1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
39 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
40 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
41 // construct one themselves.
42 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
43 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
44 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
45 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
46 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
47 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
48 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, Router};
49 use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters};
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
55 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment};
57 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
58 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, ChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
59 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
60 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
61 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
62 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
63 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
64 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
65 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
67 use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
70 use crate::prelude::*;
72 use core::cell::RefCell;
74 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
75 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
76 use core::time::Duration;
79 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
80 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
81 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
83 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
85 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
86 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
87 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
89 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
90 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
91 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
92 // before we forward it.
94 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
95 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
96 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
97 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
98 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
100 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
101 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
103 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
104 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
105 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
106 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
109 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
110 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
111 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
112 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
115 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
116 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
117 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
121 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
122 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
123 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
124 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
125 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
127 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
128 /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
129 /// may overshoot this in either case)
130 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
131 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
134 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
135 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
136 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
137 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
140 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
141 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
142 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
143 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
144 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
147 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
148 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
150 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
151 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
152 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
155 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
156 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
158 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
159 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
162 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
163 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
166 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
170 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
171 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
172 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
173 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
174 short_channel_id: u64,
176 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
177 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
179 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
180 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
185 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
187 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
188 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
189 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
191 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
192 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
195 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
196 struct ClaimableHTLC {
197 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
199 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
201 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
202 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
203 sender_intended_value: u64,
204 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
206 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
207 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
208 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
209 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
213 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
215 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
216 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
217 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
219 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
220 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
225 impl Readable for PaymentId {
226 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
227 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
232 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
234 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
235 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
236 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
238 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
239 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
244 impl Readable for InterceptId {
245 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
246 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
251 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
252 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
253 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
254 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
255 OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
258 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
260 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
261 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
262 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
264 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
265 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
269 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
270 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
271 (0, short_channel_id, required),
272 (2, htlc_id, required),
274 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
275 (0, session_priv, required),
280 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
281 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
282 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
283 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
284 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
287 session_priv: SecretKey,
288 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
289 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
290 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
291 payment_id: PaymentId,
294 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
295 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
296 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
298 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
300 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
302 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
305 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
306 payment_id.hash(hasher);
307 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
313 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
315 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
316 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
317 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
318 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
319 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
320 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
324 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
325 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
326 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
327 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
328 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
329 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
331 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
337 struct ReceiveError {
343 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
344 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
346 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
347 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
348 pub enum FailureCode {
349 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
350 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
351 TemporaryNodeFailure = 0x2000 | 2,
352 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
353 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
354 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing = 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
355 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
356 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
357 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
358 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
359 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails = 0x4000 | 15,
362 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>);
364 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
365 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
366 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
367 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
368 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
370 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
371 err: msgs::LightningError,
372 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
373 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
375 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
377 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
379 err: LightningError {
381 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
382 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
389 shutdown_finish: None,
393 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
394 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
397 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
399 err: LightningError {
401 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
402 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
408 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
409 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
413 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
416 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
418 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
419 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
423 log_level: Level::Warn,
426 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
428 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
430 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
432 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
433 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
441 shutdown_finish: None,
446 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
447 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
448 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
449 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
450 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
452 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
453 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
454 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
455 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
456 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
457 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
458 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
460 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
464 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
465 struct ClaimingPayment {
467 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
468 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
470 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
471 (0, amount_msat, required),
472 (2, payment_purpose, required),
473 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
476 struct ClaimablePayment {
477 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
478 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
479 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
482 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
483 struct ClaimablePayments {
484 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
485 /// failed/claimed by the user.
487 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
488 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
490 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
491 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
492 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
494 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
495 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
496 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
497 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
500 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
501 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
502 /// quite some time lag.
503 enum BackgroundEvent {
504 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate
506 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
507 /// are regenerated on startup.
508 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
512 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
513 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
514 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
515 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
516 /// event can be generated.
517 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
518 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user.
519 EmitEvent { event: events::Event },
522 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
523 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
524 (2, EmitEvent) => { (0, event, upgradable_required) },
527 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
528 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
529 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
530 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
531 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
534 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
535 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
536 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
537 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
541 /// State we hold per-peer.
542 pub(super) struct PeerState<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
543 /// `temporary_channel_id` or `channel_id` -> `channel`.
545 /// Holds all channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once a channel has been assigned a
546 /// `channel_id`, the `temporary_channel_id` key in the map is updated and is replaced by the
548 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
549 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
550 latest_features: InitFeatures,
551 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
552 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
553 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
554 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
555 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
557 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
558 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
559 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
560 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
562 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
563 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
564 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
565 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
566 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
567 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
568 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
569 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
570 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
571 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
575 impl <Signer: ChannelSigner> PeerState<Signer> {
576 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
577 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
578 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
579 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
580 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
583 self.channel_by_id.is_empty() && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
587 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
588 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
590 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
593 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
594 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
595 struct PendingInboundPayment {
596 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
597 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
598 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
599 /// this payment being removed.
601 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
602 user_payment_id: u64,
603 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
604 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
605 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
608 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
609 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
610 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
611 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
612 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
613 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
614 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
615 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
617 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
618 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
626 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
628 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
629 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
630 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
635 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
636 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
637 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
638 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
639 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
640 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
641 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
642 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
643 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
645 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
646 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e DefaultRouter<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L, &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters, ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>, &'g L>;
648 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`] used in testing.
649 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
650 pub trait AChannelManager {
651 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer>;
652 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
653 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface;
654 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
655 type EntropySource: EntropySource;
656 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
657 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner;
658 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
659 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner;
660 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<Signer = Self::Signer>;
661 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
662 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator;
663 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
665 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
667 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
668 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
670 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
671 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
672 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
674 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> + Sized,
675 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface + Sized,
676 ES::Target: EntropySource + Sized,
677 NS::Target: NodeSigner + Sized,
678 SP::Target: SignerProvider + Sized,
679 F::Target: FeeEstimator + Sized,
680 R::Target: Router + Sized,
681 L::Target: Logger + Sized,
683 type Watch = M::Target;
685 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
687 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
689 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
691 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer;
692 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
694 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
696 type Router = R::Target;
698 type Logger = L::Target;
700 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
703 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
704 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
706 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
707 /// to individual Channels.
709 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
710 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
711 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
712 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
714 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
715 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
716 /// returning from [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`], with ChannelManagers, writing updates
717 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during
718 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
719 /// [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the
720 /// `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
722 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
723 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
724 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
726 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
727 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
728 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
729 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
730 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
732 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
733 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
734 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
735 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
737 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
738 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
739 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
741 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
742 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
743 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
744 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
745 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
747 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
748 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
749 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
750 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
751 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
752 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
753 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
754 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
757 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
758 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
759 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
760 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
761 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
765 // `total_consistency_lock`
767 // |__`forward_htlcs`
769 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
771 // |__`per_peer_state`
773 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
775 // | |__`claimable_payments`
777 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
783 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
785 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
789 // | |__`pending_events`
791 // | |__`pending_background_events`
793 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
795 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
796 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
797 ES::Target: EntropySource,
798 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
799 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
800 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
804 default_configuration: UserConfig,
805 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
806 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
812 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
814 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
816 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
817 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
819 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
820 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
821 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
822 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
824 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
825 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
827 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
828 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
829 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
830 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
831 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
832 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
833 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
834 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
836 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
838 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
839 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
841 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
843 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
844 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
845 /// and via the classic SCID.
847 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
848 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
850 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
852 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
854 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
855 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
856 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
858 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
859 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
861 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
862 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
864 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
865 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
867 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
868 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
869 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
870 /// active channel list on load.
872 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
873 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
875 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
877 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
878 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
879 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
881 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
882 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
883 /// the handling of the events.
885 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
886 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
889 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
890 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
891 /// would break backwards compatability.
892 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
893 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
894 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
896 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
897 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
899 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
901 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
902 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
903 /// confirmation depth.
905 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
906 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
907 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
909 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
911 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
913 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
915 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
917 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
919 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
920 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
921 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
923 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
924 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
926 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
927 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
928 /// keeping additional state.
929 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
931 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
932 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
933 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
934 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
936 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
937 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
939 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
940 /// are currently open with that peer.
942 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
943 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
946 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
948 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
949 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
950 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
951 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
952 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
954 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
955 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
956 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
957 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
958 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
960 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
961 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
963 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
964 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
965 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
966 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
967 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
968 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
969 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
970 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
971 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
972 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
973 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
974 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
975 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
977 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
986 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
988 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
989 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
990 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
991 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
992 pub struct ChainParameters {
993 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
994 pub network: Network,
996 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
998 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
999 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1002 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1008 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1009 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1010 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1011 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1012 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1013 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1015 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1016 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1017 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1018 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1019 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1021 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1022 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1025 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1026 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1027 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1030 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1031 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
1033 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1034 persistence_notifier: notifier,
1035 should_persist: persist_check,
1036 _read_guard: read_guard,
1041 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1042 fn drop(&mut self) {
1043 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1044 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1049 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1050 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1052 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1054 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1055 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1056 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1057 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1058 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1060 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1061 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1063 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1065 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1066 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1067 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1068 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1069 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1070 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1071 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1072 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1073 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1074 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1075 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1076 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1077 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1079 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1080 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1082 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1083 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1084 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1085 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1087 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1088 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1089 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1090 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1091 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1092 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1095 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1097 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1098 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1101 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1103 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1104 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1106 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
1107 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
1108 /// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
1109 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
1111 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1112 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1113 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1115 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1116 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1117 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1119 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1120 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1121 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1122 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1124 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1125 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1126 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1128 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1129 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1130 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1132 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1133 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1134 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1135 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1136 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1137 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1138 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1139 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1140 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1141 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1142 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1145 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1146 /// to better separate parameters.
1147 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1148 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1149 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1150 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1151 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1152 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1153 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1154 pub features: InitFeatures,
1155 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1156 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1157 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1159 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1161 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1162 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1163 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1164 /// payments to us through this channel.
1165 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1166 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1167 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1168 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1169 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1170 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1171 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1174 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1175 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1176 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1177 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1178 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1179 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1180 /// lifetime of the channel.
1181 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1182 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1183 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1184 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1185 /// our counterparty already.
1187 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1188 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1189 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1190 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1192 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1193 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1194 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1195 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1197 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1198 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1200 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1201 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1203 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1204 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1205 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1206 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1207 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1208 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1209 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1210 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1211 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1214 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1216 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1217 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1218 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1219 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1220 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1221 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1222 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1224 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1225 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1227 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1228 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1229 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1230 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1231 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1232 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1233 /// this value on chain.
