1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::{genesis_block, ChainHash};
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
39 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
40 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
41 // construct one themselves.
42 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
43 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel};
44 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
45 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
46 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
47 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
48 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, Router};
49 use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters};
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
55 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment};
57 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
58 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, ChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
59 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
60 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
61 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
62 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
63 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
64 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
65 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
67 use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
70 use crate::prelude::*;
72 use core::cell::RefCell;
74 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
75 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
76 use core::time::Duration;
79 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
80 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
81 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
83 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
85 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
86 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
87 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
89 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
90 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
91 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
92 // before we forward it.
94 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
95 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
96 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
97 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
98 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
100 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
101 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
103 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
104 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
105 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
106 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
109 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
110 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
111 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
112 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
115 /// This was added in 0.0.116 and will break deserialization on downgrades.
116 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
117 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
118 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
119 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
123 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
124 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
125 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
126 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
127 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
129 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
130 /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
131 /// may overshoot this in either case)
132 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
133 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
134 /// The fee being skimmed off the top of this HTLC. If this is a forward, it'll be the fee we are
135 /// skimming. If we're receiving this HTLC, it's the fee that our counterparty skimmed.
136 pub(super) skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
139 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
140 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
141 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
142 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
145 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
146 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
147 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
148 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
149 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
152 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
153 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
155 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
156 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
157 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
160 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
161 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
163 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
164 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
167 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
168 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
171 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
175 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
176 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
177 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
178 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
179 short_channel_id: u64,
181 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
182 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
184 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
185 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
190 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
192 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
193 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
194 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
196 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
197 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
200 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
201 struct ClaimableHTLC {
202 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
204 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
206 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
207 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
208 sender_intended_value: u64,
209 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
211 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
212 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
213 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
214 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
216 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
217 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
220 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
222 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
223 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
224 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
226 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
227 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
232 impl Readable for PaymentId {
233 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
234 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
239 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
241 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
242 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
243 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
245 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
246 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
251 impl Readable for InterceptId {
252 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
253 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
258 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
259 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
260 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
261 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
262 OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
265 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
267 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
268 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
269 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
271 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
272 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
276 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
277 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
278 (0, short_channel_id, required),
279 (2, htlc_id, required),
281 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
282 (0, session_priv, required),
287 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
288 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
289 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
290 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
291 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
294 session_priv: SecretKey,
295 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
296 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
297 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
298 payment_id: PaymentId,
301 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
302 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
303 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
305 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
307 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
309 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
312 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
313 payment_id.hash(hasher);
314 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
320 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
322 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
323 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
324 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
325 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
326 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
327 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
331 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
332 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
333 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
334 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
335 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
336 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
338 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
344 struct ReceiveError {
350 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
351 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
353 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
354 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
355 pub enum FailureCode {
356 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
357 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
358 TemporaryNodeFailure = 0x2000 | 2,
359 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
360 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
361 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing = 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
362 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
363 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
364 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
365 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
366 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails = 0x4000 | 15,
369 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
370 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
371 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
372 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
373 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
375 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
376 err: msgs::LightningError,
377 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
378 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
380 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
382 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
384 err: LightningError {
386 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
387 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
394 shutdown_finish: None,
398 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
399 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
402 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
404 err: LightningError {
406 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
407 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
413 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
414 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
418 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
421 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
423 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
424 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
428 log_level: Level::Warn,
431 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
433 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
435 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
437 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
438 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
446 shutdown_finish: None,
451 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
452 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
453 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
454 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
455 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
457 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
458 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
459 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
460 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
461 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
462 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
463 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
465 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
469 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
470 struct ClaimingPayment {
472 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
473 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
475 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
476 (0, amount_msat, required),
477 (2, payment_purpose, required),
478 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
481 struct ClaimablePayment {
482 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
483 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
484 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
487 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
488 struct ClaimablePayments {
489 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
490 /// failed/claimed by the user.
492 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
493 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
495 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
496 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
497 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
499 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
500 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
501 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
502 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
505 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
506 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
507 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
508 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
509 enum BackgroundEvent {
510 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
511 /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
512 /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
513 /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
515 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
516 /// are regenerated on startup.
517 ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
518 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
519 /// channel to continue normal operation.
521 /// In general this should be used rather than
522 /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
523 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
524 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
526 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
527 /// are regenerated on startup.
528 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
529 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
530 funding_txo: OutPoint,
531 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
536 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
537 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
538 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
539 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
540 /// event can be generated.
541 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
542 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
543 /// operation of another channel.
545 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
546 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
547 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
548 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
550 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
551 event: events::Event,
552 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
556 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
557 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
558 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
559 (0, event, upgradable_required),
560 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
561 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
562 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
563 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
564 // downgrades to prior versions.
565 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
569 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
570 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
571 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
572 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
573 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
576 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
577 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
578 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
579 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
583 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
584 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
585 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
586 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
587 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
588 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
590 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
591 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
592 channel_id: [u8; 32],
593 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
598 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
600 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
601 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
602 channel_id: prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
603 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
608 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
609 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
613 /// State we hold per-peer.
614 pub(super) struct PeerState<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
615 /// `channel_id` -> `Channel`.
617 /// Holds all funded channels where the peer is the counterparty.
618 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
619 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `OutboundV1Channel`.
621 /// Holds all outbound V1 channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once an outbound channel has
622 /// been assigned a `channel_id`, the entry in this map is removed and one is created in
624 pub(super) outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], OutboundV1Channel<Signer>>,
625 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundV1Channel`.
627 /// Holds all inbound V1 channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once an inbound channel has
628 /// been assigned a `channel_id`, the entry in this map is removed and one is created in
630 pub(super) inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], InboundV1Channel<Signer>>,
631 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
632 latest_features: InitFeatures,
633 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
634 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
635 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
636 /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
637 /// user but which have not yet completed.
639 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
640 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
641 /// for a missing channel.
642 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
643 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
644 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
646 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
647 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
648 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
649 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
651 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
652 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
653 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
654 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
655 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
656 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
657 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
658 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
659 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
660 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
661 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
662 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
663 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
664 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
665 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
669 impl <Signer: ChannelSigner> PeerState<Signer> {
670 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
671 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
672 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
673 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
674 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
677 self.channel_by_id.is_empty() && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
678 && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
681 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including pending channels.
682 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
683 self.channel_by_id.len() +
684 self.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.len() +
685 self.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.len()
688 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
689 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> bool {
690 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
691 self.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
692 self.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
696 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
697 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
699 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
702 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
703 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
704 struct PendingInboundPayment {
705 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
706 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
707 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
708 /// this payment being removed.
710 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
711 user_payment_id: u64,
712 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
713 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
714 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
717 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
718 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
719 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
720 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
721 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
722 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
723 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
724 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
726 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
727 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
735 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
737 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
738 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
739 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
744 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
745 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
746 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
747 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
748 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
749 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
750 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
751 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
752 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
754 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
755 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
764 &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
766 &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
767 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
768 ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
773 macro_rules! define_test_pub_trait { ($vis: vis) => {
774 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`] used in testing.
775 $vis trait AChannelManager {
776 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
777 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
778 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
779 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
780 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
781 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
782 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
783 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
784 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
785 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<Signer = Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
786 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
787 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
788 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
789 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
790 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
791 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
792 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
793 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
796 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
797 define_test_pub_trait!(pub);
798 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
799 define_test_pub_trait!(pub(crate));
800 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
801 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
803 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
804 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
805 ES::Target: EntropySource,
806 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
807 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
808 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
812 type Watch = M::Target;
814 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
816 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
818 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
820 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer;
821 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
823 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
825 type Router = R::Target;
827 type Logger = L::Target;
829 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
832 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
833 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
835 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
836 /// to individual Channels.
838 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
839 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
840 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
841 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
843 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
844 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
845 /// returning from [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`], with ChannelManagers, writing updates
846 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during
847 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
848 /// [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the
849 /// `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
851 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
852 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
853 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
855 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
856 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
857 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
858 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
859 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
861 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
862 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
863 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
864 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
866 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
867 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
868 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
870 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
871 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
872 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
873 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
874 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
876 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
877 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
878 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
879 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
880 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
881 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
882 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
883 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
886 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
887 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
888 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
889 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
890 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
894 // `total_consistency_lock`
896 // |__`forward_htlcs`
898 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
900 // |__`per_peer_state`
902 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
904 // | |__`claimable_payments`
906 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
912 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
914 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
918 // | |__`pending_events`
920 // | |__`pending_background_events`
922 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
924 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
925 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
926 ES::Target: EntropySource,
927 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
928 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
929 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
933 default_configuration: UserConfig,
934 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
935 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
941 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
943 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
945 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
946 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
948 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
949 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
950 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
951 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
953 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
954 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
956 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
957 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
958 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
959 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
960 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
961 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
962 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
963 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
965 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
967 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
968 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
970 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
972 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
973 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
974 /// and via the classic SCID.
976 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
977 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
979 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
981 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
983 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
984 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
985 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
987 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
988 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
990 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
991 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
993 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
994 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
996 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
997 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
998 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
999 /// active channel list on load.
1001 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1002 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1004 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1006 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
1007 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
1008 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
1010 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1011 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1012 /// the handling of the events.
1014 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1015 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1018 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1019 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1020 /// would break backwards compatability.
1021 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1022 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1023 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1025 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1026 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
1028 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1030 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1031 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1032 /// confirmation depth.
1034 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1035 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1036 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1038 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1040 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
1042 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
1044 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1046 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1048 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1049 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1050 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1052 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1053 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1055 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1056 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1057 /// keeping additional state.
1058 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1060 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1061 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1062 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1063 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1065 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1066 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1068 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1069 /// are currently open with that peer.
1071 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1072 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1075 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1077 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1078 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1079 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
1080 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1081 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
1083 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1084 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1085 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1086 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1087 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1089 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1090 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1092 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1093 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1094 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1095 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1097 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1098 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1099 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1100 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1101 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1103 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1105 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1107 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1108 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1109 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1110 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1111 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1112 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1113 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1114 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1115 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1117 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1119 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
1123 signer_provider: SP,
1128 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1130 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1131 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1132 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1133 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1134 pub struct ChainParameters {
1135 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1136 pub network: Network,
1138 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1140 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1141 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1144 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1151 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1152 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1153 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1154 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1155 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1156 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1158 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1159 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1160 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1161 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1162 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1164 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1165 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1168 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1169 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1170 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1171 let _ = cm.get_cm().process_background_events(); // We always persist
1173 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1174 persistence_notifier: &cm.get_cm().persistence_notifier,
1175 should_persist: || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist },
1176 _read_guard: read_guard,
1181 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1182 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first.
1183 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1184 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
1186 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1187 persistence_notifier: notifier,
1188 should_persist: persist_check,
1189 _read_guard: read_guard,
1194 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1195 fn drop(&mut self) {
1196 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1197 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1202 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1203 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1205 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1207 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1208 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1209 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1210 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1211 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1213 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1214 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1216 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1218 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1219 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1220 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1221 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1222 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1223 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1224 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1225 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1226 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1227 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1228 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1229 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1230 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1232 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1233 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1235 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1236 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1237 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1238 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1240 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1241 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1242 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1243 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1244 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1245 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1248 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1250 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1251 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1254 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1256 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1257 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1259 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
1260 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
1261 /// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
1262 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
1264 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1265 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1266 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1268 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1269 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1270 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1272 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1273 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1274 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1275 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1277 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1278 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1279 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1281 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1282 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1283 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1285 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1286 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1287 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1288 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1289 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1290 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1291 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1292 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1293 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1294 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1295 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1298 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1299 /// to better separate parameters.
1300 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1301 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1302 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1303 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1304 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1305 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1306 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1307 pub features: InitFeatures,
1308 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1309 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1310 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1312 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1314 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1315 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1316 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1317 /// payments to us through this channel.
1318 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1319 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1320 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1321 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1322 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1323 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1324 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1327 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1328 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1329 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1330 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1331 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1332 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1333 /// lifetime of the channel.
1334 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1335 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1336 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1337 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1338 /// our counterparty already.
1340 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1341 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1342 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1343 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1345 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1346 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1347 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1348 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1350 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1351 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1353 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1354 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1356 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1357 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1358 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1359 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1360 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1361 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1362 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1363 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1364 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1367 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1369 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1370 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1371 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1372 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1373 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1374 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1375 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1377 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1378 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1380 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1381 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1382 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1383 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1384 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1385 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1386 /// this value on chain.
