1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`find_route`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 //! [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
25 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
35 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
38 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
39 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
40 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
41 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
43 // construct one themselves.
44 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
45 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
46 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
47 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
48 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
49 use crate::routing::router::{InFlightHtlcs, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, RouteParameters};
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
54 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
55 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, Recipient};
56 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
57 use crate::util::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
58 use crate::util::events;
59 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
60 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
61 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
62 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
63 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
66 use crate::prelude::*;
68 use core::cell::RefCell;
70 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock};
71 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
72 use core::time::Duration;
75 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
77 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
78 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
79 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
81 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
82 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
83 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
84 // before we forward it.
86 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
87 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
88 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
89 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
90 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
92 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
93 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
95 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
96 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
97 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
98 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
101 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
102 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
103 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
106 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
107 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
111 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
112 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
113 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
114 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
115 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
116 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
117 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
118 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
121 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
122 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
123 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
124 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
127 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
128 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
129 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
130 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
131 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
134 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
135 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
137 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
138 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
139 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
142 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
143 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
145 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
146 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
149 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
150 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
153 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
157 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
158 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
159 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
160 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
161 short_channel_id: u64,
163 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
164 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
166 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
167 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
172 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
174 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
175 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
176 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
178 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
179 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
182 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
183 struct ClaimableHTLC {
184 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
186 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
188 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
190 /// The sum total of all MPP parts
194 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
195 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
196 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
197 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
199 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
200 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
205 impl Readable for PaymentId {
206 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
207 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
212 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
213 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
214 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
215 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
217 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
218 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
223 impl Readable for InterceptId {
224 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
225 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
229 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
230 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
231 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
232 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
233 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
236 session_priv: SecretKey,
237 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
238 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
239 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
240 payment_id: PaymentId,
241 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
242 payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters>,
245 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
246 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
247 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
249 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
251 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
253 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payment_params } => {
256 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
257 payment_id.hash(hasher);
258 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
259 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
260 payment_params.hash(hasher);
265 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
268 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
269 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
271 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
272 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
273 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
274 payment_secret: None,
275 payment_params: None,
280 struct ReceiveError {
286 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>);
288 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
289 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
290 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
291 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
292 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
294 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
295 err: msgs::LightningError,
296 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
297 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
299 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
301 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
303 err: LightningError {
305 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
306 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
313 shutdown_finish: None,
317 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
319 err: LightningError {
321 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
324 shutdown_finish: None,
328 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
329 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
332 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
334 err: LightningError {
336 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
337 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
343 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
344 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
348 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
351 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
353 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
354 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
358 log_level: Level::Warn,
361 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
363 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
365 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
367 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
368 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
376 shutdown_finish: None,
381 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
382 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
383 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
384 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
385 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
387 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
388 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
389 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
390 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
391 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
392 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
393 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
395 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
399 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
400 struct ClaimingPayment {
402 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
403 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
405 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
406 (0, amount_msat, required),
407 (2, payment_purpose, required),
408 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
411 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
412 struct ClaimablePayments {
413 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
414 /// failed/claimed by the user.
416 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
417 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
419 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
420 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
421 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, (events::PaymentPurpose, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>)>,
423 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
424 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
425 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
426 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
429 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
430 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
431 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
432 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
433 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
434 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
437 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
438 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
439 /// quite some time lag.
440 enum BackgroundEvent {
441 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
442 /// commitment transaction.
443 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
446 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
447 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
448 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
449 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
450 /// event can be generated.
451 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
452 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user.
453 EmitEvent { event: events::Event },
456 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
457 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
459 latest_features: InitFeatures,
462 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
463 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
465 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
468 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
469 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
470 struct PendingInboundPayment {
471 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
472 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
473 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
474 /// this payment being removed.
476 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
477 user_payment_id: u64,
478 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
479 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
480 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
483 /// Stores the session_priv for each part of a payment that is still pending. For versions 0.0.102
484 /// and later, also stores information for retrying the payment.
485 pub(crate) enum PendingOutboundPayment {
487 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
490 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
491 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
492 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
493 pending_amt_msat: u64,
494 /// Used to track the fee paid. Only present if the payment was serialized on 0.0.103+.
495 pending_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
496 /// The total payment amount across all paths, used to verify that a retry is not overpaying.
498 /// Our best known block height at the time this payment was initiated.
499 starting_block_height: u32,
501 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
502 /// been resolved. This ensures we don't look up pending payments in ChannelMonitors on restart
503 /// and add a pending payment that was already fulfilled.
505 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
506 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
507 timer_ticks_without_htlcs: u8,
509 /// When a payer gives up trying to retry a payment, they inform us, letting us generate a
510 /// `PaymentFailed` event when all HTLCs have irrevocably failed. This avoids a number of race
511 /// conditions in MPP-aware payment retriers (1), where the possibility of multiple
512 /// `PaymentPathFailed` events with `all_paths_failed` can be pending at once, confusing a
513 /// downstream event handler as to when a payment has actually failed.
515 /// (1) https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1164
517 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
518 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
522 impl PendingOutboundPayment {
523 fn is_fulfilled(&self) -> bool {
525 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => true,
529 fn abandoned(&self) -> bool {
531 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => true,
535 fn get_pending_fee_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
537 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { pending_fee_msat, .. } => pending_fee_msat.clone(),
542 fn payment_hash(&self) -> Option<PaymentHash> {
544 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None,
545 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
546 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => *payment_hash,
547 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
551 fn mark_fulfilled(&mut self) {
552 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
553 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
554 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
555 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
556 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
557 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. }
560 let payment_hash = self.payment_hash();
561 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, payment_hash, timer_ticks_without_htlcs: 0 };
564 fn mark_abandoned(&mut self) -> Result<(), ()> {
565 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
566 let our_payment_hash;
567 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
568 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } |
569 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } =>
571 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } |
572 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } => {
573 our_payment_hash = *payment_hash;
577 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash: our_payment_hash };
581 /// panics if path is None and !self.is_fulfilled
582 fn remove(&mut self, session_priv: &[u8; 32], path: Option<&Vec<RouteHop>>) -> bool {
583 let remove_res = match self {
584 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
585 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
586 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
587 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
588 session_privs.remove(session_priv)
592 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
593 let path = path.expect("Fulfilling a payment should always come with a path");
594 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
595 *pending_amt_msat -= path_last_hop.fee_msat;
596 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
597 *fee_msat -= path.get_path_fees();
604 fn insert(&mut self, session_priv: [u8; 32], path: &Vec<RouteHop>) -> bool {
605 let insert_res = match self {
606 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
607 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
608 session_privs.insert(session_priv)
610 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => false,
611 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => false,
614 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
615 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
616 *pending_amt_msat += path_last_hop.fee_msat;
617 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
618 *fee_msat += path.get_path_fees();
625 fn remaining_parts(&self) -> usize {
627 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
628 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
629 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
630 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
637 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
638 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
639 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
640 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
641 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
642 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
643 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
645 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
646 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
648 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
649 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
650 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
651 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
652 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
653 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
654 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
655 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
657 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
658 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
660 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
661 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
663 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
664 /// to individual Channels.
666 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
667 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
668 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
669 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
671 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
672 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
673 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
674 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
675 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
676 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
677 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
679 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
680 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
681 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
682 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
685 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
686 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
687 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
688 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
689 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
691 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
692 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
693 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
694 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
695 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
698 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
699 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
700 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
701 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
702 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
706 // `total_consistency_lock`
708 // |__`forward_htlcs`
710 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
712 // |__`pending_inbound_payments`
714 // | |__`claimable_payments`
716 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments`
718 // | |__`channel_state`
722 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
724 // | |__`per_peer_state`
726 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
730 // | |__`pending_events`
732 // | |__`pending_background_events`
734 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
735 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
736 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
737 K::Target: KeysInterface,
738 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
741 default_configuration: UserConfig,
742 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
743 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
747 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
749 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
751 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
752 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
754 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
755 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
756 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>,
757 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
758 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>,
760 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
761 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
762 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
763 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
765 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
766 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
768 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
769 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
770 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
771 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
772 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
773 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
774 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
775 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
777 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
779 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
780 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment>>,
782 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
784 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
785 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
786 /// and via the classic SCID.
788 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
789 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
791 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
793 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
795 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
796 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
797 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
799 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
800 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
802 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
803 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
805 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
806 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
808 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
809 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
810 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
811 /// active channel list on load.
813 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
814 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
816 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
818 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
819 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
820 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
822 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
823 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
824 /// the handling of the events.
827 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
828 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
829 /// would break backwards compatability.
830 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
831 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
832 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
834 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
835 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
837 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
839 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
840 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
841 /// confirmation depth.
843 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
844 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
845 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
847 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
849 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
851 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
853 our_network_key: SecretKey,
854 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
856 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
858 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
859 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
860 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
862 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
863 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
865 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
866 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
867 /// keeping additional state.
868 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
870 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
871 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
872 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
873 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
875 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
876 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
877 /// are currently open with that peer.
878 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
879 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
882 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
883 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
885 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
886 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
887 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
888 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
889 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
890 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
891 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
892 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
893 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
894 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
895 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
897 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
904 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
906 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
907 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
908 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
909 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
910 pub struct ChainParameters {
911 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
912 pub network: Network,
914 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
916 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
917 pub best_block: BestBlock,
920 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
926 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
927 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
928 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
929 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
930 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
931 /// updates are ready for persistence).
933 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
934 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
935 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
936 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
937 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
939 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
940 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
943 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
944 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
945 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
948 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
949 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
951 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
952 persistence_notifier: notifier,
953 should_persist: persist_check,
954 _read_guard: read_guard,
959 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
961 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
962 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
967 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
968 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
970 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
972 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
973 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
974 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
975 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
976 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
978 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
979 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
981 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
983 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
984 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
985 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
986 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
987 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
988 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
989 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
990 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
991 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
992 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
993 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
994 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
995 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
997 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
998 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
1000 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1001 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1002 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1003 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
1005 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1006 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1007 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1008 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1009 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1010 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1013 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1015 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1016 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1019 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1021 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1022 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1024 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
1025 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
1026 /// [`ChannelManager::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
1027 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
1029 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1030 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1031 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1032 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1033 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1034 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1035 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1036 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1037 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1038 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1039 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1042 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1043 /// to better separate parameters.
1044 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1045 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1046 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1047 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1048 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1049 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1050 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1051 pub features: InitFeatures,
1052 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1053 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1054 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1056 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1058 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1059 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1060 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1061 /// payments to us through this channel.
1062 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1063 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1064 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1065 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1066 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1067 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1068 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1071 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
1072 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1073 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1074 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1075 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1076 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1077 /// lifetime of the channel.
1078 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1079 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1080 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1081 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1082 /// our counterparty already.
1084 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1085 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1086 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1087 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1089 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1090 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1091 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1092 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1094 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1095 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1097 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1098 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1100 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1101 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1102 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1103 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1104 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1105 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1106 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1107 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1108 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1111 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1113 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1114 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1115 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1116 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1117 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1118 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1119 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1121 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1122 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1124 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1125 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1126 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1127 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1128 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1129 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1130 /// this value on chain.
