1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
31 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
36 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
39 use chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, Watch, BestBlock};
40 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
41 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
42 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
47 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
48 use routing::router::{Payee, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, RouteParameters};
50 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
52 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT, OptionalField};
53 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
54 use util::config::UserConfig;
55 use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
56 use util::{byte_utils, events};
57 use util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
58 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
59 use util::logger::{Level, Logger};
60 use util::errors::APIError;
65 use core::cell::RefCell;
66 use io::{Cursor, Read};
67 use sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
68 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
69 use core::time::Duration;
72 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
73 use std::time::Instant;
76 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
77 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
78 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
79 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
80 use chain::keysinterface::{KeyMaterial, KeysInterface, Sign};
81 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
83 use ln::msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
84 use util::chacha20::ChaCha20;
85 use util::logger::Logger;
87 use core::convert::TryInto;
90 const IV_LEN: usize = 16;
91 const METADATA_LEN: usize = 16;
92 const METADATA_KEY_LEN: usize = 32;
93 const AMT_MSAT_LEN: usize = 8;
94 // Used to shift the payment type bits to take up the top 3 bits of the metadata bytes, or to
95 // retrieve said payment type bits.
96 const METHOD_TYPE_OFFSET: usize = 5;
98 /// A set of keys that were HKDF-expanded from an initial call to
99 /// [`KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material`].
101 /// [`KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material`]: crate::chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material
102 pub(super) struct ExpandedKey {
103 /// The key used to encrypt the bytes containing the payment metadata (i.e. the amount and
104 /// expiry, included for payment verification on decryption).
105 metadata_key: [u8; 32],
106 /// The key used to authenticate an LDK-provided payment hash and metadata as previously
107 /// registered with LDK.
108 ldk_pmt_hash_key: [u8; 32],
109 /// The key used to authenticate a user-provided payment hash and metadata as previously
110 /// registered with LDK.
111 user_pmt_hash_key: [u8; 32],
115 pub(super) fn new(key_material: &KeyMaterial) -> ExpandedKey {
116 hkdf_extract_expand(b"LDK Inbound Payment Key Expansion", &key_material)
126 fn from_bits(bits: u8) -> Result<Method, u8> {
128 bits if bits == Method::LdkPaymentHash as u8 => Ok(Method::LdkPaymentHash),
129 bits if bits == Method::UserPaymentHash as u8 => Ok(Method::UserPaymentHash),
130 unknown => Err(unknown),
135 pub(super) fn create<Signer: Sign, K: Deref>(keys: &ExpandedKey, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, keys_manager: &K, highest_seen_timestamp: u64) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()>
136 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>
138 let metadata_bytes = construct_metadata_bytes(min_value_msat, Method::LdkPaymentHash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, highest_seen_timestamp)?;
140 let mut iv_bytes = [0 as u8; IV_LEN];
141 let rand_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
142 iv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&rand_bytes[..IV_LEN]);
144 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.ldk_pmt_hash_key);
145 hmac.input(&iv_bytes);
146 hmac.input(&metadata_bytes);
147 let payment_preimage_bytes = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
149 let ldk_pmt_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_bytes).into_inner());
150 let payment_secret = construct_payment_secret(&iv_bytes, &metadata_bytes, &keys.metadata_key);
151 Ok((ldk_pmt_hash, payment_secret))
154 pub(super) fn create_from_hash(keys: &ExpandedKey, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, payment_hash: PaymentHash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, highest_seen_timestamp: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
155 let metadata_bytes = construct_metadata_bytes(min_value_msat, Method::UserPaymentHash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, highest_seen_timestamp)?;
157 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.user_pmt_hash_key);
158 hmac.input(&metadata_bytes);
159 hmac.input(&payment_hash.0);
160 let hmac_bytes = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
162 let mut iv_bytes = [0 as u8; IV_LEN];
163 iv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&hmac_bytes[..IV_LEN]);
165 Ok(construct_payment_secret(&iv_bytes, &metadata_bytes, &keys.metadata_key))
168 fn construct_metadata_bytes(min_value_msat: Option<u64>, payment_type: Method, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, highest_seen_timestamp: u64) -> Result<[u8; METADATA_LEN], ()> {
169 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
173 let mut min_amt_msat_bytes: [u8; AMT_MSAT_LEN] = match min_value_msat {
174 Some(amt) => amt.to_be_bytes(),
175 None => [0; AMT_MSAT_LEN],
177 min_amt_msat_bytes[0] |= (payment_type as u8) << METHOD_TYPE_OFFSET;
179 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time - it's updated when
180 // we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in a header. It should never be more
181 // than two hours in the future. Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we
182 // absolutely never fail a payment too early.
183 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date timestamps.
184 let expiry_bytes = (highest_seen_timestamp + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200).to_be_bytes();
186 let mut metadata_bytes: [u8; METADATA_LEN] = [0; METADATA_LEN];
187 metadata_bytes[..AMT_MSAT_LEN].copy_from_slice(&min_amt_msat_bytes);
188 metadata_bytes[AMT_MSAT_LEN..].copy_from_slice(&expiry_bytes);
193 fn construct_payment_secret(iv_bytes: &[u8; IV_LEN], metadata_bytes: &[u8; METADATA_LEN], metadata_key: &[u8; METADATA_KEY_LEN]) -> PaymentSecret {
194 let mut payment_secret_bytes: [u8; 32] = [0; 32];
195 let (iv_slice, encrypted_metadata_slice) = payment_secret_bytes.split_at_mut(IV_LEN);
196 iv_slice.copy_from_slice(iv_bytes);
198 let chacha_block = ChaCha20::get_single_block(metadata_key, iv_bytes);
199 for i in 0..METADATA_LEN {
200 encrypted_metadata_slice[i] = chacha_block[i] ^ metadata_bytes[i];
202 PaymentSecret(payment_secret_bytes)
205 /// Check that an inbound payment's `payment_data` field is sane.
207 /// LDK does not store any data for pending inbound payments. Instead, we construct our payment
208 /// secret (and, if supplied by LDK, our payment preimage) to include encrypted metadata about the
211 /// The metadata is constructed as:
212 /// payment method (3 bits) || payment amount (8 bytes - 3 bits) || expiry (8 bytes)
213 /// and encrypted using a key derived from [`KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material`].
215 /// Then on payment receipt, we verify in this method that the payment preimage and payment secret
216 /// match what was constructed.
218 /// [`create_inbound_payment`] and [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] are called by the user to
219 /// construct the payment secret and/or payment hash that this method is verifying. If the former
220 /// method is called, then the payment method bits mentioned above are represented internally as
221 /// [`Method::LdkPaymentHash`]. If the latter, [`Method::UserPaymentHash`].
223 /// For the former method, the payment preimage is constructed as an HMAC of payment metadata and
224 /// random bytes. Because the payment secret is also encoded with these random bytes and metadata
225 /// (with the metadata encrypted with a block cipher), we're able to authenticate the preimage on
228 /// For the latter, the payment secret instead contains an HMAC of the user-provided payment hash
229 /// and payment metadata (encrypted with a block cipher), allowing us to authenticate the payment
230 /// hash and metadata on payment receipt.
232 /// See [`ExpandedKey`] docs for more info on the individual keys used.
234 /// [`KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material`]: crate::chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material
235 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_inbound_payment
236 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
237 pub(super) fn verify<L: Deref>(payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData, highest_seen_timestamp: u64, keys: &ExpandedKey, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<PaymentPreimage>, ()>
238 where L::Target: Logger
240 let (iv_bytes, metadata_bytes) = decrypt_metadata(payment_data.payment_secret, keys);
242 let payment_type_res = Method::from_bits((metadata_bytes[0] & 0b1110_0000) >> METHOD_TYPE_OFFSET);
243 let mut amt_msat_bytes = [0; AMT_MSAT_LEN];
244 amt_msat_bytes.copy_from_slice(&metadata_bytes[..AMT_MSAT_LEN]);
245 // Zero out the bits reserved to indicate the payment type.
246 amt_msat_bytes[0] &= 0b00011111;
247 let min_amt_msat: u64 = u64::from_be_bytes(amt_msat_bytes.into());
248 let expiry = u64::from_be_bytes(metadata_bytes[AMT_MSAT_LEN..].try_into().unwrap());
250 // Make sure to check to check the HMAC before doing the other checks below, to mitigate timing
252 let mut payment_preimage = None;
253 match payment_type_res {
254 Ok(Method::UserPaymentHash) => {
255 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.user_pmt_hash_key);
256 hmac.input(&metadata_bytes[..]);
257 hmac.input(&payment_hash.0);
258 if !fixed_time_eq(&iv_bytes, &Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner().split_at_mut(IV_LEN).0) {
259 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash {}: unexpected payment_secret", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
263 Ok(Method::LdkPaymentHash) => {
264 match derive_ldk_payment_preimage(payment_hash, &iv_bytes, &metadata_bytes, keys) {
265 Ok(preimage) => payment_preimage = Some(preimage),
266 Err(bad_preimage_bytes) => {
267 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} due to mismatching preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(bad_preimage_bytes));
272 Err(unknown_bits) => {
273 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment hash {} due to unknown payment type {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), unknown_bits);
278 if payment_data.total_msat < min_amt_msat {
279 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} due to total_msat {} being less than the minimum amount of {} msat", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, min_amt_msat);
283 if expiry < highest_seen_timestamp {
284 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {}: expired payment", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
291 fn decrypt_metadata(payment_secret: PaymentSecret, keys: &ExpandedKey) -> ([u8; IV_LEN], [u8; METADATA_LEN]) {
292 let mut iv_bytes = [0; IV_LEN];
293 let (iv_slice, encrypted_metadata_bytes) = payment_secret.0.split_at(IV_LEN);
294 iv_bytes.copy_from_slice(iv_slice);
296 let chacha_block = ChaCha20::get_single_block(&keys.metadata_key, &iv_bytes);
297 let mut metadata_bytes: [u8; METADATA_LEN] = [0; METADATA_LEN];
298 for i in 0..METADATA_LEN {
299 metadata_bytes[i] = chacha_block[i] ^ encrypted_metadata_bytes[i];
302 (iv_bytes, metadata_bytes)
305 // Errors if the payment preimage doesn't match `payment_hash`. Returns the bad preimage bytes in
307 fn derive_ldk_payment_preimage(payment_hash: PaymentHash, iv_bytes: &[u8; IV_LEN], metadata_bytes: &[u8; METADATA_LEN], keys: &ExpandedKey) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, [u8; 32]> {
308 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.ldk_pmt_hash_key);
309 hmac.input(iv_bytes);
310 hmac.input(metadata_bytes);
311 let decoded_payment_preimage = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
312 if !fixed_time_eq(&payment_hash.0, &Sha256::hash(&decoded_payment_preimage).into_inner()) {
313 return Err(decoded_payment_preimage);
315 return Ok(PaymentPreimage(decoded_payment_preimage))
318 fn hkdf_extract_expand(salt: &[u8], ikm: &KeyMaterial) -> ExpandedKey {
319 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(salt);
321 let prk = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
322 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&prk[..]);
324 let metadata_key = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
326 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&prk[..]);
327 hmac.input(&metadata_key);
329 let ldk_pmt_hash_key = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
331 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&prk[..]);
332 hmac.input(&ldk_pmt_hash_key);
334 let user_pmt_hash_key = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
344 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
346 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
347 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
348 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
350 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
351 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
352 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
353 // before we forward it.
