1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::{genesis_block, ChainHash};
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
39 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
40 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
41 // construct one themselves.
42 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
43 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel};
44 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
45 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
46 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
47 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
48 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
49 use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters};
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
55 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs};
57 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
58 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, ChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
59 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
60 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
61 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
62 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
63 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
64 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
65 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
67 use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
70 use crate::prelude::*;
72 use core::cell::RefCell;
74 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
75 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
76 use core::time::Duration;
79 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
80 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
81 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
83 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
85 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
86 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
87 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
89 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
90 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
91 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
92 // before we forward it.
94 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
95 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
96 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
97 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
98 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
100 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
101 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
103 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
104 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
105 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
106 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
109 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
110 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
111 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
112 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
113 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
114 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
117 /// This was added in 0.0.116 and will break deserialization on downgrades.
118 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
119 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
120 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
121 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
122 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
123 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
127 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
128 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
129 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
130 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
131 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
133 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
134 /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
135 /// may overshoot this in either case)
136 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
137 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
138 /// The fee being skimmed off the top of this HTLC. If this is a forward, it'll be the fee we are
139 /// skimming. If we're receiving this HTLC, it's the fee that our counterparty skimmed.
140 pub(super) skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
143 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
144 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
145 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
146 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
149 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
150 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
151 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
152 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
153 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
156 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
157 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
159 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
160 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
161 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
164 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
165 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
167 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
168 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
171 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
172 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
175 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
179 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
180 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
181 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
182 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
183 short_channel_id: u64,
185 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
186 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
188 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
189 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
194 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
196 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
197 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
198 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
200 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
201 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
204 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
205 struct ClaimableHTLC {
206 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
208 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
210 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
211 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
212 sender_intended_value: u64,
213 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
215 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
216 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
217 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
218 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
220 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
221 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
224 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
226 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
227 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
228 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
230 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
231 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
236 impl Readable for PaymentId {
237 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
238 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
243 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
245 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
246 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
247 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
249 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
250 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
255 impl Readable for InterceptId {
256 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
257 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
262 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
263 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
264 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
265 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
266 OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
269 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
271 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
272 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
273 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
275 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
276 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
280 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
281 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
282 (0, short_channel_id, required),
283 (2, htlc_id, required),
285 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
286 (0, session_priv, required),
291 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
292 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
293 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
294 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
295 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
298 session_priv: SecretKey,
299 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
300 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
301 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
302 payment_id: PaymentId,
305 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
306 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
307 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
309 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
311 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
313 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
316 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
317 payment_id.hash(hasher);
318 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
324 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
326 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
327 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
328 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
329 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
330 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
331 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
335 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
336 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
337 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
338 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
339 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
340 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
342 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
348 struct InboundOnionErr {
354 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
355 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
357 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
358 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
359 pub enum FailureCode {
360 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
361 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
362 TemporaryNodeFailure,
363 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
364 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
365 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
366 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
367 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
368 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
369 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
370 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
371 /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
372 /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
374 /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
375 /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
376 InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
379 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
380 fn into(self) -> u16 {
382 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
383 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
384 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
385 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
390 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
391 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
392 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
393 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
394 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
396 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
397 err: msgs::LightningError,
398 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
399 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
400 channel_capacity: Option<u64>,
402 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
404 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
406 err: LightningError {
408 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
409 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
416 shutdown_finish: None,
417 channel_capacity: None,
421 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
422 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None, channel_capacity: None }
425 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, channel_capacity: u64) -> Self {
427 err: LightningError {
429 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
430 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
436 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
437 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
438 channel_capacity: Some(channel_capacity)
442 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
445 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
447 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
448 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
452 log_level: Level::Warn,
455 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
457 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
459 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
461 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
462 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
470 shutdown_finish: None,
471 channel_capacity: None,
476 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
477 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
478 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
479 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
480 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
482 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
483 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
484 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
485 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
486 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
487 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
488 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
490 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
494 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
495 struct ClaimingPayment {
497 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
498 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
500 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
501 (0, amount_msat, required),
502 (2, payment_purpose, required),
503 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
506 struct ClaimablePayment {
507 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
508 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
509 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
512 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
513 struct ClaimablePayments {
514 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
515 /// failed/claimed by the user.
517 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
518 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
520 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
521 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
522 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
524 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
525 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
526 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
527 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
530 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
531 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
532 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
533 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
534 enum BackgroundEvent {
535 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
536 /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
537 /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
538 /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
540 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
541 /// are regenerated on startup.
542 ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
543 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
544 /// channel to continue normal operation.
546 /// In general this should be used rather than
547 /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
548 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
549 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
551 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
552 /// are regenerated on startup.
553 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
554 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
555 funding_txo: OutPoint,
556 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
558 /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
559 /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
561 MonitorUpdatesComplete {
562 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
563 channel_id: [u8; 32],
568 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
569 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
570 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
571 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
572 /// event can be generated.
573 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
574 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
575 /// operation of another channel.
577 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
578 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
579 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
580 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
582 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
583 event: events::Event,
584 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
588 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
589 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
590 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
591 (0, event, upgradable_required),
592 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
593 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
594 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
595 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
596 // downgrades to prior versions.
597 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
601 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
602 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
603 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
604 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
605 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
608 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
609 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
610 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
611 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
615 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
616 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
617 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
618 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
619 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
620 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
622 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
623 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
624 channel_id: [u8; 32],
625 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
630 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
632 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
633 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
634 channel_id: prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
635 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
640 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
641 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
645 /// State we hold per-peer.
646 pub(super) struct PeerState<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
647 /// `channel_id` -> `Channel`.
649 /// Holds all funded channels where the peer is the counterparty.
650 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
651 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `OutboundV1Channel`.
653 /// Holds all outbound V1 channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once an outbound channel has
654 /// been assigned a `channel_id`, the entry in this map is removed and one is created in
656 pub(super) outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], OutboundV1Channel<Signer>>,
657 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundV1Channel`.
659 /// Holds all inbound V1 channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once an inbound channel has
660 /// been assigned a `channel_id`, the entry in this map is removed and one is created in
662 pub(super) inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], InboundV1Channel<Signer>>,
663 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
664 latest_features: InitFeatures,
665 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
666 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
667 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
668 /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
669 /// user but which have not yet completed.
671 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
672 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
673 /// for a missing channel.
674 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
675 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
676 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
678 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
679 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
680 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
681 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
683 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
684 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
685 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
686 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
687 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
688 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
689 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
690 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
691 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
692 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
693 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
694 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
695 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
696 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
697 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
701 impl <Signer: ChannelSigner> PeerState<Signer> {
702 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
703 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
704 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
705 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
706 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
709 self.channel_by_id.is_empty() && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
710 && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
713 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
714 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
715 self.channel_by_id.len() +
716 self.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.len() +
717 self.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.len()
720 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
721 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> bool {
722 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
723 self.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
724 self.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
728 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
729 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
731 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
734 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
735 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
736 struct PendingInboundPayment {
737 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
738 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
739 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
740 /// this payment being removed.
742 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
743 user_payment_id: u64,
744 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
745 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
746 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
749 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
750 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
751 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
752 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
753 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
754 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
755 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
756 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
758 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
759 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
767 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
769 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
770 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
771 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
776 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
777 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
778 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
779 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
780 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
781 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
782 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
783 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
784 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
786 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
787 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
796 &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
798 &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
799 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
800 ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
805 macro_rules! define_test_pub_trait { ($vis: vis) => {
806 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`] used in testing.
807 $vis trait AChannelManager {
808 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
809 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
810 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
811 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
812 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
813 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
814 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
815 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
816 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
817 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<Signer = Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
818 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
819 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
820 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
821 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
822 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
823 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
824 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
825 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
828 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
829 define_test_pub_trait!(pub);
830 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
831 define_test_pub_trait!(pub(crate));
832 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
833 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
835 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
836 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
837 ES::Target: EntropySource,
838 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
839 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
840 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
844 type Watch = M::Target;
846 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
848 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
850 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
852 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer;
853 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
855 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
857 type Router = R::Target;
859 type Logger = L::Target;
861 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
864 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
865 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
867 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
868 /// to individual Channels.
870 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
871 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
872 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
873 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
875 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
876 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
877 /// returning from [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`], with ChannelManagers, writing updates
878 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during
879 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
880 /// [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the
881 /// `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
883 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
884 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
885 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
887 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
888 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
889 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
890 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
891 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
893 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
894 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
895 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
896 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
898 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
899 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
900 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
902 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
903 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
904 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
905 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
906 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
908 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
909 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
910 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
911 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
912 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
913 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
914 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
915 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
918 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
919 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
920 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
921 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
922 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
926 // `total_consistency_lock`
928 // |__`forward_htlcs`
930 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
932 // |__`per_peer_state`
934 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
936 // | |__`claimable_payments`
938 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
944 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
946 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
950 // | |__`pending_events`
952 // | |__`pending_background_events`
954 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
956 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
957 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
958 ES::Target: EntropySource,
959 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
960 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
961 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
965 default_configuration: UserConfig,
966 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
967 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
973 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
975 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
977 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
978 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
980 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
981 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
982 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
983 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
985 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
986 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
988 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
989 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
990 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
991 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
992 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
993 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
994 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
995 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
997 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
999 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1000 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1002 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1004 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1005 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1006 /// and via the classic SCID.
1008 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1009 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1011 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1013 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1015 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1016 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1017 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1019 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1020 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1022 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1023 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1025 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1026 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1028 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1029 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1030 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1031 /// active channel list on load.
1033 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1034 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1036 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1038 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
1039 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
1040 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
1042 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1043 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1044 /// the handling of the events.
1046 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1047 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1050 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1051 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1052 /// would break backwards compatability.
1053 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1054 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1055 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1057 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1058 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
1060 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1062 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1063 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1064 /// confirmation depth.
1066 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1067 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1068 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1070 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1072 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
1074 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
1076 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1078 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1080 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1081 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1082 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1084 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1085 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1087 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1088 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1089 /// keeping additional state.
1090 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1092 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1093 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1094 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1095 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1097 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1098 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1100 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1101 /// are currently open with that peer.
1103 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1104 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1107 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1109 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1110 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1111 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
1112 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1113 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
1115 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1116 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1117 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1118 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1119 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1121 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1122 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1124 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1125 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1126 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1127 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1129 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1130 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1131 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1132 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1133 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1135 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1137 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1139 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1140 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1141 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1142 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1143 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1144 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1145 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1146 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1147 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1149 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1151 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
1155 signer_provider: SP,
1160 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1162 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1163 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1164 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1165 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1166 pub struct ChainParameters {
1167 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1168 pub network: Network,
1170 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1172 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1173 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1176 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1183 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1184 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1185 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1186 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1187 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1188 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1190 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1191 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1192 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1193 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1194 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1196 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1197 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1200 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1201 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1202 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1203 let _ = cm.get_cm().process_background_events(); // We always persist
1205 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1206 persistence_notifier: &cm.get_cm().persistence_notifier,
1207 should_persist: || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist },
1208 _read_guard: read_guard,
1213 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1214 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first.
1215 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1216 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
1218 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1219 persistence_notifier: notifier,
1220 should_persist: persist_check,
1221 _read_guard: read_guard,
1226 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1227 fn drop(&mut self) {
1228 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1229 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1234 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1235 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1237 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1239 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1240 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1241 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1242 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1243 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1245 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1246 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1248 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1250 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1251 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1252 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1253 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1254 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1255 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1256 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1257 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1258 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1259 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1260 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1261 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1262 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1264 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1265 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1267 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1268 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1269 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1270 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1272 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1273 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1274 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1275 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1276 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1277 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1280 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1282 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1283 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1286 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1288 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1289 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1291 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
1292 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
1293 /// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
1294 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
1296 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1297 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1298 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1300 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1301 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1302 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1304 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1305 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1306 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1307 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1309 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1310 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1311 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1313 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1314 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1315 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1317 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1318 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1319 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1320 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1321 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1322 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1323 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1324 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1325 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1326 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1327 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1330 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1331 /// to better separate parameters.
1332 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1333 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1334 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1335 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1336 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1337 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1338 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1339 pub features: InitFeatures,
1340 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1341 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1342 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1344 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1346 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1347 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1348 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1349 /// payments to us through this channel.
1350 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1351 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1352 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1353 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1354 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1355 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1356 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1359 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1360 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1361 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1362 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1363 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1364 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1365 /// lifetime of the channel.
1366 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1367 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1368 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1369 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1370 /// our counterparty already.
1372 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1373 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1374 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1375 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1377 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1378 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1379 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1380 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1382 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1383 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1385 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1386 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1388 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1389 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1390 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1391 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1392 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1393 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1394 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1395 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1396 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1399 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1401 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1402 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1403 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1404 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1405 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1406 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1407 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1409 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1410 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1412 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1413 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1414 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1415 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1416 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1417 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1418 /// this value on chain.