1235 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1237 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1239 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1240 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1241 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1242 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1244 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1245 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1246 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1248 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1249 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1250 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1251 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1252 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1254 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1255 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1256 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1257 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1259 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1260 pub balance_msat: u64,
1261 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1262 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1263 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1264 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1266 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1268 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1269 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1270 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1271 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1272 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1273 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1274 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1275 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1277 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
1278 /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1279 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1280 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1281 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1282 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1283 /// route which is valid.
1284 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1285 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1286 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1287 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1288 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1289 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1291 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1292 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1293 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1294 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1295 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1296 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1297 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1298 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1299 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1301 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1303 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1304 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1305 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1306 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1307 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1309 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1310 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1311 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1312 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1313 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1314 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1315 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1317 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1318 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1319 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1320 pub is_outbound: bool,
1321 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1322 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1323 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1324 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1325 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1327 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1328 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1329 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1330 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1332 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1333 pub is_usable: bool,
1334 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1335 pub is_public: bool,
1336 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1337 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1338 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1339 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1340 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1341 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1343 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1344 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1347 impl ChannelDetails {
1348 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1349 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1350 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1352 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1353 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1354 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1355 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1358 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1359 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1360 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1362 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1363 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1364 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1365 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1368 fn from_channel<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner>(channel: &Channel<Signer>,
1369 best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures) -> Self {
1371 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1372 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1373 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1375 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1376 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1377 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1378 features: latest_features,
1379 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1380 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1381 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1382 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1383 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1384 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1385 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1386 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1387 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1388 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1390 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1391 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1392 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1393 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1394 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1395 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1396 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1397 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1398 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(channel.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1399 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1400 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1401 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1402 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1403 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1404 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1405 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1406 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1407 confirmations: Some(channel.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1408 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1409 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1410 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1411 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1412 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1413 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1414 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1415 config: Some(channel.config()),
1420 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1421 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1422 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1423 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1424 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1426 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1428 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1429 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1430 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1433 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1434 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1435 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1437 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1438 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1439 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1441 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1442 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1443 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1445 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1446 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1450 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1452 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1454 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1455 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1456 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1457 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1459 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1460 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1461 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1464 macro_rules! handle_error {
1465 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1466 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1467 // entering the macro.
1468 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1469 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1473 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1474 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1476 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1477 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1478 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1479 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1483 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1484 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1485 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1486 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1491 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1492 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1494 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1495 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1496 action: err.action.clone()
1500 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1501 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1502 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1503 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1504 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1508 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1515 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1516 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {{
1517 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
1518 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1519 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1520 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1522 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1523 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1524 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1525 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1526 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1528 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1529 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1531 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1535 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1536 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1537 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1539 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1540 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1542 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1543 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1545 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1546 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1547 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel);
1548 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1549 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1550 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1556 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1557 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1561 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1563 $entry.remove_entry();
1571 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1572 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1576 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1578 $entry.remove_entry();
1586 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1587 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1589 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1590 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, channel);
1596 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1597 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1598 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1599 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1600 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1602 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1603 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1604 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1605 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1606 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1607 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1608 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1609 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1610 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1611 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1616 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
1617 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1618 if $channel.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
1619 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
1620 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1621 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.temporary_channel_id(),
1622 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1623 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1624 funding_txo: $channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1626 $channel.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
1631 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1632 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1633 if $channel.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1634 debug_assert!($channel.channel_pending_event_emitted());
1635 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
1636 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1637 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1638 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1639 channel_type: $channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
1641 $channel.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1646 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
1647 ($self: ident, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
1648 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
1649 &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
1650 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
1651 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1652 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.is_usable() {
1653 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
1654 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
1655 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
1656 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
1658 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
1659 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
1660 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1666 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
1667 .remove(&$chan.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
1669 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
1670 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
1671 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
1672 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
1673 updates.announcement_sigs);
1674 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
1675 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
1678 let channel_id = $chan.channel_id();
1679 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
1680 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
1682 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
1684 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1685 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1687 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
1688 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1689 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1690 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
1695 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
1696 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING, $remove: expr) => { {
1697 // update_maps_on_chan_removal needs to be able to take id_to_peer, so make sure we can in
1698 // any case so that it won't deadlock.
1699 debug_assert_ne!($self.id_to_peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1701 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1702 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
1703 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1706 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1707 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure",
1708 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1709 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan);
1710 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(
1711 "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.channel_id(),
1712 $chan.get_user_id(), $chan.force_shutdown(false),
1713 $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok()));
1717 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1718 $chan.complete_one_mon_update($update_id);
1719 if $chan.no_monitor_updates_pending() {
1720 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
1726 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr) => {
1727 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
1731 macro_rules! process_events_body {
1732 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
1733 let mut processed_all_events = false;
1734 while !processed_all_events {
1735 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
1739 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
1742 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
1743 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
1744 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1746 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
1747 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
1748 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
1749 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
1753 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
1754 let num_events = pending_events.len();
1755 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
1756 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
1759 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
1761 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
1762 $event_to_handle = event;
1764 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
1765 post_event_actions.push(action);
1770 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1771 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
1772 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
1773 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
1776 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
1777 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
1778 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
1779 processed_all_events = false;
1782 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1783 $self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1789 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1791 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1792 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1793 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1794 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1795 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1796 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1800 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
1802 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1803 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
1805 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1807 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
1808 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
1809 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
1812 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
1813 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
1814 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
1815 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1816 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1817 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1818 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1819 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1821 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1822 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1823 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1828 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1830 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1831 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1832 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
1833 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1834 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
1835 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1836 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1837 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1839 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1842 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1843 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1845 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1847 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1849 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1851 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
1852 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
1853 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1854 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1855 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
1865 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1866 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1867 &self.default_configuration
1870 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1871 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1872 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1875 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1876 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1878 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
1880 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1884 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1889 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1891 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1892 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1893 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
1894 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
1895 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
1897 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1898 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1900 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
1901 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
1902 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
1904 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1905 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1906 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1908 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1909 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1910 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1911 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1912 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1913 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1915 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1916 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1917 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1918 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1919 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1920 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1923 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1924 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1925 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1927 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1929 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
1930 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
1932 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1934 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1935 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1936 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1937 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
1938 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1939 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1943 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1948 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1950 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1951 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1952 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1954 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1956 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1959 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1962 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1963 node_id: their_network_key,
1966 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1969 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1970 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
1971 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
1972 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
1973 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
1974 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
1975 // the same channel.
1976 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
1978 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1979 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1980 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
1981 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1982 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1983 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1984 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel(channel, best_block_height,
1985 peer_state.latest_features.clone());
1993 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
1994 /// more information.
1995 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1996 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1999 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2000 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2002 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2003 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2005 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2006 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2007 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2008 // really wanted anyway.
2009 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
2012 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2013 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2014 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2015 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2017 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2018 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2019 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2020 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2021 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2024 ChannelDetails::from_channel(channel, best_block_height, features.clone()))
2030 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2031 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2033 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2034 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2035 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2037 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2038 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2039 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2040 .filter_map(|(_, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2041 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2042 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2043 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2044 total_msat: *total_msat,
2047 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2048 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2050 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2051 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2053 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2058 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
2059 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
2060 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2061 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
2062 Some(transaction) => {
2063 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2064 channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction
2069 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2070 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
2071 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
2072 reason: closure_reason
2076 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2077 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2079 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
2080 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
2081 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2083 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2084 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2086 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2087 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2088 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2089 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2090 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
2091 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2092 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut()
2093 .get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2094 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2096 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2097 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2098 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2099 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2100 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2104 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2105 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2106 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2107 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
2108 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
2111 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2112 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
2113 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
2114 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2118 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2122 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id) })
2126 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2127 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2128 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2129 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2132 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
2136 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2137 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2138 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2140 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
2141 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2143 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2144 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
2145 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2146 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2148 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2150 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2151 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2152 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2155 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2156 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2157 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2158 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2159 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2160 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2163 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2164 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2165 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2167 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2168 /// the channel being closed or not:
2169 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2170 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2171 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2172 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2173 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2174 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2175 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2177 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2178 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2179 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2180 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2182 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2184 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2185 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2186 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2189 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2190 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2191 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2192 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2193 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2194 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2198 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2199 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
2200 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2201 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2202 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2203 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2204 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2205 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2207 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2208 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2209 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2210 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2211 // ignore the result here.
2212 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2216 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2217 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2218 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2219 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2220 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2221 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2222 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2224 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2225 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2226 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2227 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2228 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) });
2230 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2232 remove_channel!(self, chan)
2234 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) });
2237 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2238 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2239 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2240 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2241 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2246 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
2249 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2250 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2251 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2252 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2253 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2254 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2255 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2256 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2257 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2258 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2259 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2260 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2271 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2272 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2273 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2275 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2276 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2277 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2280 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2281 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2282 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2284 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2285 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2286 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2287 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2288 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2291 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2292 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2293 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2294 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2295 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2299 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2300 /// local transaction(s).
2301 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2302 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2303 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2307 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2308 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2310 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2311 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
2312 return Err(ReceiveError {
2313 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
2315 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2318 // final_expiry_too_soon
2319 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2320 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2322 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2323 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2324 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2325 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2326 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2327 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2328 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2329 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2330 return Err(ReceiveError {
2331 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2332 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2335 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2336 return Err(ReceiveError {
2338 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2339 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2343 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2344 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2345 return Err(ReceiveError {
2346 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2347 err_data: Vec::new(),
2348 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2351 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage, payment_metadata } => {
2352 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2353 return Err(ReceiveError {
2354 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2355 err_data: Vec::new(),
2356 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2358 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2359 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2362 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2363 phantom_shared_secret,
2365 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2366 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2367 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2368 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2369 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2370 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2371 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2372 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2373 return Err(ReceiveError {
2374 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2375 err_data: Vec::new(),
2376 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2380 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2383 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2386 return Err(ReceiveError {
2387 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2388 err_data: Vec::new(),
2389 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2394 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2397 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2398 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2399 outgoing_amt_msat: hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2400 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2404 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2405 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2406 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2408 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2409 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2410 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2411 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2412 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2413 failure_code: $err_code,
2419 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2420 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2423 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
2424 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
2425 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2427 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2428 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2429 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2430 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2431 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2432 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2433 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2434 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2436 macro_rules! return_err {
2437 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2439 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2440 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2441 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2442 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2443 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2444 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2450 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2452 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2453 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2455 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2456 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2460 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2461 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2463 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2465 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2466 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2467 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2468 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2469 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2471 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2474 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2475 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2476 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2478 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2479 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2480 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2483 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2484 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2485 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2486 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2490 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2491 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2492 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2495 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2496 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2497 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2498 outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2499 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2504 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref outgoing_amt_msat, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2505 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2506 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2507 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2508 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2509 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2510 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(short_channel_id).cloned();
2511 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2512 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2513 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2514 // phantom or an intercept.