355 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
356 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
357 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
358 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
359 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
361 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
362 enum PendingHTLCRouting {
364 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
365 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
368 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
369 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
372 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
373 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
377 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
378 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
379 routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
380 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
381 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
382 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
383 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
386 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
387 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
388 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
389 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
392 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
393 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
394 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
395 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
396 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
399 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
401 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
403 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
404 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
405 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
407 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
409 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
413 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
417 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
418 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
419 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
420 short_channel_id: u64,
422 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
424 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
425 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
430 /// Contains a total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
431 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
432 /// are part of the same payment.
433 Invoice(msgs::FinalOnionHopData),
434 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
435 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
438 struct ClaimableHTLC {
439 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
442 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
445 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
446 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
447 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
448 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
450 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
451 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
456 impl Readable for PaymentId {
457 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
458 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
462 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
463 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
464 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
465 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
466 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
469 session_priv: SecretKey,
470 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
471 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
472 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
473 payment_id: PaymentId,
474 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
475 payee: Option<Payee>,
478 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
479 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
480 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
482 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
484 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
486 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payee } => {
489 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
490 payment_id.hash(hasher);
491 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
492 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
500 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
501 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
503 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
504 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
505 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
506 payment_secret: None,
512 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
513 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
515 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
523 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
524 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
526 MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
531 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
533 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
534 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
535 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
536 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
537 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
539 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
540 err: msgs::LightningError,
541 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u64)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
542 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
544 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
546 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
548 err: LightningError {
550 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
551 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
558 shutdown_finish: None,
562 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
564 err: LightningError {
566 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
569 shutdown_finish: None,
573 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
574 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
577 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u64, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
579 err: LightningError {
581 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
582 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
588 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
589 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
593 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
596 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
598 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
600 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
602 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
604 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
606 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
607 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
613 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
615 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
616 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
624 shutdown_finish: None,
629 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
630 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
631 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
632 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
633 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
635 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
636 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
637 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
638 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
639 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
640 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
641 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
643 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
647 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
648 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
649 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
650 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
651 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
652 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
653 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
654 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
655 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
656 /// Map from payment hash to any HTLCs which are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user.
657 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
658 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
660 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
661 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
662 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
663 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
666 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
667 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
668 /// quite some time lag.
669 enum BackgroundEvent {
670 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
671 /// commitment transaction.
672 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
675 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
676 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
678 latest_features: InitFeatures,
681 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
682 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
684 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
687 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
688 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
689 struct PendingInboundPayment {
690 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
691 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
692 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
693 /// this payment being removed.
695 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
696 user_payment_id: u64,
697 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
698 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
699 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
702 /// Stores the session_priv for each part of a payment that is still pending. For versions 0.0.102
703 /// and later, also stores information for retrying the payment.
704 pub(crate) enum PendingOutboundPayment {
706 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
709 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
710 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
711 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
712 pending_amt_msat: u64,
713 /// Used to track the fee paid. Only present if the payment was serialized on 0.0.103+.
714 pending_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
715 /// The total payment amount across all paths, used to verify that a retry is not overpaying.
717 /// Our best known block height at the time this payment was initiated.
718 starting_block_height: u32,
720 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
721 /// been resolved. This ensures we don't look up pending payments in ChannelMonitors on restart
722 /// and add a pending payment that was already fulfilled.
724 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
725 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
727 /// When a payer gives up trying to retry a payment, they inform us, letting us generate a
728 /// `PaymentFailed` event when all HTLCs have irrevocably failed. This avoids a number of race
729 /// conditions in MPP-aware payment retriers (1), where the possibility of multiple
730 /// `PaymentPathFailed` events with `all_paths_failed` can be pending at once, confusing a
731 /// downstream event handler as to when a payment has actually failed.
733 /// (1) https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1164
735 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
736 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
740 impl PendingOutboundPayment {
741 fn is_retryable(&self) -> bool {
743 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { .. } => true,
747 fn is_fulfilled(&self) -> bool {
749 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => true,
753 fn abandoned(&self) -> bool {
755 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => true,
759 fn get_pending_fee_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
761 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { pending_fee_msat, .. } => pending_fee_msat.clone(),
766 fn payment_hash(&self) -> Option<PaymentHash> {
768 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None,
769 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
770 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => *payment_hash,
771 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
775 fn mark_fulfilled(&mut self) {
776 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
777 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
778 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
779 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
780 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
781 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. }
784 let payment_hash = self.payment_hash();
785 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, payment_hash };
788 fn mark_abandoned(&mut self) -> Result<(), ()> {
789 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
790 let our_payment_hash;
791 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
792 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } |
793 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } =>
795 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } |
796 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } => {
797 our_payment_hash = *payment_hash;
801 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash: our_payment_hash };
805 /// panics if path is None and !self.is_fulfilled
806 fn remove(&mut self, session_priv: &[u8; 32], path: Option<&Vec<RouteHop>>) -> bool {
807 let remove_res = match self {
808 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
809 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
810 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
811 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
812 session_privs.remove(session_priv)
816 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
817 let path = path.expect("Fulfilling a payment should always come with a path");
818 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
819 *pending_amt_msat -= path_last_hop.fee_msat;
820 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
821 *fee_msat -= path.get_path_fees();
828 fn insert(&mut self, session_priv: [u8; 32], path: &Vec<RouteHop>) -> bool {
829 let insert_res = match self {
830 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
831 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
832 session_privs.insert(session_priv)
834 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => false,
835 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => false,
838 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
839 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
840 *pending_amt_msat += path_last_hop.fee_msat;
841 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
842 *fee_msat += path.get_path_fees();
849 fn remaining_parts(&self) -> usize {
851 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
852 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
853 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
854 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
861 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
862 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
863 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
864 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
865 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
866 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
867 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
868 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
870 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
871 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
872 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
873 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
874 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
875 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
876 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
877 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
878 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
880 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
881 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
883 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
884 /// to individual Channels.
886 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
887 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
888 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
889 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
891 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
892 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
893 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
894 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
895 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
896 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
897 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
899 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
900 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
901 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
902 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
905 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
906 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
907 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
908 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
909 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
911 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
912 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
913 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
914 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
915 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
916 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
917 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
918 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
919 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
920 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
923 default_configuration: UserConfig,
924 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
930 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
932 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
933 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
935 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
936 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
937 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
938 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
940 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
941 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
942 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
943 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
944 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
945 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
947 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
948 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
949 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
950 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
951 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
952 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
953 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
954 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
956 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
958 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
959 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment>>,
961 our_network_key: SecretKey,
962 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
964 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
966 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
967 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
968 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
970 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
971 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
972 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
973 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
975 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
976 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
977 /// are currently open with that peer.
978 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
979 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
982 /// If also holding `channel_state` lock, must lock `channel_state` prior to `per_peer_state`.
983 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
985 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
986 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
987 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
988 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
989 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
990 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
991 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
992 /// PersistenceNotifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
993 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
995 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
1002 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1004 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1005 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1006 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1007 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1008 pub struct ChainParameters {
1009 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1010 pub network: Network,
1012 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1014 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1015 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1018 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1024 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1025 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1026 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1027 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1028 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1029 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1031 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1032 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1033 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1034 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1035 persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
1037 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1038 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1041 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1042 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1043 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1046 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1047 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
1049 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1050 persistence_notifier: notifier,
1051 should_persist: persist_check,
1052 _read_guard: read_guard,
1057 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1058 fn drop(&mut self) {
1059 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1060 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1065 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1066 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1068 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1070 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1071 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1072 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1073 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1074 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1076 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1077 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1079 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1081 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1082 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1083 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1084 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1085 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1086 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1087 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
1089 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1090 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
1092 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1093 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1094 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1095 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
1097 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1098 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1099 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1100 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1101 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1102 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1105 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1107 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1108 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1111 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1113 /// The number of blocks before we consider an outbound payment for expiry if it doesn't have any
1114 /// pending HTLCs in flight.
1115 pub(crate) const PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
1117 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1118 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1119 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1120 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1121 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1122 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1123 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1124 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1125 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1126 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1127 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1130 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1131 /// to better separate parameters.
1132 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1133 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1134 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1135 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1136 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1137 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1138 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1139 pub features: InitFeatures,
1140 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1141 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1142 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1144 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1146 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1147 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1148 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1149 /// payments to us through this channel.
1150 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1153 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
1154 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1155 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1156 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1157 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1158 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1159 /// lifetime of the channel.
1160 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1161 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1162 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1163 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1164 /// our counterparty already.
1166 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1167 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1168 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1169 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1170 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1171 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1172 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1173 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1174 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1175 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1176 /// this value on chain.
