1 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
3 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
4 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
5 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
7 //! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
8 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
9 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
14 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
15 use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
17 use bitcoin_hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
18 use bitcoin_hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
19 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
20 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
21 use bitcoin_hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
23 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
24 use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
25 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
28 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,FeeEstimator};
29 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
30 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
31 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
32 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
33 use ln::router::Route;
36 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
37 use chain::keysinterface::{ChannelKeys, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemoryChannelKeys};
38 use util::config::UserConfig;
39 use util::{byte_utils, events};
40 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
41 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
42 use util::logger::Logger;
43 use util::errors::APIError;
46 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
47 use std::io::{Cursor, Read};
48 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock};
49 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
50 use std::time::Duration;
51 use std::marker::{Sync, Send};
54 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
56 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
57 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
58 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
60 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
61 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
62 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
63 // before we forward it.
65 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
66 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
67 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
68 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
69 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
71 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
72 enum PendingForwardReceiveHTLCInfo {
74 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
75 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually
80 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
81 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
82 type_data: PendingForwardReceiveHTLCInfo,
83 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
84 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
85 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
86 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
89 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
90 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
91 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
92 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
95 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
96 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
97 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
98 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
102 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
104 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
106 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
110 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
114 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
115 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
116 pub(super) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
117 short_channel_id: u64,
119 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
122 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
123 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
124 pub(super) enum HTLCSource {
125 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
128 session_priv: SecretKey,
129 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
130 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
131 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
136 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
137 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
138 route: Route { hops: Vec::new() },
139 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
140 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
145 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
146 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
148 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
156 /// payment_hash type, use to cross-lock hop
157 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
158 pub struct PaymentHash(pub [u8;32]);
159 /// payment_preimage type, use to route payment between hop
160 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
161 pub struct PaymentPreimage(pub [u8;32]);
163 type ShutdownResult = (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
165 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
166 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
167 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
168 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
169 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
171 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
172 err: msgs::LightningError,
173 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
175 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
177 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
179 err: LightningError {
181 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
182 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
184 data: err.to_string()
188 shutdown_finish: None,
192 fn ignore_no_close(err: &'static str) -> Self {
194 err: LightningError {
196 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
198 shutdown_finish: None,
202 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
203 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
206 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
208 err: LightningError {
210 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
211 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
213 data: err.to_string()
217 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
221 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
224 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
226 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
228 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
230 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
231 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
233 data: msg.to_string()
237 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { msg, .. } => LightningError {
239 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
240 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
242 data: msg.to_string()
247 shutdown_finish: None,
252 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
253 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
254 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
255 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
256 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
258 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
259 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
260 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
261 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
262 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
263 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
264 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
266 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
270 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
271 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
272 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<ChanSigner>>,
273 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
274 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
275 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
276 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
277 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
278 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
279 /// payment_hash -> Vec<(amount_received, htlc_source)> for tracking things that were to us and
280 /// can be failed/claimed by the user
281 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
282 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
284 pub(super) claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<(u64, HTLCPreviousHopData)>>,
285 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
286 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
287 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
290 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
291 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
293 latest_features: InitFeatures,
296 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
297 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
299 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
300 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
301 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
302 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
303 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
304 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
305 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
306 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F> = Arc<ChannelManager<InMemoryChannelKeys, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>>>;
308 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
309 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
310 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
311 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
312 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
313 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
314 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
315 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
316 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, M, T, F> = ChannelManager<InMemoryChannelKeys, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F>;
318 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
319 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
321 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
322 /// to individual Channels.
324 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
325 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
326 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
327 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
329 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
330 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
331 /// returning from ManyChannelMonitor::add_/update_monitor, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
332 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
333 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
334 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
335 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
337 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager), which
338 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
339 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
340 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
343 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
344 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
345 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
346 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
347 /// timer_chan_freshness_every_min roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
349 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
350 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
351 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
352 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
353 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
354 pub struct ChannelManager<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref>
355 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
356 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
357 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
358 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
360 default_configuration: UserConfig,
361 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
367 pub(super) latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
369 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
370 last_block_hash: Mutex<Sha256dHash>,
371 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
374 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>,
376 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>,
377 our_network_key: SecretKey,
379 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We just set
380 /// them to be monotonically increasing since we don't assume access to a time source.
381 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
383 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
384 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
385 /// are currently open with that peer.
386 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
387 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
389 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
391 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
392 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
393 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
394 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
395 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
402 /// The amount of time we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time between when
403 /// we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
404 pub(crate) const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
405 /// The amount of time we're willing to wait to claim money back to us
406 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24 * 7;
408 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
409 /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
410 /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
411 /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
412 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
413 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 12; //TODO?
414 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
416 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
417 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
418 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
419 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
420 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
421 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
424 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
426 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
427 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
430 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
432 macro_rules! secp_call {
433 ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
436 Err(_) => return Err($err),
441 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
442 pub struct ChannelDetails {
443 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
444 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
445 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
446 /// lifetime of the channel.
447 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
448 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
449 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
450 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
451 /// The node_id of our counterparty
452 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
453 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
454 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
455 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
456 pub counterparty_features: InitFeatures,
457 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
458 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
459 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
461 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
462 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
463 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
464 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
465 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
466 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
467 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
468 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
469 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
470 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
471 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
472 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
473 /// the peer is connected, and (c) no monitor update failure is pending resolution.
