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[rust-lightning] / lightning / src / ln / channelmanager.rs
1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
2 // history.
3 //
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
8 // licenses.
9
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
11 //!
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
15 //!
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`find_route`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
19 //!
20 //! [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
21
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
25 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26
27 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
31
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
36
37 use chain;
38 use chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, Watch, BestBlock};
39 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
40 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
41 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
43 // construct one themselves.
44 use ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
45 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
46 use ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
47 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, RouteParameters};
48 use ln::msgs;
49 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
50 use ln::onion_utils;
51 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT, OptionalField};
52 use ln::wire::Encode;
53 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner, Recipient};
54 use util::config::UserConfig;
55 use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
56 use util::{byte_utils, events};
57 use util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
58 use util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
59 use util::logger::{Level, Logger};
60 use util::errors::APIError;
61
62 use io;
63 use prelude::*;
64 use core::{cmp, mem};
65 use core::cell::RefCell;
66 use io::Read;
67 use sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
68 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
69 use core::time::Duration;
70 use core::ops::Deref;
71
72 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
73 use std::time::Instant;
74 use util::crypto::sign;
75
76 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
77 //
78 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
79 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
80 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
81 //
82 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
83 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
84 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
85 // before we forward it.
86 //
87 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
88 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
89 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
90 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
91 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
92
93 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
94 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
95         Forward {
96                 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
97                 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a "real" SCID, an
98                 /// outbound SCID alias, or a phantom node SCID.
99                 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
100         },
101         Receive {
102                 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
103                 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
104                 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
105         },
106         ReceiveKeysend {
107                 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
108                 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
109         },
110 }
111
112 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
113 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
114         pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
115         pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
116         payment_hash: PaymentHash,
117         pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
118         pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
119 }
120
121 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
122 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
123         Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
124         Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
125 }
126
127 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
128 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
129 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
130         Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
131         Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
132 }
133
134 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
135         AddHTLC {
136                 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
137
138                 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
139                 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
140                 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
141                 // HTLCs.
142                 //
143                 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
144                 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
145                 prev_htlc_id: u64,
146                 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
147         },
148         FailHTLC {
149                 htlc_id: u64,
150                 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
151         },
152 }
153
154 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
155 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
156 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
157         // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
158         short_channel_id: u64,
159         htlc_id: u64,
160         incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
161         phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
162
163         // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
164         // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
165         outpoint: OutPoint,
166 }
167
168 enum OnionPayload {
169         /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
170         Invoice {
171                 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
172                 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
173                 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
174         },
175         /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
176         Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
177 }
178
179 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
180 struct ClaimableHTLC {
181         prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
182         cltv_expiry: u32,
183         /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
184         value: u64,
185         onion_payload: OnionPayload,
186         timer_ticks: u8,
187         /// The sum total of all MPP parts
188         total_msat: u64,
189 }
190
191 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
192 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
193 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
194 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
195
196 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
197         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
198                 self.0.write(w)
199         }
200 }
201
202 impl Readable for PaymentId {
203         fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
204                 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
205                 Ok(PaymentId(buf))
206         }
207 }
208 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
209 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
210 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
211 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
212         PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
213         OutboundRoute {
214                 path: Vec<RouteHop>,
215                 session_priv: SecretKey,
216                 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
217                 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
218                 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
219                 payment_id: PaymentId,
220                 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
221                 payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters>,
222         },
223 }
224 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
225 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
226         fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
227                 match self {
228                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
229                                 0u8.hash(hasher);
230                                 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
231                         },
232                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payment_params } => {
233                                 1u8.hash(hasher);
234                                 path.hash(hasher);
235                                 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
236                                 payment_id.hash(hasher);
237                                 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
238                                 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
239                                 payment_params.hash(hasher);
240                         },
241                 }
242         }
243 }
244 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
245 #[cfg(test)]
246 impl HTLCSource {
247         pub fn dummy() -> Self {
248                 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
249                         path: Vec::new(),
250                         session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
251                         first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
252                         payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
253                         payment_secret: None,
254                         payment_params: None,
255                 }
256         }
257 }
258
259 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
260 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
261         LightningError {
262                 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
263         },
264         Reason {
265                 failure_code: u16,
266                 data: Vec<u8>,
267         }
268 }
269
270 struct ReceiveError {
271         err_code: u16,
272         err_data: Vec<u8>,
273         msg: &'static str,
274 }
275
276 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
277 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
278         PrevHopForceClosed,
279         MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
280         Success(u64),
281         DuplicateClaim,
282 }
283
284 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
285
286 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
287 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
288 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
289 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
290 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
291
292 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
293         err: msgs::LightningError,
294         chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u64)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
295         shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
296 }
297 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
298         #[inline]
299         fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
300                 Self {
301                         err: LightningError {
302                                 err: err.clone(),
303                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
304                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
305                                                 channel_id,
306                                                 data: err
307                                         },
308                                 },
309                         },
310                         chan_id: None,
311                         shutdown_finish: None,
312                 }
313         }
314         #[inline]
315         fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
316                 Self {
317                         err: LightningError {
318                                 err,
319                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
320                         },
321                         chan_id: None,
322                         shutdown_finish: None,
323                 }
324         }
325         #[inline]
326         fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
327                 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
328         }
329         #[inline]
330         fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u64, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
331                 Self {
332                         err: LightningError {
333                                 err: err.clone(),
334                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
335                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
336                                                 channel_id,
337                                                 data: err
338                                         },
339                                 },
340                         },
341                         chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
342                         shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
343                 }
344         }
345         #[inline]
346         fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
347                 Self {
348                         err: match err {
349                                 ChannelError::Warn(msg) =>  LightningError {
350                                         err: msg.clone(),
351                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
352                                                 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
353                                                         channel_id,
354                                                         data: msg
355                                                 },
356                                                 log_level: Level::Warn,
357                                         },
358                                 },
359                                 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
360                                         err: msg,
361                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
362                                 },
363                                 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
364                                         err: msg.clone(),
365                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
366                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
367                                                         channel_id,
368                                                         data: msg
369                                                 },
370                                         },
371                                 },
372                                 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
373                                         err: msg.clone(),
374                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
375                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
376                                                         channel_id,
377                                                         data: msg
378                                                 },
379                                         },
380                                 },
381                         },
382                         chan_id: None,
383                         shutdown_finish: None,
384                 }
385         }
386 }
387
388 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
389 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
390 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
391 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
392 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
393
394 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
395 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
396 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
397 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
398 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
399 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
400         /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
401         CommitmentFirst,
402         /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
403         RevokeAndACKFirst,
404 }
405
406 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
407 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
408         pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
409         /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) to the real channel id. Outbound SCID aliases are added
410         /// here once the channel is available for normal use, with SCIDs being added once the funding
411         /// transaction is confirmed at the channel's required confirmation depth.
412         pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
413         /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
414         ///
415         /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
416         /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
417         /// and via the classic SCID.
418         ///
419         /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
420         /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
421         /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
422         pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
423         /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
424         /// failed/claimed by the user.
425         ///
426         /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
427         /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
428         /// go to read them!
429         claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, (events::PaymentPurpose, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>)>,
430         /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
431         /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
432         pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
433 }
434
435 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
436 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
437 /// quite some time lag.
438 enum BackgroundEvent {
439         /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
440         /// commitment transaction.
441         ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
442 }
443
444 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
445 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
446 struct PeerState {
447         latest_features: InitFeatures,
448 }
449
450 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
451 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
452 ///
453 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
454 /// here.
455 ///
456 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
457 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
458 struct PendingInboundPayment {
459         /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
460         payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
461         /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
462         /// this payment being removed.
463         expiry_time: u64,
464         /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
465         user_payment_id: u64,
466         // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
467         payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
468         min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
469 }
470
471 /// Stores the session_priv for each part of a payment that is still pending. For versions 0.0.102
472 /// and later, also stores information for retrying the payment.
473 pub(crate) enum PendingOutboundPayment {
474         Legacy {
475                 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
476         },
477         Retryable {
478                 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
479                 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
480                 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
481                 pending_amt_msat: u64,
482                 /// Used to track the fee paid. Only present if the payment was serialized on 0.0.103+.
483                 pending_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
484                 /// The total payment amount across all paths, used to verify that a retry is not overpaying.
485                 total_msat: u64,
486                 /// Our best known block height at the time this payment was initiated.
487                 starting_block_height: u32,
488         },
489         /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
490         /// been resolved. This ensures we don't look up pending payments in ChannelMonitors on restart
491         /// and add a pending payment that was already fulfilled.
492         Fulfilled {
493                 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
494                 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
495         },
496         /// When a payer gives up trying to retry a payment, they inform us, letting us generate a
497         /// `PaymentFailed` event when all HTLCs have irrevocably failed. This avoids a number of race
498         /// conditions in MPP-aware payment retriers (1), where the possibility of multiple
499         /// `PaymentPathFailed` events with `all_paths_failed` can be pending at once, confusing a
500         /// downstream event handler as to when a payment has actually failed.
501         ///
502         /// (1) https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1164
503         Abandoned {
504                 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
505                 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
506         },
507 }
508
509 impl PendingOutboundPayment {
510         fn is_retryable(&self) -> bool {
511                 match self {
512                         PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { .. } => true,
513                         _ => false,
514                 }
515         }
516         fn is_fulfilled(&self) -> bool {
517                 match self {
518                         PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => true,
519                         _ => false,
520                 }
521         }
522         fn abandoned(&self) -> bool {
523                 match self {
524                         PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => true,
525                         _ => false,
526                 }
527         }
528         fn get_pending_fee_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
529                 match self {
530                         PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { pending_fee_msat, .. } => pending_fee_msat.clone(),
531                         _ => None,
532                 }
533         }
534
535         fn payment_hash(&self) -> Option<PaymentHash> {
536                 match self {
537                         PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None,
538                         PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
539                         PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => *payment_hash,
540                         PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
541                 }
542         }
543
544         fn mark_fulfilled(&mut self) {
545                 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
546                 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
547                         PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
548                         PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
549                         PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
550                         PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. }
551                                 => session_privs,
552                 });
553                 let payment_hash = self.payment_hash();
554                 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, payment_hash };
555         }
556
557         fn mark_abandoned(&mut self) -> Result<(), ()> {
558                 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
559                 let our_payment_hash;
560                 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
561                         PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } |
562                         PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } =>
563                                 return Err(()),
564                         PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } |
565                         PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } => {
566                                 our_payment_hash = *payment_hash;
567                                 session_privs
568                         },
569                 });
570                 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash: our_payment_hash };
571                 Ok(())
572         }
573
574         /// panics if path is None and !self.is_fulfilled
575         fn remove(&mut self, session_priv: &[u8; 32], path: Option<&Vec<RouteHop>>) -> bool {
576                 let remove_res = match self {
577                         PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
578                         PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
579                         PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
580                         PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
581                                 session_privs.remove(session_priv)
582                         }
583                 };
584                 if remove_res {
585                         if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
586                                 let path = path.expect("Fulfilling a payment should always come with a path");
587                                 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
588                                 *pending_amt_msat -= path_last_hop.fee_msat;
589                                 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
590                                         *fee_msat -= path.get_path_fees();
591                                 }
592                         }
593                 }
594                 remove_res
595         }
596
597         fn insert(&mut self, session_priv: [u8; 32], path: &Vec<RouteHop>) -> bool {
598                 let insert_res = match self {
599                         PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
600                         PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
601                                 session_privs.insert(session_priv)
602                         }
603                         PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => false,
604                         PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => false,
605                 };
606                 if insert_res {
607                         if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
608                                 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
609                                 *pending_amt_msat += path_last_hop.fee_msat;
610                                 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
611                                         *fee_msat += path.get_path_fees();
612                                 }
613                         }
614                 }
615                 insert_res
616         }
617
618         fn remaining_parts(&self) -> usize {
619                 match self {
620                         PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
621                         PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
622                         PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
623                         PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
624                                 session_privs.len()
625                         }
626                 }
627         }
628 }
629
630 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
631 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
632 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
633 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
634 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
635 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
636 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
637 ///
638 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
639 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
640
641 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
642 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
643 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
644 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
645 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
646 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
647 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
648 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
649 ///
650 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
651 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
652
653 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
654 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
655 ///
656 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
657 /// to individual Channels.
658 ///
659 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
660 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
661 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
662 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
663 ///
664 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
665 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
666 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
667 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
668 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
669 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
670 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
671 ///
672 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
673 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
674 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
675 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
676 /// object!
677 ///
678 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
679 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
680 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
681 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
682 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
683 ///
684 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
685 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
686 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
687 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
688 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
689 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
690         where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
691         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
692         K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
693         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
694                                 L::Target: Logger,
695 {
696         default_configuration: UserConfig,
697         genesis_hash: BlockHash,
698         fee_estimator: F,
699         chain_monitor: M,
700         tx_broadcaster: T,
701
702         #[cfg(test)]
703         pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
704         #[cfg(not(test))]
705         best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
706         secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
707
708         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
709         pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
710         #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
711         channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
712
713         /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
714         /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
715         /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
716         /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
717         /// Locked *after* channel_state.
718         pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
719
720         /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
721         /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
722         /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
723         /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
724         /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
725         /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
726         /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
727         /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
728         ///
729         /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
730         ///
731         /// Locked *after* channel_state.
732         pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment>>,
733
734         /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
735         /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
736         /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
737         /// active channel list on load.
738         outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
739
740         our_network_key: SecretKey,
741         our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
742
743         inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
744
745         /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
746         /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
747         /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
748         ///
749         /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
750         fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
751
752         /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
753         /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
754         last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
755
756         /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
757         /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
758         /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
759         highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
760
761         /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
762         /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
763         /// are currently open with that peer.
764         /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
765         /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
766         /// new channel.
767         ///
768         /// If also holding `channel_state` lock, must lock `channel_state` prior to `per_peer_state`.
769         per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
770
771         pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
772         pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
773         /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
774         /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
775         /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
776         /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
777         /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
778         /// PersistenceNotifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
779         total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
780
781         persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
782
783         keys_manager: K,
784
785         logger: L,
786 }
787
788 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
789 ///
790 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
791 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
792 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
793 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
794 pub struct ChainParameters {
795         /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
796         pub network: Network,
797
798         /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
799         ///
800         /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
801         pub best_block: BestBlock,
802 }
803
804 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
805 enum NotifyOption {
806         DoPersist,
807         SkipPersist,
808 }
809
810 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
811 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
812 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
813 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
814 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
815 /// updates are ready for persistence).
816 ///
817 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
818 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
819 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
820 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
821         persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
822         should_persist: F,
823         // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
824         _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
825 }
826
827 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
828         fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
829                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
830         }
831
832         fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
833                 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
834
835                 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
836                         persistence_notifier: notifier,
837                         should_persist: persist_check,
838                         _read_guard: read_guard,
839                 }
840         }
841 }
842
843 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
844         fn drop(&mut self) {
845                 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
846                         self.persistence_notifier.notify();
847                 }
848         }
849 }
850
851 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
852 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
853 ///
854 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
855 ///
856 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
857 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
858 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
859 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
860 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
861
862 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
863 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
864 ///
865 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
866 ///
867 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
868 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
869 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
870 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
871 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
872 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
873 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
874
875 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
876 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
877 /// this value.
878 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
879 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
880 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
881 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
882
883 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
884 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
885 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
886 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
887 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
888 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
889 #[deny(const_err)]
890 #[allow(dead_code)]
891 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
892
893 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
894 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
895 #[deny(const_err)]
896 #[allow(dead_code)]
897 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
898
899 /// The number of blocks before we consider an outbound payment for expiry if it doesn't have any
900 /// pending HTLCs in flight.
901 pub(crate) const PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
902
903 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
904 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
905
906 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
907 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
908 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
909         /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
910         pub fee_base_msat: u32,
911         /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
912         pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
913         /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
914         /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
915         /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
916         pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
917 }
918
919 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
920 /// to better separate parameters.
921 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
922 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
923         /// The node_id of our counterparty
924         pub node_id: PublicKey,
925         /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
926         /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
927         /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
928         pub features: InitFeatures,
929         /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
930         /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
931         /// claiming at least this value on chain.
932         ///
933         /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
934         ///
935         /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
936         pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
937         /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
938         /// payments to us through this channel.
939         pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
940         /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
941         /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
942         /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
943         pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
944         /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
945         pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
946 }
947
948 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
949 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
950 pub struct ChannelDetails {
951         /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
952         /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
953         /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
954         /// lifetime of the channel.
955         pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
956         /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
957         pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
958         /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
959         /// our counterparty already.
960         ///
961         /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
962         /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
963         pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
964         /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
965         ///
966         /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
967         pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
968         /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
969         /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
970         ///
971         /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
972         /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
973         ///
974         /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
975         /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
976         ///
977         /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
978         /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
979         /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
980         /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
981         /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
982         pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
983         /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
984         /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
985         /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
986         /// `Some(0)`).
987         ///
988         /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
989         ///
990         /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
991         /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
992         pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
993         /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
994         /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
995         /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
996         /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
997         ///
998         /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
999         /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1000         ///
1001         /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1002         pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1003         /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1004         pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1005         /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1006         /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1007         /// this value on chain.
1008         ///
1009         /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1010         ///
1011         /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1012         ///
1013         /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1014         pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1015         /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
1016         pub user_channel_id: u64,
1017         /// Our total balance.  This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1018         /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1019         /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1020         ///
1021         /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1022         /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1023         /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1024         /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1025         ///
1026         /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1027         pub balance_msat: u64,
1028         /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1029         /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1030         /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1031         /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1032         ///
1033         /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1034         ///
1035         /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1036         /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1037         /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1038         pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1039         /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1040         /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1041         /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1042         /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1043         ///
1044         /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1045         pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1046         /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1047         /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1048         /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1049         /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1050         /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1051         ///
1052         /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1053         /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1054         /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1055         pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1056         /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1057         /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1058         /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1059         /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1060         /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1061         ///
1062         /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1063         ///
1064         /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1065         /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1066         /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1067         pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1068         /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1069         /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1070         /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1071         /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1072         /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1073         ///
1074         /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1075         pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1076         /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1077         pub is_outbound: bool,
1078         /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1079         /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1080         /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1081         /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1082         /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1083         ///
1084         /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1085         pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1086         /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1087         /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1088         ///
1089         /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1090         pub is_usable: bool,
1091         /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1092         pub is_public: bool,
1093         /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1094         /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1095         pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1096         /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1097         pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1098 }
1099
1100 impl ChannelDetails {
1101         /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1102         /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1103         /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1104         ///
1105         /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1106         /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1107         pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1108                 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1109         }
1110
1111         /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1112         /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1113         /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1114         ///
1115         /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1116         /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1117         pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1118                 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1119         }
1120 }
1121
1122 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
1123 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
1124 /// states for more.