1388 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1390 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1392 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1393 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1394 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1395 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1397 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1398 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1399 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1401 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1402 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1403 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1404 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1405 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1407 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1408 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1409 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1410 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1412 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1413 pub balance_msat: u64,
1414 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1415 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1416 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1417 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1419 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1421 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1422 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1423 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1424 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1425 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1426 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1427 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1428 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1430 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
1431 /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1432 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1433 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1434 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1435 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1436 /// route which is valid.
1437 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1438 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1439 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1440 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1441 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1442 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1444 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1445 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1446 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1447 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1448 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1449 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1450 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1451 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1452 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1454 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1456 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1457 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1458 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1459 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1460 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1462 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1463 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1464 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1465 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1466 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1467 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1468 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1470 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1471 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1472 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1473 pub is_outbound: bool,
1474 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1475 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1476 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1477 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1478 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1480 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1481 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1482 /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
1483 /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
1484 pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
1485 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1486 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1488 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1489 pub is_usable: bool,
1490 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1491 pub is_public: bool,
1492 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1493 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1494 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1495 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1496 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1497 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1499 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1500 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1503 impl ChannelDetails {
1504 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1505 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1506 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1508 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1509 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1510 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1511 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1514 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1515 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1516 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1518 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1519 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1520 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1521 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1524 fn from_channel_context<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, F: Deref>(
1525 context: &ChannelContext<Signer>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
1526 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
1528 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1530 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
1531 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1532 context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1534 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1535 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1536 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1537 features: latest_features,
1538 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1539 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1540 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1541 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1542 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1543 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1544 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1545 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1546 Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1547 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1549 funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1550 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1551 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1552 channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1553 short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1554 outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1555 inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1556 channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1557 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1558 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1559 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1560 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1561 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1562 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1563 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1564 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1565 confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1566 confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1567 force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1568 is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1569 is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1570 is_usable: context.is_live(),
1571 is_public: context.should_announce(),
1572 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1573 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1574 config: Some(context.config()),
1575 channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
1580 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1581 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
1582 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
1583 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
1584 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
1585 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
1586 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
1587 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
1588 /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
1590 /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
1592 /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
1593 /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
1595 /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
1596 NegotiatingClosingFee,
1597 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
1598 /// to drop the channel.
1602 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1603 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1604 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1605 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1606 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1608 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1610 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1611 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1612 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1615 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1616 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1617 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1619 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1620 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1621 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1623 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1624 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1625 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1627 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1628 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1632 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1634 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1636 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1637 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1638 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1639 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1641 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1642 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1643 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1646 macro_rules! handle_error {
1647 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1648 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1649 // entering the macro.
1650 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1651 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1655 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1656 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1658 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1659 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1660 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1661 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1665 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1666 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1667 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1668 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1673 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1674 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1676 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1677 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1678 action: err.action.clone()
1682 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1683 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1684 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1685 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1686 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1690 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1695 ($self: ident, $internal: expr) => {
1698 Err((chan, msg_handle_err)) => {
1699 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1700 handle_error!($self, Err(msg_handle_err), counterparty_node_id).map_err(|err| (chan, err))
1706 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1707 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
1708 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.channel_id());
1709 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1710 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
1711 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1713 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1714 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1715 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1716 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1717 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1719 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1720 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1722 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1726 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1727 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1728 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1730 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1731 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1733 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1734 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1736 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1737 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1738 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$channel.context);
1739 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
1740 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1741 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1745 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_context: expr, $channel_id: expr, PREFUNDED) => {
1747 // We should only ever have `ChannelError::Close` when prefunded channels error.
1748 // In any case, just close the channel.
1749 ChannelError::Warn(msg) | ChannelError::Ignore(msg) | ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1750 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing prefunded channel {} due to an error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1751 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$channel_context);
1752 let shutdown_res = $channel_context.force_shutdown(false);
1753 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel_context.get_user_id(),
1754 shutdown_res, None))
1760 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1761 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1765 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1767 $entry.remove_entry();
1775 macro_rules! try_v1_outbound_chan_entry {
1776 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1780 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut().context, $entry.key(), PREFUNDED);
1782 $entry.remove_entry();
1790 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1791 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1795 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1797 $entry.remove_entry();
1805 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1806 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1808 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1809 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context);
1815 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1816 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1817 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1818 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1819 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1821 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1822 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1823 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1824 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
1825 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
1826 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1827 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
1828 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
1829 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
1830 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1835 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
1836 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1837 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
1838 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
1839 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
1840 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
1841 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1842 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1843 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1845 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
1850 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1851 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1852 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1853 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
1854 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
1855 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
1856 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1857 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1858 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
1860 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1865 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
1866 ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
1867 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
1868 &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
1869 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
1870 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
1871 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
1872 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
1873 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
1874 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
1875 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
1877 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
1878 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
1879 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1885 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
1886 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
1888 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
1889 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
1890 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
1891 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
1892 updates.announcement_sigs);
1893 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
1894 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
1897 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
1898 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
1899 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
1901 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
1903 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1904 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1906 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
1907 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1908 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1909 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
1914 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
1915 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $remove: expr, $completed: expr) => { {
1916 // update_maps_on_chan_removal needs to be able to take id_to_peer, so make sure we can in
1917 // any case so that it won't deadlock.
1918 debug_assert_ne!($self.id_to_peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1919 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
1921 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1922 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
1923 log_bytes!($chan.context.channel_id()[..]));
1926 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1927 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure",
1928 log_bytes!($chan.context.channel_id()[..]));
1929 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$chan.context);
1930 let res = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(
1931 "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.context.channel_id(),
1932 $chan.context.get_user_id(), $chan.context.force_shutdown(false),
1933 $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok()));
1937 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1943 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING_INITIAL_MONITOR, $remove: expr) => {
1944 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state,
1945 $per_peer_state_lock, $chan, _internal, $remove,
1946 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
1948 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
1949 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING_INITIAL_MONITOR, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
1951 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING, $remove: expr) => { {
1952 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
1953 .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
1954 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
1955 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
1956 // filter for uniqueness here.
1957 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
1958 .unwrap_or_else(|| {
1959 in_flight_updates.push($update);
1960 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
1962 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
1963 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state,
1964 $per_peer_state_lock, $chan, _internal, $remove,
1966 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
1967 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
1968 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
1972 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr) => {
1973 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $funding_txo, $update, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
1977 macro_rules! process_events_body {
1978 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
1979 let mut processed_all_events = false;
1980 while !processed_all_events {
1981 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
1985 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
1988 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
1989 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
1990 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1992 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
1993 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
1994 if $self.process_background_events() == NotifyOption::DoPersist { result = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
1996 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
1997 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
1998 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
1999 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2003 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2004 let num_events = pending_events.len();
2005 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2006 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2009 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2011 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2012 $event_to_handle = event;
2014 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2015 post_event_actions.push(action);
2020 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2021 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2022 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2023 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2024 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2025 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2028 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2029 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2030 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2031 processed_all_events = false;
2034 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
2035 $self.persistence_notifier.notify();
2041 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2043 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
2044 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2045 ES::Target: EntropySource,
2046 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2047 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2048 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2052 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2054 /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2056 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2057 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2059 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2061 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2062 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2063 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2066 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2067 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2068 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2070 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2071 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2072 current_timestamp: u32,
2074 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2075 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2076 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2077 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2079 default_configuration: config.clone(),
2080 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
2081 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2086 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2088 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
2089 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2090 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2091 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2092 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
2093 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2094 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2095 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2097 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2100 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2101 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2103 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2105 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2107 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2109 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2110 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2111 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2112 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2113 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2114 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2124 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2125 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2126 &self.default_configuration
2129 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2130 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2131 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2134 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2135 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2137 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2139 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2143 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2148 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2150 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2151 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2152 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2153 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2154 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2156 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2157 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2159 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2160 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2161 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2163 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2164 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2165 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2167 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2168 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2169 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2170 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2171 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2172 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2174 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2175 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2176 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2177 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
2178 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2179 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2182 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2183 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2184 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2186 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2188 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2189 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2191 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2193 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2194 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2195 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2196 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2197 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2198 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
2202 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2207 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
2209 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2210 match peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2211 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2213 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2215 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2218 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
2221 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2222 node_id: their_network_key,
2225 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2228 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2229 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2230 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2231 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2232 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2233 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2234 // the same channel.
2235 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2237 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2238 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2239 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2240 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2241 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2242 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
2243 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2244 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2252 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2253 /// more information.
2254 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2255 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2256 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2257 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2258 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2259 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2260 // the same channel.
2261 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2263 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2264 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2265 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2266 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2267 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2268 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
2269 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2270 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2273 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter() {
2274 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2275 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2278 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter() {
2279 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2280 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2288 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2289 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2291 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2292 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2294 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2295 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2296 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2297 // really wanted anyway.
2298 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2301 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2302 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2303 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2304 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2306 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2307 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2308 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2309 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2310 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2313 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2314 features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator))
2320 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2321 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2323 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2324 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2325 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2327 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2328 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2329 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2330 .filter_map(|(_, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2331 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2332 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2333 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2334 total_msat: *total_msat,
2337 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2338 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2340 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2341 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2343 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2348 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
2349 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, context: &ChannelContext<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
2350 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2351 match context.unbroadcasted_funding() {
2352 Some(transaction) => {
2353 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2354 channel_id: context.channel_id(), transaction
2359 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2360 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
2361 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
2362 reason: closure_reason
2366 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2367 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2369 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
2370 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
2371 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2373 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2374 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2376 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2377 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2378 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2379 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2380 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().context.get_funding_txo();
2381 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2382 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut()
2383 .get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2384 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2386 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2387 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2388 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2389 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2390 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2394 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2395 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2396 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2397 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry).map(|_| ());
2400 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2401 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
2402 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
2403 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2407 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2411 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id) })
2415 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2416 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2417 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2418 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2421 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
2425 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2426 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2427 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2429 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
2430 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2432 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2433 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
2434 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2435 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2437 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2439 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2440 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2441 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2444 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2445 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2446 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2447 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2448 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2449 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2452 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2453 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2454 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2456 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2457 /// the channel being closed or not:
2458 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2459 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2460 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2461 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2462 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2463 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2464 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2466 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2467 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2468 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2469 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2471 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2473 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2474 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2475 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2478 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2479 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2480 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2481 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2482 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2483 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2487 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2488 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
2489 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2490 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2491 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2492 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2493 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2494 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2496 if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2497 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2498 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2499 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2500 // ignore the result here.
2501 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2505 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2506 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2507 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2508 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2509 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2510 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2511 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2512 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2513 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2514 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2515 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2516 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2518 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2520 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2521 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2522 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, closure_reason);
2523 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan);
2524 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2525 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2526 } else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2527 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2528 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, closure_reason);
2529 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan);
2530 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
2531 // Prefunded channel has no update
2532 (None, chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2533 } else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2534 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2535 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, closure_reason);
2536 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan);
2537 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
2538 // Prefunded channel has no update
2539 (None, chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2541 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) });
2544 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
2545 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2546 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2551 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
2554 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2555 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2556 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2557 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2558 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2559 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2560 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2561 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2562 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2563 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2564 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2565 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2576 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2577 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2578 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2580 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2581 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2582 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2585 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2586 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2587 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2589 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2590 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2591 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2592 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2593 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2596 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2597 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2598 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2599 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2600 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2604 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2605 /// local transaction(s).