1132 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1134 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1136 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1137 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1138 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1139 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1141 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1142 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1143 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1144 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1146 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1147 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1148 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1149 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1151 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1152 pub balance_msat: u64,
1153 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1154 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1155 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1156 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1158 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1160 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1161 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1162 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1163 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1164 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1165 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1166 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1167 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1169 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1170 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1171 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1172 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1173 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1174 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1175 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1177 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1178 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1179 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1180 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1181 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1182 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1183 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1184 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1185 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1187 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1189 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1190 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1191 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1192 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1193 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1195 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1196 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1197 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1198 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1199 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1200 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1201 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1203 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1204 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1205 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1206 pub is_outbound: bool,
1207 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1208 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1209 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1210 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1211 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1213 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1214 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1215 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1216 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1218 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1219 pub is_usable: bool,
1220 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1221 pub is_public: bool,
1222 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1223 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1224 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1225 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1226 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1227 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1229 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1230 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1233 impl ChannelDetails {
1234 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1235 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1236 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1238 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1239 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1240 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1241 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1244 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1245 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1246 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1248 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1249 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1250 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1251 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1255 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
1256 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
1257 /// states for more.
1258 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
1259 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
1260 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
1261 /// send the payment at all.
1263 /// You can freely resend the payment in full (with the parameter error fixed).
1265 /// Because the payment failed outright, no payment tracking is done, you do not need to call
1266 /// [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] and [`ChannelManager::retry_payment`] will *not* work
1267 /// for this payment.
1268 ParameterError(APIError),
1269 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
1270 /// from attempting to send the payment at all.
1272 /// You can freely resend the payment in full (with the parameter error fixed).
1274 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1277 /// Because the payment failed outright, no payment tracking is done, you do not need to call
1278 /// [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] and [`ChannelManager::retry_payment`] will *not* work
1279 /// for this payment.
1280 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
1281 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
1282 /// You can freely resend the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
1283 /// paths than the ones selected).
1285 /// Because the payment failed outright, no payment tracking is done, you do not need to call
1286 /// [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] and [`ChannelManager::retry_payment`] will *not* work
1287 /// for this payment.
1288 AllFailedResendSafe(Vec<APIError>),
1289 /// Indicates that a payment for the provided [`PaymentId`] is already in-flight and has not
1290 /// yet completed (i.e. generated an [`Event::PaymentSent`]) or been abandoned (via
1291 /// [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]).
1293 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
1295 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
1296 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
1297 /// in over-/re-payment.
1299 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1300 /// send_payment, and any `Err`s which are not [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] can be
1301 /// safely retried via [`ChannelManager::retry_payment`].
1303 /// Any entries which contain `Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInprogress)` or `Ok(())` MUST NOT be
1304 /// retried as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent
1305 /// (in the case of `Ok(())`) or will send once a [`MonitorEvent::Completed`] is provided for
1306 /// the next-hop channel with the latest update_id.
1308 /// The errors themselves, in the same order as the route hops.
1309 results: Vec<Result<(), APIError>>,
1310 /// If some paths failed without irrevocably committing to the new HTLC(s), this will
1311 /// contain a [`RouteParameters`] object which can be used to calculate a new route that
1312 /// will pay all remaining unpaid balance.
1313 failed_paths_retry: Option<RouteParameters>,
1314 /// The payment id for the payment, which is now at least partially pending.
1315 payment_id: PaymentId,
1319 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1321 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1323 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1324 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1325 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1326 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1328 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1329 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1330 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1333 macro_rules! handle_error {
1334 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1337 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1338 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1340 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1341 // entering the macro.
1342 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
1343 assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
1346 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1348 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1349 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1350 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1351 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1355 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1356 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1357 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1358 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1363 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1364 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1366 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1367 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1368 action: err.action.clone()
1372 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1373 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1376 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1383 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1384 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {{
1385 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
1386 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1387 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1388 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1390 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1391 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1392 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1393 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1394 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1396 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1397 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1399 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1403 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1404 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1405 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1407 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1408 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1410 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1411 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1413 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1414 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1415 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel);
1416 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1417 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1418 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1424 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1425 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1429 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1431 $entry.remove_entry();
1439 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1440 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1444 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1446 $entry.remove_entry();
1454 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1455 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1457 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1458 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, channel);
1464 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_res {
1465 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1467 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1468 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1469 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan);
1470 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1471 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1472 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1473 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1474 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1475 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1476 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1477 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1478 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1479 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1480 $chan.force_shutdown(false), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1483 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1484 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update in progress. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1485 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1486 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1487 match $action_type {
1488 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1489 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1491 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1492 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1494 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1495 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1496 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1497 if !$resend_commitment {
1498 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1501 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1503 $chan.monitor_updating_paused($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1504 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1506 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1511 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1512 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1514 $entry.remove_entry();
1518 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY) => { {
1519 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1520 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1522 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, NO_UPDATE) => {
1523 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1525 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_channel_ready: expr, OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED) => {
1526 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, false, $resend_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1528 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1529 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1531 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1532 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
1536 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1537 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1538 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1539 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1540 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1542 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1543 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1544 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1545 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1546 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1547 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1548 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1549 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1550 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1551 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1556 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1557 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1558 if $channel.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1560 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1561 pending_events.push(events::Event::ChannelReady {
1562 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1563 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1564 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1565 channel_type: $channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
1568 $channel.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1573 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
1574 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
1575 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1576 K::Target: KeysInterface,
1577 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1580 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1582 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1583 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1585 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1587 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1588 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1589 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1590 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1591 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1592 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1593 let inbound_pmt_key_material = keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1594 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1596 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1597 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1598 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1602 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1604 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1605 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1606 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1608 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1609 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1610 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1611 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1612 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
1613 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1614 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1615 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1617 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1618 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap()),
1621 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1622 fake_scid_rand_bytes: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1624 probing_cookie_secret: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1626 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1628 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1630 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1631 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1632 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1633 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
1641 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1642 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1643 &self.default_configuration
1646 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1647 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1648 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1651 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1652 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1654 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
1656 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1660 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1665 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1667 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1668 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1669 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
1670 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
1671 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
1673 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1674 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1676 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1677 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1678 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1680 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1681 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1682 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1683 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1684 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1685 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1687 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1688 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1689 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1690 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1691 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1692 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1696 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1697 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1698 Some(peer_state) => {
1699 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1700 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1701 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1702 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1703 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key,
1704 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1705 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1709 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1714 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1717 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1719 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1720 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1721 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1723 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1724 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1725 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1726 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1728 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1730 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1733 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1735 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1736 node_id: their_network_key,
1739 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1742 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1743 let mut res = Vec::new();
1745 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1746 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1747 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1748 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1749 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1750 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1751 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1752 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1753 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1754 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1755 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1756 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1757 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1758 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1759 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1760 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1761 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1762 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1763 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1764 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1765 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1766 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1768 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1769 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1770 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1771 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1772 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1773 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1774 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1775 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1776 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1777 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1778 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1779 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1780 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1781 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1782 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1783 confirmations: Some(channel.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1784 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1785 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1786 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1787 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1788 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1789 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1790 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1791 config: Some(channel.config()),
1795 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1796 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1797 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1798 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1804 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1805 /// more information.
1806 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1807 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1810 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to [`find_route`]
1811 /// to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1813 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1814 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1817 /// [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
1818 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1819 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1820 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1821 // really wanted anyway.
1822 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1825 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1826 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1827 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1828 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1829 Some(transaction) => {
1830 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1834 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1835 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1836 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1837 reason: closure_reason
1841 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1842 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1844 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1845 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1846 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1847 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1848 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1849 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1850 if *counterparty_node_id != chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id(){
1851 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
1853 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = {
1854 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1855 match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1856 Some(peer_state) => {
1857 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1858 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1859 chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
1861 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
1864 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1866 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1867 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1868 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
1869 let (result, is_permanent) =
1870 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
1872 remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1877 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1878 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
1882 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1883 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1884 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1885 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1889 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1893 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1897 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1898 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1899 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
1900 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
1903 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
1907 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1908 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1909 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1911 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1912 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1914 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1915 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1916 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1917 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1919 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1921 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1922 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1923 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1924 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1925 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None)
1928 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1929 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1930 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1932 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1933 /// the channel being closed or not:
1934 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1935 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1936 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1937 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1938 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1939 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1940 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1942 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1944 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1945 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1946 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1947 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1948 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1952 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1953 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1954 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1955 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1956 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
1957 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1958 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1959 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
1961 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1962 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1963 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1964 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1965 // ignore the result here.
1966 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1970 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1971 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
1972 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
1973 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1975 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1976 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1977 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1978 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *peer_node_id {
1979 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1981 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
1982 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
1984 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1986 remove_channel!(self, chan)
1988 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1991 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1992 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
1993 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1994 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1995 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2000 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
2003 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2004 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2005 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2006 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2007 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
2008 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2009 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2010 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2011 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2021 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2022 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2023 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2025 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2026 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2027 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2030 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2031 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2032 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2034 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2035 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2036 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2037 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2038 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2041 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2042 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2043 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2044 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2045 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2049 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2050 /// local transaction(s).
2051 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2052 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2053 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2057 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2058 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2060 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2061 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != cltv_expiry {
2062 return Err(ReceiveError {
2063 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value",
2065 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2068 // final_expiry_too_soon
2069 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2070 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2071 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2072 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2073 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2074 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2075 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2076 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2077 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2078 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2079 return Err(ReceiveError {
2080 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2081 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2084 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2085 return Err(ReceiveError {
2087 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2088 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2092 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2093 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2094 return Err(ReceiveError {
2095 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2096 err_data: Vec::new(),
2097 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2100 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
2101 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2102 return Err(ReceiveError {
2103 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2104 err_data: Vec::new(),
2105 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2107 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2108 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2110 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2111 phantom_shared_secret,
2113 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2114 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2115 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2116 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2117 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2118 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2119 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2120 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2121 return Err(ReceiveError {
2122 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2123 err_data: Vec::new(),
2124 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2128 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2130 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2133 return Err(ReceiveError {
2134 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2135 err_data: Vec::new(),
2136 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2141 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2144 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2145 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2146 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_msat,
2147 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2151 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2152 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2153 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2155 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2156 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2157 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2158 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2159 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2160 failure_code: $err_code,
2166 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2167 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2170 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key).secret_bytes();
2172 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2173 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2174 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2175 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2176 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2177 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2178 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2179 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2181 macro_rules! return_err {
2182 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2184 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2185 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2186 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2187 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2188 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2189 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2195 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2197 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2198 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2200 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2201 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2205 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2206 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2208 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2210 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2211 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2212 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2213 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2214 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2216 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2219 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2220 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2221 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2223 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2224 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2225 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2228 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2229 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2230 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2231 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2235 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2236 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2237 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2240 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2241 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2242 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2243 outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2244 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2249 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref outgoing_amt_msat, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2250 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2251 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2252 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2253 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2254 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2255 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
2256 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2257 let forwarding_id_opt = match id_option {
2258 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2259 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2260 // phantom or an intercept.