1125 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
1126 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
1127         /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
1128         /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
1129         /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
1130         ParameterError(APIError),
1131         /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
1132         /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
1133         /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
1134         /// payment in full.
1135         ///
1136         /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1137         /// send_payment.
1138         PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
1139         /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
1140         /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
1141         /// paths than the ones selected).
1142         AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
1143         /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
1144         /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
1145         /// in over-/re-payment.
1146         ///
1147         /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1148         /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
1149         /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
1150         ///
1151         /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
1152         /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
1153         /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
1154         /// with the latest update_id.
1155         PartialFailure {
1156                 /// The errors themselves, in the same order as the route hops.
1157                 results: Vec<Result<(), APIError>>,
1158                 /// If some paths failed without irrevocably committing to the new HTLC(s), this will
1159                 /// contain a [`RouteParameters`] object which can be used to calculate a new route that
1160                 /// will pay all remaining unpaid balance.
1161                 failed_paths_retry: Option<RouteParameters>,
1162                 /// The payment id for the payment, which is now at least partially pending.
1163                 payment_id: PaymentId,
1164         },
1165 }
1166
1167 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1168 ///
1169 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1170 #[derive(Clone)]
1171 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1172         /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1173         pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1174         /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1175         /// route hints.
1176         pub phantom_scid: u64,
1177         /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1178         pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1179 }
1180
1181 macro_rules! handle_error {
1182         ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1183                 match $internal {
1184                         Ok(msg) => Ok(msg),
1185                         Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1186                                 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1187                                 {
1188                                         // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1189                                         // entering the macro.
1190                                         assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
1191                                         assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
1192                                 }
1193
1194                                 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1195
1196                                 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1197                                         $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1198                                         if let Some(update) = update_option {
1199                                                 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1200                                                         msg: update
1201                                                 });
1202                                         }
1203                                         if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1204                                                 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1205                                                         channel_id, user_channel_id,
1206                                                         reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1207                                                 });
1208                                         }
1209                                 }
1210
1211                                 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1212                                 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1213                                 } else {
1214                                         msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1215                                                 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1216                                                 action: err.action.clone()
1217                                         });
1218                                 }
1219
1220                                 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1221                                         $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1222                                 }
1223
1224                                 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1225                                 Err(err)
1226                         },
1227                 }
1228         }
1229 }
1230
1231 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1232         ($self: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1233                 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1234                         $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1235                 } else {
1236                         // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1237                         // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1238                         // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1239                         // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1240                         // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1241                         // stage.
1242                         let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1243                         debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1244                 }
1245                 $short_to_id.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1246         }
1247 }
1248
1249 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1250 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1251         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1252                 match $err {
1253                         ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1254                                 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1255                         },
1256                         ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1257                                 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1258                         },
1259                         ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1260                                 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1261                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $short_to_id, $channel);
1262                                 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1263                                 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1264                                         shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1265                         },
1266                         ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => {
1267                                 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1268                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $short_to_id, $channel);
1269                                 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(false);
1270                                 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1271                                         shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1272                         }
1273                 }
1274         }
1275 }
1276
1277 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1278         ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1279                 match $res {
1280                         Ok(res) => res,
1281                         Err(e) => {
1282                                 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1283                                 if drop {
1284                                         $entry.remove_entry();
1285                                 }
1286                                 break Err(res);
1287                         }
1288                 }
1289         }
1290 }
1291
1292 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1293         ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1294                 match $res {
1295                         Ok(res) => res,
1296                         Err(e) => {
1297                                 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1298                                 if drop {
1299                                         $entry.remove_entry();
1300                                 }
1301                                 return Err(res);
1302                         }
1303                 }
1304         }
1305 }
1306
1307 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1308         ($self: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1309                 {
1310                         let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1311                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel_state.short_to_id, channel);
1312                         channel
1313                 }
1314         }
1315 }
1316
1317 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
1318         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1319                 match $err {
1320                         ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1321                                 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1322                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $short_to_id, $chan);
1323                                 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1324                                 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1325                                 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1326                                 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1327                                 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1328                                 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1329                                 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1330                                 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1331                                 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1332                                 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1333                                                 $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1334                                 (res, true)
1335                         },
1336                         ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1337                                 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1338                                                 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1339                                                 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1340                                                                 match $action_type {
1341                                                                         RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1342                                                                         RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1343                                                                 }
1344                                                         } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1345                                                         else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1346                                                         else { "nothing" },
1347                                                 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1348                                                 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1349                                                 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1350                                 if !$resend_commitment {
1351                                         debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1352                                 }
1353                                 if !$resend_raa {
1354                                         debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1355                                 }
1356                                 $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1357                                 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1358                         },
1359                 }
1360         };
1361         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1362                 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1363                 if drop {
1364                         $entry.remove_entry();
1365                 }
1366                 res
1367         } };
1368         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY) => { {
1369                 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1370                 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1371         } };
1372         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, NO_UPDATE) => {
1373                 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1374         };
1375         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_channel_ready: expr, OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED) => {
1376                 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, false, $resend_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1377         };
1378         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1379                 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1380         };
1381         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1382                 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
1383         };
1384 }
1385
1386 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
1387         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1388                 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
1389         };
1390         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1391                 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
1392         }
1393 }
1394
1395 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
1396 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
1397         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1398                 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
1399                         (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
1400                                 break e;
1401                         },
1402                         (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
1403                 }
1404         }
1405 }
1406
1407 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1408         ($short_to_id: expr, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {
1409                 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1410                         node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1411                         msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1412                 });
1413                 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1414                 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1415                 let outbound_alias_insert = $short_to_id.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), $channel.channel_id());
1416                 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == $channel.channel_id(),
1417                         "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1418                 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1419                         let scid_insert = $short_to_id.insert(real_scid, $channel.channel_id());
1420                         assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == $channel.channel_id(),
1421                                 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1422                 }
1423         }
1424 }
1425
1426 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
1427         ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
1428          $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
1429          $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $channel_ready: expr, $announcement_sigs: expr) => { {
1430                 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
1431
1432                 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
1433                 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
1434                 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1435                 let res = loop {
1436                         let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
1437                         if !forwards.is_empty() {
1438                                 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or($channel_entry.get().outbound_scid_alias()),
1439                                         $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
1440                         }
1441
1442                         if chanmon_update.is_some() {
1443                                 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a channel_ready if there have been
1444                                 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
1445                                 // associated with a channel_ready would be the funding_created/funding_signed
1446                                 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
1447                                 // channel_ready until it's been updated, so we can't have a channel_ready and a
1448                                 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
1449                                 assert!($channel_ready.is_none());
1450                                 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a channel_ready or a
1451                                 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a channel_ready, we
1452                                 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
1453                                 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1454                         }
1455
1456                         if let Some(msg) = $channel_ready {
1457                                 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the channel_ready fly
1458                                 // before it should be allowed to.
1459                                 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
1460                                 send_channel_ready!($channel_state.short_to_id, $channel_state.pending_msg_events, $channel_entry.get(), msg);
1461                         }
1462                         if let Some(msg) = $announcement_sigs {
1463                                 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1464                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1465                                         msg,
1466                                 });
1467                         }
1468
1469                         let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
1470                         if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
1471                                 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
1472                                 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
1473                                 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
1474                                 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
1475                                 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
1476                                 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
1477                                 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
1478                                 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
1479                                 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
1480                                 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1481                                 if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1482                                         // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
1483                                         // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
1484                                         // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
1485                                         let mut order = $order;
1486                                         if $raa.is_none() {
1487                                                 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1488                                         }
1489                                         break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
1490                                 }
1491                         }
1492
1493                         macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1494                                 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
1495                                         $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1496                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1497                                                 updates: update,
1498                                         });
1499                                 }
1500                         } }
1501                         macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1502                                 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
1503                                         $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1504                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1505                                                 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1506                                         });
1507                                 }
1508                         } }
1509                         match $order {
1510                                 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1511                                         handle_cs!();
1512                                         handle_raa!();
1513                                 },
1514                                 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1515                                         handle_raa!();
1516                                         handle_cs!();
1517                                 },
1518                         }
1519                         if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1520                                 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1521                                 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1522                         }
1523                         break Ok(());
1524                 };
1525
1526                 if chanmon_update_is_none {
1527                         // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
1528                         // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
1529                         // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
1530                         assert!(res.is_ok());
1531                 }
1532
1533                 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1534         } }
1535 }
1536
1537 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1538         ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1539                 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1540
1541                 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1542
1543                 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1544                         $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1545                 }
1546         } }
1547 }
1548
1549 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
1550         where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
1551         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1552         K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1553         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1554         L::Target: Logger,
1555 {
1556         /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1557         ///
1558         /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1559         /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1560         ///
1561         /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1562         ///
1563         /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1564         /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1565         /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1566         pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1567                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1568                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1569                 let inbound_pmt_key_material = keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1570                 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1571                 ChannelManager {
1572                         default_configuration: config.clone(),
1573                         genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1574                         fee_estimator: fee_est,
1575                         chain_monitor,
1576                         tx_broadcaster,
1577
1578                         best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1579
1580                         channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1581                                 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1582                                 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
1583                                 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1584                                 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1585                                 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1586                         }),
1587                         outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1588                         pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1589                         pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1590
1591                         our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1592                         our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap()),
1593                         secp_ctx,
1594
1595                         inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1596                         fake_scid_rand_bytes: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1597
1598                         last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1599                         highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1600
1601                         per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1602
1603                         pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1604                         pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1605                         total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1606                         persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
1607
1608                         keys_manager,
1609
1610                         logger,
1611                 }
1612         }
1613
1614         /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels,  as
1615         pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1616                 &self.default_configuration
1617         }
1618
1619         fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1620                 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1621                 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1622                 let mut i = 0;
1623                 loop {
1624                         if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1625                                 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1626                         } else {
1627                                 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
1628                         }
1629                         if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1630                                 break;
1631                         }
1632                         i += 1;
1633                         if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1634                 }
1635                 outbound_scid_alias
1636         }
1637
1638         /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1639         ///
1640         /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1641         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1642         /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to 0
1643         /// for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for `user_channel_id` here.
1644         /// `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and otherwise
1645         /// ignored.
1646         ///
1647         /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1648         /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1649         ///
1650         /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1651         /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1652         /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1653         ///
1654         /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1655         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1656         /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1657         /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1658         /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1659         /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1660         ///
1661         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1662         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1663         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1664         pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1665                 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1666                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1667                 }
1668
1669                 let channel = {
1670                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1671                         match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1672                                 Some(peer_state) => {
1673                                         let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1674                                         let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1675                                         let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1676                                         let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1677                                         match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key,
1678                                                 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1679                                                 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1680                                         {
1681                                                 Ok(res) => res,
1682                                                 Err(e) => {
1683                                                         self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1684                                                         return Err(e);
1685                                                 },
1686                                         }
1687                                 },
1688                                 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1689                         }
1690                 };
1691                 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1692
1693                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1694                 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1695                 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1696
1697                 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1698                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1699                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1700                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1701                                 if cfg!(fuzzing) {
1702                                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1703                                 } else {
1704                                         panic!("RNG is bad???");
1705                                 }
1706                         },
1707                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1708                 }
1709                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1710                         node_id: their_network_key,
1711                         msg: res,
1712                 });
1713                 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1714         }
1715
1716         fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1717                 let mut res = Vec::new();
1718                 {
1719                         let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1720                         res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1721                         for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1722                                 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1723                                 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1724                                         channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1725                                 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1726                                         channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1727                                         counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1728                                                 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1729                                                 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1730                                                 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1731                                                 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1732                                                 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1733                                                 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1734                                                 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1735                                                 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1736                                                 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1737                                                 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1738                                                         Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1739                                                 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1740                                         },
1741                                         funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1742                                         // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1743                                         // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1744                                         channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1745                                         short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1746                                         outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1747                                         inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1748                                         channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1749                                         unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1750                                         balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1751                                         inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1752                                         outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1753                                         next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1754                                         user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1755                                         confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1756                                         force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1757                                         is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1758                                         is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1759                                         is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1760                                         is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1761                                         inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1762                                         inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat()
1763                                 });
1764                         }
1765                 }
1766                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1767                 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1768                         if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1769                                 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1770                         }
1771                 }
1772                 res
1773         }
1774
1775         /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1776         /// more information.
1777         pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1778                 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1779         }
1780
1781         /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to [`find_route`]
1782         /// to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1783         ///
1784         /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1785         /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1786         /// are.
1787         ///
1788         /// [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
1789         pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1790                 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1791                 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1792                 // really wanted anyway.
1793                 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1794         }
1795
1796         /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1797         fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1798                 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1799                 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1800                         Some(transaction) => {
1801                                 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1802                         },
1803                         None => {},
1804                 }
1805                 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1806                         channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1807                         user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1808                         reason: closure_reason
1809                 });
1810         }
1811
1812         fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1813                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1814
1815                 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1816                 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1817                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1818                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1819                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1820                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1821                                         if *counterparty_node_id != chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id(){
1822                                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
1823                                         }
1824                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1825                                         let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1826                                                 Some(peer_state) => {
1827                                                         let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1828                                                         let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1829                                                         chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
1830                                                 },
1831                                                 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
1832                                         };
1833                                         failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1834
1835                                         // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1836                                         if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1837                                                 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1838                                                         let (result, is_permanent) =
1839                                                                 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
1840                                                         if is_permanent {
1841                                                                 remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
1842                                                                 break result;
1843                                                         }
1844                                                 }
1845                                         }
1846
1847                                         channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1848                                                 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
1849                                                 msg: shutdown_msg
1850                                         });
1851
1852                                         if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1853                                                 let channel = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
1854                                                 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1855                                                         channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1856                                                                 msg: channel_update
1857                                                         });
1858                                                 }
1859                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1860                                         }
1861                                         break Ok(());
1862                                 },
1863                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1864                         }
1865                 };
1866
1867                 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1868                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1869                 }
1870
1871                 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
1872                 Ok(())
1873         }
1874
1875         /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1876         /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1877         /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1878         ///
1879         ///  * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1880         ///    [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1881         ///    estimate.
1882         ///  * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1883         ///    transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1884         ///    would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1885         ///    counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1886         ///
1887         /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1888         ///
1889         /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1890         /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1891         /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1892         pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1893                 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None)
1894         }
1895
1896         /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1897         /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1898         /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1899         ///
1900         /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1901         /// the channel being closed or not:
1902         ///  * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1903         ///    transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1904         ///    [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1905         ///    estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1906         ///  * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1907         ///    transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1908         ///    will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1909         ///
1910         /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1911         ///
1912         /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1913         /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1914         /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1915         pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1916                 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1917         }
1918
1919         #[inline]
1920         fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1921                 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1922                 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1923                 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1924                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1925                 }
1926                 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1927                         // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1928                         // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1929                         // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1930                         // ignore the result here.
1931                         let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1932                 }
1933         }
1934
1935         /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1936         /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
1937         fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1938                 let mut chan = {
1939                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1940                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1941                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1942                                 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *peer_node_id {
1943                                         return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1944                                 }
1945                                 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
1946                                         self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
1947                                 } else {
1948                                         self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1949                                 }
1950                                 remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan)
1951                         } else {
1952                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1953                         }
1954                 };
1955                 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1956                 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
1957                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1958                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1959                         channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1960                                 msg: update
1961                         });
1962                 }
1963
1964                 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1965         }
1966
1967         /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
1968         /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
1969         /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
1970         /// channel.
1971         pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1972                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1973                 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None) {
1974                         Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1975                                 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1976                                         events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1977                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1978                                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1979                                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1980                                                 },
1981                                         }
1982                                 );
1983                                 Ok(())
1984                         },
1985                         Err(e) => Err(e)
1986                 }
1987         }
1988
1989         /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
1990         /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
1991         pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
1992                 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1993                         let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
1994                 }
1995         }
1996
1997         fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
1998                 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
1999         {
2000                 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2001                 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != cltv_expiry {
2002                         return Err(ReceiveError {
2003                                 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value",
2004                                 err_code: 18,
2005                                 err_data: byte_utils::be32_to_array(cltv_expiry).to_vec()
2006                         })
2007                 }
2008                 // final_expiry_too_soon
2009                 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2010                 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2011                 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2012                 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2013                 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2014                 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1  {
2015                         return Err(ReceiveError {
2016                                 err_code: 17,
2017                                 err_data: Vec::new(),
2018                                 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2019                         });
2020                 }
2021                 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2022                         return Err(ReceiveError {
2023                                 err_code: 19,
2024                                 err_data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(amt_msat).to_vec(),
2025                                 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2026                         });
2027                 }
2028
2029                 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2030                         msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => {
2031                                 return Err(ReceiveError {
2032                                         err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2033                                         err_data: Vec::new(),
2034                                         msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2035                                 });
2036                         },
2037                         msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2038                                 return Err(ReceiveError {
2039                                         err_code: 0x4000|22,
2040                                         err_data: Vec::new(),
2041                                         msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2042                                 });
2043                         },
2044                         msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
2045                                 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2046                                         return Err(ReceiveError {
2047                                                 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2048                                                 err_data: Vec::new(),
2049                                                 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2050                                         });
2051                                 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2052                                         PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2053                                                 payment_data: data,
2054                                                 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2055                                                 phantom_shared_secret,
2056                                         }
2057                                 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2058                                         // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2059                                         // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2060                                         // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2061                                         // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2062                                         // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2063                                         let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2064                                         if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2065                                                 return Err(ReceiveError {
2066                                                         err_code: 0x4000|22,
2067                                                         err_data: Vec::new(),
2068                                                         msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2069                                                 });
2070                                         }
2071
2072                                         PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2073                                                 payment_preimage,
2074                                                 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2075                                         }
2076                                 } else {
2077                                         return Err(ReceiveError {
2078                                                 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2079                                                 err_data: Vec::new(),
2080                                                 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2081                                         });
2082                                 }
2083                         },
2084                 };
2085                 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2086                         routing,
2087                         payment_hash,
2088                         incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2089                         amt_to_forward: amt_msat,
2090                         outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2091                 })
2092         }
2093
2094         fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
2095                 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2096                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2097                                 {
2098                                         log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2099                                         return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2100                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2101                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2102                                                 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2103                                                 failure_code: $err_code,
2104                                         })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2105                                 }
2106                         }
2107                 }
2108
2109                 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2110                         return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2111                 }
2112
2113                 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key).secret_bytes();
2114
2115                 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2116                         //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2117                         //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2118                         //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2119                         //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2120                         //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2121                         //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2122                         return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2123                 }
2124
2125                 let mut channel_state = None;
2126                 macro_rules! return_err {
2127                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2128                                 {
2129                                         log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2130                                         if channel_state.is_none() {
2131                                                 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2132                                         }
2133                                         return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2134                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2135                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2136                                                 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
2137                                         })), channel_state.unwrap());
2138                                 }
2139                         }
2140                 }
2141
2142                 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2143                         Ok(res) => res,
2144                         Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2145                                 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2146                         },
2147                         Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2148                                 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2149                         },
2150                 };
2151
2152                 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2153                         onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2154                                 // OUR PAYMENT!