477 macro_rules! handle_error {
478 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr, $locked_channel_state: expr) => {
481 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
482 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
483 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
484 if let Some(update) = update_option {
485 $locked_channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
490 log_error!($self, "{}", err.err);
491 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
492 } else { $locked_channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id: $their_node_id, action: err.action.clone() }); }
493 // Return error in case higher-API need one
500 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
501 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
504 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
505 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
507 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
508 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
509 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
510 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
511 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
513 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
515 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { .. }) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
520 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
521 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
524 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
525 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
527 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
528 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
529 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
530 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
531 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
533 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
535 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { msg, update }) => {
536 log_error!($self, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
537 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
538 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
539 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
541 if let Err(e) = $self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update) {
543 // Upstream channel is dead, but we want at least to fail backward HTLCs to save
544 // downstream channels. In case of PermanentFailure, we are not going to be able
545 // to claim back to_remote output on remote commitment transaction. Doesn't
546 // make a difference here, we are concern about HTLCs circuit, not onchain funds.
547 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {},
548 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {},
551 let mut shutdown_res = chan.force_shutdown();
552 if shutdown_res.0.len() >= 1 {
553 log_error!($self, "You have a toxic local commitment transaction {} avaible in channel monitor, read comment in ChannelMonitor::get_latest_local_commitment_txn to be informed of manual action to take", shutdown_res.0[0].txid());
555 shutdown_res.0.clear();
556 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
562 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
563 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
564 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
566 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
568 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
569 log_error!($self, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]));
570 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
571 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
572 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
574 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
575 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
576 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
577 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
578 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
579 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
580 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
581 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
582 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
583 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()));
586 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
587 log_info!($self, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
588 log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]),
589 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
591 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
592 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
594 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
595 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
597 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
598 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
599 if !$resend_commitment {
600 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
603 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
605 $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
606 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor"), *$entry.key()))
612 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
613 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
614 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
616 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
617 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
621 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
622 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
623 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
624 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
625 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
628 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
633 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref> ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>
634 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
635 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
636 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
637 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
639 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
641 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
642 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
644 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
646 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
648 /// Users must provide the current blockchain height from which to track onchain channel
649 /// funding outpoints and send payments with reliable timelocks.
651 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
652 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods.
653 /// However, rather than calling these methods directly, the user should register
654 /// the ChannelManager as a listener to the BlockNotifier and call the BlockNotifier's
655 /// `block_(dis)connected` methods, which will notify all registered listeners in one
657 pub fn new(network: Network, fee_est: F, monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: Arc<Logger>, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, current_blockchain_height: usize) -> Result<ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>, secp256k1::Error> {
658 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
660 let res = ChannelManager {
661 default_configuration: config.clone(),
662 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
663 fee_estimator: fee_est,
667 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(current_blockchain_height),
668 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(Default::default()),
671 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
672 by_id: HashMap::new(),
673 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
674 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
675 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
676 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
678 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
680 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
682 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
684 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
685 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
695 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
697 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
698 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
699 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
700 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
702 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
703 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
705 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
706 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
707 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
708 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
709 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "channel_value must be at least 1000 satoshis" });
712 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
713 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger), config)?;
714 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
716 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
717 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
718 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
719 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
720 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
721 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" });
723 panic!("RNG is bad???");
726 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
728 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
729 node_id: their_network_key,
735 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<ChanSigner>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
736 let mut res = Vec::new();
738 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
739 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
740 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
741 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
742 res.push(ChannelDetails {
743 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
744 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
745 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
746 counterparty_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
747 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
748 inbound_capacity_msat,
749 outbound_capacity_msat,
750 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
751 is_live: channel.is_live(),
755 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
756 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
757 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.remote_network_id) {
758 chan.counterparty_features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
764 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
765 /// more information.
766 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
767 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
770 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
771 /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
773 /// These are guaranteed to have their is_live value set to true, see the documentation for
774 /// ChannelDetails::is_live for more info on exactly what the criteria are.
775 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
776 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
777 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
778 // really wanted anyway.
