1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
39 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
40 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
41 // construct one themselves.
42 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
43 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
44 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
45 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
46 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
47 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
48 use crate::routing::router::{DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, RoutePath, Router};
49 use crate::routing::scoring::ProbabilisticScorer;
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
55 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment};
57 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
58 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, ChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
59 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
60 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
61 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
62 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
63 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
64 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
65 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
67 use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
70 use crate::prelude::*;
72 use core::cell::RefCell;
74 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
75 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
76 use core::time::Duration;
79 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
80 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure};
82 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
84 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
85 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
86 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
88 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
89 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
90 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
91 // before we forward it.
93 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
94 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
95 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
96 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
97 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
99 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
100 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
102 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
103 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
104 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
105 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
108 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
109 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
110 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
113 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
114 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
118 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
119 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
120 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
121 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
122 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
124 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
125 /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
126 /// may overshoot this in either case)
127 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
128 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
131 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
132 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
133 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
134 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
137 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
138 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
139 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
140 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
141 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
144 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
145 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
147 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
148 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
149 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
152 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
153 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
155 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
156 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
159 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
160 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
163 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
167 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
168 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
169 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
170 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
171 short_channel_id: u64,
173 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
174 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
176 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
177 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
182 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
184 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
185 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
186 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
188 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
189 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
192 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
193 struct ClaimableHTLC {
194 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
196 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
198 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
199 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
200 sender_intended_value: u64,
201 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
203 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
204 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
205 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
206 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
210 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
212 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
213 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
214 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
216 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
217 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
222 impl Readable for PaymentId {
223 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
224 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
229 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
231 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
232 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
233 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
235 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
236 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
241 impl Readable for InterceptId {
242 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
243 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
248 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
249 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
250 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
251 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
252 OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
255 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
257 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
258 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
259 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
261 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
262 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
266 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
267 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
268 (0, short_channel_id, required),
269 (2, htlc_id, required),
271 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
272 (0, session_priv, required),
277 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
278 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
279 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
280 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
281 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
284 session_priv: SecretKey,
285 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
286 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
287 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
288 payment_id: PaymentId,
289 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
292 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
293 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
294 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
296 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
298 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
300 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
303 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
304 payment_id.hash(hasher);
305 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
306 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
311 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
314 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
315 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
317 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
318 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
319 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
320 payment_secret: None,
325 struct ReceiveError {
331 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
332 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
334 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
335 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
336 pub enum FailureCode {
337 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
338 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
339 TemporaryNodeFailure = 0x2000 | 2,
340 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
341 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
342 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing = 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
343 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
344 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
345 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
346 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
347 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails = 0x4000 | 15,
350 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>);
352 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
353 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
354 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
355 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
356 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
358 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
359 err: msgs::LightningError,
360 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
361 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
363 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
365 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
367 err: LightningError {
369 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
370 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
377 shutdown_finish: None,
381 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
382 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
385 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
387 err: LightningError {
389 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
390 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
396 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
397 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
401 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
404 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
406 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
407 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
411 log_level: Level::Warn,
414 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
416 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
418 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
420 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
421 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
429 shutdown_finish: None,
434 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
435 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
436 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
437 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
438 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
440 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
441 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
442 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
443 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
444 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
445 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
446 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
448 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
452 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
453 struct ClaimingPayment {
455 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
456 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
458 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
459 (0, amount_msat, required),
460 (2, payment_purpose, required),
461 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
464 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
465 struct ClaimablePayments {
466 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
467 /// failed/claimed by the user.
469 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
470 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
472 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
473 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
474 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, (events::PaymentPurpose, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>)>,
476 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
477 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
478 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
479 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
482 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
483 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
484 /// quite some time lag.
485 enum BackgroundEvent {
486 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
487 /// commitment transaction.
488 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
492 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
493 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
494 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
495 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
496 /// event can be generated.
497 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
498 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user.
499 EmitEvent { event: events::Event },
502 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
503 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
504 (2, EmitEvent) => { (0, event, upgradable_required) },
507 /// State we hold per-peer.
508 pub(super) struct PeerState<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
509 /// `temporary_channel_id` or `channel_id` -> `channel`.
511 /// Holds all channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once a channel has been assigned a
512 /// `channel_id`, the `temporary_channel_id` key in the map is updated and is replaced by the
514 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
515 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
516 latest_features: InitFeatures,
517 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
518 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
519 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
520 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
521 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
523 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
524 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
525 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
526 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
528 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
529 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
530 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
531 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
532 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
533 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
534 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
535 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
536 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
537 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
541 impl <Signer: ChannelSigner> PeerState<Signer> {
542 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
543 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
544 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
545 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
546 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
549 self.channel_by_id.is_empty() && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
553 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
554 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
556 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
559 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
560 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
561 struct PendingInboundPayment {
562 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
563 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
564 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
565 /// this payment being removed.
567 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
568 user_payment_id: u64,
569 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
570 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
571 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
574 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
575 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
576 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
577 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
578 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
579 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
580 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
581 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
583 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
584 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
592 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
594 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>
599 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
600 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
601 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
602 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
603 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
604 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
605 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
606 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
607 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
609 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
610 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e DefaultRouter<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L, &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>>, &'g L>;
612 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
613 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
615 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
616 /// to individual Channels.
618 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
619 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
620 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
621 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
623 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
624 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
625 /// returning from [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`], with ChannelManagers, writing updates
626 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during
627 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
628 /// [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the
629 /// `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
631 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
632 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
633 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
635 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
636 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
637 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
638 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
639 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
641 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
642 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
643 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
644 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
646 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
647 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
648 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
650 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
651 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
652 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
653 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
654 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
656 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
657 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
658 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
659 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
660 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
661 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
662 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
663 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
666 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
667 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
668 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
669 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
670 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
674 // `total_consistency_lock`
676 // |__`forward_htlcs`
678 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
680 // |__`per_peer_state`
682 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
684 // | |__`claimable_payments`
686 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
692 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
694 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
698 // | |__`pending_events`
700 // | |__`pending_background_events`
702 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
704 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
705 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
706 ES::Target: EntropySource,
707 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
708 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
709 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
713 default_configuration: UserConfig,
714 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
715 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
721 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
723 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
725 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
726 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
728 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
729 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
730 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
731 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
733 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
734 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
736 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
737 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
738 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
739 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
740 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
741 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
742 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
743 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
745 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
747 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
748 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
750 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
752 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
753 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
754 /// and via the classic SCID.
756 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
757 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
759 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
761 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
763 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
764 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
765 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
767 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
768 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
770 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
771 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
773 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
774 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
776 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
777 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
778 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
779 /// active channel list on load.
781 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
782 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
784 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
786 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
787 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
788 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
790 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
791 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
792 /// the handling of the events.
794 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
795 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
798 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
799 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
800 /// would break backwards compatability.
801 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
802 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
803 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
805 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
806 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
808 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
810 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
811 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
812 /// confirmation depth.
814 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
815 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
816 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
818 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
820 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
822 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
824 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
826 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
828 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
829 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
830 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
832 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
833 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
835 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
836 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
837 /// keeping additional state.
838 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
840 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
841 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
842 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
843 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
845 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
846 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
848 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
849 /// are currently open with that peer.
851 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
852 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
855 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
857 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
858 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
859 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
860 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
861 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
863 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
864 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
865 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
866 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
867 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
868 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
869 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
870 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
871 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
872 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
873 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
875 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
884 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
886 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
887 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
888 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
889 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
890 pub struct ChainParameters {
891 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
892 pub network: Network,
894 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
896 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
897 pub best_block: BestBlock,
900 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
906 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
907 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
908 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
909 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
910 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
911 /// updates are ready for persistence).
913 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
914 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
915 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
916 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
917 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
919 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
920 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
923 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
924 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
925 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
928 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
929 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
931 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
932 persistence_notifier: notifier,
933 should_persist: persist_check,
934 _read_guard: read_guard,
939 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
941 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
942 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
947 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
948 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
950 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
952 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
953 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
954 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
955 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
956 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
958 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
959 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
961 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
963 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
964 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
965 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
966 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
967 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
968 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
969 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
970 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
971 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
972 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
973 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
974 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
975 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
977 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
978 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
980 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
981 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
982 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
983 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
985 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
986 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
987 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
988 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
989 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
990 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
993 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
995 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
996 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
999 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1001 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1002 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1004 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
1005 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
1006 /// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
1007 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
1009 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1010 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1011 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1012 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1014 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1015 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1016 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1018 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1019 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1020 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1022 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1023 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1024 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1025 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1026 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1027 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1028 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1029 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1030 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1031 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1032 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1035 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1036 /// to better separate parameters.
1037 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1038 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1039 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1040 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1041 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1042 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1043 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1044 pub features: InitFeatures,
1045 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1046 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1047 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1049 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1051 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1052 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1053 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1054 /// payments to us through this channel.
1055 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1056 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1057 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1058 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1059 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1060 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1061 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1064 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1065 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1066 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1067 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1068 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1069 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1070 /// lifetime of the channel.
1071 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1072 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1073 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1074 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1075 /// our counterparty already.
1077 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1078 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1079 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1080 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1082 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1083 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1084 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1085 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1087 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1088 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1090 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1091 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1093 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1094 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1095 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1096 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1097 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1098 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1099 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1100 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1101 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1104 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1106 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1107 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1108 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1109 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1110 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1111 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1112 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1114 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1115 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1117 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1118 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1119 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1120 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1121 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1122 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1123 /// this value on chain.
