1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
31 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
36 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
39 use chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, Watch, BestBlock};
40 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
41 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
42 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
47 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
48 use routing::router::{Payee, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, RouteParameters};
50 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
52 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, OptionalField};
53 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
54 use util::config::UserConfig;
55 use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
56 use util::{byte_utils, events};
57 use util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
58 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
59 use util::logger::{Logger, Level};
60 use util::errors::APIError;
65 use core::cell::RefCell;
66 use io::{Cursor, Read};
67 use sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
68 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
69 use core::time::Duration;
72 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
73 use std::time::Instant;
75 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
77 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
78 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
79 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
81 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
82 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
83 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
84 // before we forward it.
86 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
87 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
88 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
89 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
90 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
92 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
93 enum PendingHTLCRouting {
95 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
96 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
99 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
100 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
103 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
104 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
108 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
109 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
110 routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
111 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
112 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
113 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
114 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
117 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
118 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
119 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
120 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
123 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
124 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
125 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
126 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
127 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
130 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
132 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
134 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
135 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
136 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
138 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
140 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
144 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
148 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
149 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
150 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
151 short_channel_id: u64,
153 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
155 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
156 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
161 /// Contains a total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
162 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
163 /// are part of the same payment.
164 Invoice(msgs::FinalOnionHopData),
165 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
166 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
169 struct ClaimableHTLC {
170 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
173 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
176 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
177 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
178 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
179 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
181 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
182 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
187 impl Readable for PaymentId {
188 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
189 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
193 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
194 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
195 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
196 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
197 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
200 session_priv: SecretKey,
201 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
202 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
203 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
204 payment_id: PaymentId,
205 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
206 payee: Option<Payee>,
209 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
210 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
211 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
213 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
215 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
217 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payee } => {
220 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
221 payment_id.hash(hasher);
222 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
223 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
231 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
232 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
234 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
235 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
236 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
237 payment_secret: None,
243 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
244 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
246 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
254 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
255 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
257 MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
262 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
264 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
265 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
266 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
267 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
268 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
270 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
271 err: msgs::LightningError,
272 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u64)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
273 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
275 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
277 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
279 err: LightningError {
281 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
282 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
289 shutdown_finish: None,
293 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
295 err: LightningError {
297 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
300 shutdown_finish: None,
304 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
305 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
308 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u64, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
310 err: LightningError {
312 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
313 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
319 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
320 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
324 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
327 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
329 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
331 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
333 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
335 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
337 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
338 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
344 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
346 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
347 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
355 shutdown_finish: None,
360 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
361 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
362 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
363 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
364 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
366 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
367 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
368 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
369 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
370 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
371 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
372 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
374 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
378 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
379 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
380 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
381 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
382 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
383 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
384 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
385 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
386 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
387 /// Map from payment hash to any HTLCs which are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user.
388 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
389 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
391 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
392 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
393 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
394 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
397 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
398 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
399 /// quite some time lag.
400 enum BackgroundEvent {
401 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
402 /// commitment transaction.
403 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
406 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
407 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
409 latest_features: InitFeatures,
412 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
413 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
415 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
418 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
419 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
420 struct PendingInboundPayment {
421 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
422 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
423 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
424 /// this payment being removed.
426 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
427 user_payment_id: u64,
428 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
429 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
430 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
433 /// Stores the session_priv for each part of a payment that is still pending. For versions 0.0.102
434 /// and later, also stores information for retrying the payment.
435 pub(crate) enum PendingOutboundPayment {
437 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
440 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
441 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
442 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
443 pending_amt_msat: u64,
444 /// Used to track the fee paid. Only present if the payment was serialized on 0.0.103+.
445 pending_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
446 /// The total payment amount across all paths, used to verify that a retry is not overpaying.
448 /// Our best known block height at the time this payment was initiated.
449 starting_block_height: u32,
451 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
452 /// been resolved. This ensures we don't look up pending payments in ChannelMonitors on restart
453 /// and add a pending payment that was already fulfilled.
455 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
456 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
458 /// When a payer gives up trying to retry a payment, they inform us, letting us generate a
459 /// `PaymentFailed` event when all HTLCs have irrevocably failed. This avoids a number of race
460 /// conditions in MPP-aware payment retriers (1), where the possibility of multiple
461 /// `PaymentPathFailed` events with `all_paths_failed` can be pending at once, confusing a
462 /// downstream event handler as to when a payment has actually failed.
464 /// (1) https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1164
466 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
467 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
471 impl PendingOutboundPayment {
472 fn is_retryable(&self) -> bool {
474 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { .. } => true,
478 fn is_fulfilled(&self) -> bool {
480 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => true,
484 fn abandoned(&self) -> bool {
486 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => true,
490 fn get_pending_fee_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
492 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { pending_fee_msat, .. } => pending_fee_msat.clone(),
497 fn payment_hash(&self) -> Option<PaymentHash> {
499 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None,
500 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
501 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => *payment_hash,
502 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
506 fn mark_fulfilled(&mut self) {
507 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
508 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
509 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
510 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
511 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
512 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. }
515 let payment_hash = self.payment_hash();
516 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, payment_hash };
519 fn mark_abandoned(&mut self) -> Result<(), ()> {
520 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
521 let our_payment_hash;
522 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
523 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } |
524 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } =>
526 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } |
527 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } => {
528 our_payment_hash = *payment_hash;
532 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash: our_payment_hash };
536 /// panics if path is None and !self.is_fulfilled
537 fn remove(&mut self, session_priv: &[u8; 32], path: Option<&Vec<RouteHop>>) -> bool {
538 let remove_res = match self {
539 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
540 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
541 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
542 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
543 session_privs.remove(session_priv)
547 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
548 let path = path.expect("Fulfilling a payment should always come with a path");
549 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
550 *pending_amt_msat -= path_last_hop.fee_msat;
551 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
552 *fee_msat -= path.get_path_fees();
559 fn insert(&mut self, session_priv: [u8; 32], path: &Vec<RouteHop>) -> bool {
560 let insert_res = match self {
561 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
562 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
563 session_privs.insert(session_priv)
565 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => false,
566 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => false,
569 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
570 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
571 *pending_amt_msat += path_last_hop.fee_msat;
572 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
573 *fee_msat += path.get_path_fees();
580 fn remaining_parts(&self) -> usize {
582 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
583 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
584 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
585 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
592 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
593 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
594 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
595 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
596 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
597 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
598 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
599 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
601 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
602 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
603 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
604 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
605 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
606 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
607 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
608 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
609 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
611 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
612 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
614 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
615 /// to individual Channels.
617 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
618 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
619 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
620 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
622 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
623 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
624 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
625 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
626 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
627 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
628 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
630 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
631 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
632 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
633 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
636 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
637 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
638 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
639 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
640 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
642 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
643 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
644 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
645 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
646 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
647 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
648 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
649 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
650 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
651 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
654 default_configuration: UserConfig,
655 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
661 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
663 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
664 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
666 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
667 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
668 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
669 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
671 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
672 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
673 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
674 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
675 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
676 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
678 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
679 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
680 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
681 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
682 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
683 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
684 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
685 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
687 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
689 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
690 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment>>,
692 our_network_key: SecretKey,
693 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
695 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
696 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
697 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
699 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
700 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
701 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
702 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
704 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
705 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
706 /// are currently open with that peer.
707 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
708 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
711 /// If also holding `channel_state` lock, must lock `channel_state` prior to `per_peer_state`.
712 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
714 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
715 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
716 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
717 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
718 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
719 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
720 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
721 /// PersistenceNotifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
722 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
724 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
731 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
733 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
734 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
735 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
736 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
737 pub struct ChainParameters {
738 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
739 pub network: Network,
741 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
743 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
744 pub best_block: BestBlock,
747 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
753 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
754 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
755 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
756 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
757 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
758 /// updates are ready for persistence).
760 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
761 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
762 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
763 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
764 persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
766 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
767 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
770 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
771 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
772 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
775 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
776 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
778 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
779 persistence_notifier: notifier,
780 should_persist: persist_check,
781 _read_guard: read_guard,
786 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
788 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
789 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
794 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
795 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
797 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
799 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
800 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
801 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
802 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
803 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
805 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
806 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
808 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
810 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
811 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
812 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
813 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
814 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
815 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
816 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
818 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
819 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
821 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
822 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
823 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
824 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
826 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
827 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
828 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
829 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
830 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
831 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
834 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
836 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
837 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
840 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
842 /// The number of blocks before we consider an outbound payment for expiry if it doesn't have any
843 /// pending HTLCs in flight.
844 pub(crate) const PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
846 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
847 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
848 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
849 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
850 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
851 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
852 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
853 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
854 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
855 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
856 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
859 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
860 /// to better separate parameters.