779 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
782 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
783 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
784 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
786 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
787 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
788 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
790 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
791 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
792 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
793 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
794 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
795 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
796 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
797 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(),
800 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
801 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
802 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
804 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
805 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
807 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel"})
810 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
811 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
813 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
814 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
819 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
820 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
821 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
830 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
831 let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
832 log_trace!(self, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} transactions to broadcast and {} HTLCs to fail", local_txn.len(), failed_htlcs.len());
833 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
834 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
836 for tx in local_txn {
837 log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(tx));
838 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
842 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
843 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
844 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
845 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
848 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
849 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
850 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
851 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
852 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
859 log_trace!(self, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
860 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
861 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
862 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
863 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
869 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
870 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
871 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
872 for chan in self.list_channels() {
873 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
877 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>) {
878 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
879 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
881 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
882 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
883 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
884 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
885 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
886 failure_code: $err_code,
887 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
892 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
893 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
896 let shared_secret = {
897 let mut arr = [0; 32];
898 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
901 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
903 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
904 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
905 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
906 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
907 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
908 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
909 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
910 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
913 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
914 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
915 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
916 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
917 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
920 let mut channel_state = None;
921 macro_rules! return_err {
922 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
924 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
925 if channel_state.is_none() {
926 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
928 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
929 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
930 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
931 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
932 })), channel_state.unwrap());
937 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
938 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
939 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac) = {
940 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
942 let error_code = match err {
943 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
944 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
945 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
946 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
947 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
949 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
952 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
953 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
954 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
961 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
964 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
965 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
966 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
967 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
968 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
969 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
970 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
971 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
972 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
973 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
974 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
975 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
979 // final_expiry_too_soon
980 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + (CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
981 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
983 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
984 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
985 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
987 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
988 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
989 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
992 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
993 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
994 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
995 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
997 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
998 type_data: PendingForwardReceiveHTLCInfo::Receive {},
999 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1000 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1001 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1002 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1005 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1006 let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
1007 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1009 // Check two things:
1010 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
1011 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
1012 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
1014 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
1016 // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
1017 // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
1018 chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
1020 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1022 let blinding_factor = {
1023 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1024 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1025 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1026 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
1029 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
1031 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1033 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1036 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1037 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
1040 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
1041 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1042 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1043 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
1044 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1048 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1049 type_data: PendingForwardReceiveHTLCInfo::Forward {
1050 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
1051 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1053 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1054 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1055 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1056 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1060 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1061 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref type_data, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1062 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here (which is
1063 // important as various things later assume we are a ::Receive if short_channel_id is
1065 if let &PendingForwardReceiveHTLCInfo::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = type_data {
1066 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1067 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1068 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1069 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1071 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1073 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1074 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1076 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1077 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1078 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1079 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1080 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1081 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1082 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1084 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1085 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1087 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
1088 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1089 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1091 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1092 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1094 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1095 // We want to have at least LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS to fail prior to going on chain CLAIM_BUFFER blocks before expiration
1096 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1097 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1099 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1100 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1105 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1106 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1107 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1108 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1110 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1111 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1113 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1114 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(chan_update.contents.flags));
1116 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1118 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1123 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1126 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1127 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1128 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel<ChanSigner>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1129 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1130 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1134 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
1136 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1137 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1138 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1139 timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
1140 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
1141 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
1142 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1143 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator),
1144 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1145 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1148 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1149 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
1151 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1157 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1159 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1160 /// fields for more info.
1162 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1163 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1164 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1165 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1166 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1167 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1169 /// May generate a SendHTLCs message event on success, which should be relayed.
1171 /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
1172 /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified.
1173 /// Raises APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1174 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update failure).
1175 /// Raised APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1176 /// relevant updates.
1178 /// In case of APIError::RouteError/APIError::ChannelUnavailable, the payment send has failed
1179 /// and you may wish to retry via a different route immediately.
1180 /// In case of APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed, the commitment update has been irrevocably
1181 /// committed on our end and we're just waiting for a monitor update to send it. Do NOT retry
1182 /// the payment via a different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1183 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1184 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
1185 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
1187 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1188 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
1189 if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1190 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"});
1194 let (session_priv, prng_seed) = self.keys_manager.get_onion_rand();
1196 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1198 let onion_keys = secp_call!(onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
1199 APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
1200 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
1201 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
1202 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
1204 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, &payment_hash);
1206 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1208 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1209 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1211 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1212 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
1213 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1216 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1217 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1219 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1220 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1222 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1223 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!"});
1225 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1226 route: route.clone(),
1227 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1228 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1229 }, onion_packet), channel_state, chan)
1231 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
1232 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1233 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
1234 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1235 // that we will resent the commitment update once we unfree monitor
1236 // updating, so we have to take special care that we don't return
1237 // something else in case we will resend later!
1238 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1241 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1242 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1243 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1244 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1245 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1246 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1247 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1255 } else { unreachable!(); }
1259 match handle_error!(self, err, route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey, channel_lock) {
1260 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1261 Err(e) => { Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err }) }
1265 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1267 /// Note that ALL inputs in the transaction pointed to by funding_txo MUST spend SegWit outputs
1268 /// or your counterparty can steal your funds!
1270 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1272 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1273 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1274 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1275 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1277 let (mut chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1278 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1279 let (res, chan) = match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1281 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo)
1282 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1283 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(), None)
1284 } else { unreachable!(); })
1289 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_their_node_id(), channel_state) {
1290 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1291 (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1293 Err(_) => { return; }
1296 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1297 // lock before add_monitor
1298 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1300 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1302 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1303 match handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", *temporary_channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), None)), chan.get_their_node_id(), channel_state) {
1304 Err(_) => { return; },
1305 Ok(()) => unreachable!(),
1309 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1310 // Its completely fine to continue with a FundingCreated until the monitor
1311 // update is persisted, as long as we don't generate the FundingBroadcastSafe
1312 // until the monitor has been safely persisted (as funding broadcast is not,
1314 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
1319 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1320 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1321 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1324 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1325 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1326 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1328 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1334 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<ChanSigner>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1335 if !chan.should_announce() {
1336 log_trace!(self, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1340 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1342 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1344 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1345 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1347 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1348 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1349 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1350 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1351 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1355 /// Generates a signed node_announcement from the given arguments and creates a
1356 /// BroadcastNodeAnnouncement event.