2261 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2262 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2263 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)
2267 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2270 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => Some(chan_id.clone()),
2272 let chan_update_opt = if let Some(forwarding_id) = forwarding_id_opt {
2273 let chan = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2275 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and by_id maps have
2276 // no consistency guarantees.
2277 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2281 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2282 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2283 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2284 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2285 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2287 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2288 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2289 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2290 // we don't have the channel here.
2291 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2293 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2295 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2296 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2297 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2298 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2299 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2300 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2301 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2303 if *outgoing_amt_msat < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2304 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2306 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *outgoing_amt_msat, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2307 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2311 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
2312 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
2313 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
2314 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
2316 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2323 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2324 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2325 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2326 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2327 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2328 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2330 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2331 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2333 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2334 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2335 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2336 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2337 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2338 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2339 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2340 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2341 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2342 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2348 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2349 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2350 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2351 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2353 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2354 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2356 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2357 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2358 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2360 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2361 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2362 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2363 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
2364 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
2365 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
2366 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
2370 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2375 pending_forward_info
2378 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2379 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2380 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2382 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2383 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2384 if !chan.should_announce() {
2385 return Err(LightningError {
2386 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2387 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2390 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2391 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2393 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2394 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2397 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2398 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2399 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2400 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2401 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2402 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2403 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2404 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2405 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2409 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2411 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2412 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2413 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2415 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2416 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2418 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2419 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2420 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2421 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2422 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2423 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2424 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2425 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2428 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
2429 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
2431 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2437 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2438 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2439 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2440 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2441 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2443 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2444 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2445 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2446 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2447 return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2449 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2451 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2453 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2454 let id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2455 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2456 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
2459 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2460 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2461 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
2463 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
2464 return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
2466 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2467 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2469 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2470 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2472 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2473 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2475 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2476 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2477 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2480 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2481 let update_err = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
2482 let chan_id = chan.get().channel_id();
2484 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_err, chan,
2485 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true))
2487 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure, Err(e)) => break Err(e),
2488 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed, Ok(())) => {},
2489 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress, Err(_)) => {
2490 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
2491 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
2492 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
2493 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
2494 // which we do in the send_payment check for
2495 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
2496 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
2498 _ => unreachable!(),
2501 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan_id));
2502 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2503 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2504 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2505 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2506 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2507 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2508 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2517 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
2518 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the `by_id` map.
2519 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
2520 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
2525 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2526 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2528 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2533 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2535 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
2536 /// fields for more info.
2538 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
2539 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
2540 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
2541 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a second payment with the same
2544 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
2545 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
2546 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
2547 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
2548 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
2550 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
2551 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
2553 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2554 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2555 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
2557 /// In general, a path may raise:
2558 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2559 /// node public key) is specified.
2560 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2561 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2563 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2564 /// relevant updates.
2566 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2567 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2568 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2570 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
2571 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
2572 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
2573 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
2576 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
2577 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
2578 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2580 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2581 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
2582 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2583 let onion_session_privs = self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, *payment_secret, payment_id, route)?;
2584 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None, payment_id, None, onion_session_privs)
2588 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2589 self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, route)
2592 fn add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2593 let mut onion_session_privs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2594 for _ in 0..route.paths.len() {
2595 onion_session_privs.push(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
2598 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2599 match pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
2600 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => Err(PaymentSendFailure::DuplicatePayment),
2601 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2602 let payment = entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2603 session_privs: HashSet::new(),
2604 pending_amt_msat: 0,
2605 pending_fee_msat: Some(0),
2608 starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
2609 total_msat: route.get_total_amount(),
2612 for (path, session_priv_bytes) in route.paths.iter().zip(onion_session_privs.iter()) {
2613 assert!(payment.insert(*session_priv_bytes, path));
2616 Ok(onion_session_privs)
2621 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2622 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
2623 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
2625 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
2626 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
2628 let mut total_value = 0;
2629 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2630 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2631 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
2632 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
2633 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
2634 continue 'path_check;
2636 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
2637 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
2638 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
2639 continue 'path_check;
2642 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2643 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
2645 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
2646 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
2648 if let Some(amt_msat) = recv_value_msat {
2649 debug_assert!(amt_msat >= total_value);
2650 total_value = amt_msat;
2653 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2654 let mut results = Vec::new();
2655 debug_assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), onion_session_privs.len());
2656 for (path, session_priv) in route.paths.iter().zip(onion_session_privs.into_iter()) {
2657 let mut path_res = self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &route.payment_params, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage, session_priv);
2660 Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress) => {
2661 // While a MonitorUpdateInProgress is an Err(_), the payment is still
2662 // considered "in flight" and we shouldn't remove it from the
2663 // PendingOutboundPayment set.
2666 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2667 if let Some(payment) = pending_outbounds.get_mut(&payment_id) {
2668 let removed = payment.remove(&session_priv, Some(path));
2669 debug_assert!(removed, "This can't happen as the payment has an entry for this path added by callers");
2671 debug_assert!(false, "This can't happen as the payment was added by callers");
2672 path_res = Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Internal error: payment disappeared during processing. Please report this bug!".to_owned() });
2676 results.push(path_res);
2678 let mut has_ok = false;
2679 let mut has_err = false;
2680 let mut pending_amt_unsent = 0;
2681 let mut max_unsent_cltv_delta = 0;
2682 for (res, path) in results.iter().zip(route.paths.iter()) {
2683 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
2684 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
2685 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress) = res {
2686 // MonitorUpdateInProgress is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
2690 } else if res.is_err() {
2691 pending_amt_unsent += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2692 max_unsent_cltv_delta = cmp::max(max_unsent_cltv_delta, path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta);
2695 if has_err && has_ok {
2696 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure {
2699 failed_paths_retry: if pending_amt_unsent != 0 {
2700 if let Some(payment_params) = &route.payment_params {
2701 Some(RouteParameters {
2702 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2703 final_value_msat: pending_amt_unsent,
2704 final_cltv_expiry_delta: max_unsent_cltv_delta,
2710 // If we failed to send any paths, we should remove the new PaymentId from the
2711 // `pending_outbound_payments` map, as the user isn't expected to `abandon_payment`.
2712 let removed = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&payment_id).is_some();
2713 debug_assert!(removed, "We should always have a pending payment to remove here");
2714 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedResendSafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
2720 /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2722 /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2723 /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2724 /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, if the payment
2725 /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success), or if
2726 /// further retries have been disabled with [`abandon_payment`].
2728 /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2729 /// [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]
2730 pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2731 const RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE: u64 = 10;
2732 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2733 if path.len() == 0 {
2734 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2735 err: "length-0 path in route".to_string()
2740 let mut onion_session_privs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2741 for _ in 0..route.paths.len() {
2742 onion_session_privs.push(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
2745 let (total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret) = {
2746 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2747 match outbounds.get_mut(&payment_id) {
2749 let res = match payment {
2750 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2751 total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret, pending_amt_msat, ..
2753 let retry_amt_msat: u64 = route.paths.iter().map(|path| path.last().unwrap().fee_msat).sum();
2754 if retry_amt_msat + *pending_amt_msat > *total_msat * (100 + RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE) / 100 {
2755 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2756 err: format!("retry_amt_msat of {} will put pending_amt_msat (currently: {}) more than 10% over total_payment_amt_msat of {}", retry_amt_msat, pending_amt_msat, total_msat).to_string()
2759 (*total_msat, *payment_hash, *payment_secret)
2761 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => {
2762 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2763 err: "Unable to retry payments that were initially sent on LDK versions prior to 0.0.102".to_string()
2766 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {
2767 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2768 err: "Payment already completed".to_owned()
2771 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {
2772 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2773 err: "Payment already abandoned (with some HTLCs still pending)".to_owned()
2777 for (path, session_priv_bytes) in route.paths.iter().zip(onion_session_privs.iter()) {
2778 assert!(payment.insert(*session_priv_bytes, path));
2783 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2784 err: format!("Payment with ID {} not found", log_bytes!(payment_id.0)),
2788 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, payment_id, Some(total_msat), onion_session_privs)
2791 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur.
2793 /// After this method returns, no future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id`
2794 /// are allowed. If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be
2795 /// generated as soon as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
2797 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2798 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2799 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2801 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
2802 /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, the payment may still be in the pending state
2803 /// upon restart. This allows further calls to [`retry_payment`] (and requiring a second call
2804 /// to [`abandon_payment`] to mark the payment as failed again). Otherwise, future calls to
2805 /// [`retry_payment`] will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`].
2807 /// [`abandon_payment`]: Self::abandon_payment
2808 /// [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment
2809 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2810 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2811 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2812 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2814 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2815 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
2816 if let Ok(()) = payment.get_mut().mark_abandoned() {
2817 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
2818 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2820 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
2828 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2829 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2830 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2831 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2832 /// never reach the recipient.
2834 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
2835 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
2837 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2838 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2840 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2842 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2843 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2844 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
2846 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
2848 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
2849 let onion_session_privs = self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, None, payment_id, &route)?;
2851 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage), payment_id, None, onion_session_privs) {
2852 Ok(()) => Ok(payment_hash),
2857 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
2858 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
2859 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
2860 pub fn send_probe(&self, hops: Vec<RouteHop>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2861 let payment_id = PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
2863 let payment_hash = self.probing_cookie_from_id(&payment_id);
2866 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2867 err: "No need probing a path with less than two hops".to_string()
2871 let route = Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None };
2872 let onion_session_privs = self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, None, payment_id, &route)?;
2874 match self.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &None, None, payment_id, None, onion_session_privs) {
2875 Ok(()) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2880 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
2882 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
2883 let target_payment_hash = self.probing_cookie_from_id(payment_id);
2884 target_payment_hash == *payment_hash
2887 /// Returns the 'probing cookie' for the given [`PaymentId`].
2888 fn probing_cookie_from_id(&self, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> PaymentHash {
2889 let mut preimage = [0u8; 64];
2890 preimage[..32].copy_from_slice(&self.probing_cookie_secret);
2891 preimage[32..].copy_from_slice(&payment_id.0);
2892 PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage).into_inner())
2895 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2896 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2897 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2898 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], _counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2899 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2901 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2903 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2905 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2906 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2907 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2908 } else { unreachable!(); })
2911 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2913 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2914 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2917 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2918 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2923 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2924 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2925 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2928 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2929 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2930 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2932 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2933 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
2934 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
2935 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
2944 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2945 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2946 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2950 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2952 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2953 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2955 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
2956 /// across the p2p network.
2958 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2959 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2961 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2962 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2963 /// keys per-channel).
2965 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2966 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2967 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2969 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2970 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2971 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2973 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
2974 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
2975 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
2976 /// for more details.
2978 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2979 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2980 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2981 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2983 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2984 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2985 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2986 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2991 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2992 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools at the next block. However, the modules
2993 // constituting our Lightning node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if
2994 // the wallet module is in advance on the LDK view, allow one more block of headroom.