2606 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2607 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2608 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2612 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(
2613 &self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32], payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2614 amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>, allow_underpay: bool,
2615 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
2616 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError> {
2617 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2618 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
2619 return Err(ReceiveError {
2620 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
2622 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2625 // final_expiry_too_soon
2626 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2627 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2629 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2630 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2631 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2632 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2633 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2634 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2635 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2636 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2637 return Err(ReceiveError {
2638 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2639 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2642 if (!allow_underpay && hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat) ||
2643 (allow_underpay && hop_data.amt_to_forward >
2644 amt_msat.saturating_add(counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)))
2646 return Err(ReceiveError {
2648 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2649 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2653 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2654 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2655 return Err(ReceiveError {
2656 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2657 err_data: Vec::new(),
2658 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2661 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage, payment_metadata } => {
2662 if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2663 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2664 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2665 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2666 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2667 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2668 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2669 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2670 return Err(ReceiveError {
2671 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2672 err_data: Vec::new(),
2673 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2676 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && payment_data.is_some() {
2677 return Err(ReceiveError {
2678 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2679 err_data: Vec::new(),
2680 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2683 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2687 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2689 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2690 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2693 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2694 phantom_shared_secret,
2697 return Err(ReceiveError {
2698 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2699 err_data: Vec::new(),
2700 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2705 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2708 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2709 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2710 outgoing_amt_msat: hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2711 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2712 skimmed_fee_msat: counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
2716 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
2717 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC
2718 ) -> Result<(onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg> {
2719 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2720 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2722 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2723 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2724 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2725 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2726 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2727 failure_code: $err_code,
2733 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2734 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2737 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
2738 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
2739 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2741 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2742 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2743 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2744 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2745 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2746 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2747 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2748 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2750 macro_rules! return_err {
2751 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2753 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2754 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2755 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2756 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2757 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2758 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2764 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2766 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2767 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2769 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2770 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2773 let (outgoing_scid, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, next_packet_pk_opt) = match next_hop {
2774 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
2775 next_hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData {
2776 format: msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id }, amt_to_forward,
2777 outgoing_cltv_value,
2780 let next_pk = onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx,
2781 msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &shared_secret);
2782 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(next_pk))
2784 // We'll do receive checks in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] so we have access to the
2785 // inbound channel's state.
2786 onion_utils::Hop::Receive { .. } => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
2787 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
2788 next_hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData { format: msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. }, .. }, ..
2790 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0; 0]);
2794 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
2795 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
2796 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2797 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
2798 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2799 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2800 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2801 // phantom or an intercept.
2802 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2803 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2804 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.genesis_hash)
2808 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2811 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2813 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2814 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2815 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2816 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
2817 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2819 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2820 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2821 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2823 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
2824 // have no consistency guarantees.
2825 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2829 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2830 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2831 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2832 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2833 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2835 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
2836 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2837 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2838 // we don't have the channel here.
2839 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2841 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
2843 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2844 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2845 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2846 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2847 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2848 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2849 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
2850 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
2851 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
2852 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
2853 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2855 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
2858 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2859 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2861 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
2862 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2866 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
2867 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
2868 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
2869 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
2871 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2878 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2879 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2880 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2881 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2882 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2883 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2885 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2886 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2888 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2889 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2890 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2891 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2892 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2893 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2894 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2895 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2896 if (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2897 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2903 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2904 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2905 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2906 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2908 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2909 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2911 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2912 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2913 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2915 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2916 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2917 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2918 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
2919 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
2920 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
2921 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
2925 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2927 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt))
2930 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
2931 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, shared_secret: [u8; 32], decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop,
2932 allow_underpay: bool, next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
2933 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2934 macro_rules! return_err {
2935 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2937 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2938 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2939 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2940 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2941 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2942 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2948 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2950 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
2951 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat)
2954 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2955 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2956 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2957 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2958 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2960 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2963 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2964 debug_assert!(next_packet_pubkey_opt.is_some());
2965 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2967 public_key: next_packet_pubkey_opt.unwrap_or(Err(secp256k1::Error::InvalidPublicKey)),
2968 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2969 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2972 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2973 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2974 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2975 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2979 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2980 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2981 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2984 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2985 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2986 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2987 outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2988 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2989 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
2995 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2996 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2997 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2999 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3000 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3001 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3003 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3004 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3005 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3006 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3007 return Err(LightningError {
3008 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3009 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3012 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3013 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3015 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()));
3016 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3019 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3020 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3021 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3022 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3024 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3025 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3026 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3028 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3029 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3030 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3031 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()));
3032 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3033 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3037 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3040 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3041 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()));
3042 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3044 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3045 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3046 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3047 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3048 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3051 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3052 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
3054 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3055 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3056 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3057 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3058 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3059 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3060 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3061 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3063 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3064 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3065 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3067 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3069 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3076 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3077 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3078 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv_bytes)
3081 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3082 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3083 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3085 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3086 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3087 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3089 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
3090 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
3091 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
3093 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash)
3094 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute { err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()})?;
3096 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3097 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3098 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
3099 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3102 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3103 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3104 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3105 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3106 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3107 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3108 if !chan.get().context.is_live() {
3109 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3111 let funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3112 let send_res = chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3113 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3115 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3116 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3118 }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
3119 match break_chan_entry!(self, send_res, chan) {
3120 Some(monitor_update) => {
3121 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3122 Err(e) => break Err(e),
3124 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3125 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3126 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3127 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3128 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3129 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3130 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3138 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3139 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3140 // `channel_by_id` map.
3141 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3142 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3147 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3148 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3150 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3155 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3157 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3158 /// fields for more info.
3160 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3161 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3163 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3165 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3166 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3167 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3168 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3169 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3171 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3172 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3173 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3174 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3175 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3177 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3178 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3179 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3180 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3182 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3184 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3185 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3186 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3188 /// In general, a path may raise:
3189 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3190 /// node public key) is specified.
3191 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
3192 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
3194 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3195 /// relevant updates.
3197 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3198 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3199 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3201 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3202 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3203 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3204 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3205 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3206 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3207 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3208 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3209 self.pending_outbound_payments
3210 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3211 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3212 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
3215 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3216 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3217 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3218 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3219 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3220 self.pending_outbound_payments
3221 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3222 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3223 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3224 &self.pending_events,
3225 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3226 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
3230 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3231 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3232 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3233 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3234 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3235 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
3239 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3240 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3241 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3245 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3246 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3250 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3251 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3252 /// retries are exhausted.
3254 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3255 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3257 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3258 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3259 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3261 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
3262 /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
3264 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3265 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3266 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3267 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3268 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3271 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3272 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3273 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3274 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3275 /// never reach the recipient.
3277 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3278 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3280 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3281 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3283 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3284 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3285 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3286 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3287 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3288 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3289 &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3290 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3291 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
3294 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3295 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3297 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3300 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3301 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3302 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3303 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3304 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3305 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3306 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3307 &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
3308 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3309 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
3312 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3313 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3314 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3315 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3316 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3317 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3318 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3319 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3320 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
3323 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3326 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3327 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3330 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3331 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3332 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&OutboundV1Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3333 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
3334 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3335 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3336 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3337 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3339 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3340 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3341 let (chan, msg) = match peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3343 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3345 let funding_res = chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
3346 .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3347 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3348 let user_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
3349 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
3350 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None))
3351 } else { unreachable!(); });
3353 Ok((chan, funding_msg)) => (chan, funding_msg),
3354 Err((chan, err)) => {
3355 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3356 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3358 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3359 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3360 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3366 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3368 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3369 log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3374 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3375 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3378 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3379 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3380 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3382 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3383 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3384 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.context.channel_id(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
3385 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
3394 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3395 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
3396 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3400 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3402 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3403 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3405 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3406 /// across the p2p network.
3408 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3409 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3411 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3412 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3413 /// keys per-channel).
3415 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3416 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3417 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3419 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3420 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3421 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3423 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3424 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3425 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3426 /// for more details.
3428 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3429 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3430 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3431 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3433 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3434 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3435 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3436 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3441 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3442 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3443 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3444 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3445 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3446 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 1 {
3447 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3448 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3452 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
3453 if tx.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3454 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3455 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3459 let mut output_index = None;
3460 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3461 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3462 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
3463 if output_index.is_some() {
3464 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3465 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3468 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3471 if output_index.is_none() {
3472 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3473 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3476 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
3480 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
3482 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3483 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3484 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3485 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3487 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3488 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3490 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3491 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3493 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3495 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3496 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3497 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3498 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3499 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3500 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3501 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3502 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
3503 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
3504 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3505 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
3506 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3507 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3511 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3512 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3513 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3514 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3515 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3516 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3517 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3518 if !peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) {
3519 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3520 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3524 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3525 let channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
3526 let mut config = channel.context.config();
3527 config.apply(config_update);
3528 if !channel.context.update_config(&config) {
3531 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3532 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3533 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3534 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3535 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3543 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
3545 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3546 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3547 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3548 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3550 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3551 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3553 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3554 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3556 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3558 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3559 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3560 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3561 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3562 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3563 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3564 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3565 pub fn update_channel_config(
3566 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
3567 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3568 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
3571 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
3572 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
3574 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
3575 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
3577 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
3578 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
3579 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
3580 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
3581 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
3583 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
3584 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
3585 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
3588 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3591 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
3592 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3593 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
3594 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
3595 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
3596 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3597 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3599 let next_hop_scid = {
3600 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3601 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
3602 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
3603 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3604 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3605 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
3607 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
3608 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3609 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
3612 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
3614 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3615 err: format!("Funded channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}. Channel may still be opening.",
3616 log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id)
3621 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3622 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3623 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3626 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
3627 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
3628 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
3630 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3632 let skimmed_fee_msat =
3633 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
3634 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
3635 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
3636 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
3639 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
3640 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3641 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3642 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
3643 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
3645 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
3649 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
3650 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
3652 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3655 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3656 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3657 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3659 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3660 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3661 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3664 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
3665 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3666 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3667 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3668 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
3669 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3670 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3673 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
3674 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
3675 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3676 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3681 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3683 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3684 /// Will likely generate further events.
3685 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3686 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3688 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
3689 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3690 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3692 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3693 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3695 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3696 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3697 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3699 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3700 match forward_info {
3701 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3702 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3703 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3704 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3705 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
3708 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3709 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3710 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3712 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3713 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3714 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3715 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3716 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3717 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3720 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3721 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3723 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3726 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3727 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3733 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3734 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3736 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3740 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3741 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3743 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3747 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3748 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3749 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3750 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3751 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3753 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3754 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3755 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3756 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3757 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3759 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3761 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3762 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3766 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3767 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
3768 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3769 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None)
3771 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3772 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3778 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3781 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3784 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3785 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3786 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3787 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3788 // problem, not ours.
3794 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3795 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3797 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3801 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3802 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3803 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3804 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3807 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3808 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3809 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3810 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3811 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3814 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3815 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3816 match forward_info {
3817 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3818 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
3819 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3820 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3821 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
3824 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3825 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3826 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3827 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3828 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3829 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3830 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3831 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3833 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
3834 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
3835 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, &self.fee_estimator,
3838 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3839 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3841 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3843 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3844 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3845 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3846 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3851 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3852 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3854 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3855 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3856 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
3857 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
3859 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3860 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3862 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
3864 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3865 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3866 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3875 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3876 match forward_info {
3877 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3878 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3879 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3880 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
3881 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
3884 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
3885 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3886 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3888 RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret), payment_metadata };
3889 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
3890 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
3892 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry } => {
3893 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
3894 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
3897 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
3898 payment_data, None, onion_fields)
3901 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3904 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3905 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3906 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3907 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3908 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3909 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3910 phantom_shared_secret,
3912 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
3913 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
3914 // if routing nodes overpay
3915 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
3916 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3918 total_value_received: None,
3919 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3922 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
3925 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
3927 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3928 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3929 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
3930 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3931 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3932 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
3934 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3935 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3936 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3937 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3938 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3939 phantom_shared_secret,
3941 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
3942 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3944 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
3947 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
3948 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3949 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3950 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3951 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3954 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3955 ($purpose: expr) => {{
3956 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
3957 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
3958 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
3959 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
3961 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3962 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3963 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3965 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
3966 .entry(payment_hash)
3967 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
3968 .or_insert_with(|| {
3969 committed_to_claimable = true;
3971 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
3974 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
3975 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
3976 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), log_keysend(!is_keysend));
3977 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3979 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
3980 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3981 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3983 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
3984 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
3985 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3988 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
3990 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
3991 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
3992 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
3993 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3994 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
3995 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
3996 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
3997 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3998 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3999 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
4001 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
4003 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
4004 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
4005 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4006 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4007 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4008 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
4009 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4010 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4011 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4012 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4013 committed_to_claimable = true;
4015 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
4016 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4017 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
4018 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
4019 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
4020 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
4021 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
4022 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
4023 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
4024 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4028 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4029 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4030 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4031 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4032 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4034 payment_claimable_generated = true;
4036 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
4037 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
4039 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4040 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4041 committed_to_claimable = true;
4044 payment_claimable_generated
4048 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
4049 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
4050 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4051 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4052 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4053 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4054 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4055 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4056 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4057 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4058 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4059 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4060 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4061 Ok(result) => result,
4063 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4064 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4067 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4068 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4069 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4070 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4071 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4072 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4075 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4076 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4077 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4079 check_total_value!(purpose);
4081 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4082 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4083 check_total_value!(purpose);
4087 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4088 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4089 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4090 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4092 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4093 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4094 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4095 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4096 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4097 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4098 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4099 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4101 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4102 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4103 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4105 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4106 if payment_claimable_generated {
4107 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4113 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4114 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4122 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4123 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4124 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4125 &self.pending_events, &self.logger,
4126 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
4127 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv));
4129 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4130 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4132 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4134 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4135 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4136 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4138 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4140 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4141 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4142 events.append(&mut new_events);
4145 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4147 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4148 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4149 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4151 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4153 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4154 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4155 if background_events.is_empty() {
4156 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4159 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4161 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
4162 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4163 // monitor updating completing.