861 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
862 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
863 /// The node_id of our counterparty
864 pub node_id: PublicKey,
865 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
866 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
867 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
868 pub features: InitFeatures,
869 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
870 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
871 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
873 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
875 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
876 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
877 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
878 /// payments to us through this channel.
879 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
882 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
883 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
884 pub struct ChannelDetails {
885 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
886 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
887 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
888 /// lifetime of the channel.
889 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
890 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
891 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
892 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
893 /// our counterparty already.
895 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
896 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
897 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
898 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
899 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
900 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
901 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
902 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
903 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
904 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
905 /// this value on chain.
907 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
909 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
911 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
912 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
913 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
914 pub user_channel_id: u64,
915 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
916 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
917 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
919 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
920 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
921 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
922 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
924 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
925 pub balance_msat: u64,
926 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
927 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
928 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
929 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
931 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
933 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
934 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
935 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
936 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
937 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
938 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
939 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
940 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
941 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
943 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
944 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
945 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
946 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
947 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
948 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
949 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
950 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
951 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
953 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
955 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
956 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
957 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
958 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
959 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
960 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
961 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
962 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
963 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
965 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
966 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
967 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
968 pub is_outbound: bool,
969 /// True if the channel is confirmed, funding_locked messages have been exchanged, and the
970 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `funding_locked` message exchange implies the
971 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
972 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
973 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
975 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
976 pub is_funding_locked: bool,
977 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
978 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
980 /// This is a strict superset of `is_funding_locked`.
982 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
986 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
987 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
989 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
990 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
991 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
992 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
993 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
994 ParameterError(APIError),
995 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
996 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
997 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
1000 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1002 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
1003 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
1004 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
1005 /// paths than the ones selected).
1006 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
1007 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
1008 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
1009 /// in over-/re-payment.
1011 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1012 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
1013 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
1015 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
1016 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
1017 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
1018 /// with the latest update_id.
1020 /// The errors themselves, in the same order as the route hops.
1021 results: Vec<Result<(), APIError>>,
1022 /// If some paths failed without irrevocably committing to the new HTLC(s), this will
1023 /// contain a [`RouteParameters`] object which can be used to calculate a new route that
1024 /// will pay all remaining unpaid balance.
1025 failed_paths_retry: Option<RouteParameters>,
1026 /// The payment id for the payment, which is now at least partially pending.
1027 payment_id: PaymentId,
1031 macro_rules! handle_error {
1032 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1035 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1036 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1038 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1039 // entering the macro.
1040 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
1041 assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
1044 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1046 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1047 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1048 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1049 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1053 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1054 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1055 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1056 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1061 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1062 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1064 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1065 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1066 action: err.action.clone()
1070 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1071 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1074 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1081 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1082 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1083 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1085 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1086 //TODO: Once warning messages are merged, we should send a `warning` message to our
1088 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1090 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1091 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1093 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1094 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1095 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1096 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1098 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1099 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1100 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1102 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => {
1103 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1104 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1105 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1107 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(false);
1108 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1109 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1115 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1116 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1120 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1122 $entry.remove_entry();
1130 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1131 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1135 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1137 $entry.remove_entry();
1145 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1146 ($channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1148 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1149 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1150 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1157 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
1158 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1159 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1161 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1163 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1164 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1165 if let Some(short_id) = $chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1166 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1168 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1169 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1170 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1171 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1172 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1173 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1174 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1175 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1176 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1177 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1178 $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1181 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1182 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1183 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1184 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1185 match $action_type {
1186 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1187 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1189 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1190 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1192 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1193 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1194 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1195 if !$resend_commitment {
1196 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1199 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1201 $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1202 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1206 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1207 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1209 $entry.remove_entry();
1213 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1214 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
1218 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
1219 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1220 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
1222 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1223 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
1227 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
1228 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
1229 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1230 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
1231 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
1234 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
1239 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
1240 ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
1241 $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
1242 $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $funding_locked: expr) => { {
1243 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
1244 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1246 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
1247 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
1249 let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
1250 if !forwards.is_empty() {
1251 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"),
1252 $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
1255 if chanmon_update.is_some() {
1256 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a funding_locked if there have been
1257 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
1258 // associated with a funding_locked would be the funding_created/funding_signed
1259 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
1260 // funding_locked until it's been updated, so we can't have a funding_locked and a
1261 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
1262 assert!($funding_locked.is_none());
1263 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a funding_locked or a
1264 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a funding_locked, we
1265 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
1266 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1269 if let Some(msg) = $funding_locked {
1270 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the funding_locked fly
1271 // before it should be allowed to.
1272 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
1273 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
1274 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1277 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = $self.get_announcement_sigs($channel_entry.get()) {
1278 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1279 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1280 msg: announcement_sigs,
1283 $channel_state.short_to_id.insert($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), $channel_entry.get().channel_id());
1286 let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
1287 if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
1288 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
1289 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
1290 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
1291 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
1292 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
1293 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
1294 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
1295 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
1296 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
1297 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1298 if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1299 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
1300 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
1301 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
1302 let mut order = $order;
1304 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1306 break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
1310 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1311 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
1312 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1313 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1318 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1319 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
1320 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1321 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1322 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1327 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1331 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1336 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1337 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1338 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1343 if chanmon_update_is_none {
1344 // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
1345 // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
1346 // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
1347 assert!(res.is_ok());
1350 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1354 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1355 ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1356 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1358 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1360 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1361 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1366 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
1367 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
1368 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1369 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1370 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1373 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1375 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1376 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1378 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1380 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
1382 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1383 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1384 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1385 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1386 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1387 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1390 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1391 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1392 fee_estimator: fee_est,
1396 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1398 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1399 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1400 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
1401 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1402 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1403 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1405 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1406 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1408 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
1409 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
1412 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1413 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1415 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1417 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1418 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1419 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1420 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
1428 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels, as
1429 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1430 &self.default_configuration
1433 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1435 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1436 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1437 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to 0
1438 /// for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for `user_channel_id` here.
1439 /// `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and otherwise
1442 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1443 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1445 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1446 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1447 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1449 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1450 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1451 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1452 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1453 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1454 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1456 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1457 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1458 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1459 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1460 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1461 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1465 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1466 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1467 Some(peer_state) => {
1468 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1469 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1470 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1471 Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, their_features,
1472 channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height())?
1474 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1477 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1479 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1480 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1481 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1483 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1484 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1485 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1486 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1487 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1488 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1490 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1493 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1495 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1496 node_id: their_network_key,
1499 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1502 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1503 let mut res = Vec::new();
1505 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1506 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1507 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1508 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
1509 let balance_msat = channel.get_balance_msat();
1510 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1511 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1512 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1513 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1514 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1515 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1516 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1517 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1518 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1520 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1521 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1522 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1523 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1525 inbound_capacity_msat,
1526 outbound_capacity_msat,
1527 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1528 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1529 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1530 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1531 is_funding_locked: channel.is_usable(),
1532 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1533 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1537 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1538 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1539 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1540 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1546 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1547 /// more information.
1548 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1549 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1552 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1553 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1555 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1556 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1558 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1559 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1560 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1561 // really wanted anyway.
1562 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1565 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1566 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1567 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1568 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1569 Some(transaction) => {
1570 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1574 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1575 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1576 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1577 reason: closure_reason
1581 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1582 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1584 let counterparty_node_id;
1585 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1586 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1587 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1588 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1589 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1590 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1591 counterparty_node_id = chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1592 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1593 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1594 Some(peer_state) => {
1595 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1596 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1597 chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
1599 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
1601 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1603 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1604 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1605 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1606 let (result, is_permanent) =
1607 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
1609 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1615 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1616 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1620 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1621 let channel = remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1622 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1623 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1627 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1631 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1635 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1636 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1639 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, counterparty_node_id);
1643 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1644 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1645 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1647 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1648 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1650 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1651 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1652 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1653 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1655 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1657 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1658 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1659 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1660 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1661 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, None)
1664 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1665 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1666 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1668 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1669 /// the channel being closed or not:
1670 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1671 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1672 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1673 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1674 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1675 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1676 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1678 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1680 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1681 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1682 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1683 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1684 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1688 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1689 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1690 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1691 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1692 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1694 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1695 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1696 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1697 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1698 // ignore the result here.