2515 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2516 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2517 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)
2521 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2524 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2526 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2527 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2528 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2529 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
2530 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2532 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2533 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2534 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2536 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
2537 // have no consistency guarantees.
2538 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2542 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2543 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2544 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2545 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2546 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2548 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2549 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2550 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2551 // we don't have the channel here.
2552 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2554 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2556 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2557 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2558 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2559 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2560 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2561 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2562 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
2563 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
2564 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
2565 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
2566 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2568 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
2571 if *outgoing_amt_msat < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2572 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2574 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *outgoing_amt_msat, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2575 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2579 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
2580 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
2581 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
2582 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
2584 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2591 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2592 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2593 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2594 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2595 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2596 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2598 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2599 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2601 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2602 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2603 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2604 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2605 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2606 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2607 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2608 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2609 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2610 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2616 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2617 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2618 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2619 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2621 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2622 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2624 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2625 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2626 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2628 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2629 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2630 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2631 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
2632 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
2633 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
2634 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
2638 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2643 pending_forward_info
2646 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2647 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2648 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2650 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
2651 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
2652 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2654 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2655 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
2656 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2657 if !chan.should_announce() {
2658 return Err(LightningError {
2659 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2660 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2663 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2664 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2666 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2667 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2670 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2671 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
2672 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2673 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2675 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
2676 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
2677 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2679 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2680 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
2681 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2682 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2683 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2684 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2688 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2690 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2691 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2692 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2694 let enabled = chan.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
2695 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
2696 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
2697 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
2698 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
2701 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2702 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2704 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2705 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
2706 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2707 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2708 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2709 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2710 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2711 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2713 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
2714 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
2715 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
2717 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
2719 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2726 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2727 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2728 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv_bytes)
2731 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2732 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
2733 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2735 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2736 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
2737 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2739 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2740 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
2741 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2743 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash)
2744 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute { err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()})?;
2746 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2747 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2748 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2749 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
2752 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2753 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
2754 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
2755 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2756 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2757 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
2758 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2759 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
2761 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2762 let send_res = chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
2763 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2765 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2766 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2768 }, onion_packet, &self.logger);
2769 match break_chan_entry!(self, send_res, chan) {
2770 Some(monitor_update) => {
2771 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2772 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
2773 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
2776 if update_res == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress {
2777 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
2778 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
2779 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
2780 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
2781 // which we do in the send_payment check for
2782 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
2783 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
2789 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
2790 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
2791 // `channel_by_id` map.
2792 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
2793 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
2798 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2799 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2801 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2806 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2808 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
2809 /// fields for more info.
2811 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
2812 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
2814 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
2816 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
2817 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
2818 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
2819 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
2820 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
2822 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
2823 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
2824 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
2825 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
2826 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
2828 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
2829 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
2830 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
2831 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
2833 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
2835 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
2836 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2837 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
2839 /// In general, a path may raise:
2840 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2841 /// node public key) is specified.
2842 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2843 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2845 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2846 /// relevant updates.
2848 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
2849 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2850 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2852 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2853 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2854 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
2855 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
2856 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
2857 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2858 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2859 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2860 self.pending_outbound_payments
2861 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2862 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2863 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2866 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment`], but will automatically find a route based on
2867 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2868 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
2869 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2870 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2871 self.pending_outbound_payments
2872 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
2873 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
2874 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
2875 &self.pending_events,
2876 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2877 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2881 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2882 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2883 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2884 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2885 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2886 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2890 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2891 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2892 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
2896 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
2897 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
2901 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
2902 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
2903 /// retries are exhausted.
2905 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
2906 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
2908 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2909 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2910 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2912 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
2913 /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
2915 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2916 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2917 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2918 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2919 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
2922 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2923 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2924 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2925 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2926 /// never reach the recipient.
2928 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
2929 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
2931 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2932 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2934 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2936 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2937 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2938 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2939 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2940 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
2941 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
2942 &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2943 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2944 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2947 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
2948 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2950 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
2953 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
2954 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
2955 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2956 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2957 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
2958 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
2959 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2960 &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
2961 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2962 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2965 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
2966 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
2967 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
2968 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2969 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2970 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2971 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2972 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2973 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2976 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
2979 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
2980 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
2983 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2984 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2985 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2986 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2987 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2988 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2989 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2990 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2992 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2993 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2994 let (msg, chan) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2996 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2998 let funding_res = chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2999 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3000 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
3001 } else { unreachable!(); });
3003 Ok(funding_msg) => (funding_msg, chan),
3005 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3006 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3008 let _ = handle_error!(self, funding_res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
3009 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3010 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3016 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3018 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3019 log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3024 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3025 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3028 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
3029 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3030 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3032 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3033 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3034 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
3035 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
3044 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3045 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
3046 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3050 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3052 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3053 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3055 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3056 /// across the p2p network.
3058 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3059 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3061 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3062 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3063 /// keys per-channel).
3065 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3066 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3067 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3069 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3070 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3071 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3073 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3074 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3075 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3076 /// for more details.
3078 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3079 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3080 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3081 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3083 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3084 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3085 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3086 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3091 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3092 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3093 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3094 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3095 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3096 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 1 {
3097 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3098 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3102 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
3103 if tx.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3104 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3105 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3109 let mut output_index = None;
3110 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3111 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3112 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
3113 if output_index.is_some() {
3114 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3115 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3118 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3121 if output_index.is_none() {
3122 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3123 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3126 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
3130 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
3132 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3133 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3134 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3135 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3137 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3138 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3140 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3141 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3143 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3145 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3146 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3147 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3148 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3149 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3150 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3151 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3152 pub fn update_channel_config(
3153 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
3154 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3155 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
3156 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3157 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3161 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
3162 &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
3164 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3165 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3166 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3167 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3168 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3169 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3170 if !peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) {
3171 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3172 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3176 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3177 let channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
3178 if !channel.update_config(config) {
3181 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3182 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3183 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3184 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3185 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3193 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
3194 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
3196 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
3197 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
3199 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
3200 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
3201 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
3202 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
3203 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
3205 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
3206 /// you from forwarding more than you received.
3208 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3211 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
3212 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3213 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
3214 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
3215 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3216 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3218 let next_hop_scid = {
3219 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3220 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
3221 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
3222 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3223 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3224 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
3226 if !chan.is_usable() {
3227 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3228 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
3231 chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.outbound_scid_alias())
3233 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3234 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id)
3239 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3240 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3241 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3244 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
3245 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
3246 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
3248 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3250 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
3251 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
3254 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
3255 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3256 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3257 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
3258 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
3260 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
3264 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
3265 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
3267 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3270 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3271 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3272 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3274 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3275 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3276 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3279 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
3280 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3281 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3282 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3283 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
3284 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3285 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3288 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
3289 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
3290 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3291 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3296 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3298 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3299 /// Will likely generate further events.
3300 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3301 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3303 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
3304 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3305 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3307 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3308 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3310 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3311 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3312 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3314 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3315 match forward_info {
3316 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3317 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3318 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3319 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3320 outgoing_cltv_value, incoming_amt_msat: _
3323 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3324 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3325 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3327 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3328 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3329 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3330 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3331 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3332 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3335 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3336 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3338 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3341 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3342 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3348 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3349 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3351 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3355 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3356 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3358 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3362 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3363 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3364 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3365 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3366 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3368 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3369 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3370 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3371 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3372 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3374 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3376 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3377 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3381 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3382 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3383 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3384 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3390 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3393 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3396 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3397 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3398 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3399 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3400 // problem, not ours.
3406 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3407 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3409 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3413 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3414 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3415 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3416 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3419 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3420 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3421 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3422 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3423 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3426 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3427 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3428 match forward_info {
3429 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3430 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
3431 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3432 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3433 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, incoming_amt_msat: _,
3436 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3437 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3438 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3439 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3440 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3441 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3442 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3443 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3445 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
3446 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
3447 onion_packet, &self.logger)
3449 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3450 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3452 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3454 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3455 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3456 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3457 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3462 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3463 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3465 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3466 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3467 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
3468 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
3470 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3471 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3473 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
3475 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3476 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3477 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3486 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3487 match forward_info {
3488 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3489 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3490 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3491 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat, ..
3494 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
3495 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3496 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3498 RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret), payment_metadata };
3499 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
3500 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
3502 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry } => {
3503 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: None, payment_metadata };
3504 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
3505 None, None, onion_fields)
3508 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3511 let mut claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3512 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3513 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3514 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3515 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3516 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3517 phantom_shared_secret,
3519 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
3520 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
3521 // if routing nodes overpay
3522 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
3523 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3525 total_value_received: None,
3526 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3531 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
3533 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3534 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3535 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
3536 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3537 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3538 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
3540 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3541 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3542 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3543 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3544 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3545 phantom_shared_secret,
3547 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
3548 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3550 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
3553 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
3554 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3555 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3556 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3557 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3560 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3561 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3562 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
3564 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3565 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3566 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3569 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3570 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3571 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3573 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
3574 .entry(payment_hash)
3575 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
3576 .or_insert_with(|| {
3577 committed_to_claimable = true;
3579 purpose: purpose(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
3582 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
3583 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
3584 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3587 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
3589 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
3590 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3591 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3592 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3593 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3596 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
3597 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
3598 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3599 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
3600 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
3601 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3602 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3603 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3604 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3605 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3606 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3608 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3610 _ => unreachable!(),
3613 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
3614 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
3615 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
3616 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3617 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= $payment_data.total_msat {
3618 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
3619 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3620 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3621 } else if total_value >= $payment_data.total_msat {
3622 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
3623 committed_to_claimable = true;
3625 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3626 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3627 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
3628 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
3629 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3630 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3634 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3635 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3636 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
3637 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
3639 payment_claimable_generated = true;
3641 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3642 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3644 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3645 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
3646 committed_to_claimable = true;
3649 payment_claimable_generated
3653 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3654 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3655 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3656 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3657 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3658 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3659 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3660 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3661 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3662 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3663 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3664 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3665 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3666 Ok(result) => result,
3668 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3669 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3672 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
3673 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
3674 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
3675 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
3676 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
3677 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3680 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3682 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3683 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3684 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3685 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3687 match claimable_payments.claimable_payments.entry(payment_hash) {
3688 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3689 let amount_msat = claimable_htlc.value;
3690 claimable_htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat);
3691 let claim_deadline = Some(claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER);
3692 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3693 e.insert(ClaimablePayment {
3694 purpose: purpose.clone(),
3695 onion_fields: Some(onion_fields.clone()),
3696 htlcs: vec![claimable_htlc],
3698 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3699 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3700 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3704 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3705 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3707 onion_fields: Some(onion_fields),
3710 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3711 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3712 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3718 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3719 if payment_data.is_none() {
3720 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3721 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3723 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3724 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3725 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3726 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3727 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3728 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3729 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3730 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3732 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3733 if payment_claimable_generated {
3734 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3740 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3741 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3749 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3750 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
3751 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3752 &self.pending_events, &self.logger,
3753 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3754 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv));
3756 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3757 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3759 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3761 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
3762 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
3763 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
3765 self.check_free_holding_cells();
3767 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3768 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3769 events.append(&mut new_events);
3772 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3774 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3775 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3777 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3778 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3779 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3780 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3781 if background_events.is_empty() {
3785 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3787 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
3788 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3789 // monitor updating completing.