1358 /// RGB is a node "color" and alias ia a printable human-readable string to describe this node
1359 /// to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
1361 /// addresses represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node accepts
1362 /// incoming connections. These will be broadcast to the network, publicly tying these
1363 /// addresses together. If you wish to preserve user privacy, addresses should likely contain
1364 /// only Tor Onion addresses.
1365 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], addresses: msgs::NetAddressSet) {
1366 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1368 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1369 features: NodeFeatures::supported(),
1370 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
1371 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
1373 addresses: addresses.into_vec(),
1374 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
1375 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1377 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1379 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1380 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
1381 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
1382 signature: self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key),
1383 contents: announcement
1388 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1390 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1391 /// Will likely generate further events.
1392 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1393 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1395 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1396 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1397 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
1399 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1400 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1402 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1403 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1404 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1405 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1407 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1408 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1409 match forward_info {
1410 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1411 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1412 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1413 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1414 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1416 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
1418 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1419 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
1420 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
1421 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
1422 // problem, not ours.
1429 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
1430 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1431 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1432 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1433 match forward_info {
1434 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
1435 type_data: PendingForwardReceiveHTLCInfo::Forward {
1437 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value }, } => {
1438 log_trace!(self, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), prev_short_channel_id, short_chan_id);
1439 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1440 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1441 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1442 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
1444 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet) {
1446 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1447 log_trace!(self, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
1449 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
1451 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap();
1452 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
1457 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1459 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1460 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1461 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1462 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1463 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1464 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1465 // this channel currently :/.
1471 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
1472 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
1474 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
1475 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} after delay", short_chan_id);
1476 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1478 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1479 log_trace!(self, "Failed to fail backwards to short_id {}: {}", short_chan_id, msg);
1481 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
1483 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
1484 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
1485 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
1488 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1490 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1491 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
1492 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
1493 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
1494 // messages when we can.
1495 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
1496 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
1497 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
1504 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1505 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment() {
1508 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
1509 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
1510 let their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id();
1511 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
1512 ChannelError::Ignore(_) => {
1513 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1515 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1516 log_trace!(self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
1517 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
1518 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1519 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1521 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.force_shutdown(), self.get_channel_update(&channel).ok()))
1523 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { .. } => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
1525 match handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id, channel_state) {
1526 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1527 Err(_) => { continue; },
1531 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1532 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_their_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
1535 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1536 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
1537 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1538 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1539 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1540 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
1541 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1543 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1551 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1552 match forward_info {
1553 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
1554 type_data: PendingForwardReceiveHTLCInfo::Receive { },
1555 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. }, } => {
1556 let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1557 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1558 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1559 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
1561 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
1562 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => entry.get_mut().push((amt_to_forward, prev_hop_data)),
1563 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(vec![(amt_to_forward, prev_hop_data)]); },
1565 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1566 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1567 amt: amt_to_forward,
1570 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
1571 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
1573 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1574 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
1582 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_code, update) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1584 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }),
1585 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
1589 if handle_errors.len() > 0 {
1590 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1591 for (their_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
1592 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
1596 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1597 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1598 events.append(&mut new_events);
1601 /// If a peer is disconnected we mark any channels with that peer as 'disabled'.
1602 /// After some time, if channels are still disabled we need to broadcast a ChannelUpdate
1603 /// to inform the network about the uselessness of these channels.
1605 /// This method handles all the details, and must be called roughly once per minute.
1606 pub fn timer_chan_freshness_every_min(&self) {
1607 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1608 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1609 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1610 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter_mut() {
1611 if chan.is_disabled_staged() && !chan.is_live() {
1612 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1613 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1618 } else if chan.is_disabled_staged() && chan.is_live() {
1620 } else if chan.is_disabled_marked() {
1621 chan.to_disabled_staged();
1626 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
1627 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
1628 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
1629 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
1630 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
1631 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
1632 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1634 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1635 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
1636 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1637 for (recvd_value, htlc_with_hash) in sources.drain(..) {
1638 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1639 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
1640 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash,
1641 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(recvd_value).to_vec() });
1647 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1648 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1649 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1650 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1651 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1652 /// still-available channels.
1653 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1654 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
1655 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
1656 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
1659 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, .. } => {
1660 log_trace!(self, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1661 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1662 match &onion_error {
1663 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
1665 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1667 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1668 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
1669 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
1670 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
1671 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
1672 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1673 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
1678 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1679 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1680 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1681 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
1683 error_code: onion_error_code
1687 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
1691 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
1692 // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
1693 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as Router::get_route
1694 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
1696 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
1697 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
1698 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1699 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1700 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1701 rejected_by_dest: route.hops.len() == 1,
1703 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
1709 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1710 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1711 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1712 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
1713 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1714 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1716 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
1717 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1718 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1722 let mut forward_event = None;
1723 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
1724 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
1726 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
1727 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1728 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
1730 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1731 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
1734 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1735 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
1736 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1737 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
1738 time_forwardable: time
1745 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1746 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1747 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1749 /// You must specify the expected amounts for this HTLC, and we will only claim HTLCs
1750 /// available within a few percent of the expected amount. This is critical for several
1751 /// reasons : a) it avoids providing senders with `proof-of-payment` (in the form of the
1752 /// payment_preimage without having provided the full value and b) it avoids certain
1753 /// privacy-breaking recipient-probing attacks which may reveal payment activity to
1754 /// motivated attackers.