1699 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1703 /// `peer_node_id` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1704 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
1705 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>, peer_msg: Option<&String>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1707 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1708 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1709 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1710 if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id {
1711 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id {
1712 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1715 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1716 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1718 if peer_node_id.is_some() {
1719 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
1720 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
1723 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1725 chan.remove_entry().1
1727 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1730 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1731 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
1732 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1733 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1734 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1739 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1742 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
1743 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
1744 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1745 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1746 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None, None) {
1747 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1748 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1749 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1750 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1751 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1752 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1762 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
1763 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
1764 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
1765 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1766 let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
1770 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
1771 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
1772 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
1774 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1775 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
1776 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1777 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1778 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
1779 failure_code: $err_code,
1780 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1785 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
1786 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
1789 let shared_secret = {
1790 let mut arr = [0; 32];
1791 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
1794 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1796 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
1797 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
1798 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
1799 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
1800 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
1801 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
1802 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
1803 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
1806 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
1807 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1808 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
1809 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
1810 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
1813 let mut channel_state = None;
1814 macro_rules! return_err {
1815 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
1817 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1818 if channel_state.is_none() {
1819 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1821 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1822 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1823 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1824 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
1825 })), channel_state.unwrap());
1830 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1831 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
1832 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac): (msgs::OnionHopData, _) = {
1833 match <msgs::OnionHopData as Readable>::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
1835 let error_code = match err {
1836 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
1837 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
1838 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
1839 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
1840 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1842 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1845 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
1846 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
1847 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1854 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
1857 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
1858 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
1859 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
1860 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
1861 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
1862 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
1863 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
1864 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
1865 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1866 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1867 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1868 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1872 // final_expiry_too_soon
1873 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
1874 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
1875 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
1876 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
1877 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
1878 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
1879 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1881 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1882 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1883 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1885 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1886 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1887 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1890 let routing = match next_hop_data.format {
1891 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]),
1892 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]),
1893 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
1894 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
1895 return_err!("We don't support MPP keysend payments", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
1896 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
1897 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
1899 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1901 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
1902 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
1903 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
1904 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
1905 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
1906 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
1907 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1908 if hashed_preimage != msg.payment_hash {
1909 return_err!("Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
1912 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
1914 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1917 return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]);
1922 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1923 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1924 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1925 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1927 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1929 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1930 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1931 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1932 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1935 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1936 let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
1937 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1939 // Check two things:
1940 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
1941 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
1942 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
1944 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
1946 // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
1947 // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
1948 chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
1950 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1952 let blinding_factor = {
1953 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1954 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1955 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1956 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
1959 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
1961 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1963 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1966 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1967 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
1970 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
1971 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1972 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1973 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
1974 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1978 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1979 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1980 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
1983 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1984 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1985 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1986 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1990 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1991 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1992 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
1993 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
1994 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
1995 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
1996 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1997 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1998 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1999 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2000 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2002 Some(id) => id.clone(),
2005 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
2007 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2008 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2009 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2010 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2011 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2014 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2015 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2016 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2017 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2018 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2019 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2020 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
2022 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2023 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
2025 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64)
2026 .and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000)
2027 .checked_add(chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat() as u64) });
2028 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
2029 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
2031 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta() as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2032 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
2034 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2035 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2036 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2037 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2038 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2039 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
2041 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2042 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2044 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2045 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2046 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2047 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2048 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2049 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2050 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2051 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2052 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2053 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
2059 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
2060 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2061 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2062 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
2064 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2065 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
2067 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2068 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
2069 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
2071 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
2073 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
2078 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
2081 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2082 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2083 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2085 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2086 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2087 if !chan.should_announce() {
2088 return Err(LightningError {
2089 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2090 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2093 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2094 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2097 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2098 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2099 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2100 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2101 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2102 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2103 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2104 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2105 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2109 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2111 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2112 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2114 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2115 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2116 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2117 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2118 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
2119 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2120 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2121 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2124 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
2125 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
2127 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2133 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2134 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payee: &Option<Payee>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2135 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2136 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2137 let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2138 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2140 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2141 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2142 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2143 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2144 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2146 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2148 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2150 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2151 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2153 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2154 let payment_entry = pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id);
2155 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(payment) = &payment_entry {
2156 if !payment.get().is_retryable() {
2157 return Err(APIError::RouteError {
2158 err: "Payment already completed"
2163 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2164 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2165 Some(id) => id.clone(),
2168 macro_rules! insert_outbound_payment {
2170 let payment = payment_entry.or_insert_with(|| PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2171 session_privs: HashSet::new(),
2172 pending_amt_msat: 0,
2173 pending_fee_msat: Some(0),
2174 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2175 payment_secret: *payment_secret,
2176 starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
2177 total_msat: total_value,
2179 assert!(payment.insert(session_priv_bytes, path));
2183 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2184 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
2186 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
2187 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
2189 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2190 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2192 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2193 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2195 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2196 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2198 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2199 payee: payee.clone(),
2200 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2201 channel_state, chan)
2203 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2204 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2205 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
2206 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
2207 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
2208 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
2209 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
2210 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
2211 insert_outbound_payment!(); // Only do this after possibly break'ing on Perm failure above.
2212 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2214 insert_outbound_payment!();
2216 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2217 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2218 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2219 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2220 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2221 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2222 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2223 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2229 None => { insert_outbound_payment!(); },
2231 } else { unreachable!(); }
2235 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2236 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2238 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2243 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2245 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
2246 /// fields for more info.
2248 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
2249 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
2250 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
2251 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
2252 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
2253 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
2255 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
2257 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2258 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2259 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
2261 /// In general, a path may raise:
2262 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2263 /// node public key) is specified.
2264 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2265 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2267 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2268 /// relevant updates.
2270 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2271 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2272 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2274 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
2275 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
2276 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
2277 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
2279 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
2280 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
2281 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2282 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2283 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None, None, None)
2286 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: Option<PaymentId>, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2287 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
2288 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
2290 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
2291 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
2292 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
2293 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
2294 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
2296 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
2297 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
2299 let mut total_value = 0;
2300 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2301 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2302 let payment_id = if let Some(id) = payment_id { id } else { PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()) };
2303 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
2304 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
2305 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
2306 continue 'path_check;
2308 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
2309 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
2310 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
2311 continue 'path_check;
2314 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2315 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
2317 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
2318 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
2320 if let Some(amt_msat) = recv_value_msat {
2321 debug_assert!(amt_msat >= total_value);
2322 total_value = amt_msat;
2325 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2326 let mut results = Vec::new();
2327 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2328 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &route.payee, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage));
2330 let mut has_ok = false;
2331 let mut has_err = false;
2332 let mut pending_amt_unsent = 0;
2333 let mut max_unsent_cltv_delta = 0;
2334 for (res, path) in results.iter().zip(route.paths.iter()) {
2335 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
2336 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
2337 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
2338 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
2342 } else if res.is_err() {
2343 pending_amt_unsent += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2344 max_unsent_cltv_delta = cmp::max(max_unsent_cltv_delta, path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta);
2347 if has_err && has_ok {
2348 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure {
2351 failed_paths_retry: if pending_amt_unsent != 0 {
2352 if let Some(payee) = &route.payee {
2353 Some(RouteParameters {
2354 payee: payee.clone(),
2355 final_value_msat: pending_amt_unsent,
2356 final_cltv_expiry_delta: max_unsent_cltv_delta,
2362 // If we failed to send any paths, we shouldn't have inserted the new PaymentId into
2363 // our `pending_outbound_payments` map at all.
2364 debug_assert!(self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().get(&payment_id).is_none());
2365 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
2371 /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2373 /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2374 /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2375 /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, if the payment
2376 /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success), or if
2377 /// further retries have been disabled with [`abandon_payment`].
2379 /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2380 /// [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]
2381 pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2382 const RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE: u64 = 10;
2383 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2384 if path.len() == 0 {
2385 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2386 err: "length-0 path in route".to_string()
2391 let (total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret) = {
2392 let outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2393 if let Some(payment) = outbounds.get(&payment_id) {
2395 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2396 total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret, pending_amt_msat, ..
2398 let retry_amt_msat: u64 = route.paths.iter().map(|path| path.last().unwrap().fee_msat).sum();
2399 if retry_amt_msat + *pending_amt_msat > *total_msat * (100 + RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE) / 100 {
2400 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2401 err: format!("retry_amt_msat of {} will put pending_amt_msat (currently: {}) more than 10% over total_payment_amt_msat of {}", retry_amt_msat, pending_amt_msat, total_msat).to_string()
2404 (*total_msat, *payment_hash, *payment_secret)
2406 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => {
2407 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2408 err: "Unable to retry payments that were initially sent on LDK versions prior to 0.0.102".to_string()
2411 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {
2412 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2413 err: "Payment already completed".to_owned()
2416 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {
2417 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2418 err: "Payment already abandoned (with some HTLCs still pending)".to_owned()
2423 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2424 err: format!("Payment with ID {} not found", log_bytes!(payment_id.0)),
2428 return self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, Some(payment_id), Some(total_msat)).map(|_| ())
2431 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur.
2433 /// After this method returns, any future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id`
2434 /// will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`]. If no such event has been generated,
2435 /// an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event will be generated as soon as there are no remaining
2436 /// pending HTLCs for this payment.
2438 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2439 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2440 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2442 /// [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment
2443 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2444 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2445 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2446 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2448 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2449 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
2450 if let Ok(()) = payment.get_mut().mark_abandoned() {
2451 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
2452 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2454 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
2462 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2463 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2464 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2465 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2466 /// never reach the recipient.
