994 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
995 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
996 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac) = {
997 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
999 let error_code = match err {
1000 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
1001 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
1002 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
1003 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
1004 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1006 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1009 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
1010 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
1011 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1018 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
1021 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
1022 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
1023 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
1024 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
1025 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
1026 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
1027 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
1028 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
1029 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1030 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1031 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1032 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1036 // final_expiry_too_soon
1037 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure we have at least
1038 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
1039 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown payment hash, our payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward
1040 // before our onchain logic triggers a channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational).
1041 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) <= self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
1042 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1044 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1045 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1046 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1048 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1049 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1050 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1053 let payment_data = match next_hop_data.format {
1054 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => None,
1055 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]),
1056 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data } => payment_data,
1059 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1060 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1061 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1062 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1064 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1065 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
1067 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1069 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1070 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1071 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1072 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1075 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1076 let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
1077 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1079 // Check two things:
1080 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
1081 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
1082 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
1084 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
1086 // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
1087 // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
1088 chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
1090 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1092 let blinding_factor = {
1093 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1094 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1095 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1096 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
1099 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
1101 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1103 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1106 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1107 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
1110 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
1111 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1112 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1113 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
1114 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1118 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1119 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1120 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
1121 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1123 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1124 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1125 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1126 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1130 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1131 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1132 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
1133 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
1134 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
1135 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
1136 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1137 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1138 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1139 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1141 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1143 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1144 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1146 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1147 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1148 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1149 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1150 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1151 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1152 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1154 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1155 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1157 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
1158 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1159 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1161 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1162 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1164 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1165 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now, but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty
1166 // packet sanitization (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational)
1167 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1168 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1170 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1171 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1173 // In theory, we would be safe against unitentional channel-closure, if we only required a margin of LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1174 // But, to be safe against policy reception, we use a longuer delay.
1175 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER) as u64 {
1176 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1182 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1183 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1184 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1185 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1187 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1188 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1190 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1191 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(chan_update.contents.flags));
1193 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1195 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1200 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1203 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1204 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1205 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel<ChanSigner>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1206 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1207 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1211 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
1213 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1214 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1215 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1216 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
1217 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
1218 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
1219 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1220 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator),
1221 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1222 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1225 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1226 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
1228 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1234 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
1235 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1236 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
1237 let (session_priv, prng_seed) = self.keys_manager.get_onion_rand();
1239 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
1240 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
1241 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height)?;
1242 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
1243 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
1245 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
1247 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1249 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1250 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1251 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1252 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
1253 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1256 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1257 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1259 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1260 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1262 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1263 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!"});
1265 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1267 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1268 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1269 }, onion_packet, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
1271 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
1272 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1273 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
1274 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1275 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
1276 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
1277 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
1278 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
1279 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1282 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1283 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1284 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1285 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1286 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1287 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1288 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1296 } else { unreachable!(); }
1300 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
1301 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1303 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
1308 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1310 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1311 /// fields for more info.
1313 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1314 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1315 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1316 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1317 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1318 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1320 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
1322 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
1323 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
1324 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
1326 /// In general, a path may raise:
1327 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
1328 /// node public key) is specified.
1329 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1330 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
1332 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1333 /// relevant updates.
1335 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
1336 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
1337 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1339 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
1340 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
1341 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
1342 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
1344 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
1345 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
1346 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
1347 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
1348 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
1349 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
1351 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
1352 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
1353 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
1354 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
1355 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
1357 let mut total_value = 0;
1358 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1359 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
1360 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
1361 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
1362 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
1363 continue 'path_check;
1365 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
1366 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1367 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
1368 continue 'path_check;
1371 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
1372 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
1374 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
1375 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
1378 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1379 let mut results = Vec::new();
1380 for path in route.paths.iter() {
1381 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height));
1383 let mut has_ok = false;
1384 let mut has_err = false;
1385 for res in results.iter() {
1386 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
1387 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
1388 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
1389 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
1396 if has_err && has_ok {
1397 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure(results))
1399 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
1405 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1407 /// Note that ALL inputs in the transaction pointed to by funding_txo MUST spend SegWit outputs
1408 /// or your counterparty can steal your funds!