1756 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1757 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, expected_amount: u64) -> bool {
1758 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1760 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1762 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1763 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
1764 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1765 for (received_amount, htlc_with_hash) in sources.drain(..) {
1766 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1767 if received_amount < expected_amount || received_amount > expected_amount * 2 {
1768 let mut htlc_msat_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(received_amount).to_vec();
1769 let mut height_data = byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).to_vec();
1770 htlc_msat_data.append(&mut height_data);
1771 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
1772 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), &payment_hash,
1773 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_data });
1775 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_preimage);
1781 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
1782 let (their_node_id, err) = loop {
1784 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1785 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1786 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1787 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1791 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
1792 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1793 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1795 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1796 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1798 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1799 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1800 // why it's missing.
1805 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
1806 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
1807 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1808 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
1809 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_option {
1810 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1811 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
1812 assert!(msgs.is_none());
1814 break (chan.get().get_their_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()));
1818 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
1819 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1820 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
1821 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1822 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1823 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1824 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1825 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1833 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1834 // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1835 //TODO: Do something with e?
1839 } else { unreachable!(); }
1845 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
1848 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1849 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1850 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1853 /// Restores a single, given channel to normal operation after a
1854 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1857 /// All ChannelMonitor updates up to and including highest_applied_update_id must have been
1858 /// fully committed in every copy of the given channels' ChannelMonitors.
1860 /// Note that there is no effect to calling with a highest_applied_update_id other than the
1861 /// current latest ChannelMonitorUpdate and one call to this function after multiple
1862 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures is fine. The highest_applied_update_id field
1863 /// exists largely only to prevent races between this and concurrent update_monitor calls.
1865 /// Thus, the anticipated use is, at a high level:
1866 /// 1) You register a ManyChannelMonitor with this ChannelManager,
1867 /// 2) it stores each update to disk, and begins updating any remote (eg watchtower) copies of
1868 /// said ChannelMonitors as it can, returning ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures
1869 /// any time it cannot do so instantly,
1870 /// 3) update(s) are applied to each remote copy of a ChannelMonitor,
1871 /// 4) once all remote copies are updated, you call this function with the update_id that
1872 /// completed, and once it is the latest the Channel will be re-enabled.
1873 pub fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
1874 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1876 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
1877 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
1878 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
1879 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
1882 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1883 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1884 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
1885 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
1886 let channel = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
1890 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
1894 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked) = channel.monitor_updating_restored();
1895 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1896 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), pending_forwards));
1898 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
1900 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1901 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
1902 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1903 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1908 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1909 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
1910 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1911 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1912 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1917 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1921 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1926 if needs_broadcast_safe {
1927 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1928 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
1929 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1932 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
1933 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
1934 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1937 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
1938 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1939 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1940 msg: announcement_sigs,
1943 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
1947 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().append(&mut pending_events);
1949 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
1950 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
1952 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
1954 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
1955 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
1959 fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1960 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1961 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1964 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_node_id.clone(), their_features, msg, 0, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)
1965 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1966 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1967 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1968 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
1969 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
1970 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1971 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
1972 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1973 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
1975 entry.insert(channel);
1981 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1982 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1983 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1984 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1985 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1986 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1987 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1988 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1990 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, their_features), channel_state, chan);
1991 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
1993 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1996 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1997 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1998 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1999 channel_value_satoshis: value,
2000 output_script: output_script,
2001 user_channel_id: user_id,
2006 fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2007 let ((funding_msg, monitor_update), mut chan) = {
2008 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2009 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2010 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
2011 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2012 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2013 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
2015 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
2017 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
2020 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
2021 // lock before add_monitor
2022 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2024 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
2025 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
2026 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
2027 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
2028 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
2029 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", funding_msg.channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), None));
2031 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
2032 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
2033 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
2034 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
2035 // until we have persisted our monitor.
2036 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2040 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2041 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2042 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
2043 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2044 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
2046 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2047 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
2048 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2057 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2058 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
2059 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2060 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2061 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2062 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2063 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2064 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2066 let monitor_update = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg) {
2067 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
2068 Err((Some(monitor_update), e)) => {
2069 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
2070 let _ = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
2071 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
2074 Ok(update) => update,
2076 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2077 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
2079 (chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get().get_user_id())
2081 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2084 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2085 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
2086 funding_txo: funding_txo,
2087 user_channel_id: user_id,
2092 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2093 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2094 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2095 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2096 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2097 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2098 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2100 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan);
2101 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
2102 log_trace!(self, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2103 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
2104 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
2105 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
2106 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
2107 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
2108 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
2109 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
2110 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
2111 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
2112 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2113 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2114 msg: announcement_sigs,
2119 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2123 fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2124 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
2125 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2126 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2128 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2129 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2130 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2131 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2133 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2134 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2135 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2136 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2140 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2141 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2142 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2146 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2147 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2148 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2150 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2151 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
2153 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2156 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
2157 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2159 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2160 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2161 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2162 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2170 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2171 let (tx, chan_option) = {
2172 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2173 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2174 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2175 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2176 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2177 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2179 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2180 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2181 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2182 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2187 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
2188 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
2189 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
2190 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
2191 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
2192 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2193 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2195 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2196 } else { (tx, None) }
2198 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2201 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
2202 log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
2203 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
2205 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2206 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2207 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2208 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2216 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2217 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
2218 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
2219 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
2221 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
2222 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
2223 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
2224 //but we should prevent it anyway.