2468 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function.
2470 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2471 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2473 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2475 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2476 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2477 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
2479 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
2481 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
2482 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage), None, None) {
2483 Ok(payment_id) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2488 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2489 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2490 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>
2491 (&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2493 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2495 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2497 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2498 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2499 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2500 } else { unreachable!(); })
2503 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2505 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2506 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2509 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2510 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2515 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2516 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2517 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2520 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2521 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2522 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2524 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2532 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2533 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2534 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2538 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2540 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2541 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2543 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2544 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2546 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2547 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2548 /// keys per-channel).
2550 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2551 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2552 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2554 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2555 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2556 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2558 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2559 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2560 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2561 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2563 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2564 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2565 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2566 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2570 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2571 let mut output_index = None;
2572 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2573 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2574 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2575 if output_index.is_some() {
2576 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2577 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2580 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2581 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2582 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2585 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2588 if output_index.is_none() {
2589 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2590 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2593 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2597 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
2598 if !chan.should_announce() {
2599 log_trace!(self.logger, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2603 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2605 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
2607 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2608 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2610 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
2611 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
2612 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
2613 node_signature: our_node_sig,
2614 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
2619 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
2620 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
2621 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
2623 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::core::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
2626 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
2627 // smaller than 500:
2628 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
2630 /// Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given
2631 /// arguments, providing them in corresponding events via
2632 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed
2633 /// on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node
2634 /// announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and
2635 /// our network addresses.
2637 /// `rgb` is a node "color" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this
2638 /// node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
2640 /// `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node
2641 /// accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly
2642 /// tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy,
2643 /// addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses.
2645 /// Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 500).
2647 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
2648 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
2649 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2651 if addresses.len() > 500 {
2652 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
2655 // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that
2656 // addresses be sorted for future compatibility.
2657 addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id());
2659 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2660 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
2661 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
2662 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
2663 rgb, alias, addresses,
2664 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2665 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2667 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2668 let node_announce_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2670 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2671 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2673 let mut announced_chans = false;
2674 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2675 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2676 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2678 update_msg: match self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
2683 announced_chans = true;
2685 // If the channel is not public or has not yet reached funding_locked, check the
2686 // next channel. If we don't yet have any public channels, we'll skip the broadcast
2687 // below as peers may not accept it without channels on chain first.
2691 if announced_chans {
2692 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
2693 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
2694 signature: node_announce_sig,
2695 contents: announcement
2701 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
2703 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
2704 /// Will likely generate further events.
2705 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
2706 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2708 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2709 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
2710 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2712 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2713 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2715 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
2716 if short_chan_id != 0 {
2717 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
2718 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2720 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
2721 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2722 match forward_info {
2723 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info,
2724 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2725 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2726 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2727 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2728 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2729 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
2731 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
2732 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }
2735 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2736 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
2737 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
2738 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
2739 // problem, not ours.
2746 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
2747 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2748 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2749 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2750 match forward_info {
2751 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2752 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2754 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
2755 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2756 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
2757 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2758 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2759 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2760 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2761 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2763 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet, &self.logger) {
2765 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2766 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
2768 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
2770 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap();
2771 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
2772 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
2778 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2780 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2781 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
2782 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
2783 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
2784 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
2785 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
2786 // this channel currently :/.
2792 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
2793 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
2795 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
2796 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
2797 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
2799 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2800 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
2802 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
2804 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
2805 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
2806 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
2809 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2811 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2812 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
2813 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
2814 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
2815 // messages when we can.
2816 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
2817 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
2818 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
2825 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
2826 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
2829 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
2830 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
2831 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
2832 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
2833 ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
2834 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
2836 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2837 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
2838 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
2839 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2840 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2842 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
2843 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.get_user_id(), channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
2845 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
2847 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
2851 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2852 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
2855 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
2856 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2857 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2858 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2859 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2860 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
2861 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2862 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
2863 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2865 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
2873 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2874 match forward_info {
2875 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2876 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
2877 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2878 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload) = match routing {
2879 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
2880 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data)),
2881 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
2882 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage)),
2884 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
2887 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
2888 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
2889 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2890 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2891 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2892 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2894 value: amt_to_forward,
2899 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
2901 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
2902 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
2903 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
2905 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2906 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
2907 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2908 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
2909 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
2911 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
2916 macro_rules! check_total_value {
2917 ($payment_data_total_msat: expr, $payment_secret: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
2918 let mut total_value = 0;
2919 let mut payment_received_generated = false;
2920 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
2921 .or_insert(Vec::new());
2922 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
2923 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
2924 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2925 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2929 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
2930 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2931 total_value += htlc.value;
2932 match &htlc.onion_payload {
2933 OnionPayload::Invoice(htlc_payment_data) => {
2934 if htlc_payment_data.total_msat != $payment_data_total_msat {
2935 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
2936 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data_total_msat, htlc_payment_data.total_msat);
2937 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
2939 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
2941 _ => unreachable!(),
2944 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data_total_msat {
2945 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
2946 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data_total_msat);
2947 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2950 } else if total_value == $payment_data_total_msat {
2951 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
2953 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
2954 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
2955 payment_secret: $payment_secret,
2959 payment_received_generated = true;
2961 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
2962 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
2965 payment_received_generated
2969 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
2970 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
2971 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
2972 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
2973 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
2974 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
2975 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2976 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
2977 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2978 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
2979 OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => {
2980 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we didn't have a corresponding inbound payment.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2981 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2983 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
2984 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
2985 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2986 e.insert(vec![claimable_htlc]);
2987 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
2989 amt: amt_to_forward,
2990 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage),
2993 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2994 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2995 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3001 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3003 if let OnionPayload::Invoice(ref data) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3006 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3007 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3010 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3011 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3012 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3013 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3014 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3015 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3016 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3018 let payment_received_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data.total_msat, payment_data.payment_secret, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3019 if payment_received_generated {
3020 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3026 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3027 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3035 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3036 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
3039 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3040 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3043 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3044 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3045 events.append(&mut new_events);
3048 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3050 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3051 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3053 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3054 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3055 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3056 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3057 if background_events.is_empty() {
3061 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3063 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3064 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3065 // monitor updating completing.
3066 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
3073 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3074 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3075 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3076 self.process_background_events();
3079 fn update_channel_fee(&self, short_to_id: &mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
3080 if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
3081 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3082 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3083 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3084 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3085 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3087 if !chan.is_live() {
3088 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3089 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3090 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3092 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3093 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3095 let mut retain_channel = true;
3096 let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
3099 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
3100 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3104 let ret_err = match res {
3105 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
3106 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3107 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_id);
3108 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3111 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3112 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3113 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3114 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3115 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3116 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3117 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3118 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3128 (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
3132 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3133 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3134 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3135 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3136 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3137 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3138 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3140 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3142 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3144 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3145 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3146 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3147 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3148 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3149 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3150 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3152 handle_errors.push(err);
3162 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3164 /// This currently includes:
3165 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3166 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3167 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3170 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3171 /// estimate fetches.
3172 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3173 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3174 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3175 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3177 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3179 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3181 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3182 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3183 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3184 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3185 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3186 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
3187 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3188 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3190 handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
3192 if !retain_channel { return false; }
3194 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3195 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
3196 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
3197 if needs_close { return false; }
3200 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3201 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3202 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3203 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3204 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3205 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3206 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3207 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3211 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3212 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3214 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3215 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3216 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3220 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3221 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3230 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3231 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3237 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3238 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3239 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3240 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
3241 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
3242 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
3243 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3245 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3246 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3247 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3248 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3249 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3250 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3251 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3252 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3253 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3254 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
3255 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3261 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3262 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3263 // be surfaced to the user.
3264 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
3265 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3267 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
3268 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
3269 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3270 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3271 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&chan_entry.get()) {
3272 (0x1000|7, upd.encode_with_len())
3274 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3277 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3279 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3280 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
3281 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
3283 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, payee, .. } => {
3284 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3285 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3286 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3287 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3288 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) && !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3289 let retry = if let Some(payee_data) = payee {
3290 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3291 Some(RouteParameters {
3293 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3294 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3297 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3298 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3299 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3301 rejected_by_dest: false,
3302 network_update: None,
3303 all_paths_failed: payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0,
3305 short_channel_id: None,
3312 if payment.get().abandoned() && payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3313 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3315 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3321 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3328 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3329 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
3330 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
3331 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
3332 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
3333 /// still-available channels.