1410 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1412 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1413 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1414 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1415 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1418 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1420 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo, &self.logger)
1421 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1422 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
1423 } else { unreachable!(); })
1428 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_their_node_id()) {
1429 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1432 Err(_) => { return; }
1436 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1437 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1438 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1441 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1442 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1443 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1445 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1451 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<ChanSigner>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1452 if !chan.should_announce() {
1453 log_trace!(self.logger, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1457 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1459 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1461 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1462 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1464 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1465 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1466 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1467 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1468 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1473 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
1474 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
1475 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
1477 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::std::u16::MAX as u32 / (msgs::NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
1480 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
1481 // smaller than 500:
1482 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
1484 /// Generates a signed node_announcement from the given arguments and creates a
1485 /// BroadcastNodeAnnouncement event. Note that such messages will be ignored unless peers have
1486 /// seen a channel_announcement from us (ie unless we have public channels open).
1488 /// RGB is a node "color" and alias is a printable human-readable string to describe this node
1489 /// to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
1491 /// addresses represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node accepts
1492 /// incoming connections. These will be broadcast to the network, publicly tying these
1493 /// addresses together. If you wish to preserve user privacy, addresses should likely contain
1494 /// only Tor Onion addresses.
1496 /// Panics if addresses is absurdly large (more than 500).
1497 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], addresses: Vec<msgs::NetAddress>) {
1498 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1500 if addresses.len() > 500 {
1501 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
1504 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1505 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1506 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
1507 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
1508 rgb, alias, addresses,
1509 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
1510 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1512 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1514 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1515 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
1516 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
1517 signature: self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key),
1518 contents: announcement
1523 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1525 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1526 /// Will likely generate further events.
1527 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1528 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1530 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1531 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1532 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
1534 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1535 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1537 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1538 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1539 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1540 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1542 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1543 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1544 match forward_info {
1545 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1546 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1547 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1548 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1549 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1551 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
1552 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }
1555 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1556 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
1557 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
1558 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
1559 // problem, not ours.
1566 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
1567 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1568 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1569 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1570 match forward_info {
1571 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
1572 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1574 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value }, } => {
1575 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), prev_short_channel_id, short_chan_id);
1576 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1577 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1578 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1579 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
1581 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet) {
1583 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1584 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
1586 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
1588 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap();
1589 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
1590 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
1596 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1598 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1599 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1600 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1601 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1602 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1603 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1604 // this channel currently :/.
1610 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
1611 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
1613 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
1614 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} after delay", short_chan_id);
1615 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1617 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1618 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail backwards to short_id {}: {}", short_chan_id, msg);
1620 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
1622 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
1623 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
1624 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
1627 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1629 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1630 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
1631 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
1632 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
1633 // messages when we can.
1634 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
1635 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
1636 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
1643 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1644 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
1647 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
1648 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
1649 let their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id();
1650 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
1651 ChannelError::Ignore(_) => {
1652 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1654 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1655 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
1656 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
1657 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1658 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1660 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update(&channel).ok()))
1662 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
1664 handle_errors.push((their_node_id, err));
1668 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1669 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_their_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
1672 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1673 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
1674 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1675 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1676 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1677 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
1678 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1680 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1688 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1689 match forward_info {
1690 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
1691 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry },
1692 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. }, } => {
1693 let prev_hop = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1694 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1695 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1696 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
1699 let mut total_value = 0;
1700 let payment_secret_opt =
1701 if let &Some(ref data) = &payment_data { Some(data.payment_secret.clone()) } else { None };
1702 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry((payment_hash, payment_secret_opt))
1703 .or_insert(Vec::new());
1704 htlcs.push(ClaimableHTLC {
1706 value: amt_to_forward,
1707 payment_data: payment_data.clone(),
1708 cltv_expiry: incoming_cltv_expiry,
1710 if let &Some(ref data) = &payment_data {
1711 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
1712 total_value += htlc.value;
1713 if htlc.payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat != data.total_msat {
1714 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
1716 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
1718 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > data.total_msat {
1719 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
1720 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
1721 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
1722 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(
1723 self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire)
1727 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1728 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
1729 htlc_id: htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
1730 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
1732 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
1735 } else if total_value == data.total_msat {
1736 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1737 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1738 payment_secret: Some(data.payment_secret),
1743 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1744 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1745 payment_secret: None,
1746 amt: amt_to_forward,
1750 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
1751 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
1753 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1754 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
1762 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1763 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
1766 for (their_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
1767 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id);
1770 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1771 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1772 events.append(&mut new_events);
1775 /// If a peer is disconnected we mark any channels with that peer as 'disabled'.