2155                                 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2156                                         Ok(info) => {
2157                                                 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2158                                                 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2159                                                 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2160                                                 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2161                                                 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2162                                         },
2163                                         Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2164                                 }
2165                         },
2166                         onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2167                                 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2168
2169                                 let blinding_factor = {
2170                                         let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
2171                                         sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
2172                                         sha.input(&shared_secret);
2173                                         Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
2174                                 };
2175
2176                                 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
2177                                         Err(e)
2178                                 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
2179
2180                                 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2181                                         version: 0,
2182                                         public_key,
2183                                         hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2184                                         hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2185                                 };
2186
2187                                 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2188                                         msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2189                                         msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2190                                         msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2191                                                 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2192                                         },
2193                                 };
2194
2195                                 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2196                                         routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2197                                                 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2198                                                 short_channel_id,
2199                                         },
2200                                         payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2201                                         incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2202                                         amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2203                                         outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2204                                 })
2205                         }
2206                 };
2207
2208                 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2209                 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2210                         // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2211                         // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2212                         // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2213                         if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2214                                 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
2215                                 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
2216                                         let forwarding_id_opt = match id_option {
2217                                                 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2218                                                         // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2219                                                         // phantom.
2220                                                         if fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id) {
2221                                                                 None
2222                                                         } else {
2223                                                                 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2224                                                         }
2225                                                 },
2226                                                 Some(id) => Some(id.clone()),
2227                                         };
2228                                         let (chan_update_opt, forwardee_cltv_expiry_delta) = if let Some(forwarding_id) = forwarding_id_opt {
2229                                                 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
2230                                                 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2231                                                         // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2232                                                         // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2233                                                         // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2234                                                         break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2235                                                 }
2236                                                 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2237                                                         // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2238                                                         // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2239                                                         // we don't have the channel here.
2240                                                         break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2241                                                 }
2242                                                 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2243
2244                                                 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2245                                                 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2246                                                 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2247                                                 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2248                                                 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2249                                                 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2250                                                         break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2251                                                 }
2252                                                 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2253                                                         break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2254                                                 }
2255                                                 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64)
2256                                                         .and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000)
2257                                                         .checked_add(chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat() as u64) });
2258                                                 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
2259                                                         break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, chan_update_opt));
2260                                                 }
2261                                                 (chan_update_opt, chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta())
2262                                         } else { (None, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA) };
2263
2264                                         if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + forwardee_cltv_expiry_delta as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2265                                                 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, chan_update_opt));
2266                                         }
2267                                         let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2268                                         // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2269                                         // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2270                                         // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2271                                         if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2272                                                 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2273                                         }
2274                                         if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2275                                                 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2276                                         }
2277                                         // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2278                                         // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2279                                         // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2280                                         // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2281                                         // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2282                                         // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2283                                         // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2284                                         // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2285                                         if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2286                                                 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2287                                         }
2288
2289                                         break None;
2290                                 }
2291                                 {
2292                                         let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2293                                         if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2294                                                 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2295                                                         msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2296                                                 }
2297                                                 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2298                                                         msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2299                                                 }
2300                                                 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2301                                                         // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2302                                                         0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2303                                                 }
2304                                                 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2305                                                 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2306                                                 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2307                                         }
2308                                         return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2309                                 }
2310                         }
2311                 }
2312
2313                 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
2314         }
2315
2316         /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2317         /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2318         /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2319         ///
2320         /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2321         fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2322                 if !chan.should_announce() {
2323                         return Err(LightningError {
2324                                 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2325                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2326                         });
2327                 }
2328                 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2329                         return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2330                 }
2331                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2332                 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2333         }
2334
2335         /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2336         /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2337         /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2338         /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2339         /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2340         fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2341                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2342                 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2343                         None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2344                         Some(id) => id,
2345                 };
2346
2347                 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2348         }
2349         fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2350                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2351                 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2352
2353                 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2354                         chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2355                         short_channel_id,
2356                         timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2357                         flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2358                         cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2359                         htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2360                         htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
2361                         fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2362                         fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2363                         excess_data: Vec::new(),
2364                 };
2365
2366                 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
2367                 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
2368
2369                 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2370                         signature: sig,
2371                         contents: unsigned
2372                 })
2373         }
2374
2375         // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2376         pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2377                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2378                 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2379                 let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2380                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2381
2382                 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2383                         .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2384                 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2385                 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2386                         return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2387                 }
2388                 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2389
2390                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2391
2392                 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2393                         let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2394
2395                         let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2396                         let payment_entry = pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id);
2397                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(payment) = &payment_entry {
2398                                 if !payment.get().is_retryable() {
2399                                         return Err(APIError::RouteError {
2400                                                 err: "Payment already completed"
2401                                         });
2402                                 }
2403                         }
2404
2405                         let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2406                                 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2407                                 Some(id) => id.clone(),
2408                         };
2409
2410                         macro_rules! insert_outbound_payment {
2411                                 () => {
2412                                         let payment = payment_entry.or_insert_with(|| PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2413                                                 session_privs: HashSet::new(),
2414                                                 pending_amt_msat: 0,
2415                                                 pending_fee_msat: Some(0),
2416                                                 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2417                                                 payment_secret: *payment_secret,
2418                                                 starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
2419                                                 total_msat: total_value,
2420                                         });
2421                                         assert!(payment.insert(session_priv_bytes, path));
2422                                 }
2423                         }
2424
2425                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2426                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
2427                                 match {
2428                                         if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
2429                                                 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
2430                                         }
2431                                         if !chan.get().is_live() {
2432                                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2433                                         }
2434                                         break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2435                                                 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2436                                                         path: path.clone(),
2437                                                         session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2438                                                         first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2439                                                         payment_id,
2440                                                         payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2441                                                         payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2442                                                 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2443                                         channel_state, chan)
2444                                 } {
2445                                         Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2446                                                 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2447                                                         maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
2448                                                         // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
2449                                                         // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
2450                                                         // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
2451                                                         // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
2452                                                         // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
2453                                                         insert_outbound_payment!(); // Only do this after possibly break'ing on Perm failure above.
2454                                                         return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2455                                                 }
2456                                                 insert_outbound_payment!();
2457
2458                                                 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2459                                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2460                                                         node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2461                                                         updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2462                                                                 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2463                                                                 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2464                                                                 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2465                                                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2466                                                                 update_fee: None,
2467                                                                 commitment_signed,
2468                                                         },
2469                                                 });
2470                                         },
2471                                         None => { insert_outbound_payment!(); },
2472                                 }
2473                         } else { unreachable!(); }
2474                         return Ok(());
2475                 };
2476
2477                 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2478                         Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2479                         Err(e) => {
2480                                 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2481                         },
2482                 }
2483         }
2484
2485         /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2486         ///
2487         /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
2488         /// fields for more info.
2489         ///
2490         /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
2491         /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
2492         /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
2493         /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
2494         /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
2495         /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
2496         ///
2497         /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
2498         ///
2499         /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2500         /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2501         /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
2502         ///
2503         /// In general, a path may raise:
2504         ///  * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2505         ///    node public key) is specified.
2506         ///  * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2507         ///    (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2508         ///    failure).
2509         ///  * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2510         ///    relevant updates.
2511         ///
2512         /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2513         /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2514         /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2515         ///
2516         /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
2517         /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
2518         /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
2519         /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
2520         /// payment_secret.
2521         /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
2522         /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
2523         /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2524         pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2525                 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None, None, None)
2526         }
2527
2528         fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: Option<PaymentId>, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2529                 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
2530                         return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
2531                 }
2532                 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
2533                         // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
2534                         // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
2535                         // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
2536                         return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
2537                 }
2538                 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
2539                         return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
2540                 }
2541                 let mut total_value = 0;
2542                 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2543                 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2544                 let payment_id = if let Some(id) = payment_id { id } else { PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()) };
2545                 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
2546                         if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
2547                                 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
2548                                 continue 'path_check;
2549                         }
2550                         for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
2551                                 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
2552                                         path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
2553                                         continue 'path_check;
2554                                 }
2555                         }
2556                         total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2557                         path_errs.push(Ok(()));
2558                 }
2559                 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
2560                         return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
2561                 }
2562                 if let Some(amt_msat) = recv_value_msat {
2563                         debug_assert!(amt_msat >= total_value);
2564                         total_value = amt_msat;
2565                 }
2566
2567                 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2568                 let mut results = Vec::new();
2569                 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2570                         results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &route.payment_params, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage));
2571                 }
2572                 let mut has_ok = false;
2573                 let mut has_err = false;
2574                 let mut pending_amt_unsent = 0;
2575                 let mut max_unsent_cltv_delta = 0;
2576                 for (res, path) in results.iter().zip(route.paths.iter()) {
2577                         if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
2578                         if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
2579                         if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
2580                                 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
2581                                 // PartialFailure.
2582                                 has_err = true;
2583                                 has_ok = true;
2584                         } else if res.is_err() {
2585                                 pending_amt_unsent += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2586                                 max_unsent_cltv_delta = cmp::max(max_unsent_cltv_delta, path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta);
2587                         }
2588                 }
2589                 if has_err && has_ok {
2590                         Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure {
2591                                 results,
2592                                 payment_id,
2593                                 failed_paths_retry: if pending_amt_unsent != 0 {
2594                                         if let Some(payment_params) = &route.payment_params {
2595                                                 Some(RouteParameters {
2596                                                         payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2597                                                         final_value_msat: pending_amt_unsent,
2598                                                         final_cltv_expiry_delta: max_unsent_cltv_delta,
2599                                                 })
2600                                         } else { None }
2601                                 } else { None },
2602                         })
2603                 } else if has_err {
2604                         // If we failed to send any paths, we shouldn't have inserted the new PaymentId into
2605                         // our `pending_outbound_payments` map at all.
2606                         debug_assert!(self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().get(&payment_id).is_none());
2607                         Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
2608                 } else {
2609                         Ok(payment_id)
2610                 }
2611         }
2612
2613         /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2614         ///
2615         /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2616         /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2617         /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, if the payment
2618         /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success), or if
2619         /// further retries have been disabled with [`abandon_payment`].
2620         ///
2621         /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2622         /// [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]
2623         pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2624                 const RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE: u64 = 10;
2625                 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2626                         if path.len() == 0 {
2627                                 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2628                                         err: "length-0 path in route".to_string()
2629                                 }))
2630                         }
2631                 }
2632
2633                 let (total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret) = {
2634                         let outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2635                         if let Some(payment) = outbounds.get(&payment_id) {
2636                                 match payment {
2637                                         PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2638                                                 total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret, pending_amt_msat, ..
2639                                         } => {
2640                                                 let retry_amt_msat: u64 = route.paths.iter().map(|path| path.last().unwrap().fee_msat).sum();
2641                                                 if retry_amt_msat + *pending_amt_msat > *total_msat * (100 + RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE) / 100 {
2642                                                         return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2643                                                                 err: format!("retry_amt_msat of {} will put pending_amt_msat (currently: {}) more than 10% over total_payment_amt_msat of {}", retry_amt_msat, pending_amt_msat, total_msat).to_string()
2644                                                         }))
2645                                                 }
2646                                                 (*total_msat, *payment_hash, *payment_secret)
2647                                         },
2648                                         PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => {
2649                                                 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2650                                                         err: "Unable to retry payments that were initially sent on LDK versions prior to 0.0.102".to_string()
2651                                                 }))
2652                                         },
2653                                         PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {
2654                                                 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2655                                                         err: "Payment already completed".to_owned()
2656                                                 }));
2657                                         },
2658                                         PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {
2659                                                 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2660                                                         err: "Payment already abandoned (with some HTLCs still pending)".to_owned()
2661                                                 }));
2662                                         },
2663                                 }
2664                         } else {
2665                                 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2666                                         err: format!("Payment with ID {} not found", log_bytes!(payment_id.0)),
2667                                 }))
2668                         }
2669                 };
2670                 return self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, Some(payment_id), Some(total_msat)).map(|_| ())
2671         }
2672
2673         /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur.
2674         ///
2675         /// After this method returns, any future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id`
2676         /// will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`]. If no such event has been generated,
2677         /// an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event will be generated as soon as there are no remaining
2678         /// pending HTLCs for this payment.
2679         ///
2680         /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2681         /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2682         /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2683         ///
2684         /// [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment
2685         /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2686         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2687         pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2688                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2689
2690                 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2691                 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
2692                         if let Ok(()) = payment.get_mut().mark_abandoned() {
2693                                 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
2694                                         self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2695                                                 payment_id,
2696                                                 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
2697                                         });
2698                                         payment.remove();
2699                                 }
2700                         }
2701                 }
2702         }
2703
2704         /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2705         /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2706         /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2707         /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2708         /// never reach the recipient.
2709         ///
2710         /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function.
2711         ///
2712         /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2713         /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2714         ///
2715         /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2716         ///
2717         /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2718         pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2719                 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
2720                         Some(p) => p,
2721                         None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
2722                 };
2723                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
2724                 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage), None, None) {
2725                         Ok(payment_id) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2726                         Err(e) => Err(e)
2727                 }
2728         }
2729
2730         /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2731         /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2732         fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2733                 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], _counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2734         ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2735                 let (chan, msg) = {
2736                         let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2737                                 Some(mut chan) => {
2738                                         let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2739
2740                                         (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2741                                                 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2742                                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2743                                                 } else { unreachable!(); })
2744                                         , chan)
2745                                 },
2746                                 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2747                         };
2748                         match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2749                                 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2750                                         (chan, funding_msg)
2751                                 },
2752                                 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2753                                         err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2754                                 }) },
2755                         }
2756                 };
2757
2758                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2759                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2760                         node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2761                         msg,
2762                 });
2763                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2764                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2765                                 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2766                         },
2767                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2768                                 e.insert(chan);
2769                         }
2770                 }
2771                 Ok(())
2772         }
2773
2774         #[cfg(test)]
2775         pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2776                 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2777                         Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2778                 })
2779         }
2780
2781         /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2782         ///
2783         /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2784         /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2785         ///
2786         /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
2787         /// across the p2p network.
2788         ///
2789         /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2790         /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2791         ///
2792         /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2793         /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2794         /// keys per-channel).
2795         ///
2796         /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2797         /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2798         /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2799         ///
2800         /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2801         /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2802         /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2803         ///
2804         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2805         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2806         pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2807                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2808
2809                 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2810                         if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2811                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2812                                         err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2813                                 });
2814                         }
2815                 }
2816                 {
2817                         let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2818                         // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools at the next block. However, the modules
2819                         // constituting our Lightning node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if
2820                         // the wallet module is in advance on the LDK view, allow one more block of headroom.
2821                         // TODO: updated if/when https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-bitcoin/pull/994 landed and rust-bitcoin bumped.
2822                         if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == 0xffffffff) && funding_transaction.lock_time < 500_000_000 && funding_transaction.lock_time > height + 2 {
2823                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2824                                         err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
2825                                 });
2826                         }
2827                 }
2828                 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2829                         let mut output_index = None;
2830                         let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2831                         for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2832                                 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2833                                         if output_index.is_some() {
2834                                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2835                                                         err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2836                                                 });
2837                                         }
2838                                         if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2839                                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2840                                                         err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2841                                                 });
2842                                         }
2843                                         output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2844                                 }
2845                         }
2846                         if output_index.is_none() {
2847                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2848                                         err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2849                                 });
2850                         }
2851                         Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2852                 })
2853         }
2854
2855         #[allow(dead_code)]
2856         // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
2857         // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
2858         // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
2859         // message...
2860         const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::core::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
2861         #[deny(const_err)]
2862         #[allow(dead_code)]
2863         // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
2864         // smaller than 500:
2865         const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
2866
2867         /// Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given
2868         /// arguments, providing them in corresponding events via
2869         /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed
2870         /// on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node
2871         /// announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and
2872         /// our network addresses.
2873         ///
2874         /// `rgb` is a node "color" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this
2875         /// node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
2876         ///
2877         /// `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node
2878         /// accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly
2879         /// tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy,
2880         /// addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses.
2881         ///
2882         /// Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 500).
2883         ///
2884         /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
2885         pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
2886                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2887
2888                 if addresses.len() > 500 {
2889                         panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
2890                 }
2891
2892                 // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that
2893                 // addresses be sorted for future compatibility.