4164 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4166 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update } => {
4167 let mut updated_chan = false;
4169 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4170 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4171 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4172 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4173 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4174 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4175 updated_chan = true;
4176 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4177 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan).map(|_| ())
4179 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Ok(()),
4184 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
4185 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4187 // TODO: If this channel has since closed, we're likely providing a payment
4188 // preimage update, which we must ensure is durable! We currently don't,
4189 // however, ensure that.
4191 log_error!(self.logger,
4192 "Failed to provide ChannelMonitorUpdate to closed channel! This likely lost us a payment preimage!");
4194 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4198 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4201 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4202 /// Process background events, for functional testing
4203 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4204 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4205 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4208 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4209 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
4210 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4211 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4212 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4213 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4214 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4216 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4217 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4218 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4219 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4221 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4222 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4224 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
4225 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4229 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4230 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4231 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4232 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4233 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4234 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4235 let mut should_persist = self.process_background_events();
4237 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4239 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4240 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4241 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4242 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4243 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
4244 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4245 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4253 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4255 /// This currently includes:
4256 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4257 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4258 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4260 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4261 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4262 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4264 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4265 /// estimate fetches.
4267 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4268 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4269 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4270 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4271 let mut should_persist = self.process_background_events();
4273 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4275 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4276 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4277 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4279 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4280 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4281 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4282 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4283 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4284 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4285 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
4286 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4287 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4289 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4290 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
4291 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
4292 if needs_close { return false; }
4295 match chan.channel_update_status() {
4296 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
4297 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
4298 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
4299 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
4300 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
4301 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
4302 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
4304 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4305 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
4306 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4307 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4311 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4313 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
4316 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
4318 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4319 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
4320 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4321 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4325 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4327 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
4333 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4335 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
4336 log_debug!(self.logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
4337 counterparty_node_id, log_bytes!(*chan_id));
4338 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4339 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4340 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
4341 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
4342 channel_id: *chan_id,
4343 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
4351 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
4352 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
4357 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
4358 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
4359 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
4360 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
4361 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
4362 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
4363 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
4364 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
4365 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4366 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
4367 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
4368 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
4369 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
4370 // have no channels to the peer.
4371 let remove_entry = {
4372 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
4373 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
4376 entry.remove_entry();
4379 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
4384 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
4385 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4386 // This should be unreachable
4387 debug_assert!(false);
4390 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
4391 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
4392 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
4393 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
4394 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
4395 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
4396 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
4399 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
4400 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
4401 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
4403 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
4404 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
4411 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
4412 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
4413 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
4414 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
4415 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4418 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4419 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4422 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self.pending_events);
4424 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
4425 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
4426 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
4427 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
4428 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4435 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
4436 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
4437 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
4439 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
4440 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
4441 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
4442 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
4444 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
4445 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
4446 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
4447 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
4448 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
4449 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
4452 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
4453 /// reason for the failure.
4455 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
4456 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
4457 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4459 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
4460 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
4461 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
4462 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
4463 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4464 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
4465 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4470 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
4471 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
4472 match failure_code {
4473 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
4474 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
4475 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
4476 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4477 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4478 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code as u16, htlc_msat_height_data)
4483 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4484 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4486 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
4488 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4489 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
4490 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
4491 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
4492 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
4493 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
4494 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
4496 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
4498 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
4499 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
4501 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4506 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4507 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4508 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4509 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
4510 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
4511 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
4512 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
4513 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
4514 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
4515 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4517 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4518 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4519 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4520 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
4522 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
4523 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
4524 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
4525 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
4526 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4530 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
4531 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
4532 // be surfaced to the user.
4533 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
4534 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
4535 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
4537 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
4538 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4539 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
4540 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4541 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4542 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
4543 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
4544 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
4546 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4548 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
4551 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
4552 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
4553 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
4554 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4558 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
4559 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
4560 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
4561 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
4562 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
4563 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
4564 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
4565 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
4566 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
4569 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
4570 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
4571 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
4574 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4575 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
4576 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4578 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
4579 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
4580 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
4581 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
4582 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4584 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
4585 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
4586 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
4588 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
4589 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4590 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4591 push_forward_ev = true;
4593 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
4594 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4595 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
4597 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4598 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
4601 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
4602 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4603 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4604 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
4605 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
4606 failed_next_destination: destination,
4612 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
4613 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
4615 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
4616 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
4617 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
4618 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
4620 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
4621 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
4622 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
4623 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
4625 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
4626 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
4627 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
4628 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
4629 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4630 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4631 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4632 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4634 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4637 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4638 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
4639 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4640 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
4641 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4642 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4643 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4644 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
4649 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
4650 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
4651 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id,
4653 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
4654 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
4655 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
4656 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4661 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
4663 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
4664 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
4665 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
4666 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
4667 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
4668 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
4669 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
4670 let mut valid_mpp = true;
4671 let mut errs = Vec::new();
4672 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4673 for htlc in sources.iter() {
4674 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
4675 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4676 debug_assert!(false);
4680 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
4682 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
4683 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4684 debug_assert!(false);
4688 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
4689 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
4691 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4692 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4693 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4694 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4697 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4698 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4699 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4700 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4704 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4705 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
4706 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
4707 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
4709 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4710 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4711 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4712 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4713 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4718 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4719 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4720 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4721 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4722 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
4723 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
4724 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4726 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4729 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
4730 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4731 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4732 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4736 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
4737 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
4738 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
4739 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4741 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
4742 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
4743 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
4744 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
4747 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4748 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
4749 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4750 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
4754 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
4755 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4756 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
4759 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
4760 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
4761 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4762 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4763 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id();
4764 let fulfill_res = chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
4766 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
4767 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
4768 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
4769 log_bytes!(chan_id), action);
4770 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
4773 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
4774 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4775 if let Err(e) = res {
4776 // TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge
4777 // of the HTLC's monitor with a preimage. We should retry this monitor
4778 // update over and over again until morale improves.
4779 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}", payment_preimage);
4780 return Err((counterparty_node_id, e));
4783 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
4784 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
4785 // monitor update as a background event.
4786 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
4787 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
4788 counterparty_node_id,
4789 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
4790 update: monitor_update.clone(),
4798 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4799 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4800 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4806 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4807 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
4808 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
4809 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4810 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4811 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4812 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
4813 // again on restart.
4814 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4815 payment_preimage, update_res);
4818 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
4819 // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
4821 // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
4822 // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
4823 // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
4824 // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
4825 // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
4826 // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
4827 // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
4828 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
4829 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
4830 prev_hop.outpoint, preimage_update,
4833 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
4834 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
4835 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
4836 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
4837 // `PaymentForwarded`).
4838 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
4842 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4843 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
4846 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4848 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4849 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
4850 "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
4851 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage, session_priv, path, from_onchain, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
4853 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4854 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4855 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
4856 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
4857 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4858 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4859 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4862 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
4863 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4865 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4866 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
4867 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_id),
4868 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
4870 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: None,
4874 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
4875 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4876 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4882 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4883 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4884 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4887 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
4888 for action in actions.into_iter() {
4890 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
4891 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4892 if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
4893 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4894 payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4898 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
4899 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
4901 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
4902 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
4903 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker));
4910 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
4911 /// update completion.
4912 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4913 channel: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
4914 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
4915 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
4916 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
4917 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
4918 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
4919 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()),
4920 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
4921 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
4922 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
4923 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
4924 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
4926 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
4928 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
4929 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4930 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
4931 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
4934 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4935 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
4937 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
4938 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4939 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4944 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
4945 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
4946 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4947 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4952 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
4953 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
4954 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4955 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4956 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4961 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
4965 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
4971 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
4972 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
4973 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
4977 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4978 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
4979 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
4985 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
4986 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
4988 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
4989 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4991 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
4992 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
4993 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4994 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4995 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5000 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5001 let mut peer_state_lock;
5002 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
5003 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
5004 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5005 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5007 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()){
5008 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
5009 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
5012 let remaining_in_flight =
5013 if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
5014 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
5017 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
5018 highest_applied_update_id, channel.get().context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
5019 remaining_in_flight);
5020 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
5023 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel.get_mut());
5026 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
5028 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
5029 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
5032 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5033 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5034 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5036 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
5037 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
5038 /// used to accept such channels.
5040 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5041 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5042 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5043 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
5046 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
5047 /// it as confirmed immediately.
5049 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5050 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5051 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5053 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
5054 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
5056 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
5057 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
5059 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
5060 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
5062 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5063 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5064 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5065 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
5068 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5069 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5071 let peers_without_funded_channels =
5072 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
5073 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5074 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5075 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
5076 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5077 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5078 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
5079 match peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
5080 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
5081 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_accept() {
5082 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
5085 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
5086 } else if channel.get().context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
5087 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5088 node_id: channel.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5089 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5090 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
5093 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5094 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
5095 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
5097 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5098 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5099 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5100 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
5101 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5102 node_id: channel.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5103 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5104 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
5107 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5108 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
5109 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
5113 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5114 node_id: channel.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5115 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
5118 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
5119 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) });
5125 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
5126 /// or 0-conf channels.
5128 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
5129 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
5130 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
5131 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> bool {
5132 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
5133 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5135 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5136 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
5137 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5138 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
5139 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
5140 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
5141 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
5145 return peers_without_funded_channels;
5148 fn unfunded_channel_count(
5149 peer: &PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, best_block_height: u32
5151 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
5152 for (_, chan) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
5153 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
5154 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
5155 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
5156 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
5158 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5161 for (_, chan) in peer.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter() {
5162 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
5163 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5166 num_unfunded_channels
5169 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5170 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
5171 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5174 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
5175 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5178 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
5179 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
5180 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
5181 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
5183 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
5184 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
5185 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
5186 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
5187 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
5189 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5190 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5192 debug_assert!(false);
5193 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
5195 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5196 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5198 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5199 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5200 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5201 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
5202 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
5203 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
5205 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5206 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
5207 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5210 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5211 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
5212 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5213 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
5214 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5217 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5218 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
5219 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
5222 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
5223 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
5227 let channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
5228 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
5230 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
5231 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
5233 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
5234 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
5235 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
5236 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5238 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5239 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5241 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5242 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5243 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
5246 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5247 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
5248 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
5249 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5250 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
5251 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
5252 channel_type: channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
5255 peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, channel);
5260 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5261 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
5262 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5263 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5265 debug_assert!(false);
5266 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
5268 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5269 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5270 match peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
5271 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5272 try_v1_outbound_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan);
5273 (chan.get().context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().context.get_user_id())
5275 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
5278 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5279 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
5280 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
5281 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5282 channel_value_satoshis: value,
5284 user_channel_id: user_id,
5289 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5290 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5292 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5293 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5295 debug_assert!(false);
5296 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
5299 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5300 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5301 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor) =
5302 match peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
5303 Some(inbound_chan) => {
5304 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger) {
5306 Err((mut inbound_chan, err)) => {
5307 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
5308 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
5309 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
5310 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &inbound_chan.context);
5311 let user_id = inbound_chan.context.get_user_id();
5312 let shutdown_res = inbound_chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
5313 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(format!("{}", err),
5314 msg.temporary_channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None));
5318 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
5321 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
5322 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5323 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
5325 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5326 match self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
5327 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5328 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5329 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
5330 funding_msg.channel_id))
5332 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
5333 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
5337 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
5338 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
5339 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
5340 // until we have persisted our monitor.