1420 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1422 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1424 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1425 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1426 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1427 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1429 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1430 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1431 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1433 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1434 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1435 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1436 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1437 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1439 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1440 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1441 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1442 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1444 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1445 pub balance_msat: u64,
1446 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1447 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1448 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1449 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1451 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1453 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1454 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1455 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1456 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1457 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1458 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1459 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1460 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1462 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
1463 /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1464 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1465 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1466 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1467 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1468 /// route which is valid.
1469 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1470 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1471 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1472 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1473 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1474 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1476 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1477 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1478 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1479 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1480 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1481 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1482 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1483 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1484 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1486 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1488 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1489 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1490 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1491 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1492 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1494 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1495 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1496 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1497 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1498 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1499 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1500 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1502 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1503 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1504 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1505 pub is_outbound: bool,
1506 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1507 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1508 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1509 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1510 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1512 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1513 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1514 /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
1515 /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
1516 pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
1517 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1518 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1520 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1521 pub is_usable: bool,
1522 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1523 pub is_public: bool,
1524 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1525 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1526 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1527 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1528 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1529 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1531 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1532 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1535 impl ChannelDetails {
1536 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1537 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1538 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1540 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1541 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1542 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1543 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1546 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1547 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1548 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1550 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1551 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1552 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1553 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1556 fn from_channel_context<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, F: Deref>(
1557 context: &ChannelContext<Signer>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
1558 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
1560 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1562 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
1563 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1564 context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1566 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1567 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1568 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1569 features: latest_features,
1570 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1571 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1572 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1573 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1574 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1575 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1576 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1577 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1578 Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1579 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1581 funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1582 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1583 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1584 channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1585 short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1586 outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1587 inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1588 channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1589 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1590 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1591 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1592 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1593 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1594 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1595 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1596 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1597 confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1598 confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1599 force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1600 is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1601 is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1602 is_usable: context.is_live(),
1603 is_public: context.should_announce(),
1604 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1605 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1606 config: Some(context.config()),
1607 channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
1612 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1613 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
1614 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
1615 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
1616 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
1617 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
1618 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
1619 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
1620 /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
1622 /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
1624 /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
1625 /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
1627 /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
1628 NegotiatingClosingFee,
1629 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
1630 /// to drop the channel.
1634 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1635 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1636 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1637 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1638 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1640 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1642 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1643 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1644 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1647 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1648 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1649 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1651 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1652 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1653 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1655 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1656 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1657 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1659 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1660 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1664 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1666 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1668 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1669 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1670 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1671 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1673 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1674 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1675 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1678 macro_rules! handle_error {
1679 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1680 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1681 // entering the macro.
1682 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1683 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1687 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish, channel_capacity }) => {
1688 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1690 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1691 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1692 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1693 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1697 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1698 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1699 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1700 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() },
1701 counterparty_node_id: Some($counterparty_node_id),
1702 channel_capacity_sats: channel_capacity,
1707 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1708 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1710 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1711 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1712 action: err.action.clone()
1716 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1717 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1718 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1719 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1720 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1724 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1729 ($self: ident, $internal: expr) => {
1732 Err((chan, msg_handle_err)) => {
1733 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1734 handle_error!($self, Err(msg_handle_err), counterparty_node_id).map_err(|err| (chan, err))
1740 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1741 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
1742 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.channel_id());
1743 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1744 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
1745 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1747 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1748 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1749 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1750 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1751 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1753 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1754 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1756 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1760 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1761 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1762 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1764 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1765 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1767 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1768 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1770 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1771 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1772 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$channel.context);
1773 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
1774 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1775 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok(), $channel.context.get_value_satoshis()))
1779 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_context: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED) => {
1781 // We should only ever have `ChannelError::Close` when unfunded channels error.
1782 // In any case, just close the channel.
1783 ChannelError::Warn(msg) | ChannelError::Ignore(msg) | ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1784 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing unfunded channel {} due to an error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1785 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$channel_context);
1786 let shutdown_res = $channel_context.force_shutdown(false);
1787 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel_context.get_user_id(),
1788 shutdown_res, None, $channel_context.get_value_satoshis()))
1794 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1795 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1799 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1801 $entry.remove_entry();
1809 macro_rules! try_v1_outbound_chan_entry {
1810 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1814 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut().context, $entry.key(), UNFUNDED);
1816 $entry.remove_entry();
1824 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1825 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1829 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1831 $entry.remove_entry();
1839 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1840 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1842 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1843 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context);
1849 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1850 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1851 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1852 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1853 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1855 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1856 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1857 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1858 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
1859 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
1860 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1861 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
1862 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
1863 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
1864 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1869 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
1870 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1871 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
1872 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
1873 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
1874 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
1875 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1876 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1877 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1879 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
1884 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1885 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1886 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1887 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
1888 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
1889 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
1890 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1891 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1892 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
1894 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1899 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
1900 ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
1901 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
1902 &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
1903 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
1904 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
1905 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
1906 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
1907 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
1908 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
1909 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
1911 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
1912 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
1913 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1919 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
1920 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
1922 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
1923 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
1924 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
1925 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
1926 updates.announcement_sigs);
1927 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
1928 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
1931 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
1932 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
1933 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
1935 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
1937 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1938 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1940 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
1941 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1942 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1943 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
1948 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
1949 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $remove: expr, $completed: expr) => { {
1950 // update_maps_on_chan_removal needs to be able to take id_to_peer, so make sure we can in
1951 // any case so that it won't deadlock.
1952 debug_assert_ne!($self.id_to_peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1953 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
1955 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1956 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
1957 log_bytes!($chan.context.channel_id()[..]));
1960 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1961 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure",
1962 log_bytes!($chan.context.channel_id()[..]));
1963 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$chan.context);
1964 let res = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(
1965 "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.context.channel_id(),
1966 $chan.context.get_user_id(), $chan.context.force_shutdown(false),
1967 $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok(), $chan.context.get_value_satoshis()));
1971 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1977 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING_INITIAL_MONITOR, $remove: expr) => {
1978 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state,
1979 $per_peer_state_lock, $chan, _internal, $remove,
1980 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
1982 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
1983 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING_INITIAL_MONITOR, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
1985 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING, $remove: expr) => { {
1986 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
1987 .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
1988 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
1989 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
1990 // filter for uniqueness here.
1991 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
1992 .unwrap_or_else(|| {
1993 in_flight_updates.push($update);
1994 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
1996 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
1997 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state,
1998 $per_peer_state_lock, $chan, _internal, $remove,
2000 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2001 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2002 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2006 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr) => {
2007 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $funding_txo, $update, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
2011 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2012 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2013 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2014 while !processed_all_events {
2015 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2019 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
2022 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2023 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2024 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2026 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2027 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2028 if $self.process_background_events() == NotifyOption::DoPersist { result = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
2030 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2031 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2032 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2033 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2037 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2038 let num_events = pending_events.len();
2039 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2040 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2043 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2045 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2046 $event_to_handle = event;
2048 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2049 post_event_actions.push(action);
2054 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2055 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2056 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2057 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2058 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2059 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2062 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2063 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2064 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2065 processed_all_events = false;
2068 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
2069 $self.persistence_notifier.notify();
2075 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2077 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
2078 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2079 ES::Target: EntropySource,
2080 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2081 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2082 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2086 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2088 /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2090 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2091 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2093 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2095 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2096 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2097 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2100 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2101 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2102 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2104 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2105 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2106 current_timestamp: u32,
2108 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2109 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2110 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2111 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2113 default_configuration: config.clone(),
2114 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
2115 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2120 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2122 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
2123 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2124 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2125 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2126 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
2127 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2128 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2129 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2131 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2134 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2135 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2137 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2139 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2141 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2143 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2144 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2145 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2146 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2147 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2148 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2158 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2159 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2160 &self.default_configuration
2163 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2164 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2165 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2168 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2169 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2171 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2173 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2177 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2182 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2184 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2185 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2186 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2187 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2188 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2190 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2191 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2193 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2194 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2195 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2197 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2198 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2199 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2201 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2202 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2203 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2204 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2205 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2206 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2208 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2209 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2210 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2211 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
2212 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2213 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2216 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2217 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2218 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2220 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2222 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2223 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2225 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2227 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2228 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2229 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2230 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2231 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2232 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
2236 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2241 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
2243 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2244 match peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2245 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2247 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2249 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2252 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
2255 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2256 node_id: their_network_key,
2259 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2262 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2263 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2264 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2265 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2266 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2267 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2268 // the same channel.
2269 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2271 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2272 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2273 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2274 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2275 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2276 // Only `Channels` in the channel_by_id map can be considered funded.
2277 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
2278 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2279 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2287 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2288 /// more information.
2289 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2290 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2291 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2292 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2293 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2294 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2295 // the same channel.
2296 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2298 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2299 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2300 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2301 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2302 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2303 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
2304 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2305 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2308 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter() {
2309 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2310 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2313 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter() {
2314 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2315 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2323 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2324 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2326 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2327 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2329 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2330 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2331 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2332 // really wanted anyway.
2333 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2336 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2337 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2338 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2339 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2341 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2342 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2343 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2344 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2345 let chan_context_to_details = |context| {
2346 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2348 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2350 .map(|(_, channel)| &channel.context)
2351 .chain(peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, channel)| &channel.context))
2352 .chain(peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, channel)| &channel.context))
2353 .map(chan_context_to_details)
2359 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2360 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2362 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2363 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2364 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2366 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2367 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2368 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2369 .filter_map(|(_, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2370 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2371 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2372 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2373 total_msat: *total_msat,
2376 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2377 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2379 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2380 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2382 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2387 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
2388 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, context: &ChannelContext<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
2389 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2390 match context.unbroadcasted_funding() {
2391 Some(transaction) => {
2392 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2393 channel_id: context.channel_id(), transaction
2398 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2399 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
2400 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
2401 reason: closure_reason,
2402 counterparty_node_id: Some(context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
2403 channel_capacity_sats: Some(context.get_value_satoshis()),
2407 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2408 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2410 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
2411 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
2413 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2415 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2416 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2418 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2419 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2421 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2422 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2423 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().context.get_funding_txo();
2424 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2425 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut()
2426 .get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2427 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2429 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2430 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2431 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2432 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2433 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2437 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2438 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2439 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2440 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry).map(|_| ());
2443 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2444 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
2445 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
2446 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2450 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2454 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (),
2457 // If we reach this point, it means that the channel_id either refers to an unfunded channel or
2458 // it does not exist for this peer. Either way, we can attempt to force-close it.
2460 // An appropriate error will be returned for non-existence of the channel if that's the case.
2461 return self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, false).map(|_| ())
2462 // TODO(dunxen): This is still not ideal as we're doing some extra lookups.
2463 // Fix this with https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/2422
2466 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2467 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2468 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2469 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2472 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
2476 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2477 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2478 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2480 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
2481 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2483 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2484 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
2485 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2486 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2488 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2490 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2491 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2492 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2495 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2496 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2497 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2498 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2499 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2500 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2503 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2504 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2505 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2507 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2508 /// the channel being closed or not:
2509 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2510 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2511 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2512 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2513 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2514 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2515 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2517 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2518 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2519 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2520 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2522 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2524 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2525 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2526 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2529 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2530 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2531 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2532 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2533 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2534 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2538 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2539 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
2540 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2541 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2542 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2543 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2544 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2545 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2547 if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2548 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2549 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2550 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2551 // ignore the result here.
2552 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2556 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2557 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2558 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2559 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2560 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2561 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2562 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2563 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2564 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2565 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2566 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2567 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2569 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2571 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2572 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2573 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, closure_reason);
2574 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan);
2575 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2576 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2577 } else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2578 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2579 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, closure_reason);
2580 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan);
2581 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
2582 // Unfunded channel has no update
2583 (None, chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2584 } else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2585 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2586 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, closure_reason);
2587 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan);
2588 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
2589 // Unfunded channel has no update
2590 (None, chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2592 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) });
2595 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
2596 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2597 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2602 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
2605 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2606 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2607 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2608 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2609 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2610 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2611 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2612 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2613 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2614 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2615 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2616 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2627 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2628 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2629 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2631 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2632 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2633 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2636 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2637 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2638 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2640 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2641 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2642 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2643 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2644 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2647 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2648 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2649 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2650 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2651 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2655 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2656 /// local transaction(s).