2995 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 2 {
2996 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2997 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3001 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
3002 let mut output_index = None;
3003 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3004 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3005 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
3006 if output_index.is_some() {
3007 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3008 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3011 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
3012 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3013 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3016 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3019 if output_index.is_none() {
3020 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3021 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3024 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
3028 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
3030 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3031 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3032 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3033 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3035 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3036 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3038 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3039 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3041 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3043 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3044 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3045 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3046 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3047 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3048 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3049 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3050 pub fn update_channel_config(
3051 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
3052 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3053 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
3054 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3055 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3059 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
3060 &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
3063 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3064 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3065 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3066 let channel_counterparty_node_id = channel_state.by_id.get(channel_id)
3067 .ok_or(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3068 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found", log_bytes!(*channel_id)),
3070 .get_counterparty_node_id();
3071 if channel_counterparty_node_id != *counterparty_node_id {
3072 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3073 err: "counterparty node id mismatch".to_owned(),
3077 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3078 let channel = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
3079 if !channel.update_config(config) {
3082 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3083 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3084 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3085 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3086 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3095 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
3096 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
3098 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
3099 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
3101 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
3102 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
3103 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
3104 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
3105 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
3107 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
3108 /// you from forwarding more than you received.
3110 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3113 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
3114 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3115 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
3116 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
3117 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], _next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3118 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3120 let next_hop_scid = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
3122 if !chan.is_usable() {
3123 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3124 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
3127 chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.outbound_scid_alias())
3129 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3130 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
3134 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3135 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3136 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3139 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
3140 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
3141 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
3143 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3145 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
3146 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
3149 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
3150 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3151 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3152 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
3153 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
3155 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
3159 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
3160 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
3162 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3165 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3166 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3167 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3169 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3170 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3171 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3174 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
3175 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3176 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3177 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3178 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
3179 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3180 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3183 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
3184 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
3185 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3186 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3191 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3193 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3194 /// Will likely generate further events.
3195 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3196 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3198 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
3199 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3200 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3202 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3203 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3205 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3206 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3207 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3209 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3210 match forward_info {
3211 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3212 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3213 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3214 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3215 outgoing_cltv_value, incoming_amt_msat: _
3218 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3219 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3220 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3222 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3223 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3224 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3225 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3226 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3227 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3230 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3231 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3233 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3236 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3237 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3243 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3244 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3246 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3250 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3251 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3253 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3257 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3258 let phantom_secret_res = self.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3259 if phantom_secret_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3260 let phantom_shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &phantom_secret_res.unwrap()).secret_bytes();
3261 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3263 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3264 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3265 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3266 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3267 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3269 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3271 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3272 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3276 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3277 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3278 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3279 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3285 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3288 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3291 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3292 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3293 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3294 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3295 // problem, not ours.
3301 let forward_chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3302 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
3304 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3308 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3309 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3310 match channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3311 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3312 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3315 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3316 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3317 match forward_info {
3318 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3319 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
3320 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3321 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3322 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, incoming_amt_msat: _,
3325 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3326 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3327 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3328 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3329 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3330 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3331 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3332 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3334 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
3335 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
3336 onion_packet, &self.logger)
3338 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3339 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3341 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3343 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3344 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3345 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3346 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3351 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3352 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3354 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3355 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3356 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
3357 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
3359 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3360 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3362 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
3364 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3365 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3366 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3375 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3376 match forward_info {
3377 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3378 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3379 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3380 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, ..
3383 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3384 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3385 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3386 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data }, Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret)
3388 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3389 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None, None),
3391 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3394 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3395 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3396 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3397 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3398 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3399 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3400 phantom_shared_secret,
3402 value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3404 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3409 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3410 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3411 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3412 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3413 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
3415 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3416 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3417 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3418 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3419 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3420 phantom_shared_secret,
3422 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
3423 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3427 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
3428 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3429 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3430 receiver_node_id = self.keys_manager.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3431 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3434 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3435 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3436 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
3438 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3439 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3440 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3443 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3444 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3445 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3448 let (_, htlcs) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3449 .or_insert_with(|| (purpose(), Vec::new()));
3450 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3451 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3452 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3453 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3457 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.value;
3458 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3459 total_value += htlc.value;
3460 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3461 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3462 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3463 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3464 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3465 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3467 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3469 _ => unreachable!(),
3472 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data.total_msat {
3473 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3474 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data.total_msat);
3475 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3476 } else if total_value == $payment_data.total_msat {
3477 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3478 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3479 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3480 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3483 amount_msat: total_value,
3484 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3485 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3487 payment_claimable_generated = true;
3489 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3490 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3492 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3494 payment_claimable_generated
3498 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3499 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3500 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3501 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3502 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3503 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3504 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3505 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3506 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3507 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3508 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3509 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3510 let payment_preimage = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3511 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
3513 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3517 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3519 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3520 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3521 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3522 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3525 match claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
3526 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3527 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3528 e.insert((purpose.clone(), vec![claimable_htlc]));
3529 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3530 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3531 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3533 amount_msat: outgoing_amt_msat,
3535 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3536 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3539 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3540 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3541 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3547 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3548 if payment_data.is_none() {
3549 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3550 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3553 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3554 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3555 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3556 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3557 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3558 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3559 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3560 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3562 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3563 if payment_claimable_generated {
3564 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3570 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3571 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3579 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3580 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3582 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3584 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
3585 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
3586 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
3588 self.check_free_holding_cells();
3590 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3591 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3592 events.append(&mut new_events);
3595 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3597 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3598 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3600 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3601 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3602 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3603 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3604 if background_events.is_empty() {
3608 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3610 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3611 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3612 // monitor updating completing.
3613 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
3620 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3621 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3622 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3623 self.process_background_events();
3626 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
3627 if !chan.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
3628 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3629 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3630 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3631 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3632 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3634 if !chan.is_live() {
3635 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3636 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3637 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3639 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3640 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3642 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.logger);
3643 NotifyOption::DoPersist
3647 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3648 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3649 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3650 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3651 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3652 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3653 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3655 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3657 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3658 for (chan_id, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter_mut() {
3659 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3660 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3667 fn remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self) {
3668 // If an outbound payment was completed, and no pending HTLCs remain, we should remove it
3669 // from the map. However, if we did that immediately when the last payment HTLC is claimed,
3670 // this could race the user making a duplicate send_payment call and our idempotency
3671 // guarantees would be violated. Instead, we wait a few timer ticks to do the actual
3672 // removal. This should be more than sufficient to ensure the idempotency of any
3673 // `send_payment` calls that were made at the same time the `PaymentSent` event was being
3675 let mut pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3676 let pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3677 pending_outbound_payments.retain(|payment_id, payment| {
3678 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, timer_ticks_without_htlcs, .. } = payment {
3679 let mut no_remaining_entries = session_privs.is_empty();
3680 if no_remaining_entries {
3681 for ev in pending_events.iter() {
3683 events::Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: Some(ev_payment_id), .. } |
3684 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ev_payment_id, .. } |
3685 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_id: Some(ev_payment_id), .. } => {
3686 if payment_id == ev_payment_id {
3687 no_remaining_entries = false;
3695 if no_remaining_entries {
3696 *timer_ticks_without_htlcs += 1;
3697 *timer_ticks_without_htlcs <= IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3699 *timer_ticks_without_htlcs = 0;
3706 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3708 /// This currently includes:
3709 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3710 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3711 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3713 /// * Expiring a channel's previous `ChannelConfig` if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3714 /// with the current `ChannelConfig`.
3716 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3717 /// estimate fetches.
3718 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3719 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3720 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3721 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3723 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3725 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
3726 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3728 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3729 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3730 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3731 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3732 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3733 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3735 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3736 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3737 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
3738 if needs_close { return false; }
3741 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3742 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3743 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3744 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3745 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3746 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3747 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3748 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3752 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3753 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3755 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3756 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3757 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3761 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3762 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3767 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
3773 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
3774 if htlcs.is_empty() {
3775 // This should be unreachable
3776 debug_assert!(false);
3779 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3780 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3781 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3782 if htlcs[0].total_msat == htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.value) {
3784 } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| {
3785 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3786 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3788 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.drain(..).map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
3795 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3796 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
3797 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
3798 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
3799 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
3802 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3803 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3806 self.remove_stale_resolved_payments();
3808 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
3809 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
3810 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
3811 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
3812 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3819 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3820 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3821 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3823 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
3824 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
3825 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
3826 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
3828 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
3829 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
3830 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
3831 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
3832 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
3833 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3835 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3836 if let Some((_, mut sources)) = removed_source {
3837 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3838 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3839 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
3840 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
3841 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
3842 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
3843 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3848 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3849 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3851 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3853 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3854 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3855 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3856 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3857 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3858 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3859 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3861 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3863 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3864 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3866 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3871 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3872 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3873 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3874 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
3875 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
3876 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
3877 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3878 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
3879 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
3880 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3882 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3883 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3884 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3885 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
3887 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
3888 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
3889 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
3890 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
3891 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3895 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3896 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3897 // be surfaced to the user.
3898 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
3899 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
3900 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
3902 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
3903 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3904 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3905 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
3907 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3910 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3911 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
3912 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
3913 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3917 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3918 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
3919 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
3920 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3922 // Ensure that the `channel_state` lock is not held when calling this function.
3923 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock_order requirement for
3924 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `channel_state` lock, which calling this
3925 // function with the `channel_state` locked would.
3926 assert!(self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
3929 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3930 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3931 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3934 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3935 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3936 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3938 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => {
3939 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3940 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3941 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3942 let mut all_paths_failed = false;
3943 let mut full_failure_ev = None;
3944 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(*payment_id) {
3945 if !payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
3946 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3949 if payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3950 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received failure of HTLC with payment_hash {} after payment completion", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3953 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3954 all_paths_failed = true;
3955 if payment.get().abandoned() {
3956 full_failure_ev = Some(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3957 payment_id: *payment_id,
3958 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3964 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3967 let mut retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
3968 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3969 Some(RouteParameters {
3970 payment_params: payment_params_data.clone(),
3971 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3972 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3975 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3977 let path_failure = {
3979 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_error.decode_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source);
3981 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_error.decode_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source);
3983 if self.payment_is_probe(payment_hash, &payment_id) {
3984 if !payment_retryable {
3985 events::Event::ProbeSuccessful {
3986 payment_id: *payment_id,
3987 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3991 events::Event::ProbeFailed {
3992 payment_id: *payment_id,
3993 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3999 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
4000 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
4001 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
4002 if let Some(scid) = short_channel_id {
4003 retry.as_mut().map(|r| r.payment_params.previously_failed_channels.push(scid));
4005 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
4006 payment_id: Some(*payment_id),
4007 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
4008 payment_failed_permanently: !payment_retryable,
4015 error_code: onion_error_code,
4017 error_data: onion_error_data
4021 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4022 pending_events.push(path_failure);
4023 if let Some(ev) = full_failure_ev { pending_events.push(ev); }
4025 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
4026 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
4027 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
4029 let mut forward_event = None;
4030 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4031 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4032 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
4034 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
4035 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4036 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
4038 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4039 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
4042 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
4043 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4044 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
4045 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4046 time_forwardable: time
4049 pending_events.push(events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
4050 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
4051 failed_next_destination: destination,
4057 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
4058 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
4060 /// Note that calling this method does *not* guarantee that the payment has been claimed. You
4061 /// *must* wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] event which upon a successful claim will be
4062 /// provided to your [`EventHandler`] when [`process_pending_events`] is next called.