5341 let new_channel_id = funding_msg.channel_id;
5342 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
5343 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5347 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
5349 let chan = e.insert(chan);
5350 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, monitor_res, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
5351 per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING_INITIAL_MONITOR,
5352 { peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&new_channel_id) });
5354 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
5355 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
5356 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
5357 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
5358 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
5359 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
5360 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
5361 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { shutdown_finish: Some((res, _)), .. }) = &mut res {
5369 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5370 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5371 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5372 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5374 debug_assert!(false);
5375 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5378 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5379 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5380 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5381 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5382 let monitor = try_chan_entry!(self,
5383 chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan);
5384 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor);
5385 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
5386 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
5387 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
5388 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
5389 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
5390 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
5391 shutdown_finish.0.take();
5396 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5400 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5401 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5402 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5404 debug_assert!(false);
5405 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5407 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5408 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5409 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5410 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5411 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
5412 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
5413 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
5414 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().context.channel_id()));
5415 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5416 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5417 msg: announcement_sigs,
5419 } else if chan.get().context.is_usable() {
5420 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
5421 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
5422 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
5423 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
5424 // announcement_signatures.
5425 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().context.channel_id()));
5426 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5427 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5428 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5435 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5436 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan.get_mut());
5441 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5445 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5446 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
5447 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
5448 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5449 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5451 debug_assert!(false);
5452 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5454 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5455 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5456 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5457 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
5459 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
5460 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
5461 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
5462 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
5465 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().context.get_funding_txo();
5466 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self,
5467 chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
5468 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
5470 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
5471 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
5472 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
5473 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
5474 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5475 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5480 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
5481 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5482 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
5483 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry).map(|_| ());
5487 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5490 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
5491 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
5492 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5493 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5499 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5500 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5501 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5503 debug_assert!(false);
5504 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5506 let (tx, chan_option) = {
5507 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5508 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5509 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5510 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
5511 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
5512 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
5513 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5514 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5519 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
5520 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
5521 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
5522 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
5523 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
5524 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
5525 } else { (tx, None) }
5527 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5530 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
5531 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
5532 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
5534 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
5535 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5536 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5537 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5538 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5542 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5547 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5548 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
5549 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
5550 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
5552 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
5553 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
5554 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
5555 //but we should prevent it anyway.
5557 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
5558 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5559 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5561 debug_assert!(false);
5562 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5564 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5565 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5566 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5567 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5569 let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
5570 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
5571 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(msg, shared_secret, next_hop,
5572 chan.get().context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt),
5573 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
5575 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
5576 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
5577 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
5578 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
5579 match pending_forward_info {
5580 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
5581 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
5582 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
5583 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
5585 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
5586 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
5587 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5588 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
5589 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
5592 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
5594 _ => pending_forward_info
5597 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), chan);
5599 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5604 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5605 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
5606 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5607 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5609 debug_assert!(false);
5610 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5612 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5613 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5614 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5615 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5616 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
5618 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5621 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
5625 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5626 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5627 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5629 debug_assert!(false);
5630 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5632 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5633 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5634 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5635 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5636 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
5638 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5643 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5644 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5645 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5647 debug_assert!(false);
5648 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5650 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5651 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5652 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5653 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5654 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
5655 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
5656 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
5658 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
5661 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5665 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5666 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5667 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5669 debug_assert!(false);
5670 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5672 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5673 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5674 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5675 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5676 let funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo();
5677 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5678 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5679 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5680 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan).map(|_| ())
5683 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5688 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
5689 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
5690 let mut push_forward_event = false;
5691 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
5692 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
5693 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5694 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5695 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
5696 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
5697 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
5698 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
5700 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
5701 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
5703 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5704 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
5705 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
5706 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5707 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5708 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
5710 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5711 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
5712 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
5714 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
5715 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5716 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
5717 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5718 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
5719 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
5720 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
5721 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
5722 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
5725 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5726 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
5728 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5729 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
5730 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5731 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5732 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5733 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5734 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
5735 phantom_shared_secret: None,
5738 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
5739 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
5740 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
5745 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
5746 // payments are being processed.
5747 if forward_htlcs_empty {
5748 push_forward_event = true;
5750 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5751 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
5758 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
5759 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
5762 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
5763 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5764 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
5766 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
5770 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
5771 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5772 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5773 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
5774 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
5776 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
5777 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
5778 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
5779 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
5780 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
5781 // real by taking more time.
5782 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
5783 pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5784 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
5789 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
5790 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
5791 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
5792 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
5793 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
5794 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
5795 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
5797 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
5798 .get(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
5799 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
5800 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5801 channel_funding_outpoint,
5802 counterparty_node_id,
5807 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5808 let (htlcs_to_fail, res) = {
5809 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5810 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5812 debug_assert!(false);
5813 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5814 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
5815 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5816 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5817 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5818 let funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo();
5819 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), chan);
5820 let res = if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5821 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
5822 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan).map(|_| ())
5824 (htlcs_to_fail, res)
5826 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5829 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5833 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5834 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5835 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5837 debug_assert!(false);
5838 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5840 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5841 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5842 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5843 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5844 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
5846 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5851 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5852 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5853 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5855 debug_assert!(false);
5856 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5858 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5859 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5860 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5861 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5862 if !chan.get().context.is_usable() {
5863 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
5866 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5867 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5868 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
5869 msg, &self.default_configuration
5871 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5872 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5873 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap()),
5876 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5881 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5882 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5883 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5884 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
5886 // It's not a local channel
5887 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5890 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5891 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
5892 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
5893 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5895 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5896 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5897 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5898 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5899 if chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5900 if chan.get().context.should_announce() {
5901 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5902 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5903 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5904 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5906 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5908 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5909 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5910 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5911 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5913 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5914 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
5917 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5919 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5922 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5924 let need_lnd_workaround = {
5925 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5927 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5929 debug_assert!(false);
5930 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5932 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5933 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5934 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5935 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5936 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5937 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5938 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5939 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5940 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5941 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
5942 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
5943 let mut channel_update = None;
5944 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5945 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5946 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5949 } else if chan.get().context.is_usable() {
5950 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5951 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5952 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5953 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5954 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5955 node_id: chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5960 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5961 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
5962 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5963 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5964 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5965 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5969 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5973 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
5974 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
5977 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5978 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5983 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
5984 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5985 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5987 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5988 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5989 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5990 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5991 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5992 match monitor_event {
5993 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5994 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5995 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5996 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5998 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5999 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
6000 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6001 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6004 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
6005 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
6006 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
6007 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
6009 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
6010 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
6011 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6012 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
6015 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
6016 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6017 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6018 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6019 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6020 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6021 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
6022 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
6023 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
6024 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6025 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6029 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
6030 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
6032 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
6034 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, reason);
6035 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6036 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6037 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
6038 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
6045 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
6046 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
6052 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6053 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6056 has_pending_monitor_events
6059 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
6060 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
6061 /// update events as a separate process method here.
6063 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
6064 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6065 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
6068 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
6069 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
6070 /// update was applied.
6071 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
6072 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
6073 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
6074 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
6076 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
6077 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
6078 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
6079 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
6081 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6082 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6084 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6085 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6086 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
6087 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
6088 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6089 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
6090 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
6091 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
6092 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
6094 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
6095 has_monitor_update = true;
6097 let channel_id: [u8; 32] = *channel_id;
6098 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6099 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING,
6100 peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id));
6102 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, res));
6104 continue 'peer_loop;
6113 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
6114 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
6115 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
6118 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
6119 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
6125 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
6126 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
6127 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
6128 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
6129 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
6130 let mut has_update = false;
6132 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6134 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6135 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6136 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6137 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6138 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
6139 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
6140 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
6141 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
6143 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6144 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
6147 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
6148 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
6149 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
6150 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6151 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6156 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
6158 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
6159 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
6160 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
6166 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
6167 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
6175 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
6176 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
6182 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
6183 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
6185 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
6186 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6187 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
6188 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
6189 // reorganized out of the main chain.
6190 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
6191 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
6192 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
6193 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
6194 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
6195 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
6196 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
6197 assert!(should_broadcast);
6198 } else { unreachable!(); }
6199 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
6200 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
6201 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
6204 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6208 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
6211 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
6212 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
6214 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
6215 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
6216 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
6217 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
6219 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
6221 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
6222 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
6226 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
6227 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
6229 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
6231 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
6232 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
6234 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
6235 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
6236 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
6237 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
6238 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
6239 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
6240 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
6241 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
6242 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
6243 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
6244 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
6247 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
6248 /// stored external to LDK.
6250 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
6251 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
6252 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
6254 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
6255 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
6258 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
6259 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
6260 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
6261 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
6263 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
6264 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
6265 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
6266 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
6267 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
6269 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
6270 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
6271 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
6272 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
6273 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
6275 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
6276 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
6278 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
6279 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
6283 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
6284 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
6286 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
6288 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
6289 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
6291 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6292 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
6293 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
6294 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
6295 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
6296 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
6297 min_final_cltv_expiry)
6300 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
6301 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
6303 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6304 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
6305 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
6308 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
6309 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
6311 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
6312 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
6313 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6314 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
6316 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
6317 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
6318 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
6319 Some(_) => continue,
6320 None => return scid_candidate
6325 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
6327 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
6328 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
6330 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
6331 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
6332 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
6336 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
6337 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
6338 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
6340 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
6341 /// times to get a unique scid.
6342 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
6343 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6344 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
6346 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
6347 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
6348 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
6349 return scid_candidate
6353 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
6354 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
6355 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
6356 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
6358 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6359 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6360 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6361 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6362 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
6363 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
6364 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
6365 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
6374 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6375 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
6376 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
6377 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
6378 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
6382 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
6383 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
6384 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6385 events.push_back((event, None));
6389 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
6390 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6391 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
6395 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
6396 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
6400 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
6401 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
6404 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
6405 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
6406 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
6407 /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
6408 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
6409 let mut errors = Vec::new();
6411 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6412 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6413 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6414 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
6416 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
6417 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
6418 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6419 .get_mut(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
6421 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
6425 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
6426 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id) {
6427 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
6428 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
6429 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
6430 log_trace!(self.logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
6431 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6435 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
6436 debug_assert_eq!(chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
6437 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.get_mut().unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
6438 log_debug!(self.logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
6439 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6440 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
6441 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
6443 errors.push((e, counterparty_node_id));
6445 if further_update_exists {
6446 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
6451 log_trace!(self.logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
6452 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6456 log_debug!(self.logger,
6457 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
6458 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6462 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in errors {
6463 let res = Err::<(), _>(err);
6464 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
6468 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
6469 for action in actions {
6471 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6472 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
6474 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, None);
6480 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
6481 /// using the given event handler.
6483 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
6484 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
6488 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
6492 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6494 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6495 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6496 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6497 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6498 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6499 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6503 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
6504 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
6505 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
6506 /// is always placed next to each other.
6508 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
6509 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
6510 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
6511 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
6513 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
6514 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
6515 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
6516 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
6517 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
6518 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6519 let mut result = self.process_background_events();
6521 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
6522 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
6523 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
6524 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6527 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
6528 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6530 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
6531 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6534 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
6535 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6536 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6537 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6538 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6539 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
6540 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
6544 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
6545 events.replace(pending_events);
6554 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6556 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6557 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6558 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6559 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6560 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6561 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6565 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
6567 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
6568 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
6569 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
6571 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
6575 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6577 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6578 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6579 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6580 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6581 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6582 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6586 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6588 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6589 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
6590 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
6591 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
6592 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
6595 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
6596 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
6599 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6600 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6601 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6602 let new_height = height - 1;
6604 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
6605 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
6606 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
6607 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
6608 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
6609 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
6612 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6616 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6618 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6619 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6620 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6621 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6622 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6623 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6627 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6628 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6629 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6630 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6632 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6633 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
6635 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6636 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6637 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
6638 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
6640 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6641 if height < last_best_block_height {
6642 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6643 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6647 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6648 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6649 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6650 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6652 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6653 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
6655 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6656 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6657 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
6659 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6661 macro_rules! max_time {
6662 ($timestamp: expr) => {
6664 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
6665 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
6666 // having an explicit local time source.