2226 let (mut pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
2227 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2229 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2230 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2231 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2232 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2234 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2235 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
2236 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
2237 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
2238 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { incoming_shared_secret, .. }) = pending_forward_info {
2239 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get());
2240 pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2241 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2242 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2243 reason: if let Ok(update) = chan_update {
2244 // TODO: Note that |20 is defined as "channel FROM the processing
2245 // node has been disabled" (emphasis mine), which seems to imply
2246 // that we can't return |20 for an inbound channel being disabled.
2247 // This probably needs a spec update but should definitely be
2249 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x1000|20, &{
2250 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
2251 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(update.contents.flags));
2252 res.extend_from_slice(&update.encode_with_len()[..]);
2256 // This can only happen if the channel isn't in the fully-funded
2257 // state yet, implying our counterparty is trying to route payments
2258 // over the channel back to themselves (cause no one else should
2259 // know the short_id is a lightning channel yet). We should have no
2260 // problem just calling this unknown_next_peer
2261 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
2266 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info), channel_state, chan);
2268 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2273 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2274 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2276 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2277 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2278 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2279 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2280 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2282 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
2284 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2287 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
2291 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2292 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2293 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2294 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2295 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2296 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2297 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2299 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
2301 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2306 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2307 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2308 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2309 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2310 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2311 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2312 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2314 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
2315 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
2316 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
2318 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
2321 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2325 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2326 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2327 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2328 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2329 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2330 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2331 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2333 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update) =
2334 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.fee_estimator) {
2335 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
2336 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
2337 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
2338 let _ = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
2339 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
2344 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2345 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
2346 //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
2348 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2349 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2350 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2352 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
2353 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2354 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2355 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2356 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2357 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2358 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2359 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2361 commitment_signed: msg,
2365 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2366 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2367 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2373 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2378 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2379 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2380 let mut forward_event = None;
2381 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2382 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2383 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2384 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
2386 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2387 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.type_data {
2388 PendingForwardReceiveHTLCInfo::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
2389 PendingForwardReceiveHTLCInfo::Receive { .. } => 0,
2391 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2392 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2394 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2395 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2400 match forward_event {
2402 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2403 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2404 time_forwardable: time
2412 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2413 let (pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id) = {
2414 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2415 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2416 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2417 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2418 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2419 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2421 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
2422 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, monitor_update) =
2423 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2424 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2425 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
2426 assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && closing_signed.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
2427 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA"));
2429 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures);
2432 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2433 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2434 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2438 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2439 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2440 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2444 (pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
2446 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2449 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2450 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2452 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
2457 fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2458 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2459 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2460 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2461 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2462 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2463 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2465 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
2467 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2472 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2473 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2474 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2476 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2477 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2478 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2479 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2481 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2482 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
2485 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2486 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) =
2487 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone()), channel_state, chan);
2489 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
2490 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2491 if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }).is_err() ||
2492 self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }).is_err() {
2493 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature");
2494 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
2497 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2499 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2500 msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2501 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
2502 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
2503 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
2504 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
2505 contents: announcement,
2507 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
2510 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2515 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2516 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2517 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2519 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2520 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2521 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2522 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2524 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, mut order, shutdown) =
2525 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg), channel_state, chan);
2526 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
2527 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2528 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
2529 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
2530 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
2531 if revoke_and_ack.is_none() {
2532 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2534 if commitment_update.is_none() {
2535 order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
2537 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, order, revoke_and_ack.is_some(), commitment_update.is_some());
2538 //TODO: Resend the funding_locked if needed once we get the monitor running again
2541 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2542 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2543 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2547 macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
2548 if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
2549 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2550 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2555 macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
2556 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2557 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2558 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2564 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2568 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2573 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2574 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2575 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2581 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2585 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
2586 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
2587 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
2588 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
2590 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2591 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2592 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2594 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2595 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2597 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2598 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
2599 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2600 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
2601 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
2603 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
2604 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2606 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2607 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected"});
2609 their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id();
2610 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) =
2611 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw), channel_state, chan)
2613 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2616 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2617 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
2618 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2619 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2620 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2621 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2622 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2623 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2633 match handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id, channel_state_lock) {
2634 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2635 Err(e) => { Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })}
2640 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref> events::MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>
2641 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
2642 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2643 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
2644 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2646 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<events::MessageSendEvent> {
2647 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a
2648 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2649 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2651 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2652 for htlc_update in self.monitor.get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated() {
2653 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2654 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2655 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2657 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2658 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2663 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2664 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2665 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
2670 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref> events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>
2671 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
2672 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2673 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
2674 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2676 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
2677 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a
2678 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2679 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2681 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2682 for htlc_update in self.monitor.get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated() {
2683 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2684 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2685 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2687 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2688 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2693 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2694 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2695 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
2700 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref + Sync + Send, T: Deref + Sync + Send, K: Deref + Sync + Send, F: Deref + Sync + Send>
2701 ChainListener for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>
2702 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
2703 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2704 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
2705 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2707 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
2708 let header_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
2709 log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", header_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
2710 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2711 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2713 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2714 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2715 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2716 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2717 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
2718 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
2719 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
2720 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2721 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2722 msg: funding_locked,
2724 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2725 log_trace!(self, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
2726 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2727 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2728 msg: announcement_sigs,
2731 log_trace!(self, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
2733 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2734 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
2735 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2736 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2737 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
2741 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
2742 for tx in txn_matched {
2743 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
2744 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
2745 log_trace!(self, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
2746 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2747 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2749 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
2750 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
2751 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
2752 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2753 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2754 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2763 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
2764 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2765 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2767 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2768 // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
2769 // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
2770 // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
2771 failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
2772 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2773 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2782 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2783 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2785 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
2786 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header_hash;
2788 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully update
2789 // last_node_announcement_serial or decide we don't need to.