1178 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1180 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1182 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1183 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1184 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
1185 pub user_channel_id: u64,
1186 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1187 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1188 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1190 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1191 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1192 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1193 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1195 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1196 pub balance_msat: u64,
1197 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1198 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1199 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1200 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1202 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1204 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1205 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1206 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1207 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1208 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1209 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1210 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1211 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1212 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1214 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1215 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1216 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1217 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1218 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1219 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1220 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1221 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1222 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1224 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1226 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1227 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1228 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1229 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1230 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1231 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1232 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1233 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1234 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1236 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1237 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1238 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1239 pub is_outbound: bool,
1240 /// True if the channel is confirmed, funding_locked messages have been exchanged, and the
1241 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `funding_locked` message exchange implies the
1242 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1243 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1244 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1246 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1247 pub is_funding_locked: bool,
1248 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
1249 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1251 /// This is a strict superset of `is_funding_locked`.
1252 pub is_usable: bool,
1253 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1254 pub is_public: bool,
1257 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
1258 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
1259 /// states for more.
1260 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
1261 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
1262 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
1263 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
1264 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
1265 ParameterError(APIError),
1266 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
1267 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
1268 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
1269 /// payment in full.
1271 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1273 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
1274 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
1275 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
1276 /// paths than the ones selected).
1277 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
1278 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
1279 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
1280 /// in over-/re-payment.
1282 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1283 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
1284 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
1286 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
1287 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
1288 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
1289 /// with the latest update_id.
1291 /// The errors themselves, in the same order as the route hops.
1292 results: Vec<Result<(), APIError>>,
1293 /// If some paths failed without irrevocably committing to the new HTLC(s), this will
1294 /// contain a [`RouteParameters`] object which can be used to calculate a new route that
1295 /// will pay all remaining unpaid balance.
1296 failed_paths_retry: Option<RouteParameters>,
1297 /// The payment id for the payment, which is now at least partially pending.
1298 payment_id: PaymentId,
1302 macro_rules! handle_error {
1303 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1306 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1307 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1309 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1310 // entering the macro.
1311 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
1312 assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
1315 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1317 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1318 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1319 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1320 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1324 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1325 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1326 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1327 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1332 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1333 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1335 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1336 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1337 action: err.action.clone()
1341 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1342 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1345 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1352 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1353 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1354 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1356 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1357 //TODO: Once warning messages are merged, we should send a `warning` message to our
1359 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1361 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1362 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1364 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1365 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1366 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1367 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1369 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1370 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1371 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1373 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => {
1374 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1375 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1376 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1378 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(false);
1379 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1380 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1386 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1387 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1391 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1393 $entry.remove_entry();
1401 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1402 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1406 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1408 $entry.remove_entry();
1416 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1417 ($channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1419 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1420 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1421 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1428 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
1429 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1430 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1432 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1434 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1435 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1436 if let Some(short_id) = $chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1437 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1439 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1440 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1441 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1442 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1443 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1444 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1445 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1446 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1447 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1448 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1449 $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1452 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1453 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1454 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1455 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1456 match $action_type {
1457 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1458 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1460 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1461 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1463 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1464 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1465 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1466 if !$resend_commitment {
1467 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1470 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1472 $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1473 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1477 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1478 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1480 $entry.remove_entry();
1484 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1485 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
1489 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
1490 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1491 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
1493 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1494 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
1498 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
1499 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
1500 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1501 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
1502 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
1505 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
1510 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
1511 ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
1512 $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
1513 $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $funding_locked: expr) => { {
1514 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
1515 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1517 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
1518 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
1520 let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
1521 if !forwards.is_empty() {
1522 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"),
1523 $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
1526 if chanmon_update.is_some() {
1527 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a funding_locked if there have been
1528 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
1529 // associated with a funding_locked would be the funding_created/funding_signed
1530 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
1531 // funding_locked until it's been updated, so we can't have a funding_locked and a
1532 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
1533 assert!($funding_locked.is_none());
1534 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a funding_locked or a
1535 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a funding_locked, we
1536 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
1537 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1540 if let Some(msg) = $funding_locked {
1541 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the funding_locked fly
1542 // before it should be allowed to.
1543 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
1544 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
1545 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1548 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = $self.get_announcement_sigs($channel_entry.get()) {
1549 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1550 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1551 msg: announcement_sigs,
1554 $channel_state.short_to_id.insert($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), $channel_entry.get().channel_id());
1557 let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
1558 if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
1559 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
1560 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
1561 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
1562 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
1563 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
1564 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
1565 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
1566 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
1567 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
1568 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1569 if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1570 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
1571 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
1572 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
1573 let mut order = $order;
1575 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1577 break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
1581 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1582 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
1583 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1584 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1589 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1590 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
1591 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1592 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1593 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1598 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1602 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1607 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1608 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1609 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1614 if chanmon_update_is_none {
1615 // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
1616 // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
1617 // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
1618 assert!(res.is_ok());
1621 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1625 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1626 ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1627 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1629 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1631 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1632 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1637 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
1638 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
1639 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1640 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1641 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1644 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1646 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1647 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1649 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1651 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
1653 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1654 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1655 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1656 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1657 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1658 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1659 let inbound_pmt_key_material = keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1660 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1662 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1663 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1664 fee_estimator: fee_est,
1668 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1670 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1671 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1672 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
1673 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1674 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1675 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1677 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1678 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1680 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
1681 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
1684 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1686 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1687 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1689 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1691 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1692 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1693 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1694 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
1702 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels, as
1703 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1704 &self.default_configuration
1707 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1709 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1710 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1711 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to 0
1712 /// for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for `user_channel_id` here.
1713 /// `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and otherwise
1716 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1717 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1719 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1720 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1721 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1723 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1724 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1725 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1726 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1727 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1728 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1730 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1731 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1732 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1733 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1734 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1735 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1739 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1740 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1741 Some(peer_state) => {
1742 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1743 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1744 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1745 Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, their_features,
1746 channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height())?
1748 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1751 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1753 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1754 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1755 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1757 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1758 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1759 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1760 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1761 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1762 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1764 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1767 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1769 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1770 node_id: their_network_key,
1773 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1776 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1777 let mut res = Vec::new();
1779 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1780 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1781 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1782 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
1783 let balance_msat = channel.get_balance_msat();
1784 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1785 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1786 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1787 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1788 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1789 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1790 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1791 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1792 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1794 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1795 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1796 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1797 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1799 inbound_capacity_msat,
1800 outbound_capacity_msat,
1801 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1802 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1803 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1804 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1805 is_funding_locked: channel.is_usable(),
1806 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1807 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1811 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1812 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1813 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1814 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1820 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1821 /// more information.
1822 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1823 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1826 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1827 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1829 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1830 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1832 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1833 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1834 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1835 // really wanted anyway.
1836 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1839 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1840 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1841 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1842 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1843 Some(transaction) => {
1844 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1848 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1849 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1850 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1851 reason: closure_reason
1855 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1856 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1858 let counterparty_node_id;
1859 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1860 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1861 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1862 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1863 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1864 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1865 counterparty_node_id = chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1866 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1867 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1868 Some(peer_state) => {
1869 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1870 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1871 chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
1873 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
1875 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1877 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1878 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1879 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1880 let (result, is_permanent) =
1881 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
1883 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1889 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1890 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1894 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1895 let channel = remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1896 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1897 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1901 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1905 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1909 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1910 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1913 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, counterparty_node_id);
1917 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1918 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1919 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1921 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1922 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1924 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1925 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1926 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1927 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1929 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1931 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1932 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1933 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1934 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1935 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, None)
1938 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1939 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1940 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1942 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1943 /// the channel being closed or not:
1944 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1945 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1946 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1947 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1948 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1949 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1950 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1952 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1954 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1955 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1956 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1957 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1958 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1962 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1963 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1964 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1965 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1966 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1968 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1969 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1970 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1971 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1972 // ignore the result here.
1973 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1977 /// `peer_node_id` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1978 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
1979 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>, peer_msg: Option<&String>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1981 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1982 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1983 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1984 if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id {
1985 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id {
1986 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1989 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1990 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1992 if peer_node_id.is_some() {
1993 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
1994 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
1997 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1999 chan.remove_entry().1
2001 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
2004 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2005 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
2006 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2007 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2008 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2013 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
2016 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
2017 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
2018 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2019 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2020 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None, None) {
2021 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2022 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
2023 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2024 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2025 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2026 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2036 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2037 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2038 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
2039 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2040 let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2044 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
2045 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2046 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2048 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2049 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2050 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2051 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2052 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2053 failure_code: $err_code,
2054 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2059 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2060 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2063 let shared_secret = {
2064 let mut arr = [0; 32];
2065 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
2068 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
2070 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2071 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2072 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2073 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2074 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2075 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2076 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2077 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2080 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
2081 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
2082 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
2083 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
2084 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
2087 let mut channel_state = None;
2088 macro_rules! return_err {
2089 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2091 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2092 if channel_state.is_none() {
2093 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2095 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2096 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2097 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2098 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
2099 })), channel_state.unwrap());
2104 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
2105 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
2106 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac): (msgs::OnionHopData, _) = {
2107 match <msgs::OnionHopData as Readable>::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
2109 let error_code = match err {
2110 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
2111 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
2112 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
2113 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
2114 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
2116 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
2119 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
2120 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
2121 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2128 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
2131 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
2132 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
2133 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
2134 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
2135 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
2136 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
2137 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
2138 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
2139 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
2140 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
2141 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
2142 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
2146 // final_expiry_too_soon
2147 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2148 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2149 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2150 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2151 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2152 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2153 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
2155 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
2156 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
2157 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
2159 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2160 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
2161 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
2164 let routing = match next_hop_data.format {
2165 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]),
2166 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]),
2167 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
2168 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2169 return_err!("We don't support MPP keysend payments", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
2170 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2171 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2173 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2175 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2176 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2177 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2178 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2179 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2180 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2181 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2182 if hashed_preimage != msg.payment_hash {
2183 return_err!("Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
2186 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2188 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2191 return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]);
2196 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2197 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2198 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2199 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2201 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2203 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2204 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2205 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2206 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2209 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
2210 let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
2211 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2213 // Check two things:
2214 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
2215 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
2216 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
2218 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
2220 // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
2221 // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
2222 chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
2224 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2226 let blinding_factor = {
2227 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
2228 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
2229 sha.input(&shared_secret);
2230 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
2233 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
2235 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
2237 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2240 hop_data: new_packet_data,
2241 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2244 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2245 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2246 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2247 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2248 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2252 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2253 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2254 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2257 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2258 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2259 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2260 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2264 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2265 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2266 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2267 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2268 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2269 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2270 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
2271 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
2272 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
2273 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2274 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2276 Some(id) => id.clone(),
2279 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
2281 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2282 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2283 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2284 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2285 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2288 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2289 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2290 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2291 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2292 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2293 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2294 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
2296 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2297 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
2299 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64)
2300 .and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000)
2301 .checked_add(chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat() as u64) });
2302 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
2303 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
2305 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta() as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2306 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
2308 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2309 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2310 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2311 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2312 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2313 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
2315 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2316 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2318 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2319 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2320 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2321 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2322 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2323 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2324 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2325 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2326 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2327 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
2333 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
2334 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2335 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2336 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
2338 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2339 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
2341 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2342 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
2343 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
2345 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
2347 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
2352 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
2355 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2356 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2357 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2359 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2360 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2361 if !chan.should_announce() {
2362 return Err(LightningError {
2363 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2364 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2367 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2368 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2371 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2372 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2373 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2374 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2375 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2376 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2377 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2378 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2379 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2383 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2385 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2386 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2388 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2389 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2390 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2391 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2392 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
2393 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2394 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2395 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2398 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
2399 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
2401 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2407 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2408 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payee: &Option<Payee>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2409 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2410 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2411 let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2412 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2414 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2415 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2416 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2417 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2418 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2420 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2422 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2424 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2425 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2427 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2428 let payment_entry = pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id);
2429 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(payment) = &payment_entry {
2430 if !payment.get().is_retryable() {
2431 return Err(APIError::RouteError {
2432 err: "Payment already completed"
2437 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2438 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2439 Some(id) => id.clone(),
2442 macro_rules! insert_outbound_payment {
2444 let payment = payment_entry.or_insert_with(|| PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2445 session_privs: HashSet::new(),
2446 pending_amt_msat: 0,
2447 pending_fee_msat: Some(0),
2448 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2449 payment_secret: *payment_secret,
2450 starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
2451 total_msat: total_value,
2453 assert!(payment.insert(session_priv_bytes, path));
2457 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2458 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
2460 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
2461 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
2463 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2464 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2466 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2467 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2469 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2470 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2472 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2473 payee: payee.clone(),
2474 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2475 channel_state, chan)
2477 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2478 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2479 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
2480 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
2481 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
2482 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
2483 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
2484 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
2485 insert_outbound_payment!(); // Only do this after possibly break'ing on Perm failure above.