6667 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
6668 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
6669 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6670 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
6671 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
6677 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
6678 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6679 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
6680 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
6684 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
6685 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
6686 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
6687 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6688 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6689 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
6690 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.context.get_funding_txo(), chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
6691 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
6698 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
6699 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6700 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6701 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
6702 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
6703 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
6704 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
6705 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6706 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6711 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6713 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6714 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6715 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6716 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6717 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6718 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6722 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
6723 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
6725 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
6726 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
6727 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6728 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6729 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6731 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6732 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
6734 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6735 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6736 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6737 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6738 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6739 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
6740 let res = f(channel);
6741 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
6742 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
6743 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
6744 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
6745 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
6747 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
6748 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
6749 if channel.context.is_usable() {
6750 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
6751 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
6752 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6753 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6758 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
6763 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6764 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
6767 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
6768 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
6769 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6770 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6771 msg: announcement_sigs,
6773 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6774 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
6775 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6777 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6778 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6779 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
6784 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
6785 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
6786 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
6787 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
6788 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
6789 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
6790 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
6791 // is always consistent.
6792 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
6793 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
6794 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
6795 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
6796 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
6799 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
6800 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
6801 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
6802 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
6803 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true));
6804 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
6805 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6809 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
6810 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, reason);
6811 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6812 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6813 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
6814 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
6815 data: reason_message,
6825 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6826 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
6827 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
6828 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
6829 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
6830 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
6831 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
6832 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6833 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6834 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
6836 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
6837 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
6838 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
6842 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
6845 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6846 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
6847 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6848 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6849 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
6850 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
6851 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6852 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6853 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
6856 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
6857 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6858 _ => unreachable!(),
6860 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
6861 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
6862 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
6863 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
6869 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
6871 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
6872 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
6876 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
6878 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
6879 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
6881 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
6882 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
6885 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6886 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
6887 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
6890 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
6891 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
6892 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
6893 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
6896 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6897 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6898 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6899 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6902 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6903 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6905 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6906 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6907 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6908 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6909 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
6912 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6913 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6914 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
6915 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
6918 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6919 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6920 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6921 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
6924 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6925 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6926 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
6927 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6931 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
6932 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6934 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6935 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6936 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6937 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6938 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6939 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6943 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
6944 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6945 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6948 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
6949 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6950 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6951 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6954 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
6955 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6956 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6959 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
6960 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6961 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6962 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6965 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6966 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6967 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6970 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6971 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6972 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6975 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6976 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6977 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6980 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6981 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6982 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6985 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6986 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6987 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6990 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6991 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6992 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6995 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6996 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6997 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7000 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
7001 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7002 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7005 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
7006 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7007 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7010 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
7011 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7012 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7015 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
7016 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7017 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7020 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
7021 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7022 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7025 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
7026 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7027 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7030 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
7031 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
7032 let force_persist = self.process_background_events();
7033 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
7034 if force_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { NotifyOption::DoPersist } else { persist }
7036 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
7041 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
7042 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7043 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7046 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
7047 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7048 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7049 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7051 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
7052 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7053 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
7054 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7055 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7056 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7057 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
7058 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
7059 if chan.is_shutdown() {
7060 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7061 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
7066 peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
7067 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7068 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
7071 peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
7072 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7073 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
7076 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
7078 // V1 Channel Establishment
7079 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
7080 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
7081 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
7082 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
7083 // V2 Channel Establishment
7084 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
7085 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
7086 // Common Channel Establishment
7087 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
7088 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
7089 // Interactive Transaction Construction
7090 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
7091 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
7092 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
7093 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
7094 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
7095 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
7096 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
7097 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
7098 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
7099 // Channel Operations
7100 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
7101 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
7102 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
7103 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
7104 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
7105 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
7107 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
7108 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
7109 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
7110 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
7111 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
7112 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
7113 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
7114 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
7115 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
7118 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
7119 peer_state.is_connected = false;
7120 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
7121 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
7124 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
7126 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
7128 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7129 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
7133 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
7134 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
7135 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7139 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7141 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
7142 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
7143 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
7144 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
7145 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
7146 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
7149 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7150 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
7151 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
7152 if inbound_peer_limited {
7155 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
7156 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7157 outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7158 inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7159 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
7160 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7161 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
7162 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
7163 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
7167 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
7168 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
7169 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
7171 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7172 if inbound_peer_limited &&
7173 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
7174 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
7179 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
7180 peer_state.is_connected = true;
7185 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7187 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7188 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7189 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7190 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7191 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7192 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
7193 let retain = if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
7194 if !chan.context.have_received_message() {
7195 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
7196 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
7197 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
7201 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
7202 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7203 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
7208 if retain && chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
7209 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.default_configuration) {
7210 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
7211 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
7212 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7221 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
7225 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
7226 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7228 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
7229 let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = {
7230 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7231 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
7232 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
7233 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7234 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7235 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned()
7236 .chain(peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.keys().cloned())
7237 .chain(peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.keys().cloned()).collect()
7239 for channel_id in channel_ids {
7240 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
7241 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
7245 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
7246 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7247 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
7248 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
7249 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7250 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7251 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
7252 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
7253 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
7254 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7262 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
7263 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
7267 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
7268 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
7271 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
7272 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
7275 fn get_genesis_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
7276 Some(vec![ChainHash::from(&self.genesis_hash[..])])
7279 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
7280 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7281 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7282 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7285 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
7286 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7287 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7288 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7291 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
7292 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7293 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7294 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7297 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
7298 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7299 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7300 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7303 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
7304 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7305 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7306 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7309 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
7310 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7311 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7312 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7315 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
7316 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7317 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7318 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7321 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
7322 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7323 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7324 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7327 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
7328 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7329 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7330 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7334 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7335 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7336 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
7337 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
7340 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7341 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7343 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
7344 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
7345 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
7346 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InvoiceFeatures {
7347 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
7350 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7351 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7352 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
7353 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
7356 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7357 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7358 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
7359 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
7362 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7363 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7364 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
7365 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
7366 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
7367 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
7368 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
7369 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
7370 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
7371 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
7372 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
7373 features.set_payment_secret_required();
7374 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
7375 features.set_wumbo_optional();
7376 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
7377 features.set_channel_type_optional();
7378 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
7379 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
7380 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
7381 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
7386 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
7387 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
7389 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
7390 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
7391 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
7392 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
7395 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
7396 (2, node_id, required),
7397 (4, features, required),
7398 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
7399 (8, forwarding_info, option),
7400 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7401 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7404 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
7405 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7406 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7407 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
7408 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
7409 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
7410 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7411 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
7412 (2, self.channel_id, required),
7413 (3, self.channel_type, option),
7414 (4, self.counterparty, required),
7415 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
7416 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
7417 (7, self.config, option),
7418 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
7419 (9, self.confirmations, option),
7420 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
7421 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
7422 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
7423 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
7424 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
7425 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
7426 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
7427 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
7428 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
7429 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
7430 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
7431 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
7432 (30, self.is_usable, required),
7433 (32, self.is_public, required),
7434 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7435 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7436 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
7437 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
7438 (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
7444 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
7445 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7446 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7447 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
7448 (2, channel_id, required),
7449 (3, channel_type, option),
7450 (4, counterparty, required),
7451 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7452 (6, funding_txo, option),
7453 (7, config, option),
7454 (8, short_channel_id, option),
7455 (9, confirmations, option),
7456 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
7457 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
7458 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
7459 (16, balance_msat, required),
7460 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
7461 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
7462 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
7463 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
7464 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
7465 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
7466 (22, confirmations_required, option),
7467 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
7468 (26, is_outbound, required),
7469 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
7470 (30, is_usable, required),
7471 (32, is_public, required),
7472 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7473 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7474 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
7475 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
7476 (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
7479 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7480 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
7481 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
7482 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
7483 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
7487 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
7489 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
7490 outbound_scid_alias,
7494 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
7495 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
7497 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
7498 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
7499 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
7500 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
7501 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
7502 confirmations_required,
7504 force_close_spend_delay,
7505 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
7506 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
7507 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
7508 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
7509 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
7510 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
7511 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
7512 channel_shutdown_state,
7517 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
7518 (2, channels, vec_type),
7519 (4, phantom_scid, required),
7520 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
7523 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
7525 (0, onion_packet, required),
7526 (2, short_channel_id, required),
7529 (0, payment_data, required),
7530 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
7531 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
7532 (3, payment_metadata, option),
7534 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
7535 (0, payment_preimage, required),
7536 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
7537 (3, payment_metadata, option),
7538 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
7542 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
7543 (0, routing, required),
7544 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
7545 (4, payment_hash, required),
7546 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
7547 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
7548 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
7549 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
7553 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
7554 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7556 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
7558 channel_id.write(writer)?;
7559 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7560 reason.write(writer)?;
7562 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7563 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
7566 channel_id.write(writer)?;
7567 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7568 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
7569 failure_code.write(writer)?;
7576 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
7577 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7578 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7581 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
7582 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7583 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7584 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
7588 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7589 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7590 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7591 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
7592 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
7595 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
7596 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
7597 // messages contained in the variants.
7598 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
7599 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
7600 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
7602 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
7603 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
7604 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
7605 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
7606 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
7609 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
7610 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
7611 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
7612 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
7613 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
7615 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
7620 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
7625 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
7626 (0, short_channel_id, required),
7627 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
7628 (2, outpoint, required),
7629 (4, htlc_id, required),
7630 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
7633 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
7634 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7635 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
7636 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
7637 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
7639 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7640 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
7641 (1, self.total_msat, required),
7642 (2, self.value, required),
7643 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
7644 (4, payment_data, option),
7645 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
7646 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
7647 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
7648 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
7654 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
7655 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7656 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7657 (0, prev_hop, required),
7658 (1, total_msat, option),
7659 (2, value_ser, required),
7660 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
7661 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
7662 (5, total_value_received, option),
7663 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
7664 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
7665 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
7667 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
7668 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
7669 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
7671 if payment_data.is_some() {
7672 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7674 if total_msat.is_none() {
7675 total_msat = Some(value);
7677 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
7680 if total_msat.is_none() {
7681 if payment_data.is_none() {
7682 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7684 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
7686 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
7690 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
7693 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
7694 total_value_received,
7695 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
7697 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
7698 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
7703 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
7704 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7705 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7708 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
7709 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
7710 let mut path_hops: Option<Vec<RouteHop>> = Some(Vec::new());
7711 let mut payment_id = None;
7712 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
7713 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
7714 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7715 (0, session_priv, required),
7716 (1, payment_id, option),
7717 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
7718 (4, path_hops, vec_type),
7719 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
7720 (6, blinded_tail, option),
7722 if payment_id.is_none() {
7723 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
7725 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
7727 let path = Path { hops: path_hops.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?, blinded_tail };
7728 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
7729 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7731 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
7732 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
7733 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
7734 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7738 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7739 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
7740 first_hop_htlc_msat,
7742 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
7745 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7746 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
7751 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
7752 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
7754 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
7756 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
7757 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7758 (0, session_priv, required),
7759 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
7760 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
7761 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
7762 (4, path.hops, vec_type),
7763 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
7764 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
7767 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
7769 field.write(writer)?;
7776 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
7777 (0, forward_info, required),
7778 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
7779 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
7780 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
7781 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
7784 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
7786 (0, htlc_id, required),
7787 (2, err_packet, required),
7792 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
7793 (0, payment_secret, required),
7794 (2, expiry_time, required),
7795 (4, user_payment_id, required),
7796 (6, payment_preimage, required),
7797 (8, min_value_msat, required),
7800 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7802 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7803 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7804 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7805 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7806 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7807 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7811 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7812 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
7814 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7816 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
7818 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7819 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
7820 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
7823 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
7825 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7826 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
7827 let mut number_of_channels = 0;
7828 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7829 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7830 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7831 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7832 serializable_peer_count += 1;
7834 number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len();
7835 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
7836 if !channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
7837 unfunded_channels += 1;
7842 ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
7844 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7845 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7846 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7847 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
7848 if channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
7849 channel.write(writer)?;
7856 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7857 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7858 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
7859 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7860 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7861 for forward in pending_forwards {
7862 forward.write(writer)?;
7867 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7869 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7870 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
7871 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7873 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
7874 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
7875 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7876 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
7877 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7878 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7879 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
7880 htlc.write(writer)?;
7882 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
7883 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
7886 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
7887 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
7888 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7889 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
7890 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
7891 // per_peer_state lock at all.