2790 let old_serial = self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire);
2791 if old_serial < header.time as usize {
2792 if self.last_node_announcement_serial.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
2799 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
2800 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, _: u32) {
2801 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2802 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2804 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2805 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2806 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2807 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2808 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
2809 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
2810 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
2811 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2813 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
2814 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
2815 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2825 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2826 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2828 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
2829 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.bitcoin_hash();
2833 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref + Sync + Send, T: Deref + Sync + Send, K: Deref + Sync + Send, F: Deref + Sync + Send>
2834 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>
2835 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
2836 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2837 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
2838 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2840 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
2841 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2842 let res = self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, their_features, msg);
2844 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2845 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2849 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
2850 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2851 let res = self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, their_features, msg);
2853 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2854 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2858 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
2859 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2860 let res = self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg);
2862 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2863 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2867 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
2868 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2869 let res = self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg);
2871 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2872 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2876 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
2877 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2878 let res = self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg);
2880 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2881 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2885 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
2886 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2887 let res = self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg);
2889 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2890 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2894 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
2895 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2896 let res = self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg);
2898 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2899 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2903 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
2904 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2905 let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg);
2907 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2908 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2912 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
2913 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2914 let res = self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg);
2916 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2917 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2921 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
2922 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2923 let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg);
2925 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2926 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2930 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
2931 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2932 let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg);
2934 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2935 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2939 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
2940 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2941 let res = self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg);
2943 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2944 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2948 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
2949 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2950 let res = self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg);
2952 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2953 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2957 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
2958 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2959 let res = self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg);
2961 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2962 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2966 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
2967 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2968 let res = self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg);
2970 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2971 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2975 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
2976 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2977 let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg);
2979 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2980 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2984 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
2985 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2986 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2987 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
2988 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
2990 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2991 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2992 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2993 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2994 if no_connection_possible {
2995 log_debug!(self, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2996 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2997 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2998 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2999 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3001 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
3002 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
3003 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3013 log_debug!(self, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
3014 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3015 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
3016 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
3017 chan.to_disabled_marked();
3018 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
3019 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
3020 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
3022 if chan.is_shutdown() {
3023 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3024 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3028 no_channels_remain = false;
3034 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
3036 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3037 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3038 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3039 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3040 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3041 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3042 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3043 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3044 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3045 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3046 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3047 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
3048 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
3049 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
3050 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3051 &events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => true,
3055 if no_channels_remain {
3056 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(their_node_id);
3059 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3060 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3062 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
3063 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
3064 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
3069 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
3070 log_debug!(self, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
3072 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3075 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3076 match peer_state_lock.entry(their_node_id.clone()) {
3077 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3078 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
3079 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
3082 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
3083 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
3088 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3089 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3090 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3091 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3092 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
3093 if !chan.have_received_message() {
3094 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
3095 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
3096 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
3100 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
3101 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
3102 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(),
3108 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
3111 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
3112 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3114 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
3115 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3116 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
3117 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
3121 self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
3126 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3127 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3129 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCInfo {
3130 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3131 match &self.type_data {
3132 &PendingForwardReceiveHTLCInfo::Forward { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id } => {
3134 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
3135 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3137 &PendingForwardReceiveHTLCInfo::Receive { } => {
3141 self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
3142 self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3143 self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
3144 self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
3149 impl Readable for PendingHTLCInfo {
3150 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
3151 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
3152 type_data: match Readable::read(reader)? {
3153 0u8 => PendingForwardReceiveHTLCInfo::Forward {
3154 onion_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
3155 short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3157 1u8 => PendingForwardReceiveHTLCInfo::Receive { },
3158 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3160 incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
3161 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
3162 amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
3163 outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
3168 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
3169 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3171 &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => {
3173 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3175 &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => {
3177 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3184 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
3185 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
3186 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3187 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3188 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3189 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3194 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus {
3195 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3197 &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => {
3199 forward_info.write(writer)?;
3201 &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => {
3203 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3210 impl Readable for PendingHTLCStatus {
3211 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