2486 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2488 insert_outbound_payment!();
2490 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2491 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2492 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2493 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2494 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2495 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2496 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2497 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2503 None => { insert_outbound_payment!(); },
2505 } else { unreachable!(); }
2509 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2510 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2512 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2517 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2519 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
2520 /// fields for more info.
2522 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
2523 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
2524 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
2525 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
2526 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
2527 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
2529 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
2531 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2532 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2533 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
2535 /// In general, a path may raise:
2536 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2537 /// node public key) is specified.
2538 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2539 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2541 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2542 /// relevant updates.
2544 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2545 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2546 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2548 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
2549 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
2550 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
2551 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
2553 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
2554 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
2555 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2556 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2557 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None, None, None)
2560 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: Option<PaymentId>, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2561 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
2562 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
2564 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
2565 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
2566 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
2567 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
2568 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
2570 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
2571 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
2573 let mut total_value = 0;
2574 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2575 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2576 let payment_id = if let Some(id) = payment_id { id } else { PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()) };
2577 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
2578 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
2579 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
2580 continue 'path_check;
2582 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
2583 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
2584 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
2585 continue 'path_check;
2588 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2589 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
2591 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
2592 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
2594 if let Some(amt_msat) = recv_value_msat {
2595 debug_assert!(amt_msat >= total_value);
2596 total_value = amt_msat;
2599 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2600 let mut results = Vec::new();
2601 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2602 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &route.payee, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage));
2604 let mut has_ok = false;
2605 let mut has_err = false;
2606 let mut pending_amt_unsent = 0;
2607 let mut max_unsent_cltv_delta = 0;
2608 for (res, path) in results.iter().zip(route.paths.iter()) {
2609 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
2610 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
2611 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
2612 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
2616 } else if res.is_err() {
2617 pending_amt_unsent += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2618 max_unsent_cltv_delta = cmp::max(max_unsent_cltv_delta, path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta);
2621 if has_err && has_ok {
2622 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure {
2625 failed_paths_retry: if pending_amt_unsent != 0 {
2626 if let Some(payee) = &route.payee {
2627 Some(RouteParameters {
2628 payee: payee.clone(),
2629 final_value_msat: pending_amt_unsent,
2630 final_cltv_expiry_delta: max_unsent_cltv_delta,
2636 // If we failed to send any paths, we shouldn't have inserted the new PaymentId into
2637 // our `pending_outbound_payments` map at all.
2638 debug_assert!(self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().get(&payment_id).is_none());
2639 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
2645 /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2647 /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2648 /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2649 /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, if the payment
2650 /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success), or if
2651 /// further retries have been disabled with [`abandon_payment`].
2653 /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2654 /// [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]
2655 pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2656 const RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE: u64 = 10;
2657 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2658 if path.len() == 0 {
2659 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2660 err: "length-0 path in route".to_string()
2665 let (total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret) = {
2666 let outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2667 if let Some(payment) = outbounds.get(&payment_id) {
2669 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2670 total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret, pending_amt_msat, ..
2672 let retry_amt_msat: u64 = route.paths.iter().map(|path| path.last().unwrap().fee_msat).sum();
2673 if retry_amt_msat + *pending_amt_msat > *total_msat * (100 + RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE) / 100 {
2674 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2675 err: format!("retry_amt_msat of {} will put pending_amt_msat (currently: {}) more than 10% over total_payment_amt_msat of {}", retry_amt_msat, pending_amt_msat, total_msat).to_string()
2678 (*total_msat, *payment_hash, *payment_secret)
2680 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => {
2681 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2682 err: "Unable to retry payments that were initially sent on LDK versions prior to 0.0.102".to_string()
2685 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {
2686 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2687 err: "Payment already completed".to_owned()
2690 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {
2691 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2692 err: "Payment already abandoned (with some HTLCs still pending)".to_owned()
2697 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2698 err: format!("Payment with ID {} not found", log_bytes!(payment_id.0)),
2702 return self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, Some(payment_id), Some(total_msat)).map(|_| ())
2705 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur.
2707 /// After this method returns, any future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id`
2708 /// will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`]. If no such event has been generated,
2709 /// an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event will be generated as soon as there are no remaining
2710 /// pending HTLCs for this payment.
2712 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2713 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2714 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2716 /// [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment
2717 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2718 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2719 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2720 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2722 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2723 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
2724 if let Ok(()) = payment.get_mut().mark_abandoned() {
2725 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
2726 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2728 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
2736 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2737 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2738 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2739 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2740 /// never reach the recipient.
2742 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function.
2744 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2745 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2747 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2749 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2750 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2751 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
2753 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
2755 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
2756 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage), None, None) {
2757 Ok(payment_id) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2762 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2763 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2764 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>
2765 (&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2767 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2769 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2771 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2772 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2773 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2774 } else { unreachable!(); })
2777 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2779 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2780 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2783 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2784 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2789 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2790 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2791 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2794 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2795 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2796 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2798 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2806 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2807 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2808 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2812 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2814 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2815 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2817 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2818 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2820 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2821 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2822 /// keys per-channel).
2824 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2825 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2826 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2828 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2829 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2830 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2832 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2833 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2834 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2835 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2837 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2838 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2839 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2840 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2844 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2845 let mut output_index = None;
2846 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2847 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2848 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2849 if output_index.is_some() {
2850 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2851 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2854 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2855 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2856 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2859 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2862 if output_index.is_none() {
2863 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2864 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2867 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2871 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
2872 if !chan.should_announce() {
2873 log_trace!(self.logger, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2877 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2879 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
2881 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2882 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2884 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
2885 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
2886 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
2887 node_signature: our_node_sig,
2888 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
2893 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
2894 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
2895 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
2897 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::core::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
2900 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
2901 // smaller than 500:
2902 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
2904 /// Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given
2905 /// arguments, providing them in corresponding events via
2906 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed
2907 /// on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node
2908 /// announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and
2909 /// our network addresses.
2911 /// `rgb` is a node "color" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this
2912 /// node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
2914 /// `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node
2915 /// accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly
2916 /// tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy,
2917 /// addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses.
2919 /// Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 500).
2921 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
2922 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
2923 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2925 if addresses.len() > 500 {
2926 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
2929 // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that
2930 // addresses be sorted for future compatibility.
2931 addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id());
2933 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2934 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
2935 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
2936 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
2937 rgb, alias, addresses,
2938 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2939 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2941 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2942 let node_announce_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2944 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2945 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2947 let mut announced_chans = false;
2948 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2949 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2950 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2952 update_msg: match self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
2957 announced_chans = true;
2959 // If the channel is not public or has not yet reached funding_locked, check the
2960 // next channel. If we don't yet have any public channels, we'll skip the broadcast
2961 // below as peers may not accept it without channels on chain first.
2965 if announced_chans {
2966 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
2967 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
2968 signature: node_announce_sig,
2969 contents: announcement
2975 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
2977 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
2978 /// Will likely generate further events.
2979 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
2980 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2982 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2983 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
2984 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2986 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2987 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2989 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
2990 if short_chan_id != 0 {
2991 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
2992 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2994 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
2995 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2996 match forward_info {
2997 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info,
2998 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2999 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3000 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3001 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3002 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3003 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3005 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
3006 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }
3009 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3010 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3011 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3012 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3013 // problem, not ours.
3020 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3021 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3022 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3023 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3024 match forward_info {
3025 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3026 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
3028 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
3029 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3030 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3031 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3032 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3033 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3034 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3035 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3037 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet, &self.logger) {
3039 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3040 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3042 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3044 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap();
3045 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3046 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
3052 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3054 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3055 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
3056 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
3057 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
3058 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
3059 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
3060 // this channel currently :/.