1125 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1127 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1129 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1130 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1131 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1132 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1134 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1135 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1136 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1138 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1139 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1140 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1141 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1142 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1144 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1145 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1146 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1147 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1149 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1150 pub balance_msat: u64,
1151 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1152 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1153 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1154 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1156 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1158 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1159 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1160 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1161 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1162 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1163 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1164 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1165 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1167 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1168 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1169 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1170 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1171 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1172 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1173 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1175 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1176 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1177 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1178 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1179 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1180 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1181 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1182 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1183 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1185 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1187 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1188 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1189 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1190 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1191 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1193 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1194 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1195 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1196 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1197 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1198 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1199 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1201 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1202 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1203 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1204 pub is_outbound: bool,
1205 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1206 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1207 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1208 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1209 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1211 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1212 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1213 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1214 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1216 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1217 pub is_usable: bool,
1218 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1219 pub is_public: bool,
1220 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1221 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1222 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1223 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1224 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1225 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1227 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1228 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1231 impl ChannelDetails {
1232 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1233 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1234 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1236 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1237 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1238 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1239 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1242 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1243 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1244 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1246 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1247 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1248 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1249 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1252 fn from_channel<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner>(channel: &Channel<Signer>,
1253 best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures) -> Self {
1255 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1256 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1257 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1259 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1260 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1261 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1262 features: latest_features,
1263 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1264 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1265 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1266 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1267 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1268 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1269 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1270 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1271 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1272 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1274 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1275 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1276 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1277 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1278 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1279 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1280 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1281 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1282 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(channel.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1283 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1284 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1285 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1286 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1287 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1288 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1289 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1290 confirmations: Some(channel.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1291 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1292 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1293 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1294 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1295 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1296 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1297 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1298 config: Some(channel.config()),
1303 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1304 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1305 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1306 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1307 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1309 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1311 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1312 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1313 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1316 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1317 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1318 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1320 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1321 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1322 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1324 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1325 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1326 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1328 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1329 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1333 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1335 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1337 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1338 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1339 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1340 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1342 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1343 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1344 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1347 macro_rules! handle_error {
1348 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1349 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1350 // entering the macro.
1351 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1352 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1356 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1357 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1359 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1360 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1361 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1362 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1366 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1367 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1368 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1369 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1374 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1375 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1377 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1378 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1379 action: err.action.clone()
1383 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1384 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1385 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1386 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1387 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1391 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1398 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1399 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {{
1400 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
1401 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1402 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1403 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1405 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1406 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1407 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1408 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1409 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1411 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1412 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1414 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1418 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1419 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1420 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1422 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1423 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1425 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1426 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1428 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1429 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1430 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel);
1431 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1432 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1433 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1439 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1440 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1444 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1446 $entry.remove_entry();
1454 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1455 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1459 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1461 $entry.remove_entry();
1469 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1470 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1472 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1473 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, channel);
1479 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1480 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1481 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1482 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1483 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1485 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1486 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1487 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1488 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1489 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1490 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1491 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1492 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1493 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1494 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1499 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
1500 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1501 if $channel.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
1502 $locked_events.push(events::Event::ChannelPending {
1503 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1504 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.temporary_channel_id(),
1505 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1506 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1507 funding_txo: $channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1509 $channel.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
1514 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1515 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1516 if $channel.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1517 debug_assert!($channel.channel_pending_event_emitted());
1518 $locked_events.push(events::Event::ChannelReady {
1519 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1520 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1521 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1522 channel_type: $channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
1524 $channel.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1529 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
1530 ($self: ident, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
1531 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
1532 &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
1533 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
1534 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1535 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.is_usable() {
1536 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
1537 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
1538 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
1539 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
1541 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
1542 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
1543 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1549 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
1550 .remove(&$chan.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
1552 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
1553 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
1554 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
1555 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
1556 updates.announcement_sigs);
1557 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
1558 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
1561 let channel_id = $chan.channel_id();
1562 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
1563 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
1565 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
1567 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1568 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1570 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
1571 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1572 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1573 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
1578 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
1579 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING, $remove: expr) => { {
1580 // update_maps_on_chan_removal needs to be able to take id_to_peer, so make sure we can in
1581 // any case so that it won't deadlock.
1582 debug_assert!($self.id_to_peer.try_lock().is_ok());
1584 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1585 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
1586 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1589 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1590 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure",
1591 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1592 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan);
1593 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(
1594 "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.channel_id(),
1595 $chan.get_user_id(), $chan.force_shutdown(false),
1596 $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok()));
1600 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1601 if ($update_id == 0 || $chan.get_next_monitor_update()
1602 .expect("We can't be processing a monitor update if it isn't queued")
1603 .update_id == $update_id) &&
1604 $chan.get_latest_monitor_update_id() == $update_id
1606 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
1612 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr) => {
1613 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
1617 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1619 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1620 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1621 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1622 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1623 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1624 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1628 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
1630 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1631 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
1633 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1635 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
1636 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
1637 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
1640 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
1641 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
1642 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
1643 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1644 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1645 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1646 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1647 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1649 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1650 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1651 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1656 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1658 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1659 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1660 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
1661 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1662 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
1663 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1664 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1665 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1667 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1670 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1671 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1673 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1675 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1677 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1679 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1680 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1681 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1682 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
1692 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1693 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1694 &self.default_configuration
1697 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1698 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1699 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1702 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1703 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1705 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
1707 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1711 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1716 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1718 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1719 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1720 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
1721 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
1722 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
1724 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1725 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1727 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1728 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1729 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1731 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1732 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1733 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1734 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1735 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1736 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1738 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1739 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1740 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1741 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1742 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1743 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1746 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1747 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1748 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1750 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1752 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
1753 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
1755 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1757 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1758 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1759 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1760 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
1761 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1762 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1766 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1771 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1773 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1774 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1775 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1777 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1779 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1782 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1785 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1786 node_id: their_network_key,
1789 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1792 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1793 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
1794 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
1795 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
1796 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
1797 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
1798 // the same channel.
1799 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
1801 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1802 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1803 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
1804 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1805 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1806 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1807 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel(channel, best_block_height,
1808 peer_state.latest_features.clone());
1816 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
1817 /// more information.
1818 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1819 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1822 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1823 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1825 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1826 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1828 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1829 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1830 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1831 // really wanted anyway.
1832 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1835 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
1836 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1837 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1838 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1840 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
1841 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1842 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1843 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1844 return peer_state.channel_by_id
1847 ChannelDetails::from_channel(channel, best_block_height, features.clone()))
1853 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
1854 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1856 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
1857 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
1858 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
1860 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
1861 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
1862 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
1863 .filter_map(|(_, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
1864 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
1865 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
1866 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
1867 total_msat: *total_msat,
1870 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
1871 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
1873 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
1874 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
1876 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
1881 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1882 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1883 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1884 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1885 Some(transaction) => {
1886 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1890 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1891 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1892 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1893 reason: closure_reason
1897 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1898 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1900 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1901 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1902 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1904 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
1905 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
1907 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1908 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1909 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1910 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1911 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
1912 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1913 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut()
1914 .get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?;
1915 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1917 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
1918 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
1919 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
1920 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1921 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
1925 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1926 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
1927 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1928 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
1929 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
1932 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1933 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1934 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1935 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1939 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1943 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id) })
1947 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1948 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1949 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
1950 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
1953 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
1957 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1958 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1959 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1961 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1962 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1964 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1965 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1966 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1967 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1969 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
1971 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1972 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1973 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1974 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
1975 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1976 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None)
1979 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1980 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1981 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1983 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1984 /// the channel being closed or not:
1985 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1986 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1987 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1988 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1989 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1990 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1991 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1993 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
1995 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1996 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1997 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1998 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
1999 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2000 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
2004 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2005 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
2006 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2007 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2008 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2009 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2010 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2011 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2013 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2014 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2015 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2016 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2017 // ignore the result here.
2018 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2022 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2023 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2024 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2025 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2026 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2027 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2028 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2030 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2031 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2032 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2033 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2034 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) });
2036 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2038 remove_channel!(self, chan)
2040 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) });
2043 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2044 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2045 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2046 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2047 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2052 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
2055 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2056 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2057 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2058 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2059 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2060 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2061 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2062 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2063 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2064 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2065 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2066 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2077 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2078 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2079 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2081 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2082 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2083 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2086 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2087 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2088 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2090 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2091 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2092 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2093 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2094 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2097 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2098 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2099 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2100 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2101 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2105 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2106 /// local transaction(s).
2107 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2108 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2109 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2113 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2114 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2116 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2117 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
2118 return Err(ReceiveError {
2119 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
2121 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2124 // final_expiry_too_soon
2125 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2126 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2128 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2129 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2130 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2131 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2132 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2133 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2134 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2135 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2136 return Err(ReceiveError {
2137 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2138 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2141 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2142 return Err(ReceiveError {
2144 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2145 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2149 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2150 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2151 return Err(ReceiveError {
2152 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2153 err_data: Vec::new(),
2154 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2157 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
2158 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2159 return Err(ReceiveError {
2160 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2161 err_data: Vec::new(),
2162 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2164 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2165 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2167 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2168 phantom_shared_secret,
2170 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2171 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2172 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2173 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2174 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2175 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2176 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2177 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2178 return Err(ReceiveError {
2179 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2180 err_data: Vec::new(),
2181 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2185 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2187 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2190 return Err(ReceiveError {
2191 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2192 err_data: Vec::new(),
2193 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2198 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2201 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2202 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2203 outgoing_amt_msat: hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2204 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2208 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2209 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2210 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2212 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2213 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2214 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2215 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2216 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2217 failure_code: $err_code,
2223 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2224 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2227 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
2228 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
2229 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2231 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2232 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2233 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2234 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2235 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2236 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2237 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2238 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2240 macro_rules! return_err {
2241 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2243 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2244 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2245 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2246 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2247 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2248 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2254 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2256 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2257 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2259 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2260 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2264 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2265 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2267 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2269 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2270 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2271 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2272 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2273 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2275 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2278 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2279 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2280 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2282 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2283 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2284 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2287 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2288 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2289 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2290 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2294 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2295 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2296 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2299 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2300 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2301 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2302 outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2303 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2308 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref outgoing_amt_msat, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2309 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2310 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2311 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2312 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2313 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2314 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(short_channel_id).cloned();
2315 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2316 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2317 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2318 // phantom or an intercept.
2319 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2320 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2321 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)
2325 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2328 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2330 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2331 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2332 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2333 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
2334 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2336 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2337 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2338 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2340 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
2341 // have no consistency guarantees.
2342 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2346 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2347 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2348 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2349 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2350 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2352 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2353 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2354 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2355 // we don't have the channel here.