3334 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
3335 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3336 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3337 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3340 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3341 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3342 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3344 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, payment_id, ref payee, .. } => {
3345 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3346 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3347 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3348 let mut all_paths_failed = false;
3349 let mut full_failure_ev = None;
3350 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3351 if !payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
3352 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3355 if payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3356 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received failure of HTLC with payment_hash {} after payment completion", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3359 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3360 all_paths_failed = true;
3361 if payment.get().abandoned() {
3362 full_failure_ev = Some(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3364 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3370 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3373 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3374 let retry = if let Some(payee_data) = payee {
3375 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3376 Some(RouteParameters {
3377 payee: payee_data.clone(),
3378 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3379 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3382 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3384 let path_failure = match &onion_error {
3385 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3387 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3389 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3390 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
3391 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
3392 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
3393 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3394 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3395 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3396 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
3403 error_code: onion_error_code,
3405 error_data: onion_error_data
3408 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3414 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
3415 // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
3416 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
3417 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
3419 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
3420 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
3421 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3422 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3423 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3424 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
3425 network_update: None,
3428 short_channel_id: Some(path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id),
3431 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
3433 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
3437 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3438 pending_events.push(path_failure);
3439 if let Some(ev) = full_failure_ev { pending_events.push(ev); }
3441 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3442 let err_packet = match onion_error {
3443 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
3444 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
3445 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
3446 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
3448 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
3449 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3450 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
3454 let mut forward_event = None;
3455 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3456 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
3458 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
3459 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3460 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
3462 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3463 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
3466 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3467 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
3468 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3469 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3470 time_forwardable: time
3477 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentReceived`], generating any
3478 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
3480 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3481 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
3482 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3483 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3485 /// Returns whether any HTLCs were claimed, and thus if any new [`MessageSendEvent`]s are now
3486 /// pending for processing via [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`].
3488 /// [`Event::PaymentReceived`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentReceived
3489 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3490 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3491 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
3492 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
3493 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3495 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3497 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3498 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
3499 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3500 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3502 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
3503 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
3504 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
3505 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
3507 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3508 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3509 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3510 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3511 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3513 let mut valid_mpp = true;
3514 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3515 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3521 let mut errs = Vec::new();
3522 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
3523 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3525 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3526 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3527 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3528 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3529 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3530 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
3531 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3533 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
3534 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
3535 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
3536 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
3537 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
3538 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
3539 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
3540 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
3542 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
3543 ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
3544 // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
3545 // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
3546 // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
3547 // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
3549 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
3554 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
3555 // which were generated.
3556 channel_state.take();
3558 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
3559 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3560 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
3567 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
3568 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
3569 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
3570 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3571 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3573 return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed
3577 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3578 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
3579 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
3580 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
3581 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3582 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
3583 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3584 payment_preimage, e);
3585 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
3586 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3587 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
3588 Some(htlc_value_msat)
3591 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
3592 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
3593 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3594 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3595 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3596 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3597 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3598 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
3599 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3600 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3606 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
3608 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
3611 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
3612 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3613 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
3614 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
3615 payment_preimage, e);
3617 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3618 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
3620 chan.remove_entry();
3622 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
3625 } else { unreachable!(); }
3628 fn finalize_claims(&self, mut sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
3629 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3630 for source in sources.drain(..) {
3631 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } = source {
3632 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3633 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3634 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3635 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3636 assert!(payment.get().is_fulfilled());
3637 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, None) {
3638 pending_events.push(
3639 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
3641 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash(),
3646 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3654 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool) {
3656 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
3657 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3658 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3659 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3660 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3661 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3662 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3663 if !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3664 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3665 let fee_paid_msat = payment.get().get_pending_fee_msat();
3666 pending_events.push(
3667 events::Event::PaymentSent {
3668 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3674 payment.get_mut().mark_fulfilled();
3678 // We currently immediately remove HTLCs which were fulfilled on-chain.
3679 // This could potentially lead to removing a pending payment too early,
3680 // with a reorg of one block causing us to re-add the fulfilled payment on
3682 // TODO: We should have a second monitor event that informs us of payments
3683 // irrevocably fulfilled.
3684 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
3685 let payment_hash = Some(PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()));
3686 pending_events.push(
3687 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
3695 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3700 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
3703 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
3704 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
3705 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
3706 let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
3707 let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
3708 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
3709 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
3712 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
3713 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3714 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
3715 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
3716 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3719 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
3720 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
3721 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
3722 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
3723 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3724 payment_preimage, e);
3726 // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
3727 // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
3728 // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
3729 // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
3732 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3733 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
3734 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3735 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
3739 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
3740 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
3741 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
3744 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3745 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
3747 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
3755 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
3756 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
3757 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
3760 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
3761 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3763 let chan_restoration_res;
3764 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims) = {
3765 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3766 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3767 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
3768 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
3769 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
3771 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
3775 let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger);
3776 let channel_update = if updates.funding_locked.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() && !channel.get().should_announce() {
3777 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
3778 // funding_locked and the channel is in a usable state. Further, we rely on the
3779 // normal announcement_signatures process to send a channel_update for public
3780 // channels, only generating a unicast channel_update if this is a private channel.
3781 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3782 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3783 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()).unwrap(),
3786 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, None, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.funding_locked);
3787 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
3788 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
3790 (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs)
3792 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
3793 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
3794 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
3795 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
3799 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3800 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
3801 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
3804 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
3805 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
3808 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3809 &their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger)
3810 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
3811 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3812 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3813 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
3814 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
3815 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3816 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
3817 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3818 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
3820 entry.insert(channel);
3826 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3827 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
3828 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3829 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3830 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
3831 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3832 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3833 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
3835 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, &their_features), channel_state, chan);
3836 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
3838 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
3841 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3842 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
3843 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
3844 channel_value_satoshis: value,
3846 user_channel_id: user_id,
3851 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3852 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
3853 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3854 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3855 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3856 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
3857 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3858 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3859 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
3861 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
3863 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
3866 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
3867 // lock before watch_channel
3868 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
3870 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
3871 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
3872 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
3873 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
3874 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
3875 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
3876 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
3877 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
3878 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
3879 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
3880 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
3882 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
3883 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
3884 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
3885 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
3886 // until we have persisted our monitor.
3887 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3891 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3892 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3893 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
3894 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3895 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
3897 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3898 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
3899 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3908 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3910 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3911 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3912 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3913 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3914 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3915 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3916 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3918 let (monitor, funding_tx) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
3919 Ok(update) => update,
3920 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
3922 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
3923 let mut res = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
3924 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
3925 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
3926 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
3927 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
3928 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
3929 shutdown_finish.0.take();
3936 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3939 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
3940 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
3944 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3945 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3946 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3947 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3948 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3949 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3950 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3952 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3953 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
3954 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3955 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
3956 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
3957 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
3958 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
3959 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
3960 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
3961 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
3962 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
3963 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
3964 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
3965 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3966 msg: announcement_sigs,
3968 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
3969 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3970 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3971 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
3976 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3980 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3981 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
3982 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
3983 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3984 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3986 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
3987 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
3988 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3989 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3992 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
3993 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
3994 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
3995 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
3998 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
3999 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4001 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4002 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
4003 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4004 let (result, is_permanent) =
4005 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
4007 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
4013 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4014 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4015 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4022 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4025 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4026 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4029 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
4033 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4034 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4035 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4036 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4037 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4038 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4039 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4040 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4042 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
4043 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4044 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4045 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4050 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4051 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4052 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4053 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4054 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4055 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
4056 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4058 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
4059 } else { (tx, None) }
4061 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4064 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4065 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4066 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4068 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4069 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4070 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4071 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4075 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4080 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4081 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4082 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4083 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4085 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4086 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4087 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4088 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4090 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4091 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4093 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4094 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4095 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4096 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4099 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4100 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4101 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4102 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4103 match pending_forward_info {
4104 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4105 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4106 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
4107 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{
4108 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
4109 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
4110 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
4111 res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]);
4115 // The only case where we'd be unable to
4116 // successfully get a channel update is if the
4117 // channel isn't in the fully-funded state yet,
4118 // implying our counterparty is trying to route
4119 // payments over the channel back to themselves
4120 // (because no one else should know the short_id
4121 // is a lightning channel yet). We should have
4122 // no problem just calling this
4123 // unknown_next_peer (0x4000|10).