2657 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2658 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2659 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2663 fn construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(
2664 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, hop_hmac: [u8; 32],
2665 new_packet_bytes: [u8; onion_utils::ONION_DATA_LEN], shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2666 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
2667 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
2668 debug_assert!(next_packet_pubkey_opt.is_some());
2669 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2671 public_key: next_packet_pubkey_opt.unwrap_or(Err(secp256k1::Error::InvalidPublicKey)),
2672 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2676 let (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value) = match hop_data {
2677 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value } =>
2678 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value),
2679 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. } =>
2680 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2681 msg: "Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node",
2682 err_code: 0x4000 | 22,
2683 err_data: Vec::new(),
2687 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2688 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2689 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2692 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2693 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2694 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2695 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward,
2696 outgoing_cltv_value,
2697 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
2701 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(
2702 &self, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, shared_secret: [u8; 32], payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2703 amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>, allow_underpay: bool,
2704 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
2705 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
2706 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, onion_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata) = match hop_data {
2707 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
2708 payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata, ..
2710 (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata),
2712 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2713 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2714 err_data: Vec::new(),
2715 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2718 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2719 if outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
2720 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2721 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
2723 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2726 // final_expiry_too_soon
2727 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2728 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2730 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2731 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2732 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2733 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2734 if (outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2735 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2736 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2737 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2738 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2739 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2740 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2743 if (!allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat > amt_msat) ||
2744 (allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat >
2745 amt_msat.saturating_add(counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)))
2747 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2749 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2750 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2754 let routing = if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2755 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2756 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2757 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2758 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2759 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2760 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2761 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2762 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2763 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2764 err_data: Vec::new(),
2765 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2768 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && payment_data.is_some() {
2769 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2770 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2771 err_data: Vec::new(),
2772 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2775 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2779 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
2782 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2783 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2786 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
2787 phantom_shared_secret,
2791 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2792 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2793 err_data: Vec::new(),
2794 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2797 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2800 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2801 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2802 outgoing_amt_msat: onion_amt_msat,
2803 outgoing_cltv_value,
2804 skimmed_fee_msat: counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
2808 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
2809 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC
2810 ) -> Result<(onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg> {
2811 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2812 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2814 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2815 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2816 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2817 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2818 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2819 failure_code: $err_code,
2825 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2826 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2829 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
2830 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
2831 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2833 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2834 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2835 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2836 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2837 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2838 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2839 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2840 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2842 macro_rules! return_err {
2843 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2845 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2846 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2847 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2848 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2849 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2850 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2856 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2858 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2859 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2861 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2862 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2865 let (outgoing_scid, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, next_packet_pk_opt) = match next_hop {
2866 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
2867 next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward {
2868 short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value
2871 let next_pk = onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx,
2872 msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &shared_secret);
2873 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(next_pk))
2875 // We'll do receive checks in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] so we have access to the
2876 // inbound channel's state.
2877 onion_utils::Hop::Receive { .. } => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
2878 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. }, .. } => {
2879 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0; 0]);
2883 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
2884 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
2885 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2886 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
2887 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2888 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2889 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2890 // phantom or an intercept.
2891 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2892 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2893 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.genesis_hash)
2897 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2900 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2902 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2903 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2904 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2905 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
2906 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2908 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2909 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2910 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2912 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
2913 // have no consistency guarantees.
2914 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2918 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2919 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2920 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2921 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2922 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2924 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
2925 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2926 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2927 // we don't have the channel here.
2928 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2930 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
2932 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2933 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2934 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2935 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2936 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2937 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2938 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
2939 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
2940 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
2941 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
2942 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2944 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
2947 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2948 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2950 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
2951 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2955 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
2956 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
2957 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
2958 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
2960 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2967 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2968 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2969 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2970 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2971 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2972 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2974 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2975 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2977 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2978 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2979 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2980 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2981 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2982 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2983 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2984 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2985 if (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2986 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2992 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2993 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2994 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2995 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2997 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2998 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3000 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3001 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3002 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3004 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3005 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3006 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3007 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3008 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3009 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3010 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3014 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
3016 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt))
3019 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3020 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, shared_secret: [u8; 32], decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop,
3021 allow_underpay: bool, next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
3022 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3023 macro_rules! return_err {
3024 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3026 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3027 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3028 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3029 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3030 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3031 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3037 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3039 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3040 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat)
3043 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3044 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3045 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3046 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3047 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3049 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3052 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3053 match self.construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3054 new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3055 Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3056 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3062 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3063 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3064 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3066 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3067 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3068 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3070 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3071 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3072 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3073 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3074 return Err(LightningError {
3075 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3076 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3079 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3080 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3082 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()));
3083 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3086 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3087 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3088 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3089 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3091 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3092 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3093 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3095 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3096 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3097 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3098 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()));
3099 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3100 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3104 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3107 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3108 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()));
3109 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3111 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3112 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3113 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3114 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3115 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3118 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3119 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
3121 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3122 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3123 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3124 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3125 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3126 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3127 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3128 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3130 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3131 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3132 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3134 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3136 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3143 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3144 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3145 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3146 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3151 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3152 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3153 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3156 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3157 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3159 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3160 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3161 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3163 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
3164 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
3165 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
3167 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash)
3168 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute { err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()})?;
3170 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3171 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3172 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
3173 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3176 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3177 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3178 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3179 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3180 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3181 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3182 if !chan.get().context.is_live() {
3183 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3185 let funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3186 let send_res = chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3187 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3189 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3190 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3192 }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
3193 match break_chan_entry!(self, send_res, chan) {
3194 Some(monitor_update) => {
3195 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3196 Err(e) => break Err(e),
3198 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3199 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3200 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3201 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3202 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3203 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3204 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3212 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3213 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3214 // `channel_by_id` map.
3215 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3216 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3221 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3222 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3224 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3229 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3231 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3232 /// fields for more info.
3234 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3235 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3237 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3239 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3240 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3241 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3242 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3243 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3245 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3246 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3247 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3248 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3249 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3251 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3252 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3253 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3254 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3256 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3258 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3259 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3260 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3262 /// In general, a path may raise:
3263 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3264 /// node public key) is specified.
3265 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
3266 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
3268 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3269 /// relevant updates.
3271 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3272 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3273 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3275 /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3276 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3277 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3278 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3279 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3280 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3281 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3282 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3283 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3284 self.pending_outbound_payments
3285 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3286 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3287 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3290 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3291 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3292 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3293 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3294 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3295 self.pending_outbound_payments
3296 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3297 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3298 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3299 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3303 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3304 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3305 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3306 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3307 keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3308 best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3312 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3313 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3314 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3318 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3319 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3323 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3324 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3325 /// retries are exhausted.
3327 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3328 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3330 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3331 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3332 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3334 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
3335 /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
3337 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3338 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3339 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3340 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3341 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3344 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3345 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3346 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3347 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3348 /// never reach the recipient.
3350 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3351 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3353 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3354 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3356 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3357 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3358 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3359 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3360 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3361 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3362 &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3365 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3366 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3368 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3371 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3372 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3373 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3374 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3375 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3376 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3377 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3378 &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3381 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3382 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3383 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3384 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3385 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3386 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3387 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
3388 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3389 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3392 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3395 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3396 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3399 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3400 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3401 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&OutboundV1Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3402 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
3403 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3404 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3405 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3406 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3408 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3409 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3410 let (chan, msg) = match peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3412 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3414 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
3415 .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3416 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3417 let user_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
3418 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
3419 let channel_capacity = chan.context.get_value_satoshis();
3420 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, channel_capacity))
3421 } else { unreachable!(); });
3423 Ok((chan, funding_msg)) => (chan, funding_msg),
3424 Err((chan, err)) => {
3425 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3426 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3428 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3429 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3430 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3436 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3438 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3439 log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3444 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3445 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3448 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3449 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3450 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3452 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3453 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3454 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.context.channel_id(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
3455 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
3464 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3465 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
3466 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3470 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3472 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3473 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3475 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3476 /// across the p2p network.
3478 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3479 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3481 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3482 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3483 /// keys per-channel).
3485 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3486 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3487 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3489 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3490 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3491 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3493 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3494 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3495 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3496 /// for more details.
3498 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3499 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3500 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3501 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3503 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3504 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3505 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3506 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3511 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3512 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3513 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3514 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3515 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3516 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 1 {
3517 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3518 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3522 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
3523 if tx.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3524 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3525 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3529 let mut output_index = None;
3530 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3531 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3532 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
3533 if output_index.is_some() {
3534 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3535 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3538 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3541 if output_index.is_none() {
3542 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3543 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3546 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
3550 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
3552 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3553 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3554 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3555 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3557 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3558 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3560 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3561 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3563 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3565 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3566 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3567 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3568 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3569 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3570 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3571 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3572 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
3573 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
3574 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3575 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
3576 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3577 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3581 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3582 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3583 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3584 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3585 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3586 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3587 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3588 if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
3589 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3590 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3594 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3595 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
3596 let mut config = channel.context.config();
3597 config.apply(config_update);
3598 if !channel.context.update_config(&config) {
3601 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3602 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3603 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3604 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3605 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3612 let context = if let Some(channel) = peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
3613 &mut channel.context
3614 } else if let Some(channel) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
3615 &mut channel.context
3617 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
3618 debug_assert!(false);
3619 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3621 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
3622 log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3625 let mut config = context.config();
3626 config.apply(config_update);
3627 // We update the config, but we MUST NOT broadcast a `channel_update` before `channel_ready`
3628 // which would be the case for pending inbound/outbound channels.
3629 context.update_config(&config);
3634 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
3636 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3637 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3638 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3639 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3641 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3642 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3644 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3645 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3647 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3649 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3650 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3651 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3652 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3653 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3654 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3655 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3656 pub fn update_channel_config(
3657 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
3658 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3659 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
3662 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
3663 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
3665 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
3666 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
3668 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
3669 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
3670 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
3671 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
3672 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
3674 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
3675 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
3676 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
3679 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3682 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
3683 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3684 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
3685 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
3686 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
3687 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3688 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3690 let next_hop_scid = {
3691 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3692 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
3693 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
3694 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3695 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3696 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
3698 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
3699 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3700 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
3703 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
3705 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3706 err: format!("Funded channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}. Channel may still be opening.",
3707 log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id)
3712 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3713 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3714 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3717 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
3718 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
3719 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
3721 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3723 let skimmed_fee_msat =
3724 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
3725 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
3726 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
3727 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
3730 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
3731 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3732 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3733 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
3734 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
3736 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
3740 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
3741 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
3743 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3746 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3747 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3748 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3750 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3751 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3752 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3755 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
3756 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3757 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3758 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3759 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
3760 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3761 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3764 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
3765 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
3766 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3767 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3772 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3774 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3775 /// Will likely generate further events.
3776 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3777 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3779 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
3780 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3781 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3783 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3784 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3786 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3787 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3788 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3790 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3791 match forward_info {
3792 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3793 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3794 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3795 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3796 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
3799 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3800 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3801 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3803 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3804 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3805 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3806 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3807 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3808 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3811 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3812 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3814 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3817 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3818 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3824 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3825 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3827 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3831 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3832 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3834 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3838 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3839 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3840 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3841 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3842 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3844 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3845 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3846 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3847 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3848 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3850 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3852 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3853 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3857 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3858 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
3859 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3860 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None)
3862 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3863 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3869 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3872 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3875 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3876 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3877 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3878 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3879 // problem, not ours.
3885 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3886 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3888 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3892 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3893 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3894 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3895 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3898 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3899 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3900 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3901 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3902 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3905 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3906 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3907 match forward_info {
3908 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3909 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
3910 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3911 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3912 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
3915 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3916 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3917 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3918 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3919 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3920 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3921 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3922 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3924 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
3925 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
3926 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, &self.fee_estimator,
3929 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3930 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3932 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3934 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3935 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3936 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3937 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3942 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3943 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3945 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3946 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3947 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
3948 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
3950 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3951 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3953 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
3955 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3956 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3957 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3966 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3967 match forward_info {
3968 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3969 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3970 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3971 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
3972 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
3975 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
3976 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret, custom_tlvs } => {
3977 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3978 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
3979 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
3980 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
3981 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
3983 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs } => {
3984 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
3985 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
3989 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
3990 payment_data, None, onion_fields)
3993 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3996 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3997 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3998 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3999 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4000 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4001 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4002 phantom_shared_secret,
4004 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
4005 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
4006 // if routing nodes overpay
4007 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
4008 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
4010 total_value_received: None,
4011 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
4014 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
4017 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
4019 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
4020 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
4021 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
4022 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4023 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
4024 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
4026 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4027 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
4028 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4029 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
4030 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
4031 phantom_shared_secret,
4033 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
4034 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
4036 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
4039 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4040 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4041 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4042 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4043 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4046 macro_rules! check_total_value {
4047 ($purpose: expr) => {{
4048 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
4049 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
4050 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
4051 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
4053 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4054 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
4055 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4057 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
4058 .entry(payment_hash)
4059 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
4060 .or_insert_with(|| {
4061 committed_to_claimable = true;
4063 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
4066 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
4067 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
4068 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), log_keysend(!is_keysend));
4069 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4071 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4072 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4073 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4075 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
4076 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
4077 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4080 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
4082 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
4083 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
4084 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
4085 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
4086 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
4087 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4088 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4089 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
4090 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
4091 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
4093 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
4095 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
4096 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
4097 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4098 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4099 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4100 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
4101 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4102 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4103 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4104 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4105 committed_to_claimable = true;
4107 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
4108 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4109 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
4110 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
4111 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
4112 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
4113 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
4114 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
4115 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
4116 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4120 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4121 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4122 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4123 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4124 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4126 payment_claimable_generated = true;
4128 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
4129 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
4131 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4132 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4133 committed_to_claimable = true;
4136 payment_claimable_generated
4140 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
4141 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
4142 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4143 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4144 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4145 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4146 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4147 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4148 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4149 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4150 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4151 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4152 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4153 Ok(result) => result,
4155 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4156 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4159 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4160 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4161 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4162 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4163 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4164 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4167 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4168 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4169 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4171 check_total_value!(purpose);
4173 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4174 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4175 check_total_value!(purpose);
4179 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4180 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4181 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4182 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4184 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4185 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4186 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4187 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4188 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4189 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4190 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4191 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4193 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4194 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4195 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4197 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4198 if payment_claimable_generated {
4199 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4205 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4206 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4214 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4215 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4216 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4217 &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
4219 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4220 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4222 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4224 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4225 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4226 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4228 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4230 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4231 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4232 events.append(&mut new_events);
4235 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4237 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4238 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4239 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4241 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4243 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4244 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4245 if background_events.is_empty() {
4246 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4249 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4251 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
4252 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4253 // monitor updating completing.