7892 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
7895 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
7896 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
7897 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
7898 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
7899 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
7901 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7902 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
7903 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
7904 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
7905 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
7906 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
7907 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
7912 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7913 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
7914 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
7915 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
7916 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
7917 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
7918 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
7919 // well save the space and not write any events here.
7920 0u64.write(writer)?;
7922 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7923 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
7924 event.write(writer)?;
7928 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
7929 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
7930 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
7931 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
7932 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
7933 0u64.write(writer)?;
7935 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
7936 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
7937 // likely to be identical.
7938 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7939 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7941 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7942 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
7943 hash.write(writer)?;
7944 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
7947 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
7948 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
7949 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7950 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
7951 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
7954 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
7955 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7957 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7958 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7959 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
7960 session_priv.write(writer)?;
7963 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
7964 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
7968 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
7969 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
7970 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7972 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7973 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7974 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
7980 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
7981 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7982 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
7983 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
7986 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
7987 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
7988 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
7989 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
7990 pending_claiming_payments = None;
7993 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
7994 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
7995 for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
7996 if !updates.is_empty() {
7997 if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(HashMap::new()); }
7998 in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
8003 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8004 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
8005 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
8006 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
8007 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
8008 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
8009 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
8010 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
8011 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
8012 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
8013 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
8014 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
8015 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
8022 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
8023 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8024 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
8025 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
8028 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
8029 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
8030 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
8031 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
8032 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
8033 // check that the event is sane here.
8034 let event_encoded = event.encode();
8035 let event_read: Option<Event> =
8036 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
8037 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
8043 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
8044 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8045 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8046 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
8047 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
8048 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
8051 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
8052 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
8053 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
8054 events.push_back((ev, action));
8055 } else if action.is_some() {
8056 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8063 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
8064 (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
8065 (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
8066 (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
8067 (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
8068 (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
8071 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
8073 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
8075 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
8076 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
8077 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
8078 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
8079 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
8080 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
8081 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
8082 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
8083 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
8084 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
8085 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
8086 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
8087 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
8089 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
8090 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
8092 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
8093 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
8095 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
8096 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
8097 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
8098 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
8099 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
8100 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
8102 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
8103 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8105 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8106 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8107 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8108 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8109 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8110 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8114 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
8115 pub entropy_source: ES,
8117 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
8118 pub node_signer: NS,
8120 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
8121 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
8123 pub signer_provider: SP,
8125 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
8127 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
8128 pub fee_estimator: F,
8129 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
8131 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
8132 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
8133 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
8134 pub chain_monitor: M,
8136 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
8137 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
8138 /// force-closed during deserialization.
8139 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
8140 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
8141 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
8143 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
8145 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
8146 /// deserialization.
8148 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
8149 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
8150 pub default_config: UserConfig,
8152 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
8153 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
8155 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
8156 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
8157 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
8158 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
8160 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
8163 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
8164 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
8167 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8168 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8170 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8171 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8172 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8173 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8174 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8175 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8179 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
8180 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
8181 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
8182 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
8183 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
8185 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
8186 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
8191 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
8192 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
8193 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8194 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
8196 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8197 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8198 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8199 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8200 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8201 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8205 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8206 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
8207 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
8211 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8212 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
8214 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8215 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8216 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8217 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8218 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8219 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8223 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8224 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8226 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8227 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8228 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8230 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
8232 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8233 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8234 let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8235 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8236 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8237 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
8238 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
8239 for _ in 0..channel_count {
8240 let mut channel: Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (
8241 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
8243 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8244 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
8245 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
8246 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
8247 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
8248 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
8249 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
8250 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
8251 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
8252 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
8253 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
8254 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
8255 let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
8256 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = monitor_update {
8257 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
8258 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
8261 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
8262 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
8263 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8264 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
8265 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
8267 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
8268 let mut found_htlc = false;
8269 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
8270 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
8273 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
8274 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
8275 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
8276 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
8277 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
8278 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
8279 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
8280 log_info!(args.logger,
8281 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
8282 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
8283 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8287 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
8288 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
8289 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
8290 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
8291 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8293 if channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
8294 id_to_peer.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
8296 match peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
8297 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
8298 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
8299 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel);
8301 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
8302 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
8303 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel);
8304 entry.insert(by_id_map);
8308 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
8309 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
8310 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
8311 // safely discard the channel.
8312 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false);
8313 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
8314 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8315 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
8316 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
8319 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
8320 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
8321 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
8322 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
8323 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
8324 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8328 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8329 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
8330 log_info!(args.logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
8331 log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
8332 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
8333 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
8334 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
8336 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
8340 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
8341 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8342 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
8343 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
8344 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8345 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8346 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
8347 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
8348 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
8350 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
8353 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8354 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
8355 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
8356 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8357 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8358 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
8359 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
8360 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
8362 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
8365 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
8368 outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8369 inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8370 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
8371 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
8372 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8373 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
8374 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8375 is_connected: false,
8379 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8380 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>)>()));
8381 for _ in 0..peer_count {
8382 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
8383 let peer_chans = peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new());
8384 let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
8385 peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
8386 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
8389 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8390 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
8391 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
8392 for _ in 0..event_count {
8393 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
8394 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
8399 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8400 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
8401 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8403 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
8404 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
8405 // on-startup monitor updates.
8406 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
8407 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
8409 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8413 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
8414 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8416 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8417 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
8418 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
8419 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
8420 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8424 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8425 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
8426 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
8427 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
8428 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
8429 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
8430 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
8432 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
8433 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8437 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
8438 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
8439 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
8440 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
8441 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
8442 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
8443 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
8444 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
8445 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
8446 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
8447 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
8448 let mut events_override = None;
8449 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
8450 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8451 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
8452 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
8453 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
8454 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
8455 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
8456 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
8457 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
8458 (8, events_override, option),
8459 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
8460 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
8461 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
8462 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
8464 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
8465 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8468 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
8469 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8472 if let Some(events) = events_override {
8473 pending_events_read = events;
8476 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
8477 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
8480 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
8481 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
8482 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
8483 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
8484 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
8485 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
8487 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
8489 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
8490 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
8491 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
8494 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
8495 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
8496 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
8497 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
8498 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
8500 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
8501 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
8502 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
8504 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
8505 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
8506 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
8507 ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
8508 $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
8510 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
8511 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
8512 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
8513 log_trace!(args.logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
8514 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, log_bytes!($funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
8515 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
8516 pending_background_events.push(
8517 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
8518 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
8519 funding_txo: $funding_txo,
8520 update: update.clone(),
8523 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
8524 log_error!(args.logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
8525 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8527 max_in_flight_update_id
8531 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
8532 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
8533 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8534 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
8535 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
8537 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8538 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
8539 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
8540 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
8541 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
8542 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
8543 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
8544 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
8545 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, ""));
8548 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
8549 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
8550 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
8551 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
8552 log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
8553 log_error!(args.logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
8554 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
8555 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
8556 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
8557 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
8558 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8563 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
8564 for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
8565 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
8566 // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
8567 // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
8568 // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
8569 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
8570 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(HashMap::new()))
8572 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8573 handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
8574 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, "closed ");
8576 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
8577 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.",
8578 log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
8579 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
8580 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
8581 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
8582 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
8583 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8588 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
8589 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
8591 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
8592 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
8593 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
8594 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
8597 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
8598 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
8599 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
8600 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
8601 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
8602 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
8603 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
8605 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8606 let counterparty_opt = id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
8607 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
8608 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
8609 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
8610 if path.hops.is_empty() {
8611 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
8612 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8615 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
8616 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
8617 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
8618 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
8619 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
8620 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
8621 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
8622 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
8624 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
8625 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
8626 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
8627 retry_strategy: None,
8628 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
8629 payment_params: None,
8630 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
8631 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
8632 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8633 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8634 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8635 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
8636 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
8637 total_msat: path_amt,
8638 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
8640 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
8641 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
8646 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
8648 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
8649 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
8650 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
8651 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
8653 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
8654 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
8655 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
8656 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
8657 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
8658 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
8659 forwards.retain(|forward| {
8660 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
8661 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
8662 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
8663 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
8668 !forwards.is_empty()
8670 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
8671 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
8672 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
8673 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
8674 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
8675 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
8676 intercepted_id != ev_id
8683 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
8684 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
8685 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
8686 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
8687 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
8688 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
8689 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
8690 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
8691 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
8692 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
8693 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
8694 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv, path, false, &pending_events, &args.logger);
8695 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
8702 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
8703 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
8705 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
8707 .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
8708 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
8709 if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
8710 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
8711 // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
8712 // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
8713 // channel_id -> peer map entry).
8714 counterparty_opt.is_none(),
8715 monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()))
8718 // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
8719 // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
8720 // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
8721 // channel still live case here.
8725 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
8726 pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
8731 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
8732 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
8733 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
8734 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
8735 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
8736 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
8737 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
8738 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
8742 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
8743 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
8745 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
8746 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
8747 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
8748 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8750 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
8751 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
8752 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8754 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
8755 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
8757 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
8758 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
8760 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
8763 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
8764 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
8765 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
8767 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
8771 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
8772 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
8773 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
8774 if htlcs.is_empty() {
8775 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8777 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
8778 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
8779 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
8780 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
8781 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
8782 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
8783 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
8784 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
8786 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
8787 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8791 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
8793 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
8795 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
8796 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
8798 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
8799 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
8804 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8805 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8807 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
8809 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8811 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
8812 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
8813 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
8814 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8818 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
8819 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
8820 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8821 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8822 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
8823 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
8824 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
8826 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
8827 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
8828 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
8830 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
8831 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
8832 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
8833 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
8834 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
8835 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8837 if chan.context.is_usable() {
8838 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
8839 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
8840 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
8841 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
8842 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8848 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
8850 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8851 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
8852 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
8853 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
8854 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
8855 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
8856 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
8857 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
8858 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
8859 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
8860 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
8862 for claimable_htlc in payment.htlcs {
8863 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
8865 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
8866 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
8867 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
8868 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
8870 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
8871 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
8872 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
8873 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
8875 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
8876 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
8877 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
8878 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
8880 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
8881 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
8882 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
8883 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8884 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8885 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
8886 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
8889 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
8890 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
8893 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
8896 purpose: payment.purpose,
8897 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
8903 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
8904 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
8905 for (_, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
8906 for action in actions.iter() {
8907 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
8908 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
8909 Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), ..
8911 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
8912 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
8913 .entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
8914 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
8919 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
8921 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
8922 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8926 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
8928 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
8929 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
8930 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
8931 router: args.router,
8933 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
8935 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
8936 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
8937 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
8938 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
8940 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
8941 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
8942 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
8943 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
8944 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
8945 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
8947 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
8952 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
8954 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
8956 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
8957 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
8958 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
8959 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
8960 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
8961 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
8963 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
8964 node_signer: args.node_signer,
8965 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
8967 logger: args.logger,
8968 default_configuration: args.default_config,
8971 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
8972 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
8973 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
8974 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
8975 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
8978 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_chan_id) in pending_claims_to_replay {
8979 // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
8980 // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
8981 // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
8982 channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value),
8983 downstream_closed, downstream_chan_id);
8986 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
8987 //connection or two.
8989 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
8995 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8996 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8997 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
8998 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
8999 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
9000 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
9001 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
9002 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
9003 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
9004 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
9005 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
9006 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
9007 use crate::util::test_utils;
9008 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
9009 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
9012 fn test_notify_limits() {
9013 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
9014 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
9015 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9016 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9017 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9018 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9020 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
9021 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
9022 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9023 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9024 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9026 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9028 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
9029 // to connect messages with new values
9030 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
9031 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
9032 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
9033 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
9034 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
9035 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
9037 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
9038 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9039 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9040 // ... but the last node should not.
9041 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9042 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
9043 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9044 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9046 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
9047 // about the channel.
9048 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
9049 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
9050 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9052 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
9054 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
9055 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
9056 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
9057 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
9058 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9059 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9061 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
9062 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
9063 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
9065 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
9066 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
9067 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
9068 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
9069 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
9070 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
9072 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
9073 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
9074 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
9075 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
9076 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9077 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9078 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
9079 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
9081 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
9082 // the channel info has updated.