2894                 addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id());
2895
2896                 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2897                         features: NodeFeatures::known(),
2898                         timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
2899                         node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
2900                         rgb, alias, addresses,
2901                         excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2902                         excess_data: Vec::new(),
2903                 };
2904                 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2905                 let node_announce_sig = sign(&self.secp_ctx, &msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2906
2907                 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2908                 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2909
2910                 let mut announced_chans = false;
2911                 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2912                         if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()) {
2913                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2914                                         msg,
2915                                         update_msg: match self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
2916                                                 Ok(msg) => msg,
2917                                                 Err(_) => continue,
2918                                         },
2919                                 });
2920                                 announced_chans = true;
2921                         } else {
2922                                 // If the channel is not public or has not yet reached channel_ready, check the
2923                                 // next channel. If we don't yet have any public channels, we'll skip the broadcast
2924                                 // below as peers may not accept it without channels on chain first.
2925                         }
2926                 }
2927
2928                 if announced_chans {
2929                         channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
2930                                 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
2931                                         signature: node_announce_sig,
2932                                         contents: announcement
2933                                 },
2934                         });
2935                 }
2936         }
2937
2938         /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
2939         ///
2940         /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
2941         /// Will likely generate further events.
2942         pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
2943                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2944
2945                 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2946                 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
2947                 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
2948                 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2949                 {
2950                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2951                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2952
2953                         for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
2954                                 if short_chan_id != 0 {
2955                                         let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
2956                                                 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2957                                                 None => {
2958                                                         for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2959                                                                 match forward_info {
2960                                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2961                                                                                 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
2962                                                                                 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2963                                                                                         macro_rules! fail_forward {
2964                                                                                                 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
2965                                                                                                         {
2966                                                                                                                 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2967                                                                                                                 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2968                                                                                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2969                                                                                                                         outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2970                                                                                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2971                                                                                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2972                                                                                                                         phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
2973                                                                                                                 });
2974                                                                                                                 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
2975                                                                                                                         HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: $err_code, data: $err_data }
2976                                                                                                                 ));
2977                                                                                                                 continue;
2978                                                                                                         }
2979                                                                                                 }
2980                                                                                         }
2981                                                                                         if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
2982                                                                                                 let phantom_secret_res = self.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::PhantomNode);
2983                                                                                                 if phantom_secret_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id) {
2984                                                                                                         let phantom_shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &phantom_secret_res.unwrap()).secret_bytes();
2985                                                                                                         let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
2986                                                                                                                 Ok(res) => res,
2987                                                                                                                 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2988                                                                                                                         let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
2989                                                                                                                         // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
2990                                                                                                                         // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
2991                                                                                                                         // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
2992                                                                                                                         // of the onion.
2993                                                                                                                         fail_forward!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
2994                                                                                                                 },
2995                                                                                                                 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2996                                                                                                                         fail_forward!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
2997                                                                                                                 },
2998                                                                                                         };
2999                                                                                                         match next_hop {
3000                                                                                                                 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3001                                                                                                                         match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3002                                                                                                                                 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3003                                                                                                                                 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => fail_forward!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3004                                                                                                                         }
3005                                                                                                                 },
3006                                                                                                                 _ => panic!(),
3007                                                                                                         }
3008                                                                                                 } else {
3009                                                                                                         fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3010                                                                                                 }
3011                                                                                         } else {
3012                                                                                                 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3013                                                                                         }
3014                                                                                 },
3015                                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3016                                                                                 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3017                                                                                 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3018                                                                                 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3019                                                                                 // problem, not ours.
3020                                                                         }
3021                                                                 }
3022                                                         }
3023                                                         continue;
3024                                                 }
3025                                         };
3026                                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3027                                                 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3028                                                 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3029                                                 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3030                                                         match forward_info {
3031                                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3032                                                                                 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
3033                                                                                         onion_packet, ..
3034                                                                                 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
3035                                                                                 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3036                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3037                                                                         let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3038                                                                                 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3039                                                                                 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3040                                                                                 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3041                                                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3042                                                                                 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3043                                                                                 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3044                                                                         });
3045                                                                         match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet, &self.logger) {
3046                                                                                 Err(e) => {
3047                                                                                         if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3048                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3049                                                                                         } else {
3050                                                                                                 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3051                                                                                         }
3052                                                                                         let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3053                                                                                         failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3054                                                                                                 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data }
3055                                                                                         ));
3056                                                                                         continue;
3057                                                                                 },
3058                                                                                 Ok(update_add) => {
3059                                                                                         match update_add {
3060                                                                                                 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3061                                                                                                 None => {
3062                                                                                                         // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3063                                                                                                         // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
3064                                                                                                         // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
3065                                                                                                         // commitment_signed messages when we can.
3066                                                                                                         // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
3067                                                                                                         // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
3068                                                                                                         // this channel currently :/.
3069                                                                                                 }
3070                                                                                         }
3071                                                                                 }
3072                                                                         }
3073                                                                 },
3074                                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3075                                                                         panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3076                                                                 },
3077                                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3078                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3079                                                                         match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
3080                                                                                 Err(e) => {
3081                                                                                         if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3082                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3083                                                                                         } else {
3084                                                                                                 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
3085                                                                                         }
3086                                                                                         // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3087                                                                                         // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3088                                                                                         // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3089                                                                                         continue;
3090                                                                                 },
3091                                                                                 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3092                                                                                 Ok(None) => {
3093                                                                                         // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3094                                                                                         // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
3095                                                                                         // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
3096                                                                                         // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
3097                                                                                         // messages when we can.
3098                                                                                         // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
3099                                                                                         // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
3100                                                                                         // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
3101                                                                                 }
3102                                                                         }
3103                                                                 },
3104                                                         }
3105                                                 }
3106
3107                                                 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
3108                                                         let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
3109                                                                 Ok(res) => res,
3110                                                                 Err(e) => {
3111                                                                         // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
3112                                                                         // close channel and then send error message to peer.
3113                                                                         let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3114                                                                         let err: Result<(), _>  = match e {
3115                                                                                 ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
3116                                                                                         panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
3117                                                                                 }
3118                                                                                 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
3119                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
3120                                                                                         let mut channel = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan);
3121                                                                                         // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
3122                                                                                         Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel.channel_id(), channel.get_user_id(), channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
3123                                                                                 },
3124                                                                                 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
3125                                                                         };
3126                                                                         handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
3127                                                                         continue;
3128                                                                 }
3129                                                         };
3130                                                         if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3131                                                                 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
3132                                                                 continue;
3133                                                         }
3134                                                         log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
3135                                                                 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3136                                                         channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3137                                                                 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3138                                                                 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3139                                                                         update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
3140                                                                         update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3141                                                                         update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
3142                                                                         update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3143                                                                         update_fee: None,
3144                                                                         commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
3145                                                                 },
3146                                                         });
3147                                                 }
3148                                         } else {
3149                                                 unreachable!();
3150                                         }
3151                                 } else {
3152                                         for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3153                                                 match forward_info {
3154                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3155                                                                         routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
3156                                                                         prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3157                                                                 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3158                                                                         PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3159                                                                                 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3160                                                                                 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data }, Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret)
3161                                                                         },
3162                                                                         PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3163                                                                                 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None, None),
3164                                                                         _ => {
3165                                                                                 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3166                                                                         }
3167                                                                 };
3168                                                                 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3169                                                                         prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3170                                                                                 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3171                                                                                 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3172                                                                                 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3173                                                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3174                                                                                 phantom_shared_secret,
3175                                                                         },
3176                                                                         value: amt_to_forward,
3177                                                                         timer_ticks: 0,
3178                                                                         total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { amt_to_forward },
3179                                                                         cltv_expiry,
3180                                                                         onion_payload,
3181                                                                 };
3182
3183                                                                 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3184                                                                         ($htlc: expr) => {
3185                                                                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
3186                                                                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3187                                                                                         &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
3188                                                                                 );
3189                                                                                 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3190                                                                                                 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3191                                                                                                 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3192                                                                                                 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3193                                                                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3194                                                                                                 phantom_shared_secret,
3195                                                                                         }), payment_hash,
3196                                                                                         HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
3197                                                                                 ));
3198                                                                         }
3199                                                                 }
3200
3201                                                                 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3202                                                                         ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3203                                                                                 let mut payment_received_generated = false;
3204                                                                                 let purpose = || {
3205                                                                                         events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3206                                                                                                 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3207                                                                                                 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3208                                                                                         }
3209                                                                                 };
3210                                                                                 let (_, htlcs) = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3211                                                                                         .or_insert_with(|| (purpose(), Vec::new()));
3212                                                                                 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3213                                                                                         if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3214                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3215                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3216                                                                                                 continue
3217                                                                                         }
3218                                                                                 }
3219                                                                                 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.value;
3220                                                                                 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3221                                                                                         total_value += htlc.value;
3222                                                                                         match &htlc.onion_payload {
3223                                                                                                 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3224                                                                                                         if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3225                                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3226                                                                                                                         log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3227                                                                                                                 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3228                                                                                                         }
3229                                                                                                         if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3230                                                                                                 },
3231                                                                                                 _ => unreachable!(),
3232                                                                                         }
3233                                                                                 }
3234                                                                                 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data.total_msat {
3235                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3236                                                                                                 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data.total_msat);
3237                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3238                                                                                 } else if total_value == $payment_data.total_msat {
3239                                                                                         htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3240                                                                                         new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3241                                                                                                 payment_hash,
3242                                                                                                 purpose: purpose(),
3243                                                                                                 amount_msat: total_value,
3244                                                                                         });
3245                                                                                         payment_received_generated = true;
3246                                                                                 } else {
3247                                                                                         // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3248                                                                                         // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3249                                                                                         // MPP parts.
3250                                                                                         htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3251                                                                                 }
3252                                                                                 payment_received_generated
3253                                                                         }}
3254                                                                 }
3255
3256                                                                 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3257                                                                 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3258                                                                 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3259                                                                 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3260                                                                 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3261                                                                 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3262                                                                 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3263                                                                 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3264                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3265                                                                                 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3266                                                                                         OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3267                                                                                                 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3268                                                                                                 let payment_preimage = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3269                                                                                                         Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
3270                                                                                                         Err(()) => {
3271                                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3272                                                                                                                 continue
3273                                                                                                         }
3274                                                                                                 };
3275                                                                                                 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3276                                                                                         },
3277                                                                                         OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3278                                                                                                 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
3279                                                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3280                                                                                                                 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3281                                                                                                                 e.insert((purpose.clone(), vec![claimable_htlc]));
3282                                                                                                                 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3283                                                                                                                         payment_hash,
3284                                                                                                                         amount_msat: amt_to_forward,
3285                                                                                                                         purpose,
3286                                                                                                                 });
3287                                                                                                         },
3288                                                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3289                                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3290                                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3291                                                                                                         }
3292                                                                                                 }
3293                                                                                         }
3294                                                                                 }
3295                                                                         },
3296                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3297                                                                                 if payment_data.is_none() {
3298                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3299                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3300                                                                                         continue
3301                                                                                 };
3302                                                                                 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3303                                                                                 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3304                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3305                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3306                                                                                 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3307                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3308                                                                                                 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3309                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3310                                                                                 } else {
3311                                                                                         let payment_received_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3312                                                                                         if payment_received_generated {
3313                                                                                                 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3314                                                                                         }
3315                                                                                 }
3316                                                                         },
3317                                                                 };
3318                                                         },
3319                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3320                                                                 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3321                                                         }
3322                                                 }
3323                                         }
3324                                 }
3325                         }
3326                 }
3327
3328                 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3329                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
3330                 }
3331                 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3332
3333                 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3334                         let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3335                 }
3336
3337                 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3338                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3339                 events.append(&mut new_events);
3340         }
3341
3342         /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3343         ///
3344         /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3345         /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3346         ///
3347         /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3348         fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3349                 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3350                 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3351                 if background_events.is_empty() {
3352                         return false;
3353                 }
3354
3355                 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3356                         match event {
3357                                 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3358                                         // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3359                                         // monitor updating completing.
3360                                         let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
3361                                 },
3362                         }
3363                 }
3364                 true
3365         }
3366
3367         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3368         /// Process background events, for functional testing
3369         pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3370                 self.process_background_events();
3371         }
3372
3373         fn update_channel_fee(&self, short_to_id: &mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
3374                 if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
3375                 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3376                 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3377                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3378                                 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3379                         return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3380                 }
3381                 if !chan.is_live() {
3382                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3383                                 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3384                         return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3385                 }
3386                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3387                         log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3388
3389                 let mut retain_channel = true;
3390                 let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
3391                         Ok(res) => Ok(res),
3392                         Err(e) => {
3393                                 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
3394                                 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3395                                 Err(res)
3396                         }
3397                 };
3398                 let ret_err = match res {
3399                         Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
3400                                 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3401                                         let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
3402                                         if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3403                                         res
3404                                 } else {
3405                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3406                                                 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3407                                                 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3408                                                         update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3409                                                         update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3410                                                         update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3411                                                         update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3412                                                         update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3413                                                         commitment_signed,
3414                                                 },
3415                                         });
3416                                         Ok(())
3417                                 }
3418                         },
3419                         Ok(None) => Ok(()),
3420                         Err(e) => Err(e),
3421                 };
3422                 (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
3423         }
3424
3425         #[cfg(fuzzing)]
3426         /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3427         /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3428         /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3429         /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3430         pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3431                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3432                         let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3433
3434                         let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3435
3436                         let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3437                         {
3438                                 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3439                                 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3440                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3441                                 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3442                                 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3443                                         let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3444                                         if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3445                                         if err.is_err() {
3446                                                 handle_errors.push(err);
3447                                         }
3448                                         retain_channel
3449                                 });
3450                         }
3451
3452                         should_persist
3453                 });
3454         }
3455
3456         /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3457         ///
3458         /// This currently includes:
3459         ///  * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3460         ///  * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3461         ///    than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3462         ///    the channel.
3463         ///
3464         /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3465         /// estimate fetches.
3466         pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3467                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3468                         let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3469                         if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3470
3471                         let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3472
3473                         let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3474                         let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3475                         {
3476                                 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3477                                 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3478                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3479                                 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3480                                 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3481                                         let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
3482                                         let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3483                                         if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3484                                         if err.is_err() {
3485                                                 handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
3486                                         }
3487                                         if !retain_channel { return false; }
3488
3489                                         if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3490                                                 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
3491                                                 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
3492                                                 if needs_close { return false; }
3493                                         }
3494
3495                                         match chan.channel_update_status() {
3496                                                 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3497                                                 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3498                                                 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3499                                                 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3500                                                 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3501                                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3502                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3503                                                                         msg: update
3504                                                                 });
3505                                                         }
3506                                                         should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3507                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3508                                                 },
3509                                                 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3510                                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3511                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3512                                                                         msg: update
3513                                                                 });
3514                                                         }
3515                                                         should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3516                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3517                                                 },
3518                                                 _ => {},
3519                                         }
3520
3521                                         true
3522                                 });
3523
3524                                 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
3525                                         if htlcs.is_empty() {
3526                                                 // This should be unreachable
3527                                                 debug_assert!(false);
3528                                                 return false;
3529                                         }
3530                                         if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3531                                                 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3532                                                 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3533                                                 if htlcs[0].total_msat == htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.value) {
3534                                                         return true;
3535                                                 } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| {
3536                                                         htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3537                                                         return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3538                                                 }) {
3539                                                         timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.into_iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.prev_hop.clone(), payment_hash.clone())));
3540                                                         return false;
3541                                                 }
3542                                         }
3543                                         true
3544                                 });
3545                         }
3546
3547                         for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3548                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0), &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 23, data: Vec::new() });
3549                         }
3550
3551                         for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3552                                 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3553                         }
3554                         should_persist
3555                 });
3556         }
3557
3558         /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3559         /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3560         /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3561         ///
3562         /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
3563         /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
3564         /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentReceived`] event. Alternatively, the payment
3565         /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
3566         ///
3567         /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
3568         /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
3569         /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
3570         /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
3571         pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
3572                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3573
3574                 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3575                 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3576                 if let Some((_, mut sources)) = removed_source {
3577                         for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3578                                 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3579                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3580                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3581                                                 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3582                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3583                                                 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
3584                                                 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3585                         }
3586                 }
3587         }
3588
3589         /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3590         /// that we want to return and a channel.
3591         ///
3592         /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3593         /// forwarding
3594         fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3595                 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3596                 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3597                 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3598                 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3599                 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3600                         chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3601                 } else {
3602                         chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3603                 };
3604                 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3605                         self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3606                 } else {
3607                         (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3608                 }
3609         }
3610
3611
3612         /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3613         /// that we want to return and a channel.
3614         fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3615                 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
3616                 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
3617                         let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
3618                         if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3619                                 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3620                                 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3621                         }
3622                         (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3623                         msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3624                         upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3625                         (desired_err_code, enc.0)
3626                 } else {
3627                         // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
3628                         // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
3629                         // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
3630                         // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
3631                         (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3632                 }
3633         }
3634
3635         // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3636         // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3637         // be surfaced to the user.
3638         fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
3639                 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
3640                 _counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
3641         ) {
3642                 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3643                         match htlc_src {
3644                                 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
3645                                         let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
3646                                                 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3647                                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3648                                                                 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
3649                                                         },
3650                                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3651                                                 };
3652                                         let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3653                                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
3654                                                 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
3655                                 },
3656                                 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, payment_params, .. } => {
3657                                         let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3658                                         session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3659                                         let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3660                                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3661                                                 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) && !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3662                                                         let retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
3663                                                                 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3664                                                                 Some(RouteParameters {
3665                                                                         payment_params: payment_params_data,
3666                                                                         final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3667                                                                         final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3668                                                                 })
3669                                                         } else { None };
3670                                                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3671                                                         pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3672                                                                 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3673                                                                 payment_hash,
3674                                                                 rejected_by_dest: false,
3675                                                                 network_update: None,
3676                                                                 all_paths_failed: payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0,
3677                                                                 path: path.clone(),
3678                                                                 short_channel_id: None,
3679                                                                 retry,
3680                                                                 #[cfg(test)]
3681                                                                 error_code: None,
3682                                                                 #[cfg(test)]
3683                                                                 error_data: None,
3684                                                         });
3685                                                         if payment.get().abandoned() && payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3686                                                                 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3687                                                                         payment_id,
3688                                                                         payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3689                                                                 });
3690                                                                 payment.remove();
3691                                                         }
3692                                                 }
3693                                         } else {
3694                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3695                                         }
3696                                 },
3697                         };
3698                 }
3699         }
3700
3701         /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3702         /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
3703         /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
3704         /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
3705         /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
3706         /// still-available channels.