2356 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2358 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2360 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2361 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2362 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2363 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2364 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2365 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2366 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2368 if *outgoing_amt_msat < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2369 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2371 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *outgoing_amt_msat, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2372 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2376 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
2377 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
2378 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
2379 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
2381 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2388 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2389 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2390 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2391 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2392 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2393 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2395 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2396 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2398 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2399 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2400 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2401 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2402 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2403 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2404 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2405 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2406 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2407 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2413 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2414 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2415 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2416 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2418 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2419 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2421 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2422 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2423 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2425 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2426 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2427 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2428 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
2429 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
2430 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
2431 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
2435 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2440 pending_forward_info
2443 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2444 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2445 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2447 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
2448 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
2449 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2451 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2452 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
2453 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2454 if !chan.should_announce() {
2455 return Err(LightningError {
2456 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2457 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2460 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2461 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2463 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2464 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2467 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2468 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
2469 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2470 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2472 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
2473 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
2474 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2476 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2477 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
2478 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2479 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2480 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2481 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2485 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2487 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2488 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2489 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2491 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2492 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2494 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2495 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2496 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2497 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2498 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2499 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2500 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2501 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2503 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
2504 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
2505 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
2507 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
2509 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2516 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2517 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2518 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv_bytes)
2521 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2522 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
2523 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2525 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2526 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
2527 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2529 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2530 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
2531 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2532 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2533 return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()});
2535 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2537 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2538 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2539 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2540 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
2543 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2544 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
2545 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
2546 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2547 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2548 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
2549 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2550 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
2552 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2553 let send_res = chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
2554 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2556 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2557 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2559 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2560 }, onion_packet, &self.logger);
2561 match break_chan_entry!(self, send_res, chan) {
2562 Some(monitor_update) => {
2563 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2564 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
2565 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
2568 if update_res == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress {
2569 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
2570 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
2571 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
2572 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
2573 // which we do in the send_payment check for
2574 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
2575 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
2581 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
2582 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
2583 // `channel_by_id` map.
2584 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
2585 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
2590 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2591 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2593 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2598 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2600 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
2601 /// fields for more info.
2603 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
2604 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
2606 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
2608 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
2609 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
2610 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
2611 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
2612 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
2614 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
2615 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
2616 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
2617 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
2618 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
2620 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
2621 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
2622 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
2623 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
2625 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
2627 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
2628 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2629 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
2631 /// In general, a path may raise:
2632 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2633 /// node public key) is specified.
2634 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2635 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2637 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2638 /// relevant updates.
2640 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
2641 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2642 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2644 /// # A caution on `payment_secret`
2646 /// `payment_secret` is unrelated to `payment_hash` (or [`PaymentPreimage`]) and exists to
2647 /// authenticate the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization)
2648 /// attacks. For newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one,
2649 /// the [`Route`] must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a
2650 /// recipient-provided `payment_secret`.
2652 /// If a `payment_secret` *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret
2653 /// feature bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the
2654 /// [`Route`], we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2656 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2657 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2658 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
2659 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
2660 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
2661 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2662 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2663 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2664 self.pending_outbound_payments
2665 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2666 |path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2667 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2670 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment`], but will automatically find a route based on
2671 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2672 pub fn send_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
2673 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2674 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2675 self.pending_outbound_payments
2676 .send_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
2677 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
2678 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
2679 &self.pending_events,
2680 |path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2681 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2685 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2686 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2687 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2688 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2689 |path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2690 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2694 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2695 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2696 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
2700 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
2701 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
2702 /// retries are exhausted.
2704 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
2705 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
2707 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2708 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2709 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2711 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
2712 /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
2714 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2715 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2716 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2717 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2718 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, &self.pending_events);
2721 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2722 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2723 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2724 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2725 /// never reach the recipient.
2727 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
2728 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
2730 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2731 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2733 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2735 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2736 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2737 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2738 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2739 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
2740 route, payment_preimage, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
2742 |path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2743 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2746 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
2747 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2749 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
2752 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
2753 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
2754 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2755 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2756 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, payment_id,
2757 retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
2758 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2759 &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
2760 |path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2761 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2764 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
2765 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
2766 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
2767 pub fn send_probe(&self, hops: Vec<RouteHop>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2768 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2769 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2770 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(hops, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2771 |path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2772 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2775 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
2778 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
2779 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
2782 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2783 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2784 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2785 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2786 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2787 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2788 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2789 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2791 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2792 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2793 let (msg, chan) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2795 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2797 let funding_res = chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2798 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2799 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2800 } else { unreachable!(); });
2802 Ok(funding_msg) => (funding_msg, chan),
2804 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
2805 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2807 let _ = handle_error!(self, funding_res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
2808 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2809 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
2814 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) }) },
2817 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2818 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2821 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2822 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2823 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2825 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2826 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
2827 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
2828 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
2837 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2838 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2839 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2843 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2845 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2846 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2848 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
2849 /// across the p2p network.
2851 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2852 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2854 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2855 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2856 /// keys per-channel).
2858 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2859 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2860 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2862 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2863 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2864 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2866 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
2867 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
2868 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
2869 /// for more details.
2871 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2872 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2873 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2874 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2876 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2877 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2878 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2879 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2884 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2885 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools at the next block. However, the modules
2886 // constituting our Lightning node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if
2887 // the wallet module is in advance on the LDK view, allow one more block of headroom.
2888 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 2 {
2889 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2890 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
2894 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2895 let mut output_index = None;
2896 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2897 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2898 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2899 if output_index.is_some() {
2900 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2901 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2904 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2905 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2906 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2909 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2912 if output_index.is_none() {
2913 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2914 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2917 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2921 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
2923 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
2924 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
2925 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
2926 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
2928 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
2929 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
2931 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
2932 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
2934 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
2936 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
2937 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
2938 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
2939 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
2940 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2941 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
2942 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
2943 pub fn update_channel_config(
2944 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
2945 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2946 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
2947 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2948 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
2952 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
2953 &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
2955 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2956 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2957 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2958 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2959 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2960 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2961 if !peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) {
2962 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2963 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
2967 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2968 let channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
2969 if !channel.update_config(config) {
2972 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
2973 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
2974 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
2975 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2976 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2984 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
2985 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
2987 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
2988 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
2990 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
2991 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
2992 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
2993 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
2994 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
2996 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
2997 /// you from forwarding more than you received.
2999 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3002 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
3003 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3004 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
3005 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
3006 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3007 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3009 let next_hop_scid = {
3010 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3011 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
3012 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
3013 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3014 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3015 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
3017 if !chan.is_usable() {
3018 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3019 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
3022 chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.outbound_scid_alias())
3024 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3025 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id)
3030 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3031 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3032 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3035 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
3036 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
3037 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
3039 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3041 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
3042 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
3045 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
3046 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3047 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3048 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
3049 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
3051 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
3055 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
3056 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
3058 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3061 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3062 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3063 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3065 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3066 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3067 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3070 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
3071 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3072 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3073 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3074 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
3075 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3076 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3079 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
3080 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
3081 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3082 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3087 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3089 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3090 /// Will likely generate further events.
3091 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3092 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3094 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
3095 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3096 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3098 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3099 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3101 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3102 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3103 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3105 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3106 match forward_info {
3107 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3108 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3109 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3110 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3111 outgoing_cltv_value, incoming_amt_msat: _
3114 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3115 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3116 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3118 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3119 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3120 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3121 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3122 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3123 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3126 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3127 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3129 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3132 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3133 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3139 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3140 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3142 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3146 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3147 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3149 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3153 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3154 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3155 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3156 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3157 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3159 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3160 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3161 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3162 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3163 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3165 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3167 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3168 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3172 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3173 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3174 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3175 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3181 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3184 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3187 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3188 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3189 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3190 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3191 // problem, not ours.
3197 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3198 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3200 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3204 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3205 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3206 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3207 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3210 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3211 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3212 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3213 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3214 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3217 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3218 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3219 match forward_info {
3220 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3221 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
3222 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3223 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3224 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, incoming_amt_msat: _,
3227 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3228 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3229 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3230 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3231 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3232 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3233 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3234 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3236 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
3237 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
3238 onion_packet, &self.logger)
3240 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3241 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3243 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3245 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3246 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3247 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3248 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3253 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3254 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3256 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3257 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3258 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
3259 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
3261 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3262 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3264 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
3266 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3267 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3268 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3277 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3278 match forward_info {
3279 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3280 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3281 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3282 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat, ..
3285 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3286 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3287 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3288 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data }, Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret)
3290 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3291 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None, None),
3293 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3296 let mut claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3297 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3298 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3299 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3300 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3301 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3302 phantom_shared_secret,
3304 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
3305 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
3306 // if routing nodes overpay
3307 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
3308 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3310 total_value_received: None,
3311 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3316 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3317 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3318 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3319 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3320 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
3322 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3323 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3324 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3325 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3326 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3327 phantom_shared_secret,
3329 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
3330 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3334 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
3335 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3336 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3337 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3338 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3341 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3342 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3343 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
3345 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3346 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3347 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3350 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3351 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3352 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3355 let (_, ref mut htlcs) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3356 .or_insert_with(|| (purpose(), Vec::new()));
3357 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3358 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3359 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3360 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3364 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
3365 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3366 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
3367 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3368 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3369 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3370 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3371 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3372 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3374 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3376 _ => unreachable!(),
3379 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
3380 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
3381 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
3382 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3383 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= $payment_data.total_msat {
3384 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
3385 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3386 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3387 } else if total_value >= $payment_data.total_msat {
3388 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3389 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3390 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
3391 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
3392 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3393 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3397 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3398 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3400 payment_claimable_generated = true;
3402 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3403 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3405 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3407 payment_claimable_generated
3411 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3412 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3413 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3414 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3415 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3416 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3417 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3418 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3419 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3420 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3421 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3422 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3423 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3424 Ok(result) => result,
3426 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3427 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3431 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
3432 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
3433 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
3434 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
3435 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
3436 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3440 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3442 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3443 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3444 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3445 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3448 match claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
3449 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3450 let amount_msat = claimable_htlc.value;
3451 claimable_htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat);
3452 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3453 e.insert((purpose.clone(), vec![claimable_htlc]));
3454 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3455 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3456 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3460 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3461 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3464 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3465 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3466 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3472 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3473 if payment_data.is_none() {
3474 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3475 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3478 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3479 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3480 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3481 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3482 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3483 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3484 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3485 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3487 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3488 if payment_claimable_generated {
3489 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3495 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3496 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3504 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3505 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
3506 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3507 &self.pending_events, &self.logger,
3508 |path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3509 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv));
3511 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3512 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3514 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3516 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
3517 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
3518 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
3520 self.check_free_holding_cells();
3522 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3523 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3524 events.append(&mut new_events);
3527 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3529 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3530 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3532 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3533 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3534 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3535 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3536 if background_events.is_empty() {
3540 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3542 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3543 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3544 // monitor updating completing.