1776 /// After some time, if channels are still disabled we need to broadcast a ChannelUpdate
1777 /// to inform the network about the uselessness of these channels.
1779 /// This method handles all the details, and must be called roughly once per minute.
1780 pub fn timer_chan_freshness_every_min(&self) {
1781 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1782 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1783 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1784 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter_mut() {
1785 if chan.is_disabled_staged() && !chan.is_live() {
1786 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1787 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1792 } else if chan.is_disabled_staged() && chan.is_live() {
1794 } else if chan.is_disabled_marked() {
1795 chan.to_disabled_staged();
1800 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
1801 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
1802 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
1803 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
1804 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
1805 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> bool {
1806 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1808 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1809 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&(*payment_hash, *payment_secret));
1810 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1811 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
1812 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1813 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
1814 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
1815 self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32,
1817 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
1818 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
1819 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
1825 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1826 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1827 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1828 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1829 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1830 /// still-available channels.
1831 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1832 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
1833 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
1834 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
1837 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, .. } => {
1838 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1839 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1840 match &onion_error {
1841 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
1843 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1845 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1846 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
1847 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
1848 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
1849 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
1850 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1851 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
1856 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1857 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1858 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1859 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
1861 error_code: onion_error_code,
1863 error_data: onion_error_data
1867 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
1873 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
1874 // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
1875 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
1876 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
1878 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
1879 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
1880 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1881 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1882 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1883 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
1885 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
1887 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
1893 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1894 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1895 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1896 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
1897 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1898 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1900 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
1901 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1902 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1906 let mut forward_event = None;
1907 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
1908 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
1910 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
1911 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1912 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
1914 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1915 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
1918 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1919 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
1920 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1921 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
1922 time_forwardable: time
1929 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1930 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1931 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1933 /// You must specify the expected amounts for this HTLC, and we will only claim HTLCs
1934 /// available within a few percent of the expected amount. This is critical for several
1935 /// reasons : a) it avoids providing senders with `proof-of-payment` (in the form of the
1936 /// payment_preimage without having provided the full value and b) it avoids certain
1937 /// privacy-breaking recipient-probing attacks which may reveal payment activity to
1938 /// motivated attackers.
1940 /// Note that the privacy concerns in (b) are not relevant in payments with a payment_secret
1941 /// set. Thus, for such payments we will claim any payments which do not under-pay.
1943 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1944 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, expected_amount: u64) -> bool {
1945 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1947 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1949 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1950 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&(payment_hash, *payment_secret));
1951 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1952 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
1954 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
1955 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
1956 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
1957 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
1959 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
1960 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
1961 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
1962 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
1963 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
1966 let (is_mpp, mut valid_mpp) = if let &Some(ref data) = &sources[0].payment_data {
1967 assert!(payment_secret.is_some());
1968 (true, data.total_msat >= expected_amount)
1970 assert!(payment_secret.is_none());
1974 for htlc in sources.iter() {
1975 if !is_mpp || !valid_mpp { break; }
1976 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
1981 let mut errs = Vec::new();
1982 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
1983 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
1984 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1985 if (is_mpp && !valid_mpp) || (!is_mpp && (htlc.value < expected_amount || htlc.value > expected_amount * 2)) {
1986 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
1987 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
1988 self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32,
1990 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
1991 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
1992 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
1994 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
1996 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = e.1.err.action {
1997 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
1998 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
1999 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", e.1.err.err);
2000 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
2001 } else { errs.push(e); }
2003 Err(None) if is_mpp => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
2005 log_warn!(self.logger, "Channel we expected to claim an HTLC from was closed.");
2007 Ok(()) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
2012 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
2013 // which were generated.