3707         fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
3708                 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3709                 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3710                 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3711                 //timer handling.
3712
3713                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3714                 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3715                 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3716                 match source {
3717                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => {
3718                                 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3719                                 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3720                                 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3721                                 let mut all_paths_failed = false;
3722                                 let mut full_failure_ev = None;
3723                                 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3724                                         if !payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
3725                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3726                                                 return;
3727                                         }
3728                                         if payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3729                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received failure of HTLC with payment_hash {} after payment completion", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3730                                                 return;
3731                                         }
3732                                         if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3733                                                 all_paths_failed = true;
3734                                                 if payment.get().abandoned() {
3735                                                         full_failure_ev = Some(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3736                                                                 payment_id,
3737                                                                 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3738                                                         });
3739                                                         payment.remove();
3740                                                 }
3741                                         }
3742                                 } else {
3743                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3744                                         return;
3745                                 }
3746                                 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3747                                 let retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
3748                                         let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3749                                         Some(RouteParameters {
3750                                                 payment_params: payment_params_data.clone(),
3751                                                 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3752                                                 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3753                                         })
3754                                 } else { None };
3755                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3756
3757                                 let path_failure = match &onion_error {
3758                                         &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3759 #[cfg(test)]
3760                                                 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3761 #[cfg(not(test))]
3762                                                 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3763                                                 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
3764                                                 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
3765                                                 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
3766                                                 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3767                                                         payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3768                                                         payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3769                                                         rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
3770                                                         network_update,
3771                                                         all_paths_failed,
3772                                                         path: path.clone(),
3773                                                         short_channel_id,
3774                                                         retry,
3775 #[cfg(test)]
3776                                                         error_code: onion_error_code,
3777 #[cfg(test)]
3778                                                         error_data: onion_error_data
3779                                                 }
3780                                         },
3781                                         &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3782 #[cfg(test)]
3783                                                         ref failure_code,
3784 #[cfg(test)]
3785                                                         ref data,
3786                                                         .. } => {
3787                                                 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
3788                                                 // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
3789                                                 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as find_route
3790                                                 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
3791                                                 // ChannelDetails.
3792                                                 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
3793                                                 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
3794                                                 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3795                                                         payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3796                                                         payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3797                                                         rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
3798                                                         network_update: None,
3799                                                         all_paths_failed,
3800                                                         path: path.clone(),
3801                                                         short_channel_id: Some(path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id),
3802                                                         retry,
3803 #[cfg(test)]
3804                                                         error_code: Some(*failure_code),
3805 #[cfg(test)]
3806                                                         error_data: Some(data.clone()),
3807                                                 }
3808                                         }
3809                                 };
3810                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3811                                 pending_events.push(path_failure);
3812                                 if let Some(ev) = full_failure_ev { pending_events.push(ev); }
3813                         },
3814                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3815                                 let err_packet = match onion_error {
3816                                         HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
3817                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
3818                                                 if let Some(phantom_ss) = phantom_shared_secret {
3819                                                         let phantom_packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
3820                                                         let encrypted_phantom_packet = onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, &phantom_packet);
3821                                                         onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &encrypted_phantom_packet.data[..])
3822                                                 } else {
3823                                                         let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
3824                                                         onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
3825                                                 }
3826                                         },
3827                                         HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
3828                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3829                                                 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
3830                                         }
3831                                 };
3832
3833                                 let mut forward_event = None;
3834                                 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3835                                         forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
3836                                 }
3837                                 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
3838                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3839                                                 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
3840                                         },
3841                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3842                                                 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
3843                                         }
3844                                 }
3845                                 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3846                                 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
3847                                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3848                                         pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3849                                                 time_forwardable: time
3850                                         });
3851                                 }
3852                         },
3853                 }
3854         }
3855
3856         /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentReceived`], generating any
3857         /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
3858         ///
3859         /// Note that calling this method does *not* guarantee that the payment has been claimed. You
3860         /// *must* wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] event which upon a successful claim will be
3861         /// provided to your [`EventHandler`] when [`process_pending_events`] is next called.
3862         ///
3863         /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3864         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
3865         /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3866         /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3867         ///
3868         /// [`Event::PaymentReceived`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentReceived
3869         /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
3870         /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
3871         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3872         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3873         /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
3874         pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
3875                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3876
3877                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3878
3879                 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3880                 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
3881                 if let Some((payment_purpose, mut sources)) = removed_source {
3882                         assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3883
3884                         // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
3885                         // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
3886                         // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
3887                         // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
3888                         //
3889                         // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3890                         // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3891                         // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3892                         // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3893                         // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3894                         // it.
3895                         let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
3896                         let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
3897                         let mut valid_mpp = true;
3898                         for htlc in sources.iter() {
3899                                 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3900                                         valid_mpp = false;
3901                                         break;
3902                                 }
3903                                 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
3904                                         log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
3905                                         debug_assert!(false);
3906                                         valid_mpp = false;
3907                                         break;
3908                                 }
3909                                 expected_amt_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
3910                                 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
3911                                         // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
3912                                         // that there's one payment here and move on.
3913                                         if sources.len() != 1 {
3914                                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
3915                                                 debug_assert!(false);
3916                                                 valid_mpp = false;
3917                                                 break;
3918                                         }
3919                                 }
3920
3921                                 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
3922                         }
3923                         if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
3924                                 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
3925                                 return;
3926                         }
3927                         if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
3928                                 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
3929                                         expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
3930                                 return;
3931                         }
3932
3933                         let mut errs = Vec::new();
3934                         let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
3935                         for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3936                                 if !valid_mpp {
3937                                         if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3938                                         let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3939                                         htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3940                                                         self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3941                                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3942                                                                          HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
3943                                                                          HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3944                                 } else {
3945                                         match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
3946                                                 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
3947                                                         if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
3948                                                                 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
3949                                                                 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
3950                                                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
3951                                                                 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
3952                                                         } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
3953                                                 },
3954                                                 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
3955                                                 ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
3956                                                         // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
3957                                                         // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
3958                                                         // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
3959                                                         // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
3960                                                 },
3961                                                 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
3962                                         }
3963                                 }
3964                         }
3965
3966                         if claimed_any_htlcs {
3967                                 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
3968                                         payment_hash,
3969                                         purpose: payment_purpose,
3970                                         amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
3971                                 });
3972                         }
3973
3974                         // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
3975                         // which were generated.
3976                         channel_state.take();
3977
3978                         for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
3979                                 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3980                                 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
3981                         }
3982                 }
3983         }
3984
3985         fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
3986                 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
3987                 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
3988                 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3989                         Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3990                         None => {
3991                                 return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed
3992                         }
3993                 };
3994
3995                 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3996                         match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
3997                                 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
3998                                         if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
3999                                                 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4000                                                         log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
4001                                                                 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4002                                                                 payment_preimage, e);
4003                                                         return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
4004                                                                 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4005                                                                 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
4006                                                                 Some(htlc_value_msat)
4007                                                         );
4008                                                 }
4009                                                 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
4010                                                         log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
4011                                                                 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4012                                                         channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4013                                                                 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4014                                                                 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4015                                                                         update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4016                                                                         update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
4017                                                                         update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4018                                                                         update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4019                                                                         update_fee: None,
4020                                                                         commitment_signed,
4021                                                                 }
4022                                                         });
4023                                                 }
4024                                                 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
4025                                         } else {
4026                                                 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
4027                                         }
4028                                 },
4029                                 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
4030                                         if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4031                                                 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
4032                                                         "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
4033                                                         payment_preimage, e);
4034                                         }
4035                                         let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4036                                         let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
4037                                         if drop {
4038                                                 chan.remove_entry();
4039                                         }
4040                                         return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
4041                                 },
4042                         }
4043                 } else { unreachable!(); }
4044         }
4045
4046         fn finalize_claims(&self, mut sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4047                 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4048                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4049                 for source in sources.drain(..) {
4050                         if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } = source {
4051                                 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4052                                 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4053                                 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4054                                         assert!(payment.get().is_fulfilled());
4055                                         if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, None) {
4056                                                 pending_events.push(
4057                                                         events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4058                                                                 payment_id,
4059                                                                 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash(),
4060                                                                 path,
4061                                                         }
4062                                                 );
4063                                         }
4064                                         if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
4065                                                 payment.remove();
4066                                         }
4067                                 }
4068                         }
4069                 }
4070         }
4071
4072         fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4073                 match source {
4074                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4075                                 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4076                                 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4077                                 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4078                                 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4079                                 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4080                                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4081                                         if !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
4082                                                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4083                                                 let fee_paid_msat = payment.get().get_pending_fee_msat();
4084                                                 pending_events.push(
4085                                                         events::Event::PaymentSent {
4086                                                                 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
4087                                                                 payment_preimage,
4088                                                                 payment_hash,
4089                                                                 fee_paid_msat,
4090                                                         }
4091                                                 );
4092                                                 payment.get_mut().mark_fulfilled();
4093                                         }
4094
4095                                         if from_onchain {
4096                                                 // We currently immediately remove HTLCs which were fulfilled on-chain.
4097                                                 // This could potentially lead to removing a pending payment too early,
4098                                                 // with a reorg of one block causing us to re-add the fulfilled payment on
4099                                                 // restart.
4100                                                 // TODO: We should have a second monitor event that informs us of payments
4101                                                 // irrevocably fulfilled.
4102                                                 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
4103                                                         let payment_hash = Some(PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()));
4104                                                         pending_events.push(
4105                                                                 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4106                                                                         payment_id,
4107                                                                         payment_hash,
4108                                                                         path,
4109                                                                 }
4110                                                         );
4111                                                 }
4112
4113                                                 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
4114                                                         payment.remove();
4115                                                 }
4116                                         }
4117                                 } else {
4118                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
4119                                 }
4120                         },
4121                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4122                                 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4123                                 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
4124                                 let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
4125                                 let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
4126                                         ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
4127                                         ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
4128                                         _ => None,
4129                                 };
4130                                 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
4131                                         let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4132                                                 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4133                                                 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4134                                                         payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4135                                                 }],
4136                                         };
4137                                         // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4138                                         // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
4139                                         // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
4140                                         if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
4141                                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4142                                                                                          payment_preimage, e);
4143                                         }
4144                                         // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
4145                                         // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
4146                                         // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
4147                                         // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
4148                                         // can happen.
4149                                 }
4150                                 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4151                                 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
4152                                         let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4153                                         let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4154                                 }
4155
4156                                 if claimed_htlc {
4157                                         if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4158                                                 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4159                                                         Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4160                                                 } else { None };
4161
4162                                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4163                                                 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4164                                                 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
4165
4166                                                 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4167                                                         fee_earned_msat,
4168                                                         claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4169                                                         prev_channel_id,
4170                                                         next_channel_id,
4171                                                 });
4172                                         }
4173                                 }
4174                         },
4175                 }
4176         }
4177
4178         /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4179         pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4180                 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4181         }
4182
4183         fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
4184                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4185
4186                 let chan_restoration_res;
4187                 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims) = {
4188                         let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4189                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4190                         let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4191                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4192                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4193                         };
4194                         if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4195                                 return;
4196                         }
4197
4198                         let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
4199                         let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() {
4200                                 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
4201                                 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
4202                                 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
4203                                 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
4204                                 // now.
4205                                 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()) {
4206                                         Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4207                                                 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4208                                                 msg,
4209                                         })
4210                                 } else { None }
4211                         } else { None };
4212                         chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, None, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready, updates.announcement_sigs);
4213                         if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4214                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4215                         }
4216                         (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs)
4217                 };
4218                 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
4219                 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
4220                 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4221                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
4222                 }
4223         }
4224
4225         /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4226         ///
4227         /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4228         /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4229         /// the channel.
4230         ///
4231         /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4232         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4233         /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4234         ///
4235         /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4236         /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4237         /// used to accept such channels.
4238         ///
4239         /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4240         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4241         pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4242                 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4243         }
4244
4245         /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4246         /// it as confirmed immediately.
4247         ///
4248         /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4249         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4250         /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4251         ///
4252         /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4253         /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4254         ///
4255         /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4256         /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4257         ///
4258         /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4259         /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4260         ///
4261         /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4262         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4263         pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4264                 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4265         }
4266
4267         fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4268                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4269
4270                 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4271                 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4272                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4273                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4274                                 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4275                                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4276                                 }
4277                                 if *counterparty_node_id != channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id() {
4278                                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
4279                                 }
4280                                 if accept_0conf {
4281                                         channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4282                                 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4283                                         let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4284                                                 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4285                                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4286                                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4287                                                 }
4288                                         };
4289                                         channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4290                                         let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, channel);
4291                                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4292                                 }
4293
4294                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4295                                         node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4296                                         msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4297                                 });
4298                         }
4299                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4300                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist".to_owned() });
4301                         }
4302                 }
4303                 Ok(())
4304         }
4305
4306         fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4307                 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4308                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4309                 }
4310
4311                 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4312                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4313                 }
4314
4315                 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4316                 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager,
4317                         counterparty_node_id.clone(), &their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration,
4318                         self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4319                 {
4320                         Err(e) => {
4321                                 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4322                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4323                         },
4324                         Ok(res) => res
4325                 };
4326                 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4327                 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4328                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4329                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4330                                 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4331                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4332                         },
4333                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4334                                 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4335                                         if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4336                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4337                                         }
4338                                         channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4339                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4340                                                 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(0),
4341                                         });
4342                                 } else {
4343                                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4344                                         pending_events.push(
4345                                                 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4346                                                         temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4347                                                         counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4348                                                         funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4349                                                         push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4350                                                         channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4351                                                 }
4352                                         );
4353                                 }
4354
4355                                 entry.insert(channel);
4356                         }
4357                 }
4358                 Ok(())
4359         }
4360
4361         fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4362                 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4363                         let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4364                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4365                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4366                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4367                                         if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4368                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4369                                         }
4370                                         try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.peer_channel_config_limits, &their_features), channel_state, chan);
4371                                         (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4372                                 },
4373                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4374                         }
4375                 };
4376                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4377                 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4378                         temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4379                         counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4380                         channel_value_satoshis: value,
4381                         output_script,
4382                         user_channel_id: user_id,
4383                 });
4384                 Ok(())
4385         }
4386
4387         fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4388                 let ((funding_msg, monitor, mut channel_ready), mut chan) = {
4389                         let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4390                         let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4391                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4392                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4393                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4394                                         if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4395                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4396                                         }
4397                                         (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
4398                                 },
4399                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4400                         }
4401                 };
4402                 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
4403                 // lock before watch_channel
4404                 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
4405                         match e {
4406                                 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
4407                                         // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4408                                         // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4409                                         // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4410                                         // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4411                                         // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
4412                                         // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
4413                                         // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4414                                         let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
4415                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4416                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
4417                                 },
4418                                 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
4419                                         // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4420                                         // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4421                                         // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4422                                         // until we have persisted our monitor.
4423                                         chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, channel_ready.is_some(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4424                                         channel_ready = None; // Don't send the channel_ready now
4425                                 },
4426                         }
4427                 }
4428                 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4429                 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4430                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4431                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4432                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4433                         },
4434                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4435                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4436                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4437                                         msg: funding_msg,
4438                                 });
4439                                 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4440                                         send_channel_ready!(channel_state.short_to_id, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
4441                                 }
4442                                 e.insert(chan);
4443                         }
4444                 }
4445                 Ok(())
4446         }
4447
4448         fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4449                 let funding_tx = {
4450                         let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4451                         let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4452                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4453                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4454                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4455                                         if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4456                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4457                                         }
4458                                         let (monitor, funding_tx, channel_ready) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
4459                                                 Ok(update) => update,
4460                                                 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4461                                         };
4462                                         if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
4463                                                 let mut res = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, channel_ready.is_some(), OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED);
4464                                                 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4465                                                         // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4466                                                         // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4467                                                         // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4468                                                         if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4469                                                                 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4470                                                         }
4471                                                 }
4472                                                 return res
4473                                         }
4474                                         if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4475                                                 send_channel_ready!(channel_state.short_to_id, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get(), msg);
4476                                         }
4477                                         funding_tx
4478                                 },
4479                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4480                         }
4481                 };
4482                 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
4483                 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
4484                 Ok(())
4485         }
4486
4487         fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4488                 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4489                 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4490                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4491                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4492                                 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4493                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4494                                 }
4495                                 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, self.get_our_node_id(),
4496                                         self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4497                                 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4498                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4499                                         channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4500                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4501                                                 msg: announcement_sigs,
4502                                         });
4503                                 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4504                                         // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4505                                         // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4506                                         // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4507                                         // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4508                                         // announcement_signatures.