4124 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
4127 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[])
4129 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4130 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4131 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4134 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4136 _ => pending_forward_info
4139 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4141 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4146 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4147 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4148 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4149 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4150 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4151 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4152 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4153 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4155 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
4157 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4160 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false);
4164 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4165 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4166 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4167 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4168 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4169 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4170 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4172 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
4174 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4179 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4180 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4181 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4182 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4183 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4184 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4185 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4187 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4188 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4189 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
4191 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
4194 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4198 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4199 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4200 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4201 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4202 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4203 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4204 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4206 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
4207 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
4208 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4209 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
4210 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
4211 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
4212 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
4217 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4218 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
4220 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4221 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4222 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4224 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
4225 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4226 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4227 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4228 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4229 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4230 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4231 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4233 commitment_signed: msg,
4239 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4244 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4245 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4246 let mut forward_event = None;
4247 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4248 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4249 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4250 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
4252 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4253 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
4254 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4255 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4256 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4258 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4259 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4260 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
4262 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4263 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4264 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
4269 match forward_event {
4271 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4272 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4273 time_forwardable: time
4281 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4282 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
4284 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4285 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4286 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4287 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4288 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4289 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4291 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
4292 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
4293 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4294 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
4295 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update) {
4296 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
4297 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
4298 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
4299 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4300 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
4301 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
4303 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan,
4304 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
4305 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(),
4306 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4307 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
4309 } else { unreachable!(); }
4312 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
4313 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4314 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4318 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4319 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
4320 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
4321 .expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"),
4322 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
4324 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4327 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
4329 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
4330 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) =>
4332 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4333 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
4335 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
4336 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
4343 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4344 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4345 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4346 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4347 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4348 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4349 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4351 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
4353 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4358 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4359 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4360 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4362 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4363 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4364 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4365 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4367 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
4368 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
4371 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
4372 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), msg), channel_state, chan),
4373 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
4374 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
4375 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4378 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4383 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
4384 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4385 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4386 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4387 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
4388 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
4390 // It's not a local channel
4391 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
4394 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4395 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4396 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4397 if chan.get().should_announce() {
4398 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
4399 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
4400 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
4401 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4403 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
4405 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
4406 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
4407 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
4408 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4410 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
4413 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
4415 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
4418 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4419 let chan_restoration_res;
4420 let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround) = {
4421 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4422 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4424 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4425 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4426 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4427 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4429 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
4430 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
4431 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
4432 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
4433 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, order, htlcs_failed_forward, shutdown) =
4434 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4435 let mut channel_update = None;
4436 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4437 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4438 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4441 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4442 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
4443 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
4444 // they have the latest channel parameters.
4445 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4446 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4447 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4450 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
4451 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order, monitor_update_opt, Vec::new(), None, funding_locked);
4452 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4453 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4455 (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround)
4457 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4460 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
4461 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id);
4463 if let Some(funding_locked_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
4464 self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, &funding_locked_msg)?;
4469 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
4470 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
4471 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4472 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
4473 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
4474 for monitor_event in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
4475 match monitor_event {
4476 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
4477 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
4478 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
4479 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.onchain_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true);
4481 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
4482 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4485 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
4486 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
4487 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4488 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4489 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4490 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4491 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4492 if let Some(mut chan) = by_id.remove(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
4493 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4494 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4496 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
4497 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4498 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4502 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
4503 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
4505 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
4507 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
4508 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4509 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4510 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4511 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
4516 MonitorEvent::UpdateCompleted { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
4517 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
4522 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4523 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4526 has_pending_monitor_events
4529 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
4530 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
4531 /// update events as a separate process method here.
4532 #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
4533 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
4534 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
4537 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
4538 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
4539 /// update was applied.
4541 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
4542 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
4543 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
4544 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
4545 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
4546 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
4547 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4548 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
4550 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4551 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4552 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4553 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4554 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4556 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4557 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
4558 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
4559 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
4560 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id));
4562 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
4563 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4564 has_monitor_update = true;
4565 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), channel_id);
4566 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
4567 if close_channel { return false; }
4569 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4570 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4571 updates: commitment_update,
4578 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
4579 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
4580 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
4587 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
4588 for (failures, channel_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
4589 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id);
4592 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4593 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4599 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
4600 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
4601 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
4602 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
4603 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
4604 let mut has_update = false;
4606 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4607 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4608 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4609 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4610 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4612 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4613 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
4614 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
4615 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
4617 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4618 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
4621 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
4622 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
4623 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
4624 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4625 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4628 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4629 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4634 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4636 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
4637 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4643 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
4644 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
4651 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4652 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4658 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
4659 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
4661 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
4662 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4663 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
4664 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
4665 // reorganized out of the main chain.
4666 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
4667 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
4668 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
4669 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
4670 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
4671 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
4672 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
4673 assert!(should_broadcast);
4674 } else { unreachable!(); }
4675 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
4677 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4681 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
4682 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
4684 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
4686 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4687 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4688 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4689 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4690 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
4691 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
4692 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
4693 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
4694 // its updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
4695 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
4696 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
4697 // never fail a payment too early.
4698 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
4700 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
4703 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
4708 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
4711 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
4712 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you, returning the first and storing the second.
4714 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
4715 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
4716 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
4718 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
4720 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
4721 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
4722 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
4723 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4724 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> (PaymentHash, PaymentSecret) {
4725 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
4726 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4729 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
4730 .expect("RNG Generated Duplicate PaymentHash"))
4733 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
4734 /// stored external to LDK.
4736 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
4737 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
4738 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
4740 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) must be globally unique. This
4741 /// method may return an Err if another payment with the same payment_hash is still pending.
4743 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
4744 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
4745 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
4746 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
4748 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
4749 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
4750 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
4751 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
4752 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
4754 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
4755 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
4756 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
4757 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
4758 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
4760 /// Pending inbound payments are stored in memory and in serialized versions of this
4761 /// [`ChannelManager`]. If potentially unbounded numbers of inbound payments may exist and
4762 /// space is limited, you may wish to rate-limit inbound payment creation.
4764 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
4766 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
4767 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
4769 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4770 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
4771 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
4772 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
4775 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))]
4776 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
4777 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
4778 let event_handler = |event: &events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event.clone());
4779 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
4784 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
4785 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().is_empty()
4789 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
4790 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().clear()
4794 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4795 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4796 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4797 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4798 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4801 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
4802 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
4803 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4804 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4806 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
4807 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
4808 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
4809 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4812 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
4813 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4815 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
4816 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4819 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
4820 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4821 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
4823 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
4824 events.replace(pending_events);
4833 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4835 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4836 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4837 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4838 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4841 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
4843 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
4844 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
4846 /// Pending events are persisted as part of [`ChannelManager`]. While these events are cleared
4847 /// when processed, an [`EventHandler`] must be able to handle previously seen events when
4848 /// restarting from an old state.
4849 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
4850 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4851 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4853 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
4854 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
4855 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
4856 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4859 let mut pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
4860 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
4861 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4864 for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
4865 handler.handle_event(&event);
4873 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4875 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4876 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4877 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4878 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4881 fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
4883 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4884 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), block.header.prev_blockhash,
4885 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
4886 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
4887 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
4890 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
4891 self.transactions_confirmed(&block.header, &txdata, height);
4892 self.best_block_updated(&block.header, height);
4895 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
4896 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4897 let new_height = height - 1;
4899 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
4900 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
4901 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
4902 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
4903 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
4904 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
4907 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, &self.logger));
4911 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4913 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4914 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4915 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4916 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4919 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
4920 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4921 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4922 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4924 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
4925 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
4927 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4928 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, &self.logger).map(|a| (a, Vec::new())));
4931 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
4932 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4933 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4934 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4936 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
4937 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
4939 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4941 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
4943 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, &self.logger));
4945 macro_rules! max_time {
4946 ($timestamp: expr) => {
4948 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
4949 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
4950 // having an explicit local time source.