4064 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
4065 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
4066 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
4067 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
4069 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
4070 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
4071 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
4072 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4073 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4074 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4075 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4077 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4080 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4081 if let Some((payment_purpose, sources)) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
4082 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4083 for htlc in sources.iter() {
4084 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4085 let phantom_pubkey = self.keys_manager.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4086 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4087 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
4092 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
4093 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: sources.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
4094 payment_purpose, receiver_node_id,
4096 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
4097 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
4098 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
4099 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4104 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
4106 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we check that all channels which contain a claimable
4107 // HTLC still exist. While this isn't guaranteed to remain true if a channel closes while
4108 // we're claiming (or even after we claim, before the commitment update dance completes),
4109 // it should be a relatively rare race, and we'd rather not claim HTLCs that require us to
4110 // go on-chain (and lose the on-chain fee to do so) than just reject the payment.
4112 // Note that we'll still always get our funds - as long as the generated
4113 // `ChannelMonitorUpdate` makes it out to the relevant monitor we can claim on-chain.
4115 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
4116 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
4117 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
4118 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
4119 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
4121 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
4122 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
4123 let mut valid_mpp = true;
4124 let mut errs = Vec::new();
4125 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
4126 for htlc in sources.iter() {
4127 let chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4128 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
4135 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_id) {
4140 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
4141 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4142 debug_assert!(false);
4146 expected_amt_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
4147 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
4148 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
4149 // that there's one payment here and move on.
4150 if sources.len() != 1 {
4151 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
4152 debug_assert!(false);
4158 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
4160 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4161 mem::drop(channel_state);
4162 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4163 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4166 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4167 mem::drop(channel_state);
4168 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4169 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4170 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4174 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4175 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
4176 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.take().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop,
4178 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
4180 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4181 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4182 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4183 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4184 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4188 mem::drop(channel_state);
4190 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4191 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4192 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4193 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4194 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
4195 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
4196 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4198 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4201 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
4202 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4203 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4204 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4208 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
4209 mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>,
4210 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
4211 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
4212 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4214 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
4215 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4216 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4217 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4218 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
4219 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
4220 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
4221 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4222 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4224 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
4225 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4226 payment_preimage, e);
4227 let err = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err();
4228 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4229 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)));
4230 return Err((counterparty_node_id, err));
4233 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
4234 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
4235 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4236 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4237 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4238 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4239 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4240 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
4241 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4242 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4248 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4249 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)));
4255 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
4256 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4257 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4259 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4260 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4261 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same update and try
4262 // again on restart.
4263 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
4264 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
4265 payment_preimage, e);
4268 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
4270 chan.remove_entry();
4272 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4273 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
4274 Err((counterparty_node_id, res))
4278 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4279 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4280 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4284 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4285 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
4286 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, preimage_update);
4287 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4288 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4289 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4290 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
4291 // again on restart.
4292 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4293 payment_preimage, update_res);
4295 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4296 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
4297 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
4298 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
4299 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
4300 // `PaymentForwarded`).
4301 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
4306 fn finalize_claims(&self, mut sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4307 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4308 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4309 for source in sources.drain(..) {
4310 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } = source {
4311 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4312 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4313 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4314 assert!(payment.get().is_fulfilled());
4315 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, None) {
4316 pending_events.push(
4317 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4319 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash(),
4329 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4331 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4332 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4333 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4334 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4335 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4336 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4337 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4338 if !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
4339 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4340 let fee_paid_msat = payment.get().get_pending_fee_msat();
4341 pending_events.push(
4342 events::Event::PaymentSent {
4343 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
4349 payment.get_mut().mark_fulfilled();
4353 // We currently immediately remove HTLCs which were fulfilled on-chain.
4354 // This could potentially lead to removing a pending payment too early,
4355 // with a reorg of one block causing us to re-add the fulfilled payment on
4357 // TODO: We should have a second monitor event that informs us of payments
4358 // irrevocably fulfilled.
4359 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
4360 let payment_hash = Some(PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()));
4361 pending_events.push(
4362 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4371 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
4374 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4375 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4376 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage,
4377 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
4378 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4379 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4380 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4383 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4384 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
4386 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4388 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4394 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
4395 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4396 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4402 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4403 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4404 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4407 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
4408 for action in actions.into_iter() {
4410 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
4411 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4412 if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
4413 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4414 payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4418 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event } => {
4419 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(event);
4425 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
4426 /// update completion.
4427 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4428 channel: &mut Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
4429 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
4430 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
4431 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
4432 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
4433 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
4435 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get_counterparty_node_id();
4436 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4437 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.outbound_scid_alias()),
4438 channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
4441 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4442 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
4444 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
4445 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4446 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4451 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
4453 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
4454 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
4455 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4456 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4461 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
4462 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
4463 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4464 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4465 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4470 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
4474 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
4480 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
4481 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
4482 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4488 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
4489 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4492 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims, counterparty_node_id) = {
4493 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4494 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4495 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4496 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4497 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4499 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4503 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4504 let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
4505 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() {
4506 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
4507 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
4508 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
4509 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
4511 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()) {
4512 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4513 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4518 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(&mut channel_state.pending_msg_events, channel.get_mut(), updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready, updates.announcement_sigs);
4519 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4520 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4523 (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs, counterparty_node_id)
4525 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
4526 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
4528 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
4529 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4530 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id: funding_txo.to_channel_id() };
4531 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
4535 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4537 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4538 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4541 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4542 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4543 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4545 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4546 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4547 /// used to accept such channels.
4549 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4550 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4551 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4552 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4555 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4556 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4558 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4559 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4560 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4562 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4563 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4565 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4566 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4568 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4569 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4571 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4572 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4573 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4574 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4577 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4578 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4580 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4581 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4582 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4583 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4584 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4585 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4587 if *counterparty_node_id != channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id() {
4588 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
4591 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4592 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4593 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4594 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4595 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4596 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4599 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4600 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4601 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4604 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4605 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4606 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4609 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4610 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist".to_owned() });
4616 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4617 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4618 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4621 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4622 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4625 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
4626 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
4627 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
4629 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4630 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager,
4631 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &their_features, msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration,
4632 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4635 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4636 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4640 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4641 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4642 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4643 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4644 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4645 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4647 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4648 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4649 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4650 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4652 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4653 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4654 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4657 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4658 pending_events.push(
4659 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4660 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4661 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4662 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4663 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4664 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4669 entry.insert(channel);
4675 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4676 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4677 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4678 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4679 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4680 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4681 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4682 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4684 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &their_features), chan);
4685 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4687 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4690 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4691 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4692 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4693 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4694 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4696 user_channel_id: user_id,
4701 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4702 let ((funding_msg, monitor, mut channel_ready), mut chan) = {
4703 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4704 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4705 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4706 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4707 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4708 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4709 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4711 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.keys_manager, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
4713 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4716 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
4717 // lock before watch_channel
4718 match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
4719 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4720 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
4721 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4722 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4723 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4724 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4725 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
4726 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
4727 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4728 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(false);
4729 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4730 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
4732 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
4733 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4734 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4735 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4736 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4737 chan.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, channel_ready.is_some(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4738 channel_ready = None; // Don't send the channel_ready now
4741 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4742 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4743 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4744 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4745 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4747 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4748 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4749 match id_to_peer.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
4750 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4751 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4752 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
4753 funding_msg.channel_id))
4755 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
4756 i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
4759 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4760 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4763 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4764 send_channel_ready!(self, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
4772 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4774 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4775 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4776 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4777 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4778 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4779 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4780 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4782 let (monitor, funding_tx, channel_ready) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.keys_manager, &self.logger) {
4783 Ok(update) => update,
4784 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan),
4786 match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
4787 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4789 let mut res = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, channel_ready.is_some(), OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED);
4790 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4791 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4792 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4793 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4794 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4795 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4801 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4802 send_channel_ready!(self, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get(), msg);
4806 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4809 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
4810 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
4814 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4815 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4816 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4817 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4818 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4819 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4820 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4822 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, self.get_our_node_id(),
4823 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
4824 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4825 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4826 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4827 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4828 msg: announcement_sigs,
4830 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4831 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4832 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4833 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4834 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4835 // announcement_signatures.
4836 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4837 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4838 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4839 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4845 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, chan.get_mut());
4849 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4853 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4854 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4855 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4856 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4857 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4859 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4860 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4861 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4862 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4865 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4866 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4867 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4868 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4871 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), chan_entry);
4872 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4874 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4875 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
4876 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
4877 let (result, is_permanent) =
4878 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
4880 remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
4885 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4886 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4887 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4894 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4897 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4898 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
4899 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
4900 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4903 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
4907 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4908 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4909 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4910 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4911 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4912 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4913 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4914 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4916 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
4917 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4918 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4919 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4924 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4925 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4926 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4927 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4928 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4929 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
4930 } else { (tx, None) }
4932 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4935 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4936 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4937 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4939 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4940 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4941 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4942 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4946 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4951 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4952 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4953 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4954 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4956 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4957 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4958 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4959 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4961 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4962 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4963 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4965 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4966 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4967 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4968 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4971 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4972 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4973 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4974 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4975 match pending_forward_info {
4976 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4977 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4978 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
4979 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
4981 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
4982 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
4983 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4984 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4985 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4988 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4990 _ => pending_forward_info
4993 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
4995 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5000 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5001 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5002 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
5003 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5004 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5005 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5006 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5007 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5009 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
5011 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5014 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
5018 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5019 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5020 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5021 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5022 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5023 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5024 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5026 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
5028 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5033 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5034 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5035 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5036 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5037 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5038 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5039 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5041 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
5042 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
5043 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
5045 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
5048 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5052 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5053 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5054 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5055 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5056 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5057 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5058 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5060 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
5061 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
5062 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan),
5063 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
5064 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
5065 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
5066 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan);
5071 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
5072 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some()) {
5076 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5077 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5078 msg: revoke_and_ack,
5080 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
5081 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5082 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5083 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
5084 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5085 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5086 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5087 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5089 commitment_signed: msg,
5095 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5100 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
5101 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
5102 let mut forward_event = None;
5103 let mut new_intercept_events = Vec::new();
5104 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
5105 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5106 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5107 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
5108 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
5109 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
5110 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
5112 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
5113 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
5115 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5116 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
5117 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
5118 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5119 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5120 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
5122 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5123 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
5124 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
5126 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
5127 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5128 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
5129 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5130 new_intercept_events.push(events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
5131 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
5132 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
5133 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
5134 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
5137 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5138 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
5140 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5141 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
5142 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5143 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5144 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5145 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5146 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
5147 phantom_shared_secret: None,
5150 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
5151 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
5152 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
5157 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
5158 // payments are being processed.