3790 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
3797 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3798 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3799 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3800 self.process_background_events();
3803 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
3804 if !chan.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
3805 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3806 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
3807 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3808 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3809 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3811 if !chan.is_live() {
3812 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3813 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3814 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3816 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3817 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3819 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.logger);
3820 NotifyOption::DoPersist
3824 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3825 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3826 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3827 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3828 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3829 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3830 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3832 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3834 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3835 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3836 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3837 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3838 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
3839 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3840 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3848 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3850 /// This currently includes:
3851 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3852 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3853 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3855 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3856 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
3857 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
3859 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
3860 /// estimate fetches.
3862 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3863 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
3864 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3865 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3866 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3867 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3869 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3871 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
3872 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3873 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
3875 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3876 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3877 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3878 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3879 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
3880 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
3881 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3882 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3883 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3885 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3886 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3887 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
3888 if needs_close { return false; }
3891 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3892 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
3893 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
3894 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.is_live()
3895 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3896 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.is_live()
3897 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3898 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.is_live() => {
3900 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
3901 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3902 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3903 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3907 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3909 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
3912 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.is_live() => {
3914 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
3915 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3916 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3917 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3921 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3923 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
3929 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
3933 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
3934 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
3939 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
3940 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
3941 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
3942 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
3943 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
3944 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
3945 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
3946 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
3947 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3948 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
3949 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
3950 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
3951 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
3952 // have no channels to the peer.
3953 let remove_entry = {
3954 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
3955 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
3958 entry.remove_entry();
3961 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
3966 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
3967 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
3968 // This should be unreachable
3969 debug_assert!(false);
3972 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3973 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3974 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3975 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
3976 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
3977 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
3978 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
3981 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
3982 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3983 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3985 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
3986 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
3993 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3994 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
3995 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
3996 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
3997 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4000 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4001 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4004 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self.pending_events);
4006 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
4007 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
4008 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
4009 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
4010 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4017 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
4018 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
4019 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
4021 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
4022 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
4023 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
4024 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
4026 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
4027 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
4028 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
4029 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
4030 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
4031 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
4034 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
4035 /// reason for the failure.
4037 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
4038 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
4039 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4041 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
4042 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
4043 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
4044 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
4045 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4046 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
4047 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4052 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
4053 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
4054 match failure_code {
4055 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
4056 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
4057 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
4058 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4059 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4060 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code as u16, htlc_msat_height_data)
4065 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4066 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4068 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
4070 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4071 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
4072 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
4073 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
4074 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
4075 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
4076 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
4078 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
4080 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
4081 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
4083 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4088 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4089 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4090 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4091 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
4092 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
4093 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
4094 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
4095 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
4096 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
4097 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4099 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4100 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4101 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4102 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
4104 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
4105 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
4106 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
4107 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
4108 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4112 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
4113 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
4114 // be surfaced to the user.
4115 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
4116 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
4117 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
4119 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
4120 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4121 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
4122 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4123 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4124 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
4125 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
4126 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
4128 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4130 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
4133 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
4134 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
4135 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
4136 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4140 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
4141 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
4142 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
4143 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
4144 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
4145 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
4146 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
4147 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
4148 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
4151 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
4152 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
4153 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
4156 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4157 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
4158 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4160 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
4161 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
4162 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
4163 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
4164 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4166 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
4167 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
4168 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
4170 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
4171 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4172 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4173 push_forward_ev = true;
4175 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
4176 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4177 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
4179 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4180 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
4183 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
4184 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4185 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4186 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
4187 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
4188 failed_next_destination: destination,
4194 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
4195 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
4197 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
4198 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
4199 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
4200 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
4202 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
4203 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
4204 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
4205 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
4207 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
4208 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
4209 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
4210 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
4211 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4212 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4213 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4214 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4216 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4219 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4220 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
4221 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4222 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
4223 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4224 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4225 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4226 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
4231 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
4232 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
4233 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id,
4235 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
4236 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
4237 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
4238 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4243 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
4245 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
4246 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
4247 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
4248 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
4249 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
4250 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
4251 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
4252 let mut valid_mpp = true;
4253 let mut errs = Vec::new();
4254 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4255 for htlc in sources.iter() {
4256 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
4257 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4258 debug_assert!(false);
4262 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
4264 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
4265 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4266 debug_assert!(false);
4270 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
4272 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
4273 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
4274 // that there's one payment here and move on.
4275 if sources.len() != 1 {
4276 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
4277 debug_assert!(false);
4283 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
4285 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4286 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4287 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4288 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4291 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4292 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4293 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4294 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4298 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4299 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
4300 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
4301 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
4303 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4304 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4305 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4306 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4307 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4312 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4313 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4314 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4315 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4316 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
4317 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
4318 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4320 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4323 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
4324 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4325 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4326 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4330 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
4331 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
4332 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
4333 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4336 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4337 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
4338 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4339 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
4343 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
4344 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4345 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
4348 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
4349 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
4350 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4351 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4352 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4353 let fulfill_res = chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
4355 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
4356 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
4357 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
4358 log_bytes!(chan_id), action);
4359 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
4361 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4362 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update);
4363 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
4364 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4365 if let Err(e) = res {
4366 // TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge
4367 // of the HTLC's monitor with a preimage. We should retry this monitor
4368 // update over and over again until morale improves.
4369 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}", payment_preimage);
4370 return Err((counterparty_node_id, e));
4377 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4378 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4379 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4383 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4384 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
4385 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
4386 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4387 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4388 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4389 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
4390 // again on restart.
4391 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4392 payment_preimage, update_res);
4394 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
4395 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
4396 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
4397 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
4398 // `PaymentForwarded`).
4399 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
4403 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4404 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
4407 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4409 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4410 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage, session_priv, path, from_onchain, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
4412 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4413 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4414 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
4415 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
4416 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4417 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4418 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4421 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4422 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
4424 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4426 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4429 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
4433 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
4434 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4435 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4441 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4442 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4443 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4446 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
4447 for action in actions.into_iter() {
4449 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
4450 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4451 if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
4452 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4453 payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4457 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event } => {
4458 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
4464 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
4465 /// update completion.
4466 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4467 channel: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
4468 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
4469 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
4470 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
4471 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
4472 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
4473 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()),
4474 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
4475 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
4476 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
4477 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
4478 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
4480 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
4482 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get_counterparty_node_id();
4483 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4484 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.outbound_scid_alias()),
4485 channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
4488 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4489 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
4491 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
4492 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4493 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4498 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
4499 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
4500 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4501 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4506 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
4507 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
4508 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4509 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4510 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4515 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
4519 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
4525 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
4526 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
4527 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
4531 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4532 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
4533 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
4539 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
4540 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
4542 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
4543 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4545 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
4546 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
4547 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4548 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4549 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4554 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4555 let mut peer_state_lock;
4556 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4557 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
4558 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4559 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4561 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()){
4562 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4563 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4566 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}",
4567 highest_applied_update_id, channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id());
4568 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4571 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, highest_applied_update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel.get_mut());
4574 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4576 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4577 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4580 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4581 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4582 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4584 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4585 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4586 /// used to accept such channels.
4588 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4589 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4590 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4591 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4594 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4595 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4597 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4598 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4599 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4601 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4602 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4604 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4605 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4607 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4608 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4610 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4611 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4612 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4613 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4616 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4617 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4619 let peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| !peer.channel_by_id.is_empty());
4620 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4621 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4622 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4623 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4624 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4625 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.len() == 1;
4626 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4627 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4628 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4629 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4632 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4633 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4634 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4635 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4636 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4637 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4640 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4641 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4642 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4644 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4645 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4646 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4647 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
4648 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4649 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4650 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4651 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
4654 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4655 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4656 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
4660 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4661 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4662 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4665 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4666 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) });
4672 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
4673 /// or 0-conf channels.
4675 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
4676 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
4677 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
4678 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> bool {
4679 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
4680 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4682 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4683 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
4684 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4685 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
4686 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
4687 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.channel_by_id.len() {
4688 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
4692 return peers_without_funded_channels;
4695 fn unfunded_channel_count(
4696 peer: &PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, best_block_height: u32
4698 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
4699 for (_, chan) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
4700 if !chan.is_outbound() && chan.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
4701 chan.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
4703 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
4706 num_unfunded_channels
4709 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4710 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4711 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4714 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4715 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4718 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
4719 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
4720 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
4721 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4723 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
4724 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
4725 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
4726 let channeled_peers_without_funding = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| !node.channel_by_id.is_empty());
4728 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4729 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4731 debug_assert!(false);
4732 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
4734 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4735 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4737 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4738 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4739 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4740 if peer_state.channel_by_id.is_empty() &&
4741 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
4742 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
4744 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4745 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
4746 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4749 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4750 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
4751 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4752 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
4753 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4756 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
4757 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
4758 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4761 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4762 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4766 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4767 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4768 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4769 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4771 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4772 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4773 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4774 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4776 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4777 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4778 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4781 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4782 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4783 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4784 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4785 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4786 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4787 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4791 entry.insert(channel);
4797 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4798 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4799 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4800 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4802 debug_assert!(false);
4803 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4805 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4806 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4807 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4808 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4809 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan);
4810 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4812 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4815 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4816 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4817 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4818 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4819 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4821 user_channel_id: user_id,
4826 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4827 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4829 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4830 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4832 debug_assert!(false);
4833 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4836 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4837 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4838 let ((funding_msg, monitor), chan) =
4839 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4840 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4841 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
4843 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4846 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4847 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4848 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4850 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4851 match self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().entry(chan.channel_id()) {
4852 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4853 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4854 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
4855 funding_msg.channel_id))
4857 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
4858 i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
4862 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4863 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4864 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4865 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4866 let new_channel_id = funding_msg.channel_id;
4867 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4868 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4872 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
4874 let chan = e.insert(chan);
4875 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, monitor_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
4876 per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING, { peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&new_channel_id) });
4878 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4879 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4880 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4881 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4882 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
4883 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
4884 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4885 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { shutdown_finish: Some((res, _)), .. }) = &mut res {
4893 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4894 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4895 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4896 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4898 debug_assert!(false);
4899 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4902 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4903 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4904 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4905 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4906 let monitor = try_chan_entry!(self,
4907 chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan);
4908 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor);
4909 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4910 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4911 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4912 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4913 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4914 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4915 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4920 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4924 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4925 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4926 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4928 debug_assert!(false);
4929 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4931 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4932 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4933 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4934 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4935 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
4936 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
4937 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4938 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4939 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4940 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4941 msg: announcement_sigs,
4943 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4944 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4945 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4946 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4947 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4948 // announcement_signatures.