4951 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
4952 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
4953 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
4954 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
4955 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
4961 max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
4962 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
4963 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4964 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
4965 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
4968 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4969 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4970 outbounds.retain(|payment_id, payment| {
4971 if payment.remaining_parts() != 0 { return true }
4972 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { starting_block_height, payment_hash, .. } = payment {
4973 if *starting_block_height + PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS <= height {
4974 log_info!(self.logger, "Timing out payment with id {} and hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_id.0), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4975 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
4976 payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash,
4984 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
4985 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4986 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_id.len());
4987 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
4988 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
4989 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
4995 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
4996 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4997 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
4998 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
4999 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
5000 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|_| (None, Vec::new()))
5001 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
5002 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
5007 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5009 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5010 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5011 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5012 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5015 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
5016 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
5018 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ClosureReason>>
5019 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
5020 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5021 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5022 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5024 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5025 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5027 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5028 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5029 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5030 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5031 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
5032 let res = f(channel);
5033 if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res {
5034 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
5035 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
5036 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5037 failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
5041 if let Some(funding_locked) = chan_res {
5042 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
5043 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5044 msg: funding_locked,
5046 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
5047 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5048 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5049 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5050 msg: announcement_sigs,
5052 } else if channel.is_usable() {
5053 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures but with private channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5054 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5055 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5056 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel).unwrap(),
5059 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5061 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
5063 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
5064 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5065 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
5067 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
5068 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
5069 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
5070 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
5071 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5075 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
5076 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
5077 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5078 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5079 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
5080 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
5081 data: reason_message,
5089 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5090 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, htlcs| {
5091 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
5092 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
5093 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
5094 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
5095 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
5096 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
5097 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
5098 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
5099 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5100 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
5101 data: htlc_msat_height_data
5106 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
5111 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
5113 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
5114 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
5118 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
5119 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
5120 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5123 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
5124 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
5125 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5126 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
5129 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
5130 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5132 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
5133 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
5136 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5137 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
5138 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
5139 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
5140 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5144 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
5145 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
5146 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
5147 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
5151 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
5152 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5153 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5154 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5155 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5156 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5159 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
5160 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5161 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5164 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
5165 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5166 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5169 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
5170 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5171 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5174 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
5175 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5176 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5179 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
5180 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5181 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5184 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
5185 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5186 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5189 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
5190 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5191 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5194 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
5195 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5196 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5199 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
5200 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5201 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5204 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
5205 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5206 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5209 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
5210 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5211 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5214 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
5215 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5216 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5219 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
5220 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5221 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5224 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
5225 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5226 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5229 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
5230 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5231 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5234 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
5235 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5236 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
5239 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
5244 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
5245 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5246 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5249 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
5250 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5251 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5252 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
5254 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5255 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5256 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5257 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5258 if no_connection_possible {
5259 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5260 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5261 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5262 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
5263 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
5265 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
5266 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5267 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5271 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5278 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5279 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5280 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5281 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
5282 if chan.is_shutdown() {
5283 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
5284 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
5286 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5289 no_channels_remain = false;
5295 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
5297 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5298 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5299 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5300 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5301 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5302 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5303 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5304 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5305 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5306 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5307 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5308 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5309 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5310 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
5311 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5312 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5313 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
5314 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
5315 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
5319 if no_channels_remain {
5320 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
5323 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5324 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5328 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
5329 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5331 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5334 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5335 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
5336 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5337 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
5338 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
5341 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
5342 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
5347 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5348 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5349 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5350 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5351 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5352 if !chan.have_received_message() {
5353 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
5354 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
5355 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
5359 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
5360 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5361 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
5367 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
5370 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
5371 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5373 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
5374 for chan in self.list_channels() {
5375 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
5376 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
5377 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
5381 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
5382 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
5387 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
5388 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
5389 struct PersistenceNotifier {
5390 /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
5391 /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
5392 persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
5395 impl PersistenceNotifier {
5398 persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
5404 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
5405 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5410 guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
5411 let result = *guard;
5419 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
5420 fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5421 let current_time = Instant::now();
5423 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
5424 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5429 guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
5430 // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
5431 // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
5432 // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
5433 // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
5435 let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
5436 let result = *guard;
5437 if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
5441 match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
5442 None => return result,
5448 // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
5450 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
5451 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5452 *persistence_lock = true;
5453 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
5458 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
5459 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
5461 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
5463 (0, onion_packet, required),
5464 (2, short_channel_id, required),
5467 (0, payment_data, required),
5468 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
5470 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
5471 (0, payment_preimage, required),
5472 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
5476 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
5477 (0, routing, required),
5478 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
5479 (4, payment_hash, required),
5480 (6, amt_to_forward, required),
5481 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required)
5485 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
5486 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5488 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
5490 channel_id.write(writer)?;
5491 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5492 reason.write(writer)?;
5494 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
5495 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
5498 channel_id.write(writer)?;
5499 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5500 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
5501 failure_code.write(writer)?;
5508 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
5509 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5510 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5513 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5514 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5515 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5516 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
5520 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
5521 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5522 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5523 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
5524 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
5527 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
5528 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
5529 // messages contained in the variants.
5530 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
5531 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
5532 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
5534 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
5535 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
5536 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
5537 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
5538 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
5541 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
5542 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
5543 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
5544 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
5545 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
5547 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
5552 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
5557 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
5558 (0, short_channel_id, required),
5559 (2, outpoint, required),
5560 (4, htlc_id, required),
5561 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
5564 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
5565 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5566 let payment_data = match &self.onion_payload {
5567 OnionPayload::Invoice(data) => Some(data.clone()),
5570 let keysend_preimage = match self.onion_payload {
5571 OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => None,
5572 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => Some(preimage.clone()),
5577 (0, self.prev_hop, required), (2, self.value, required),
5578 (4, payment_data, option), (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
5579 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
5585 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
5586 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5587 let mut prev_hop = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
5589 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
5590 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
5591 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
5595 (0, prev_hop, required), (2, value, required),
5596 (4, payment_data, option), (6, cltv_expiry, required),
5597 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
5599 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
5601 if payment_data.is_some() {
5602 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
5604 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
5607 if payment_data.is_none() {
5608 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
5610 OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data.unwrap())
5614 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
5622 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
5623 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5624 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5627 let mut session_priv: ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
5628 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
5629 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
5630 let mut payment_id = None;
5631 let mut payment_secret = None;
5632 let mut payee = None;
5633 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
5634 (0, session_priv, required),
5635 (1, payment_id, option),
5636 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
5637 (3, payment_secret, option),
5638 (4, path, vec_type),
5641 if payment_id.is_none() {
5642 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
5644 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
5646 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
5647 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
5648 first_hop_htlc_msat: first_hop_htlc_msat,
5649 path: path.unwrap(),
5650 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
5655 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
5656 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
5661 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
5662 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::io::Error> {
5664 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payee } => {
5666 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
5667 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
5668 (0, session_priv, required),
5669 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
5670 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
5671 (3, payment_secret, option),
5672 (4, path, vec_type),
5676 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
5678 field.write(writer)?;
5685 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
5686 (0, LightningError) => {
5690 (0, failure_code, required),
5691 (2, data, vec_type),
5695 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
5697 (0, forward_info, required),
5698 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
5699 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
5700 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
5703 (0, htlc_id, required),
5704 (2, err_packet, required),
5708 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
5709 (0, payment_secret, required),
5710 (2, expiry_time, required),
5711 (4, user_payment_id, required),
5712 (6, payment_preimage, required),
5713 (8, min_value_msat, required),
5716 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(PendingOutboundPayment,
5718 (0, session_privs, required),
5721 (0, session_privs, required),
5722 (1, payment_hash, option),
5725 (0, session_privs, required),
5726 (1, pending_fee_msat, option),
5727 (2, payment_hash, required),
5728 (4, payment_secret, option),
5729 (6, total_msat, required),
5730 (8, pending_amt_msat, required),
5731 (10, starting_block_height, required),
5734 (0, session_privs, required),
5735 (2, payment_hash, required),
5739 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5740 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5741 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5742 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5743 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5746 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5747 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
5749 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
5751 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
5753 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5754 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
5755 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
5758 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5759 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
5760 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
5761 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
5762 unfunded_channels += 1;
5765 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
5766 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
5767 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
5768 channel.write(writer)?;
5772 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5773 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
5774 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
5775 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5776 for forward in pending_forwards {
5777 forward.write(writer)?;
5781 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5782 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
5783 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
5784 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5785 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
5786 htlc.write(writer)?;
5790 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5791 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5792 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5793 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
5794 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5795 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
5798 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5799 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5800 for event in events.iter() {
5801 event.write(writer)?;
5804 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
5805 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5806 for event in background_events.iter() {
5808 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
5810 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
5811 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
5816 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
5817 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
5819 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5820 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5821 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
5822 hash.write(writer)?;
5823 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
5826 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5827 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
5828 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
5829 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
5830 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
5831 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
5834 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
5835 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
5837 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
5838 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
5839 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
5840 session_priv.write(writer)?;
5843 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
5844 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
5848 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
5849 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
5850 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
5852 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
5853 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
5854 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
5859 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
5860 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
5861 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
5868 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
5870 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
5872 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
5873 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
5874 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
5875 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
5876 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
5877 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
5878 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
5879 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
5880 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
5881 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
5882 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
5883 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
5884 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
5886 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
5887 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
5889 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
5890 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
5892 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
5893 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
5894 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
5895 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
5896 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
5897 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
5899 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
5900 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5901 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5902 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5903 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5904 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5907 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
5908 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
5910 pub keys_manager: K,
5912 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
5914 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
5915 pub fee_estimator: F,
5916 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
5918 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
5919 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
5920 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
5921 pub chain_monitor: M,
5923 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
5924 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
5925 /// force-closed during deserialization.
5926 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
5927 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
5928 /// deserialization.