5159 if forward_htlcs_empty {
5160 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
5162 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5163 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
5170 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
5171 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
5174 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
5175 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5176 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
5179 match forward_event {
5181 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5182 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5183 time_forwardable: time
5191 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5192 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
5194 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5195 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5196 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5197 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5198 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5199 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5201 let was_paused_for_mon_update = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
5202 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
5203 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5204 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
5205 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update);
5206 if was_paused_for_mon_update {
5207 assert!(update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
5208 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
5209 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
5210 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
5211 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
5212 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Existing pending monitor update prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
5214 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5215 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan,
5216 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
5217 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(), false,
5218 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
5219 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
5221 } else { unreachable!(); }
5223 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
5224 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5225 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5229 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
5230 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
5231 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
5232 .unwrap_or(chan.get().outbound_scid_alias()),
5233 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
5234 chan.get().get_user_id()))
5236 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5239 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5241 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
5242 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, user_channel_id)) =>
5244 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
5245 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: channel_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5246 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
5248 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, user_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
5249 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
5256 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5257 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5258 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5259 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5260 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5261 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5262 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5264 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
5266 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5271 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5272 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5273 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5275 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5276 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5277 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5278 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5280 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
5281 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
5284 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5285 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5286 self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), msg), chan),
5287 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5288 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5289 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
5292 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5297 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5298 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5299 let chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5300 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
5302 // It's not a local channel
5303 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5306 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5307 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5308 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5309 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5310 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5311 if chan.get().should_announce() {
5312 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5313 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5314 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5315 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5317 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5319 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5320 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5321 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5322 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5324 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5325 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
5328 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5330 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5333 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5335 let need_lnd_workaround = {
5336 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5337 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5339 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5340 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5341 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5342 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5344 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5345 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5346 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5347 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5348 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5349 msg, &self.logger, self.our_network_pubkey.clone(), self.genesis_hash,
5350 &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
5351 let mut channel_update = None;
5352 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5353 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5354 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5357 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5358 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5359 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5360 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5361 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5362 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5363 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5368 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5369 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
5370 &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5371 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5372 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5373 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5377 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5381 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
5382 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
5385 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5386 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5391 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
5392 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5393 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5394 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5395 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5396 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5397 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5398 match monitor_event {
5399 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5400 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5401 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5402 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5404 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5405 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5406 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5407 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5410 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5411 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5412 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5413 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5414 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5415 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5416 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5417 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5418 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5419 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5420 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5424 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5425 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5427 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5429 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5430 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5431 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5432 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5433 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5438 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5439 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
5445 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5446 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5449 has_pending_monitor_events
5452 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5453 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5454 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5456 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5457 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
5460 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5461 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5462 /// update was applied.
5463 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5464 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5465 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5466 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5468 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5469 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5470 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5471 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5473 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5474 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
5475 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
5476 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5478 holding_cell_failed_htlcs,
5480 chan.get_counterparty_node_id()
5483 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
5484 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
5485 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
5486 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5487 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5488 updates: commitment_update,
5492 has_monitor_update = true;
5493 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, channel_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
5494 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
5495 if close_channel { return false; }
5502 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5503 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5504 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
5511 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5512 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5513 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5516 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5517 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5523 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5524 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5525 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5526 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5527 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5528 let mut has_update = false;
5530 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5531 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5532 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5533 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5535 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5536 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5537 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5538 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5540 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5541 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5544 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5545 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5546 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5547 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5548 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5553 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5555 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5556 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5557 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
5563 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5564 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5571 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5572 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5578 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5579 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5581 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5582 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5583 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5584 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5585 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5586 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5587 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5588 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5589 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5590 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5591 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5592 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5593 assert!(should_broadcast);
5594 } else { unreachable!(); }
5595 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5597 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5601 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5602 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5604 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5605 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5608 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5610 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5611 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5612 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5613 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5614 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5615 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5616 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5617 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5618 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5619 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5620 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5621 // never fail a payment too early.
5622 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5624 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5627 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5632 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5635 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5636 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5638 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
5639 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5640 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5642 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5644 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5645 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5649 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5650 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5652 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5654 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5655 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5656 /// [`PaymentClaimable::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::payment_preimage
5657 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5658 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5659 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, &self.keys_manager, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5662 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5663 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5665 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5668 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5670 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5672 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5673 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5674 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5675 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5676 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5679 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5680 /// stored external to LDK.
5682 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5683 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5684 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5686 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5687 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5690 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5691 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5692 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5693 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5695 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5696 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5697 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5698 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5699 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5701 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5702 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5703 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
5704 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5705 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
5707 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
5708 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
5710 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5711 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5715 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5716 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5718 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5720 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5721 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5722 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5723 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5726 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5727 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5729 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5732 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5734 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5736 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5737 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5740 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5741 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5743 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5744 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5745 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5748 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5749 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5751 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5752 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5753 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5754 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5756 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
5757 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5758 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
5759 Some(_) => continue,
5760 None => return scid_candidate
5765 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5767 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5768 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5770 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5771 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5772 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5776 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
5777 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
5778 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
5780 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
5781 /// times to get a unique scid.
5782 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5783 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5784 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5786 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
5787 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5788 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
5789 return scid_candidate
5793 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
5794 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
5795 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
5796 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
5798 for chan in self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.values() {
5799 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
5800 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
5801 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
5809 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5810 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5811 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5812 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
5813 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5818 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
5819 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5820 if events.is_empty() { None } else { Some(events.remove(0)) }
5824 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5825 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().is_empty()
5829 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5830 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().clear()
5833 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
5834 /// using the given event handler.
5836 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
5837 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
5840 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock until the returned future completes so that
5841 // we can be sure no other persists happen while processing events.
5842 let _read_guard = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
5844 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5846 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5847 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5848 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5849 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5852 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5853 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5854 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5857 for event in pending_events {
5858 handler(event).await;
5861 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
5862 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
5867 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
5868 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
5869 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5870 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5871 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5874 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5875 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5876 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5877 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5879 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5880 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5881 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5882 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5885 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5886 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5888 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5889 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5892 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5893 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5894 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
5896 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5897 events.replace(pending_events);
5906 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
5908 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
5909 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5910 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5911 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5914 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5916 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5917 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5918 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5919 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5920 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5922 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5923 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5924 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5925 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5928 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5929 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5930 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5933 for event in pending_events {
5934 handler.handle_event(event);
5942 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
5944 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
5945 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5946 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5947 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5950 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5952 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5953 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
5954 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5955 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5956 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5959 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
5960 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
5963 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5964 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5965 let new_height = height - 1;
5967 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5968 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5969 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5970 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5971 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5972 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5975 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5979 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
5981 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
5982 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5983 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5984 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5987 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5988 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5989 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5990 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5992 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5993 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5995 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5996 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger)
5997 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5999 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6000 if height < last_best_block_height {
6001 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6002 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
6006 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6007 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6008 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6009 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6011 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6012 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
6014 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6016 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
6018 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
6020 macro_rules! max_time {
6021 ($timestamp: expr) => {
6023 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
6024 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
6025 // having an explicit local time source.
6026 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
6027 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
6028 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6029 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
6030 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
6036 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
6037 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6038 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
6039 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
6043 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
6044 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6045 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
6046 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
6047 if let (Some(funding_txo), block_hash) = (chan.get_funding_txo(), chan.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
6048 res.push((funding_txo.txid, block_hash));
6054 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
6055 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6056 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
6057 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
6058 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
6059 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
6060 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6061 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6066 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
6068 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
6069 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6070 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6071 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6074 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
6075 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
6077 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
6078 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
6079 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6080 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6081 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6083 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6084 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
6086 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6087 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
6088 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
6089 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
6090 let res = f(channel);
6091 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
6092 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
6093 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
6094 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
6095 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
6097 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
6098 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
6099 if channel.is_usable() {
6100 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6101 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
6102 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6103 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6108 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6112 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
6114 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
6115 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6116 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6117 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6118 msg: announcement_sigs,
6120 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6121 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, height) {
6122 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6124 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6125 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6126 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap(),
6131 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
6132 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6133 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
6134 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
6135 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
6136 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
6137 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
6138 // is always consistent.
6139 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
6140 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
6141 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
6142 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
6143 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
6146 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
6147 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel);
6148 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
6149 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
6150 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
6151 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
6152 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6156 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
6157 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
6158 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6159 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6160 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
6161 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6162 data: reason_message,
6171 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6172 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
6173 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
6174 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
6175 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
6176 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
6177 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
6178 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6179 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6180 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
6182 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
6183 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
6184 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
6188 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
6191 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6192 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
6193 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6194 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6195 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
6196 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
6197 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6198 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6199 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
6202 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
6203 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6204 _ => unreachable!(),
6206 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
6207 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
6208 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
6209 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
6215 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
6217 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
6218 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
6222 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
6223 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
6224 /// [`await_persistable_update`], [`await_persistable_update_timeout`], or a future returned by
6225 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
6227 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
6229 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
6230 /// [`await_persistable_update_timeout`]: Self::await_persistable_update_timeout
6231 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
6232 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
6233 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
6234 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
6237 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
6238 /// [`await_persistable_update`], `await_persistable_update_timeout`, or a future returned by
6239 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
6241 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
6242 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
6243 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
6244 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
6247 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when a persistable update is available. Note that
6248 /// callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this [`ChannelManager`] and
6249 /// should instead register actions to be taken later.
6250 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
6251 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
6254 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6255 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
6256 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
6259 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
6260 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
6261 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
6262 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
6266 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref >
6267 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
6268 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
6269 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6270 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6271 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6274 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
6275 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6276 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6279 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
6280 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6281 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6284 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6285 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6286 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6289 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6290 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6291 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6294 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6295 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6296 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6299 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6300 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6301 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6304 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6305 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6306 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6309 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6310 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6311 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6314 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6315 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6316 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6319 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6320 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6321 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6324 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6325 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6326 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6329 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6330 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6331 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6334 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6335 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6336 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6339 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6340 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6341 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6344 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6345 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6346 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6349 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6350 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6351 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6354 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6359 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6360 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6361 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6364 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
6365 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6366 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6367 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
6369 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6370 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
6371 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
6372 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates. We believe we {} make future connections to this peer.",
6373 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id), if no_connection_possible { "cannot" } else { "can" });
6374 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6375 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6376 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6377 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6378 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
6379 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6382 no_channels_remain = false;
6387 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6389 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6390 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6391 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6392 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6393 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6394 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6395 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6396 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6397 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6398 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6399 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6400 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6401 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6402 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6403 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6404 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6405 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6406 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6407 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6408 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6412 if no_channels_remain {
6413 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
6416 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6417 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6421 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) -> Result<(), ()> {
6422 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
6423 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting with no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6427 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6429 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6432 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6433 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6434 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6435 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6436 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6439 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6440 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6445 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6446 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
6447 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
6448 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6449 let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6450 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6451 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6452 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6453 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6457 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6458 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6459 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6464 if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6465 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()) {
6466 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
6467 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
6468 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6476 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6480 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6481 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6483 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6484 for chan in self.list_channels() {
6485 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
6486 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6487 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6492 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6493 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6494 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6495 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6498 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6499 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6500 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6508 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6509 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6513 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6514 provided_node_features()
6517 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
6518 provided_init_features()
6522 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6523 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6524 pub fn provided_node_features() -> NodeFeatures {
6525 provided_init_features().to_context()
6528 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6529 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6531 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6532 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6533 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6534 pub fn provided_invoice_features() -> InvoiceFeatures {
6535 provided_init_features().to_context()
6538 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6539 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6540 pub fn provided_channel_features() -> ChannelFeatures {
6541 provided_init_features().to_context()
6544 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6545 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6546 pub fn provided_init_features() -> InitFeatures {
6547 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
6548 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the ChannelMessageHandler impl for
6549 // ErroringMessageHandler.