4254 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4256 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update } => {
4257 let mut updated_chan = false;
4259 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4260 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4261 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4262 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4263 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4264 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4265 updated_chan = true;
4266 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4267 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan).map(|_| ())
4269 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Ok(()),
4274 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
4275 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4277 // TODO: If this channel has since closed, we're likely providing a payment
4278 // preimage update, which we must ensure is durable! We currently don't,
4279 // however, ensure that.
4281 log_error!(self.logger,
4282 "Failed to provide ChannelMonitorUpdate to closed channel! This likely lost us a payment preimage!");
4284 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4286 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
4287 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4288 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4289 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4290 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4291 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
4292 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4294 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
4295 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
4296 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4297 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4298 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
4304 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4307 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4308 /// Process background events, for functional testing
4309 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4310 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4311 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4314 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4315 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
4316 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4317 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4318 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4319 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4320 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4322 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4323 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4324 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4325 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4327 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4328 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4330 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
4331 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4335 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4336 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4337 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4338 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4339 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4340 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4341 let mut should_persist = self.process_background_events();
4343 let normal_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4344 let min_mempool_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum);
4346 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4347 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4348 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4349 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4350 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
4351 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4356 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4357 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4365 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4367 /// This currently includes:
4368 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4369 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4370 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4372 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4373 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4374 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4375 /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
4377 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4378 /// estimate fetches.
4380 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4381 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4382 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4383 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4384 let mut should_persist = self.process_background_events();
4386 let normal_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4387 let min_mempool_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum);
4389 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4390 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4391 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4393 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4394 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4395 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4396 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4397 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4398 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4399 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
4400 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4405 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4406 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4408 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4409 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
4410 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
4411 if needs_close { return false; }
4414 match chan.channel_update_status() {
4415 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
4416 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
4417 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
4418 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
4419 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
4420 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
4421 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
4423 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4424 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
4425 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4426 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4430 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4432 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
4435 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
4437 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4438 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
4439 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4440 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4444 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4446 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
4452 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4454 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
4455 log_debug!(self.logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
4456 counterparty_node_id, log_bytes!(*chan_id));
4457 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4458 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4459 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
4460 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
4461 channel_id: *chan_id,
4462 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
4471 let process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
4473 chan_context: &mut ChannelContext<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
4474 unfunded_chan_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
4475 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4477 chan_context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4478 if unfunded_chan_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
4479 log_error!(self.logger,
4480 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner",
4481 log_bytes!(&chan_id[..]));
4482 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan_context);
4483 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4484 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan_context.force_shutdown(false));
4485 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4486 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4487 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4488 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4489 channel_id: *chan_id,
4490 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
4499 peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| process_unfunded_channel_tick(
4500 chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context, pending_msg_events));
4501 peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| process_unfunded_channel_tick(
4502 chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context, pending_msg_events));
4504 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
4505 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
4510 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
4511 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
4512 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
4513 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
4514 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
4515 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
4516 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
4517 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
4518 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4519 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
4520 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
4521 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
4522 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
4523 // have no channels to the peer.
4524 let remove_entry = {
4525 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
4526 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
4529 entry.remove_entry();
4532 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
4537 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
4538 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4539 // This should be unreachable
4540 debug_assert!(false);
4543 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
4544 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
4545 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
4546 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
4547 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
4548 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
4549 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
4552 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
4553 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
4554 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
4556 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
4557 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
4564 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
4565 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
4566 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
4567 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
4568 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4571 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4572 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4575 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self.pending_events);
4577 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
4578 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
4579 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
4580 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
4581 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4588 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
4589 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
4590 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
4592 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
4593 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
4594 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
4595 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
4597 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
4598 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
4599 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
4600 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
4601 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
4602 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
4605 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
4606 /// reason for the failure.
4608 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
4609 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
4610 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4612 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
4613 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
4614 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
4615 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
4616 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4617 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
4618 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4623 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
4624 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
4625 match failure_code {
4626 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
4627 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
4628 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
4629 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4630 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4631 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
4633 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
4634 let fail_data = match data {
4635 Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
4638 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
4643 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4644 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4646 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
4648 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4649 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
4650 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
4651 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
4652 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
4653 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
4654 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
4656 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
4658 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
4659 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
4661 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4666 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4667 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4668 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4669 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
4670 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
4671 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
4672 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
4673 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
4674 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
4675 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4677 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4678 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4679 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4680 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
4682 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
4683 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
4684 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
4685 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
4686 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4690 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
4691 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
4692 // be surfaced to the user.
4693 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
4694 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
4695 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
4697 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
4698 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4699 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
4700 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4701 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4702 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
4703 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
4704 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
4706 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4708 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
4711 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
4712 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
4713 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
4714 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4718 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
4719 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
4720 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
4721 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
4722 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
4723 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
4724 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
4725 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
4726 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
4729 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
4730 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
4731 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
4734 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4735 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
4736 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4738 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
4739 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
4740 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
4741 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
4742 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4744 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
4745 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
4746 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
4748 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
4749 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4750 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4751 push_forward_ev = true;
4753 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
4754 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4755 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
4757 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4758 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
4761 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
4762 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4763 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4764 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
4765 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
4766 failed_next_destination: destination,
4772 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
4773 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
4775 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
4776 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
4777 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
4778 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
4780 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
4781 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
4782 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
4783 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
4785 /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
4786 /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
4787 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
4789 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
4790 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
4791 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
4792 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
4793 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4794 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4795 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
4796 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4797 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
4800 /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
4801 /// even type numbers.
4805 /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
4806 /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
4808 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
4809 pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4810 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
4813 fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
4814 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4816 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4819 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4820 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
4821 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4822 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
4823 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4824 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4825 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4826 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
4831 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
4832 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
4833 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id,
4835 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
4836 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
4837 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
4838 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4841 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
4842 if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
4843 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
4844 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
4845 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4846 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
4847 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
4848 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
4849 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4850 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
4851 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4860 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
4862 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
4863 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
4864 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
4865 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
4866 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
4867 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
4868 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
4869 let mut valid_mpp = true;
4870 let mut errs = Vec::new();
4871 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4872 for htlc in sources.iter() {
4873 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
4874 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4875 debug_assert!(false);
4879 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
4881 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
4882 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4883 debug_assert!(false);
4887 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
4888 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
4890 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4891 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4892 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4893 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4896 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4897 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4898 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4899 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4903 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4904 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
4905 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
4906 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
4908 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4909 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4910 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4911 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4912 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4917 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4918 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4919 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4920 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4921 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
4922 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
4923 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4925 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4928 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
4929 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4930 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4931 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4935 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
4936 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
4937 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
4938 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4940 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
4941 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
4942 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
4943 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
4946 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4947 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
4948 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4949 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
4953 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
4954 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4955 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
4958 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
4959 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
4960 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4961 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4962 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id();
4963 let fulfill_res = chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
4965 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
4966 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
4967 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
4968 log_bytes!(chan_id), action);
4969 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
4972 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
4973 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4974 if let Err(e) = res {
4975 // TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge
4976 // of the HTLC's monitor with a preimage. We should retry this monitor
4977 // update over and over again until morale improves.
4978 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}", payment_preimage);
4979 return Err((counterparty_node_id, e));
4982 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
4983 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
4984 // monitor update as a background event.
4985 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
4986 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
4987 counterparty_node_id,
4988 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
4989 update: monitor_update.clone(),
4997 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4998 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4999 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5005 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
5006 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
5007 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
5008 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5009 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
5010 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
5011 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
5012 // again on restart.
5013 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
5014 payment_preimage, update_res);
5017 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
5018 // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
5020 // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
5021 // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
5022 // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
5023 // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
5024 // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
5025 // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
5026 // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
5027 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5028 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
5029 prev_hop.outpoint, preimage_update,
5032 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
5033 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
5034 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
5035 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
5036 // `PaymentForwarded`).
5037 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
5041 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
5042 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
5045 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
5047 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
5048 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
5049 "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
5050 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage, session_priv, path, from_onchain, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
5052 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
5053 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5054 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
5055 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
5056 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
5057 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
5058 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
5061 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5062 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
5064 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
5065 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5066 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_id),
5067 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
5069 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: None,
5073 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
5074 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5075 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
5081 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
5082 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
5083 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
5086 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
5087 for action in actions.into_iter() {
5089 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
5090 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5091 if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
5092 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
5093 payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5097 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5098 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
5100 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
5101 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
5102 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker));
5109 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
5110 /// update completion.
5111 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5112 channel: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
5113 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
5114 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
5115 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
5116 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
5117 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
5118 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()),
5119 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5120 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
5121 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
5122 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
5123 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
5125 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
5127 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5128 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5129 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
5130 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
5133 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
5134 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
5136 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
5137 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5138 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5143 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
5144 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
5145 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5146 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5151 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
5152 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
5153 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5154 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5155 msg: revoke_and_ack,
5160 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
5164 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
5170 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
5171 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
5172 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
5176 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5177 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
5178 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
5184 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
5185 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5187 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
5188 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5190 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5191 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5192 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5193 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5194 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5199 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5200 let mut peer_state_lock;
5201 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
5202 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
5203 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5204 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5206 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5209 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5210 .remove(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5211 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5212 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5213 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5216 let remaining_in_flight =
5217 if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
5218 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
5221 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
5222 highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
5223 remaining_in_flight);
5224 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
5227 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
5230 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
5232 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
5233 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
5236 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5237 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5238 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5240 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
5241 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
5242 /// used to accept such channels.
5244 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5245 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5246 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5247 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
5250 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
5251 /// it as confirmed immediately.
5253 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5254 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5255 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5257 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
5258 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
5260 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
5261 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
5263 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
5264 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
5266 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5267 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5268 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5269 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
5272 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5273 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5275 let peers_without_funded_channels =
5276 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
5277 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5278 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5279 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
5280 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5281 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5282 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
5283 match peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
5284 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
5285 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_accept() {
5286 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
5289 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
5290 } else if channel.get().context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
5291 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5292 node_id: channel.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5293 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5294 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
5297 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5298 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
5299 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
5301 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5302 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5303 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5304 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
5305 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5306 node_id: channel.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5307 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5308 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
5311 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5312 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
5313 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
5317 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5318 node_id: channel.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5319 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
5322 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
5323 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) });
5329 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
5330 /// or 0-conf channels.