5930 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
5931 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
5932 pub default_config: UserConfig,
5934 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
5935 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
5937 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
5938 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
5939 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
5940 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
5942 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
5945 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
5946 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
5949 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5950 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5951 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5952 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5953 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5954 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5957 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
5958 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
5959 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
5960 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
5961 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
5963 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
5964 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
5969 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
5970 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
5971 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5972 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
5973 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5974 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5975 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5976 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5979 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5980 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
5981 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
5985 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5986 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
5987 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5988 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5989 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5990 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5993 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5994 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
5996 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5997 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5998 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6000 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
6002 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6003 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6004 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6005 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6006 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
6007 for _ in 0..channel_count {
6008 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (&args.keys_manager, best_block_height))?;
6009 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
6010 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
6011 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
6012 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6013 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6014 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6015 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6016 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
6017 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
6018 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6019 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6020 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6021 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6022 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6023 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
6024 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6025 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6026 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6027 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6028 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6029 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
6030 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
6031 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
6032 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6033 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6034 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
6035 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
6036 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6037 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
6038 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6039 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
6040 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
6043 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6044 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6045 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
6047 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
6050 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6051 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6052 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6053 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6054 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
6055 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6059 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
6060 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
6061 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
6062 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6066 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
6067 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6068 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6069 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
6070 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6071 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6072 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
6073 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
6074 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
6076 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
6079 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6080 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6081 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
6082 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6083 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6084 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
6085 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
6086 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
6088 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
6091 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6092 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
6093 for _ in 0..peer_count {
6094 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6095 let peer_state = PeerState {
6096 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
6098 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
6101 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6102 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
6103 for _ in 0..event_count {
6104 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
6105 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
6109 if forward_htlcs_count > 0 {
6110 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
6111 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
6112 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
6113 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
6114 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
6115 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6116 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
6120 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6121 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
6122 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
6123 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6124 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
6125 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6129 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6130 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6132 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6133 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
6134 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
6135 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
6136 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6140 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6141 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
6142 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
6143 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
6144 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
6145 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
6146 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
6148 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
6149 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6153 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
6154 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
6155 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
6156 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6157 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
6158 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
6160 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
6161 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
6162 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
6163 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
6164 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
6165 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
6167 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
6169 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
6170 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
6171 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
6172 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
6173 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
6174 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
6175 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
6177 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors {
6178 if by_id.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
6179 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
6180 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
6181 if path.is_empty() {
6182 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
6183 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6185 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
6186 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
6187 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
6188 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
6189 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6190 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
6191 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
6192 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
6194 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6195 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
6196 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
6197 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
6198 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
6200 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
6201 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
6202 total_msat: path_amt,
6203 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
6205 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
6206 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
6215 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6216 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
6218 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
6219 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
6222 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
6224 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
6225 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
6226 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
6228 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
6230 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
6235 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6237 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
6238 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
6240 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
6241 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &args.keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
6244 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
6245 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
6247 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
6249 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
6250 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
6251 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
6252 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
6254 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
6255 logger: args.logger,
6256 default_configuration: args.default_config,
6259 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
6260 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
6263 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
6264 //connection or two.
6266 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
6272 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6273 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6274 use core::time::Duration;
6275 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
6276 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
6277 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
6278 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
6280 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
6281 use routing::router::{Payee, RouteParameters, find_route};
6282 use util::errors::APIError;
6283 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
6284 use util::test_utils;
6286 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
6288 fn test_wait_timeout() {
6289 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
6291 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
6294 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
6295 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
6297 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
6298 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
6299 thread::spawn(move || {
6301 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
6302 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6303 *persistence_lock = true;
6306 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
6312 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
6313 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
6315 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
6318 if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
6323 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
6325 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
6328 if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
6335 fn test_notify_limits() {
6336 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
6337 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
6338 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6339 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6340 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6341 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6343 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
6344 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
6345 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6346 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6347 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6349 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6351 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
6352 // to connect messages with new values
6353 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
6354 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
6355 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
6356 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
6358 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
6359 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6360 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6361 // ... but the last node should not.
6362 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6363 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
6364 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6365 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6367 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
6368 // about the channel.
6369 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6370 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6371 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6373 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
6375 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6376 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6377 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6378 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6379 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6380 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6382 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
6383 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6384 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6386 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
6387 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
6388 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
6389 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
6390 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
6391 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
6393 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
6394 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
6395 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
6396 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
6397 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6398 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6399 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6400 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6402 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
6403 // the channel info has updated.
6404 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
6405 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
6406 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6407 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6408 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6409 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6413 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
6414 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
6416 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6417 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6418 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6419 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6420 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6422 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
6423 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
6424 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
6425 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
6426 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
6427 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
6428 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payee, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
6429 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6430 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6431 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6432 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
6434 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
6435 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
6436 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6437 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6438 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6439 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
6440 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
6441 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6442 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6443 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6444 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6445 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6446 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6447 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6448 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6449 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6450 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6451 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6452 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6453 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6454 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
6455 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
6457 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
6458 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payee, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
6459 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6460 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6461 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6462 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
6464 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
6465 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
6466 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
6467 // lightning messages manually.
6468 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
6469 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6470 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6471 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6472 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
6473 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6474 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6475 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
6476 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6477 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6478 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
6479 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6480 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6481 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6482 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
6483 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6484 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6485 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
6486 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6487 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6488 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
6489 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6490 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
6491 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6492 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6493 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
6494 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6496 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
6497 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
6498 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6499 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
6501 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
6502 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
6503 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
6504 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
6506 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6509 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
6510 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
6511 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
6512 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
6514 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6517 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
6518 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
6519 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
6520 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
6522 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6527 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
6528 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
6529 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
6530 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
6531 // fails as expected.
6532 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6533 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6534 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6535 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6536 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6537 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
6539 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
6540 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
6541 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
6543 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
6544 let params = RouteParameters {
6545 payee: Payee::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id()),
6546 final_value_msat: 100_000,
6547 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
6549 let route = find_route(
6550 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), ¶ms, nodes[0].network_graph, None,
6551 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
6553 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
6554 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6555 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6556 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6557 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
6558 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
6559 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6560 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6561 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6562 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6563 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6564 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6565 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6566 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6567 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6568 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6569 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6570 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6571 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6572 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
6573 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
6575 // Finally, claim the original payment.
6576 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
6578 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
6579 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
6580 let route = find_route(
6581 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), ¶ms, nodes[0].network_graph, None,
6582 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
6584 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
6585 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6586 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6587 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6588 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
6589 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
6590 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
6592 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
6593 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
6594 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
6595 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6596 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6597 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6598 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
6599 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
6600 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6601 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6602 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6603 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6604 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6605 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6606 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6607 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6608 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6609 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6610 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6611 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6612 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6613 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
6614 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
6616 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
6617 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
6621 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
6622 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
6623 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
6624 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6625 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6626 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6627 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6629 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
6630 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
6631 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6632 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6634 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6635 let params = RouteParameters {
6636 payee: Payee::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
6637 final_value_msat: 10000,
6638 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
6640 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
6641 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
6642 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
6643 let route = find_route(
6644 &payer_pubkey, ¶ms, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
6645 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
6648 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
6649 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
6650 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
6651 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6653 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6654 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
6655 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6656 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6657 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6658 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6659 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6661 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
6665 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
6666 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
6667 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6668 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6669 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6670 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6672 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
6673 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
6674 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6675 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6677 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6678 let params = RouteParameters {
6679 payee: Payee::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
6680 final_value_msat: 10000,
6681 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
6683 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
6684 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
6685 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
6686 let route = find_route(
6687 &payer_pubkey, ¶ms, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
6688 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
6691 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
6692 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
6693 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
6694 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
6695 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6697 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6698 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
6699 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6700 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6701 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6702 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6703 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6705 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
6709 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
6710 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
6711 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
6712 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
6713 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6715 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
6716 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
6717 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
6718 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
6720 // Marshall an MPP route.
6721 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
6722 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
6723 route.paths.push(path);
6724 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
6725 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
6726 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
6727 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
6728 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
6729 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
6731 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None).unwrap_err() {
6732 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
6733 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
6734 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
6739 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "unstable"))]
6742 use chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
6743 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
6744 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
6745 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
6746 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
6747 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
6748 use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
6749 use routing::router::{Payee, get_route};
6750 use routing::scoring::Scorer;
6751 use util::test_utils;
6752 use util::config::UserConfig;
6753 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
6755 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6756 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6757 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
6759 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
6763 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
6764 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
6765 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
6766 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
6767 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
6768 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
6769 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
6774 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
6775 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
6778 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
6779 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
6780 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
6782 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
6783 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
6785 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
6786 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
6788 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
6789 config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
6791 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
6792 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
6793 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
6794 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
6795 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
6797 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
6799 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
6801 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
6802 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
6803 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
6804 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
6805 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
6807 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
6809 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
6811 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6812 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6813 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
6814 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
6815 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6818 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
6819 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
6820 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
6822 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
6823 } else { panic!(); }
6825 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
6826 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6828 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
6831 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
6834 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
6835 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
6837 node_a.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6838 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6839 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
6840 match msg_events[0] {
6841 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref msg, .. } => {
6842 node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
6843 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
6847 match msg_events[1] {
6848 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
6852 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
6854 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
6855 macro_rules! send_payment {
6856 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
6857 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
6858 let payee = Payee::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id())
6859 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
6860 let scorer = Scorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
6861 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payee, &dummy_graph,
6862 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer).unwrap();
6864 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
6865 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
6867 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
6868 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
6870 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
6871 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
6872 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6873 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
6874 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
6875 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6876 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
6877 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
6879 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
6880 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
6881 assert!($node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
6883 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
6884 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
6885 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
6886 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6887 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6889 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
6892 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
6893 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6894 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
6895 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6897 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
6902 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
6903 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);