3066 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3067 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3069 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3070 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3071 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
3073 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3074 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3076 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
3078 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3079 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3080 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3083 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3085 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3086 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
3087 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
3088 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
3089 // messages when we can.
3090 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
3091 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
3092 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
3099 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
3100 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
3103 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
3104 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
3105 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3106 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
3107 ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
3108 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
3110 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
3111 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
3112 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
3113 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3114 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3116 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
3117 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.get_user_id(), channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
3119 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
3121 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
3125 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3126 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
3129 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
3130 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3131 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3132 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3133 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3134 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
3135 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3136 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
3137 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3139 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
3147 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3148 match forward_info {
3149 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3150 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
3151 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3152 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload) = match routing {
3153 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3154 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data)),
3155 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3156 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage)),
3158 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3161 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3162 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3163 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3164 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3165 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3166 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3168 value: amt_to_forward,
3173 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3175 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
3176 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3177 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
3179 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3180 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3181 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3182 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3183 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3185 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
3190 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3191 ($payment_data_total_msat: expr, $payment_secret: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3192 let mut total_value = 0;
3193 let mut payment_received_generated = false;
3194 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3195 .or_insert(Vec::new());
3196 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3197 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3198 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3199 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3203 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3204 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3205 total_value += htlc.value;
3206 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3207 OnionPayload::Invoice(htlc_payment_data) => {
3208 if htlc_payment_data.total_msat != $payment_data_total_msat {
3209 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3210 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data_total_msat, htlc_payment_data.total_msat);
3211 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3213 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3215 _ => unreachable!(),
3218 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data_total_msat {
3219 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3220 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data_total_msat);
3221 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3224 } else if total_value == $payment_data_total_msat {
3225 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3227 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3228 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3229 payment_secret: $payment_secret,
3233 payment_received_generated = true;
3235 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3236 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3239 payment_received_generated
3243 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3244 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3245 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3246 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3247 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3248 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3249 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3250 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3251 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3252 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3253 OnionPayload::Invoice(ref payment_data) => {
3254 let payment_preimage = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, payment_data.clone(), self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3255 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
3257 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3261 let payment_data_total_msat = payment_data.total_msat;
3262 let payment_secret = payment_data.payment_secret.clone();
3263 check_total_value!(payment_data_total_msat, payment_secret, payment_preimage);
3265 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3266 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
3267 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3268 e.insert(vec![claimable_htlc]);
3269 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3271 amt: amt_to_forward,
3272 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage),
3275 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3276 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3277 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3283 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3285 if let OnionPayload::Invoice(ref data) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3288 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3289 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3292 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3293 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3294 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3295 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3296 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3297 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3298 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3300 let payment_received_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data.total_msat, payment_data.payment_secret, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3301 if payment_received_generated {
3302 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3308 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3309 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3317 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3318 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
3321 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3322 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3325 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3326 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3327 events.append(&mut new_events);
3330 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3332 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3333 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3335 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3336 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3337 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3338 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3339 if background_events.is_empty() {
3343 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3345 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3346 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3347 // monitor updating completing.
3348 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
3355 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3356 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3357 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3358 self.process_background_events();
3361 fn update_channel_fee(&self, short_to_id: &mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
3362 if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
3363 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3364 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3365 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3366 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3367 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3369 if !chan.is_live() {
3370 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3371 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3372 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3374 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3375 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3377 let mut retain_channel = true;
3378 let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
3381 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
3382 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3386 let ret_err = match res {
3387 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
3388 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3389 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_id);
3390 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3393 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3394 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3395 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3396 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3397 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3398 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3399 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3400 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3410 (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
3414 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3415 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3416 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3417 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3418 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3419 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3420 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3422 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3424 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3426 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3427 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3428 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3429 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3430 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3431 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3432 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3434 handle_errors.push(err);
3444 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3446 /// This currently includes:
3447 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3448 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3449 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3452 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3453 /// estimate fetches.
3454 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3455 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3456 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3457 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3459 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3461 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3463 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3464 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3465 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3466 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3467 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3468 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
3469 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3470 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3472 handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
3474 if !retain_channel { return false; }
3476 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3477 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
3478 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
3479 if needs_close { return false; }
3482 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3483 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3484 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3485 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3486 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3487 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3488 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3489 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3493 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3494 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3496 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3497 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3498 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3502 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3503 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3512 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3513 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3519 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3520 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3521 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3522 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
3523 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
3524 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
3525 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3527 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3528 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3529 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3530 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3531 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3532 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3533 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3534 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3535 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3536 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
3537 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3543 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3544 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3545 // be surfaced to the user.
3546 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
3547 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3549 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
3550 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
3551 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3552 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3553 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&chan_entry.get()) {
3554 (0x1000|7, upd.encode_with_len())
3556 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3559 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3561 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3562 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
3563 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
3565 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, payee, .. } => {
3566 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3567 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3568 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3569 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3570 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) && !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3571 let retry = if let Some(payee_data) = payee {
3572 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3573 Some(RouteParameters {
3575 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3576 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3579 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3580 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3581 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3583 rejected_by_dest: false,
3584 network_update: None,
3585 all_paths_failed: payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0,
3587 short_channel_id: None,
3594 if payment.get().abandoned() && payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3595 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3597 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3603 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3610 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3611 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
3612 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
3613 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
3614 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
3615 /// still-available channels.
3616 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
3617 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3618 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3619 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3622 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3623 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3624 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3626 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, payment_id, ref payee, .. } => {
3627 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3628 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3629 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3630 let mut all_paths_failed = false;
3631 let mut full_failure_ev = None;
3632 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3633 if !payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
3634 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3637 if payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3638 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received failure of HTLC with payment_hash {} after payment completion", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3641 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3642 all_paths_failed = true;
3643 if payment.get().abandoned() {
3644 full_failure_ev = Some(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3646 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3652 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3655 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3656 let retry = if let Some(payee_data) = payee {
3657 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3658 Some(RouteParameters {
3659 payee: payee_data.clone(),
3660 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3661 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3664 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3666 let path_failure = match &onion_error {
3667 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3669 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3671 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3672 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
3673 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
3674 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
3675 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3676 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3677 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3678 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
3685 error_code: onion_error_code,
3687 error_data: onion_error_data
3690 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3696 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
3697 // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
3698 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
3699 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
3701 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
3702 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
3703 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3704 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3705 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3706 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
3707 network_update: None,
3710 short_channel_id: Some(path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id),
3713 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
3715 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
3719 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3720 pending_events.push(path_failure);
3721 if let Some(ev) = full_failure_ev { pending_events.push(ev); }
3723 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3724 let err_packet = match onion_error {
3725 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
3726 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
3727 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
3728 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
3730 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
3731 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3732 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
3736 let mut forward_event = None;
3737 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3738 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
3740 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
3741 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3742 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
3744 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3745 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
3748 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3749 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
3750 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3751 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3752 time_forwardable: time
3759 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentReceived`], generating any
3760 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
3762 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3763 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
3764 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3765 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3767 /// Returns whether any HTLCs were claimed, and thus if any new [`MessageSendEvent`]s are now
3768 /// pending for processing via [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`].
3770 /// [`Event::PaymentReceived`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentReceived
3771 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3772 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3773 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
3774 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
3775 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3777 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3779 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3780 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
3781 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3782 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3784 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
3785 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
3786 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
3787 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
3789 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3790 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3791 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3792 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3793 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3795 let mut valid_mpp = true;
3796 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3797 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3803 let mut errs = Vec::new();
3804 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
3805 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3807 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3808 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3809 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3810 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3811 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3812 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
3813 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3815 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
3816 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
3817 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
3818 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
3819 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
3820 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
3821 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
3822 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
3824 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
3825 ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
3826 // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
3827 // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
3828 // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
3829 // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
3831 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
3836 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
3837 // which were generated.
3838 channel_state.take();
3840 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
3841 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3842 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
3849 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
3850 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
3851 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
3852 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3853 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3855 return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed
3859 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3860 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
3861 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
3862 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
3863 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3864 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
3865 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3866 payment_preimage, e);
3867 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
3868 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3869 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
3870 Some(htlc_value_msat)
3873 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
3874 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
3875 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3876 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3877 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3878 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3879 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3880 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
3881 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3882 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3888 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
3890 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
3893 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
3894 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3895 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
3896 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
3897 payment_preimage, e);
3899 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3900 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
3902 chan.remove_entry();
3904 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
3907 } else { unreachable!(); }
3910 fn finalize_claims(&self, mut sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
3911 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3912 for source in sources.drain(..) {
3913 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } = source {
3914 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3915 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3916 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3917 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3918 assert!(payment.get().is_fulfilled());
3919 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, None) {
3920 pending_events.push(
3921 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
3923 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash(),
3928 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3936 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool) {
3938 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
3939 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3940 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3941 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3942 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3943 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3944 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3945 if !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3946 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3947 let fee_paid_msat = payment.get().get_pending_fee_msat();
3948 pending_events.push(
3949 events::Event::PaymentSent {
3950 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3956 payment.get_mut().mark_fulfilled();
3960 // We currently immediately remove HTLCs which were fulfilled on-chain.
3961 // This could potentially lead to removing a pending payment too early,
3962 // with a reorg of one block causing us to re-add the fulfilled payment on
3964 // TODO: We should have a second monitor event that informs us of payments
3965 // irrevocably fulfilled.
3966 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
3967 let payment_hash = Some(PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()));
3968 pending_events.push(
3969 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
3977 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3982 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
3985 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
3986 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
3987 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
3988 let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
3989 let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
3990 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
3991 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
3994 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
3995 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3996 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
3997 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
3998 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4001 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4002 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
4003 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
4004 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
4005 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4006 payment_preimage, e);
4008 // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
4009 // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
4010 // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
4011 // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
4014 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4015 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
4016 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4017 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4021 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4022 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4023 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4026 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4027 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4029 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4037 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4038 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4039 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4042 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
4043 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4045 let chan_restoration_res;
4046 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims) = {
4047 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4048 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4049 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4050 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4051 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4053 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4057 let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger);
4058 let channel_update = if updates.funding_locked.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() && !channel.get().should_announce() {
4059 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
4060 // funding_locked and the channel is in a usable state. Further, we rely on the
4061 // normal announcement_signatures process to send a channel_update for public
4062 // channels, only generating a unicast channel_update if this is a private channel.