5332 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
5333 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
5334 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
5335 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> bool {
5336 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
5337 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5339 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5340 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
5341 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5342 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
5343 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
5344 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
5345 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
5349 return peers_without_funded_channels;
5352 fn unfunded_channel_count(
5353 peer: &PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, best_block_height: u32
5355 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
5356 for (_, chan) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
5357 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
5358 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
5359 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
5360 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
5362 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5365 for (_, chan) in peer.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter() {
5366 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
5367 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5370 num_unfunded_channels
5373 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5374 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
5375 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5378 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
5379 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5382 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
5383 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
5384 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
5385 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
5387 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
5388 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
5389 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
5390 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
5391 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
5393 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5394 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5396 debug_assert!(false);
5397 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
5399 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5400 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5402 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5403 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5404 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5405 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
5406 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
5407 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
5409 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5410 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
5411 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5414 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5415 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
5416 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5417 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
5418 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5421 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5422 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
5423 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
5426 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
5427 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
5431 let channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
5432 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
5434 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
5435 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
5437 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
5438 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
5439 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
5440 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5442 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5443 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5445 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5446 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5447 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
5450 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5451 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
5452 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
5453 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5454 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
5455 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
5456 channel_type: channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
5459 peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, channel);
5464 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5465 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
5466 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5467 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5469 debug_assert!(false);
5470 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
5472 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5473 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5474 match peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
5475 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5476 try_v1_outbound_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan);
5477 (chan.get().context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().context.get_user_id())
5479 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
5482 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5483 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
5484 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
5485 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5486 channel_value_satoshis: value,
5488 user_channel_id: user_id,
5493 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5494 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5496 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5497 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5499 debug_assert!(false);
5500 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
5503 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5504 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5505 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor) =
5506 match peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
5507 Some(inbound_chan) => {
5508 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger) {
5510 Err((mut inbound_chan, err)) => {
5511 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
5512 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
5513 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
5514 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &inbound_chan.context);
5515 let user_id = inbound_chan.context.get_user_id();
5516 let shutdown_res = inbound_chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
5517 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(format!("{}", err),
5518 msg.temporary_channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, inbound_chan.context.get_value_satoshis()));
5522 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
5525 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
5526 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5527 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
5529 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5530 match self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
5531 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5532 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5533 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
5534 funding_msg.channel_id))
5536 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
5537 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
5541 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
5542 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
5543 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
5544 // until we have persisted our monitor.
5545 let new_channel_id = funding_msg.channel_id;
5546 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
5547 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5551 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
5553 let chan = e.insert(chan);
5554 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, monitor_res, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
5555 per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING_INITIAL_MONITOR,
5556 { peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&new_channel_id) });
5558 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
5559 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
5560 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
5561 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
5562 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
5563 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
5564 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
5565 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { shutdown_finish: Some((res, _)), .. }) = &mut res {
5573 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5574 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5575 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5576 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5578 debug_assert!(false);
5579 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5582 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5583 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5584 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5585 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5586 let monitor = try_chan_entry!(self,
5587 chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan);
5588 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor);
5589 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
5590 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
5591 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
5592 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
5593 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
5594 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
5595 shutdown_finish.0.take();
5600 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5604 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5605 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5606 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5608 debug_assert!(false);
5609 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5611 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5612 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5613 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5614 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5615 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
5616 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
5617 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
5618 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().context.channel_id()));
5619 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5620 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5621 msg: announcement_sigs,
5623 } else if chan.get().context.is_usable() {
5624 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
5625 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
5626 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
5627 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
5628 // announcement_signatures.
5629 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().context.channel_id()));
5630 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5631 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5632 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5639 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5640 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan.get_mut());
5645 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5649 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5650 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
5651 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
5652 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5653 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5655 debug_assert!(false);
5656 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5658 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5659 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5660 // TODO(dunxen): Fix this duplication when we switch to a single map with enums as per
5661 // https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/2422
5662 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5663 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", log_bytes!(&msg.channel_id[..]));
5664 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_entry.get().context, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel);
5665 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5666 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
5668 } else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5669 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", log_bytes!(&msg.channel_id[..]));
5670 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_entry.get().context, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel);
5671 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5672 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
5674 } else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5675 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
5676 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
5677 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
5678 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
5681 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().context.get_funding_txo();
5682 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self,
5683 chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
5684 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
5686 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
5687 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
5688 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
5689 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
5690 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5691 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5696 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
5697 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5698 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
5699 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry).map(|_| ());
5703 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5706 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
5707 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
5708 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5709 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5715 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5716 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5717 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5719 debug_assert!(false);
5720 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5722 let (tx, chan_option) = {
5723 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5724 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5725 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5726 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
5727 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
5728 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
5729 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5730 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5735 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
5736 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
5737 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
5738 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
5739 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
5740 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
5741 } else { (tx, None) }
5743 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5746 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
5747 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
5748 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
5750 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
5751 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5752 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5753 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5754 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5758 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5763 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5764 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
5765 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
5766 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
5768 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
5769 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
5770 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
5771 //but we should prevent it anyway.
5773 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
5774 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5775 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5777 debug_assert!(false);
5778 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5780 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5781 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5782 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5783 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5785 let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
5786 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
5787 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(msg, shared_secret, next_hop,
5788 chan.get().context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt),
5789 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
5791 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
5792 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
5793 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
5794 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
5795 match pending_forward_info {
5796 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
5797 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
5798 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
5799 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
5801 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
5802 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
5803 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5804 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
5805 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
5808 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
5810 _ => pending_forward_info
5813 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), chan);
5815 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5820 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5821 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
5822 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5823 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5825 debug_assert!(false);
5826 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5828 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5829 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5830 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5831 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5832 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
5834 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5837 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
5841 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5842 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5843 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5845 debug_assert!(false);
5846 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5848 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5849 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5850 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5851 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5852 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
5854 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5859 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5860 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5861 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5863 debug_assert!(false);
5864 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5866 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5867 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5868 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5869 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5870 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
5871 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
5872 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
5874 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
5877 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5881 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5882 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5883 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5885 debug_assert!(false);
5886 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5888 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5889 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5890 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5891 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5892 let funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo();
5893 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5894 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5895 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5896 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan).map(|_| ())
5899 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5904 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
5905 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
5906 let mut push_forward_event = false;
5907 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
5908 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
5909 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5910 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5911 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
5912 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
5913 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
5914 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
5916 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
5917 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
5919 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5920 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
5921 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
5922 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5923 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5924 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
5926 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5927 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
5928 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
5930 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
5931 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5932 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
5933 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5934 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
5935 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
5936 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
5937 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
5938 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
5941 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5942 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
5944 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5945 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
5946 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5947 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5948 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5949 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5950 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
5951 phantom_shared_secret: None,
5954 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
5955 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
5956 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
5961 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
5962 // payments are being processed.
5963 if forward_htlcs_empty {
5964 push_forward_event = true;
5966 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5967 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
5974 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
5975 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
5978 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
5979 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5980 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
5982 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
5986 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
5987 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5988 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5989 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
5990 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
5992 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
5993 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
5994 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
5995 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
5996 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
5997 // real by taking more time.
5998 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
5999 pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6000 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
6005 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
6006 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
6007 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
6008 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
6009 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6010 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
6011 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
6013 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6014 .get(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
6015 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
6016 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6017 channel_funding_outpoint,
6018 counterparty_node_id,
6023 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6024 let (htlcs_to_fail, res) = {
6025 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6026 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6028 debug_assert!(false);
6029 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6030 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
6031 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6032 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6033 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
6034 let funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo();
6035 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), chan);
6036 let res = if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6037 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6038 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan).map(|_| ())
6040 (htlcs_to_fail, res)
6042 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6045 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
6049 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6050 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6051 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6053 debug_assert!(false);
6054 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6056 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6057 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6058 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6059 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
6060 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
6062 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6067 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6068 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6069 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6071 debug_assert!(false);
6072 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6074 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6075 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6076 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6077 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
6078 if !chan.get().context.is_usable() {
6079 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
6082 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6083 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
6084 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
6085 msg, &self.default_configuration
6087 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6088 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6089 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap()),
6092 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6097 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
6098 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6099 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
6100 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
6102 // It's not a local channel
6103 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
6106 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6107 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
6108 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
6109 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
6111 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6112 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6113 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
6114 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
6115 if chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6116 if chan.get().context.should_announce() {
6117 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
6118 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
6119 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
6120 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
6122 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
6124 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
6125 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
6126 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
6127 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
6129 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
6130 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
6133 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
6135 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
6138 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6140 let need_lnd_workaround = {
6141 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6143 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6145 debug_assert!(false);
6146 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6148 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6149 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6150 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6151 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
6152 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
6153 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
6154 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
6155 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
6156 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
6157 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
6158 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
6159 let mut channel_update = None;
6160 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
6161 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6162 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6165 } else if chan.get().context.is_usable() {
6166 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
6167 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
6168 // they have the latest channel parameters.
6169 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
6170 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6171 node_id: chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6176 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
6177 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
6178 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
6179 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
6180 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
6181 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
6185 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6189 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
6190 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
6193 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
6194 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
6199 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
6200 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
6201 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
6203 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6204 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
6205 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
6206 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
6207 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
6208 match monitor_event {
6209 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
6210 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
6211 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
6212 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
6214 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
6215 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
6216 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6217 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6220 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
6221 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
6222 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
6223 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
6225 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
6226 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
6227 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6228 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
6231 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
6232 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6233 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6234 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6235 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6236 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6237 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
6238 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
6239 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
6240 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6241 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6245 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
6246 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
6248 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
6250 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, reason);
6251 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6252 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6253 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
6254 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
6261 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
6262 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
6268 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6269 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6272 has_pending_monitor_events
6275 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
6276 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
6277 /// update events as a separate process method here.
6279 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
6280 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6281 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
6284 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
6285 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
6286 /// update was applied.
6287 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
6288 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
6289 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
6290 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
6292 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
6293 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
6294 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
6295 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
6297 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6298 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6300 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6301 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6302 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
6303 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
6304 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6305 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
6306 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
6307 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
6308 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
6310 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
6311 has_monitor_update = true;
6313 let channel_id: [u8; 32] = *channel_id;
6314 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6315 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING,
6316 peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id));
6318 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, res));
6320 continue 'peer_loop;
6329 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
6330 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
6331 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
6334 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
6335 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
6341 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
6342 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
6343 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
6344 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
6345 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
6346 let mut has_update = false;
6348 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6350 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6351 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6352 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6353 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6354 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
6355 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
6356 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
6357 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
6359 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6360 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
6363 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
6364 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
6365 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
6366 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6367 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6372 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
6374 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
6375 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
6376 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
6382 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
6383 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
6391 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
6392 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
6398 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
6399 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
6401 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
6402 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6403 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
6404 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
6405 // reorganized out of the main chain.
6406 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
6407 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
6408 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
6409 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
6410 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
6411 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
6412 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
6413 assert!(should_broadcast);
6414 } else { unreachable!(); }
6415 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
6416 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
6417 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
6420 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6424 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
6427 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
6428 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
6430 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
6431 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
6432 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
6433 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
6435 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
6437 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
6438 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
6442 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
6443 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
6445 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
6447 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
6448 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
6450 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
6451 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
6452 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
6453 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
6454 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
6455 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
6456 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
6457 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
6458 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
6459 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
6460 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
6463 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
6464 /// stored external to LDK.
6466 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
6467 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
6468 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
6470 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
6471 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
6474 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
6475 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
6476 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
6477 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
6479 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
6480 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
6481 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
6482 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
6483 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
6485 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
6486 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
6487 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
6488 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
6489 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
6491 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
6492 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
6494 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
6495 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
6499 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
6500 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
6502 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
6504 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
6505 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
6507 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6508 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
6509 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
6510 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
6511 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
6512 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
6513 min_final_cltv_expiry)
6516 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
6517 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
6519 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6520 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
6521 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
6524 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
6525 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
6527 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
6528 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
6529 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6530 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
6532 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
6533 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
6534 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
6535 Some(_) => continue,
6536 None => return scid_candidate
6541 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
6543 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
6544 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
6546 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
6547 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
6548 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
6552 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
6553 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
6554 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
6556 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
6557 /// times to get a unique scid.
6558 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
6559 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6560 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
6562 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
6563 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
6564 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
6565 return scid_candidate
6569 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
6570 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
6571 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
6572 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
6574 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6575 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6576 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6577 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6578 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
6579 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
6580 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
6581 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
6590 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6591 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
6592 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
6593 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
6594 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
6598 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
6599 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
6600 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6601 events.push_back((event, None));
6605 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
6606 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6607 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
6611 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
6612 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
6616 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
6617 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
6620 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
6621 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
6622 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
6623 /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
6624 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
6625 let mut errors = Vec::new();
6627 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6628 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6629 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6630 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
6632 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
6633 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
6634 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6635 .get_mut(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
6637 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
6641 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
6642 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id) {
6643 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
6644 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
6645 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
6646 log_trace!(self.logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
6647 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6651 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
6652 debug_assert_eq!(chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
6653 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.get_mut().unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
6654 log_debug!(self.logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
6655 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6656 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
6657 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
6659 errors.push((e, counterparty_node_id));
6661 if further_update_exists {
6662 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
6667 log_trace!(self.logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
6668 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6672 log_debug!(self.logger,
6673 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
6674 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6678 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in errors {
6679 let res = Err::<(), _>(err);
6680 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
6684 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
6685 for action in actions {
6687 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6688 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
6690 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, None);
6696 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
6697 /// using the given event handler.
6699 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
6700 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
6704 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
6708 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6710 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6711 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6712 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6713 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6714 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6715 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6719 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
6720 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
6721 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
6722 /// is always placed next to each other.