4509                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4510                                         if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4511                                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4512                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4513                                                         msg,
4514                                                 });
4515                                         }
4516                                 }
4517                                 Ok(())
4518                         },
4519                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4520                 }
4521         }
4522
4523         fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4524                 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4525                 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4526                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4527                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4528
4529                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4530                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4531                                         if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4532                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4533                                         }
4534
4535                                         if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4536                                                 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4537                                                         log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4538                                                         if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4539                                         }
4540
4541                                         let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
4542                                         dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4543
4544                                         // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4545                                         if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
4546                                                 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4547                                                         let (result, is_permanent) =
4548                                                                 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
4549                                                         if is_permanent {
4550                                                                 remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
4551                                                                 break result;
4552                                                         }
4553                                                 }
4554                                         }
4555
4556                                         if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4557                                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4558                                                         node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4559                                                         msg,
4560                                                 });
4561                                         }
4562
4563                                         break Ok(());
4564                                 },
4565                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4566                         }
4567                 };
4568                 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4569                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4570                 }
4571
4572                 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
4573                 Ok(())
4574         }
4575
4576         fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4577                 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4578                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4579                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4580                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4581                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4582                                         if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4583                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4584                                         }
4585                                         let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
4586                                         if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4587                                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4588                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4589                                                         msg,
4590                                                 });
4591                                         }
4592                                         if tx.is_some() {
4593                                                 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4594                                                 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4595                                                 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4596                                                 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4597                                                 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4598                                                 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry)))
4599                                         } else { (tx, None) }
4600                                 },
4601                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4602                         }
4603                 };
4604                 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4605                         log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4606                         self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4607                 }
4608                 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4609                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4610                                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4611                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4612                                         msg: update
4613                                 });
4614                         }
4615                         self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4616                 }
4617                 Ok(())
4618         }
4619
4620         fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4621                 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4622                 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4623                 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4624                 //
4625                 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4626                 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4627                 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4628                 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4629
4630                 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4631                 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4632
4633                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4634                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4635                                 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4636                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4637                                 }
4638
4639                                 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4640                                         // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4641                                         // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4642                                         // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4643                                         match pending_forward_info {
4644                                                 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4645                                                         let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4646                                                                 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
4647                                                                 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, real_code, &error_data)
4648                                                         } else {
4649                                                                 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[])
4650                                                         };
4651                                                         let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4652                                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4653                                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4654                                                                 reason
4655                                                         };
4656                                                         PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4657                                                 },
4658                                                 _ => pending_forward_info
4659                                         }
4660                                 };
4661                                 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4662                         },
4663                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4664                 }
4665                 Ok(())
4666         }
4667
4668         fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4669                 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4670                 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4671                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4672                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4673                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4674                                         if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4675                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4676                                         }
4677                                         try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
4678                                 },
4679                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4680                         }
4681                 };
4682                 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
4683                 Ok(())
4684         }
4685
4686         fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4687                 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4688                 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4689                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4690                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4691                                 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4692                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4693                                 }
4694                                 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
4695                         },
4696                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4697                 }
4698                 Ok(())
4699         }
4700
4701         fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4702                 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4703                 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4704                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4705                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4706                                 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4707                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4708                                 }
4709                                 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4710                                         let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4711                                         try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
4712                                 }
4713                                 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
4714                                 Ok(())
4715                         },
4716                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4717                 }
4718         }
4719
4720         fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4721                 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4722                 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4723                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4724                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4725                                 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4726                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4727                                 }
4728                                 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
4729                                         match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
4730                                                 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4731                                                 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
4732                                                         assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
4733                                                         let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
4734                                                         try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
4735                                                         unreachable!();
4736                                                 },
4737                                                 Ok(res) => res
4738                                         };
4739                                 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4740                                         return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
4741                                 }
4742                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4743                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4744                                         msg: revoke_and_ack,
4745                                 });
4746                                 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
4747                                         channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4748                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4749                                                 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4750                                                         update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4751                                                         update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4752                                                         update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4753                                                         update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4754                                                         update_fee: None,
4755                                                         commitment_signed: msg,
4756                                                 },
4757                                         });
4758                                 }
4759                                 Ok(())
4760                         },
4761                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4762                 }
4763         }
4764
4765         #[inline]
4766         fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4767                 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4768                         let mut forward_event = None;
4769                         if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4770                                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4771                                 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4772                                         forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
4773                                 }
4774                                 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4775                                         match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
4776                                                         PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4777                                                         PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4778                                                         PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4779                                         }) {
4780                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4781                                                         entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4782                                                                                                         prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
4783                                                 },
4784                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4785                                                         entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4786                                                                                                      prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
4787                                                 }
4788                                         }
4789                                 }
4790                         }
4791                         match forward_event {
4792                                 Some(time) => {
4793                                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4794                                         pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4795                                                 time_forwardable: time
4796                                         });
4797                                 }
4798                                 None => {},
4799                         }
4800                 }
4801         }
4802
4803         fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4804                 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
4805                 let res = loop {
4806                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4807                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4808                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4809                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4810                                         if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4811                                                 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4812                                         }
4813                                         let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
4814                                         let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
4815                                                 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4816                                         htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
4817                                         if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update) {
4818                                                 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
4819                                                         assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
4820                                                         assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
4821                                                         assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4822                                                         assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
4823                                                         break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
4824                                                 } else {
4825                                                         if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan,
4826                                                                         RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
4827                                                                         raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(), false,
4828                                                                         raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4829                                                                         raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
4830                                                                 break Err(e);
4831                                                         } else { unreachable!(); }
4832                                                 }
4833                                         }
4834                                         if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
4835                                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4836                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4837                                                         updates,
4838                                                 });
4839                                         }
4840                                         break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4841                                                         raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
4842                                                         chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
4843                                                                 .unwrap_or(chan.get().outbound_scid_alias()),
4844                                                         chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
4845                                 },
4846                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4847                         }
4848                 };
4849                 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
4850                 match res {
4851                         Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
4852                                 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) =>
4853                         {
4854                                 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4855                                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
4856                                 }
4857                                 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
4858                                 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
4859                                 Ok(())
4860                         },
4861                         Err(e) => Err(e)
4862                 }
4863         }
4864
4865         fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4866                 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4867                 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4868                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4869                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4870                                 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4871                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4872                                 }
4873                                 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
4874                         },
4875                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4876                 }
4877                 Ok(())
4878         }
4879
4880         fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4881                 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4882                 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4883
4884                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4885                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4886                                 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4887                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4888                                 }
4889                                 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
4890                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
4891                                 }
4892
4893                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
4894                                         msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
4895                                                 self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), msg), channel_state, chan),
4896                                         // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
4897                                         // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
4898                                         update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4899                                 });
4900                         },
4901                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4902                 }
4903                 Ok(())
4904         }
4905
4906         /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
4907         fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4908                 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4909                 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4910                 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
4911                         Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
4912                         None => {
4913                                 // It's not a local channel
4914                                 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
4915                         }
4916                 };
4917                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4918                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4919                                 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4920                                         if chan.get().should_announce() {
4921                                                 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
4922                                                 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
4923                                                 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
4924                                                 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4925                                         }
4926                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
4927                                 }
4928                                 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
4929                                 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
4930                                 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
4931                                         return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4932                                 } else {
4933                                         try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
4934                                 }
4935                         },
4936                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
4937                 }
4938                 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
4939         }
4940
4941         fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4942                 let chan_restoration_res;
4943                 let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround) = {
4944                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4945                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4946
4947                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4948                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4949                                         if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4950                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4951                                         }
4952                                         // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
4953                                         // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
4954                                         // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
4955                                         // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
4956                                         let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
4957                                                 msg, &self.logger, self.our_network_pubkey.clone(), self.genesis_hash,
4958                                                 &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), channel_state, chan);
4959                                         let mut channel_update = None;
4960                                         if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
4961                                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4962                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4963                                                         msg,
4964                                                 });
4965                                         } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4966                                                 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
4967                                                 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
4968                                                 // they have the latest channel parameters.
4969                                                 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4970                                                         channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4971                                                                 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4972                                                                 msg,
4973                                                         });
4974                                                 }
4975                                         }
4976                                         let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
4977                                         chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(
4978                                                 self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
4979                                                 responses.mon_update, Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
4980                                         if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4981                                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4982                                         }
4983                                         (responses.holding_cell_failed_htlcs, need_lnd_workaround)
4984                                 },
4985                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4986                         }
4987                 };
4988                 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
4989                 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
4990
4991                 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
4992                         self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
4993                 }
4994                 Ok(())
4995         }
4996
4997         /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
4998         fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
4999                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5000                 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5001                 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5002                 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5003                         for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5004                                 match monitor_event {
5005                                         MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5006                                                 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5007                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5008                                                         self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5009                                                 } else {
5010                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5011                                                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
5012                                                 }
5013                                         },
5014                                         MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5015                                         MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5016                                                 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5017                                                 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5018                                                 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5019                                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5020                                                 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5021                                                         let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
5022                                                         failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5023                                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5024                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5025                                                                         msg: update
5026                                                                 });
5027                                                         }
5028                                                         let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5029                                                                 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5030                                                         } else {
5031                                                                 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5032                                                         };
5033                                                         self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5034                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5035                                                                 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5036                                                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5037                                                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5038                                                                 },
5039                                                         });
5040                                                 }
5041                                         },
5042                                         MonitorEvent::UpdateCompleted { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5043                                                 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
5044                                         },
5045                                 }
5046                         }
5047                 }
5048
5049                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5050                         self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5051                 }
5052
5053                 has_pending_monitor_events
5054         }
5055
5056         /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5057         /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5058         /// update events as a separate process method here.
5059         #[cfg(fuzzing)]
5060         pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5061                 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
5062         }
5063
5064         /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5065         /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5066         /// update was applied.
5067         ///
5068         /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
5069         /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
5070         /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
5071         /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
5072         fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5073                 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5074                 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5075                 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5076                 {
5077                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5078                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5079                         let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5080                         let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5081                         let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5082
5083                         by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5084                                 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
5085                                         Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
5086                                                 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5087                                                         failed_htlcs.push((
5088                                                                 holding_cell_failed_htlcs,
5089                                                                 *channel_id,
5090                                                                 chan.get_counterparty_node_id()
5091                                                         ));
5092                                                 }
5093                                                 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
5094                                                         if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
5095                                                                 has_monitor_update = true;
5096                                                                 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, channel_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
5097                                                                 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
5098                                                                 if close_channel { return false; }
5099                                                         } else {
5100                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5101                                                                         node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5102                                                                         updates: commitment_update,
5103                                                                 });
5104                                                         }
5105                                                 }
5106                                                 true
5107                                         },
5108                                         Err(e) => {
5109                                                 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
5110                                                 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5111                                                 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
5112                                                 !close_channel
5113                                         }
5114                                 }
5115                         });
5116                 }
5117
5118                 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5119                 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5120                         self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5121                 }
5122
5123                 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5124                         let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5125                 }
5126
5127                 has_update
5128         }
5129
5130         /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5131         /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5132         /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5133         fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5134                 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5135                 let mut has_update = false;
5136                 {
5137                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5138                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5139                         let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5140                         let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5141                         let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5142
5143                         by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5144                                 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5145                                         Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5146                                                 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5147                                                         has_update = true;
5148                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5149                                                                 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5150                                                         });
5151                                                 }
5152                                                 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5153                                                         // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5154                                                         // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5155                                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5156                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5157                                                                         msg: update
5158                                                                 });
5159                                                         }
5160
5161                                                         self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5162
5163                                                         log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5164                                                         self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5165                                                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_id, chan);
5166                                                         false
5167                                                 } else { true }
5168                                         },
5169                                         Err(e) => {
5170                                                 has_update = true;
5171                                                 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
5172                                                 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5173                                                 !close_channel
5174                                         }
5175                                 }
5176                         });
5177                 }
5178
5179                 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5180                         let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5181                 }
5182
5183                 has_update
5184         }
5185
5186         /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5187         /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5188         /// Channel object.
5189         fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5190                 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5191                         // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5192                         // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5193                         // reorganized out of the main chain.
5194                         // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5195                         // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5196                         // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5197                         // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5198                         if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5199                                 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5200                                 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5201                                         assert!(should_broadcast);
5202                                 } else { unreachable!(); }
5203                                 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5204                         }
5205                         self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5206                 }
5207         }
5208
5209         fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5210                 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5211
5212                 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5213                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5214                 }
5215
5216                 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5217
5218                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5219                 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5220                 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5221                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5222                                 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5223                                         payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5224                                         user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5225                                         // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5226                                         // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5227                                         // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5228                                         // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5229                                         // never fail a payment too early.
5230                                         // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5231                                         // timestamps.
5232                                         expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5233                                 });
5234                         },
5235                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5236                 }
5237                 Ok(payment_secret)
5238         }
5239
5240         /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5241         /// to pay us.
5242         ///
5243         /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5244         /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5245         ///
5246         /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
5247         /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5248         /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5249         ///
5250         /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5251         ///
5252         /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5253         /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5254         ///
5255         /// # Note
5256         ///
5257         /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5258         /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5259         ///
5260         /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5261         ///
5262         /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5263         /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5264         /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
5265         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5266         pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5267                 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, &self.keys_manager, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5268         }
5269
5270         /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5271         /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5272         ///
5273         /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5274         ///
5275         /// # Note
5276         /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5277         ///
5278         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5279         #[deprecated]
5280         pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5281                 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5282                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5283                 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5284                 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5285         }
5286
5287         /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5288         /// stored external to LDK.
5289         ///
5290         /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5291         /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5292         /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5293         ///
5294         /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5295         /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5296         /// payments.
5297         ///
5298         /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5299         /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5300         /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5301         /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5302         ///
5303         /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5304         /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5305         /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5306         /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5307         /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5308         ///
5309         /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5310         /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5311         /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
5312         /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5313         /// [`PaymentReceived`].
5314         ///
5315         /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
5316         /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
5317         ///
5318         /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5319         /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5320         ///
5321         /// # Note
5322         ///
5323         /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5324         /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5325         ///
5326         /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5327         ///
5328         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5329         /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5330         pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5331                 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5332         }
5333
5334         /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5335         /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5336         ///
5337         /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5338         ///
5339         /// # Note
5340         /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5341         ///
5342         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5343         #[deprecated]
5344         pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5345                 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5346         }
5347
5348         /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5349         /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5350         ///
5351         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5352         pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5353                 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5354         }
5355
5356         /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5357         /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5358         ///
5359         /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5360         pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5361                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5362                 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5363                 loop {
5364                         let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block.height(), &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
5365                         // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5366                         match channel_state.short_to_id.entry(scid_candidate) {
5367                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => continue,
5368                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return scid_candidate
5369                         }
5370                 }
5371         }
5372
5373         /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5374         ///
5375         /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5376         pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5377                 PhantomRouteHints {
5378                         channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5379                         phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5380                         real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5381                 }
5382         }
5383
5384         #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5385         pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5386                 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5387                 let event_handler = |event: &events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event.clone());
5388                 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5389                 events.into_inner()
5390         }
5391
5392         #[cfg(test)]
5393         pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5394                 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().is_empty()
5395         }
5396
5397         #[cfg(test)]
5398         pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5399                 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().clear()
5400         }
5401 }
5402
5403 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5404         where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5405         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5406         K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5407         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5408                                 L::Target: Logger,
5409 {
5410         fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5411                 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5412                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5413                         let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5414
5415                         // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5416                         // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5417                         if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5418                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5419                         }
5420
5421                         if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5422                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5423                         }
5424                         if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5425                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5426                         }
5427
5428                         let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5429                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5430                         mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
5431
5432                         if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5433                                 events.replace(pending_events);
5434                         }
5435
5436                         result
5437                 });
5438                 events.into_inner()
5439         }
5440 }
5441
5442 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5443 where
5444         M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5445         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5446         K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5447         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5448         L::Target: Logger,
5449 {
5450         /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5451         ///
5452         /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5453         /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5454         ///
5455         /// Pending events are persisted as part of [`ChannelManager`]. While these events are cleared
5456         /// when processed, an [`EventHandler`] must be able to handle previously seen events when
5457         /// restarting from an old state.
5458         fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5459                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5460                         let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5461
5462                         // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5463                         // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5464                         if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5465                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5466                         }
5467
5468                         let mut pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5469                         if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5470                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5471                         }
5472
5473                         for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
5474                                 handler.handle_event(&event);
5475                         }
5476
5477                         result
5478                 });
5479         }
5480 }
5481
5482 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5483 where
5484         M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5485         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5486         K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5487         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5488         L::Target: Logger,
5489 {
5490         fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5491                 {
5492                         let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5493                         assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
5494                                 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5495                         assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5496                                 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5497                 }
5498
5499                 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
5500                 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
5501         }
5502
5503         fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5504                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5505                 let new_height = height - 1;
5506                 {
5507                         let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5508                         assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5509                                 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5510                         assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5511                                 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5512                         *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5513                 }
5514
5515                 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5516         }
5517 }
5518
5519 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5520 where
5521         M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5522         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5523         K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5524         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5525         L::Target: Logger,
5526 {
5527         fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5528                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5529                 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5530                 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5531
5532                 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5533                 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5534
5535                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5536                 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger)
5537                         .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5538
5539                 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5540                 if height < last_best_block_height {
5541                         let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5542                         self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5543                 }
5544         }
5545
5546         fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5547                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5548                 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5549                 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5550
5551                 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5552                 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5553
5554                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5555
5556                 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5557
5558                 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5559
5560                 macro_rules! max_time {
5561                         ($timestamp: expr) => {
5562                                 loop {
5563                                         // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5564                                         // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5565                                         // having an explicit local time source.
5566                                         // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5567                                         // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5568                                         let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5569                                         if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5570                                         if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5571                                                 break;
5572                                         }
5573                                 }
5574                         }
5575                 }
5576                 max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
5577                 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5578                 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5579                 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5580                         inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5581                 });
5582
5583                 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5584                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5585                 outbounds.retain(|payment_id, payment| {
5586                         if payment.remaining_parts() != 0 { return true }
5587                         if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { starting_block_height, payment_hash, .. } = payment {
5588                                 if *starting_block_height + PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS <= height {
5589                                         log_info!(self.logger, "Timing out payment with id {} and hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_id.0), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
5590                                         pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
5591                                                 payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash,
5592                                         });
5593                                         false
5594                                 } else { true }
5595                         } else { true }
5596                 });
5597         }
5598
5599         fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
5600                 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5601                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_id.len());
5602                 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
5603                         if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
5604                                 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
5605                         }
5606                 }
5607                 res
5608         }
5609
5610         fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5611                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5612                 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5613                         if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5614                                 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
5615                                         channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
5616                                 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5617                         } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5618                 });
5619         }
5620 }
5621
5622 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5623 where
5624         M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5625         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5626         K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5627         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5628         L::Target: Logger,
5629 {
5630         /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
5631         /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
5632         /// the function.
5633         fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
5634                         (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
5635                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5636                 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5637                 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5638
5639                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5640                 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5641                 {
5642                         let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5643                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5644                         let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5645                         let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5646                         channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
5647                                 let res = f(channel);
5648                                 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
5649                                         for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
5650                                                 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
5651                                                 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5652                                                         failure_code, data,
5653                                                 }));
5654                                         }
5655                                         if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
5656                                                 send_channel_ready!(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
5657                                                 if channel.is_usable() {
5658                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5659                                                         if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
5660                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5661                                                                         node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5662                                                                         msg,
5663                                                                 });
5664                                                         }
5665                                                 } else {
5666                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5667                                                 }
5668                                         }
5669                                         if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
5670                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5671                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5672                                                         node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5673                                                         msg: announcement_sigs,
5674                                                 });
5675                                                 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5676                                                         if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, height) {
5677                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5678                                                                         msg: announcement,
5679                                                                         // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5680                                                                         // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5681                                                                         update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap(),
5682                                                                 });
5683                                                         }
5684                                                 }
5685                                         }
5686                                         if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
5687                                                 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5688                                                         // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
5689                                                         // to the short_to_id map here. Note that we check whether we can relay
5690                                                         // using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e. enforce option_scid_alias
5691                                                         // then), and if the funding tx is ever un-confirmed we force-close the
5692                                                         // channel, ensuring short_to_id is always consistent.