4063 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4064 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4065 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()).unwrap(),
4068 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, None, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.funding_locked);
4069 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4070 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4072 (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs)
4074 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
4075 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
4076 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4077 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
4081 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4082 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4083 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4086 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4087 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4090 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4091 &their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger)
4092 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
4093 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4094 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4095 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4096 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
4097 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4098 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4099 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4100 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
4102 entry.insert(channel);
4108 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4109 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4110 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4111 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4112 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4113 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4114 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4115 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4117 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, &their_features), channel_state, chan);
4118 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4120 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4123 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4124 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4125 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4126 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4128 user_channel_id: user_id,
4133 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4134 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
4135 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4136 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4137 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4138 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4139 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4140 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4141 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4143 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
4145 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4148 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
4149 // lock before watch_channel
4150 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
4152 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
4153 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4154 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4155 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4156 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4157 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
4158 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
4159 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4160 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
4161 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4162 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
4164 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
4165 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4166 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4167 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
4168 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4169 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4173 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4174 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4175 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4176 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4177 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4179 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4180 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4181 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4190 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4192 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4193 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4194 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4195 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4196 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4197 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4198 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4200 let (monitor, funding_tx) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
4201 Ok(update) => update,
4202 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4204 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
4205 let mut res = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
4206 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4207 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4208 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4209 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4210 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4211 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4218 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4221 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
4222 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
4226 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4227 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4228 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4229 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4230 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4231 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4232 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4234 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4235 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
4236 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4237 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
4238 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
4239 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
4240 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
4241 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
4242 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
4243 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
4244 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
4245 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
4246 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4247 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4248 msg: announcement_sigs,
4250 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4251 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4252 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4253 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4258 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4262 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4263 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4264 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4265 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4266 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4268 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4269 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4270 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4271 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4274 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4275 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4276 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4277 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4280 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
4281 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4283 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4284 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
4285 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4286 let (result, is_permanent) =
4287 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
4289 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
4295 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4296 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4297 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4304 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4307 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4308 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4311 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
4315 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4316 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4317 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4318 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4319 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4320 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4321 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4322 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4324 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
4325 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4326 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4327 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4332 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4333 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4334 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4335 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4336 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4337 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
4338 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4340 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
4341 } else { (tx, None) }
4343 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4346 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4347 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4348 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4350 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4351 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4352 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4353 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4357 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4362 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4363 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4364 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4365 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4367 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4368 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4369 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4370 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4372 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4373 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4375 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4376 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4377 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4378 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4381 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4382 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4383 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4384 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4385 match pending_forward_info {
4386 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4387 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4388 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
4389 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{
4390 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
4391 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
4392 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
4393 res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]);
4397 // The only case where we'd be unable to
4398 // successfully get a channel update is if the
4399 // channel isn't in the fully-funded state yet,
4400 // implying our counterparty is trying to route
4401 // payments over the channel back to themselves
4402 // (because no one else should know the short_id
4403 // is a lightning channel yet). We should have
4404 // no problem just calling this
4405 // unknown_next_peer (0x4000|10).
4406 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
4409 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[])
4411 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4412 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4413 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4416 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4418 _ => pending_forward_info
4421 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4423 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4428 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4429 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4430 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4431 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4432 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4433 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4434 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4435 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4437 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
4439 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4442 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false);
4446 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4447 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4448 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4449 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4450 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4451 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4452 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4454 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
4456 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4461 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4462 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4463 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4464 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4465 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4466 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4467 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4469 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4470 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4471 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
4473 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
4476 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4480 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4481 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4482 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4483 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4484 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4485 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4486 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4488 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
4489 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
4490 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4491 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
4492 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
4493 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
4494 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
4499 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4500 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
4502 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4503 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4504 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4506 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
4507 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4508 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4509 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4510 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4511 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4512 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4513 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4515 commitment_signed: msg,
4521 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4526 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4527 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4528 let mut forward_event = None;
4529 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4530 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4531 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4532 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
4534 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4535 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
4536 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4537 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4538 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4540 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4541 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4542 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
4544 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4545 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4546 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
4551 match forward_event {
4553 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4554 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4555 time_forwardable: time
4563 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4564 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
4566 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4567 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4568 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4569 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4570 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4571 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4573 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
4574 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
4575 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4576 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
4577 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update) {
4578 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
4579 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
4580 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
4581 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4582 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
4583 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
4585 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan,
4586 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
4587 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(),
4588 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4589 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
4591 } else { unreachable!(); }
4594 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
4595 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4596 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4600 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4601 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
4602 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
4603 .expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"),
4604 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
4606 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4609 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
4611 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
4612 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) =>
4614 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4615 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
4617 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
4618 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
4625 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4626 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4627 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4628 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4629 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4630 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4631 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4633 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
4635 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4640 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4641 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4642 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4644 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4645 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4646 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4647 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4649 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
4650 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
4653 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
4654 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), msg), channel_state, chan),
4655 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
4656 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
4657 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4660 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4665 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
4666 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4667 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4668 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4669 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
4670 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
4672 // It's not a local channel
4673 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
4676 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4677 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4678 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4679 if chan.get().should_announce() {
4680 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
4681 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
4682 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
4683 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4685 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
4687 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
4688 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
4689 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
4690 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4692 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
4695 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
4697 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
4700 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4701 let chan_restoration_res;
4702 let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround) = {
4703 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4704 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4706 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4707 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4708 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4709 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4711 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
4712 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
4713 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
4714 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
4715 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, order, htlcs_failed_forward, shutdown) =
4716 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4717 let mut channel_update = None;
4718 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4719 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4720 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4723 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4724 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
4725 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
4726 // they have the latest channel parameters.
4727 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4728 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4729 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4732 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
4733 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order, monitor_update_opt, Vec::new(), None, funding_locked);
4734 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4735 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4737 (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround)
4739 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4742 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
4743 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id);
4745 if let Some(funding_locked_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
4746 self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, &funding_locked_msg)?;
4751 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
4752 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
4753 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4754 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
4755 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
4756 for monitor_event in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
4757 match monitor_event {
4758 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
4759 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
4760 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
4761 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.onchain_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true);
4763 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
4764 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4767 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
4768 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
4769 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4770 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4771 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4772 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4773 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4774 if let Some(mut chan) = by_id.remove(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
4775 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4776 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4778 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
4779 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4780 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4784 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
4785 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
4787 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
4789 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
4790 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4791 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4792 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4793 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
4798 MonitorEvent::UpdateCompleted { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
4799 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
4804 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4805 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4808 has_pending_monitor_events
4811 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
4812 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
4813 /// update events as a separate process method here.
4814 #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
4815 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
4816 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
4819 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
4820 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
4821 /// update was applied.
4823 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
4824 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
4825 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
4826 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
4827 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
4828 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
4829 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4830 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
4832 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4833 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4834 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4835 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4836 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4838 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4839 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
4840 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
4841 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
4842 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id));
4844 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
4845 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4846 has_monitor_update = true;
4847 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), channel_id);
4848 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
4849 if close_channel { return false; }
4851 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4852 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4853 updates: commitment_update,
4860 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
4861 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
4862 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
4869 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
4870 for (failures, channel_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
4871 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id);
4874 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4875 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4881 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
4882 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
4883 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
4884 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
4885 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
4886 let mut has_update = false;
4888 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4889 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4890 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4891 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4892 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4894 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4895 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
4896 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
4897 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
4899 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4900 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
4903 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
4904 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
4905 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
4906 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4907 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4910 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4911 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4916 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4918 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
4919 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4925 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
4926 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
4933 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4934 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4940 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
4941 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
4943 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
4944 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4945 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
4946 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
4947 // reorganized out of the main chain.
4948 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
4949 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
4950 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
4951 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
4952 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
4953 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
4954 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
4955 assert!(should_broadcast);
4956 } else { unreachable!(); }
4957 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
4959 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4963 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
4964 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
4966 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4967 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
4970 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
4972 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4973 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4974 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4975 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4976 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
4977 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
4978 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
4979 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
4980 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
4981 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
4982 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
4983 // never fail a payment too early.
4984 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
4986 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
4989 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
4994 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
4997 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
4998 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5000 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
5001 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5002 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5004 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5006 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5007 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5011 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5012 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5014 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5016 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5017 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5018 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
5019 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5020 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5021 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, &self.keys_manager, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5024 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5025 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5028 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5030 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5032 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5033 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5034 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5035 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5036 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5039 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5040 /// stored external to LDK.
5042 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5043 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5044 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5046 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5047 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5050 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5051 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5052 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5053 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5055 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5056 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5057 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5058 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5059 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5061 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5062 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5063 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
5064 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5065 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
5067 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5069 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
5070 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
5072 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5073 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5077 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5078 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5080 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5082 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5083 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5084 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5085 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5088 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5089 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5092 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5094 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5096 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5097 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5100 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))]
5101 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5102 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5103 let event_handler = |event: &events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event.clone());
5104 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5109 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5110 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().is_empty()
5114 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5115 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().clear()
5119 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5120 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5121 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5122 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5123 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5126 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5127 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5128 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5129 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5131 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5132 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5133 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5134 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5137 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5138 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5140 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5141 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5144 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5145 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5146 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
5148 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5149 events.replace(pending_events);
5158 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5160 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5161 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5162 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5163 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5166 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5168 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5169 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5171 /// Pending events are persisted as part of [`ChannelManager`]. While these events are cleared
5172 /// when processed, an [`EventHandler`] must be able to handle previously seen events when
5173 /// restarting from an old state.