6724 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
6725 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
6726 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
6727 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
6729 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
6730 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
6731 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
6732 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
6733 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
6734 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6735 let mut result = self.process_background_events();
6737 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
6738 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
6739 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
6740 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6743 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
6744 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6746 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
6747 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6750 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
6751 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6752 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6753 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6754 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6755 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
6756 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
6760 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
6761 events.replace(pending_events);
6770 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6772 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6773 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6774 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6775 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6776 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6777 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6781 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
6783 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
6784 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
6785 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
6787 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
6791 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6793 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6794 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6795 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6796 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6797 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6798 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6802 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6804 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6805 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
6806 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
6807 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
6808 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
6811 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
6812 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
6815 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6816 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6817 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6818 let new_height = height - 1;
6820 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
6821 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
6822 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
6823 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
6824 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
6825 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
6828 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6832 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6834 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6835 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6836 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6837 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6838 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6839 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6843 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6844 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6845 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6846 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6848 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6849 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
6851 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6852 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6853 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
6854 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
6856 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6857 if height < last_best_block_height {
6858 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6859 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6863 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6864 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6865 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6866 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6868 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6869 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
6871 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6872 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6873 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
6875 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6877 macro_rules! max_time {
6878 ($timestamp: expr) => {
6880 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
6881 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
6882 // having an explicit local time source.
6883 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
6884 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
6885 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6886 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
6887 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
6893 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
6894 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6895 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
6896 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
6900 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
6901 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
6902 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
6903 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6904 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6905 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
6906 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.context.get_funding_txo(), chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
6907 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
6914 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
6915 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6916 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6917 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
6918 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
6919 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
6920 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
6921 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6922 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6927 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6929 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6930 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6931 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6932 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6933 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6934 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6938 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
6939 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
6941 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
6942 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
6943 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6944 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6945 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6947 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6948 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
6950 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6951 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6952 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6953 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6954 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6955 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
6956 let res = f(channel);
6957 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
6958 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
6959 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
6960 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
6961 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
6963 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
6964 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
6965 if channel.context.is_usable() {
6966 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
6967 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
6968 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6969 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6974 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
6979 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6980 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
6983 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
6984 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
6985 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6986 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6987 msg: announcement_sigs,
6989 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6990 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
6991 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6993 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6994 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6995 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
7000 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
7001 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
7002 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
7003 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
7004 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
7005 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
7006 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
7007 // is always consistent.
7008 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
7009 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
7010 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
7011 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
7012 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
7015 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
7016 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
7017 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
7018 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
7019 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true));
7020 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
7021 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7025 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
7026 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, reason);
7027 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7028 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7029 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
7030 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
7031 data: reason_message,
7041 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
7042 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
7043 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
7044 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
7045 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
7046 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
7047 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
7048 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
7049 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
7050 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
7052 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
7053 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
7054 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
7058 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
7061 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7062 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
7063 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
7064 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
7065 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
7066 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
7067 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
7068 phantom_shared_secret: None,
7069 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
7072 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
7073 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
7074 _ => unreachable!(),
7076 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
7077 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
7078 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
7079 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
7085 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
7087 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
7088 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
7092 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
7094 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
7095 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
7097 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
7098 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
7101 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7102 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
7103 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
7106 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
7107 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
7108 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
7109 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
7112 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7113 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7114 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
7115 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
7118 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7119 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7121 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
7122 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
7123 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
7124 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
7125 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
7128 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7129 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7130 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
7131 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
7134 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7135 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7136 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
7137 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
7140 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7141 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7142 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
7143 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
7147 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7148 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7150 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7151 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7152 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7153 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7154 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7155 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7159 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
7160 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7161 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7164 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
7165 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7166 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7167 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7170 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
7171 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7172 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7175 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
7176 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7177 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7178 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7181 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
7182 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7183 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7186 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
7187 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7188 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7191 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
7192 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7193 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7196 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
7197 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7198 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7201 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
7202 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7203 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7206 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
7207 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7208 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7211 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
7212 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7213 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7216 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
7217 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7218 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7221 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
7222 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7223 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7226 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
7227 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7228 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7231 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
7232 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7233 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7236 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
7237 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7238 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7241 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
7242 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7243 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7246 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
7247 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
7248 let force_persist = self.process_background_events();
7249 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
7250 if force_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { NotifyOption::DoPersist } else { persist }
7252 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
7257 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
7258 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7259 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7262 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
7263 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7264 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7265 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7267 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
7268 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7269 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
7270 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7271 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7272 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7273 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
7274 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
7275 if chan.is_shutdown() {
7276 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7277 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
7282 peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
7283 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7284 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
7287 peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
7288 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7289 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
7292 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
7294 // V1 Channel Establishment
7295 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
7296 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
7297 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
7298 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
7299 // V2 Channel Establishment
7300 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
7301 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
7302 // Common Channel Establishment
7303 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
7304 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
7305 // Interactive Transaction Construction
7306 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
7307 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
7308 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
7309 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
7310 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
7311 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
7312 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
7313 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
7314 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
7315 // Channel Operations
7316 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
7317 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
7318 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
7319 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
7320 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
7321 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
7323 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
7324 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
7325 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
7326 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
7327 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
7328 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
7329 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
7330 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
7331 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
7334 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
7335 peer_state.is_connected = false;
7336 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
7337 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
7340 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
7342 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
7344 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7345 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
7349 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
7350 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
7351 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7355 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7357 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
7358 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
7359 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
7360 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
7361 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
7362 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
7365 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7366 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
7367 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
7368 if inbound_peer_limited {
7371 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
7372 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7373 outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7374 inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7375 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
7376 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7377 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
7378 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
7379 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
7383 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
7384 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
7385 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
7387 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7388 if inbound_peer_limited &&
7389 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
7390 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
7395 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
7396 peer_state.is_connected = true;
7401 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7403 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7404 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
7405 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7406 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7407 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7409 // Since unfunded channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer, and they're not persisted
7410 // (so won't be recovered after a crash) we don't need to bother closing unfunded channels and
7411 // clearing their maps here. Instead we can just send queue channel_reestablish messages for
7412 // channels in the channel_by_id map.
7413 peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().for_each(|(_, chan)| {
7414 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
7415 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7416 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
7420 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
7424 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
7425 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7427 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
7428 let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = {
7429 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7430 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
7431 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
7432 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7433 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7434 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned()
7435 .chain(peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.keys().cloned())
7436 .chain(peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.keys().cloned()).collect()
7438 for channel_id in channel_ids {
7439 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
7440 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
7444 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
7445 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7446 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
7447 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
7448 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7449 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7450 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
7451 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
7452 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
7453 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7461 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
7462 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
7466 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
7467 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
7470 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
7471 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
7474 fn get_genesis_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
7475 Some(vec![ChainHash::from(&self.genesis_hash[..])])
7478 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
7479 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7480 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7481 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7484 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
7485 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7486 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7487 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7490 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
7491 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7492 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7493 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7496 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
7497 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7498 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7499 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7502 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
7503 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7504 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7505 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7508 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
7509 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7510 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7511 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7514 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
7515 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7516 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7517 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7520 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
7521 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7522 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7523 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7526 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
7527 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7528 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7529 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7533 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7534 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7535 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
7536 let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
7537 node_features.set_keysend_optional();
7541 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7542 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7544 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
7545 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
7546 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
7547 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
7548 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
7551 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7552 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7553 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
7554 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
7557 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7558 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7559 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
7560 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
7563 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7564 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7565 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
7566 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
7567 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
7568 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
7569 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
7570 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
7571 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
7572 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
7573 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
7574 features.set_payment_secret_required();
7575 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
7576 features.set_wumbo_optional();
7577 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
7578 features.set_channel_type_optional();
7579 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
7580 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
7581 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
7582 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
7587 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
7588 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
7590 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
7591 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
7592 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
7593 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
7596 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
7597 (2, node_id, required),
7598 (4, features, required),
7599 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
7600 (8, forwarding_info, option),
7601 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7602 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7605 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
7606 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7607 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7608 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
7609 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
7610 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
7611 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7612 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
7613 (2, self.channel_id, required),
7614 (3, self.channel_type, option),
7615 (4, self.counterparty, required),
7616 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
7617 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
7618 (7, self.config, option),
7619 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
7620 (9, self.confirmations, option),
7621 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
7622 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
7623 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
7624 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
7625 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
7626 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
7627 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
7628 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
7629 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
7630 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
7631 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
7632 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
7633 (30, self.is_usable, required),
7634 (32, self.is_public, required),
7635 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7636 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7637 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
7638 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
7639 (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
7645 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
7646 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7647 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7648 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
7649 (2, channel_id, required),
7650 (3, channel_type, option),
7651 (4, counterparty, required),
7652 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7653 (6, funding_txo, option),
7654 (7, config, option),
7655 (8, short_channel_id, option),
7656 (9, confirmations, option),
7657 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
7658 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
7659 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
7660 (16, balance_msat, required),
7661 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
7662 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
7663 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
7664 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
7665 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
7666 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
7667 (22, confirmations_required, option),
7668 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
7669 (26, is_outbound, required),
7670 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
7671 (30, is_usable, required),
7672 (32, is_public, required),
7673 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7674 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7675 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
7676 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
7677 (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
7680 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7681 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
7682 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
7683 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
7684 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
7688 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
7690 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
7691 outbound_scid_alias,
7695 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
7696 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
7698 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
7699 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
7700 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
7701 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
7702 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
7703 confirmations_required,
7705 force_close_spend_delay,
7706 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
7707 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
7708 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
7709 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
7710 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
7711 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
7712 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
7713 channel_shutdown_state,
7718 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
7719 (2, channels, required_vec),
7720 (4, phantom_scid, required),
7721 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
7724 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
7726 (0, onion_packet, required),
7727 (2, short_channel_id, required),
7730 (0, payment_data, required),
7731 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
7732 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
7733 (3, payment_metadata, option),
7734 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
7736 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
7737 (0, payment_preimage, required),
7738 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
7739 (3, payment_metadata, option),
7740 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
7741 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
7745 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
7746 (0, routing, required),
7747 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
7748 (4, payment_hash, required),
7749 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
7750 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
7751 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
7752 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
7756 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
7757 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7759 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
7761 channel_id.write(writer)?;
7762 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7763 reason.write(writer)?;
7765 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7766 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
7769 channel_id.write(writer)?;
7770 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7771 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
7772 failure_code.write(writer)?;
7779 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
7780 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7781 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7784 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
7785 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7786 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7787 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
7791 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7792 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7793 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7794 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
7795 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
7798 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
7799 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
7800 // messages contained in the variants.
7801 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
7802 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
7803 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
7805 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
7806 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
7807 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
7808 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
7809 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
7812 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
7813 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
7814 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
7815 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
7816 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
7818 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
7823 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
7828 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
7829 (0, short_channel_id, required),
7830 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
7831 (2, outpoint, required),
7832 (4, htlc_id, required),
7833 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
7836 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
7837 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7838 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
7839 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
7840 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
7842 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7843 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
7844 (1, self.total_msat, required),
7845 (2, self.value, required),
7846 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
7847 (4, payment_data, option),
7848 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
7849 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
7850 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
7851 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
7857 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
7858 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7859 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7860 (0, prev_hop, required),
7861 (1, total_msat, option),
7862 (2, value_ser, required),
7863 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
7864 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
7865 (5, total_value_received, option),
7866 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
7867 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
7868 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
7870 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
7871 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
7872 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
7874 if payment_data.is_some() {
7875 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7877 if total_msat.is_none() {
7878 total_msat = Some(value);
7880 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
7883 if total_msat.is_none() {
7884 if payment_data.is_none() {
7885 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7887 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
7889 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
7893 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
7896 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
7897 total_value_received,
7898 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
7900 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
7901 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
7906 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
7907 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7908 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7911 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
7912 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
7913 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
7914 let mut payment_id = None;
7915 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
7916 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
7917 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7918 (0, session_priv, required),
7919 (1, payment_id, option),
7920 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
7921 (4, path_hops, required_vec),
7922 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
7923 (6, blinded_tail, option),
7925 if payment_id.is_none() {
7926 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
7928 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
7930 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
7931 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
7932 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7934 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
7935 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
7936 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
7937 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7941 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7942 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
7943 first_hop_htlc_msat,
7945 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
7948 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7949 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
7954 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
7955 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
7957 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
7959 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
7960 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7961 (0, session_priv, required),
7962 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
7963 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
7964 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
7965 (4, path.hops, required_vec),
7966 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
7967 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
7970 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
7972 field.write(writer)?;
7979 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
7980 (0, forward_info, required),
7981 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
7982 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
7983 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
7984 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
7987 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
7989 (0, htlc_id, required),
7990 (2, err_packet, required),
7995 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
7996 (0, payment_secret, required),
7997 (2, expiry_time, required),
7998 (4, user_payment_id, required),
7999 (6, payment_preimage, required),
8000 (8, min_value_msat, required),
8003 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8005 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8006 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8007 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8008 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8009 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8010 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8014 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8015 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
8017 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8019 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
8021 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
8022 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
8023 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
8026 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
8028 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8029 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
8030 let mut number_of_channels = 0;
8031 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8032 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8033 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8034 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
8035 serializable_peer_count += 1;
8037 number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len();
8038 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
8039 if !channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
8040 unfunded_channels += 1;
8045 ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
8047 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8048 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8049 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8050 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
8051 if channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
8052 channel.write(writer)?;
8059 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8060 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8061 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
8062 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
8063 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8064 for forward in pending_forwards {
8065 forward.write(writer)?;
8070 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8072 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8073 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
8074 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8076 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
8077 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
8078 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8079 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
8080 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8081 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8082 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
8083 htlc.write(writer)?;
8085 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
8086 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
8089 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
8090 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
8091 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8092 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
8093 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
8094 // per_peer_state lock at all.