4949 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4950 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4951 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4952 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4959 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4960 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan.get_mut());
4965 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4969 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4970 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4971 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4972 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4973 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4975 debug_assert!(false);
4976 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4978 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4979 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4980 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4981 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4983 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4984 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4985 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4986 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4989 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
4990 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self,
4991 chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
4992 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4994 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4995 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
4996 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
4997 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
4998 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4999 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5004 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
5005 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5006 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5007 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
5008 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
5012 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5015 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
5016 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
5017 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5018 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5024 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5025 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5026 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5028 debug_assert!(false);
5029 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5031 let (tx, chan_option) = {
5032 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5033 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5034 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5035 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
5036 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
5037 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
5038 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5039 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5044 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
5045 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
5046 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
5047 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
5048 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
5049 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
5050 } else { (tx, None) }
5052 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5055 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
5056 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
5057 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
5059 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
5060 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5061 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5062 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5063 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5067 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5072 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5073 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
5074 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
5075 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
5077 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
5078 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
5079 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
5080 //but we should prevent it anyway.
5082 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
5083 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5084 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5086 debug_assert!(false);
5087 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5089 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5090 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5091 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5092 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5094 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
5095 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
5096 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
5097 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
5098 match pending_forward_info {
5099 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
5100 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
5101 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
5102 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
5104 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
5105 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
5106 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5107 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
5108 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
5111 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
5113 _ => pending_forward_info
5116 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
5118 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5123 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5124 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
5125 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5126 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5128 debug_assert!(false);
5129 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5131 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5132 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5133 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5134 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5135 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
5137 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5140 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
5144 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5145 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5146 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5148 debug_assert!(false);
5149 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5151 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5152 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5153 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5154 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5155 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
5157 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5162 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5163 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5164 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5166 debug_assert!(false);
5167 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5169 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5170 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5171 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5172 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5173 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
5174 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
5175 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
5177 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
5180 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5184 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5185 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5186 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5188 debug_assert!(false);
5189 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5191 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5192 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5193 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5194 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5195 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
5196 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5197 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5198 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
5199 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5200 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
5201 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
5204 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5209 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
5210 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
5211 let mut push_forward_event = false;
5212 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
5213 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
5214 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5215 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5216 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
5217 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
5218 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
5219 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
5221 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
5222 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
5224 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5225 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
5226 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
5227 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5228 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5229 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
5231 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5232 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
5233 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
5235 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
5236 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5237 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
5238 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5239 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
5240 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
5241 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
5242 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
5243 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
5246 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5247 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
5249 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5250 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
5251 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5252 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5253 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5254 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5255 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
5256 phantom_shared_secret: None,
5259 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
5260 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
5261 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
5266 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
5267 // payments are being processed.
5268 if forward_htlcs_empty {
5269 push_forward_event = true;
5271 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5272 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
5279 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
5280 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
5283 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
5284 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5285 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
5287 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
5291 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued.
5292 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
5293 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5294 let forward_ev_exists = pending_events.iter()
5295 .find(|(ev, _)| if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false })
5297 if !forward_ev_exists {
5298 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5300 Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
5305 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5306 let (htlcs_to_fail, res) = {
5307 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5308 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5310 debug_assert!(false);
5311 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5312 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
5313 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5314 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5315 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5316 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
5317 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5318 let res = if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5319 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
5320 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5321 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5322 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
5324 (htlcs_to_fail, res)
5326 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5329 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5333 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5334 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5335 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5337 debug_assert!(false);
5338 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5340 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5341 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5342 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5343 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5344 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
5346 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5351 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5352 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5353 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5355 debug_assert!(false);
5356 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5358 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5359 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5360 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5361 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5362 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
5363 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
5366 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5367 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5368 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
5369 msg, &self.default_configuration
5371 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5372 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5373 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap()),
5376 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5381 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5382 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5383 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5384 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
5386 // It's not a local channel
5387 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5390 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5391 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
5392 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
5393 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5395 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5396 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5397 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5398 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5399 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5400 if chan.get().should_announce() {
5401 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5402 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5403 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5404 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5406 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5408 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5409 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5410 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5411 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5413 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5414 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
5417 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5419 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5422 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5424 let need_lnd_workaround = {
5425 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5427 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5429 debug_assert!(false);
5430 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5432 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5433 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5434 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5435 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5436 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5437 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5438 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5439 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5440 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5441 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
5442 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
5443 let mut channel_update = None;
5444 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5445 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5446 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5449 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5450 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5451 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5452 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5453 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5454 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5455 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5460 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5461 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
5462 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5463 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5464 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5465 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5469 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5473 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
5474 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
5477 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5478 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5483 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
5484 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5485 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5487 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5488 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5489 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5490 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5491 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5492 match monitor_event {
5493 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5494 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5495 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5496 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5498 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5499 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5500 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5501 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5504 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5505 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5506 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
5507 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
5509 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5510 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5511 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5512 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
5515 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
5516 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5517 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5518 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5519 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5520 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5521 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5522 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5523 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5524 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5525 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5529 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5530 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5532 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5534 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5535 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5536 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5537 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5538 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5545 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5546 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
5552 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5553 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5556 has_pending_monitor_events
5559 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5560 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5561 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5563 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5564 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5565 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5566 NotifyOption::DoPersist
5568 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
5573 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5574 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5575 /// update was applied.
5576 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5577 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5578 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5579 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5581 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
5582 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
5583 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
5584 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
5586 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5587 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5589 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5590 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5591 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
5592 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
5593 let funding_txo = chan.get_funding_txo();
5594 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
5595 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger);
5596 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5597 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
5599 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
5600 has_monitor_update = true;
5602 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(
5603 funding_txo.expect("channel is live"), monitor_update);
5604 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5605 let channel_id: [u8; 32] = *channel_id;
5606 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5607 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING,
5608 peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id));
5610 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, res));
5612 continue 'peer_loop;
5621 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5622 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5623 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5626 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5627 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5633 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5634 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5635 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5636 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5637 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5638 let mut has_update = false;
5640 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5642 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5643 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5644 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5645 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5646 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5647 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5648 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5649 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5651 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5652 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5655 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5656 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5657 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5658 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5659 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5664 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5666 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5667 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
5668 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
5674 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5675 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5683 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5684 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5690 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5691 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5693 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5694 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5695 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5696 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5697 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5698 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5699 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5700 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5701 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5702 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5703 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5704 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5705 assert!(should_broadcast);
5706 } else { unreachable!(); }
5707 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)));
5709 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5713 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5714 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5716 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5717 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5720 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5722 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5723 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5724 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5725 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5726 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5727 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5728 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5729 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5730 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5731 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5732 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5733 // never fail a payment too early.
5734 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5736 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5739 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5744 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5747 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5748 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5750 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
5751 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
5752 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5753 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5755 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5757 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5758 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5762 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5763 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5765 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5767 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5768 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5770 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5771 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5772 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
5773 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
5774 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
5775 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5776 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
5777 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5778 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
5779 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5780 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
5783 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5784 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5786 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5789 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5791 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5793 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5794 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5795 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5796 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5797 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5800 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5801 /// stored external to LDK.
5803 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5804 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5805 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5807 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5808 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5811 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5812 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5813 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5814 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5816 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5817 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5818 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5819 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5820 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5822 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5823 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5824 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
5825 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5826 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
5828 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
5829 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
5831 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5832 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5836 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5837 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5839 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5841 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5842 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5844 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5845 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5846 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
5847 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5848 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
5849 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5850 min_final_cltv_expiry)
5853 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5854 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5856 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5859 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5861 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5863 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5864 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5867 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5868 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5870 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5871 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5872 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5875 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5876 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5878 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
5879 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5880 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5881 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5883 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5884 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5885 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
5886 Some(_) => continue,
5887 None => return scid_candidate
5892 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5894 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
5895 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5897 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5898 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5899 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5903 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
5904 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
5905 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
5907 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
5908 /// times to get a unique scid.
5909 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5910 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5911 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5913 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5914 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5915 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
5916 return scid_candidate
5920 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
5921 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
5922 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
5923 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
5925 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5926 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5927 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5928 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5929 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5930 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
5931 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
5932 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
5941 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5942 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5943 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5944 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
5945 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5949 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
5950 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
5951 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5952 events.push_back((event, None));
5956 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
5957 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5958 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
5962 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5963 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
5967 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5968 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
5971 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint) {
5972 let mut errors = Vec::new();
5974 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5975 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5976 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5977 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
5978 if self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter()
5979 .any(|(_ev, action_opt)| action_opt == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5980 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
5983 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have another event
5984 // blocking any monitor updates for this channel. If we do, let those
5985 // events be the ones that ultimately release the monitor update(s).
5986 log_trace!(self.logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another event is pending",
5987 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
5990 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5991 debug_assert_eq!(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
5992 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.get_mut().unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
5993 log_debug!(self.logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
5994 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
5995 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update);
5996 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5997 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5998 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
6000 errors.push((e, counterparty_node_id));
6002 if further_update_exists {
6003 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
6008 log_trace!(self.logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
6009 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6013 log_debug!(self.logger,
6014 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
6015 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6019 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in errors {
6020 let res = Err::<(), _>(err);
6021 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
6025 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
6026 for action in actions {
6028 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6029 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
6031 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint);
6037 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
6038 /// using the given event handler.
6040 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
6041 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
6045 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
6049 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6051 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6052 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6053 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6054 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6055 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6056 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6060 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
6061 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
6062 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
6063 /// is always placed next to each other.