5174 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5175 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5176 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5178 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5179 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5180 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5181 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5184 let mut pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5185 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5186 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5189 for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
5190 handler.handle_event(&event);
5198 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5200 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5201 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5202 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5203 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5206 fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
5208 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5209 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), block.header.prev_blockhash,
5210 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5211 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5212 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5215 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
5216 self.transactions_confirmed(&block.header, &txdata, height);
5217 self.best_block_updated(&block.header, height);
5220 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5221 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5222 let new_height = height - 1;
5224 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5225 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5226 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5227 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5228 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5229 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5232 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, &self.logger));
5236 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5238 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5239 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5240 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5241 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5244 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5245 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5246 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5247 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5249 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5250 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5252 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5253 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, &self.logger).map(|a| (a, Vec::new())));
5256 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5257 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5258 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5259 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5261 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5262 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5264 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5266 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5268 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, &self.logger));
5270 macro_rules! max_time {
5271 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5273 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5274 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5275 // having an explicit local time source.
5276 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5277 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5278 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5279 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5280 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5286 max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
5287 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5288 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5289 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5290 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5293 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5294 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5295 outbounds.retain(|payment_id, payment| {
5296 if payment.remaining_parts() != 0 { return true }
5297 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { starting_block_height, payment_hash, .. } = payment {
5298 if *starting_block_height + PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS <= height {
5299 log_info!(self.logger, "Timing out payment with id {} and hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_id.0), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
5300 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
5301 payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash,
5309 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
5310 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5311 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_id.len());
5312 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
5313 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
5314 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
5320 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5321 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5322 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5323 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5324 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
5325 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|_| (None, Vec::new()))
5326 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
5327 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
5332 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5334 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5335 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5336 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5337 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5340 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
5341 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
5343 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ClosureReason>>
5344 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
5345 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5346 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5347 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5349 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5350 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5352 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5353 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5354 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5355 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5356 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
5357 let res = f(channel);
5358 if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res {
5359 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
5360 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
5361 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5362 failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
5366 if let Some(funding_locked) = chan_res {
5367 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
5368 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5369 msg: funding_locked,
5371 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
5372 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5373 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5374 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5375 msg: announcement_sigs,
5377 } else if channel.is_usable() {
5378 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures but with private channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5379 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5380 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5381 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel).unwrap(),
5384 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5386 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
5388 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
5389 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5390 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
5392 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
5393 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
5394 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
5395 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
5396 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5400 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
5401 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
5402 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5403 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5404 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
5405 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
5406 data: reason_message,
5414 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5415 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, htlcs| {
5416 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
5417 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
5418 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
5419 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
5420 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
5421 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
5422 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
5423 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
5424 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5425 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
5426 data: htlc_msat_height_data
5431 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
5436 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
5438 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
5439 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
5443 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
5444 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
5445 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5448 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
5449 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
5450 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5451 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
5454 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
5455 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5457 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
5458 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
5461 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5462 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
5463 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
5464 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
5465 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5469 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
5470 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
5471 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
5472 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
5476 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
5477 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5478 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5479 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5480 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5481 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5484 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
5485 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5486 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5489 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
5490 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5491 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5494 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
5495 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5496 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5499 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
5500 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5501 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5504 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
5505 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5506 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5509 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
5510 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5511 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5514 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
5515 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5516 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5519 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
5520 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5521 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5524 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
5525 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5526 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5529 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
5530 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5531 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5534 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
5535 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5536 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5539 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
5540 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5541 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5544 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
5545 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5546 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5549 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
5550 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5551 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5554 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
5555 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5556 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5559 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
5560 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5561 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
5564 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
5569 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
5570 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5571 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5574 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
5575 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5576 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5577 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
5579 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5580 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5581 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5582 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5583 if no_connection_possible {
5584 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5585 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5586 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5587 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
5588 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
5590 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
5591 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5592 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5596 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5603 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5604 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5605 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5606 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
5607 if chan.is_shutdown() {
5608 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
5609 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
5611 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5614 no_channels_remain = false;
5620 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
5622 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5623 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5624 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5625 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5626 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5627 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5628 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5629 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5630 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5631 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5632 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5633 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5634 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5635 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
5636 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5637 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5638 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
5639 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
5640 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
5644 if no_channels_remain {
5645 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
5648 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5649 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5653 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
5654 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5656 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5659 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5660 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
5661 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5662 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
5663 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
5666 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
5667 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
5672 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5673 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5674 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5675 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5676 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5677 if !chan.have_received_message() {
5678 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
5679 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
5680 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
5684 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
5685 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5686 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
5692 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
5695 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
5696 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5698 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
5699 for chan in self.list_channels() {
5700 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
5701 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
5702 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
5706 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
5707 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
5712 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
5713 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
5714 struct PersistenceNotifier {
5715 /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
5716 /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
5717 persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
5720 impl PersistenceNotifier {
5723 persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
5729 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
5730 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5735 guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
5736 let result = *guard;
5744 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
5745 fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5746 let current_time = Instant::now();
5748 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
5749 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5754 guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
5755 // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
5756 // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
5757 // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
5758 // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
5760 let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
5761 let result = *guard;
5762 if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
5766 match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
5767 None => return result,
5773 // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
5775 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
5776 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5777 *persistence_lock = true;
5778 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
5783 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
5784 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
5786 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
5788 (0, onion_packet, required),
5789 (2, short_channel_id, required),
5792 (0, payment_data, required),
5793 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
5795 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
5796 (0, payment_preimage, required),
5797 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
5801 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
5802 (0, routing, required),
5803 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
5804 (4, payment_hash, required),
5805 (6, amt_to_forward, required),
5806 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required)
5810 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
5811 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5813 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
5815 channel_id.write(writer)?;
5816 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5817 reason.write(writer)?;
5819 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
5820 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
5823 channel_id.write(writer)?;
5824 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5825 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
5826 failure_code.write(writer)?;
5833 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
5834 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5835 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5838 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5839 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5840 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5841 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
5845 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
5846 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5847 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5848 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
5849 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
5852 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
5853 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
5854 // messages contained in the variants.
5855 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
5856 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
5857 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
5859 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
5860 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
5861 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
5862 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
5863 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
5866 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
5867 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
5868 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
5869 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
5870 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
5872 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
5877 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
5882 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
5883 (0, short_channel_id, required),
5884 (2, outpoint, required),
5885 (4, htlc_id, required),
5886 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
5889 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
5890 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5891 let payment_data = match &self.onion_payload {
5892 OnionPayload::Invoice(data) => Some(data.clone()),
5895 let keysend_preimage = match self.onion_payload {
5896 OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => None,
5897 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => Some(preimage.clone()),
5902 (0, self.prev_hop, required), (2, self.value, required),
5903 (4, payment_data, option), (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
5904 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
5910 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
5911 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5912 let mut prev_hop = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
5914 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
5915 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
5916 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
5920 (0, prev_hop, required), (2, value, required),
5921 (4, payment_data, option), (6, cltv_expiry, required),
5922 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
5924 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
5926 if payment_data.is_some() {
5927 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
5929 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
5932 if payment_data.is_none() {
5933 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
5935 OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data.unwrap())
5939 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
5947 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
5948 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5949 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5952 let mut session_priv: ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
5953 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
5954 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
5955 let mut payment_id = None;
5956 let mut payment_secret = None;
5957 let mut payee = None;
5958 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
5959 (0, session_priv, required),
5960 (1, payment_id, option),
5961 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
5962 (3, payment_secret, option),
5963 (4, path, vec_type),
5966 if payment_id.is_none() {
5967 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
5969 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
5971 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
5972 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
5973 first_hop_htlc_msat: first_hop_htlc_msat,
5974 path: path.unwrap(),
5975 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
5980 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
5981 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
5986 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
5987 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::io::Error> {
5989 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payee } => {
5991 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
5992 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
5993 (0, session_priv, required),
5994 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
5995 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
5996 (3, payment_secret, option),
5997 (4, path, vec_type),
6001 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6003 field.write(writer)?;
6010 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
6011 (0, LightningError) => {
6015 (0, failure_code, required),
6016 (2, data, vec_type),
6020 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6022 (0, forward_info, required),
6023 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6024 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6025 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6028 (0, htlc_id, required),
6029 (2, err_packet, required),
6033 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6034 (0, payment_secret, required),
6035 (2, expiry_time, required),
6036 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6037 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6038 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6041 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(PendingOutboundPayment,
6043 (0, session_privs, required),
6046 (0, session_privs, required),
6047 (1, payment_hash, option),
6050 (0, session_privs, required),
6051 (1, pending_fee_msat, option),
6052 (2, payment_hash, required),
6053 (4, payment_secret, option),
6054 (6, total_msat, required),
6055 (8, pending_amt_msat, required),
6056 (10, starting_block_height, required),
6059 (0, session_privs, required),
6060 (2, payment_hash, required),
6064 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
6065 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6066 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6067 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6068 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6071 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6072 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6074 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6076 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
6078 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6079 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
6080 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
6083 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6084 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
6085 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6086 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6087 unfunded_channels += 1;
6090 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
6091 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6092 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6093 channel.write(writer)?;
6097 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6098 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
6099 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6100 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6101 for forward in pending_forwards {
6102 forward.write(writer)?;
6106 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6107 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
6108 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6109 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6110 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
6111 htlc.write(writer)?;
6115 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6116 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6117 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6118 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
6119 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6120 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
6123 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6124 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6125 for event in events.iter() {
6126 event.write(writer)?;
6129 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
6130 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6131 for event in background_events.iter() {
6133 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
6135 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
6136 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
6141 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6142 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6144 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6145 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6146 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
6147 hash.write(writer)?;
6148 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
6151 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6152 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
6153 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
6154 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6155 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
6156 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
6159 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
6160 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6162 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6163 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6164 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
6165 session_priv.write(writer)?;
6168 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
6169 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
6173 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
6174 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
6175 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6177 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6178 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6179 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
6184 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6185 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
6186 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
6193 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
6195 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
6197 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6198 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
6199 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
6200 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
6201 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
6202 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
6203 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
6204 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
6205 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6206 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
6207 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
6208 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
6209 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
6211 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
6212 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
6214 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
6215 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
6217 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
6218 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
6219 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
6220 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
6221 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
6222 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
6224 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
6225 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6226 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6227 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6228 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6229 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6232 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
6233 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
6235 pub keys_manager: K,
6237 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6239 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
6240 pub fee_estimator: F,
6241 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6243 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
6244 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
6245 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
6246 pub chain_monitor: M,
6248 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
6249 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
6250 /// force-closed during deserialization.
6251 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
6252 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
6253 /// deserialization.