9083 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
9084 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
9085 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9086 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9087 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
9088 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
9092 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
9093 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
9095 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9096 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9097 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9098 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9099 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9101 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
9102 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
9103 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
9104 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
9106 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
9107 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
9108 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
9109 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
9110 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
9111 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
9112 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
9113 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
9114 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9115 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9116 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9117 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
9119 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
9120 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9121 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9122 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9123 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9124 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9125 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9126 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9127 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9128 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9129 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9130 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9131 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9132 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9133 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9134 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9135 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9136 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9137 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9138 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9139 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9140 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9141 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
9143 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
9144 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
9145 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
9146 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9147 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9148 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9149 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
9151 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
9152 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
9153 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
9154 // lightning messages manually.
9155 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9156 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
9157 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9159 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9160 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9161 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
9162 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9163 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9164 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
9165 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9166 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9167 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
9168 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9169 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9170 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9171 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
9172 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9173 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9174 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
9175 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9176 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9177 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
9178 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9179 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
9180 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9181 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9182 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
9183 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9185 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
9186 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
9187 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9188 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
9190 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
9191 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
9192 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
9193 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
9195 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9198 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
9199 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
9200 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
9201 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
9203 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9206 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
9207 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
9208 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
9209 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
9211 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9216 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
9217 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
9218 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
9221 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
9222 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
9223 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
9224 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
9225 // fails as expected.
9226 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
9227 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
9228 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
9229 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
9230 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
9231 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
9232 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9233 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9234 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
9235 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
9236 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
9237 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9238 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9239 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9240 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9242 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
9243 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
9244 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
9246 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
9247 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9248 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
9249 final_value_msat: 100_000,
9251 let route = find_route(
9252 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
9253 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9255 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9256 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9257 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9258 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9259 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9260 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9261 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9262 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9263 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9264 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9265 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
9266 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
9267 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9268 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9269 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9270 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9271 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9272 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9273 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9274 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9275 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9276 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9277 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9278 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9280 // Finally, claim the original payment.
9281 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
9283 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
9284 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9285 let route = find_route(
9286 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
9287 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9289 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9290 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9291 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9292 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9293 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9294 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9295 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9296 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
9298 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
9299 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
9300 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9301 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9302 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9303 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9304 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9305 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9306 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9307 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9308 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9309 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9310 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9311 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9312 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9313 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9314 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9315 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9316 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9317 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9318 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9319 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9320 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9321 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9323 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
9324 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
9326 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
9327 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
9328 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9329 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
9330 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9331 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9332 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9333 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9334 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9335 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
9337 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
9338 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9339 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
9340 final_value_msat: 100_000,
9342 let route = find_route(
9343 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
9344 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9346 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
9347 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9348 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
9349 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9350 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9351 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9352 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9353 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9354 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9355 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9356 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9357 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9358 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9359 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9360 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9361 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9362 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9363 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9364 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9365 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9366 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9367 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9368 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9370 // Finally, claim the original payment.
9371 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
9375 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
9376 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
9377 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
9378 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9379 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9380 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9381 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9383 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9384 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9386 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9387 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9388 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false),
9389 final_value_msat: 10_000,
9391 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
9392 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9393 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9394 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9395 let route = find_route(
9396 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9397 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9400 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9401 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
9402 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
9403 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
9404 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
9405 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
9406 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9408 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9409 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
9410 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9411 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9412 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9413 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9414 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
9416 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
9420 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
9421 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
9422 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
9423 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
9424 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
9425 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9426 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9427 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
9428 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9430 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9431 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9433 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9434 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9435 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false),
9436 final_value_msat: 10_000,
9438 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
9439 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9440 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9441 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9442 let route = find_route(
9443 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9444 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9447 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9448 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
9449 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
9450 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
9451 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
9452 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
9453 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
9454 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
9455 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9457 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9458 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
9459 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9460 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9461 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9462 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9463 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
9465 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
9469 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
9470 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9471 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9472 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9473 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9475 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9476 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9477 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9478 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9480 // Marshall an MPP route.
9481 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
9482 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
9483 route.paths.push(path);
9484 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9485 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
9486 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
9487 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
9488 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
9489 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
9491 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9492 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
9494 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
9495 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
9497 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
9502 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
9503 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9504 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9505 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9506 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9508 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9510 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9511 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9513 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9514 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
9515 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9516 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9519 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
9520 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
9521 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9522 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
9523 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
9524 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
9527 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9530 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
9531 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
9536 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
9537 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
9538 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9539 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9540 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9541 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9543 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
9544 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
9546 total_msat: 100_000,
9549 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
9550 // payment verification fails as expected.
9551 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
9552 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
9553 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
9554 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
9556 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
9560 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
9561 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
9565 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
9566 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
9567 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
9568 // the channel is successfully closed.
9569 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9570 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9571 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9572 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9574 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9575 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9576 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
9577 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9578 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9580 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
9581 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
9583 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
9584 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
9585 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9586 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9589 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9591 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
9592 // as it has the funding transaction.
9593 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9594 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
9595 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9598 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9600 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9602 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9604 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9605 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
9606 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9608 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9611 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
9612 // as it has the funding transaction.
9613 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9614 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
9615 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9617 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9618 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9619 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
9620 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9621 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9622 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9623 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9624 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
9626 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9627 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9628 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9629 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
9631 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9632 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
9634 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
9635 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
9636 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
9637 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
9638 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9639 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
9640 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9644 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
9645 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
9646 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
9647 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
9648 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9649 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
9650 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9653 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9655 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
9656 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
9657 // closing transaction).
9658 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
9659 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
9660 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9662 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
9663 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
9664 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9665 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
9666 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9669 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9671 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
9673 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
9674 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
9675 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9677 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9679 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
9680 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
9683 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
9684 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
9685 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
9688 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
9689 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
9690 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
9693 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
9695 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
9696 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
9698 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
9699 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
9701 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
9702 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
9707 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
9708 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
9709 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
9710 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
9711 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9712 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
9713 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
9714 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
9717 let channel_id = [4; 32];
9718 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9719 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
9721 // Test the API functions.
9722 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
9724 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
9726 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
9728 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
9730 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
9732 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
9734 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
9738 fn test_connection_limiting() {
9739 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
9740 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9741 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9742 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9743 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9745 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
9747 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9748 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9750 let mut funding_tx = None;
9751 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
9752 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9753 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9756 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9757 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
9758 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
9759 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
9760 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9762 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9763 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9764 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9766 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9768 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
9769 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9770 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9772 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9775 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
9776 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9777 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9778 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
9779 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9781 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
9782 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
9784 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
9785 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
9786 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9787 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9788 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
9789 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9790 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9793 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9794 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9795 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9796 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9797 }, true).unwrap_err();
9799 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
9800 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
9801 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9802 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9803 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
9804 for ev in chan_closed_events {
9805 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
9807 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9808 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9810 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
9811 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9812 }, true).unwrap_err();
9814 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
9815 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
9816 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9818 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9820 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
9821 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
9823 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
9824 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
9825 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
9826 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
9827 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9829 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9830 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
9831 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9833 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
9834 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9835 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
9837 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
9838 // "protected" and can connect again.
9839 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
9840 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
9841 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9843 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9845 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
9847 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9848 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
9852 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
9853 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
9854 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9855 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9856 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9857 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9859 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
9861 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9862 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9864 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
9865 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9866 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9867 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9870 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
9872 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9873 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
9874 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9876 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
9877 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9878 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9880 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
9881 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9882 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
9883 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9887 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
9888 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
9889 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
9890 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9891 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9892 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
9893 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
9894 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
9895 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9897 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
9899 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9900 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9902 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
9903 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
9904 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9905 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9906 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9907 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9910 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9911 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9913 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9914 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
9916 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9918 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
9919 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9922 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
9923 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9924 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9925 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9926 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9928 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9929 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9931 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9932 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
9933 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
9934 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
9938 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9940 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
9941 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9943 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
9944 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9945 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9947 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9948 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
9950 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9952 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
9956 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
9957 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
9958 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
9959 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
9960 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
9961 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
9962 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
9963 let hop_data = msgs::OnionHopData {
9964 amt_to_forward: 100,
9965 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
9966 format: msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode {
9967 keysend_preimage: None,
9968 payment_metadata: None,
9969 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
9970 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
9974 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
9975 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
9976 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::ReceiveError { err_code, .. }) =
9977 node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9978 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat))
9980 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
9981 } else { panic!(); }
9983 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
9984 let hop_data = msgs::OnionHopData { // This is the same hop_data as above, OnionHopData doesn't implement Clone
9985 amt_to_forward: 100,
9986 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
9987 format: msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode {
9988 keysend_preimage: None,
9989 payment_metadata: None,
9990 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
9991 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
9995 assert!(node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9996 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat)).is_ok());
10000 fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
10001 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
10002 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
10003 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
10004 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
10006 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
10007 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
10009 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10010 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10011 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
10012 &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
10013 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10015 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10016 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10018 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10019 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
10020 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10021 match &msg_events[0] {
10022 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
10023 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10025 ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
10026 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
10027 _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
10030 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10033 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10034 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10036 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
10037 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
10038 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10040 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10044 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
10045 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
10046 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
10047 // the channel without the anchors feature.
10048 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10049 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10050 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
10051 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
10052 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
10053 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
10054 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10056 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
10057 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10058 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
10060 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10061 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10063 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10064 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
10066 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10069 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10070 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
10072 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10073 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
10075 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
10079 fn test_update_channel_config() {
10080 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10081 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
10082 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
10083 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
10084 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
10085 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10086 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
10088 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
10089 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10090 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
10092 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
10093 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
10094 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
10095 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10096 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10098 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10099 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
10102 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
10103 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10104 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
10106 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
10107 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
10108 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
10109 ..Default::default()
10111 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
10112 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10113 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10115 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10116 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
10119 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
10120 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
10121 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
10122 ..Default::default()
10124 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
10125 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
10126 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10127 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10129 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10130 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
10137 use crate::chain::Listen;
10138 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
10139 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
10140 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
10141 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
10142 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
10143 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
10144 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
10145 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
10146 use crate::util::test_utils;
10147 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
10149 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
10150 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
10151 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
10153 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
10155 use criterion::Criterion;
10157 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
10158 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
10159 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
10160 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
10161 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
10162 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
10163 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
10165 struct ANodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
10166 node: &'a Manager<'a, P>,
10168 impl<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'a, P> {
10169 type CM = Manager<'a, P>;
10171 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'a, P> { self.node }
10173 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
10176 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
10177 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
10180 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
10181 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
10182 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
10184 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
10185 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
10187 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
10188 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
10189 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
10190 let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
10191 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
10193 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
10194 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
10195 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
10197 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
10198 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
10199 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
10200 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
10202 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
10203 }, genesis_block.header.time);
10204 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
10206 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
10207 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
10208 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
10209 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
10210 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
10212 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
10213 }, genesis_block.header.time);
10214 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
10216 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
10217 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10219 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
10220 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10221 }, false).unwrap();
10222 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
10223 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
10224 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10227 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
10228 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
10229 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
10231 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
10232 } else { panic!(); }
10234 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
10235 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10236 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
10237 match events_b[0] {
10238 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10239 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
10241 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10244 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10245 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10246 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
10247 match events_a[0] {
10248 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10249 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
10251 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10254 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
10256 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), 42, vec![tx]);
10257 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
10258 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
10260 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10261 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10262 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
10263 match msg_events[0] {
10264 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
10265 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
10266 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
10270 match msg_events[1] {
10271 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10275 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10276 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
10277 match events_a[0] {
10278 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10279 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
10281 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10284 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10285 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
10286 match events_b[0] {
10287 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10288 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
10290 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10293 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
10294 macro_rules! send_payment {
10295 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
10296 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
10297 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.invoice_features()).unwrap();
10298 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
10299 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
10300 payment_count += 1;
10301 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
10302 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
10304 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
10305 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), RouteParameters {
10306 payment_params, final_value_msat: 10_000,
10307 }, Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
10308 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
10309 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10310 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
10311 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
10312 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
10313 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
10314 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
10316 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
10317 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
10318 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
10319 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
10321 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
10322 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
10323 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
10324 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10325 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
10327 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
10330 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
10331 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
10332 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
10333 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10335 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
10339 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
10340 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
10341 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);