2014 channel_state.take();
2016 for (their_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
2017 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
2018 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, their_node_id);
2025 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> Result<(), Option<(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)>> {
2026 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
2027 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
2028 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
2029 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2035 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
2036 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
2037 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
2038 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
2039 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_option {
2040 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2041 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
2042 assert!(msgs.is_none());
2044 return Err(Some((chan.get().get_their_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err())));
2048 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
2049 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2050 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
2051 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2052 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2053 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
2054 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2055 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2064 // TODO: Do something with e?
2065 // This should only occur if we are claiming an HTLC at the same time as the
2066 // HTLC is being failed (eg because a block is being connected and this caused
2067 // an HTLC to time out). This should, of course, only occur if the user is the
2068 // one doing the claiming (as it being a part of a peer claim would imply we're
2069 // about to lose funds) and only if the lock in claim_funds was dropped as a
2070 // previous HTLC was failed (thus not for an MPP payment).
2071 debug_assert!(false, "This shouldn't be reachable except in absurdly rare cases between monitor updates and HTLC timeouts: {:?}", e);
2075 } else { unreachable!(); }
2078 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
2080 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
2081 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2082 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2083 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
2087 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
2088 if let Err((their_node_id, err)) = match self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage) {
2091 // TODO: There is probably a channel monitor somewhere that needs to
2092 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
2093 // why it's missing.
2096 Err(Some(res)) => Err(res),
2098 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2099 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
2100 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, their_node_id);
2106 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
2107 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
2108 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
2111 /// Restores a single, given channel to normal operation after a
2112 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
2115 /// All ChannelMonitor updates up to and including highest_applied_update_id must have been
2116 /// fully committed in every copy of the given channels' ChannelMonitors.
2118 /// Note that there is no effect to calling with a highest_applied_update_id other than the
2119 /// current latest ChannelMonitorUpdate and one call to this function after multiple
2120 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures is fine. The highest_applied_update_id field
2121 /// exists largely only to prevent races between this and concurrent update_monitor calls.
2123 /// Thus, the anticipated use is, at a high level:
2124 /// 1) You register a ManyChannelMonitor with this ChannelManager,
2125 /// 2) it stores each update to disk, and begins updating any remote (eg watchtower) copies of
2126 /// said ChannelMonitors as it can, returning ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures
2127 /// any time it cannot do so instantly,
2128 /// 3) update(s) are applied to each remote copy of a ChannelMonitor,
2129 /// 4) once all remote copies are updated, you call this function with the update_id that
2130 /// completed, and once it is the latest the Channel will be re-enabled.
2131 pub fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
2132 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2134 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
2135 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
2136 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
2137 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
2140 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2141 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2142 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2143 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2144 let channel = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
2148 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
2152 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked) = channel.monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger);
2153 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2154 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), pending_forwards));
2156 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
2158 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
2159 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
2160 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2161 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2166 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
2167 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
2168 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2169 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2170 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2175 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2179 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2184 if needs_broadcast_safe {
2185 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
2186 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
2187 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
2190 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2191 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2192 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2195 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2196 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2197 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2198 msg: announcement_sigs,
2201 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2205 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().append(&mut pending_events);
2207 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
2208 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2210 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
2212 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
2213 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
2217 fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2218 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
2219 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
2222 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_node_id.clone(), their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration)
2223 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
2224 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2225 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2226 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
2227 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
2228 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2229 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
2230 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2231 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
2233 entry.insert(channel);
2239 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2240 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
2241 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2242 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2243 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
2244 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2245 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2246 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
2248 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, their_features), channel_state, chan);
2249 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
2251 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
2254 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2255 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
2256 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
2257 channel_value_satoshis: value,
2258 output_script: output_script,
2259 user_channel_id: user_id,
2264 fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2265 let ((funding_msg, monitor_update), mut chan) = {
2266 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2267 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2268 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
2269 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2270 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2271 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
2273 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
2275 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
2278 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
2279 // lock before add_monitor
2280 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo(), monitor_update) {
2282 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
2283 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
2284 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
2285 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
2286 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
2287 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", funding_msg.channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), None));
2289 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
2290 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
2291 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
2292 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
2293 // until we have persisted our monitor.