6255 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
6256 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
6257 pub default_config: UserConfig,
6259 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
6260 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
6262 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
6263 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
6264 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
6265 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
6267 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
6270 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
6271 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
6274 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6275 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
6276 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6277 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6278 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6279 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6282 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
6283 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
6284 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
6285 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
6286 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
6288 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
6289 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
6294 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
6295 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
6296 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6297 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
6298 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6299 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6300 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6301 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6304 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6305 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
6306 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
6310 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6311 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
6312 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6313 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6314 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6315 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6318 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6319 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6321 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6322 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6323 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6325 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
6327 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6328 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6329 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6330 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6331 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
6332 for _ in 0..channel_count {
6333 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (&args.keys_manager, best_block_height))?;
6334 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
6335 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
6336 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
6337 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6338 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6339 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6340 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6341 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
6342 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
6343 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6344 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6345 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6346 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6347 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6348 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
6349 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6350 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6351 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6352 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6353 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6354 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
6355 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
6356 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
6357 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6358 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6359 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
6360 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
6361 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6362 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
6363 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6364 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
6365 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
6368 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6369 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6370 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
6372 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
6375 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6376 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6377 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6378 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6379 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
6380 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6384 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
6385 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
6386 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
6387 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6391 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
6392 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6393 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6394 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
6395 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6396 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6397 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
6398 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
6399 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
6401 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
6404 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6405 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6406 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
6407 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6408 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6409 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
6410 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
6411 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
6413 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
6416 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6417 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
6418 for _ in 0..peer_count {
6419 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6420 let peer_state = PeerState {
6421 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
6423 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
6426 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6427 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
6428 for _ in 0..event_count {
6429 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
6430 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
6434 if forward_htlcs_count > 0 {
6435 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
6436 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
6437 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
6438 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
6439 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
6440 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6441 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
6445 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6446 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
6447 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
6448 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6449 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
6450 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6454 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6455 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6457 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6458 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
6459 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
6460 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
6461 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6465 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6466 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
6467 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
6468 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
6469 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
6470 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
6471 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
6473 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
6474 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6478 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
6479 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
6480 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
6481 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6482 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
6483 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
6485 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
6486 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
6487 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
6488 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
6489 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
6490 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
6492 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
6494 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
6495 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
6496 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
6497 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
6498 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
6499 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
6500 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
6502 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors {
6503 if by_id.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
6504 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
6505 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
6506 if path.is_empty() {
6507 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
6508 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6510 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
6511 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
6512 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
6513 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
6514 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6515 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
6516 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
6517 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
6519 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6520 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
6521 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
6522 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
6523 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
6525 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
6526 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
6527 total_msat: path_amt,
6528 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
6530 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
6531 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
6540 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6541 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
6543 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
6544 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
6547 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
6548 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
6549 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
6551 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
6552 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
6553 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
6555 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
6557 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
6562 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6564 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
6565 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
6566 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
6568 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
6569 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &args.keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
6572 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
6573 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
6575 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
6577 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
6578 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
6579 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
6580 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
6582 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
6583 logger: args.logger,
6584 default_configuration: args.default_config,
6587 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
6588 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
6591 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
6592 //connection or two.
6594 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
6600 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6601 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6602 use core::time::Duration;
6603 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
6604 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
6605 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
6606 use ln::channelmanager::inbound_payment;
6607 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
6608 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
6610 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
6611 use routing::router::{Payee, RouteParameters, find_route};
6612 use util::errors::APIError;
6613 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
6614 use util::test_utils;
6616 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
6618 fn test_wait_timeout() {
6619 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
6621 use core::sync::atomic::AtomicBool;
6624 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
6625 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
6627 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
6628 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
6629 thread::spawn(move || {
6631 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
6632 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6633 *persistence_lock = true;
6636 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
6642 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
6643 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
6645 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
6648 if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
6653 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
6655 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
6658 if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
6665 fn test_notify_limits() {
6666 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
6667 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
6668 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6669 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6670 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6671 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6673 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
6674 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
6675 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6676 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6677 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6679 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6681 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
6682 // to connect messages with new values
6683 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
6684 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
6685 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
6686 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
6688 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
6689 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6690 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6691 // ... but the last node should not.
6692 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6693 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
6694 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6695 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6697 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
6698 // about the channel.
6699 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6700 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6701 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6703 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
6705 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6706 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6707 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6708 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6709 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6710 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6712 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
6713 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6714 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6716 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
6717 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
6718 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
6719 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
6720 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
6721 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
6723 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
6724 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
6725 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
6726 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
6727 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6728 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6729 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6730 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6732 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
6733 // the channel info has updated.
6734 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
6735 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
6736 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6737 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6738 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6739 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6743 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
6744 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
6746 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6747 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6748 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6749 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6750 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6752 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
6753 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
6754 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
6755 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
6756 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
6757 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
6758 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payee, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
6759 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6760 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6761 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6762 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
6764 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
6765 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
6766 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6767 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6768 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6769 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
6770 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
6771 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6772 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6773 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6774 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6775 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6776 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6777 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6778 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6779 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6780 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6781 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6782 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6783 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6784 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
6785 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
6787 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
6788 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payee, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
6789 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6790 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6791 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6792 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
6794 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
6795 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
6796 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
6797 // lightning messages manually.
6798 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
6799 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6800 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6801 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6802 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
6803 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6804 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6805 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
6806 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6807 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6808 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
6809 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6810 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6811 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6812 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
6813 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6814 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6815 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
6816 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6817 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6818 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
6819 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6820 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
6821 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6822 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6823 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
6824 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6826 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
6827 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
6828 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6829 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
6831 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
6832 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
6833 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
6834 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
6836 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6839 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
6840 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
6841 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
6842 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
6844 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6847 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
6848 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
6849 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
6850 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
6852 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6857 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
6858 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
6859 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
6860 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
6861 // fails as expected.
6862 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6863 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6864 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6865 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6866 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6867 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
6869 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
6870 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
6871 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
6873 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
6874 let params = RouteParameters {
6875 payee: Payee::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id()),
6876 final_value_msat: 100_000,
6877 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
6879 let route = find_route(
6880 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), ¶ms, nodes[0].network_graph, None,
6881 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
6883 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
6884 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6885 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6886 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6887 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
6888 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
6889 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6890 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6891 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6892 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6893 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6894 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6895 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6896 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6897 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6898 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6899 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6900 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6901 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6902 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
6903 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
6905 // Finally, claim the original payment.
6906 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
6908 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
6909 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
6910 let route = find_route(
6911 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), ¶ms, nodes[0].network_graph, None,
6912 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
6914 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
6915 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6916 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6917 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6918 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
6919 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
6920 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
6922 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
6923 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
6924 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
6925 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6926 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6927 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6928 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
6929 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
6930 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6931 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6932 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6933 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6934 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6935 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6936 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6937 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6938 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6939 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6940 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6941 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6942 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6943 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
6944 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
6946 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
6947 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
6951 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
6952 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
6953 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
6954 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6955 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6956 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6957 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6959 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
6960 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
6961 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6962 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6964 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6965 let params = RouteParameters {
6966 payee: Payee::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
6967 final_value_msat: 10000,
6968 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
6970 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
6971 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
6972 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
6973 let route = find_route(
6974 &payer_pubkey, ¶ms, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
6975 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
6978 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
6979 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
6980 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
6981 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6983 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6984 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
6985 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6986 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6987 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6988 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6989 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6991 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
6995 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
6996 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
6997 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6998 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6999 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7000 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7002 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7003 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7004 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7005 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7007 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7008 let params = RouteParameters {
7009 payee: Payee::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7010 final_value_msat: 10000,
7011 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7013 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7014 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7015 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
7016 let route = find_route(
7017 &payer_pubkey, ¶ms, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7018 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
7021 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7022 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7023 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
7024 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
7025 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7027 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7028 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7029 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7030 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7031 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7032 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7033 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7035 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
7039 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
7040 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7041 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7042 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
7043 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7045 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7046 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7047 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7048 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7050 // Marshall an MPP route.
7051 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
7052 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
7053 route.paths.push(path);
7054 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7055 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
7056 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
7057 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
7058 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
7059 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
7061 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None).unwrap_err() {
7062 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
7063 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
7064 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
7069 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
7070 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
7071 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7072 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7073 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7074 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7076 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
7077 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
7079 total_msat: 100_000,
7082 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
7083 // payment verification fails as expected.
7084 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
7085 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
7086 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, payment_data.clone(), nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
7087 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
7089 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
7093 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
7094 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
7098 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "unstable"))]
7101 use chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
7102 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
7103 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
7104 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
7105 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7106 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
7107 use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
7108 use routing::router::{Payee, get_route};
7109 use routing::scoring::Scorer;
7110 use util::test_utils;
7111 use util::config::UserConfig;
7112 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
7114 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7115 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7116 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
7118 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
7122 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
7123 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
7124 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
7125 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
7126 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
7127 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
7128 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
7133 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
7134 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
7137 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
7138 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
7139 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
7141 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
7142 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7144 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
7145 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7147 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
7148 config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
7150 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
7151 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
7152 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
7153 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
7154 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
7156 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
7158 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
7160 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
7161 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
7162 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
7163 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
7164 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
7166 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
7168 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
7170 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7171 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7172 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
7173 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7174 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7177 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
7178 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7179 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
7181 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
7182 } else { panic!(); }
7184 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7185 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7187 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
7190 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
7193 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
7194 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
7196 node_a.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7197 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7198 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
7199 match msg_events[0] {
7200 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref msg, .. } => {
7201 node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
7202 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
7206 match msg_events[1] {
7207 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7211 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
7213 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
7214 macro_rules! send_payment {
7215 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
7216 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
7217 let payee = Payee::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id())
7218 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7219 let scorer = Scorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
7220 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payee, &dummy_graph,
7221 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer).unwrap();
7223 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
7224 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
7226 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
7227 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
7229 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
7230 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
7231 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7232 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
7233 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
7234 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
7235 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
7236 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7238 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
7239 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
7240 assert!($node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
7242 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
7243 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
7244 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
7245 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7246 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
7248 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
7251 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
7252 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
7253 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
7254 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7256 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
7261 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
7262 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);