8095 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
8098 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
8099 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
8100 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
8101 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
8102 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
8104 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
8105 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
8106 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
8107 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
8108 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
8109 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
8110 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
8115 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8116 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
8117 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
8118 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
8119 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
8120 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
8121 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
8122 // well save the space and not write any events here.
8123 0u64.write(writer)?;
8125 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8126 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
8127 event.write(writer)?;
8131 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
8132 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
8133 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
8134 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
8135 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
8136 0u64.write(writer)?;
8138 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
8139 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
8140 // likely to be identical.
8141 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
8142 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
8144 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8145 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
8146 hash.write(writer)?;
8147 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
8150 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
8151 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
8152 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
8153 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
8154 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
8157 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
8158 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
8160 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
8161 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
8162 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
8163 session_priv.write(writer)?;
8166 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
8167 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
8171 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
8172 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
8173 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
8175 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
8176 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
8177 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
8183 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
8184 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8185 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
8186 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
8189 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
8190 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
8191 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
8192 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
8193 pending_claiming_payments = None;
8196 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
8197 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
8198 for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
8199 if !updates.is_empty() {
8200 if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(HashMap::new()); }
8201 in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
8206 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8207 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
8208 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
8209 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
8210 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
8211 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
8212 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
8213 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
8214 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
8215 (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
8216 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
8217 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
8218 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
8225 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
8226 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8227 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
8228 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
8231 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
8232 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
8233 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
8234 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
8235 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
8236 // check that the event is sane here.
8237 let event_encoded = event.encode();
8238 let event_read: Option<Event> =
8239 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
8240 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
8246 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
8247 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8248 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8249 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
8250 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
8251 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
8254 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
8255 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
8256 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
8257 events.push_back((ev, action));
8258 } else if action.is_some() {
8259 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8266 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
8267 (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
8268 (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
8269 (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
8270 (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
8271 (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
8274 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
8276 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
8278 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
8279 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
8280 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
8281 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
8282 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
8283 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
8284 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
8285 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
8286 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
8287 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
8288 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
8289 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
8290 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
8292 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
8293 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
8295 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
8296 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
8298 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
8299 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
8300 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
8301 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
8302 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
8303 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
8305 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
8306 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8308 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8309 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8310 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8311 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8312 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8313 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8317 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
8318 pub entropy_source: ES,
8320 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
8321 pub node_signer: NS,
8323 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
8324 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
8326 pub signer_provider: SP,
8328 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
8330 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
8331 pub fee_estimator: F,
8332 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
8334 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
8335 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
8336 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
8337 pub chain_monitor: M,
8339 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
8340 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
8341 /// force-closed during deserialization.
8342 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
8343 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
8344 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
8346 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
8348 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
8349 /// deserialization.
8351 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
8352 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
8353 pub default_config: UserConfig,
8355 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
8356 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
8358 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
8359 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
8360 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
8361 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
8363 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
8366 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
8367 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
8370 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8371 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8373 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8374 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8375 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8376 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8377 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8378 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8382 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
8383 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
8384 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
8385 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
8386 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
8388 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
8389 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
8394 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
8395 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
8396 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8397 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
8399 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8400 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8401 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8402 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8403 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8404 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8408 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8409 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
8410 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
8414 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8415 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
8417 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8418 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8419 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8420 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8421 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8422 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8426 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8427 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8429 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8430 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8431 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8433 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
8435 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8436 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8437 let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8438 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8439 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8440 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
8441 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
8442 for _ in 0..channel_count {
8443 let mut channel: Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (
8444 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
8446 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8447 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
8448 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
8449 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
8450 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
8451 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
8452 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
8453 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
8454 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
8455 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
8456 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
8457 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
8458 let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
8459 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = monitor_update {
8460 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
8461 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
8464 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
8465 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
8466 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8467 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
8468 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
8469 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
8470 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
8472 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
8473 let mut found_htlc = false;
8474 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
8475 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
8478 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
8479 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
8480 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
8481 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
8482 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
8483 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
8484 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
8485 log_info!(args.logger,
8486 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
8487 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
8488 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8492 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
8493 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
8494 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
8495 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
8496 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8498 if channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
8499 id_to_peer.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
8501 match peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
8502 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
8503 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
8504 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel);
8506 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
8507 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
8508 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel);
8509 entry.insert(by_id_map);
8513 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
8514 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
8515 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
8516 // safely discard the channel.
8517 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false);
8518 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
8519 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8520 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
8521 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
8522 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
8523 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
8526 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
8527 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
8528 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
8529 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
8530 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
8531 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8535 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8536 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
8537 log_info!(args.logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
8538 log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
8539 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
8540 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
8541 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
8543 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
8547 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
8548 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8549 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
8550 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
8551 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8552 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8553 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
8554 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
8555 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
8557 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
8560 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8561 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
8562 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
8563 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8564 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8565 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
8566 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
8567 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
8569 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
8572 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
8575 outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8576 inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8577 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
8578 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
8579 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8580 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
8581 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8582 is_connected: false,
8586 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8587 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>)>()));
8588 for _ in 0..peer_count {
8589 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
8590 let peer_chans = peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new());
8591 let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
8592 peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
8593 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
8596 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8597 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
8598 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
8599 for _ in 0..event_count {
8600 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
8601 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
8606 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8607 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
8608 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8610 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
8611 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
8612 // on-startup monitor updates.
8613 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
8614 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
8616 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8620 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
8621 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8623 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8624 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
8625 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
8626 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
8627 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8631 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8632 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
8633 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
8634 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
8635 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
8636 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
8637 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
8639 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
8640 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8644 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
8645 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
8646 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
8647 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
8648 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
8649 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
8650 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
8651 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
8652 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
8653 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
8654 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
8655 let mut events_override = None;
8656 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
8657 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8658 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
8659 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
8660 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
8661 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
8662 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
8663 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
8664 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
8665 (8, events_override, option),
8666 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
8667 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
8668 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
8669 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
8671 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
8672 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8675 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
8676 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8679 if let Some(events) = events_override {
8680 pending_events_read = events;
8683 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
8684 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
8687 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
8688 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
8689 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
8690 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
8691 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
8692 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
8694 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
8696 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
8697 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
8698 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
8701 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
8702 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
8703 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
8704 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
8705 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
8707 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
8708 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
8709 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
8711 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
8712 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
8713 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
8714 ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
8715 $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
8717 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
8718 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
8719 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
8720 log_trace!(args.logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
8721 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, log_bytes!($funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
8722 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
8723 pending_background_events.push(
8724 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
8725 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
8726 funding_txo: $funding_txo,
8727 update: update.clone(),
8730 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
8731 // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
8732 // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
8733 // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
8734 pending_background_events.push(
8735 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
8736 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
8737 channel_id: $funding_txo.to_channel_id(),
8740 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
8741 log_error!(args.logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
8742 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8744 max_in_flight_update_id
8748 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
8749 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
8750 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8751 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
8752 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
8754 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8755 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
8756 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
8757 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
8758 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
8759 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
8760 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
8761 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
8762 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, ""));
8765 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
8766 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
8767 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
8768 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
8769 log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
8770 log_error!(args.logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
8771 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
8772 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
8773 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
8774 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
8775 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8780 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
8781 for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
8782 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
8783 // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
8784 // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
8785 // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
8786 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
8787 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(HashMap::new()))
8789 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8790 handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
8791 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, "closed ");
8793 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
8794 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.",
8795 log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
8796 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
8797 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
8798 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
8799 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
8800 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8805 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
8806 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
8808 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
8809 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
8810 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
8811 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
8814 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
8815 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
8816 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
8817 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
8818 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
8819 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
8820 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
8822 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8823 let counterparty_opt = id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
8824 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
8825 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
8826 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
8827 if path.hops.is_empty() {
8828 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
8829 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8832 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
8833 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
8834 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
8835 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
8836 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
8837 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
8838 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
8839 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
8841 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
8842 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
8843 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
8844 retry_strategy: None,
8845 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
8846 payment_params: None,
8847 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
8848 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
8849 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8850 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8851 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8852 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8853 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
8854 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
8855 total_msat: path_amt,
8856 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
8858 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
8859 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
8864 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
8866 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
8867 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
8868 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
8869 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
8871 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
8872 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
8873 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
8874 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
8875 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
8876 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
8877 forwards.retain(|forward| {
8878 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
8879 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
8880 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
8881 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
8886 !forwards.is_empty()
8888 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
8889 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
8890 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
8891 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
8892 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
8893 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
8894 intercepted_id != ev_id
8901 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
8902 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
8903 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
8904 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
8905 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
8906 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
8907 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
8908 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
8909 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
8910 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
8911 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
8912 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv, path, false, &pending_events, &args.logger);
8913 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
8920 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
8921 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
8923 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
8925 .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
8926 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
8927 if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
8928 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
8929 // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
8930 // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
8931 // channel_id -> peer map entry).
8932 counterparty_opt.is_none(),
8933 monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()))
8936 // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
8937 // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
8938 // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
8939 // channel still live case here.
8943 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
8944 pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
8949 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
8950 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
8951 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
8952 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
8953 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
8954 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
8955 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
8956 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
8960 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
8961 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
8963 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
8964 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
8965 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
8966 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8968 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
8969 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
8970 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8972 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
8973 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
8975 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
8976 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
8978 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
8981 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
8982 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
8983 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
8985 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
8989 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
8990 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
8991 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
8992 if htlcs.is_empty() {
8993 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8995 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
8996 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
8997 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
8998 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
8999 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
9000 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
9001 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
9002 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
9004 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
9005 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9009 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
9011 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
9013 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
9014 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
9016 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
9017 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
9022 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9023 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
9025 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
9027 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9029 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
9030 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
9031 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
9032 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9036 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
9037 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
9038 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9039 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9040 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
9041 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
9042 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
9044 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
9045 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
9046 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
9048 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
9049 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
9050 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
9051 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
9052 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
9053 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9055 if chan.context.is_usable() {
9056 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
9057 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
9058 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
9059 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
9060 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9066 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
9068 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
9069 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
9070 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
9071 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
9072 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
9073 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
9074 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
9075 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
9076 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
9077 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
9078 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
9080 for claimable_htlc in payment.htlcs {
9081 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
9083 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
9084 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
9085 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
9086 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
9088 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
9089 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
9090 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
9091 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
9093 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
9094 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
9095 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
9096 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
9098 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
9099 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
9100 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
9101 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9102 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9103 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
9104 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
9107 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
9108 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
9111 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
9114 purpose: payment.purpose,
9115 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
9121 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
9122 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
9123 for (_, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
9124 for action in actions.iter() {
9125 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
9126 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
9127 Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), ..
9129 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
9130 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
9131 .entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
9132 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
9134 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
9135 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
9136 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
9137 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
9143 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
9145 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
9146 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9150 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
9152 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
9153 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
9154 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
9155 router: args.router,
9157 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
9159 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
9160 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
9161 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
9162 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
9164 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
9165 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
9166 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
9167 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
9168 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
9169 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
9171 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
9176 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
9178 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
9180 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
9181 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
9182 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
9183 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
9184 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
9185 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
9187 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
9188 node_signer: args.node_signer,
9189 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
9191 logger: args.logger,
9192 default_configuration: args.default_config,
9195 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
9196 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
9197 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
9198 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
9199 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
9202 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_chan_id) in pending_claims_to_replay {
9203 // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
9204 // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
9205 // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
9206 channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value),
9207 downstream_closed, downstream_chan_id);
9210 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
9211 //connection or two.
9213 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
9219 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
9220 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
9221 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
9222 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
9223 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
9224 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
9225 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
9226 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
9227 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
9228 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
9229 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
9230 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
9231 use crate::util::test_utils;
9232 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
9233 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
9236 fn test_notify_limits() {
9237 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
9238 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
9239 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9240 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9241 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9242 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9244 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
9245 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
9246 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9247 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9248 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9250 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9252 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
9253 // to connect messages with new values
9254 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
9255 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
9256 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
9257 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
9258 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
9259 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
9261 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
9262 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9263 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9264 // ... but the last node should not.