2294 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2298 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2299 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2300 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
2301 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2302 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
2304 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2305 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
2306 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2315 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2316 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
2317 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2318 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2319 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2320 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2321 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2322 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2324 let monitor = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
2325 Ok(update) => update,
2326 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
2328 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2329 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
2331 (chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get().get_user_id())
2333 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2336 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2337 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
2338 funding_txo: funding_txo,
2339 user_channel_id: user_id,
2344 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2345 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2346 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2347 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2348 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2349 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2350 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2352 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan);
2353 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
2354 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2355 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
2356 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
2357 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
2358 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
2359 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
2360 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
2361 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
2362 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
2363 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
2364 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2365 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2366 msg: announcement_sigs,
2371 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2375 fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2376 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
2377 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2378 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2380 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2381 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2382 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2383 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2385 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2386 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2387 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2388 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2392 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2393 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2394 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2398 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2399 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2400 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2402 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2403 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
2405 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2408 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
2409 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2411 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2412 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2413 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2414 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2422 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2423 let (tx, chan_option) = {
2424 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2425 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2426 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2427 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2428 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2429 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2431 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2432 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2433 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2434 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2439 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
2440 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
2441 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
2442 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
2443 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
2444 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2445 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2447 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2448 } else { (tx, None) }
2450 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2453 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
2454 log_trace!(self.logger, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
2455 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
2457 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2458 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2459 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2460 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2468 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2469 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
2470 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
2471 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
2473 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
2474 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
2475 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
2476 //but we should prevent it anyway.
2478 let (mut pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
2479 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2481 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2482 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2483 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2484 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2486 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2487 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
2488 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
2489 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
2490 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { incoming_shared_secret, .. }) = pending_forward_info {
2491 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get());
2492 pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2493 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2494 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2495 reason: if let Ok(update) = chan_update {
2496 // TODO: Note that |20 is defined as "channel FROM the processing
2497 // node has been disabled" (emphasis mine), which seems to imply
2498 // that we can't return |20 for an inbound channel being disabled.
2499 // This probably needs a spec update but should definitely be
2501 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x1000|20, &{
2502 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
2503 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(update.contents.flags));
2504 res.extend_from_slice(&update.encode_with_len()[..]);
2508 // This can only happen if the channel isn't in the fully-funded
2509 // state yet, implying our counterparty is trying to route payments
2510 // over the channel back to themselves (cause no one else should
2511 // know the short_id is a lightning channel yet). We should have no
2512 // problem just calling this unknown_next_peer
2513 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
2518 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info), channel_state, chan);
2520 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2525 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2526 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2528 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2529 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2530 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2531 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2532 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2534 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
2536 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2539 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
2543 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2544 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2545 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2546 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2547 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2548 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2549 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2551 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
2553 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2558 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2559 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2560 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2561 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2562 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2563 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2564 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2566 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
2567 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
2568 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
2570 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
2573 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2577 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2578 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2579 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2580 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2581 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2582 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2583 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2585 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update) =
2586 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
2587 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
2588 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
2589 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
2590 let _ = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
2591 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
2596 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2597 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
2598 //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
2600 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2601 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2602 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2604 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
2605 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2606 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2607 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2608 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2609 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2610 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2611 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2613 commitment_signed: msg,
2617 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2618 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2619 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2625 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2630 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2631 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2632 let mut forward_event = None;
2633 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2634 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2635 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2636 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
2638 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2639 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
2640 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
2641 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
2643 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2644 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2646 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2647 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2652 match forward_event {
2654 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2655 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2656 time_forwardable: time
2664 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2665 let (pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id) = {
2666 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2667 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2668 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2669 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2670 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2671 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2673 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
2674 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, monitor_update) =
2675 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
2676 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2677 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
2678 assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && closing_signed.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
2679 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA"));
2681 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures);