6550 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
6551 features.set_data_loss_protect_optional();
6552 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
6553 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
6554 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
6555 features.set_payment_secret_required();
6556 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
6557 features.set_wumbo_optional();
6558 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
6559 features.set_channel_type_optional();
6560 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
6561 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
6565 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6566 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6568 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6569 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6570 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6571 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6574 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6575 (2, node_id, required),
6576 (4, features, required),
6577 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6578 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6579 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6580 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6583 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
6584 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6585 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6586 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6587 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
6588 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
6589 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6590 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
6591 (2, self.channel_id, required),
6592 (3, self.channel_type, option),
6593 (4, self.counterparty, required),
6594 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
6595 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
6596 (7, self.config, option),
6597 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
6598 (9, self.confirmations, option),
6599 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
6600 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6601 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6602 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
6603 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6604 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6605 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6606 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6607 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6608 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
6609 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
6610 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
6611 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
6612 (30, self.is_usable, required),
6613 (32, self.is_public, required),
6614 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6615 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6616 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6622 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
6623 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6624 init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6625 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6626 (2, channel_id, required),
6627 (3, channel_type, option),
6628 (4, counterparty, required),
6629 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6630 (6, funding_txo, option),
6631 (7, config, option),
6632 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6633 (9, confirmations, option),
6634 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6635 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6636 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6637 (16, balance_msat, required),
6638 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6639 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6640 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6641 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6642 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6643 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6644 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6645 (26, is_outbound, required),
6646 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
6647 (30, is_usable, required),
6648 (32, is_public, required),
6649 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6650 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6651 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6654 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6655 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6656 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
6657 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
6658 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
6662 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
6664 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
6665 outbound_scid_alias,
6669 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
6670 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
6672 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
6673 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6674 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
6675 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6676 confirmations_required,
6678 force_close_spend_delay,
6679 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
6680 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
6681 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
6682 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
6683 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
6684 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
6689 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6690 (2, channels, vec_type),
6691 (4, phantom_scid, required),
6692 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6695 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6697 (0, onion_packet, required),
6698 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6701 (0, payment_data, required),
6702 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6703 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6705 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6706 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6707 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6711 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6712 (0, routing, required),
6713 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6714 (4, payment_hash, required),
6715 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
6716 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
6717 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
6721 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6722 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6724 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6726 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6727 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6728 reason.write(writer)?;
6730 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6731 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6734 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6735 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6736 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6737 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6744 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6745 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6746 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6749 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6750 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6751 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6752 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6756 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6757 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6758 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6759 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6760 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6763 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6764 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6765 // messages contained in the variants.
6766 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6767 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6768 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6770 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6771 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6772 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6773 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6774 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6777 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6778 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6779 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6780 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6781 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6783 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6788 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6793 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6794 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6795 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6796 (2, outpoint, required),
6797 (4, htlc_id, required),
6798 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6801 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6802 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6803 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
6804 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
6805 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
6807 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6808 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
6809 (1, self.total_msat, required),
6810 (2, self.value, required),
6811 (4, payment_data, option),
6812 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6813 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6819 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6820 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6821 let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6823 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6824 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6825 let mut total_msat = None;
6826 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6827 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6828 (0, prev_hop, required),
6829 (1, total_msat, option),
6830 (2, value, required),
6831 (4, payment_data, option),
6832 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6833 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6835 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6837 if payment_data.is_some() {
6838 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6840 if total_msat.is_none() {
6841 total_msat = Some(value);
6843 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6846 if total_msat.is_none() {
6847 if payment_data.is_none() {
6848 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6850 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
6852 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
6856 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6859 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
6866 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6867 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6868 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6871 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6872 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6873 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
6874 let mut payment_id = None;
6875 let mut payment_secret = None;
6876 let mut payment_params = None;
6877 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6878 (0, session_priv, required),
6879 (1, payment_id, option),
6880 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6881 (3, payment_secret, option),
6882 (4, path, vec_type),
6883 (5, payment_params, option),
6885 if payment_id.is_none() {
6886 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6888 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6890 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6891 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6892 first_hop_htlc_msat,
6893 path: path.unwrap(),
6894 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6899 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6900 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6905 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6906 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
6908 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payment_params } => {
6910 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6911 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6912 (0, session_priv, required),
6913 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6914 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6915 (3, payment_secret, option),
6916 (4, *path, vec_type),
6917 (5, payment_params, option),
6920 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6922 field.write(writer)?;
6929 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
6930 (0, forward_info, required),
6931 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
6932 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6933 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6934 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6937 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6939 (0, htlc_id, required),
6940 (2, err_packet, required),
6945 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6946 (0, payment_secret, required),
6947 (2, expiry_time, required),
6948 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6949 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6950 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6953 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(PendingOutboundPayment,
6955 (0, session_privs, required),
6958 (0, session_privs, required),
6959 (1, payment_hash, option),
6960 (3, timer_ticks_without_htlcs, (default_value, 0)),
6963 (0, session_privs, required),
6964 (1, pending_fee_msat, option),
6965 (2, payment_hash, required),
6966 (4, payment_secret, option),
6967 (6, total_msat, required),
6968 (8, pending_amt_msat, required),
6969 (10, starting_block_height, required),
6972 (0, session_privs, required),
6973 (2, payment_hash, required),
6977 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
6978 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
6979 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6980 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6981 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6984 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6985 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6987 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6989 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
6991 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6992 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
6993 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
6997 // Take `channel_state` lock temporarily to avoid creating a lock order that requires
6998 // that the `forward_htlcs` lock is taken after `channel_state`
6999 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
7000 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
7001 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
7002 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7003 unfunded_channels += 1;
7006 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
7007 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
7008 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7009 channel.write(writer)?;
7015 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7016 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7017 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
7018 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7019 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7020 for forward in pending_forwards {
7021 forward.write(writer)?;
7026 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7027 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
7028 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7030 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
7031 (claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7032 for (payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops)) in claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
7033 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7034 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7035 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
7036 htlc.write(writer)?;
7038 htlc_purposes.push(purpose);
7041 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7042 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7043 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7044 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
7045 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7046 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
7049 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7050 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7051 for event in events.iter() {
7052 event.write(writer)?;
7055 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
7056 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7057 for event in background_events.iter() {
7059 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
7061 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
7062 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
7067 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
7068 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
7069 // likely to be identical.
7070 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7071 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7073 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7074 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
7075 hash.write(writer)?;
7076 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
7079 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
7080 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
7081 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7082 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
7083 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
7086 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
7087 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7089 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7090 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7091 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
7092 session_priv.write(writer)?;
7095 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
7096 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
7100 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
7101 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
7102 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7104 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7105 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7106 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
7112 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
7113 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7114 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
7115 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
7118 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
7119 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
7120 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
7121 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
7122 pending_claiming_payments = None;
7124 debug_assert!(false, "While we have code to serialize pending_claiming_payments, the map should always be empty until a later PR");
7127 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7128 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
7129 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7130 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
7131 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7132 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
7133 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
7134 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7135 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
7142 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
7144 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
7146 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7147 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
7148 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
7149 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
7150 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
7151 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
7152 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
7153 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
7154 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7155 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
7156 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
7157 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
7158 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
7160 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
7161 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
7163 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
7164 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
7166 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
7167 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
7168 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
7169 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
7170 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
7171 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
7173 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
7174 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
7175 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
7176 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7177 K::Target: KeysInterface,
7178 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7181 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
7182 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
7184 pub keys_manager: K,
7186 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7188 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
7189 pub fee_estimator: F,
7190 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7192 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
7193 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
7194 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
7195 pub chain_monitor: M,
7197 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
7198 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
7199 /// force-closed during deserialization.
7200 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
7201 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
7202 /// deserialization.
7204 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
7205 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
7206 pub default_config: UserConfig,
7208 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
7209 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
7211 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
7212 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
7213 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
7214 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
7216 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
7219 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
7220 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>,
7223 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
7224 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>
7225 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
7226 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7227 K::Target: KeysInterface,
7228 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7231 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
7232 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
7233 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
7234 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
7235 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>) -> Self {
7237 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
7238 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
7243 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
7244 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
7245 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
7246 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>>)
7247 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
7248 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7249 K::Target: KeysInterface,
7250 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7253 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7254 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
7255 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
7259 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
7260 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>)
7261 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
7262 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7263 K::Target: KeysInterface,
7264 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7267 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7268 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7270 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7271 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7272 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7274 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7276 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7277 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7278 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7279 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7280 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7281 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
7282 for _ in 0..channel_count {
7283 let mut channel: Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (&args.keys_manager, best_block_height))?;
7284 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7285 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
7286 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
7287 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7288 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7289 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7290 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7291 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
7292 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
7293 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7294 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7295 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7296 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7297 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7298 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7299 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7300 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7301 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7302 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7303 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7304 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
7305 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
7306 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
7307 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7308 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7309 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
7310 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
7311 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7312 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7313 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7314 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7315 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
7317 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7318 let mut found_htlc = false;
7319 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7320 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
7323 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
7324 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
7325 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
7326 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
7327 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
7328 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
7329 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
7330 log_info!(args.logger,
7331 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
7332 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7333 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7337 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7338 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
7339 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7341 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7342 id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
7344 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7346 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
7347 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
7348 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
7349 // safely discard the channel.