3545 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
3552 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3553 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3554 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3555 self.process_background_events();
3558 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
3559 if !chan.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
3560 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3561 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
3562 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3563 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3564 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3566 if !chan.is_live() {
3567 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3568 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3569 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3571 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3572 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3574 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.logger);
3575 NotifyOption::DoPersist
3579 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3580 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3581 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3582 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3583 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3584 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3585 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3587 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3589 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3590 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3591 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3592 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3593 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
3594 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3595 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3603 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3605 /// This currently includes:
3606 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3607 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3608 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3610 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3611 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
3612 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
3614 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
3615 /// estimate fetches.
3617 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3618 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
3619 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3620 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3621 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3622 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3624 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3626 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
3627 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3628 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
3630 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3631 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3632 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3633 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3634 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
3635 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
3636 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3637 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3638 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3640 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3641 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3642 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
3643 if needs_close { return false; }
3646 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3647 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3648 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3649 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3650 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3651 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3652 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3653 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3657 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3658 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3660 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3661 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3662 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3666 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3667 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3672 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
3676 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
3677 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
3682 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
3683 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
3684 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
3685 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
3686 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
3687 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
3688 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
3689 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
3690 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3691 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
3692 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
3693 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
3694 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
3695 // have no channels to the peer.
3696 let remove_entry = {
3697 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
3698 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
3701 entry.remove_entry();
3704 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
3709 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
3710 if htlcs.is_empty() {
3711 // This should be unreachable
3712 debug_assert!(false);
3715 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3716 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3717 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3718 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
3719 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
3720 if htlcs[0].total_msat <= htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value) {
3722 } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| {
3723 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3724 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3726 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.drain(..).map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
3733 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3734 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
3735 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
3736 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
3737 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
3740 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3741 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3744 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self.pending_events);
3746 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
3747 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
3748 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
3749 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
3750 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3757 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3758 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3759 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3761 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
3762 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
3763 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
3764 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
3766 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
3767 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
3768 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
3769 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
3770 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
3771 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
3774 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
3775 /// reason for the failure.
3777 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
3778 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
3779 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3781 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3782 if let Some((_, mut sources)) = removed_source {
3783 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3784 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
3785 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
3786 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
3787 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3792 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
3793 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
3794 match failure_code {
3795 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
3796 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
3797 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
3798 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3799 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
3800 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code as u16, htlc_msat_height_data)
3805 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3806 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3808 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3810 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3811 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3812 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3813 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3814 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3815 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3816 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3818 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3820 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3821 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3823 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3828 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3829 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3830 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3831 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
3832 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
3833 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
3834 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3835 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
3836 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
3837 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3839 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3840 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3841 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3842 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
3844 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
3845 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
3846 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
3847 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
3848 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3852 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3853 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3854 // be surfaced to the user.
3855 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
3856 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
3857 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
3859 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
3860 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3861 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
3862 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3863 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3864 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3865 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3866 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
3868 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3870 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
3873 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3874 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
3875 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
3876 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3880 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3881 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
3882 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
3883 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
3884 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
3885 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
3886 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
3887 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
3888 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
3891 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3892 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3893 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3896 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3897 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3898 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3900 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
3901 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
3902 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
3903 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
3904 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
3906 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
3907 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
3908 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
3910 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
3911 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
3912 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3913 push_forward_ev = true;
3915 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
3916 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3917 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
3919 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3920 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
3923 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
3924 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
3925 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3926 pending_events.push(events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
3927 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
3928 failed_next_destination: destination,
3934 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
3935 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
3937 /// Note that calling this method does *not* guarantee that the payment has been claimed. You
3938 /// *must* wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] event which upon a successful claim will be
3939 /// provided to your [`EventHandler`] when [`process_pending_events`] is next called.
3941 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3942 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
3943 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3944 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3946 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
3947 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
3948 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
3949 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3950 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3951 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
3952 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3954 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3957 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3958 if let Some((payment_purpose, sources)) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
3959 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3960 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3961 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3962 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3963 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3964 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
3969 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
3970 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: sources.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
3971 payment_purpose, receiver_node_id,
3973 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
3974 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
3975 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
3976 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3981 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3983 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we check that all channels which contain a claimable
3984 // HTLC still exist. While this isn't guaranteed to remain true if a channel closes while
3985 // we're claiming (or even after we claim, before the commitment update dance completes),
3986 // it should be a relatively rare race, and we'd rather not claim HTLCs that require us to
3987 // go on-chain (and lose the on-chain fee to do so) than just reject the payment.
3989 // Note that we'll still always get our funds - as long as the generated
3990 // `ChannelMonitorUpdate` makes it out to the relevant monitor we can claim on-chain.
3992 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3993 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3994 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3995 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3996 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3998 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
3999 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
4000 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
4001 let mut valid_mpp = true;
4002 let mut errs = Vec::new();
4003 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4004 for htlc in sources.iter() {
4005 let (counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4006 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
4013 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4014 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
4019 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4020 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4022 if peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&chan_id).is_none() {
4027 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
4028 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4029 debug_assert!(false);
4033 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
4035 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
4036 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4037 debug_assert!(false);
4041 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
4043 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
4044 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
4045 // that there's one payment here and move on.
4046 if sources.len() != 1 {
4047 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
4048 debug_assert!(false);
4054 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
4056 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4057 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4058 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4059 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4062 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4063 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4064 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4065 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4069 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4070 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
4071 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
4072 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
4074 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4075 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4076 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4077 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4078 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4083 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4084 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4085 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4086 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4087 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
4088 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
4089 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4091 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4094 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
4095 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4096 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4097 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4101 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
4102 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
4103 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
4104 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4106 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4107 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
4108 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4109 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
4113 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
4114 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id).map(
4115 |peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap()
4119 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
4120 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
4121 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4122 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4123 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4124 let fulfill_res = chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
4126 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
4127 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
4128 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
4129 log_bytes!(chan_id), action);
4130 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
4132 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4133 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update);
4134 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
4135 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4136 if let Err(e) = res {
4137 // TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge
4138 // of the HTLC's monitor with a preimage. We should retry this monitor
4139 // update over and over again until morale improves.
4140 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}", payment_preimage);
4141 return Err((counterparty_node_id, e));
4147 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4148 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4149 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4153 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4154 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
4155 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
4156 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4157 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4158 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4159 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
4160 // again on restart.
4161 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4162 payment_preimage, update_res);
4164 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
4165 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
4166 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
4167 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
4168 // `PaymentForwarded`).
4169 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
4173 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4174 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
4177 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4179 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4180 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage, session_priv, path, from_onchain, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
4182 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4183 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4184 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
4185 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
4186 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4187 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4188 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4191 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4192 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
4194 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4196 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4199 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
4203 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
4204 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4205 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4211 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4212 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4213 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4216 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
4217 for action in actions.into_iter() {
4219 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
4220 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4221 if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
4222 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4223 payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4227 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event } => {
4228 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(event);
4234 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
4235 /// update completion.
4236 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4237 channel: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
4238 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
4239 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
4240 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
4241 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
4242 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
4243 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()),
4244 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
4245 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
4246 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
4247 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
4248 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
4250 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
4252 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get_counterparty_node_id();
4253 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4254 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.outbound_scid_alias()),
4255 channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
4258 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4259 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
4261 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
4262 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4263 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4268 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
4269 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
4270 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4271 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4276 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
4277 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
4278 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4279 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4280 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4285 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
4289 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
4295 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
4296 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
4297 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4301 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4302 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
4303 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
4309 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
4310 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
4312 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
4313 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4315 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
4316 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
4317 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4318 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4319 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4324 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4325 let mut peer_state_lock;
4326 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4327 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
4328 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4329 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4331 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()){
4332 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4333 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4336 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}",
4337 highest_applied_update_id, channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id());
4338 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4341 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, highest_applied_update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel.get_mut());
4344 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4346 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4347 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4350 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4351 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4352 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4354 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4355 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4356 /// used to accept such channels.
4358 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4359 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4360 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4361 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4364 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4365 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4367 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4368 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4369 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4371 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4372 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4374 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4375 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4377 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4378 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4380 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4381 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4382 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4383 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4386 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4387 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4389 let peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| !peer.channel_by_id.is_empty());
4390 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4391 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4392 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4393 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4394 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4395 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.len() == 1;
4396 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4397 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4398 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4399 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4402 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4403 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4404 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4405 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4406 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4407 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4410 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4411 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4412 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4414 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4415 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4416 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4417 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
4418 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4419 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4420 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4421 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
4424 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4425 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4426 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
4430 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4431 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4432 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4435 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4436 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) });
4442 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
4443 /// or 0-conf channels.