3212 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3213 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3214 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3215 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3220 impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, {
3223 incoming_packet_shared_secret
3226 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
3227 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3229 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => {
3231 hop_data.write(writer)?;
3233 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
3235 route.write(writer)?;
3236 session_priv.write(writer)?;
3237 first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
3244 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
3245 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
3246 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3247 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3248 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3249 route: Readable::read(reader)?,
3250 session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
3251 first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
3253 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3258 impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
3259 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3261 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3265 &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
3267 failure_code.write(writer)?;
3268 data.write(writer)?;
3275 impl Readable for HTLCFailReason {
3276 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
3277 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3278 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
3279 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3280 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
3281 data: Readable::read(reader)?,
3283 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3288 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
3289 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3291 &HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { ref prev_short_channel_id, ref prev_htlc_id, ref forward_info } => {
3293 prev_short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3294 prev_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3295 forward_info.write(writer)?;
3297 &HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3299 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3300 err_packet.write(writer)?;
3307 impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo {
3308 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCForwardInfo, DecodeError> {
3309 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3310 0 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC {
3311 prev_short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3312 prev_htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3313 forward_info: Readable::read(reader)?,
3315 1 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC {
3316 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3317 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
3319 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3324 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Writeable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>
3325 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
3326 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3327 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3328 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3330 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3331 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
3333 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3334 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3336 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
3337 (self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
3338 self.last_block_hash.lock().unwrap().write(writer)?;
3340 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3341 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
3342 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3343 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3344 unfunded_channels += 1;
3347 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
3348 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3349 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3350 channel.write(writer)?;
3354 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3355 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
3356 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3357 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3358 for forward in pending_forwards {
3359 forward.write(writer)?;
3363 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3364 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
3365 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3366 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3367 for &(recvd_amt, ref previous_hop) in previous_hops.iter() {
3368 recvd_amt.write(writer)?;
3369 previous_hop.write(writer)?;
3373 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3374 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3375 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3376 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
3377 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3378 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
3381 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
3387 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
3389 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
3391 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
3392 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling <(Sha256dHash,
3393 /// ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args).
3394 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
3395 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
3396 /// 3) Register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints with your chain watch mechanism using
3397 /// ChannelMonitor::get_monitored_outpoints and ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
3398 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
3399 /// 5) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local ManyChannelMonitor.
3400 /// 6) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
3401 /// 7) Register the new ChannelManager with your ChainWatchInterface.
3402 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner: 'a + ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref>
3403 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
3404 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3405 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3406 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3409 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
3410 /// deserialization.
3411 pub keys_manager: K,
3413 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3415 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
3416 pub fee_estimator: F,
3417 /// The ManyChannelMonitor for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3419 /// No calls to the ManyChannelMonitor will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
3420 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
3421 /// ManyChannelMonitor after deserializing this ChannelManager.
3424 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
3425 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
3426 /// force-closed during deserialization.
3427 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
3428 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
3429 /// deserialization.
3430 pub logger: Arc<Logger>,
3431 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
3432 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
3433 pub default_config: UserConfig,
3435 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
3436 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
3438 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
3439 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
3440 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
3441 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
3443 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
3445 pub channel_monitors: &'a mut HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>>,
3448 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
3449 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
3450 impl<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref>
3451 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>> for (Sha256dHash, Arc<ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>>)
3452 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
3453 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3454 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3455 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3457 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3458 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>)>::read(reader, args)?;
3459 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
3463 impl<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref>
3464 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>)
3465 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
3466 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3467 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3468 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3470 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3471 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3472 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3473 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
3474 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
3477 let genesis_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3478 let latest_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3479 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3481 let mut closed_channels = Vec::new();
3483 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3484 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3485 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3486 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3487 for _ in 0..channel_count {
3488 let mut channel: Channel<ChanSigner> = ReadableArgs::read(reader, args.logger.clone())?;
3489 if channel.last_block_connected != Default::default() && channel.last_block_connected != last_block_hash {
3490 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3493 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
3494 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
3495 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
3496 if channel.get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_local_commitment_number() ||
3497 channel.get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
3498 channel.get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_remote_commitment_number() ||
3499 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
3500 let mut force_close_res = channel.force_shutdown();
3501 force_close_res.0 = monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn();
3502 closed_channels.push(force_close_res);
3504 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3505 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
3507 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
3510 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3514 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
3515 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
3516 closed_channels.push((monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn(), Vec::new()));
3520 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3521 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3522 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
3523 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3524 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3525 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, 128));
3526 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
3527 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3529 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
3532 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3533 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3534 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
3535 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3536 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3537 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, 2));
3538 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
3539 previous_hops.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
3541 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
3544 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3545 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, 128));
3546 for _ in 0..peer_count {
3547 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
3548 let peer_state = PeerState {
3549 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
3551 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
3554 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3556 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
3558 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
3559 monitor: args.monitor,
3560 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
3562 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(latest_block_height as usize),
3563 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(last_block_hash),
3564 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
3566 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
3571 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
3573 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
3575 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
3577 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
3579 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3580 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
3581 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
3582 logger: args.logger,
3583 default_configuration: args.default_config,
3586 for close_res in closed_channels.drain(..) {
3587 channel_manager.finish_force_close_channel(close_res);
3588 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
3589 //connection or two.
3592 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))