2684 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2685 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2686 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2690 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2691 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2692 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2696 (pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
2698 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2701 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2702 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2704 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
2709 fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2710 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2711 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2712 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2713 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2714 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2715 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2717 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
2719 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2724 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2725 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2726 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2728 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2729 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2730 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2731 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2733 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2734 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
2737 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2738 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) =
2739 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone()), channel_state, chan);
2741 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
2742 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2743 if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }).is_err() ||
2744 self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }).is_err() {
2745 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature");
2746 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
2749 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2751 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2752 msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2753 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
2754 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
2755 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
2756 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
2757 contents: announcement,
2759 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
2762 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2767 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2768 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2769 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2771 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2772 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2773 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2774 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2776 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, mut order, shutdown) =
2777 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
2778 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
2779 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2780 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
2781 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
2782 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
2783 if revoke_and_ack.is_none() {
2784 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2786 if commitment_update.is_none() {
2787 order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
2789 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, order, revoke_and_ack.is_some(), commitment_update.is_some());
2790 //TODO: Resend the funding_locked if needed once we get the monitor running again
2793 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2794 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2795 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2799 macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
2800 if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
2801 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2802 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2807 macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
2808 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2809 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2810 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2816 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2820 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2825 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2826 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2827 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2833 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2837 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
2838 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
2839 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
2840 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
2842 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2843 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2845 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2846 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2847 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2849 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2850 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
2851 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2852 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
2853 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
2855 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
2856 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2858 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2859 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected"});
2861 their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id();
2862 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) =
2863 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
2865 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2868 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2869 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
2870 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2871 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2872 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2873 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2874 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2875 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2885 match handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id) {
2886 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2887 Err(e) => { Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })}
2892 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> events::MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>
2893 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
2894 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2895 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
2896 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2899 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<events::MessageSendEvent> {
2900 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a
2901 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2902 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2904 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2905 for htlc_update in self.monitor.get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated() {
2906 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2907 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2908 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2910 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2911 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2916 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2917 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2918 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
2923 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>
2924 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
2925 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2926 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
2927 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2930 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
2931 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a
2932 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2933 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2935 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2936 for htlc_update in self.monitor.get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated() {
2937 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2938 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2939 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2941 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2942 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2947 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2948 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2949 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
2954 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref + Sync + Send, T: Deref + Sync + Send, K: Deref + Sync + Send, F: Deref + Sync + Send, L: Deref + Sync + Send>
2955 ChainListener for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>
2956 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
2957 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2958 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
2959 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2962 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
2963 let header_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
2964 log_trace!(self.logger, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", header_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
2965 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2966 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2967 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
2969 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2970 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2971 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2972 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2973 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
2974 let res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
2975 if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res {
2976 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
2977 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
2978 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
2979 failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
2983 if let Some(funding_locked) = chan_res {
2984 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2985 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2986 msg: funding_locked,
2988 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2989 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
2990 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2991 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2992 msg: announcement_sigs,
2995 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
2997 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2999 } else if let Err(e) = res {
3000 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3001 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
3002 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
3006 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
3007 for tx in txn_matched {
3008 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
3009 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
3010 log_trace!(self.logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
3011 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3012 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3014 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
3015 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
3016 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
3017 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
3018 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
3019 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3028 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height, &self.logger) {
3029 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3030 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3032 // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
3033 // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
3034 // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
3035 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(false));
3036 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
3037 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3046 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|&(ref payment_hash, _), htlcs| {
3047 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3048 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
3049 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
3050 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
3051 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
3052 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
3053 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3054 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
3055 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3056 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
3057 data: htlc_msat_height_data
3062 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
3065 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3066 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3069 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
3070 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
3072 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
3073 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header_hash;
3075 // Update last_node_announcement_serial to be the max of its current value and the
3076 // block timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
3077 // having an explicit local time source.
3078 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully update
3079 // last_node_announcement_serial or decide we don't need to.