4445 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
4446 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
4447 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
4448 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> bool {
4449 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
4450 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4452 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4453 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
4454 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4455 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
4456 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
4457 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.channel_by_id.len() {
4458 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
4462 return peers_without_funded_channels;
4465 fn unfunded_channel_count(
4466 peer: &PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, best_block_height: u32
4468 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
4469 for (_, chan) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
4470 if !chan.is_outbound() && chan.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
4471 chan.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
4473 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
4476 num_unfunded_channels
4479 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4480 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4481 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4484 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4485 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4488 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
4489 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
4490 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
4491 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4493 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
4494 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
4495 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
4496 let channeled_peers_without_funding = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| !node.channel_by_id.is_empty());
4498 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4499 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4501 debug_assert!(false);
4502 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
4504 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4505 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4507 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4508 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4509 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4510 if peer_state.channel_by_id.is_empty() &&
4511 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
4512 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
4514 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4515 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
4516 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4519 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4520 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
4521 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4522 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
4523 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4526 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
4527 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
4528 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4531 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4532 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4536 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4537 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4538 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4539 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4541 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4542 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4543 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4544 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4546 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4547 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4548 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4551 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4552 pending_events.push(
4553 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4554 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4555 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4556 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4557 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4558 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4563 entry.insert(channel);
4569 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4570 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4571 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4572 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4574 debug_assert!(false);
4575 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4577 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4578 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4579 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4580 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4581 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan);
4582 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4584 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4587 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4588 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4589 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4590 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4591 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4593 user_channel_id: user_id,
4598 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4599 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4601 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4602 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4604 debug_assert!(false);
4605 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4608 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4609 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4610 let ((funding_msg, monitor), chan) =
4611 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4612 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4613 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
4615 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4618 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4619 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4620 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4622 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4623 match self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().entry(chan.channel_id()) {
4624 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4625 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4626 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
4627 funding_msg.channel_id))
4629 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
4630 i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
4634 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4635 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4636 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4637 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4638 let new_channel_id = funding_msg.channel_id;
4639 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4640 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4644 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
4646 let chan = e.insert(chan);
4647 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, monitor_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
4648 per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING, { peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&new_channel_id) });
4650 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4651 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4652 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4653 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4654 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
4655 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
4656 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4657 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { shutdown_finish: Some((res, _)), .. }) = &mut res {
4665 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4666 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4667 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4668 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4670 debug_assert!(false);
4671 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4674 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4675 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4676 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4677 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4678 let monitor = try_chan_entry!(self,
4679 chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan);
4680 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor);
4681 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4682 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4683 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4684 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4685 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4686 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4687 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4692 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4696 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4697 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4698 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4700 debug_assert!(false);
4701 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4703 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4704 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4705 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4706 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4707 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
4708 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
4709 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4710 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4711 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4712 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4713 msg: announcement_sigs,
4715 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4716 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4717 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4718 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4719 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4720 // announcement_signatures.
4721 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4722 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4723 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4724 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4731 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4732 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan.get_mut());
4737 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4741 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4742 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4743 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4744 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4745 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4747 debug_assert!(false);
4748 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4750 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4751 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4752 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4753 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4755 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4756 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4757 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4758 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4761 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
4762 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self,
4763 chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
4764 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4766 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4767 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
4768 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
4769 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
4770 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4771 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4776 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4777 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
4778 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4779 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
4780 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
4784 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4787 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4788 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
4789 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
4790 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4796 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4797 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4798 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4800 debug_assert!(false);
4801 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4803 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4804 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4805 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4806 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4807 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4808 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
4809 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4810 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4811 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4816 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4817 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4818 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4819 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4820 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4821 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
4822 } else { (tx, None) }
4824 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4827 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4828 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4829 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4831 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4832 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4833 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4834 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4835 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4839 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4844 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4845 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4846 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4847 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4849 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4850 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4851 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4852 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4854 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4855 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4856 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4858 debug_assert!(false);
4859 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4861 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4862 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4863 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4864 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4866 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4867 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4868 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4869 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4870 match pending_forward_info {
4871 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4872 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4873 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
4874 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
4876 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
4877 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
4878 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4879 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4880 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4883 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4885 _ => pending_forward_info
4888 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
4890 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4895 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4896 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4897 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4898 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4900 debug_assert!(false);
4901 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4903 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4904 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4905 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4906 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4907 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
4909 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4912 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
4916 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4917 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4918 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4920 debug_assert!(false);
4921 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4923 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4924 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4925 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4926 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4927 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
4929 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4934 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4935 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4936 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4938 debug_assert!(false);
4939 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4941 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4942 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4943 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4944 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4945 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4946 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4947 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
4949 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
4952 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4956 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4957 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4958 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4960 debug_assert!(false);
4961 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4963 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4964 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4965 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4966 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4967 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
4968 let monitor_update = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
4969 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
4970 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4971 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
4972 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
4974 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4979 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4980 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4981 let mut push_forward_event = false;
4982 let mut new_intercept_events = Vec::new();
4983 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
4984 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4985 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4986 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
4987 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4988 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4989 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4991 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
4992 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
4994 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4995 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
4996 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
4997 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4998 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4999 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
5001 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5002 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
5003 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
5005 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
5006 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5007 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
5008 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5009 new_intercept_events.push(events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
5010 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
5011 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
5012 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
5013 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
5016 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5017 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
5019 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5020 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
5021 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5022 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5023 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5024 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5025 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
5026 phantom_shared_secret: None,
5029 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
5030 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
5031 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
5036 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
5037 // payments are being processed.
5038 if forward_htlcs_empty {
5039 push_forward_event = true;
5041 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5042 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
5049 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
5050 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
5053 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
5054 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5055 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
5057 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
5061 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued.
5062 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
5063 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5064 let forward_ev_exists = pending_events.iter()
5065 .find(|ev| if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false })
5067 if !forward_ev_exists {
5068 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5070 Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
5075 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5076 let (htlcs_to_fail, res) = {
5077 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5078 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5080 debug_assert!(false);
5081 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5082 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
5083 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5084 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5085 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5086 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
5087 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5088 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
5089 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5090 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5091 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5092 (htlcs_to_fail, res)
5094 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5097 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5101 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5102 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5103 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5105 debug_assert!(false);
5106 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5108 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5109 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5110 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5111 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5112 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
5114 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5119 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5120 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5121 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5123 debug_assert!(false);
5124 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5126 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5127 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5128 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5129 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5130 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
5131 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
5134 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5135 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5136 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
5137 msg, &self.default_configuration
5139 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5140 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5141 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap()),
5144 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5149 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5150 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5151 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5152 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
5154 // It's not a local channel
5155 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5158 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5159 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
5160 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
5161 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5163 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5164 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5165 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5166 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5167 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5168 if chan.get().should_announce() {
5169 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5170 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5171 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5172 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5174 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5176 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5177 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5178 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5179 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5181 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5182 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
5185 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5187 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5190 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5192 let need_lnd_workaround = {
5193 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5195 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5197 debug_assert!(false);
5198 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5200 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5201 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5202 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5203 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5204 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5205 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5206 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5207 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5208 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5209 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
5210 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
5211 let mut channel_update = None;
5212 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5213 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5214 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5217 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5218 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5219 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5220 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5221 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5222 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5223 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5228 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5229 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
5230 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5231 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5232 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5233 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5237 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5241 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
5242 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
5245 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5246 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5251 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
5252 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5253 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5255 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5256 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5257 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5258 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5259 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5260 match monitor_event {
5261 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5262 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5263 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5264 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5266 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5267 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5268 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5269 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5272 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5273 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5274 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
5275 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
5277 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5278 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5279 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5280 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
5283 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
5284 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5285 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5286 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5287 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5288 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5289 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5290 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5291 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5292 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5293 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5297 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5298 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5300 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5302 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5303 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5304 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5305 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5306 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5313 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5314 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
5320 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5321 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5324 has_pending_monitor_events
5327 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5328 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5329 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5331 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5332 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5333 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5334 NotifyOption::DoPersist
5336 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
5341 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5342 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5343 /// update was applied.
5344 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5345 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5346 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5347 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5349 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
5350 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
5351 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
5352 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
5354 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5355 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5357 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5358 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5359 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
5360 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
5361 let funding_txo = chan.get_funding_txo();
5362 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
5363 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger);
5364 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5365 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
5367 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
5368 has_monitor_update = true;
5370 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(
5371 funding_txo.expect("channel is live"), monitor_update);
5372 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5373 let channel_id: [u8; 32] = *channel_id;
5374 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5375 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING,
5376 peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id));
5378 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, res));
5380 continue 'peer_loop;
5389 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5390 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5391 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5394 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5395 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5401 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5402 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5403 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5404 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5405 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5406 let mut has_update = false;
5408 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5410 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5411 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5412 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5413 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5414 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5415 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5416 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5417 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5419 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5420 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5423 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5424 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5425 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5426 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5427 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5432 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5434 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5435 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5436 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
5442 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5443 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5451 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5452 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5458 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5459 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5461 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5462 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5463 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5464 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5465 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5466 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5467 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5468 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5469 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5470 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5471 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5472 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5473 assert!(should_broadcast);
5474 } else { unreachable!(); }
5475 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5477 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5481 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5482 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5484 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5485 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5488 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5490 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5491 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5492 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5493 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5494 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5495 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5496 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5497 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5498 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5499 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5500 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5501 // never fail a payment too early.
5502 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5504 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5507 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5512 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5515 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5516 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5518 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
5519 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
5520 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5521 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5523 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5525 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5526 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5530 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5531 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5533 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5535 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5536 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5538 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5539 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5540 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
5541 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
5542 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
5543 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5544 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
5545 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5546 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
5547 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5548 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
5551 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5552 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5554 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5557 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5559 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5561 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5562 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5563 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5564 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5565 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5568 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5569 /// stored external to LDK.
5571 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5572 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5573 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5575 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5576 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5579 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5580 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5581 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5582 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5584 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5585 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5586 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5587 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5588 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5590 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5591 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5592 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
5593 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5594 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
5596 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
5597 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
5599 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5600 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5604 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5605 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5607 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5609 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5610 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5612 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5613 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5614 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
5615 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5616 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
5617 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5618 min_final_cltv_expiry)
5621 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5622 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5624 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5627 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5629 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5631 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5632 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5635 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5636 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5638 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5639 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5640 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5643 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5644 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5646 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5647 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5648 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5649 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5651 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5652 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5653 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
5654 Some(_) => continue,
5655 None => return scid_candidate
5660 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5662 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5663 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5665 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5666 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5667 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5671 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
5672 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
5673 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
5675 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
5676 /// times to get a unique scid.
5677 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5678 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5679 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5681 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5682 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5683 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
5684 return scid_candidate
5688 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
5689 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
5690 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
5691 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
5693 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5694 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5695 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5696 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5697 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5698 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
5699 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
5700 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
5709 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5710 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5711 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5712 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
5713 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5717 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
5718 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
5719 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5724 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
5725 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5726 if events.is_empty() { None } else { Some(events.remove(0)) }
5730 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5731 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
5735 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5736 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
5739 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
5740 /// using the given event handler.
5742 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
5743 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
5746 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock until the returned future completes so that
5747 // we can be sure no other persists happen while processing events.