5693                                                         let scid_insert = short_to_id.insert(real_scid, channel.channel_id());
5694                                                         assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == channel.channel_id(),
5695                                                                 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
5696                                                                 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
5697                                                 }
5698                                         }
5699                                 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
5700                                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_id, channel);
5701                                         // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
5702                                         // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
5703                                         failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
5704                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
5705                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5706                                                         msg: update
5707                                                 });
5708                                         }
5709                                         let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
5710                                         self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
5711                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5712                                                 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5713                                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
5714                                                         channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
5715                                                         data: reason_message,
5716                                                 } },
5717                                         });
5718                                         return false;
5719                                 }
5720                                 true
5721                         });
5722
5723                         if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5724                                 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
5725                                         htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
5726                                                 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
5727                                                 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
5728                                                 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
5729                                                 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
5730                                                 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
5731                                                         let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
5732                                                         htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
5733                                                         timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5734                                                                 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
5735                                                                 data: htlc_msat_height_data
5736                                                         }));
5737                                                         false
5738                                                 } else { true }
5739                                         });
5740                                         !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
5741                                 });
5742                         }
5743                 }
5744
5745                 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
5746
5747                 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
5748                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
5749                 }
5750         }
5751
5752         /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
5753         /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
5754         /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5755         /// up.
5756         ///
5757         /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
5758         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
5759         pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5760                 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
5761         }
5762
5763         /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
5764         /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5765         /// up.
5766         pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
5767                 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
5768         }
5769
5770         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5771         pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
5772                 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
5773                 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
5774                 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5775                 *guard
5776         }
5777
5778         /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
5779         /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
5780         pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
5781                 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
5782         }
5783 }
5784
5785 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
5786         ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5787         where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5788         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5789         K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5790         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5791         L::Target: Logger,
5792 {
5793         fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
5794                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5795                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5796         }
5797
5798         fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
5799                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5800                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5801         }
5802
5803         fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
5804                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5805                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5806         }
5807
5808         fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
5809                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5810                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5811         }
5812
5813         fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
5814                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5815                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5816         }
5817
5818         fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
5819                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5820                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5821         }
5822
5823         fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
5824                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5825                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5826         }
5827
5828         fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
5829                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5830                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5831         }
5832
5833         fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
5834                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5835                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5836         }
5837
5838         fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
5839                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5840                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5841         }
5842
5843         fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
5844                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5845                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5846         }
5847
5848         fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
5849                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5850                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5851         }
5852
5853         fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
5854                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5855                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5856         }
5857
5858         fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
5859                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5860                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5861         }
5862
5863         fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
5864                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5865                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5866         }
5867
5868         fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
5869                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5870                         if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
5871                                 persist
5872                         } else {
5873                                 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
5874                         }
5875                 });
5876         }
5877
5878         fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
5879                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5880                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5881         }
5882
5883         fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
5884                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5885                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5886                 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
5887                 {
5888                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5889                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5890                         let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5891                         let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5892                         log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates. We believe we {} make future connections to this peer.",
5893                                 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id), if no_connection_possible { "cannot" } else { "can" });
5894                         channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5895                                 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5896                                         chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
5897                                         if chan.is_shutdown() {
5898                                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_id, chan);
5899                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5900                                                 return false;
5901                                         } else {
5902                                                 no_channels_remain = false;
5903                                         }
5904                                 }
5905                                 true
5906                         });
5907                         pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
5908                                 match msg {
5909                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5910                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5911                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5912                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5913                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5914                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5915                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5916                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5917                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5918                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5919                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5920                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5921                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5922                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
5923                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5924                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5925                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
5926                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
5927                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
5928                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
5929                                 }
5930                         });
5931                 }
5932                 if no_channels_remain {
5933                         self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
5934                 }
5935
5936                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5937                         self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5938                 }
5939         }
5940
5941         fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
5942                 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5943
5944                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5945
5946                 {
5947                         let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5948                         match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
5949                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5950                                         e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
5951                                                 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
5952                                         }));
5953                                 },
5954                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
5955                                         e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
5956                                 },
5957                         }
5958                 }
5959
5960                 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5961                 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5962                 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5963                 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5964                         if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5965                                 if !chan.have_received_message() {
5966                                         // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
5967                                         // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
5968                                         // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
5969                                         // drop it.
5970                                         false
5971                                 } else {
5972                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
5973                                                 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5974                                                 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
5975                                         });
5976                                         true
5977                                 }
5978                         } else { true }
5979                 });
5980                 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
5981         }
5982
5983         fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
5984                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5985
5986                 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
5987                         for chan in self.list_channels() {
5988                                 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
5989                                         // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
5990                                         let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data));
5991                                 }
5992                         }
5993                 } else {
5994                         {
5995                                 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
5996                                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5997                                 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
5998                                         if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5999                                                 return;
6000                                         }
6001                                         if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6002                                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6003                                                         node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6004                                                         msg,
6005                                                 });
6006                                                 return;
6007                                         }
6008                                 }
6009                         }
6010
6011                         // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6012                         let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data));
6013                 }
6014         }
6015 }
6016
6017 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
6018 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
6019 struct PersistenceNotifier {
6020         /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
6021         /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
6022         persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
6023 }
6024
6025 impl PersistenceNotifier {
6026         fn new() -> Self {
6027                 Self {
6028                         persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
6029                 }
6030         }
6031
6032         fn wait(&self) {
6033                 loop {
6034                         let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
6035                         let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
6036                         if *guard {
6037                                 *guard = false;
6038                                 return;
6039                         }
6040                         guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
6041                         let result = *guard;
6042                         if result {
6043                                 *guard = false;
6044                                 return
6045                         }
6046                 }
6047         }
6048
6049         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
6050         fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
6051                 let current_time = Instant::now();
6052                 loop {
6053                         let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
6054                         let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
6055                         if *guard {
6056                                 *guard = false;
6057                                 return true;
6058                         }
6059                         guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
6060                         // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
6061                         // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
6062                         // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
6063                         // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
6064                         // 1.42.0.
6065                         let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
6066                         let result = *guard;
6067                         if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
6068                                 *guard = false;
6069                                 return result;
6070                         }
6071                         match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
6072                                 None => return result,
6073                                 Some(_) => continue
6074                         }
6075                 }
6076         }
6077
6078         // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
6079         fn notify(&self) {
6080                 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
6081                 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6082                 *persistence_lock = true;
6083                 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
6084                 cnd.notify_all();
6085         }
6086 }
6087
6088 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6089 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6090
6091 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6092         (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6093         (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6094         (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6095 });
6096
6097 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6098         (2, node_id, required),
6099         (4, features, required),
6100         (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6101         (8, forwarding_info, option),
6102         (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6103         (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6104 });
6105
6106 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelDetails, {
6107         (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6108         (2, channel_id, required),
6109         (3, channel_type, option),
6110         (4, counterparty, required),
6111         (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6112         (6, funding_txo, option),
6113         (8, short_channel_id, option),
6114         (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6115         (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6116         (14, user_channel_id, required),
6117         (16, balance_msat, required),
6118         (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6119         // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6120         // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6121         (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap())),
6122         (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6123         (22, confirmations_required, option),
6124         (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6125         (26, is_outbound, required),
6126         (28, is_channel_ready, required),
6127         (30, is_usable, required),
6128         (32, is_public, required),
6129         (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6130         (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6131 });
6132
6133 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6134         (2, channels, vec_type),
6135         (4, phantom_scid, required),
6136         (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6137 });
6138
6139 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6140         (0, Forward) => {
6141                 (0, onion_packet, required),
6142                 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6143         },
6144         (1, Receive) => {
6145                 (0, payment_data, required),
6146                 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6147                 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6148         },
6149         (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6150                 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6151                 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6152         },
6153 ;);
6154
6155 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6156         (0, routing, required),
6157         (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6158         (4, payment_hash, required),
6159         (6, amt_to_forward, required),
6160         (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required)
6161 });
6162
6163
6164 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6165         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6166                 match self {
6167                         HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6168                                 0u8.write(writer)?;
6169                                 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6170                                 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6171                                 reason.write(writer)?;
6172                         },
6173                         HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6174                                 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6175                         }) => {
6176                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
6177                                 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6178                                 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6179                                 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6180                                 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6181                         },
6182                 }
6183                 Ok(())
6184         }
6185 }
6186
6187 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6188         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6189                 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6190                 match id {
6191                         0 => {
6192                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6193                                         channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6194                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6195                                         reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6196                                 }))
6197                         },
6198                         1 => {
6199                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6200                                         channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6201                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6202                                         sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6203                                         failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6204                                 }))
6205                         },
6206                         // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6207                         // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6208                         // messages contained in the variants.
6209                         // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6210                         // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6211                         // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6212                         2 => {
6213                                 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6214                                 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6215                                 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6216                                 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6217                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6218                         },
6219                         3 => {
6220                                 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6221                                 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6222                                 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6223                                 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6224                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6225                         },
6226                         _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6227                 }
6228         }
6229 }
6230
6231 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6232         (0, Forward),
6233         (1, Fail),
6234 );
6235
6236 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6237         (0, short_channel_id, required),
6238         (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6239         (2, outpoint, required),
6240         (4, htlc_id, required),
6241         (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6242 });
6243
6244 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6245         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6246                 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
6247                         OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
6248                         OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
6249                 };
6250                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6251                         (0, self.prev_hop, required),
6252                         (1, self.total_msat, required),
6253                         (2, self.value, required),
6254                         (4, payment_data, option),
6255                         (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6256                         (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6257                 });
6258                 Ok(())
6259         }
6260 }
6261
6262 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6263         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6264                 let mut prev_hop = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6265                 let mut value = 0;
6266                 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6267                 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6268                 let mut total_msat = None;
6269                 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6270                 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6271                         (0, prev_hop, required),
6272                         (1, total_msat, option),
6273                         (2, value, required),
6274                         (4, payment_data, option),
6275                         (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6276                         (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6277                 });
6278                 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6279                         Some(p) => {
6280                                 if payment_data.is_some() {
6281                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6282                                 }
6283                                 if total_msat.is_none() {
6284                                         total_msat = Some(value);
6285                                 }
6286                                 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6287                         },
6288                         None => {
6289                                 if total_msat.is_none() {
6290                                         if payment_data.is_none() {
6291                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6292                                         }
6293                                         total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
6294                                 }
6295                                 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
6296                         },
6297                 };
6298                 Ok(Self {
6299                         prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6300                         timer_ticks: 0,
6301                         value,
6302                         total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
6303                         onion_payload,
6304                         cltv_expiry,
6305                 })
6306         }
6307 }
6308
6309 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6310         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6311                 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6312                 match id {
6313                         0 => {
6314                                 let mut session_priv: ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6315                                 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6316                                 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
6317                                 let mut payment_id = None;
6318                                 let mut payment_secret = None;
6319                                 let mut payment_params = None;
6320                                 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6321                                         (0, session_priv, required),
6322                                         (1, payment_id, option),
6323                                         (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6324                                         (3, payment_secret, option),
6325                                         (4, path, vec_type),
6326                                         (5, payment_params, option),
6327                                 });
6328                                 if payment_id.is_none() {
6329                                         // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6330                                         // instead.
6331                                         payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6332                                 }
6333                                 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6334                                         session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6335                                         first_hop_htlc_msat: first_hop_htlc_msat,
6336                                         path: path.unwrap(),
6337                                         payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6338                                         payment_secret,
6339                                         payment_params,
6340                                 })
6341                         }
6342                         1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6343                         _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6344                 }
6345         }
6346 }
6347
6348 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6349         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::io::Error> {
6350                 match self {
6351                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payment_params } => {
6352                                 0u8.write(writer)?;
6353                                 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6354                                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6355                                         (0, session_priv, required),
6356                                         (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6357                                         (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6358                                         (3, payment_secret, option),
6359                                         (4, path, vec_type),
6360                                         (5, payment_params, option),
6361                                  });
6362                         }
6363                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6364                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
6365                                 field.write(writer)?;
6366                         }
6367                 }
6368                 Ok(())
6369         }
6370 }
6371
6372 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
6373         (0, LightningError) => {
6374                 (0, err, required),
6375         },
6376         (1, Reason) => {
6377                 (0, failure_code, required),
6378                 (2, data, vec_type),
6379         },
6380 ;);
6381
6382 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6383         (0, AddHTLC) => {
6384                 (0, forward_info, required),
6385                 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6386                 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6387                 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6388         },
6389         (1, FailHTLC) => {
6390                 (0, htlc_id, required),
6391                 (2, err_packet, required),
6392         },
6393 ;);
6394
6395 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6396         (0, payment_secret, required),
6397         (2, expiry_time, required),
6398         (4, user_payment_id, required),
6399         (6, payment_preimage, required),
6400         (8, min_value_msat, required),
6401 });
6402
6403 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(PendingOutboundPayment,
6404         (0, Legacy) => {
6405                 (0, session_privs, required),
6406         },
6407         (1, Fulfilled) => {
6408                 (0, session_privs, required),
6409                 (1, payment_hash, option),
6410         },
6411         (2, Retryable) => {
6412                 (0, session_privs, required),
6413                 (1, pending_fee_msat, option),
6414                 (2, payment_hash, required),
6415                 (4, payment_secret, option),
6416                 (6, total_msat, required),
6417                 (8, pending_amt_msat, required),
6418                 (10, starting_block_height, required),
6419         },
6420         (3, Abandoned) => {
6421                 (0, session_privs, required),
6422                 (2, payment_hash, required),
6423         },
6424 );
6425
6426 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
6427         where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6428         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6429         K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6430         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6431         L::Target: Logger,
6432 {
6433         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6434                 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6435
6436                 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6437
6438                 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
6439                 {
6440                         let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6441                         best_block.height().write(writer)?;
6442                         best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
6443                 }
6444
6445                 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6446                 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
6447                 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6448                         if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6449                                 unfunded_channels += 1;
6450                         }
6451                 }
6452                 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
6453                 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6454                         if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6455                                 channel.write(writer)?;
6456                         }
6457                 }
6458
6459                 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6460                 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
6461                         short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6462                         (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6463                         for forward in pending_forwards {
6464                                 forward.write(writer)?;
6465                         }
6466                 }
6467
6468                 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
6469                 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6470                 for (payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops)) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
6471                         payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6472                         (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6473                         for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
6474                                 htlc.write(writer)?;
6475                         }
6476                         htlc_purposes.push(purpose);
6477                 }
6478
6479                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6480                 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6481                 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6482                         peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
6483                         let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6484                         peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
6485                 }
6486
6487                 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6488                 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6489                 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6490                 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6491                 for event in events.iter() {
6492                         event.write(writer)?;
6493                 }
6494
6495                 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
6496                 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6497                 for event in background_events.iter() {
6498                         match event {
6499                                 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
6500                                         0u8.write(writer)?;
6501                                         funding_txo.write(writer)?;
6502                                         monitor_update.write(writer)?;
6503                                 },
6504                         }
6505                 }
6506
6507                 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6508                 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6509
6510                 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6511                 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
6512                         hash.write(writer)?;
6513                         pending_payment.write(writer)?;
6514                 }
6515
6516                 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
6517                 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
6518                 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6519                         if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
6520                                 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
6521                         }
6522                 }
6523                 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
6524                 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6525                         match outbound {
6526                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6527                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6528                                         for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
6529                                                 session_priv.write(writer)?;
6530                                         }
6531                                 }
6532                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
6533                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
6534                         }
6535                 }
6536
6537                 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
6538                 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
6539                 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6540                         match outbound {
6541                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6542                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6543                                         pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
6544                                 },
6545                                 _ => {},
6546                         }
6547                 }
6548                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6549                         (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
6550                         (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
6551                         (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
6552                         (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
6553                         (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
6554                 });
6555
6556                 Ok(())
6557         }
6558 }
6559
6560 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
6561 ///
6562 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
6563 /// is:
6564 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6565 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
6566 ///    `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
6567 ///    This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
6568 ///    [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
6569 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
6570 ///    same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
6571 ///    [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
6572 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6573 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
6574 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
6575 ///    Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
6576 ///    will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
6577 ///    the next step.
6578 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
6579 ///    [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
6580 ///
6581 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
6582 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
6583 ///
6584 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
6585 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
6586 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
6587 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
6588 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
6589 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
6590 ///
6591 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
6592 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6593         where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6594         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6595         K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6596         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6597         L::Target: Logger,
6598 {
6599         /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
6600         /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
6601         /// signing data.
6602         pub keys_manager: K,
6603
6604         /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6605         ///
6606         /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
6607         pub fee_estimator: F,
6608         /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6609         ///
6610         /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
6611         /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
6612         /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
6613         pub chain_monitor: M,
6614
6615         /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
6616         /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
6617         /// force-closed during deserialization.
6618         pub tx_broadcaster: T,
6619         /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
6620         /// deserialization.
6621         pub logger: L,
6622         /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
6623         /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
6624         pub default_config: UserConfig,
6625
6626         /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
6627         /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
6628         ///
6629         /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
6630         /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
6631         /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
6632         /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
6633         ///
6634         /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
6635         /// this struct.