3080 let old_serial = self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire);
3081 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
3082 if self.last_node_announcement_serial.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
3088 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
3089 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, _: u32) {
3090 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3091 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3093 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3094 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3095 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3096 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3097 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
3098 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
3099 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
3100 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3102 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown(true));
3103 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
3104 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3114 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3115 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3117 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
3118 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.bitcoin_hash();
3122 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref + Sync + Send, T: Deref + Sync + Send, K: Deref + Sync + Send, F: Deref + Sync + Send, L: Deref + Sync + Send>
3123 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>
3124 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
3125 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3126 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3127 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3130 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
3131 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3132 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, their_features, msg), *their_node_id);
3135 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
3136 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3137 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, their_features, msg), *their_node_id);
3140 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
3141 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3142 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3145 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
3146 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3147 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3150 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
3151 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3152 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3155 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
3156 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3157 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3160 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
3161 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3162 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3165 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
3166 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3167 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3170 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
3171 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3172 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3175 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
3176 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3177 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3180 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
3181 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3182 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3185 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
3186 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3187 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3190 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
3191 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3192 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3195 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
3196 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3197 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3200 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
3201 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3202 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3205 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
3206 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3207 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3210 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
3211 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3212 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3213 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
3214 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
3216 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3217 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3218 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3219 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3220 if no_connection_possible {
3221 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
3222 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3223 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
3224 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3225 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3227 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
3228 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
3229 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3239 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
3240 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3241 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
3242 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
3243 chan.to_disabled_marked();
3244 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
3245 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
3246 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
3248 if chan.is_shutdown() {
3249 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3250 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3254 no_channels_remain = false;
3260 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
3262 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3263 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3264 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3265 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3266 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3267 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3268 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3269 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3270 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3271 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3272 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3273 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
3274 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
3275 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
3276 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3277 &events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => true,
3281 if no_channels_remain {
3282 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(their_node_id);
3285 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3286 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3288 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
3289 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
3290 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
3295 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
3296 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
3298 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3301 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3302 match peer_state_lock.entry(their_node_id.clone()) {
3303 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3304 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
3305 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
3308 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
3309 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
3314 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3315 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3316 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3317 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3318 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
3319 if !chan.have_received_message() {
3320 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
3321 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
3322 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
3326 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
3327 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
3328 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
3334 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
3337 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
3338 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3340 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
3341 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3342 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
3343 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
3347 self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
3352 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3353 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3355 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCInfo {
3356 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3357 match &self.routing {
3358 &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id } => {
3360 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
3361 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3363 &PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { ref payment_data, ref incoming_cltv_expiry } => {
3365 payment_data.write(writer)?;
3366 incoming_cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
3369 self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
3370 self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3371 self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
3372 self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
3377 impl Readable for PendingHTLCInfo {
3378 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
3379 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
3380 routing: match Readable::read(reader)? {
3381 0u8 => PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
3382 onion_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
3383 short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3385 1u8 => PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
3386 payment_data: Readable::read(reader)?,
3387 incoming_cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
3389 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3391 incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
3392 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
3393 amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
3394 outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
3399 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
3400 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3402 &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => {
3404 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3406 &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => {
3408 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3415 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
3416 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
3417 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3418 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3419 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3420 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3425 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus {
3426 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3428 &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => {
3430 forward_info.write(writer)?;
3432 &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => {
3434 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3441 impl Readable for PendingHTLCStatus {
3442 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
3443 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3444 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3445 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3446 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3451 impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, {
3454 incoming_packet_shared_secret
3457 impl_writeable!(ClaimableHTLC, 0, {
3464 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
3465 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3467 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => {
3469 hop_data.write(writer)?;
3471 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
3473 path.write(writer)?;
3474 session_priv.write(writer)?;
3475 first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
3482 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
3483 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
3484 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3485 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3486 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3487 path: Readable::read(reader)?,
3488 session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
3489 first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
3491 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3496 impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
3497 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3499 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3503 &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
3505 failure_code.write(writer)?;
3506 data.write(writer)?;
3513 impl Readable for HTLCFailReason {
3514 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
3515 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3516 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
3517 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3518 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
3519 data: Readable::read(reader)?,
3521 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3526 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
3527 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3529 &HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { ref prev_short_channel_id, ref prev_htlc_id, ref forward_info } => {
3531 prev_short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3532 prev_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3533 forward_info.write(writer)?;
3535 &HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3537 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3538 err_packet.write(writer)?;
3545 impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo {
3546 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCForwardInfo, DecodeError> {
3547 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3548 0 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC {
3549 prev_short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3550 prev_htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3551 forward_info: Readable::read(reader)?,
3553 1 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC {
3554 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3555 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
3557 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3562 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Writeable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>
3563 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
3564 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3565 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3566 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3569 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3570 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
3572 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3573 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3575 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
3576 (self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
3577 self.last_block_hash.lock().unwrap().write(writer)?;
3579 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3580 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
3581 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3582 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3583 unfunded_channels += 1;
3586 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
3587 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3588 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3589 channel.write(writer)?;
3593 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3594 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
3595 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3596 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3597 for forward in pending_forwards {
3598 forward.write(writer)?;
3602 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3603 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
3604 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3605 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3606 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
3607 htlc.write(writer)?;
3611 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3612 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3613 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3614 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
3615 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3616 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
3619 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3620 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3621 for event in events.iter() {
3622 event.write(writer)?;
3625 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
3631 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
3633 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
3635 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
3636 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling <(Sha256dHash,
3637 /// ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args).