5748 let _read_guard = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
5750 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5752 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5753 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5754 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5755 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5758 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5759 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5760 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5763 for event in pending_events {
5764 handler(event).await;
5767 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
5768 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
5773 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5775 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5776 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5777 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5778 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5779 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5780 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5784 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
5785 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
5786 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
5787 /// is always placed next to each other.
5789 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
5790 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
5791 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
5792 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
5794 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
5795 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
5796 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
5797 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5798 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5799 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5800 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5802 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5803 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5804 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5805 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5808 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5809 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5811 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5812 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5815 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5816 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5817 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5818 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5819 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5820 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
5821 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
5825 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5826 events.replace(pending_events);
5835 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5837 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5838 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5839 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5840 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5841 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5842 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5846 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5848 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5849 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5850 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5851 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5852 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5854 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5855 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5856 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5857 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5860 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5861 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5862 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5865 for event in pending_events {
5866 handler.handle_event(event);
5874 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5876 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5877 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5878 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5879 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5880 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5881 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5885 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5887 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5888 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
5889 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5890 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5891 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5894 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
5895 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
5898 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5899 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5900 let new_height = height - 1;
5902 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5903 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5904 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5905 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5906 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5907 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5910 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5914 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5916 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5917 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5918 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5919 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5920 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5921 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5925 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5926 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5927 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5928 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5930 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5931 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5933 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5934 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
5935 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5937 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5938 if height < last_best_block_height {
5939 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5940 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5944 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5945 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5946 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5947 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5949 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5950 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5952 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5954 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5956 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5958 macro_rules! max_time {
5959 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5961 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5962 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5963 // having an explicit local time source.
5964 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5965 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5966 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5967 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5968 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5974 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5975 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5976 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5977 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5981 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
5982 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
5983 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5984 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5985 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5986 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5987 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.get_funding_txo(), chan.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
5988 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
5995 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5996 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5997 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5998 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5999 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
6000 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
6001 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6002 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6007 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6009 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6010 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6011 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6012 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6013 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6014 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6018 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
6019 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
6021 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
6022 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
6023 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6024 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6025 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6027 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6028 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
6030 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6031 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6032 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6033 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6034 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6035 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
6036 let res = f(channel);
6037 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
6038 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
6039 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
6040 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
6041 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
6043 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
6044 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
6045 if channel.is_usable() {
6046 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6047 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
6048 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6049 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6054 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6059 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6060 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
6063 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
6064 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6065 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6066 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6067 msg: announcement_sigs,
6069 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6070 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
6071 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6073 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6074 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6075 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
6080 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
6081 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6082 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
6083 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
6084 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
6085 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
6086 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
6087 // is always consistent.
6088 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
6089 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
6090 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
6091 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
6092 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
6095 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
6096 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel);
6097 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
6098 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
6099 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
6100 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
6101 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6105 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
6106 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
6107 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6108 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6109 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
6110 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6111 data: reason_message,
6121 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6122 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
6123 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
6124 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
6125 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
6126 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
6127 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
6128 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6129 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6130 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
6132 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
6133 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
6134 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
6138 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
6141 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6142 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
6143 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6144 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6145 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
6146 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
6147 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6148 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6149 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
6152 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
6153 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6154 _ => unreachable!(),
6156 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
6157 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
6158 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
6159 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
6165 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
6167 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
6168 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
6172 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
6174 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
6175 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
6177 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
6178 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
6181 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6182 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
6183 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
6186 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
6187 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
6188 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
6189 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
6192 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6193 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6194 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6195 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6198 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6199 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6201 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6202 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6203 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6204 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6205 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
6208 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6209 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6210 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
6211 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
6214 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6215 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6216 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6217 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
6220 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6221 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6222 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
6223 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6227 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
6228 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6230 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6231 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6232 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6233 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6234 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6235 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6239 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
6240 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6241 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6244 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
6245 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6246 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6249 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6250 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6251 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6254 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6255 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6256 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6259 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6260 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6261 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6264 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6265 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6266 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6269 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6270 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6271 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6274 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6275 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6276 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6279 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6280 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6281 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6284 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6285 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6286 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6289 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6290 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6291 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6294 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6295 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6296 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6299 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6300 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6301 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6304 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6305 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6306 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6309 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6310 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6311 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6314 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6315 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6316 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6319 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6324 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6325 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6326 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6329 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
6330 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6331 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6332 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6334 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
6335 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6336 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
6337 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6338 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6339 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6340 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6341 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6342 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6343 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
6344 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6349 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6351 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
6352 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
6353 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
6354 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
6355 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
6356 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
6357 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
6358 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
6359 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
6360 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
6361 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
6362 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
6363 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6364 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6365 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6366 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
6367 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
6368 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6369 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6370 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6371 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6374 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
6375 peer_state.is_connected = false;
6376 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
6377 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
6380 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
6382 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6384 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6385 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6389 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
6390 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
6391 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6395 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6397 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
6398 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
6399 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
6400 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
6401 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
6402 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
6405 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6406 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6407 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6408 if inbound_peer_limited {
6411 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6412 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
6413 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6414 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6415 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
6419 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6420 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
6421 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6423 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6424 if inbound_peer_limited &&
6425 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
6426 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
6431 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
6432 peer_state.is_connected = true;
6437 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6439 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6440 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6441 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6442 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6443 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6444 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6445 let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6446 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6447 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6448 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6449 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6453 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6454 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6455 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6460 if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6461 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.default_configuration) {
6462 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
6463 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
6464 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6473 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6477 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6478 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6480 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6481 let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = {
6482 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6483 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6484 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6485 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6486 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6487 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
6489 for channel_id in channel_ids {
6490 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6491 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6495 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6496 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6497 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6498 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6499 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6500 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6501 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6502 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6503 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6504 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6512 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6513 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6517 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6518 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6521 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
6522 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6526 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6527 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6528 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
6529 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6532 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6533 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6535 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6536 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6537 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6538 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6539 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6542 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6543 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6544 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
6545 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6548 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6549 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6550 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6551 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
6554 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6555 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6556 pub fn provided_init_features(_config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
6557 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
6558 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
6559 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
6560 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
6561 features.set_data_loss_protect_optional();
6562 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
6563 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
6564 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
6565 features.set_payment_secret_required();
6566 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
6567 features.set_wumbo_optional();
6568 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
6569 features.set_channel_type_optional();
6570 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
6571 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
6573 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
6574 if _config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
6575 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
6581 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6582 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6584 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6585 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6586 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6587 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6590 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6591 (2, node_id, required),
6592 (4, features, required),
6593 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6594 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6595 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6596 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6599 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
6600 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6601 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6602 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6603 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
6604 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
6605 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6606 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
6607 (2, self.channel_id, required),
6608 (3, self.channel_type, option),
6609 (4, self.counterparty, required),
6610 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
6611 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
6612 (7, self.config, option),
6613 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
6614 (9, self.confirmations, option),
6615 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
6616 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6617 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6618 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
6619 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6620 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6621 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6622 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6623 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6624 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
6625 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
6626 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
6627 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
6628 (30, self.is_usable, required),
6629 (32, self.is_public, required),
6630 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6631 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6632 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6633 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
6639 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
6640 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6641 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6642 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6643 (2, channel_id, required),
6644 (3, channel_type, option),
6645 (4, counterparty, required),
6646 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6647 (6, funding_txo, option),
6648 (7, config, option),
6649 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6650 (9, confirmations, option),
6651 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6652 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6653 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6654 (16, balance_msat, required),
6655 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6656 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6657 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6658 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6659 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6660 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6661 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6662 (26, is_outbound, required),
6663 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
6664 (30, is_usable, required),
6665 (32, is_public, required),
6666 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6667 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6668 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6669 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
6672 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6673 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6674 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
6675 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
6676 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
6680 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
6682 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
6683 outbound_scid_alias,
6687 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
6688 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
6690 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
6691 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6692 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
6693 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6694 confirmations_required,
6696 force_close_spend_delay,
6697 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
6698 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
6699 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
6700 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
6701 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
6702 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
6703 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
6708 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6709 (2, channels, vec_type),
6710 (4, phantom_scid, required),
6711 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6714 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6716 (0, onion_packet, required),
6717 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6720 (0, payment_data, required),
6721 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6722 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6724 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6725 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6726 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6730 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6731 (0, routing, required),
6732 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6733 (4, payment_hash, required),
6734 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
6735 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
6736 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
6740 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6741 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6743 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6745 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6746 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6747 reason.write(writer)?;
6749 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6750 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6753 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6754 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6755 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6756 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6763 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6764 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6765 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6768 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6769 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6770 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6771 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6775 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6776 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6777 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6778 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6779 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6782 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6783 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6784 // messages contained in the variants.