6065 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
6066 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
6067 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
6068 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
6070 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
6071 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
6072 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
6073 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
6074 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
6075 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6076 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
6078 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
6079 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
6080 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
6081 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6084 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
6085 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6087 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
6088 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6091 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
6092 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6093 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6094 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6095 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6096 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
6097 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
6101 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
6102 events.replace(pending_events);
6111 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6113 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6114 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6115 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6116 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6117 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6118 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6122 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
6124 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
6125 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
6126 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
6128 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
6132 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6134 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6135 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6136 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6137 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6138 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6139 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6143 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6145 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6146 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
6147 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
6148 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
6149 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
6152 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
6153 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
6156 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6157 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6158 let new_height = height - 1;
6160 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
6161 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
6162 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
6163 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
6164 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
6165 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
6168 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6172 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6174 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6175 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6176 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6177 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6178 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6179 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6183 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6184 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6185 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6186 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6188 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6189 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
6191 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6192 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
6193 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
6195 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6196 if height < last_best_block_height {
6197 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6198 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6202 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6203 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6204 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6205 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6207 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6208 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
6210 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6212 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
6214 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6216 macro_rules! max_time {
6217 ($timestamp: expr) => {
6219 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
6220 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
6221 // having an explicit local time source.
6222 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
6223 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
6224 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6225 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
6226 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
6232 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
6233 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6234 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
6235 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
6239 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
6240 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
6241 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
6242 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6243 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6244 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
6245 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.get_funding_txo(), chan.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
6246 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
6253 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
6254 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6255 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
6256 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
6257 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
6258 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
6259 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6260 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6265 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6267 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6268 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6269 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6270 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6271 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6272 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6276 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
6277 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
6279 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
6280 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
6281 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6282 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6283 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6285 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6286 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
6288 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6289 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6290 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6291 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6292 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6293 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
6294 let res = f(channel);
6295 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
6296 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
6297 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
6298 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
6299 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
6301 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
6302 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
6303 if channel.is_usable() {
6304 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6305 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
6306 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6307 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6312 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6317 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6318 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
6321 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
6322 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6323 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6324 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6325 msg: announcement_sigs,
6327 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6328 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
6329 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6331 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6332 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6333 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
6338 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
6339 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6340 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
6341 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
6342 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
6343 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
6344 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
6345 // is always consistent.
6346 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
6347 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
6348 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
6349 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
6350 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
6353 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
6354 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel);
6355 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
6356 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
6357 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
6358 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
6359 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6363 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
6364 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
6365 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6366 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6367 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
6368 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6369 data: reason_message,
6379 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6380 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
6381 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
6382 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
6383 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
6384 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
6385 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
6386 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6387 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6388 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
6390 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
6391 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
6392 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
6396 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
6399 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6400 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
6401 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6402 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6403 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
6404 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
6405 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6406 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6407 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
6410 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
6411 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6412 _ => unreachable!(),
6414 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
6415 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
6416 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
6417 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
6423 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
6425 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
6426 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
6430 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
6432 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
6433 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
6435 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
6436 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
6439 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6440 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
6441 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
6444 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
6445 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
6446 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
6447 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
6450 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6451 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6452 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6453 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6456 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6457 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6459 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6460 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6461 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6462 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6463 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
6466 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6467 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6468 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
6469 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
6472 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6473 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6474 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6475 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
6478 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6479 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6480 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
6481 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6485 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
6486 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6488 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6489 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6490 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6491 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6492 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6493 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6497 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
6498 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6499 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6502 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
6503 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6504 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6505 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6508 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
6509 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6510 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6513 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
6514 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6515 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6516 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6519 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6520 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6521 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6524 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6525 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6526 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6529 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6530 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6531 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6534 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6535 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6536 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6539 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6540 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6541 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6544 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6545 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6546 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6549 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6550 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6551 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6554 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6555 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6556 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6559 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6560 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6561 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6564 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6565 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6566 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6569 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6570 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6571 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6574 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6575 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6576 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6579 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6580 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6581 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6584 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6585 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6586 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6589 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6594 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6595 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6596 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6599 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
6600 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6601 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6602 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6604 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
6605 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6606 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
6607 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6608 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6609 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6610 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6611 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6612 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6613 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
6614 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6619 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6621 // V1 Channel Establishment
6622 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
6623 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
6624 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
6625 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
6626 // V2 Channel Establishment
6627 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
6628 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
6629 // Common Channel Establishment
6630 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
6631 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
6632 // Interactive Transaction Construction
6633 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
6634 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
6635 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
6636 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
6637 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
6638 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
6639 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
6640 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
6641 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
6642 // Channel Operations
6643 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
6644 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
6645 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
6646 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
6647 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
6648 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
6650 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
6651 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6652 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6653 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6654 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
6655 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6656 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6657 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6658 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6661 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
6662 peer_state.is_connected = false;
6663 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
6664 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
6667 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
6669 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6671 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6672 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6676 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
6677 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
6678 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6682 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6684 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
6685 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
6686 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
6687 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
6688 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
6689 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
6692 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6693 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6694 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6695 if inbound_peer_limited {
6698 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6699 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
6700 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6701 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6702 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
6706 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6707 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
6708 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6710 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6711 if inbound_peer_limited &&
6712 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
6713 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
6718 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
6719 peer_state.is_connected = true;
6724 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6726 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6727 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6728 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6729 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6730 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6731 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6732 let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6733 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6734 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6735 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6736 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6740 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6741 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6742 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6747 if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6748 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.default_configuration) {
6749 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
6750 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
6751 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6760 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6764 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6765 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6767 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6768 let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = {
6769 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6770 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6771 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6772 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6773 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6774 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
6776 for channel_id in channel_ids {
6777 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6778 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6782 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6783 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6784 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6785 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6786 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6787 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6788 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6789 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6790 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6791 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6799 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6800 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6804 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6805 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6808 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
6809 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6812 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
6813 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6814 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6815 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6818 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
6819 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6820 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6821 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6824 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
6825 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6826 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6827 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6830 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
6831 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6832 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6833 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6836 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
6837 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6838 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6839 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6842 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
6843 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6844 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6845 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6848 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
6849 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6850 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6851 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6854 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
6855 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6856 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6857 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6860 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
6861 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6862 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6863 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6867 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6868 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6869 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
6870 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6873 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6874 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6876 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6877 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6878 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6879 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6880 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6883 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6884 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6885 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
6886 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6889 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6890 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6891 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6892 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
6895 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6896 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6897 pub fn provided_init_features(_config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
6898 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
6899 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
6900 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
6901 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
6902 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
6903 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
6904 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
6905 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
6906 features.set_payment_secret_required();
6907 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
6908 features.set_wumbo_optional();
6909 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
6910 features.set_channel_type_optional();
6911 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
6912 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
6914 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
6915 if _config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
6916 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
6922 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6923 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6925 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6926 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6927 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6928 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6931 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6932 (2, node_id, required),
6933 (4, features, required),
6934 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6935 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6936 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6937 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6940 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
6941 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6942 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6943 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6944 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
6945 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
6946 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6947 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
6948 (2, self.channel_id, required),
6949 (3, self.channel_type, option),
6950 (4, self.counterparty, required),
6951 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
6952 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
6953 (7, self.config, option),
6954 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
6955 (9, self.confirmations, option),
6956 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
6957 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6958 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6959 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
6960 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6961 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
6962 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6963 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
6964 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
6965 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
6966 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
6967 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
6968 (30, self.is_usable, required),
6969 (32, self.is_public, required),
6970 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6971 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6972 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6973 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
6979 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
6980 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6981 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6982 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6983 (2, channel_id, required),
6984 (3, channel_type, option),
6985 (4, counterparty, required),
6986 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6987 (6, funding_txo, option),
6988 (7, config, option),
6989 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6990 (9, confirmations, option),
6991 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6992 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6993 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6994 (16, balance_msat, required),
6995 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6996 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6997 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6998 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6999 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
7000 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
7001 (22, confirmations_required, option),
7002 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
7003 (26, is_outbound, required),
7004 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
7005 (30, is_usable, required),
7006 (32, is_public, required),
7007 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7008 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7009 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
7010 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
7013 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7014 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
7015 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
7016 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
7017 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
7021 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
7023 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
7024 outbound_scid_alias,
7028 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
7029 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
7031 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
7032 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
7033 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
7034 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
7035 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
7036 confirmations_required,
7038 force_close_spend_delay,
7039 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
7040 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
7041 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
7042 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
7043 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
7044 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
7045 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
7050 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
7051 (2, channels, vec_type),
7052 (4, phantom_scid, required),
7053 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
7056 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
7058 (0, onion_packet, required),
7059 (2, short_channel_id, required),
7062 (0, payment_data, required),
7063 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
7064 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
7065 (3, payment_metadata, option),
7067 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
7068 (0, payment_preimage, required),
7069 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
7070 (3, payment_metadata, option),
7074 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
7075 (0, routing, required),
7076 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
7077 (4, payment_hash, required),
7078 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
7079 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
7080 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
7084 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
7085 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7087 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
7089 channel_id.write(writer)?;
7090 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7091 reason.write(writer)?;
7093 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7094 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
7097 channel_id.write(writer)?;
7098 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7099 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
7100 failure_code.write(writer)?;
7107 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
7108 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7109 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7112 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
7113 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7114 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7115 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
7119 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7120 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7121 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7122 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
7123 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
7126 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
7127 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
7128 // messages contained in the variants.