3638 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
3639 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
3640 /// 3) Register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints with your chain watch mechanism using
3641 /// ChannelMonitor::get_monitored_outpoints and ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
3642 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
3643 /// 5) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local ManyChannelMonitor.
3644 /// 6) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
3645 /// 7) Register the new ChannelManager with your ChainWatchInterface.
3646 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner: 'a + ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
3647 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
3648 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3649 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3650 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3654 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
3655 /// deserialization.
3656 pub keys_manager: K,
3658 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3660 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
3661 pub fee_estimator: F,
3662 /// The ManyChannelMonitor for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3664 /// No calls to the ManyChannelMonitor will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
3665 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
3666 /// ManyChannelMonitor after deserializing this ChannelManager.
3669 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
3670 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
3671 /// force-closed during deserialization.
3672 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
3673 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
3674 /// deserialization.
3676 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
3677 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
3678 pub default_config: UserConfig,
3680 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
3681 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
3683 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
3684 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
3685 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
3686 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
3688 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
3690 pub channel_monitors: &'a mut HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>>,
3693 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
3694 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
3695 impl<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
3696 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>>)
3697 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
3698 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3699 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3700 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3703 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3704 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
3705 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
3709 impl<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
3710 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>)
3711 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
3712 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3713 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3714 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3717 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3718 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3719 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3720 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
3721 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
3724 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3725 let latest_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3726 let last_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3728 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3730 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3731 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3732 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3733 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3734 for _ in 0..channel_count {
3735 let mut channel: Channel<ChanSigner> = Readable::read(reader)?;
3736 if channel.last_block_connected != Default::default() && channel.last_block_connected != last_block_hash {
3737 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3740 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
3741 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
3742 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
3743 if channel.get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_local_commitment_number() ||
3744 channel.get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
3745 channel.get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_remote_commitment_number() ||
3746 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
3747 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
3748 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3749 } else if channel.get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_local_commitment_number() ||
3750 channel.get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
3751 channel.get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_remote_commitment_number() ||
3752 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
3753 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
3754 let (_, _, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
3755 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
3756 monitor.broadcast_latest_local_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
3758 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3759 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
3761 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
3764 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3768 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
3769 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
3770 monitor.broadcast_latest_local_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
3774 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
3775 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3776 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3777 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
3778 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3779 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3780 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
3781 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
3782 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3784 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
3787 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3788 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3789 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
3790 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3791 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3792 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
3793 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
3794 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3796 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
3799 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3800 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
3801 for _ in 0..peer_count {
3802 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
3803 let peer_state = PeerState {
3804 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
3806 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
3809 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3810 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
3811 for _ in 0..event_count {
3812 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
3813 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
3818 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3820 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
3822 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
3823 monitor: args.monitor,
3824 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
3826 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(latest_block_height as usize),
3827 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(last_block_hash),
3828 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
3830 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
3835 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
3837 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
3839 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
3841 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
3843 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
3844 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
3845 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
3846 logger: args.logger,
3847 default_configuration: args.default_config,
3850 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
3851 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3854 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
3855 //connection or two.
3857 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))