6785 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6786 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6787 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6789 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6790 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6791 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6792 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6793 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6796 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6797 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6798 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6799 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6800 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6802 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6807 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6812 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6813 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6814 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6815 (2, outpoint, required),
6816 (4, htlc_id, required),
6817 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6820 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6821 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6822 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
6823 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
6824 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
6826 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6827 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
6828 (1, self.total_msat, required),
6829 (2, self.value, required),
6830 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
6831 (4, payment_data, option),
6832 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
6833 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6834 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6840 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6841 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6842 let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
6844 let mut sender_intended_value = None;
6845 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6846 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6847 let mut total_value_received = None;
6848 let mut total_msat = None;
6849 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6850 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6851 (0, prev_hop, required),
6852 (1, total_msat, option),
6853 (2, value, required),
6854 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
6855 (4, payment_data, option),
6856 (5, total_value_received, option),
6857 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6858 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6860 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6862 if payment_data.is_some() {
6863 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6865 if total_msat.is_none() {
6866 total_msat = Some(value);
6868 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6871 if total_msat.is_none() {
6872 if payment_data.is_none() {
6873 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6875 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
6877 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
6881 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6884 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
6885 total_value_received,
6886 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
6893 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6894 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6895 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6898 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
6899 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6900 let mut path: Option<Vec<RouteHop>> = Some(Vec::new());
6901 let mut payment_id = None;
6902 let mut payment_secret = None;
6903 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
6904 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6905 (0, session_priv, required),
6906 (1, payment_id, option),
6907 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6908 (3, payment_secret, option),
6909 (4, path, vec_type),
6910 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
6912 if payment_id.is_none() {
6913 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6915 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6917 if path.is_none() || path.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
6918 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6920 let path = path.unwrap();
6921 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
6922 if params.final_cltv_expiry_delta == 0 {
6923 params.final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta;
6926 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6927 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6928 first_hop_htlc_msat,
6930 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6934 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6935 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6940 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6941 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
6943 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret } => {
6945 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6946 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6947 (0, session_priv, required),
6948 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6949 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6950 (3, payment_secret, option),
6951 (4, *path, vec_type),
6952 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
6955 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6957 field.write(writer)?;
6964 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
6965 (0, forward_info, required),
6966 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
6967 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6968 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6969 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6972 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6974 (0, htlc_id, required),
6975 (2, err_packet, required),
6980 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6981 (0, payment_secret, required),
6982 (2, expiry_time, required),
6983 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6984 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6985 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6988 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6990 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6991 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6992 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6993 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6994 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6995 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6999 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7000 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
7002 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7004 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
7006 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7007 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
7008 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
7011 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
7013 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7014 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
7015 let mut number_of_channels = 0;
7016 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7017 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7018 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7019 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7020 serializable_peer_count += 1;
7022 number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len();
7023 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
7024 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7025 unfunded_channels += 1;
7030 ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
7032 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7033 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7034 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7035 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
7036 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7037 channel.write(writer)?;
7044 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7045 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7046 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
7047 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7048 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7049 for forward in pending_forwards {
7050 forward.write(writer)?;
7055 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7057 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7058 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
7059 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7061 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
7062 (claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7063 for (payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops)) in claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
7064 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7065 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7066 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
7067 htlc.write(writer)?;
7069 htlc_purposes.push(purpose);
7072 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
7073 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
7074 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7075 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
7076 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
7077 // per_peer_state lock at all.
7078 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
7081 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
7082 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
7083 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
7084 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
7085 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
7087 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7088 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
7089 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
7090 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
7091 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
7092 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
7093 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
7098 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7099 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7100 for event in events.iter() {
7101 event.write(writer)?;
7104 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
7105 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7106 for event in background_events.iter() {
7108 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
7110 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
7111 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
7116 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
7117 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
7118 // likely to be identical.
7119 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7120 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7122 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7123 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
7124 hash.write(writer)?;
7125 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
7128 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
7129 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
7130 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7131 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
7132 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
7135 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
7136 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7138 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7139 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7140 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
7141 session_priv.write(writer)?;
7144 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
7145 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
7149 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
7150 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
7151 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7153 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7154 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7155 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
7161 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
7162 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7163 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
7164 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
7167 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
7168 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
7169 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
7170 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
7171 pending_claiming_payments = None;
7174 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7175 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
7176 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7177 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
7178 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7179 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
7180 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7181 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
7182 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7183 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
7190 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
7192 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
7194 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7195 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
7196 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
7197 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
7198 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
7199 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
7200 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
7201 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
7202 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7203 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
7204 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
7205 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
7206 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
7208 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
7209 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
7211 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
7212 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
7214 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
7215 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
7216 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
7217 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
7218 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
7219 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
7221 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
7222 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7224 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7225 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7226 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7227 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7228 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7229 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7233 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
7234 pub entropy_source: ES,
7236 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
7237 pub node_signer: NS,
7239 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
7240 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
7242 pub signer_provider: SP,
7244 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7246 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
7247 pub fee_estimator: F,
7248 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7250 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
7251 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
7252 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
7253 pub chain_monitor: M,
7255 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
7256 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
7257 /// force-closed during deserialization.
7258 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
7259 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
7260 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
7262 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
7264 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
7265 /// deserialization.
7267 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
7268 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
7269 pub default_config: UserConfig,
7271 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
7272 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
7274 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
7275 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
7276 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
7277 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
7279 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
7282 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
7283 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
7286 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7287 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7289 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7290 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7291 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7292 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7293 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7294 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7298 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
7299 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
7300 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
7301 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
7302 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
7304 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
7305 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
7310 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
7311 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
7312 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7313 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
7315 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7316 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7317 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7318 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7319 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7320 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7324 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7325 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
7326 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
7330 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7331 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
7333 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7334 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7335 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7336 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7337 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7338 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7342 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7343 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7345 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7346 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7347 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7349 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7351 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7352 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7353 let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7354 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7355 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7356 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
7357 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
7358 for _ in 0..channel_count {
7359 let mut channel: Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (
7360 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
7362 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7363 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
7364 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
7365 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7366 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7367 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7368 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7369 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
7370 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
7371 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7372 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7373 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7374 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7375 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7376 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7377 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7378 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7379 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7380 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7381 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7382 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
7383 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
7384 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
7385 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7386 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7387 let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
7388 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
7389 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate(monitor_update));
7391 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
7392 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7393 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7394 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7395 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
7397 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7398 let mut found_htlc = false;
7399 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7400 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
7403 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
7404 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
7405 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
7406 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
7407 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
7408 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
7409 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
7410 log_info!(args.logger,
7411 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
7412 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7413 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7417 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7418 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
7419 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7421 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7422 id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
7424 match peer_channels.entry(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
7425 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7426 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
7427 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7429 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7430 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
7431 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7432 entry.insert(by_id_map);
7436 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
7437 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
7438 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
7439 // safely discard the channel.
7440 let _ = channel.force_shutdown(false);
7441 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7442 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7443 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7444 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
7447 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7448 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7449 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7450 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7451 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7452 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7456 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7457 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
7458 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
7459 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
7460 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
7462 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
7466 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
7467 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7468 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7469 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
7470 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7471 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7472 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
7473 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
7474 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
7476 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
7479 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7480 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7481 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
7482 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7483 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7484 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
7485 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
7486 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
7488 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
7491 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7492 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>)>()));
7493 for _ in 0..peer_count {
7494 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7495 let peer_state = PeerState {
7496 channel_by_id: peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new()),
7497 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
7498 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7499 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
7500 is_connected: false,
7502 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
7505 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7506 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
7507 for _ in 0..event_count {
7508 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
7509 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
7514 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7515 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
7516 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7518 let (funding_txo, monitor_update): (OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate) = (Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?);
7519 if pending_background_events.iter().find(|e| {
7520 let BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((pending_funding_txo, pending_monitor_update)) = e;
7521 *pending_funding_txo == funding_txo && *pending_monitor_update == monitor_update
7523 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)));
7526 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7530 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
7531 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7533 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7534 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
7535 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
7536 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
7537 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7541 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7542 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
7543 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
7544 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
7545 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
7546 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
7547 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
7549 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
7550 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7554 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
7555 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
7556 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
7557 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
7558 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
7559 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7560 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7561 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
7562 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
7563 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = Some(Vec::new());
7564 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7565 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
7566 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7567 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
7568 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7569 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
7570 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7571 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
7572 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7573 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
7575 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
7576 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7579 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
7580 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7583 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
7584 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
7587 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
7588 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
7589 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
7590 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
7591 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
7592 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
7594 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
7596 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
7597 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
7598 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
7602 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
7603 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
7604 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
7605 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
7606 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
7607 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
7608 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
7610 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7611 if id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
7612 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
7613 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
7614 if path.is_empty() {
7615 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
7616 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7619 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
7620 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
7621 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
7622 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
7623 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7624 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
7625 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
7626 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
7628 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7629 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
7630 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
7631 retry_strategy: None,
7632 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
7633 payment_params: None,
7634 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
7635 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
7637 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
7638 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
7639 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
7640 total_msat: path_amt,
7641 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
7643 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
7644 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
7649 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7651 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
7652 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
7653 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
7654 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
7656 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
7657 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
7658 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
7659 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
7660 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
7661 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
7662 forwards.retain(|forward| {
7663 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
7664 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7665 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7666 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7671 !forwards.is_empty()
7673 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
7674 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7675 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7676 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7677 pending_events_read.retain(|event| {
7678 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
7679 intercepted_id != ev_id
7686 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
7687 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
7688 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
7689 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
7690 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
7691 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
7692 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
7693 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
7694 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
7695 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
7696 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
7697 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv, path, false, &pending_events, &args.logger);
7698 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
7707 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
7708 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
7709 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
7710 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
7711 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
7712 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
7713 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7714 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
7718 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
7719 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
7721 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
7722 if let Some(mut purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
7723 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
7724 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7726 for (purpose, (payment_hash, previous_hops)) in purposes.drain(..).zip(claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..)) {
7727 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7730 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
7731 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
7732 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
7733 if previous_hops.is_empty() {
7734 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7736 let purpose = match &previous_hops[0].onion_payload {
7737 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
7738 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
7739 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
7740 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
7741 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
7742 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
7743 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
7745 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7746 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7750 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
7752 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7754 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
7755 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
7757 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7761 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7762 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7764 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
7766 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7768 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
7769 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
7770 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
7771 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7775 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
7776 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
7777 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7778 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7779 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7780 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
7781 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
7783 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
7784 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
7785 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
7787 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7788 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
7789 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7790 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7791 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7792 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7794 if chan.is_usable() {
7795 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
7796 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7797 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7798 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7799 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7805 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
7807 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7808 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
7809 if let Some((payment_purpose, claimable_htlcs)) = claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
7810 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7811 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
7812 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
7813 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
7814 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
7815 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
7816 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
7817 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
7819 for claimable_htlc in claimable_htlcs {
7820 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
7822 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
7823 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
7824 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
7825 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
7827 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
7828 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
7829 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
7830 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
7832 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
7833 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
7834 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
7835 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
7837 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
7838 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
7839 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
7840 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7841 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7842 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
7843 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
7846 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
7847 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
7850 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
7853 purpose: payment_purpose,
7854 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
7860 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
7861 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get_mut(&node_id) {
7862 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
7864 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
7865 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7869 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
7871 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
7872 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
7873 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
7874 router: args.router,
7876 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
7878 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
7879 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
7880 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
7881 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
7883 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
7884 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
7885 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
7886 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
7887 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
7888 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
7890 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
7895 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
7897 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
7899 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
7900 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
7901 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
7902 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
7904 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
7905 node_signer: args.node_signer,
7906 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
7908 logger: args.logger,
7909 default_configuration: args.default_config,
7912 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7913 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
7914 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
7915 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7916 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7919 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
7920 //connection or two.