7350 let _ = channel.force_shutdown(false);
7351 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7352 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7353 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7354 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
7357 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7358 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7359 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7360 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7361 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7362 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7366 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
7367 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
7368 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
7369 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7373 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
7374 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7375 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7376 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
7377 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7378 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7379 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
7380 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
7381 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
7383 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
7386 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7387 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7388 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
7389 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7390 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7391 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
7392 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
7393 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
7395 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
7398 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7399 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
7400 for _ in 0..peer_count {
7401 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7402 let peer_state = PeerState {
7403 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
7405 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
7408 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7409 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
7410 for _ in 0..event_count {
7411 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
7412 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
7417 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7418 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
7419 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
7420 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7421 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
7422 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7426 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
7427 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7429 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7430 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
7431 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
7432 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
7433 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7437 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7438 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
7439 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
7440 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
7441 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
7442 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
7443 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
7445 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
7446 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7450 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
7451 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
7452 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
7453 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
7454 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
7455 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7456 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7457 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
7458 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
7459 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7460 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
7461 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7462 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
7463 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7464 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
7465 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
7466 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7467 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
7469 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
7470 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7473 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
7474 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7477 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
7478 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
7479 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
7480 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
7481 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
7482 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
7484 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
7486 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
7487 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
7488 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
7489 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
7490 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
7491 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
7492 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
7494 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7495 if by_id.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
7496 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
7497 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
7498 if path.is_empty() {
7499 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
7500 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7502 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
7503 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
7504 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
7505 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
7506 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7507 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
7508 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
7509 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
7511 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7512 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
7513 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
7514 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
7515 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
7517 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
7518 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
7519 total_msat: path_amt,
7520 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
7522 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
7523 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
7528 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7529 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) = htlc_source {
7530 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
7531 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
7532 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
7534 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
7535 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
7536 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
7537 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
7538 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
7539 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
7540 forwards.retain(|forward| {
7541 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
7542 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7543 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7544 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7549 !forwards.is_empty()
7551 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
7552 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7553 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7554 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7555 pending_events_read.retain(|event| {
7556 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
7557 intercepted_id != ev_id
7569 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
7570 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
7571 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
7572 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
7573 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
7574 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
7575 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7576 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
7580 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
7581 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
7583 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
7584 if let Some(mut purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
7585 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
7586 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7588 for (purpose, (payment_hash, previous_hops)) in purposes.drain(..).zip(claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..)) {
7589 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7592 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
7593 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
7594 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
7595 if previous_hops.is_empty() {
7596 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7598 let purpose = match &previous_hops[0].onion_payload {
7599 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
7600 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
7601 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
7602 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
7603 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
7604 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
7605 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
7607 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7608 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7612 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
7614 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7616 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
7617 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
7619 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7623 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7624 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7626 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
7627 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
7630 let our_network_key = match args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node) {
7632 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7634 let our_network_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &our_network_key);
7635 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
7636 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
7637 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
7638 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7642 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
7643 for (chan_id, chan) in by_id.iter_mut() {
7644 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
7645 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
7647 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
7648 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.keys_manager);
7649 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
7651 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7652 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
7653 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7654 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7655 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7656 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7658 if chan.is_usable() {
7659 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
7660 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7661 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7662 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7663 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7668 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
7670 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7671 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
7672 if let Some((payment_purpose, claimable_htlcs)) = claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
7673 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7674 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
7675 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
7676 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
7677 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
7678 let phantom_pubkey = args.keys_manager.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
7679 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
7680 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
7682 for claimable_htlc in claimable_htlcs {
7683 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
7685 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
7686 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
7687 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
7688 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
7690 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
7691 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
7692 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
7693 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
7695 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
7696 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
7697 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
7698 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
7700 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
7701 if let Some(channel) = by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
7702 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
7704 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
7705 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
7708 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
7711 purpose: payment_purpose,
7712 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
7718 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
7720 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
7721 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
7722 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
7724 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
7726 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
7728 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7730 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
7731 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
7732 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
7733 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
7735 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
7736 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
7737 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
7738 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
7739 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
7740 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
7742 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
7748 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
7750 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
7752 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
7753 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
7754 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
7755 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
7757 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
7758 logger: args.logger,
7759 default_configuration: args.default_config,
7762 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7763 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
7764 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
7765 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7766 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7769 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
7770 //connection or two.
7772 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
7778 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7779 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7780 use core::time::Duration;
7781 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
7782 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
7783 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
7784 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7785 use crate::ln::msgs;
7786 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
7787 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
7788 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7789 use crate::util::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
7790 use crate::util::test_utils;
7791 use crate::chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
7794 fn test_notify_limits() {
7795 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
7796 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
7797 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7798 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7799 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7800 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7802 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
7803 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
7804 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7805 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7806 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7808 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7810 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
7811 // to connect messages with new values
7812 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7813 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7814 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7815 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7817 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
7818 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7819 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7820 // ... but the last node should not.
7821 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7822 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
7823 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7824 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7826 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
7827 // about the channel.
7828 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7829 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7830 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7832 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
7834 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7835 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7836 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7837 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7838 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7839 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7841 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
7842 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7843 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7845 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
7846 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
7847 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
7848 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
7849 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
7850 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
7852 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
7853 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
7854 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7855 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7856 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7857 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7858 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7859 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7861 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
7862 // the channel info has updated.
7863 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7864 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7865 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7866 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7867 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7868 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7872 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
7873 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
7875 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7876 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7877 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7878 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7879 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7881 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
7882 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7883 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
7884 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
7886 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
7887 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
7888 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
7889 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
7890 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
7891 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
7892 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7893 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7894 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7895 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
7897 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
7898 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7899 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7900 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7901 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7902 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7903 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7904 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7905 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7906 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7907 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7908 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
7909 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7910 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7911 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7912 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7913 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7914 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7915 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7916 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7917 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7918 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
7920 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
7921 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
7922 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7923 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7924 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7925 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
7927 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
7928 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
7929 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
7930 // lightning messages manually.
7931 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7932 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
7933 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7935 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7936 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7937 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
7938 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7939 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7940 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
7941 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7942 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7943 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
7944 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7945 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7946 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7947 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7948 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7949 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7950 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
7951 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7952 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7953 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
7954 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7955 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7956 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7957 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7958 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
7959 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7961 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
7962 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
7963 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7964 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
7966 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
7967 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
7968 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
7969 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
7971 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7974 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7975 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7976 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7977 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7979 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7982 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7983 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7984 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7985 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7987 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7992 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
7993 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
7994 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
7995 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
7996 // fails as expected.
7997 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7998 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7999 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8000 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8001 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8002 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
8003 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8005 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
8006 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
8007 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
8009 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
8010 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8011 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id()),
8012 final_value_msat: 100_000,
8013 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
8015 let route = find_route(
8016 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8017 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8019 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8020 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8021 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8022 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8023 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8024 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8025 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8026 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8027 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8028 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
8029 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
8030 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8031 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8032 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8033 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8034 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8035 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8036 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8037 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8038 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8039 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8040 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8041 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8043 // Finally, claim the original payment.
8044 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8046 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
8047 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8048 let route = find_route(
8049 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8050 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8052 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8053 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8054 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8055 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8056 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
8057 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
8058 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
8060 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
8061 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8062 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8063 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8064 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8065 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8066 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8067 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8068 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8069 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8070 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8071 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8072 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8073 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8074 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8075 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8076 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8077 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8078 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8079 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8080 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8081 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8082 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8084 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
8085 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8089 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
8090 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
8091 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
8092 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8093 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8094 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8095 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8097 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8098 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8099 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8100 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8102 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8103 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8104 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
8105 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8106 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
8108 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
8109 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8110 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
8111 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8112 let route = find_route(
8113 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8114 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8117 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8118 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
8119 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash, None, PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8120 nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8121 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8123 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8124 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8125 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8126 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8127 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8128 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8129 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8131 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
8135 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
8136 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
8137 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8138 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8139 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8140 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8142 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8143 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8144 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8145 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8147 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8148 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8149 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
8150 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8151 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
8153 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
8154 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8155 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
8156 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8157 let route = find_route(
8158 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8159 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8162 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8163 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8164 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
8165 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, Some(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8166 nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8167 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8169 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8170 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8171 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8172 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8173 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8174 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8175 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8177 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
8181 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
8182 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8183 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8184 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8185 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8187 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8188 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8189 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8190 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8192 // Marshall an MPP route.
8193 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8194 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8195 route.paths.push(path);
8196 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8197 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8198 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8199 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8200 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8201 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8203 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None, PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap_err() {
8204 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
8205 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
8206 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
8211 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
8212 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
8213 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8214 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8215 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8216 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8218 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
8219 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
8221 total_msat: 100_000,
8224 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
8225 // payment verification fails as expected.
8226 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
8227 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
8228 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
8229 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
8231 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
8235 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
8236 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
8240 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
8241 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
8242 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
8243 // the channel is successfully closed.
8244 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8245 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8246 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8247 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8249 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8250 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8251 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel);
8252 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8253 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
8255 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
8256 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
8258 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
8259 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
8260 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8261 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8264 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8266 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8267 // as it has the funding transaction.
8268 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8269 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8270 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8272 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8275 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8277 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8279 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8280 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8281 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8283 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8284 // as it has the funding transaction.
8285 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8286 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8287 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8289 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8290 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8291 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8292 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8293 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8294 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8295 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
8297 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8298 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8299 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8300 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
8302 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8303 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
8305 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
8306 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
8307 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
8308 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
8309 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8310 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8311 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8313 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
8314 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
8315 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
8316 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
8317 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8318 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8319 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8322 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8324 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
8325 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
8326 // closing transaction).
8327 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
8328 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
8329 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8331 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
8332 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
8333 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8334 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8335 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8338 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8340 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
8342 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
8343 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
8344 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8346 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8348 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8349 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8353 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
8355 use crate::chain::Listen;
8356 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
8357 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, KeysInterface, InMemorySigner};
8358 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId};
8359 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
8360 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
8361 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
8362 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
8363 use crate::util::test_utils;
8364 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
8365 use crate::util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
8367 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8368 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8369 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
8371 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
8375 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
8376 node: &'a ChannelManager<
8377 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
8378 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
8379 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
8380 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
8381 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>,
8386 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
8387 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
8390 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
8391 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
8392 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
8394 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
8395 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
8397 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
8398 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
8400 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
8401 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
8403 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8404 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
8405 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
8406 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
8407 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8409 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
8411 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
8413 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8414 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
8415 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
8416 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
8417 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8419 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
8421 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
8423 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8424 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8425 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8426 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8427 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8430 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
8431 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8432 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
8434 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8435 } else { panic!(); }
8437 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8438 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8440 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
8443 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8446 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
8447 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
8449 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8450 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8451 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
8452 match msg_events[0] {
8453 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
8454 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
8455 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8459 match msg_events[1] {
8460 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8464 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8465 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
8467 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8468 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
8470 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8473 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8474 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
8476 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8477 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8479 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8482 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger_a);
8484 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
8485 macro_rules! send_payment {
8486 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
8487 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
8488 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id())
8489 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
8490 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
8491 let seed = [3u8; 32];
8492 let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42);
8493 let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8494 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph.read_only(),
8495 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
8497 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
8498 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
8500 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
8501 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
8503 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8504 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
8505 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8506 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
8507 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8508 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8509 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8510 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8512 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
8513 expect_payment_claimable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
8514 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8515 expect_payment_claimed!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
8517 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
8518 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
8519 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8520 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8521 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
8523 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
8526 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
8527 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8528 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8529 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8531 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
8536 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
8537 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);