7129 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
7130 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
7131 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
7133 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
7134 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
7135 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
7136 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
7137 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
7140 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
7141 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
7142 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
7143 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
7144 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
7146 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
7151 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
7156 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
7157 (0, short_channel_id, required),
7158 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
7159 (2, outpoint, required),
7160 (4, htlc_id, required),
7161 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
7164 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
7165 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7166 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
7167 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
7168 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
7170 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7171 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
7172 (1, self.total_msat, required),
7173 (2, self.value, required),
7174 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
7175 (4, payment_data, option),
7176 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
7177 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
7178 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
7184 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
7185 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7186 let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
7188 let mut sender_intended_value = None;
7189 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
7190 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
7191 let mut total_value_received = None;
7192 let mut total_msat = None;
7193 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
7194 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7195 (0, prev_hop, required),
7196 (1, total_msat, option),
7197 (2, value, required),
7198 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
7199 (4, payment_data, option),
7200 (5, total_value_received, option),
7201 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
7202 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
7204 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
7206 if payment_data.is_some() {
7207 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7209 if total_msat.is_none() {
7210 total_msat = Some(value);
7212 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
7215 if total_msat.is_none() {
7216 if payment_data.is_none() {
7217 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7219 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
7221 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
7225 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
7228 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
7229 total_value_received,
7230 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
7237 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
7238 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7239 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7242 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
7243 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
7244 let mut path_hops: Option<Vec<RouteHop>> = Some(Vec::new());
7245 let mut payment_id = None;
7246 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
7247 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
7248 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7249 (0, session_priv, required),
7250 (1, payment_id, option),
7251 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
7252 (4, path_hops, vec_type),
7253 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
7254 (6, blinded_tail, option),
7256 if payment_id.is_none() {
7257 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
7259 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
7261 let path = Path { hops: path_hops.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?, blinded_tail };
7262 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
7263 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7265 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
7266 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
7267 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
7268 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7272 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7273 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
7274 first_hop_htlc_msat,
7276 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
7279 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7280 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
7285 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
7286 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
7288 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
7290 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
7291 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7292 (0, session_priv, required),
7293 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
7294 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
7295 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
7296 (4, path.hops, vec_type),
7297 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
7298 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
7301 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
7303 field.write(writer)?;
7310 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
7311 (0, forward_info, required),
7312 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
7313 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
7314 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
7315 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
7318 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
7320 (0, htlc_id, required),
7321 (2, err_packet, required),
7326 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
7327 (0, payment_secret, required),
7328 (2, expiry_time, required),
7329 (4, user_payment_id, required),
7330 (6, payment_preimage, required),
7331 (8, min_value_msat, required),
7334 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7336 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7337 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7338 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7339 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7340 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7341 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7345 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7346 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
7348 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7350 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
7352 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7353 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
7354 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
7357 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
7359 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7360 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
7361 let mut number_of_channels = 0;
7362 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7363 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7364 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7365 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7366 serializable_peer_count += 1;
7368 number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len();
7369 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
7370 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7371 unfunded_channels += 1;
7376 ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
7378 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7379 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7380 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7381 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
7382 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7383 channel.write(writer)?;
7390 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7391 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7392 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
7393 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7394 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7395 for forward in pending_forwards {
7396 forward.write(writer)?;
7401 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7403 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7404 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
7405 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7407 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
7408 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
7409 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7410 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
7411 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7412 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7413 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
7414 htlc.write(writer)?;
7416 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
7417 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
7420 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
7421 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
7422 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7423 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
7424 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
7425 // per_peer_state lock at all.
7426 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
7429 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
7430 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
7431 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
7432 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
7433 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
7435 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7436 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
7437 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
7438 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
7439 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
7440 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
7441 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
7446 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7447 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
7448 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
7449 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
7450 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
7451 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
7452 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
7453 // well save the space and not write any events here.
7454 0u64.write(writer)?;
7456 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7457 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
7458 event.write(writer)?;
7462 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
7463 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
7464 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
7465 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
7466 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
7467 0u64.write(writer)?;
7469 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
7470 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
7471 // likely to be identical.
7472 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7473 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7475 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7476 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
7477 hash.write(writer)?;
7478 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
7481 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
7482 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
7483 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7484 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
7485 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
7488 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
7489 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7491 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7492 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7493 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
7494 session_priv.write(writer)?;
7497 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
7498 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
7502 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
7503 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
7504 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7506 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7507 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7508 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
7514 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
7515 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7516 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
7517 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
7520 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
7521 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
7522 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
7523 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
7524 pending_claiming_payments = None;
7527 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7528 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
7529 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7530 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
7531 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7532 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
7533 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7534 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
7535 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
7536 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7537 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
7538 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
7545 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
7546 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7547 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
7548 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
7551 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
7552 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
7553 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
7554 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
7555 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
7556 // check that the event is sane here.
7557 let event_encoded = event.encode();
7558 let event_read: Option<Event> =
7559 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
7560 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
7566 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
7567 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7568 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7569 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
7570 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
7571 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
7574 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
7575 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
7576 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
7577 events.push_back((ev, action));
7578 } else if action.is_some() {
7579 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7586 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
7588 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
7590 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7591 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
7592 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
7593 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
7594 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
7595 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
7596 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
7597 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
7598 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7599 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
7600 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
7601 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
7602 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
7604 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
7605 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
7607 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
7608 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
7610 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
7611 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
7612 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
7613 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
7614 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
7615 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
7617 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
7618 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7620 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7621 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7622 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7623 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7624 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7625 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7629 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
7630 pub entropy_source: ES,
7632 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
7633 pub node_signer: NS,
7635 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
7636 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
7638 pub signer_provider: SP,
7640 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7642 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
7643 pub fee_estimator: F,
7644 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7646 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
7647 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
7648 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
7649 pub chain_monitor: M,
7651 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
7652 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
7653 /// force-closed during deserialization.
7654 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
7655 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
7656 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
7658 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
7660 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
7661 /// deserialization.
7663 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
7664 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
7665 pub default_config: UserConfig,
7667 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
7668 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
7670 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
7671 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
7672 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
7673 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
7675 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
7678 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
7679 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
7682 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7683 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7685 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7686 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7687 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7688 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7689 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7690 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7694 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
7695 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
7696 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
7697 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
7698 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
7700 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
7701 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
7706 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
7707 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
7708 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7709 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
7711 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7712 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7713 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7714 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7715 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7716 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7720 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7721 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
7722 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
7726 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7727 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
7729 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7730 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7731 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7732 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7733 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7734 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7738 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7739 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7741 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7742 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7743 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7745 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7747 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7748 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7749 let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7750 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7751 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7752 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
7753 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
7754 for _ in 0..channel_count {
7755 let mut channel: Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (
7756 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
7758 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7759 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
7760 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
7761 if channel.get_latest_complete_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7762 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
7763 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
7764 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7765 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_complete_monitor_update_id());
7766 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7767 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7768 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7769 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7770 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7771 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7772 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7773 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7774 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7775 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
7776 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
7777 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
7778 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7779 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7780 let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
7781 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
7782 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup(monitor_update));
7784 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
7785 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7786 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7787 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7788 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
7790 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7791 let mut found_htlc = false;
7792 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7793 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
7796 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
7797 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
7798 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
7799 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
7800 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
7801 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
7802 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
7803 log_info!(args.logger,
7804 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
7805 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7806 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7810 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7811 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
7812 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7814 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7815 id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
7817 match peer_channels.entry(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
7818 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7819 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
7820 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7822 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7823 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
7824 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7825 entry.insert(by_id_map);
7829 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
7830 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
7831 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
7832 // safely discard the channel.
7833 let _ = channel.force_shutdown(false);
7834 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7835 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7836 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7837 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
7840 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7841 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7842 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7843 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7844 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7845 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7849 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7850 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
7851 log_info!(args.logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
7852 log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
7853 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
7854 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
7855 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
7857 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
7861 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
7862 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7863 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7864 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
7865 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7866 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7867 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
7868 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
7869 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
7871 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
7874 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7875 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7876 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
7877 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7878 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7879 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
7880 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
7881 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
7883 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
7886 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7887 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>)>()));
7888 for _ in 0..peer_count {
7889 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7890 let peer_state = PeerState {
7891 channel_by_id: peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new()),
7892 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
7893 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7894 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
7895 is_connected: false,
7897 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
7900 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7901 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
7902 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
7903 for _ in 0..event_count {
7904 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
7905 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
7910 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7911 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
7912 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7914 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
7915 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
7916 // on-startup monitor updates.
7917 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
7918 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
7920 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7924 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
7925 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7927 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7928 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
7929 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
7930 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
7931 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7935 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7936 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
7937 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
7938 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
7939 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
7940 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
7941 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
7943 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
7944 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7948 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
7949 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
7950 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
7951 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
7952 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
7953 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7954 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7955 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
7956 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
7957 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
7958 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = Some(Vec::new());
7959 let mut events_override = None;
7960 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7961 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
7962 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7963 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
7964 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7965 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
7966 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7967 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
7968 (8, events_override, option),
7969 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7970 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
7971 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
7973 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
7974 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7977 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
7978 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7981 if let Some(events) = events_override {
7982 pending_events_read = events;
7985 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
7986 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
7989 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
7990 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
7991 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
7992 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
7993 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
7994 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
7996 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
7998 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
7999 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
8000 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
8004 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
8005 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
8006 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
8007 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
8008 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
8009 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
8010 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
8012 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8013 if id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
8014 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
8015 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
8016 if path.hops.is_empty() {
8017 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
8018 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8021 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
8022 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
8023 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
8024 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
8025 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
8026 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
8027 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
8028 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
8030 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
8031 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
8032 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
8033 retry_strategy: None,
8034 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
8035 payment_params: None,
8036 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
8037 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
8038 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8039 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8040 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8041 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
8042 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
8043 total_msat: path_amt,
8044 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
8046 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
8047 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
8052 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
8054 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
8055 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
8056 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
8057 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
8059 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
8060 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
8061 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
8062 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
8063 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
8064 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
8065 forwards.retain(|forward| {
8066 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
8067 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
8068 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
8069 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
8074 !forwards.is_empty()
8076 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
8077 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
8078 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
8079 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
8080 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
8081 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
8082 intercepted_id != ev_id
8089 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
8090 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
8091 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
8092 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
8093 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
8094 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
8095 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
8096 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
8097 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
8098 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
8099 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
8100 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv, path, false, &pending_events, &args.logger);
8101 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
8110 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
8111 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
8112 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
8113 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
8114 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
8115 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
8116 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
8117 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
8121 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
8122 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
8124 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
8125 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
8126 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
8127 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8129 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
8130 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
8131 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8133 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
8134 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
8136 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
8137 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
8139 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
8142 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
8143 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
8144 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
8146 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
8150 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
8151 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
8152 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
8153 if htlcs.is_empty() {
8154 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8156 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
8157 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
8158 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
8159 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
8160 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
8161 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
8162 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
8163 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
8165 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
8166 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8170 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
8172 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
8174 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
8175 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
8177 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
8178 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
8183 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8184 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8186 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
8188 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8190 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
8191 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
8192 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
8193 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8197 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
8198 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
8199 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8200 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8201 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
8202 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
8203 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
8205 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
8206 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
8207 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
8209 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
8210 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
8211 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
8212 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
8213 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
8214 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8216 if chan.is_usable() {
8217 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
8218 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
8219 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
8220 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
8221 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8227 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
8229 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8230 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
8231 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
8232 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
8233 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
8234 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
8235 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
8236 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
8237 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
8238 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
8239 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
8241 for claimable_htlc in payment.htlcs {
8242 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
8244 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
8245 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
8246 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
8247 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
8249 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
8250 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
8251 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
8252 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
8254 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
8255 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
8256 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
8257 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
8259 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
8260 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
8261 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
8262 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8263 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8264 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
8265 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
8268 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
8269 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
8272 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
8275 purpose: payment.purpose,
8276 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
8282 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
8283 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get_mut(&node_id) {
8284 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
8286 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
8287 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8291 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
8293 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
8294 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
8295 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
8296 router: args.router,
8298 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
8300 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
8301 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
8302 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
8303 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
8305 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
8306 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
8307 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
8308 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
8309 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
8310 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
8312 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
8317 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
8319 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
8321 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
8322 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
8323 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
8324 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
8325 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
8327 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
8328 node_signer: args.node_signer,
8329 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
8331 logger: args.logger,
8332 default_configuration: args.default_config,
8335 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
8336 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
8337 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
8338 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
8339 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
8342 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
8343 //connection or two.