9265 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9266 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
9267 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9268 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9270 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
9271 // about the channel.
9272 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
9273 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
9274 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9276 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
9278 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
9279 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
9280 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
9281 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
9282 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9283 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9285 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
9286 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
9287 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
9289 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
9290 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
9291 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
9292 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
9293 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
9294 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
9296 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
9297 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
9298 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
9299 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
9300 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9301 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9302 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
9303 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
9305 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
9306 // the channel info has updated.
9307 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
9308 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
9309 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9310 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9311 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
9312 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
9316 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
9317 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
9319 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9320 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9321 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9322 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9323 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9325 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
9326 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
9327 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
9328 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
9330 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
9331 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
9332 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
9333 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
9334 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
9335 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
9336 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
9337 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
9338 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9339 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9340 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9341 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
9343 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
9344 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9345 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9346 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9347 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9348 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9349 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9350 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9351 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9352 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9353 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9354 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9355 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9356 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9357 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9358 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9359 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9360 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9361 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9362 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9363 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9364 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9365 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
9367 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
9368 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
9369 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
9370 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9371 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9372 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9373 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
9375 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
9376 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
9377 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
9378 // lightning messages manually.
9379 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9380 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
9381 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9383 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9384 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9385 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
9386 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9387 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9388 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
9389 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9390 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9391 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
9392 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9393 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9394 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9395 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
9396 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9397 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9398 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
9399 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9400 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9401 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
9402 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9403 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
9404 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9405 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9406 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
9407 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9409 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
9410 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
9411 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9412 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
9414 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
9415 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
9416 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
9417 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
9419 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9422 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
9423 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
9424 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
9425 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
9427 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9430 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
9431 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
9432 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
9433 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
9435 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9440 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
9441 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
9442 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
9445 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
9446 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
9447 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
9448 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
9449 // fails as expected.
9450 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
9451 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
9452 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
9453 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
9454 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
9455 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
9456 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9457 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9458 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
9459 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
9460 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
9461 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9462 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9463 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9464 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9466 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
9467 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
9468 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
9470 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
9471 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9472 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
9473 final_value_msat: 100_000,
9475 let route = find_route(
9476 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
9477 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9479 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9480 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9481 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9482 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9483 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9484 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9485 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9486 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9487 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9488 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9489 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
9490 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
9491 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9492 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9493 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9494 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9495 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9496 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9497 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9498 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9499 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9500 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9501 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9502 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9504 // Finally, claim the original payment.
9505 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
9507 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
9508 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9509 let route = find_route(
9510 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
9511 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9513 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9514 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9515 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9516 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9517 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9518 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9519 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9520 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
9522 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
9523 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
9524 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9525 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9526 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9527 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9528 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9529 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9530 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9531 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9532 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9533 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9534 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9535 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9536 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9537 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9538 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9539 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9540 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9541 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9542 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9543 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9544 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9545 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9547 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
9548 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
9550 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
9551 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
9552 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9553 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
9554 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9555 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9556 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9557 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9558 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9559 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
9561 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
9562 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9563 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
9564 final_value_msat: 100_000,
9566 let route = find_route(
9567 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
9568 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9570 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
9571 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9572 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
9573 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9574 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9575 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9576 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9577 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9578 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9579 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9580 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9581 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9582 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9583 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9584 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9585 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9586 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9587 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9588 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9589 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9590 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9591 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9592 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9594 // Finally, claim the original payment.
9595 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
9599 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
9600 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
9601 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
9602 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9603 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9604 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9605 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9607 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9608 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9610 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9611 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9612 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false),
9613 final_value_msat: 10_000,
9615 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
9616 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9617 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9618 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9619 let route = find_route(
9620 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9621 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9624 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9625 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
9626 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
9627 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
9628 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
9629 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
9630 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9632 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9633 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
9634 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9635 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9636 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9637 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9638 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
9640 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
9644 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
9645 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
9646 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
9647 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
9648 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
9649 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9650 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9651 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
9652 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9654 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9655 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9657 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9658 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9659 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false),
9660 final_value_msat: 10_000,
9662 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
9663 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9664 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9665 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9666 let route = find_route(
9667 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9668 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9671 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9672 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
9673 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
9674 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
9675 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
9676 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
9677 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
9678 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
9679 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9681 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9682 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
9683 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9684 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9685 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9686 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9687 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
9689 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
9693 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
9694 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9695 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9696 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9697 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9699 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9700 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9701 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9702 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9704 // Marshall an MPP route.
9705 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
9706 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
9707 route.paths.push(path);
9708 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9709 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
9710 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
9711 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
9712 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
9713 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
9715 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9716 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
9718 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
9719 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
9721 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
9726 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
9727 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9728 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9729 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9730 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9732 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9734 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9735 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9737 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9738 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
9739 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9740 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
9743 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
9744 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
9745 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9746 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
9747 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
9748 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
9751 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9754 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
9755 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
9760 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
9761 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
9762 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9763 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9764 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9765 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9767 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
9768 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
9770 total_msat: 100_000,
9773 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
9774 // payment verification fails as expected.
9775 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
9776 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
9777 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
9778 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
9780 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
9784 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
9785 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
9789 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
9790 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
9791 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
9792 // the channel is successfully closed.
9793 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9794 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9795 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9796 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9798 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9799 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9800 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
9801 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9802 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9804 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
9805 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
9807 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
9808 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
9809 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9810 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9813 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9815 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
9816 // as it has the funding transaction.
9817 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9818 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
9819 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9822 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9824 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9826 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9828 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9829 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
9830 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9832 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9835 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
9836 // as it has the funding transaction.
9837 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9838 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
9839 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9841 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9842 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9843 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
9844 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9845 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9846 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9847 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9848 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
9850 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9851 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9852 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9853 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
9855 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9856 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
9858 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
9859 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
9860 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
9861 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
9862 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9863 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
9864 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9868 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
9869 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
9870 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
9871 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
9872 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9873 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
9874 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9877 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9879 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
9880 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
9881 // closing transaction).
9882 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
9883 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
9884 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9886 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
9887 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
9888 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9889 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
9890 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9893 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9895 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
9897 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
9898 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
9899 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9901 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9903 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
9904 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
9907 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
9908 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
9909 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
9912 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
9913 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
9914 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
9917 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
9919 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
9920 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
9922 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
9923 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
9925 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
9926 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
9931 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
9932 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
9933 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
9934 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
9935 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9936 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
9937 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
9938 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
9941 let channel_id = [4; 32];
9942 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9943 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
9945 // Test the API functions.
9946 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
9948 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
9950 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
9952 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
9954 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
9956 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
9958 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
9962 fn test_connection_limiting() {
9963 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
9964 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9965 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9966 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9967 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9969 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
9971 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9972 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9974 let mut funding_tx = None;
9975 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
9976 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9977 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9980 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9981 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
9982 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
9983 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
9984 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9986 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9987 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9988 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9990 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9992 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
9993 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9994 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9996 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9999 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
10000 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10001 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10002 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
10003 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10005 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
10006 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
10008 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
10009 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
10010 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10011 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10012 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
10013 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10014 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10017 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10018 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10019 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10020 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10021 }, true).unwrap_err();
10023 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
10024 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
10025 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10026 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10027 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
10028 for ev in chan_closed_events {
10029 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
10031 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10032 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10034 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
10035 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10036 }, true).unwrap_err();
10038 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
10039 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
10040 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10041 }, false).unwrap();
10042 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10044 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
10045 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
10047 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
10048 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
10049 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
10050 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
10051 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10053 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10054 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
10055 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10057 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
10058 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10059 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
10061 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
10062 // "protected" and can connect again.
10063 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
10064 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
10065 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10067 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10069 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
10071 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10072 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
10076 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
10077 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
10078 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10079 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10080 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10081 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10083 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
10085 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10086 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10088 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
10089 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10090 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10091 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10094 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
10096 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10097 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
10098 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10100 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
10101 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10102 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10104 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
10105 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10106 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
10107 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10111 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
10112 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
10113 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
10114 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10115 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10116 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
10117 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
10118 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
10119 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10121 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
10123 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10124 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10126 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
10127 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
10128 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10129 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10130 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10131 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10134 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10135 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10137 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10138 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
10140 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10142 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
10143 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10146 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
10147 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10148 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10149 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10150 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10152 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10153 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10155 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10156 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
10157 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
10158 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
10162 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10164 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
10165 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10167 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
10168 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10169 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10171 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10172 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
10174 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10176 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
10180 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
10181 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
10182 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
10183 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
10184 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
10185 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
10186 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
10187 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
10189 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
10190 payment_metadata: None,
10191 keysend_preimage: None,
10192 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
10193 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
10195 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
10197 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
10198 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
10199 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundOnionErr { err_code, .. }) =
10200 node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10201 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat))
10203 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
10204 } else { panic!(); }
10206 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
10207 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
10209 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
10210 payment_metadata: None,
10211 keysend_preimage: None,
10212 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
10213 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
10215 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
10217 assert!(node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10218 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat)).is_ok());
10222 fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
10223 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
10224 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
10225 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
10226 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
10228 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
10229 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
10231 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10232 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10233 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
10234 &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
10235 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10237 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10238 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10240 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10241 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
10242 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10243 match &msg_events[0] {
10244 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
10245 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10247 ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
10248 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
10249 _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
10252 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10255 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10256 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10258 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
10259 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
10260 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10262 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10266 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
10267 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
10268 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
10269 // the channel without the anchors feature.
10270 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10271 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10272 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
10273 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
10274 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
10275 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
10276 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10278 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
10279 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10280 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
10282 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10283 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10285 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10286 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
10288 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10291 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10292 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
10294 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10295 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
10297 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
10301 fn test_update_channel_config() {
10302 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10303 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
10304 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
10305 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
10306 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
10307 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10308 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
10310 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
10311 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10312 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
10314 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
10315 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
10316 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
10317 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10318 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10320 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10321 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
10324 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
10325 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10326 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
10328 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
10329 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
10330 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
10331 ..Default::default()
10333 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
10334 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10335 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10337 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10338 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
10341 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
10342 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
10343 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
10344 ..Default::default()
10346 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
10347 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
10348 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10349 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10351 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10352 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
10355 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
10356 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
10357 let bad_channel_id = [10; 32];
10358 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
10359 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
10362 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
10363 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
10364 ..Default::default()
10366 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
10369 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
10370 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
10371 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10372 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
10378 use crate::chain::Listen;
10379 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
10380 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
10381 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
10382 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
10383 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
10384 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
10385 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
10386 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
10387 use crate::util::test_utils;
10388 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
10390 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
10391 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
10392 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
10394 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
10396 use criterion::Criterion;
10398 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
10399 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
10400 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
10401 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
10402 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
10403 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
10404 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
10406 struct ANodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
10407 node: &'a Manager<'a, P>,
10409 impl<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'a, P> {
10410 type CM = Manager<'a, P>;
10412 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'a, P> { self.node }
10414 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
10417 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
10418 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
10421 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
10422 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
10423 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
10425 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
10426 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
10428 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
10429 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
10430 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
10431 let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
10432 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
10434 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
10435 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
10436 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
10438 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
10439 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
10440 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
10441 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
10443 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
10444 }, genesis_block.header.time);
10445 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
10447 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
10448 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
10449 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
10450 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
10451 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
10453 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
10454 }, genesis_block.header.time);
10455 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
10457 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
10458 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10460 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
10461 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10462 }, false).unwrap();
10463 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
10464 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
10465 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10468 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
10469 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
10470 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
10472 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
10473 } else { panic!(); }
10475 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
10476 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10477 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
10478 match events_b[0] {
10479 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10480 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
10482 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10485 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10486 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10487 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
10488 match events_a[0] {
10489 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10490 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
10492 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10495 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
10497 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), 42, vec![tx]);
10498 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
10499 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
10501 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10502 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10503 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
10504 match msg_events[0] {
10505 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
10506 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
10507 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
10511 match msg_events[1] {
10512 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10516 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10517 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
10518 match events_a[0] {
10519 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10520 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
10522 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10525 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10526 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
10527 match events_b[0] {
10528 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10529 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
10531 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10534 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
10535 macro_rules! send_payment {
10536 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
10537 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
10538 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.invoice_features()).unwrap();
10539 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
10540 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
10541 payment_count += 1;
10542 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
10543 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
10545 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
10546 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), RouteParameters {
10547 payment_params, final_value_msat: 10_000,
10548 }, Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
10549 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
10550 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10551 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
10552 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
10553 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
10554 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
10555 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
10557 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
10558 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
10559 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
10560 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
10562 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
10563 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
10564 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
10565 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10566 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
10568 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
10571 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
10572 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
10573 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
10574 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10576 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
10580 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
10581 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
10582 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);