7922 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
7928 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7929 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7930 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
7931 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
7932 use core::time::Duration;
7933 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
7934 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
7935 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
7936 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, InterceptId};
7937 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7938 use crate::ln::msgs;
7939 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
7940 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
7941 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7942 use crate::util::test_utils;
7943 use crate::util::config::ChannelConfig;
7944 use crate::chain::keysinterface::EntropySource;
7947 fn test_notify_limits() {
7948 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
7949 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
7950 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7951 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7952 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7953 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7955 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
7956 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
7957 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7958 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7959 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7961 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7963 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
7964 // to connect messages with new values
7965 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7966 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7967 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
7968 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
7969 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
7970 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
7972 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
7973 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7974 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7975 // ... but the last node should not.
7976 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7977 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
7978 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7979 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7981 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
7982 // about the channel.
7983 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7984 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7985 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7987 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
7989 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7990 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7991 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7992 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7993 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7994 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7996 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
7997 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7998 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8000 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
8001 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
8002 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
8003 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
8004 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
8005 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
8007 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
8008 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
8009 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
8010 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
8011 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8012 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8013 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8014 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8016 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
8017 // the channel info has updated.
8018 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
8019 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
8020 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8021 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8022 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8023 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8027 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
8028 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
8030 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8031 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8032 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8033 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8034 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8036 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
8037 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8038 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
8039 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
8041 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
8042 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
8043 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
8044 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
8045 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
8046 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
8047 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8048 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8049 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8050 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
8052 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
8053 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8054 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8055 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8056 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8057 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8058 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8059 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8060 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8061 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8062 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8063 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
8064 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8065 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8066 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8067 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8068 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8069 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8070 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8071 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8072 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8073 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8075 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
8076 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
8077 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8078 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8079 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8080 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
8082 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
8083 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
8084 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
8085 // lightning messages manually.
8086 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8087 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
8088 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8090 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8091 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8092 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
8093 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8094 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8095 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
8096 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8097 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8098 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
8099 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8100 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8101 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8102 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8103 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8104 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8105 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
8106 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8107 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8108 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
8109 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8110 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8111 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8112 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8113 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
8114 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8116 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
8117 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
8118 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8119 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
8121 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
8122 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
8123 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
8124 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
8126 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8129 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8130 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8131 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8132 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8134 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8137 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8138 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8139 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8140 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8142 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8147 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
8148 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
8149 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
8150 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
8151 // fails as expected.
8152 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8153 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8154 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8155 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8156 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8157 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8158 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8160 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
8161 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
8162 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
8164 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
8165 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8166 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV),
8167 final_value_msat: 100_000,
8169 let route = find_route(
8170 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8171 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8173 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8174 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8175 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8176 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8177 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8178 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8179 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8180 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8181 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8182 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
8183 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
8184 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8185 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8186 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8187 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8188 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8189 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8190 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8191 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8192 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8193 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8194 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8195 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8197 // Finally, claim the original payment.
8198 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8200 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
8201 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8202 let route = find_route(
8203 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8204 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8206 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8207 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8208 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8209 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8210 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
8211 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
8212 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
8214 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
8215 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8216 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8217 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8218 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8219 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8220 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8221 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8222 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8223 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8224 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8225 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8226 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8227 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8228 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8229 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8230 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8231 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8232 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8233 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8234 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8235 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8236 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8238 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
8239 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8243 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
8244 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
8245 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
8246 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8247 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8248 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8249 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8251 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8252 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8254 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8255 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8256 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8257 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8259 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8260 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8261 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8262 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8263 let route = find_route(
8264 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8265 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8268 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8269 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
8270 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash, None, PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8271 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8272 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8274 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8275 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8276 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8277 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8278 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8279 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8280 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8282 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
8286 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
8287 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
8288 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8289 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8290 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8291 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8293 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8294 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8296 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8297 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8298 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8299 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8301 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8302 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8303 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8304 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8305 let route = find_route(
8306 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8307 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8310 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8311 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8312 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
8313 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, Some(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8314 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8315 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8317 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8318 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8319 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8320 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8321 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8322 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8323 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8325 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
8329 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
8330 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8331 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8332 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8333 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8335 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8336 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8337 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8338 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8340 // Marshall an MPP route.
8341 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8342 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8343 route.paths.push(path);
8344 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8345 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8346 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8347 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8348 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8349 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8351 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None, PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap_err() {
8352 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
8353 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
8355 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
8360 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
8361 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8362 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8363 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8364 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8366 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8368 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8369 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8371 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8372 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8373 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8374 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8377 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
8378 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
8379 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8380 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
8381 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
8382 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
8385 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
8388 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
8389 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
8394 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
8395 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
8396 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8397 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8398 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8399 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8401 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
8402 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
8404 total_msat: 100_000,
8407 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
8408 // payment verification fails as expected.
8409 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
8410 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
8411 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
8412 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
8414 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
8418 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
8419 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
8423 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
8424 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
8425 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
8426 // the channel is successfully closed.
8427 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8428 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8429 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8430 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8432 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8433 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8434 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
8435 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8436 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
8438 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
8439 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
8441 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
8442 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
8443 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8444 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8447 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8449 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8450 // as it has the funding transaction.
8451 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8452 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8453 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8456 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8458 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8460 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8462 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8463 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8464 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8466 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8469 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8470 // as it has the funding transaction.
8471 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8472 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8473 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8475 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8476 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8477 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8478 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8479 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8480 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8481 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8482 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
8484 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8485 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8486 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8487 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
8489 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8490 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
8492 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
8493 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
8494 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
8495 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
8496 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8497 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8498 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8502 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
8503 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
8504 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
8505 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
8506 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8507 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8508 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8511 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8513 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
8514 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
8515 // closing transaction).
8516 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
8517 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
8518 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8520 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
8521 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
8522 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8523 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8524 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8527 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8529 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
8531 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
8532 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
8533 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8535 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8537 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8538 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8541 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8542 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
8543 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8546 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8547 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
8548 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8551 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
8553 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8554 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8556 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
8557 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8559 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
8560 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8565 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
8566 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
8567 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
8568 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
8569 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8570 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
8571 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
8572 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
8575 let channel_id = [4; 32];
8576 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8577 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
8579 // Test the API functions.
8580 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
8582 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
8584 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8586 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8588 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8590 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
8592 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
8596 fn test_connection_limiting() {
8597 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
8598 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8599 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8600 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8601 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8603 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8605 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8606 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8608 let mut funding_tx = None;
8609 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
8610 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8611 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8614 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
8615 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
8616 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
8617 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
8618 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8620 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8621 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8622 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8624 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8626 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8627 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8628 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8630 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8633 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
8634 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8635 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8636 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8637 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8639 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
8640 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
8642 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
8643 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
8644 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8645 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8646 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
8647 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8648 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8650 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8651 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8652 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8653 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err();
8655 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
8656 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
8657 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8658 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8659 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
8660 for ev in chan_closed_events {
8661 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
8663 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8664 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8665 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8666 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err();
8668 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
8669 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8670 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
8671 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8673 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
8674 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
8676 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
8677 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
8678 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
8679 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
8680 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8682 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8683 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
8684 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8686 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
8687 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8688 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
8690 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
8691 // "protected" and can connect again.
8692 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
8693 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8694 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8695 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8697 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
8699 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8700 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
8704 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
8705 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
8706 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8707 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8708 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8709 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8711 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8713 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8714 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8716 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
8717 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8718 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8719 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8722 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
8724 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8725 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8726 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8728 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
8729 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8730 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8732 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
8733 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8734 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8735 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8739 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
8740 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
8741 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
8742 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8743 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8744 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
8745 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8746 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
8747 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8749 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8751 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8752 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8754 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
8755 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
8756 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8757 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8758 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8759 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8761 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8762 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8764 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8765 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
8767 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8769 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
8770 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8773 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
8774 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8775 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8776 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8777 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8778 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8779 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8781 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8782 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
8783 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
8784 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
8788 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8790 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
8791 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8793 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
8794 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8795 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8797 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8798 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
8800 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8802 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
8807 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
8808 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
8809 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
8810 // the channel without the anchors feature.
8811 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8812 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8813 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
8814 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8815 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8816 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
8817 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8819 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
8820 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8821 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8823 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8824 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8826 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8827 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8829 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8832 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8833 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
8835 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8836 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8838 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8842 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
8844 use crate::chain::Listen;
8845 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
8846 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
8847 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
8848 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId};
8849 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
8850 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
8851 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
8852 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
8853 use crate::util::test_utils;
8854 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
8856 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8857 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8858 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
8860 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
8864 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
8865 node: &'a ChannelManager<
8866 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
8867 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
8868 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
8869 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
8870 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
8871 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>,
8876 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
8877 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
8880 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
8881 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
8882 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
8884 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
8886 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
8887 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
8888 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8889 let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
8890 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
8892 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
8893 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
8895 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
8896 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
8897 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
8898 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8900 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
8902 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
8904 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8905 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
8906 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
8907 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
8908 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8910 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
8912 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
8914 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_b.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8915 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_a.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
8916 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8917 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8918 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8921 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
8922 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8923 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
8925 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8926 } else { panic!(); }
8928 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8929 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8930 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
8932 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8933 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8935 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8938 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8939 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8940 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
8942 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8943 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
8945 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8948 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
8951 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8954 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
8955 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
8957 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8958 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8959 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
8960 match msg_events[0] {
8961 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
8962 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
8963 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8967 match msg_events[1] {
8968 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8972 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8973 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
8975 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8976 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
8978 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8981 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8982 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
8984 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8985 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8987 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8990 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a);
8992 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
8993 macro_rules! send_payment {
8994 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
8995 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
8996 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
8997 .with_features($node_b.invoice_features());
8998 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8999 let seed = [3u8; 32];
9000 let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42);
9001 let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9002 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph.read_only(),
9003 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
9005 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
9006 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
9008 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
9009 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
9011 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9012 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
9013 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9014 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
9015 let (raa, cs) = do_get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
9016 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
9017 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
9018 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
9020 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
9021 expect_payment_claimable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
9022 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9023 expect_payment_claimed!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
9025 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
9026 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
9027 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
9028 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9029 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
9031 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
9034 let (raa, cs) = do_get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
9035 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
9036 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
9037 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9039 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
9044 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
9045 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);