8345 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
8351 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8352 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8353 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
8354 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
8355 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
8356 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
8357 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
8358 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
8359 use crate::ln::msgs;
8360 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
8361 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
8362 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
8363 use crate::util::test_utils;
8364 use crate::util::config::ChannelConfig;
8365 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
8368 fn test_notify_limits() {
8369 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
8370 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
8371 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8372 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8373 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8374 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8376 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
8377 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
8378 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8379 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8380 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8382 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8384 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
8385 // to connect messages with new values
8386 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
8387 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
8388 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
8389 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
8390 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
8391 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
8393 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
8394 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8395 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8396 // ... but the last node should not.
8397 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8398 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
8399 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8400 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8402 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
8403 // about the channel.
8404 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8405 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8406 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8408 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
8410 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8411 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8412 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8413 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8414 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8415 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8417 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
8418 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8419 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8421 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
8422 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
8423 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
8424 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
8425 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
8426 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
8428 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
8429 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
8430 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
8431 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
8432 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8433 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8434 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8435 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8437 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
8438 // the channel info has updated.
8439 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
8440 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
8441 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8442 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8443 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8444 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8448 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
8449 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
8451 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8452 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8453 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8454 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8455 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8457 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
8458 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8459 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
8460 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
8462 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
8463 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
8464 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
8465 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
8466 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
8467 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
8468 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
8469 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
8470 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8471 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8472 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8473 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
8475 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
8476 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8477 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8478 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8479 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8480 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8481 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8482 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8483 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8484 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8485 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8486 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8487 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
8488 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8489 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8490 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8491 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8492 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8493 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8494 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8495 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8496 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8497 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8499 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
8500 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
8501 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
8502 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8503 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8504 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8505 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
8507 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
8508 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
8509 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
8510 // lightning messages manually.
8511 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8512 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
8513 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8515 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8516 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8517 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
8518 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8519 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8520 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
8521 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8522 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8523 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
8524 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8525 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8526 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8527 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8528 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8529 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8530 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
8531 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8532 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8533 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
8534 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8535 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8536 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8537 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8538 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
8539 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8541 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
8542 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
8543 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8544 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
8546 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
8547 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
8548 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
8549 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
8551 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8554 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8555 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8556 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8557 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8559 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8562 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8563 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8564 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8565 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8567 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8572 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
8573 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
8574 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
8575 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
8576 // fails as expected.
8577 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8578 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8579 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8580 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8581 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8582 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8583 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8585 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
8586 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
8587 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
8589 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
8590 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8591 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV),
8592 final_value_msat: 100_000,
8594 let route = find_route(
8595 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8596 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
8598 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8599 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8600 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8601 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8602 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8603 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8604 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8605 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8606 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8607 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8608 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
8609 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
8610 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8611 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8612 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8613 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8614 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8615 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8616 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8617 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8618 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8619 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8620 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8621 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8623 // Finally, claim the original payment.
8624 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8626 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
8627 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8628 let route = find_route(
8629 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8630 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
8632 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8633 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8634 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8635 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8636 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8637 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
8638 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
8639 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
8641 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
8642 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8643 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8644 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8645 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8646 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8647 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8648 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8649 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8650 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8651 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8652 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8653 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8654 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8655 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8656 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8657 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8658 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8659 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8660 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8661 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8662 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8663 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8664 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8666 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
8667 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8671 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
8672 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
8673 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
8674 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8675 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8676 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8677 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8679 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8680 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8682 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8683 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8684 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8685 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8687 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8688 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8689 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8690 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8691 let route = find_route(
8692 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8693 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
8696 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8697 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
8698 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
8699 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8700 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
8701 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8702 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8704 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8705 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8706 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8707 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8708 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8709 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8710 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8712 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
8716 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
8717 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
8718 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8719 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8720 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8721 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8723 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8724 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8726 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8727 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8728 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8729 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8731 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8732 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8733 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8734 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8735 let route = find_route(
8736 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8737 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
8740 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8741 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8742 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
8743 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
8744 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8745 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
8746 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
8747 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8748 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8750 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8751 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8752 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8753 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8754 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8755 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8756 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8758 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
8762 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
8763 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8764 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8765 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8766 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8768 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8769 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8770 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8771 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8773 // Marshall an MPP route.
8774 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8775 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8776 route.paths.push(path);
8777 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8778 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8779 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8780 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8781 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8782 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8784 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8785 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
8787 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
8788 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
8790 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
8795 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
8796 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8797 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8798 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8799 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8801 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8803 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8804 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8806 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8807 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8808 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8809 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8812 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
8813 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
8814 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8815 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
8816 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
8817 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
8820 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
8823 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
8824 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
8829 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
8830 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
8831 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8832 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8833 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8834 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8836 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
8837 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
8839 total_msat: 100_000,
8842 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
8843 // payment verification fails as expected.
8844 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
8845 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
8846 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
8847 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
8849 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
8853 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
8854 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
8858 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
8859 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
8860 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
8861 // the channel is successfully closed.
8862 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8863 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8864 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8865 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8867 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8868 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8869 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
8870 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8871 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
8873 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
8874 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
8876 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
8877 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
8878 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8879 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8882 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8884 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8885 // as it has the funding transaction.
8886 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8887 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8888 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8891 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8893 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8895 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8897 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8898 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8899 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8901 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8904 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8905 // as it has the funding transaction.
8906 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8907 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8908 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8910 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8911 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8912 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8913 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8914 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8915 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8916 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8917 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
8919 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8920 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8921 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8922 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
8924 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8925 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
8927 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
8928 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
8929 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
8930 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
8931 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8932 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8933 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8937 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
8938 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
8939 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
8940 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
8941 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8942 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8943 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8946 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8948 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
8949 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
8950 // closing transaction).
8951 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
8952 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
8953 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8955 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
8956 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
8957 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8958 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8959 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8962 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8964 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
8966 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
8967 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
8968 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8970 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8972 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8973 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8976 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8977 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
8978 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8981 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8982 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
8983 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8986 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
8988 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8989 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8991 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
8992 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8994 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
8995 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
9000 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
9001 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
9002 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
9003 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
9004 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9005 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
9006 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
9007 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
9010 let channel_id = [4; 32];
9011 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9012 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
9014 // Test the API functions.
9015 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
9017 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
9019 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
9021 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
9023 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
9025 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
9027 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
9031 fn test_connection_limiting() {
9032 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
9033 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9034 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9035 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9036 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9038 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
9040 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9041 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9043 let mut funding_tx = None;
9044 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
9045 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9046 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9049 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9050 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
9051 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
9052 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
9053 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9055 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9056 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9057 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9059 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9061 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
9062 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9063 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9065 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9068 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
9069 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9070 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9071 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
9072 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9074 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
9075 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
9077 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
9078 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
9079 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9080 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9081 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
9082 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9083 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
9085 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9086 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9087 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9088 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err();
9090 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
9091 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
9092 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9093 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9094 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
9095 for ev in chan_closed_events {
9096 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
9098 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9099 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
9100 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
9101 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err();
9103 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
9104 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
9105 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
9106 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9108 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
9109 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
9111 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
9112 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
9113 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
9114 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
9115 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9117 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9118 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
9119 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9121 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
9122 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9123 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
9125 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
9126 // "protected" and can connect again.
9127 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
9128 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
9129 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
9130 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9132 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
9134 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9135 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
9139 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
9140 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
9141 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9142 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9143 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9144 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9146 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
9148 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9149 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9151 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
9152 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9153 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9154 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9157 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
9159 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9160 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
9161 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9163 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
9164 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9165 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9167 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
9168 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9169 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
9170 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9174 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
9175 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
9176 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
9177 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9178 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9179 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
9180 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
9181 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
9182 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9184 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
9186 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9187 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9189 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
9190 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
9191 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9192 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9193 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9194 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
9196 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9197 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9199 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9200 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
9202 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9204 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
9205 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9208 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
9209 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9210 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9211 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9212 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
9213 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9214 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9216 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9217 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
9218 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
9219 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
9223 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9225 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
9226 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9228 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
9229 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9230 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9232 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9233 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
9235 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9237 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
9242 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
9243 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
9244 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
9245 // the channel without the anchors feature.
9246 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9247 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9248 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
9249 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
9250 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
9251 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
9252 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9254 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
9255 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9256 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
9258 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9259 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9261 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9262 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9264 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9267 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9268 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
9270 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9271 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
9273 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9279 use crate::chain::Listen;
9280 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
9281 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
9282 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
9283 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
9284 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
9285 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
9286 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
9287 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
9288 use crate::util::test_utils;
9289 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
9291 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
9292 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
9293 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
9295 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
9297 use criterion::Criterion;
9299 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
9300 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
9301 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
9302 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
9303 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
9304 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
9305 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
9307 struct ANodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
9308 node: &'a Manager<'a, P>,
9310 impl<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'a, P> {
9311 type CM = Manager<'a, P>;
9313 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'a, P> { self.node }
9315 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
9318 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
9319 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
9322 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
9323 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
9324 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
9326 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
9328 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
9329 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
9330 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
9331 let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
9332 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
9334 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
9335 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
9337 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
9338 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
9339 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
9340 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
9342 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
9344 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
9346 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
9347 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
9348 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
9349 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
9350 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
9352 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
9354 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
9356 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_b.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
9357 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_a.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
9358 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9359 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
9360 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9363 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
9364 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9365 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
9367 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9368 } else { panic!(); }
9370 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
9371 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9372 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
9374 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9375 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
9377 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9380 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9381 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9382 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
9384 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9385 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
9387 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9390 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
9392 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), 42, vec![tx]);
9393 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
9394 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
9396 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9397 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9398 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
9399 match msg_events[0] {
9400 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
9401 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
9402 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
9406 match msg_events[1] {
9407 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9411 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9412 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
9414 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9415 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
9417 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9420 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9421 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
9423 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9424 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
9426 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9429 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
9430 macro_rules! send_payment {
9431 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
9432 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
9433 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.invoice_features()).unwrap();
9434 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
9435 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
9437 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
9438 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
9440 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
9441 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), RouteParameters {
9442 payment_params, final_value_msat: 10_000,
9443 }, Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
9444 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
9445 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9446 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
9447 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
9448 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
9449 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
9450 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
9452 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
9453 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
9454 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9455 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
9457 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
9458 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
9459 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
9460 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9461 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
9463 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
9466 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
9467 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
9468 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
9469 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9471 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
9475 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
9476 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
9477 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);