6636         ///
6637         /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
6638         pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
6639 }
6640
6641 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6642                 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
6643         where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6644                 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6645                 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6646                 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6647                 L::Target: Logger,
6648         {
6649         /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
6650         /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
6651         /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
6652         pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
6653                         mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
6654                 Self {
6655                         keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
6656                         channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
6657                 }
6658         }
6659 }
6660
6661 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
6662 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
6663 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6664         ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
6665         where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6666         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6667         K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6668         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6669         L::Target: Logger,
6670 {
6671         fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6672                 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
6673                 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
6674         }
6675 }
6676
6677 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6678         ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
6679         where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6680         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6681         K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6682         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6683         L::Target: Logger,
6684 {
6685         fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6686                 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6687
6688                 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6689                 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6690                 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6691
6692                 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
6693
6694                 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6695                 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6696                 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6697                 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6698                 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
6699                 for _ in 0..channel_count {
6700                         let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (&args.keys_manager, best_block_height))?;
6701                         let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
6702                         funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
6703                         if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
6704                                 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6705                                                 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6706                                                 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6707                                                 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6708                                         // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
6709                                         log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
6710                                         log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6711                                                 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6712                                         log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6713                                         log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6714                                         log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6715                                         log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
6716                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6717                                 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6718                                                 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6719                                                 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6720                                                 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6721                                         // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
6722                                         log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
6723                                         log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
6724                                         log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6725                                                 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6726                                         let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
6727                                         failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
6728                                         monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6729                                         channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
6730                                                 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6731                                                 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
6732                                                 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
6733                                         });
6734                                 } else {
6735                                         log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6736                                         if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6737                                                 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
6738                                         }
6739                                         by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
6740                                 }
6741                         } else {
6742                                 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6743                                 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6744                                 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6745                                 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6746                                 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
6747                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6748                         }
6749                 }
6750
6751                 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
6752                         if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
6753                                 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
6754                                 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6755                         }
6756                 }
6757
6758                 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
6759                 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6760                 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6761                 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
6762                         let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6763                         let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6764                         let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
6765                         for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
6766                                 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
6767                         }
6768                         forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
6769                 }
6770
6771                 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6772                 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6773                 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
6774                         let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6775                         let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6776                         let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
6777                         for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
6778                                 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
6779                         }
6780                         claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
6781                 }
6782
6783                 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6784                 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
6785                 for _ in 0..peer_count {
6786                         let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6787                         let peer_state = PeerState {
6788                                 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
6789                         };
6790                         per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
6791                 }
6792
6793                 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6794                 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
6795                 for _ in 0..event_count {
6796                         match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
6797                                 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
6798                                 None => continue,
6799                         }
6800                 }
6801                 if forward_htlcs_count > 0 {
6802                         // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
6803                         // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
6804                         // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
6805                         // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
6806                         // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
6807                         pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6808                                 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
6809                         });
6810                 }
6811
6812                 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6813                 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
6814                 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
6815                         match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6816                                 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
6817                                 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6818                         }
6819                 }
6820
6821                 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6822                 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6823
6824                 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6825                 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
6826                 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
6827                         if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
6828                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6829                         }
6830                 }
6831
6832                 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6833                 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
6834                         HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
6835                 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
6836                         let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
6837                         let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
6838                                 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
6839                         };
6840                         if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
6841                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6842                         };
6843                 }
6844
6845                 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
6846                 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
6847                 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
6848                 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
6849                 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
6850                 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
6851                 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6852                         (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
6853                         (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
6854                         (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
6855                         (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
6856                         (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
6857                 });
6858                 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
6859                         fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
6860                 }
6861
6862                 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
6863                         pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
6864                 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
6865                         let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
6866                         for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
6867                                 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
6868                         }
6869                         pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
6870                 } else {
6871                         // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
6872                         // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
6873                         // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
6874                         // corresponding `Channel` at all).
6875                         // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
6876                         // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
6877                         // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
6878                         // 0.0.102+
6879                         for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
6880                                 if by_id.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
6881                                         for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
6882                                                 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
6883                                                         if path.is_empty() {
6884                                                                 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
6885                                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6886                                                         }
6887                                                         let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
6888                                                         let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
6889                                                         session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
6890                                                         match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
6891                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6892                                                                         let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
6893                                                                         log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
6894                                                                                 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
6895                                                                 },
6896                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6897                                                                         let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
6898                                                                         entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
6899                                                                                 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
6900                                                                                 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
6901                                                                                 payment_secret,
6902                                                                                 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
6903                                                                                 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
6904                                                                                 total_msat: path_amt,
6905                                                                                 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
6906                                                                         });
6907                                                                         log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
6908                                                                                 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0),  log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
6909                                                                 }
6910                                                         }
6911                                                 }
6912                                         }
6913                                 }
6914                         }
6915                 }
6916
6917                 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
6918                 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
6919
6920                 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
6921                 if let Some(mut purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
6922                         if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
6923                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6924                         }
6925                         for (purpose, (payment_hash, previous_hops)) in purposes.drain(..).zip(claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..)) {
6926                                 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
6927                         }
6928                 } else {
6929                         // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
6930                         // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
6931                         for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
6932                                 if previous_hops.is_empty() {
6933                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6934                                 }
6935                                 let purpose = match &previous_hops[0].onion_payload {
6936                                         OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
6937                                                 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
6938                                                         events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
6939                                                                 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
6940                                                                         Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
6941                                                                         None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
6942                                                                                 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
6943                                                                                 Err(()) => {
6944                                                                                         log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
6945                                                                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6946                                                                                 }
6947                                                                         }
6948                                                                 },
6949                                                                 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
6950                                                         }
6951                                                 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
6952                                         },
6953                                         OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
6954                                                 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
6955                                 };
6956                                 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
6957                         }
6958                 }
6959
6960                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6961                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
6962
6963                 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
6964                         pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
6965                 }
6966
6967                 let our_network_key = match args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node) {
6968                         Ok(key) => key,
6969                         Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6970                 };
6971                 let our_network_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &our_network_key);
6972                 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
6973                         if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
6974                                 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
6975                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6976                         }
6977                 }
6978
6979                 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
6980                 for (chan_id, chan) in by_id.iter_mut() {
6981                         if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
6982                                 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
6983                                 loop {
6984                                         outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
6985                                                 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.keys_manager);
6986                                         if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
6987                                 }
6988                                 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6989                         } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
6990                                 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
6991                                 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
6992                                 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
6993                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6994                         }
6995                         if chan.is_usable() {
6996                                 if short_to_id.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), *chan_id).is_some() {
6997                                         // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
6998                                         // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
6999                                         log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7000                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7001                                 }
7002                         }
7003                 }
7004
7005                 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7006                         for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
7007                                 if let Some((payment_purpose, claimable_htlcs)) = claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
7008                                         log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7009                                         let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
7010                                         for claimable_htlc in claimable_htlcs {
7011                                                 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
7012
7013                                                 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
7014                                                 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
7015                                                 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
7016                                                 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
7017                                                 //
7018                                                 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
7019                                                 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
7020                                                 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
7021                                                 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
7022                                                 // reason to.
7023                                                 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
7024                                                 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
7025                                                 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
7026                                                 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
7027                                                 // restart.
7028                                                 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
7029                                                 if let Some(channel) = by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
7030                                                         channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
7031                                                 }
7032                                                 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
7033                                                         previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &args.fee_estimator, &args.logger);
7034                                                 }
7035                                         }
7036                                         pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
7037                                                 payment_hash,
7038                                                 purpose: payment_purpose,
7039                                                 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
7040                                         });
7041                                 }
7042                         }
7043                 }
7044
7045                 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
7046                         genesis_hash,
7047                         fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
7048                         chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
7049                         tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
7050
7051                         best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
7052
7053                         channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
7054                                 by_id,
7055                                 short_to_id,
7056                                 forward_htlcs,
7057                                 claimable_htlcs,
7058                                 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7059                         }),
7060                         inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
7061                         pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
7062                         pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
7063
7064                         outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
7065                         fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
7066
7067                         our_network_key,
7068                         our_network_pubkey,
7069                         secp_ctx,
7070
7071                         last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
7072                         highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
7073
7074                         per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
7075
7076                         pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
7077                         pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
7078                         total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
7079                         persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
7080
7081                         keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
7082                         logger: args.logger,
7083                         default_configuration: args.default_config,
7084                 };
7085
7086                 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7087                         channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
7088                 }
7089
7090                 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
7091                 //connection or two.
7092
7093                 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
7094         }
7095 }
7096
7097 #[cfg(test)]
7098 mod tests {
7099         use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7100         use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7101         use core::time::Duration;
7102         use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
7103         use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
7104         use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
7105         use ln::channelmanager::inbound_payment;
7106         use ln::features::InitFeatures;
7107         use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7108         use ln::msgs;
7109         use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
7110         use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
7111         use util::errors::APIError;
7112         use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
7113         use util::test_utils;
7114         use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
7115
7116         #[cfg(feature = "std")]
7117         #[test]
7118         fn test_wait_timeout() {
7119                 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
7120                 use sync::Arc;
7121                 use core::sync::atomic::AtomicBool;
7122                 use std::thread;
7123
7124                 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
7125                 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
7126
7127                 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
7128                 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
7129                 thread::spawn(move || {
7130                         loop {
7131                                 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
7132                                 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7133                                 *persistence_lock = true;
7134                                 cnd.notify_all();
7135
7136                                 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
7137                                         break
7138                                 }
7139                         }
7140                 });
7141
7142                 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
7143                 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
7144
7145                 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
7146                 // available.
7147                 loop {
7148                         if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
7149                                 break
7150                         }
7151                 }
7152
7153                 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
7154
7155                 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
7156                 // are available.
7157                 loop {
7158                         if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
7159                                 break
7160                         }
7161                 }
7162         }
7163
7164         #[test]
7165         fn test_notify_limits() {
7166                 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
7167                 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
7168                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7169                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7170                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7171                 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7172
7173                 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
7174                 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
7175                 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7176                 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7177                 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7178
7179                 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7180
7181                 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
7182                 // to connect messages with new values
7183                 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7184                 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7185                 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7186                 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7187
7188                 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
7189                 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7190                 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7191                 // ... but the last node should not.
7192                 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7193                 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
7194                 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7195                 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7196
7197                 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
7198                 // about the channel.
7199                 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7200                 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7201                 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7202
7203                 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
7204                 // parties.
7205                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7206                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7207                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7208                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7209                 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7210                 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7211
7212                 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
7213                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7214                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7215
7216                 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
7217                 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
7218                 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
7219                 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
7220                 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
7221                 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
7222
7223                 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
7224                 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
7225                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7226                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7227                 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7228                 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7229                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7230                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7231
7232                 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
7233                 // the channel info has updated.
7234                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7235                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7236                 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7237                 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7238                 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7239                 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7240         }
7241
7242         #[test]
7243         fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
7244                 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
7245                 // expected.
7246                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7247                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7248                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7249                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7250                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7251
7252                 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
7253                 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7254                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
7255                 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
7256                 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
7257                 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
7258                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
7259                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7260                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7261                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7262                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
7263
7264                 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
7265                 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7266                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7267                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7268                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7269                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7270                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7271                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7272                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7273                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7274                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7275                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7276                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7277                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7278                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7279                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7280                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7281                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7282                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7283                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7284                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7285                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
7286
7287                 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
7288                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
7289                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7290                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7291                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7292                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
7293
7294                 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
7295                 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
7296                 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
7297                 // lightning messages manually.
7298                 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7299                 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
7300                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7301
7302                 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7303                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7304                 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
7305                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7306                 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7307                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
7308                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7309                 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7310                 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
7311                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7312                 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7313                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7314                 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7315                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7316                 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7317                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
7318                 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7319                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7320                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
7321                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7322                 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7323                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7324                 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7325                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
7326                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7327
7328                 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
7329                 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
7330                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7331                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
7332                 match events[0] {
7333                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
7334                                 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
7335                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
7336                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
7337                         },
7338                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7339                 }
7340                 match events[1] {
7341                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7342                                 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7343                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7344                                 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7345                         },
7346                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7347                 }
7348                 match events[2] {
7349                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7350                                 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7351                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7352                                 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7353                         },
7354                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7355                 }
7356         }
7357
7358         #[test]
7359         fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
7360                 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
7361                 //      outbound regular payment fails as expected.
7362                 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
7363                 //      fails as expected.
7364                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7365                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7366                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7367                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7368                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7369                 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7370                 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7371
7372                 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
7373                 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
7374                 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
7375
7376                 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
7377                 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7378                         payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id()),
7379                         final_value_msat: 100_000,
7380                         final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
7381                 };
7382                 let route = find_route(
7383                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(),
7384                         None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7385                 ).unwrap();
7386                 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7387                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7388                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7389                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7390                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7391                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7392                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7393                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7394                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7395                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7396                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7397                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7398                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7399                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7400                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7401                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7402                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7403                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7404                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7405                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7406                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7407
7408                 // Finally, claim the original payment.
7409                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7410
7411                 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
7412                 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7413                 let route = find_route(
7414                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(),
7415                         None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7416                 ).unwrap();
7417                 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7418                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7419                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7420                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7421                 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
7422                 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
7423                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
7424
7425                 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
7426                 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7427                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
7428                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7429                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7430                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7431                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7432                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7433                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7434                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7435                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7436                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7437                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7438                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7439                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7440                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7441                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7442                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7443                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7444                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7445                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7446                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7447                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7448
7449                 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
7450                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7451         }
7452
7453         #[test]
7454         fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
7455                 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
7456                 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
7457                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7458                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7459                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7460                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7461
7462                 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7463                 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7464                 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7465                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7466
7467                 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7468                 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7469                         payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7470                         final_value_msat: 10000,
7471                         final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7472                 };
7473                 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7474                 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7475                 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7476                 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7477                 let route = find_route(
7478                         &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph.read_only(),
7479                         Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()), nodes[0].logger, &scorer,
7480                         &random_seed_bytes
7481                 ).unwrap();
7482
7483                 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7484                 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
7485                 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
7486                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7487
7488                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7489                 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7490                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7491                 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7492                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7493                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7494                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7495
7496                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
7497         }
7498
7499         #[test]
7500         fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
7501                 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
7502                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7503                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7504                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7505                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7506
7507                 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7508                 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7509                 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7510                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7511
7512                 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7513                 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7514                         payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7515                         final_value_msat: 10000,
7516                         final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7517                 };
7518                 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7519                 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7520                 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7521                 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7522                 let route = find_route(
7523                         &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph.read_only(),
7524                         Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()), nodes[0].logger, &scorer,
7525                         &random_seed_bytes
7526                 ).unwrap();
7527
7528                 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7529                 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7530                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
7531                 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
7532                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7533
7534                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7535                 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7536                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7537                 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7538                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7539                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7540                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7541
7542                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
7543         }
7544
7545         #[test]
7546         fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
7547                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7548                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7549                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
7550                 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7551
7552                 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7553                 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7554                 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7555                 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7556
7557                 // Marshall an MPP route.
7558                 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
7559                 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
7560                 route.paths.push(path);
7561                 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7562                 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
7563                 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
7564                 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
7565                 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
7566                 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
7567
7568                 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None).unwrap_err() {
7569                         PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
7570                                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))                        },
7571                         _ => panic!("unexpected error")
7572                 }
7573         }
7574
7575         #[test]
7576         fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
7577                 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
7578                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7579                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7580                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7581                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7582
7583                 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
7584                 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
7585                         payment_secret,
7586                         total_msat: 100_000,
7587                 };
7588
7589                 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
7590                 // payment verification fails as expected.
7591                 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
7592                 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
7593                 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
7594                         Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
7595                         Err(()) => {
7596                                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
7597                         }
7598                 }
7599
7600                 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
7601                 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
7602         }
7603 }
7604
7605 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
7606 pub mod bench {
7607         use chain::Listen;
7608         use chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
7609         use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, KeysInterface, InMemorySigner};
7610         use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
7611         use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
7612         use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7613         use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
7614         use routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
7615         use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
7616         use util::test_utils;
7617         use util::config::UserConfig;
7618         use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
7619
7620         use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7621         use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7622         use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
7623
7624         use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
7625
7626         use test::Bencher;
7627
7628         struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
7629                 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
7630                         &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
7631                                 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
7632                                 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
7633                         &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
7634                         &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
7635         }
7636
7637         #[cfg(test)]
7638         #[bench]
7639         fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
7640                 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
7641         }
7642
7643         pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
7644                 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
7645                 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
7646                 // calls per node.
7647                 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
7648                 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7649
7650                 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
7651                 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7652
7653                 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
7654                 config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
7655
7656                 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
7657                 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
7658                 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
7659                 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
7660                 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
7661                         network,
7662                         best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
7663                 });
7664                 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
7665
7666                 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
7667                 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
7668                 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
7669                 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
7670                 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
7671                         network,
7672                         best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
7673                 });
7674                 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
7675
7676                 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7677                 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7678                 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
7679                 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7680                 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7681
7682                 let tx;
7683                 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
7684                         tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7685                                 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
7686                         }]};
7687                         node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
7688                 } else { panic!(); }
7689
7690                 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7691                 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7692
7693                 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
7694
7695                 let block = Block {
7696                         header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
7697                         txdata: vec![tx],
7698                 };
7699                 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
7700                 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
7701
7702                 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7703                 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7704                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
7705                 match msg_events[0] {
7706                         MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
7707                                 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
7708                                 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
7709                         },
7710                         _ => panic!(),
7711                 }
7712                 match msg_events[1] {
7713                         MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7714                         _ => panic!(),
7715                 }
7716
7717                 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger_a);
7718
7719                 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
7720                 macro_rules! send_payment {
7721                         ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
7722                                 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
7723                                 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id())
7724                                         .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7725                                 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7726                                 let seed = [3u8; 32];
7727                                 let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42);
7728                                 let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7729                                 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph.read_only(),
7730                                         Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7731
7732                                 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
7733                                 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
7734                                 payment_count += 1;
7735                                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
7736                                 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
7737
7738                                 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
7739                                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
7740                                 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7741                                 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
7742                                 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
7743                                 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
7744                                 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
7745                                 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7746
7747                                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
7748                                 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
7749                                 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7750                                 expect_payment_claimed!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
7751
7752                                 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
7753                                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
7754                                                 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
7755                                                 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7756                                                 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
7757                                         },
7758                                         _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
7759                                 }
7760
7761                                 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
7762                                 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
7763                                 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
7764                                 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7765
7766                                 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
7767                         }
7768                 }
7769
7770                 bench.iter(|| {
7771                         send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
7772                         send_payment!(node_b, node_a);
7773                 });
7774         }
7775 }